Battles of Rzhev The Rzhev Battles ( ) were a series of Soviet Operations in World War II dating between January 8 , 1942 and March 31 , 1943 ; these operations took place in the general area of Rzhev , Sychyovka and Vyazma against German forces . These battles are also known as the " Rzhev meat grinder " ( " Ржевская мясорубка " ) due to huge losses by the Red Army . This part of the Second World War was poorly covered by Soviet military historiography , and what coverage exists occurred only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union , when historians gained access to relevant documents . The exact dates of particular battles , their names , outcomes , significance , and even losses have not been fully clarified . A reminder of these until recently ' nameless ' battles is found in the poem by Aleksandr Tvardovsky , which contains the evocative phrase " I was killed near Rzhev . . . " ( Я убит подо Ржевом , 1945 – 1946 ) . The major operations that were executed in this area of the front were : Rzhev - Vyazma Strategic Offensive Operation . During the , and the Rzhev - Vyazma Strategic Offensive Operation ( 8 January 1942 - 20 April 1942 ) , German forces were pushed back from Moscow . As a result , a salient was formed along the front line in the direction of the capital , which became known as the Rzhev - Vyazma Salient . It was strategically important for the German Army Group Centre due to the threat it posed to Moscow , and was therefore heavily fortified and strongly defended . Initial Soviet forces committed by the Kalinin and Western Front included the 22nd , 29th , 30th , 31st , 39th of the former , and the 1st Shock , 5th , 10th , 16th , 20th , 33rd , 43rd , 49th , and 50th armies and three cavalry corps for the later . The intent was for the 22nd Army , 29th Army and 39th Armies supported by the 11th Cavalry Corps to attack West of Rzhev , and penetrate deep into the western flank of the AG Centre ' s 9th Army . This was achieved in January , and by the end of the month the cavalry corps found itself 110 km in the depth of the German flank . To eliminate this threat to the rear of the Army Group Centre ' s 9th Army , the Germans had started Operation Seydlitz by 2 July . However , due to the nature of the terrain the supply route the troops of the Soviet 22nd Army , 29th Army and 39th Armies which attempted to enlarge the penetration became difficult , and they were encircled . The cutting of a major highway to Rzhev by the cavalry signalled the commencement of the Toropets – Kholm Offensive . Toropets – Kholm Offensive | Toropets - Kholm Offensive . This offensive was conducted by the Western Front against the Wehrmacht ' s 4th Panzer Army and the 4th Army . Vyazma Airborne Operation . A Soviet airborne operation , conducted by the 4th Airborne Corps in seven separate landing zones , five of them intended to cut major road and rail line of communication to the Wehrmacht ' s 9th Army . Operation Seydlitz . In the aftermath of the Soviet winter counteroffensive of 1941 – 42 , substantial soviet forces remained in the rear of the German Ninth Army . These forces maintained a hold on the primitive forested swamp region between Rzhev and Bely . On July 2 , 1942 , Ninth Army under General Model launched an operation ( Seylitz ) to clear the Soviet forces out . The Germans first blocked the natural breakout route through the Obsha valley and then split the Soviet forces into two isolated pockets . The battle lasted eleven days and ended with the elimination of the encircled soviet forces . The attempted rescue of 2nd Shock Army ( 13 May 1942 – 10 July 1942 ) by the soviet forces failed . However , during this period the city of Zubtsov was re - taken by the Red Army . Rzhev - Sychyovka Strategic Offensive ( Operation Mars ) . The next Rzhev - Sychyovka Offensive ( 25 November 1942 - 20 December 1942 ) codenamed Operation Mars . the operation consisted of several incremental offensive phases This operation was nearly as heavy in losses for the Red Army as the first offensive , and also failed to reach desired objectives , but the Red Army tied down German forces which may have otherwise been used to try to relieve the Stalingrad garrison , which was fighting for its life in Stalingrad . The information about offensive was provided to OKH by an NKVD double agent known as Heine as part of the plan to distract German forces from Stalingrad . However , due to the general course of the war , Hitler ordered German forces to withdraw from the salient in March 1943 during Operation Büffel . The Stavka used this as an opportunity to unsuccessfully pursue the retreating Wehrmacht troops . Result . Politico - military result . Fighting in the area remained mostly static for 14 months . Losses and setbacks elsewhere along the front finally compelled the Germans to abandon the salient in order to free up reserves for the front as a whole . The German presence in Rzhev was seen as a direct threat to Moscow and the Soviets directed many very costly offensives into what was a very strongly defended area of the front . After 14 months pointing " the Rzhev - Vyazma pistol " to Moscow , the