Bravo Two Zero Bravo Two Zero was the call sign of an eight - man British Army SAS patrol , deployed into Iraq during the First Gulf War in January 1991 . According to one patrol member ' s account , the patrol were given the task of " gathering intelligence ; . . . finding a good LUP ( lying up position ) and setting up an OP [ observation post ] " on the Iraqi Main Supply Route ( MSR ) between Baghdad and North - Western Iraq , while according to another , the task was to find and destroy Iraqi Scud missile launchers along a stretch of the MSR . The patrol was the subject of several books . Accounts in the first two books , by patrol commander Andy McNab ' s " Bravo Two Zero " ( 1993 ) followed by Chris Ryan ' s " The One That Got Away " ( 1995 ) , as well as those by the SAS ' s RSM at the time of the patrol , Peter Ratcliffe ( " Eye of the Storm " , 2000 ) , did not always correspond , leading to accusations from the media of lying . The investigative book " The Real Bravo Two Zero " ( 2002 ) by Michael Asher , followed the patrol route and interviewed witnesses . The subsequent book , " Soldier Five " by patrol member Mike Coburn ( Kiwi Mike ) , was released in 2004 . For McNab ' s conduct during the patrol , he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal , whilst Ryan , and two other patrol members ( Steven Lane and Robert Consiglio ) were awarded the Military Medal . The patrol . Background . In January 1991 , during the prelude to the Coalition ground invasion of Iraq , B Squadron 22 SAS were stationed at a forward operating base in Saudi Arabia . The Squadron provided a number of long - range , similarly tasked teams deep into Iraq including three eight - man patrols ; " Bravo One Zero " , " Bravo Two Zero " and " Bravo Three Zero " . Asher lists one of the three patrols as " Bravo One Niner " , though it is not clear whether this is one of the same three listed by Ryan . This article refers to the " Bravo Two Zero " patrol . Insertion . On the night of 22 / 23 January , the patrol were transported into Iraqi airspace by a RAF Chinook helicopter , along with " Bravo One Zero " and their Land Rover 110 vehicles . Unlike " Bravo One Zero " , the patrol had decided not to take vehicles . According to McNab ' s account , the patrol walked during the first night to the proposed location of the observation post . However , both Ryan ' s and Coburn ' s accounts put the distance at . Eye - witness accounts of Bedouin tribesmen , and Asher ' s re - creation support the Ryan / Coburn estimate of . Whilst Ryan states the patrol was intentionally dropped only from the observation post because of heavy pack weights , Coburn ' s account suggests that the patrol was dropped closer than intended to the observation post , due to a navigational error made by the Royal Air Force . This could account for the differences in the patrol members ' estimates . According to both Ryan and McNab , the weight of their equipment required the patrol to ' shuttle ' the equipment to the observation post . Four members would walk approximately 300 m , then drop their Bergen s and wait . The next four would move up and drop their Bergens , then the first four would return for their jerry cans of water and bring them back to the group , followed by the second four doing the same . In this manner , each member of the patrol covered three times the distance from the drop off to the observation post . Soon after the patrol landed on Iraqi soil , Lane discovered that they had communication problems and could not receive messages on the patrol ' s radio . McNab later claimed that the patrol had been issued incorrect radio frequencies ; however a 2002 BBC report discovered that there was no error with the frequencies because the patrol ' s transmissions had been noted in the SAS daily record log . Ratcliffe lays the blame for the faulty radios on McNab as , being the patrol commander , it was his job to make sure the patrol ' s equipment was working . Compromise . In the late afternoon of 24 January , the patrol was stumbled upon by a herd of sheep and a young shepherd . Believing themselves compromised , the patrol decided to withdraw , leaving behind excess equipment . As they were preparing to leave , they heard what they thought to be a tank approaching their position . The patrol took up defensive positions , prepared their LAW rockets , and waited for it to come into sight . However , the vehicle turned out to be a bulldozer , which reversed rapidly after seeing the patrol . Realising that they had now definitely been compromised the patrol withdrew from their position . Shortly afterwards , as they were exfiltrating ( according to McNab ' s account ) , a firefight with Iraqi Armoured Personnel Carriers and other forces developed . In 2001 , Asher interviewed the Bedouin family that discovered the patrol . The family stated the patrol had been spotted by the driver of the bulldozer , not the young shepherd . According to the family , they were not sure who the men were and followed them a short distance , eventually firing several warning shots , whereupon the patrol returned fire and moved away . Asher ' s investigation into the events , the terrain and position of the Iraqi Army did not support McNab ' s version of events , and excludes an attack by Iraqi soldiers and Armoured Personnel carriers . Coburn ' s version , " Soldier Five " , partially supports McNab ' s version of events ( specifically the presence of one armoured personnel carrier ) and describes being fired upon by a 12 . 7 mm DShK heavy machine gun and numerous Iraqi soldiers . In Ryan ' s version , " [ MacGown ] also saw an armoured car carrying a . 