Battle of Šibenik The Battle of Šibenik ( ) , also known as the September War ( " Rujanski rat " ) , was an armed conflict fought between the Yugoslav People ' s Army ( " Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija " – JNA ) , supported by the Croatian Serb - established Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina ( SAO Krajina ) , and the Croatian National Guard ( " Zbor Narodne Garde " – ZNG ) , supported by the Croatian Police . The battle was fought to the north and west of the city of Šibenik , Croatia on 16 – 22 September 1991 , during the Croatian War of Independence . The JNA ' s initial orders were to relieve Croatian siege of their barracks in the city and isolate the region of Dalmatia from the rest of Croatia . The JNA ' s advance was supported by the Yugoslav Air Force and the Yugoslav Navy . Fighting stopped following a Croatian counter - attack that pushed the JNA back from the outskirts of Šibenik . Although some ground was lost to the Yugoslavs , especially around the town of Drniš , northeast of Šibenik , the ZNG captured several JNA and Yugoslav Navy facilities in the city , including dozens of navy vessels and several coastal artillery batteries . The captured batteries were used to support defence of the city . The JNA Šibenik garrison was evacuated following an agreement between the Croatian officials and the JNA , except for several comparably small JNA posts in the city which were captured by the ZNG . The September – October fighting caused three Croatian military and seven civilian deaths , as well as more than a hundred wounded . JNA bombarded Šibenik , causing damage to numerous structures , including the Cathedral of St . James , a UNESCO World Heritage Site . The " The New York Times " judged the bombardment to be a part of calculated assaults on the heritage of Croatia . Artillery bombardment of the city continued over the following 100 days . The battle is commemorated in Šibenik each year . Background . In 1990 , following the electoral defeat of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia , ethnic tensions worsened . The Yugoslav People ' s Army ( " Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija " – JNA ) confiscated Croatia ' s Territorial Defence weapons to minimize resistance . On 17 August , tensions escalated into an open revolt of the Croatian Serbs , centred on the predominantly Serb - populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin , parts of the Lika , Kordun , Banovina and eastern Croatia . After two unsuccessful attempts by Serbia , supported by Montenegro and Serbia ' s provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo , to obtain the Yugoslav Presidency ' s approval of a JNA operation to disarm Croatian security forces in January 1991 , and a bloodless skirmish between Serb insurgents and Croatian special police in March , the JNA itself , supported by Serbia and its allies , asked the federal Presidency to give it wartime authorities and declare a state of emergency . The request was denied on 15 March , and the JNA came under control of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević . Milošević , preferring a campaign to expand Serbia rather than preservation of Yugoslavia , publicly threatened to replace the JNA with a Serbian army and declared that he no longer recognized the authority of the federal Presidency . The threat caused the JNA to gradually abandon plans to preserve Yugoslavia in favour of expansion of Serbia . By the end of the month , the conflict had escalated to the first fatalities . The JNA stepped in , supporting the insurgents , and preventing Croatian police from intervening . In early April , leaders of the Serb revolt in Croatia declared their intention of integration of the area under their control , viewed by the Government of Croatia as a breakaway region with Serbia . In the beginning of 1991 , Croatia had no regular army . In an effort to bolster its defence , Croatia doubled police personnel to about 20 , 000 . The most effective part of the force was 3 , 000 special police , deployed in twelve battalions adopting military unit organization . In addition , there were 9 , 000 – 10 , 000 regionally organized reserve police . The reserve police were set up in 16 battalions and 10 companies , but the reserve force lacked weapons . In May , the Croatian government responded by forming the Croatian National Guard ( " Zbor narodne garde " - ZNG ) , but its development was hampered by a United Nations arms embargo introduced in September . Prelude . By late June and throughout July , northern Dalmatia saw daily armed skirmishes but no actual combat . Nonetheless , the increasing intensity of the conflict in the region and elsewhere in Croatia led to the preparation of bomb shelter s in Zadar by city officials . Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina ( SAO Krajina ) authorities called up three Territorial Defence units in the Zadar hinterland on 11 July , one day after another fatal shooting of a Croatian police patrol in the Zadar area , while the JNA 9th ( Knin ) Corps conscripted the local Serb population in Benkovac to strengthen its ranks by the end of the month . In late July , a paramilitary group , led by Miro Barešić and formally subordinated to the Croatian Ministry of Defence , conducted several sabotages in the Benkovac area . On 1 August , Croatia deployed two battalions of the ZNG 4th Guards Brigade to Kruševo near Obrovac . Two days later they engaged in combat against the SAO Krajina Territorial Defence and police forces , marking the first such engagement of the Croatian War of Independence in the region . On 26 August , the JNA 9th ( Knin ) Corps openly sided with the SAO Krajina forces as they jointly attacked Kijevo , expelling all Croats from the village . Another significant setback for Croatia in the region was JNA capture of the Maslenica Bridge on 11 September . That severed the last overland road link between Dalmatia and the rest of Croatia . On 11 – 13 September , an attack in the area of Skradin cut water and power supply to Šibenik . On 14 September , the ZNG and the Croatian police blockaded and cut utilities to all JNA facilities located in Croatian - controlled territory , beginning the Battle of the Barracks . The move blockaded 33 large JNA garrisons in Croatia and numerous smaller facilities , including border posts , weapons and ammunition storage depots . The blockade forced the JNA to amend its planned campaign in Croatia to accommodate the new development . The same day , a coastal artillery battery on the Žirje Island was captured by Croatian forces , after JNA Senior Sergeant Željko Baltić , battery commanding officer , switched his allegiance . The battery consisted of twelve Ansaldo 90 / 53 guns which were once armament of the Italian battleship " Vittorio Veneto " . Order of battle . The JNA ' s planned campaign included an advance in the Šibenik area by the 9th ( Knin ) Corps , which was tasked with isolating Dalmatia from the rest of Croatia . As it was fully mobilised and prepared for deployment , the corps began operations against the ZNG on 16 September . Its main axis of attack was directed at Vodice , with supporting advances towards Zadar , Drniš and Sinj . The push was designed to create favourable circumstances to attack Zadar , Šibenik and Split . With support from a corps - level battalion of M - 84 tanks and the SAO Krajina Territorial Defence , the JNA 221st Mechanised Brigade ( without its battalion of T - 34 tanks ) , was committed to the main axis of the attack . The secondary advance , towards Biograd na Moru on the right flank , was assigned to the 180th Mechanised Brigade , supported by the armoured battalion removed from the 221st Brigade , the 557th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment and the SAO Krajina Territorial Defence . Offensive support was provided by the 9th Mixed Artillery Regiment and the 9th Military Police Battalion . The 221st Brigade was commanded by Colonel Borislav Đukić . Elements the 46th Partisan Division , drawn from the 24th ( Kragujevac ) Corps , also provuded support for the corps . The JNA garrison in Šibenik barracks included the 11th Marine Infantry Brigade — one of a handful of units regularly maintained at full combat readiness . In opposition to the JNA , the ZNG 113th Infantry Brigade , commanded by Milivoj Petković , defended the city of Šibenik together with police forces , under overall control of the Šibenik crisis centre headed by Josip Juras . The 4th Battalion of the 113th Infantry Brigade , commanded by Josip Jukica , as well as the 4th Battalion of the 4th Guards Brigade , commanded by Ivan Zelić , defended the Drniš area , northeast of Šibenik , supported by a company of police . The 600 - strong 4th Battalion of the 4th Guards Brigade represented the strongest ZNG unit in the area , while the JNA is estimated by Croatian sources to have deployed approximately 1 , 500 troops against Drniš . On 20 September , all Croatian combat troops in Drniš area were subordinated to Luka Vujić . The western bank of the Krka River and approaches to Vodice were controlled by the 3rd Battalion of the 113th Infantry Brigade . While small arms were sufficient to arm a part of the battalion at a time , the battalion did not have any heavy weapons . Timeline . The offensive commenced at 16 : 00 on 16 September . On the left flank , the JNA advanced towards Drniš , capturing the villages of Maljkovo and Kričke , and interdicting the Drniš – Split , east of the Krka River . On the opposite river bank , the JNA advanced towards Vodice and Šibenik , threatening the city from the west , reaching the western side of the Šibenik Bridge on the Adriatic Highway . The advance was so rapid it cut off the 1st Company of the 3rd Battalion of the ZNG 113th Infantry Brigade from the rest of the ZNG force . That day , the ZNG captured a coastal artillery battery near village of Zečevo . By 17 September , the commanding officer of the JNA 9th ( Knin ) Corps , Major General Vladimir Vuković , modified the initial deployment plan , because of strong resistance offered by the ZNG and the Croatian police , relying on populated areas and terrain features to hold back the JNA forces north of Vodice . The changes involved diverting a part of the force to attack Drniš and Sinj directly , while the remainder of the attacking force rested . The Yugoslav Navy started a blockade of Šibenik and the entire Croatian Adriatic coast . On the night of 17 / 18 September , the JNA was ordered to trap and destroy the ZNG force in Drniš and the Miljevci Plateau area , while holding positions achieved elsewhere . In the morning , the JNA resumed its offensive towards Vodice , on the right flank of the attack , while the ZNG abandoned Drniš and pulled back to village of Unešić . On 19 September , the ZNG captured a JNA coastal artillery battery on the Smokvica Island and " Krušćica " barracks near Rogoznica . Weapons retrieved from the captured barracks , a shipment received from Gospić following capture of JNA facilities in the town , as well as use of the captured artillery pieces , significantly improved ZNG ' s capabilities . The JNA advance south from Drniš