Germans finally had to abandon that " pistol " in March 1943 , losing a strategically important bridgehead , which Horst Grossman described as " the base of the Eastern Front " . Although Nazi Germany still possessed many other " bases " on the Eastern Front , such as the Donbass industrial area , the huge granaries of Ukraine , the strategical importance of the Rzhev - Vyazma salient made its loss severe . Abandoning it effectively meant the Germans would abandon any future offensive against Moscow . Defending the salient required 29 divisions . Its abandonment freed up 22 of those divisions . It created a strategic reserve which allowed the Germans to stabilize the front and somewhat recover from massive losses at Stalingrad . It is easy to understand the doubts of general Heinz Guderian about the strategic aims of the later Battle of Kursk , since the Germans had to abandon the strategically important Rzhev - Vyazma for gathering troops to take a much less valuable one at Kursk . In other words , the retreat of the Germans in operation Buffel was tactically and militarily successful , but the abandonment of " the Rzhev - Vyazma pistol " was a strategic loss for Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front . The Soviet Army paid a high price in the battles of the Rzhev salients , but with the German withdrawal an important bridgehead which could enable the Germans to threaten Moscow was eliminated . The Germans had also moved back to defensive positions that were as strong as the ones they held within the salients . The reserves gained by the Germans through the withdrawal were soon after used up in the offensive against Kursk later in 1943 . Military losses . Losses for the entire series of operations around the Rzhev salient from 1941 to 1943 are difficult to calculate . These operations cover an entire series of battles and defensive operations over a wide area involving many formations on both sides . For the whole series of Rzhev battles , the numbers are not clear yet . But , since the mobilized manpower of both sides were enormous and the fighting is violent , casualties should be very high . According to A . V . Isayev , the Soviet losses from January 1942 to March 1943 is 392 , 554 irrecoverable and 768 , 233 sanitary . The Soviet losses during the beginning period of 1942 ( including " operation Jupiter " ) are 272 , 320 irrecoverable and 504 , 569 sanitary ; with 25 . 7 % of total manpower participated in these battles is killed in the battlefield . According to V . V . Beshanov , the casualties of the July – September Rzhev offensive are 193 . 683 all cases , and during Operation Mars the Soviet suffered 250 . 000 casualties with 800 tanks were damaged or destroyed . Isayev provided a lower number : 70 , 340 irrecoverable and 145 , 300 sanitary . The total gross casualties of Operation Mars is very high , but they only make up about 13 . 2 % troop strength ( and KIA is not over 6 % ) ; meanwhile , during the beginning phase of 1942 ( including " Operation Juniper " ) , total losses are up to 75 . 2 % troop strength ( and dead rate are 25 . 7 % ) . The retired German general , Horst Grossmann , in his book " Rzhev , the basement of the Eastern Front " did not provide the total casualties of the German side . But according to his description , from 31 July to 9 August , one German battalion at the front line , after being exhausted in the violent battles , only had one commandant and 22 soldiers , and in 31 August there were battalions which had only one commandant and 12 soldiers ( equal to one squad ) . According to Grossmann , during Operation Mars , the German suffered 40 , 000 casualties . According to the German reports which are still stored at the Storage Center of National Document of Germany , from March 1942 to March 1943 , the casualties of the 2nd , 4th , 9th , 2nd Panzer , 3rd Panzer and 4th Panzer Army ( The 4th Panzer Army only have data from March to April 1942 ) amount to 162 , 713 KIA , 35 , 650 MIA , 469 , 747 WIA . The number of soldiers who died during treatment in the hospital are still unknown . After collecting and synthesizing these data , the casualties of the German force during the Battles of Rzhev may reach 452 , 000 irrecoverable and 469 , 747 sanitary . The casualties of German forces from January 1942 to March 1943 , according to Mikhail Yuryevich Myagkov , is about 330 , 000 irrecoverable and more than 450 , 000 sanitary . Civilian losses . Before the war , Rzhev had more than 56 , 000 people , but when it was liberated on 3 March 1943 , there were only 150 people left , and if the population at the rural area were taken in , the population was still only 350 . Most of its inhabitant were transported to the Holocaust at Germany and Eastern Europe . Among 5 , 443 houses , only 297 remained . The total material loss was 500 million Ruble according to the current price of 1941 . Vyazma was also virtually destroyed during the war . In this city , two death camp of the Nazi Germany , named Dulag No . 184 and Dulag No . 