Robert Spencer Robinson Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson KCB ( 1809 – 1889 ) was a British naval officer , who served as two five - year terms as Controller of the Navy from February 1861 to February 1871 , and was therefore responsible for the procurement of warships at a time when the Royal Navy was changing over from unarmoured wooden ships to ironclad s . As a result of the " Captain " disaster , Robinson was not given a third term as Controller . Robinson has been " described as having one of the best brains of any Victorian admiral " . Personal life . He was born at Welford Park , Berkshire , the son of Sir John Robinson Bt . ( 1754 – 1832 ) , Archdeacon of Armagh . On 10 May 1841 he married Clementina , daughter of Admiral Sir John Louis . Early naval career . Robinson entered the Navy on 6 December 1821 . He was promoted to lieutenant on 27 September 1830 , and from 5 May 1831 until 1834 served as lieutenant in the 50 - gun razee frigate " Dublin " , commanded by Lord James Townshend . " Dublin " was flagship on the South America station . In 1836 he was appointed to the 84 - gun two - decker " Asia " . " Asia " was commissioned on 18 March 1836 by Captain William Fisher , and served in the Mediterranean . On 26 September 1837 , he was appointed to the 28 - gun frigate " Tyne " , which had been commissioned on 5 September 1837 by Captain John Townshend , and was also serving in Mediterranean . On 28 June 1838 he was promoted to commander . In April 1839 , he completed a book : " The Nautical Steam Engine Explained , and Its Powers and Capabilities Described for the Officers of the Navy and Others Interested in the Important Results of Steam Navigation " . On 20 July 1839 he was appointed captain of the 6 - gun paddle - sloop " Phoenix " , serving in the Mediterranean . However the captain of the 4 - gun paddle - sloop " Hydra " , Commander Anthony William Milward died , and Robinson was appointed to " Hydra " ( also serving in the Mediterranean ) . A replacement for Robinson as captain of the " Phoenix " was appointed on 1 March 1840 . Under Robinson " Hydra " took part in Commodore Charles Napier ' s attack on Sidon in September 1840 . Robinson was promoted to captain on 5 November 1840 ; a replacement for Robinson as captain of " Hydra " was appointed on 26 December 1840 . Captain Robinson . In 1847 , he wrote " Observations on the Steam Ships of the Royal Navy " . On 15 February 1850 , Robinson was appointed as captain of the 46 - gun screw - frigate " Arrogant " in the Channel Fleet off Lison , where he replaced Captain Robert Fitzroy . " Arrogant " paid off at Portsmouth on 26 September 1852 . On 15 June 1854 , Robinson commissioned the new 80 - gun screw two - decker " Colossus " at Portsmouth . " Colossus " served on the North America and West Indies station in 1854 , and then in 1855 in the Baltic during what is now called the Crimean War . Robinson left " Colossus " on 24 January 1856 . On 13 February 1856 , Robinson was appointed captain of the 102 - gun screw three - decker " Royal George " , which was one of the ships that transported the British Army back from the Crimea after the conclusion of the campaign there . The " Royal George " paid off at Sheerness on 28 August 1856 . On 25 August 1856 , Robinson was appointed Superintendent of the Steam Reserve at Devonport , flying his flag in the 60 - gun screw ' blockship ' " Ajax " . from 1 February 1858 until May 1859 , he was captain of the 90 - gun screw - two - decker " Exmouth " guard ship of ordinary , Devonport . Robinson was promoted to rear admiral on 9 June 1860 . Controller . On 7 Feb 1861 Rear Admiral Sir Baldwin Wake Walker resigned as Controller of the Navy . Rear Admiral Robinson was appointed to replace him . As Controller , " Rear Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson . . . was an iron - willed administrator for an ironclad age . Bitterly dissatisfied with the private contractors as well as dockyard obfuscation , Robinson steadily applied pressure on the Board for greater control and greater centralisation , not just in the hands of Their Lordships , but more his own . It was the only way to directly insure the work would be completed as required . In the person of Chief Constructor , Edward J . Reed , the Controller was able to combine the new architecture of naval power with its execution . ' " Robinson is chiefly important for his remarkable career as Controller of the Navy ( 1861 – 71 ) . The royal dockyards were a byword for inefficiency , under siege and the subject of an inquiry