was effectively halted that day , following three successful ambush attacks by the ZNG in Unešić , Pakovo Selo and south of Žitnić . The JNA orders were changed again on 20 September , when the JNA 9th ( Knin ) Corps orders were supplanted by the Military - Maritime District order , issued by Vice Admiral Mile Kandić , for the corps to reorient the JNA force north of Vodice towards Šibenik and Split . This required crossing the Šibenik Bridge spanning the Krka River ria . The eastward advancewith close air support from the Yugoslav Air Force failed , and cost the air force four aircraft shot down by the ZNG . On 22 September , a Croatian counter - attack , supported by recently acquired artillery , pushed back the JNA from the bridge by 10 : 00 , extending the ZNG - controlled bridgehead to the area of Gaćelezi , to the northwest . Four guns of the Žirje battery were used as anti - tank guns in support of the counter - attack . On 22 September , the Croatian forces captured JNA " Kuline " barracks in Šibenik itself along with the 15 Yugoslav Navy vessels based there . In addition , 19 vessels undergoing various stages of overhaul were captured in " Velimir Škorpik " shipyard . The ships , comprising approximately a quarter of the Yugoslav Naval assets , included : " Vlado Ćetković " ( RTOP - 402 ) " Končar " - class fast attack craft ( renamed " Šibenik " ( RTOP - 21 ) later on ) , " Velimir Škorpik " ( RČ - 310 ) " Osa " - class missile boat , " Partizan II " ( TČ - 222 ) " Shershen " - class torpedo boat and " Biokovo " ( PČ - 171 ) , " Cer " ( PČ - 180 ) and " Durmitor " ( PČ - 181 ) " Mirna " - class patrol boat s . On 23 September , the JNA fully secured Drniš and its surroundings . At the same time , it shifted its focus to the Battle of Zadar , away from Šibenik . The Yugoslav naval blockade was lifted unilaterally the same day . Even though a number of JNA facilities in the city were captured by the ZNG , several major JNA posts remained in Šibenik . Those included " Rade Končar " barracks housing the 11th Marine Infantry Brigade , " Ante Jonić " barracks , " Minerska " depot where naval mine s were stored , " Jamnjak " depot and the " Ražine " artillery battery containing confiscated Croatian Territorial Defence weapons and " Duboka " fuel storage . The " Duboka " depot consisted of three storage tanks . Aftermath . The JNA failed to meet its objectives and was defeated in the battle , subsequently nicknamed the " September War " ( " Rujanski rat " ) . Its total losses in the battle were not reported . The ZNG and the Croatian police sustained losses of three killed and 49 wounded troops in the battle . At the same time seven civilians were killed and 64 wounded . JNA artillery continued intermittent bombardment of Šibenik over the following 100 days resulting in further casualties and damage . The damaged structures included the Cathedral of St . James , a UNESCO World Heritage Site . An editorial in " The New York Times " labeled bombardment of the cathedral as a part of the " calculated assaults " on treasures of Croatia . During the fighting , electrical substation s in Bilice and Konjsko were destroyed , disrupting electric power distribution in Dalmatia . Evacuation of the JNA facilities and surrender of the confiscated Territorial Defence weapons stored in the Šibenik – Split area was agreed on 21 November . Throughout the process , tensions remained high , and the JNA made contingency plans to break through from Knin to Šibenik and Split to relieve the siege of its forces there — codenamed Operation Coast - 91 ( " Operacija Obala - 91 " ) and Operation Hurricane - 91 ( " Operacija Orkan - 91 " ) respectively . All of the JNA facilities in Šibenik , along with the confiscated Territorial Defence weapons , were handed over to the Croatian authorities by 10 December . News coverage of the battle produced a television footage of ZNG air defence artillery at Zečevo shooting at a Yugoslav Air force Soko J - 21 Jastreb and scoring a hit on another J - 21 using a guided missile . The footage , ending in shouts claiming that both of the planes were downed , became one of the most significant pieces of material in terms of propaganda and morale in Croatia . Nonetheless , the footage proved controversial , since the first plane is not shown falling to the ground or into the sea , but diving towards the horizon after giving away a puff of smoke — variously interpreted as smoke caused by the plane ' s cannon fire or anti - aircraft fire damage . While the first J - 21 downing remains unconfirmed , the second J - 21 , piloted by Valter Juršić of the 240th Fighter - Bomber Aviation Squadron , was shot down by Neven Livajić using a 9K38 Igla and wreckage of the plane was retrieved . Another controversy which arose in the aftermath of the battle pertains to the Žirje Island coastal artillery battery . Extent of the role played by the battery was disputed between Brigadier General Rahim Ademi , who claimed the bridge was beyond range of the guns , and thirteen ZNG and police officers , who held various posts in Šibenik at the time , who claimed Ademi was wrong in his assessment . After the war , the guns were removed from Žirje . two were refurbished in preparation for return to Žirje , as museum exhibits . The battle is commemorated annually in Šibenik each September . There are two documentary films covering Šibenik and its surroundings during the battle : " My city will be happy too " ( " I moj će grad biti sretan " ) by Matea Šarić and " September War 1991 , Šibenik – Vodice " ( " Rujanski rat 1991 . Šibenik – Vodice " ) by Šime Strikoman .