230 were established . Prisoners in these camps were Soviet soldiers and Soviet civilians in the area of Smolensk , Nelidovo , Rzhev , Zubstov , Gzhatsk , Sychyovka . . . According to the German ' s data that Soviet SMERSH collected after the battles , there were 5 , 500 people who died because of wounds . During the winter 1941 - 42 , in these camps , about 300 people each day were killed by diseases , cold , starvation , torture and other causes . After the war , there were two mass graves discovered in this place , each have the size of 4 x 100 m and 70 , 000 - 80 , 000 unidentified bodies . The German also discovered and executed 8 local political leaders , 60 commissars and political instructor s , and 117 Jews in the camp No . 230 . Good points and faults in the Soviet and German tactics . USSR . Strength . The Soviet managed to exploit the earlier victory at the battle of Moskva and create some advantages in the critical sector of the front . Their attacks threatened the flanks of Army Group Center and forced the German to divert the forces to these areas , therefore reduced the pressure on Moskva . During this time , the USSR ' s Army commanders began to concentrate their main forces at the critical zones to strengthen their position at these area , or to muster enough power for their assaults . In addition , the Soviet also started using tanks as a main assault force instead of a mere supporting tool for infantries . The Front commanders also learned some important experiences about commanding and coordinating a combined force . From May 1942 , the Soviet Fronts started to have the own air armies for supporting the land troops , which are under direct commands of the Front commanders . That means these commanders began to have some sort of full authority to use the air forces , except the long - ranged strategic bomber units which were still under direct command of the Soviet STAVKA . After the " manpower crisis " of late 1941 , in 1942 the Soviet had gathered enough strategic reserves , they also began to pay more attention to develop them . In 1942 the Soviet managed to build 18 new reserved armies and resupply other 9 ones . At Rzhev area , the Soviet army received 3 reserved armies and have 3 other resupplied . Of course , in this period , many Soviet units still had inadequate strength and equipments , but with the more plentiful reserve force , they managed to somewhat maintain stable fighting capability and prevent the severe fluctuation in manpower . This enabled the Red Army to conduct active defenses and prepare for large - scaled offensives . Weakness . As the second top person of the STAVKA , G . K . Zhukov was one of the first Soviet military officer to admit and to make a strict self - criticism about the Soviet ' s and also his own faults in this period : The Soviet Army suffered terribly from severe deficits in weapons and equipment due to the tremendous losses during the German onslaught in 1941 . Meanwhile , during the first half of 1942 , the reserved source of equipment was still not adequate . For example , during January and February 1942 , the Western Front only received 55 % of needed 82mm mortar rounds , 36 % needed 120mm ones and 44 % needed artillery munitions . On average , each artillery battery only had 2 rounds per day . The weapons deficit was so severe that the Front commanders had to make occasional appeals for equipment . The serious lack of ammunition hampered Soviet efforts in neutralizing German strongpoints , leading to heavy casualties in the assaults . The lack of equipment did not only occurs in the case of cannons and mortars , but also for small arms . During " the ammunitions famine " at Rzhev salient , on average , the Red Army only had 3 bullets for each rifle , 30 bullets for each submachine gun , 300 bullets for each light machine gun and 600 bullets for each heavy one . The " famine " of munitions in firearms and artillery pieces forced the Soviet army commanders , in many cases , to use tanks in the role of artillery ; such inappropriate usage together with the outdated military thinking ( which did not pay enough attention to the assault role of tank forces ) sharply reduced the effectiveness of the tank units , rendered them from conducting deep penetration into the German defensive line . About the tank forces , although the Soviet possessed a large number of tanks , but the number of low quality , damaged and outdated ones were also large . In the Bryansk , Western and Kalinin Front , the proportion of low quality tanks was 69 % and the rate of damaged tanks were about 41 - 55 % . All the above facts mean that , the Red Army in Rzhev area did not have adequate preparation in terms of equipment , weapons and logistics . The worst mistakes of the Red Army in 1942 at the Rzhev salients lies in the coordination and cooperation between its Fronts and the control of STAVKA towards them . During the offensives in January and February 1942 , instead of establishing a centralized command and control with tight cooperation between the Fronts , the Soviet STAVKA and I . V . Stalin let each Front carry out their own assault without notable cooperation between the Fronts . Such separated and uncooperative assaults failed to achieve their goals and lead to the total failure