by a royal commission , with Robinson as secretary , when he was appointed Controller in 1861 . Arguing that the dockyards were great manufacturing establishments and should be , but were not , managed according to the principles followed by successful manufacturers , he drew up a brilliant , but radical and therefore controversial , plan of dockyard reorganisation . This the First Lord of the Admiralty H . C . E . Childers ( 1868 – 71 ) carried out , although not completely or altogether faithfully , in 1869 - 70 . Much was still unsettled when Childers suffered a nervous breakdown , from overwork and grief over the loss of his son in the Captain disaster ( 1870 ) , for which he blamed Robinson and Robinson ’ s protégé the Chief Constructor Edward Reed , and resigned , leaving the Admiralty in disarray . Parliamentary inquiries over several years following Childers ’ s resignation led either to modification or repeal of certain of the reforms . All were , however , ultimately vindicated . ( J . M . Haas , A Management Odyssey : The Royal Dockyards , 1714 - 1914 University Press of America , 1994 ) jpp . 97 – 99 , 119 - 28 . Robinson was promoted to vice admiral on 2 April 1866 . He was appointed Knight Commander of the Bath , on the civil list on 7 December 1868 , and Fellow of the Royal Society on 3 June 1869 . One of the types vessels Robinson had built when he was Controller were " shallow - draft ironclads which were passed off as ' coast defence vessels ' but which were . . . viewed by their designers at the Admiralty as offensive weapons , specifically intended for attacking coastal fortifications and naval arsenals . In urging the construction of several such vessels in 1866 , Vice - Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson , stated that they were ' intended either for coast defences , or the attack of shipping in an enemy harbour . ' . . . This was never systematically codified as anything like a ' strategy ' in the modern sense of the word , and indeed for every blazing reference to ' assaulting an enemy ' s coast ' in British newspapers , many more authorities expressed their professional doubts . In short , the Royal Navy never really developed an alternative strategy to the close blockade , an alternative built round destroying enemy vessels before they could utilize their ability to evade blockaders . The ' coast defence ' battleships , along with the gun - and later torpedo boats were , in the words of Lambert , ' the cutting edge of British strategy , their function . . . to destroy fleets sheltering inside their bases . . . " But a plan was never actually formulated ( the closet being the disastrous Dardanelles campaign in the First World War ) and coastal defence counter - measures — iron - plated granite forts mounting the heaviest ordnance possible , mines , and obstructions - - ' counter deterred ' much more effectively , cheaply and reliably . John Beeler speculates that " Throughout the 1860s [ Robert ] Spencer Robinson consistently rated the British ironclad fleet inferior to its cross - Channel rival , in order to lend weight to his campaigns for enlarged and accelerated shipbuilding programmes . In late 1867 , for instance , he wrote that a ' comparison was made between the armoured ships of England and those of France ; it was pointed out [ in the autumn of 1866 ] that , on the whole we were manifestly inferior in the number of our ironclads to that Power , taking into account those that were building . . . The inferiority in the number of ironclad ships , which existed in 1866 still exists in 1867 . ' [ Robert ] Spencer Robinson counted thirty - nice English ironclads to forty - six French . " " At no time after 1865 was Britain ' s lead in completed ironclads endangered . [ Robert ] Spencer Robinson [ and his colleagues ] Milne and Corry thus serves as wonderful examples of what defence analyst Edward Luttwak has termed ' amoral navalism ' ; professionals agitating for the enlargement of the force at their disposal without regard for either the constraints imposed by politics and foreign policy ( or any other factors for that matter ) , or the actual menace posed by rival forces . " While Robinson and other prominent Board members did worry about Britain ' s real ' supremacy ' at sea , at least in terms of ironclads afloat and the power of the guns they carried , there is no actual evidence to support Beeler ' s theory that they were somehow putting on a show for gullible members of Parliament ( including those with naval experience themselves ) . Problems with