50 caliber machine gun pull up . Somehow , I never saw that . ' " Ryan later estimated that he fired 70 rounds during the incident . Emergency pickup . The British standard operating procedure s ( SOP ) state that in the case of an emergency or no radio contact the patrol should return to their original infiltration point , where a helicopter would land briefly every 24 hours . This plan was complicated by the incorrect location of the initial landing site ; the patrol reached the designated emergency pickup point , but the helicopter never appeared . Ratcliffe later revealed that this was due to an illness suffered by the pilot , while en route , necessitating his abandoning his mission on this occasion . Because of a malfunctioning emergency radio , that allowed them only to send messages and not receive them , the patrol did not realise that while trying to reach overhead allied jets , they had in fact been heard by a US jet pilot . The jet pilots were aware of the patrol ' s problems but were unable to raise them . Many sortie s were flown to the team ' s last known position and their expected exfiltration route in an attempt to locate them and to hinder attempts by Iraqi troops trying to capture them . Exfiltration route . Standard operating procedures mandate that before an infiltration of any team behind enemy lines , an exfiltration route should be planned so that members of the patrol know where to go if they get separated or something goes wrong . The plans of the patrol indicated a southern exfiltration route towards Saudi Arabia . According to the SAS daily record log kept during that time , a TACBE transmission from the patrol was received on 24 January . The log read " Bravo Two Zero made TACBE contact again , it was reasonable to assume that they were moving south , " though in fact the patrol headed north - west towards the Syrian border . Coburn ' s account suggests that during the planning phase of the mission , Syria had been the agreed destination should an escape plan need to be implemented . He also suggests that this was on the advice of the Officer Commanding B Squadron at that time . According to Ratcliffe , the change in plan nullified all efforts over the following days by allied forces to locate and rescue the team . McNab has also been criticised for refusing advice from superiors to include vehicles in the mission ( to be left at an emergency pickup point ) which would have facilitated an easier exfiltration . Another SAS team used Land Rovers in this role when they also had to abandon a similar mission . However , it is also suggested that the patrol jointly agreed not to take vehicles because they felt they were too few in number and the vehicles too small ( only short - wheelbase Land Rovers were available ) to be of use and were ill - suited to a mission that was intended to be conducted from a fixed observation post . Separation . During the night of 24 / 25 January , whilst McNab was trying to contact a passing Coalition aircraft using a TACBE communicator , the patrol inadvertently became separated into two groups . Whilst the others waited for a response on the TACBE , Phillips , Ryan and MacGown continued to move through the darkness . Neither of the two resultant groups followed the standard emergency rendezvous ( ERV ) procedure they had been trained to follow — and had previously followed the night before . Instead , both groups independently continued north towards the Syrian border . After the separation , Phillips , Ryan and MacGown were equipped with two M16 / M203 assault rifles and a Browning Hi - Power pistol between them , as well as at least one TACBE , and the night sight around Ryan ' s neck . McNab , Pring , Lane , Consiglio , and Coburn were equipped with their original weapons ( three Minimi s and two M16 / M203 s between them ) as well as MacGown ' s Minimi ( which MacNab was carrying , but soon discarded ) . The larger group carried at least one TACBE , and the Magellan GPS . According to Ryan , he was also carrying a 66 mm LAW rocket which he had struggled to free from his Bergen during the initial contact . According to McNab however , the only item removed by Ryan from his Bergan was a silver hipflask , and it was McNab who was the only one carrying a 66 after this contact . This can be backed up by McNab ' s book Bravo Two Zero in which he stated he left the 66 in the bergen and was the only one to do so . Despite conflicting accounts , it is possible that Ryan may have in fact eventually ended up with McNab ' s LAW rocket , an item that Ryan later claimed to have used against an Iraqi ' Land - Rover type ' vehicle , though this event is discounted by Ratcliffe who states that , at the Regimental debrief , " " " [ Ryan ] made no mention at all of encountering enemy troops on his trek . " Death of Phillips . In the evening of 25 January , Ryan , MacGown and Phillips left the tank berm they had stayed in during the day and headed north . Phillips was already suffering from hypothermia , and could not hold his M16 / M203 , which was handed to MacGown . As they continued , Phillips ' condition worsened to the point where he mistook his black gloves for the colour of his own hands , and began yelling out loud . Eventually , Phillips lost contact with the other two somewhere around 2000 hrs , and died a short time later . According to Ryan and MacGown , they both searched for Phillips for about twenty minutes before deciding to continue without him , while according to General Sir Peter de la Billière , only Ryan searched while MacGown waited . Ryan also indicated that he didn ' t know Phillips was necessarily dead when he wrote : " I hoped to God that [ Phillips ] was doing the same . That he would find his way down . . . " and later " there were still five to account for , " though MacGown admitted he knew Phillips was dead at the time . Sergeant Vince Phillips , a nineteen - year veteran of the British Armed Forces , and eight - year veteran of the Special Air Service , was 36 when he died of hypothermia in the evening of 25 January 1991 in North Western Iraq . According to the SAS regimental roll of honour , it states that Phillips died of exposure while evading