of the whole offensives . To make matter worse , on 19 January 1942 Stalin suddenly retook the 1st Shock Army from the Western Front with a " very nonsense " reason . That unreasonable act severely weakened the right wing of the Western Front , lead to the failure of the offensive at the area Olenino - Rzhev - Osuga . Another faults in the Soviet ' s tactics and commands were the ambitious and unrealistic goals of the offensives . At the beginning 1942 , the Red Army had just recovered from the disaster losses during the late half of 1941 , therefore it was still very weak . Even the victory at the previous battle of Moskva was already a miracle for the Soviet Union . In every offensive , the aims and scale have to be correlative with the army ' s strength , but at the battles of Rzhev , the Soviet commanders demanded too much from their subordinates . Last but not least , another " palindromic disease " of the Red Army in 1942 is the hesitant in retreating from dangerous area . As a results , many Soviet units were trapped in a notable number of " pockets " when the German counter - attacked . In these cases , only the troops of 11th Cavalry Corps and 6th Tank Corps managed to escape successfully . The escape of 33rd and 41st Army was conducted on time , but they failed to keep it secret and chose the wrong direction to move , leading to considerable casualties . And in the case of 11th Cavalry and 39th Army , the STAVKA made a serious mistake when they planned to keep them in the Kholm - Zhirkovsky bridgehead for future attacks ; however not only they failed to conduct any attacks but also they were surrounded and nearly destroyed during the Seydlitz operation . Nazi Germany . Strength . After the soviet winter offensive of 1941 – 42 , the Germans were able to strongly hold and defend the salient against a series of Soviet offensives . The operations led to disproportionate Soviet losses and tied down large number of Soviet troops . The defense of the Salient provided the Germans with a base from which they could launch a new offensive against Moscow at a future time . The defensive positions created by the Germans after the retreat from Moscow were well constructed and placed . The Germans eventually withdrew from the positions only due to losses elsewhere in the war and were able to withdraw from the salient with minimal losses . Weakness . German operations in 1941 directed at Moscow lasted too late into the year . Rather than stabilize the front and create defensive positions , the Germans pushed their forces forward and left them poorly prepared for the Soviet winter counteroffensive . The losses in men and equipment to Army Group Centre were considerable . The Army group lacked the strength to go back on the offensive in 1942 . After the front stabilized , the German Army tied down enormous amounts of manpower in holding salients from which they did not intend to exploit . This reduced the amount of manpower the Germans could devote to operations elsewhere on the front . The Germans also used some of their best formations , such as 9th Army , in a strictly static defensive role . The Rzhev salient had value and tied down disproportionate numbers of Soviet troops , but it is unclear if the salient was worth the loss of around 20 high quality divisions for offensive or defensive operations elsewhere in 1942 . The abandonment of the salient was necessary in 1943 to create reserves for the front as a whole . But the reserves and the strength created were mostly used up in the costly offensive directed at Kursk in 1943 . Controversies about the battles of Rzhev . This part of the Second World War was poorly covered by Soviet military historiography , and what coverage exists occurred only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union , when historians gained access to relevant documents . Exact dates of particular battles , their names , outcomes , significance , and even losses have not been fully clarified and there are still many controversies about these topics . Casualties of the Soviet forces . In 2009 , a television movie was aired in Russia entitled " Rzhev : Marshal Zhukov ’ s Unknown Battle " ; it made no attempt to cover up the huge losses suffered by Soviet forces , as a consequence , there were public calls in Russia for the arrest of some of those involved in its production . In the movie , the casualties of Soviet forces are given as 433 , 000 KIA . The journalist Alina Makeyeva , in an article of " Komsomolskaya Pravda " newspaper which was published on 19 February 2009 , wrote : " The number presented by the historian is too low . There must be more than one million Soviet soldiers and officers was killed ! Rzhev and its neighboring towns were completely destroyed . " ; however Alina could not present any proof . Journalist Elena Tokaryeva in her article which was published in the newspaper " The Violin " ( Russia ) on 26 February 2009 also claimed that more than 1 , 000 , 000 Soviet soldiers were killed at Rzhev . " The race of the numbers of casualties at Rzhev " continued with the data of researcher Svetlana Aleksandrovna Gerasimova from National Museum at Tver . In her thesis " Rzhev - Sychyovka , the first offensive in 1942 under a new point of view " , Gerasimova claimed that 1 , 325 , 823 Soviet troops lost their lives during the four offensives at that area . The number of casualties again was raised with the claim of journalist Igor Elkov in his articled published in the " Russian Weekly " on 26 February 2009 . Igor said : " The accurate number of casualties of both sides is still dubious . Recently , there are some opinions about from 1 . 