ironclad construction , arguments over design in everything from turrets to plating schemes to ordnance , and rising costs were real . The fact remained that other powers were investing in both sea - going ironclads and coastal defence measures , which increasingly put the British Royal Navy under pressure to remain at par , let alone ' undisputed ' , at sea — and certainly not indomitable against a rival maritime power ' s own coastline . In the 1868 General Election . the Liberals , won a majority , and William Ewart Gladstone became Prime Minister on 9 December 1868 . The custom in those days was for the Board of Admiralty to resign when there was a change of government . On 18 December 1868 , Vice - Admiral Robinson was appointed Third Naval Lord . The new First Lord of the Admiralty , Hugh Culling Eardley Childers " initiated a determined programme of cost and manpower reductions , fully backed by the Prime Minister , Gladstone described him [ Childers ] as ' a man likely to scan with a rigid eye the civil expenses of the Naval Service ' . He got the naval estimates just below the psychologically important figure of £10 , 000 , 000 . Childers strengthened his own position as First Lord by reducing the role of the Board of Admiralty to a purely formal one , making meetings rare and short and confining the Naval Lords rigidly to the administrative functions . . . Initially Childers had the support of the influential Controller of the Navy , Vice - Admiral Sir [ Robert ] Spencer Robinson . " " In 1870 [ Robert ] Spencer Robinson counted the British ironclad force at thirty - nice ships , and that of France at forty - one , claiming that France had a superiority of numbers in heavy guns , and concluded that ' [ a ] t this moment an alliance between France and so small a naval power as Holland would turn most seriously the naval preponderance against England . . . ' With all this [ the First Naval Lord ] [ Admiral S . C . ] Dacres cordially concurred , pointing out especially that ' [ t ] there is no doubt that we are outnumbered by some ten vessels of the special service class [ i . e . coast and harbour defence vessels ] of French ships . ' " " After the end of the Franco - Prussian War and " Robinson ' s departure from the Admiralty , calmer more balanced heads prevailed , and more rational assessments of the technological disparity between the two battlefleets were soon forthcoming . " The earliest French ironclads were wooden - hulled — though fully armoured , unlike HMS Warrior for example — and there was the likelihood of hull - rot . But by the time these vessels were in anything like real danger ( as late as 1877 they were still reported as perfectly sea - going ) technology had already made both their 4 . 75 - inch - thick iron armour plating and their capacity for mounting the latest heavy guns ( over 30 tons each ) hopelessly obsolete . Warrior , with her fine iron hull by contrast , remained afloat , also obsolete and largely out of the picture . The French were the first to introduce steel hull - construction , in 1876 . The British Admiralty followed suit years later . Technology remained a double - edged sword for both Britain and France in this period . When Robinson ' s subordinate , the Chief Constructor , Edward James Reed resigned in July 1870 , Robinson described this as a national disaster . Robinson ' s second five - year term as Controller came to an end on 9 February 1871 . He was not appointed to a third term because the Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone decided against it , in the light of the loss of the " Captain " , for which Robinson was quite unfairly blamed by the First Lord of the Admiralty , Hugh Childers . Robinson ' s replacement as Third Naval Lord and Controller was Captain Robert Hall . Retirement . Robinson was put on the retirement list on 1 April 1871 . He was promoted to Admiral on 14 July 1871 . In 1871 he wrote " Results of Admiralty Organisation as Established by Sir James Graham and Mr Childers " . The " New York Times " published the following on 13 September 1871 : " The entire ship - building interest of Hull , England , is reported to have been purchased by a Company , of who the leading officers are Vice - Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson and Naval Constructor Reid [ sic ] . " In 1873 he stood as independent Liberal critic of Gladstone ' s naval policy at the Hull by - election , without success . Death . Robinson died at his residence 61 Eaton Place , London on 27 July 1889 , and is buried in Kensal Green Cemetery .