capture in Iraq on the 22nd of January 1991 at the age of 36 . Capture of MacGown . At about midday on 26 January , Ryan and MacGown were stumbled upon by an " ‘ old ’ " ( according to MacGown ) goat herder tending a flock of goats . After discussions involving killing the man , MacGown decided to go with him to locate a vehicle , while Ryan decided it was not safe to do so and remained where he was under the agreement that MacGown would return by 1830 hrs . MacGown took with him Phillips ' M16 / M203 , but left his belt kit , in order to not " cut such an aggressive figure . " MacGown walked with the goat herder for about four hours , before encountering a group of men , with a Toyota Landcruiser vehicle . According to Ryan , MacGown shot and killed an unarmed Arab as he ran towards the vehicle , followed by two more armed with AK - 47 s . Without his belt kit , he had run out of ammunition , and was captured as he attempted to take the vehicle . According to McNab ' s account , the old goat herder left MacGown with directions to a hut , where he found two vehicles . After killing a uniformed Iraqi soldier attempting to reach one of the vehicles , " six or seven " more came from the hut , three of whom were killed before MacGown ' s M16 / M203 jammed , and he was captured as he sat in one of the vehicles . According to an interview given by MacGown in 2002 , he came across the first soldier near a vehicle : " I brought up my trump card which was " mohaba " and he said nothing , and I carried on talking and he then made a dash for the vehicle . I shot him in the head . A single shot . " As more soldiers came out of the hut , MacGown aimed his rifle and fired but heard a click , indicating he was out of ammunition . It was apparent that Phillips had never reloaded the weapon after the initial contact on 24 January . For reasons unknown to MacGown , the soldiers did not return fire , but instead took him captive . Hijack of vehicle by McNab ' s group . During the evening of 26 January , McNab ' s group of five commandeered a taxi by having Consiglio pretend to be wounded in McNab ' s arms whilst lying on the side of a road . When the car approached , Pring , Lane , and Coburn came up from behind cover and surrounded the vehicle . According to McNab ' s account , the group evicted all occupants from the taxi and drove until they reached a check point , where Lane shot and killed one soldier , while the others in the group killed two more . According to Ryan ' s second - hand account ( presumably taken from the Regimental debriefing ) , the group were driven to the checkpoint by one of the Iraqi occupants of the taxi . They exited the vehicle with plans to rendezvous on the other side of the checkpoint , but the driver alerted the Police , and the group were forced to continue on foot . Asher ' s investigation supported Ryan ' s version of events with no reported armed contact and no reported Iraqi casualties . Capture of McNab ' s group . In the early morning of 27 January , McNab ' s group of five came into contact with local civilians and Police . Consiglio was shot and killed by armed civilians at approximately 0200 hrs . Lane died of hypothermia later that same morning after swimming the Euphrates with Pring , who along with McNab and Coburn was subsequently captured . During an exchange of gun fire prior to capture , Coburn was shot in both the arm and ankle . According to McNab , the four captured patrol members ( McNab , Pring , MacGown and the wounded Coburn ) were moved numerous times , enduring torture and interrogation at each successive location . According to MacGown however , " incidents such as teeth extraction and burning with a heated spoon did not happen . It is inconceivable that any such incidents could have occurred without them being discussed or being physically obvious . " News footage of MacGown and Pring taken at the time of their release on 5 March , showed no evidence of any facial injuries and the members were described as ' in good shape ' by a Red Cross representative . They were last held at Abu Ghraib Prison before their release . Ryan ' s escape to Syria . Ryan made SAS history with the " longest escape and evasion by an SAS trooper or any other soldier , " to make it to Syria , covering , more than SAS trooper Jack Sillito had in the Sahara Desert in 1942 . Equipment . Each member of the patrol wore a two - shade Desert DPM uniform , with a World War II era sand - coloured desert smock . While the other members had regular issue army boots , Ryan ( the only member to avoid eventual capture ) wore a pair of £100 , " brown Raichle Gore - Tex - lined walking boots . " Each member carried a belt kit , ' Bergen ' rucksack , one sandbag of food , one sandbag containing two NBC suit s , extra ammunition bandoliers and a jerry can of water . " The belt kit contained ammunition , water , food and trauma - care equipment . " The rucksack contained 25 kilos of sandbag s and observation post equipment , seven days worth of rations , spare batteries for the radio , demolition equipment ( including PE4 plastic explosive , detonators , and both Claymore and Elsie anti - personnel mines ) , and intravenous drips and fluids for emergencies . The patrol also had a PRC 319 HF patrol radio carried by Lane , four TACBE communication device s ( carried by McNab , Ryan , and two others ) to communicate with allied aircraft , a Magellan GPS carried by Coburn and a night sight ( referred to as a ' kite - site ' ) carried by MacGown . The total weight of each member ' s kit was estimated at by McNab and by Ryan . McNab , Phillips , Ryan , and Lane carried M16 / M203 assault rifles , while Pring , Consiglio , MacGown , and Coburn carried FN Minimi light support machine guns . Each member carried a 66 mm LAW rocket on his back . Due to a missing shipment within the squadron , Phillips was the only member who carried a backup weapon , a Browning Hi - Power pistol .