3 to 1 . 5 million Soviet soldiers was killed . It may be reach the number of 2 million " . All these data was heavily criticized by the Reserved Colonel , Doctor of History A . V . Isayev . By providing the data in the stored documents of Russian Ministry of Defence , Isayev stated that the " research " of Svetlana Aleksandrovna Gerasimova belongs to the type of " research on the high - heel shoes " . The claimed of above journalist are also judgment of people without adequate knowledge of history , and are the results of demagogic motivation under the slogan " every information must be shown to the people " . Using very detailed documents with clear origins , A . V . Isayev provied the casualties of the Soviet forces as below : A . V . Isayev also used the research of Colonel - General G . F . Krivosheyev , his senior workmate at Russian Military History Institute and pointed out the common results between Isayev and Krivosheyev . On the Website " Soldier " of Russian Military History Institute , Isayev also said that the electronic draft of Krivosheyev was stolen and illegally used by the hackers , hence these drafts were completely deleted from the Institute Website . Nowadays , only the book whose copyright is held by Krivosheyev himself is recognized as legal document . Finally , A . V . Isayev claimed that the Soviet casualties at Rzhev from January 1942 to March 1943 were 392 , 554 KIA and 768 , 233 WIA . The document film of Aleksey Vladimirovich Pivovarov was also heavily criticized by Isayev ; he stated that in this film , many important events of the Rzhev battles is not mentioned such as the breakout of 1st Guard Cavalry Corps , the breakout of more than 17 , 000 remaining troops of 33rd Army during Operation Seydlitz , and the breakout of the 41st Army . According to A . V . Isayev , if the film of Aleksey Vladimirovich Pivovarov and the thesis of Svetlana Aleksandrovna Gerasimova were true , many living people should have been recorded as KIA . Until now , there has not been any Russian articles or works which objects the arguments of A . V . Isayev . Role of G . K . Zhukov in Operation Mars . The role of Zhukov in this infamous offensive is also a debated topic . American military history , Colonel David M . Glantz ( Hoa Kỳ ) claimed that G . K . Zhukov had to take the main responsibility in the tactical failure of this operation , and this is " the greatest defeat of Marshal Zhukov " . In more detail , David Glantz asserted that Zhukov ' s command in this offensive was not careful , too ambitious , too clumsy and all these lead to a disaster . However , Antony Beevor disagreed with Glantz ' s comment . According to Beevor , at that time Zhukov had to concentrated on Operation Uranus at Stalingrad battlefield hence he had little time to care for what was happening at Rzhev . The Russian authors Vladimir Chernov and Galina Yaroslavovna also disagreed with Glantz . They asserted that from 26 August 1942 Zhukov did not command the Western Front , and that from 29 August he had his hand busy with the serious matters at Stalingard . It has been asserted that I . V . Stalin was actually the commander in charge of all the fronts at the Rzhev salient . Zhukov only took part in the commanding at Rzhev during its later periods as a " firefighter " who was solving the serious problems of the battlefield at that moment . Therefore , Beevor asserted the comments of Glantz about Zhukov ' s responsibility were not correct . The Title " City of Military Glory " of Rzhev . Rzhev was conferred the status of “ City of Military Glory ” by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin on October 8 , 2007 , for “ courage , endurance and mass heroism , exhibited by defenders of the city in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Motherland ” . This act also caused heated debate and controversy . Many people believed that Rzhev shouldn ' t be a " City of Military Glory " since it was under Nazi German occupation before being liberated . However , according to the law , being occupied does not prevent a city from receiving this honorary title . As long as its citizens , military personnel and government officers paid a large contribution for the Great Patriotic War and expressed great heroism , bravery and patriotism in these contributions , that is enough . Furthermore , the fierce and heroic resistance of Soviet citizens at Rzhev did not only occur during the 1942 - 1943 period , but also during the defence of Moscow in 1941 . According to all these facts , Rzhev , Vyazma and many other cities have enough conditions to have the title " City of Military Glory , " whether they were occupied or not .