1963 South Vietnamese coup In November 1963 , President Ngô Đình Diệm of South Vietnam was deposed by a group of Army of the Republic of Vietnam officers who disagreed with his handling of both the Buddhist crisis and the Viet Cong threat to the regime . The Kennedy administration had been aware of the coup planning , but Cable 243 from the United States Department of State to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge , Jr . , stated that it was US policy not to try to stop it . Lucien Conein , the Central Intelligence Agency ’ s liaison between the US embassy and the coup planners , told them that the US would not intervene to stop it . Conein also provided funds to the coup leaders . The coup was led by General Dương Văn Minh and started on 1 November . It proceeded smoothly as many loyalist leaders were captured after being caught off - guard and casualties were light . Diệm was captured and executed the next day along with his brother and adviser Ngô Đình Nhu . Background . Diệm ' s road to political power began in July 1954 , when he was appointed the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam by former Emperor Bảo Ðại , who was Head of State . Bảo Ðại disliked Diệm but selected him in the hopes that he would attract United States aid , but the two became embroiled in a power struggle . The issue was brought to a head when Diệm scheduled a referendum for October 1955 , which was rigged by his brother Nhu , and proclaimed himself the President of the newly created Republic of Vietnam . He proceeded to strengthen his autocratic and nepotistic rule over the country . A constitution was written by a rubber stamp legislature which gave Diệm the power to create laws by decree and arbitrarily give himself emergency powers . Dissidents , both communist and nationalist , were jailed and executed in the thousands , and elections were routinely rigged . Opposition candidates were threatened with being charged for conspiring with the Vietnam People ' s Army , which carried the death penalty , and in many areas , large numbers of ARVN troops were sent to stuff ballot boxes . Diệm kept the control of the nation firmly within the hands of his family , and promotions in the ARVN were given on the basis of loyalty rather than merit . Two unsuccessful attempts had been made to depose Diệm ; in 1960 , a paratrooper revolt was quashed after Diệm stalled for negotiations to buy time for loyalists to put down the coup attempt , while a 1962 palace bombing by two Vietnam Air Force pilots failed to kill him . South Vietnam ' s Buddhist majority had long been discontented with Diệm ' s strong favoritism towards Roman Catholics . Public servants and army officers had long been promoted on the basis of religious preference , and government contracts , US aid , business favours and tax concessions were preferentially given to Catholics . The Roman Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country , and its holdings were exempt from land reform ( i . e . , appropriation ) . In the countryside , Catholics were " de facto " exempt from performing corvée labour and in some rural areas , it was claimed that Catholic priests led private armies against Buddhist villages . In 1957 , Diệm dedicated the nation to the Virgin Mary . Discontent with Diệm and Nhu exploded into mass protest during mid - 1963 when nine Buddhists died at the hand of Diệm ' s army and police on Vesak , the birthday of Gautama Buddha . In May 1963 , a law against the flying of religious flags was selectively enforced ; the Buddhist flag was banned from display on Vesak while the Vatican flag was displayed to celebrate the anniversary of the consecration of Archbishop Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục , Diệm ' s brother . Many Buddhists defied the ban and a protest was ended when government forces opened fire . With Diệm remaining intransigent in the face of escalating Buddhist demands for religious equality , sections of society began calling for his removal from power . The key turning point came shortly after midnight on 21 August , when Nhu ' s Special Forces raided and vandalised Buddhist pagodas across the country , arresting thousands of monks and causing a death toll estimated to be in the hundreds . Numerous coup plans had been explored by the army before , but the plotters intensified their activities with increased confidence after the of US President John F . Kennedy authorised the U . S . embassy to explore the possibility of a leadership change through Cable 243 . They felt Diệm ' s policies were making their client regime in South Vietnam politically unsustainable . Conspiracies . There were many conspiracies against Diệm in 1963 , many by different cliques of military officers independent from one another . According to the historian Ellen Hammer , there were " perhaps as many as six and possibly more " different plots , and these spanned the gamut of society to include civilian politicians , union leaders , and university students . Plotting by mid - level officers . In mid - 1963 , one group was composed of mid - level officers such as colonels , majors , and captains . Ðỗ Mậu was in this group , which was coordinated by Trần Kim Tuyến , South Vietnam ' s director of intelligence . Tuyến had been a palace insider , but a rift had developed in recent years , and he began plotting as early as 1962 . As South Vietnam was a police state , Tuyến was a powerful figure and had many contacts . Another person in this group was Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo , an undetected communist agent who was deliberately fomenting infighting among the officers and mismanaging the Strategic Hamlet Program in order to destabilise the Saigon government . Tuyến ' s group had many officers who were members of the opposition Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng and Đại Việt Quốc Dân Đảng , who had been discriminated against on issues of promotions , which were preferentially given to members of the regime ' s secret Cần Lao Party party . These included commanders of airborne , marine and tank units from the 5th Division , mostly at battalion level . When Tuyến ' s machinations were uncovered , he was exiled by Nhu . Mậu and Thảo took over but their initial coup plans for 15 July were shelved when American CIA agent Lucien Conein instructed Thảo ' s superior , General Trần Thiện Khiêm , the head of the army , to stop the coup on the grounds that it was premature . Thảo and Mậu ' s group resumed plotting , intending to move on 24 October and they recruited a total of 3 , 000 men . They augmented their forces with an assortment of officers from auxiliary units such as from the Signal Corps , Transportation Corps and some Vietnam Air Force pilots . Mậu enlisted the help of Khiêm following Tuyến ' s departure into exile . Mậu gained the cooperation of an assortment of military and civilian dissidents known as the Military and Civilian Front for the Revolution in Vietnam ( MCFRV ) . The MCFRV had started to plot independently in August and their leader was a cousin of Mậu . Thảo ' s 24 October coup was canceled after senior officers decided that their younger colleagues could not succeed without the help of General Tôn Thất Đính , a loyalist who controlled the III Corps . The generals sabotaged the younger officers by ordering one of their key regiments into the countryside to fight the communists . The younger officers ' plot was integrated into the generals ' larger group , and because Khiêm and Mậu were involved with both groups . After the coup was completed , the media learned that the conspiracy organised by Tuyến and Thảo had been more advanced than that of the generals ' before the latter were integrated into the main plot . General Trần Văn Đôn threatened to have the younger officers arrested but Mậu intervened to protect them . Plotting by the generals . Following the Xá Lợi Pagoda raids , the senior generals started their own plot in earnest , having only had vague plans prior to this . General Đôn , nominally a high - ranking general , but in a position without command of troops since the palace distrusted him , was sought out by Mậu , who wanted to collaborate . Mậu later accompanied the ranking general in the plot , Dương Văn Minh , on recruitment campaigns . Despite his high rank , Minh was out of favour and served as the Presidential Military Advisor , a meaningless desk job where he had no subordinates in the field and no access to soldiers . Mậu helped Minh to secure the cooperation of General Nguyễn Khánh , who commanded the II Corps that oversaw the Central Highlands of the country , and Colonel Nguyễn Văn Thiệu , who commanded the 5th Division based just outside the capital Saigon in Biên Hòa . According to Thiệu , Mậu and Minh had promised to establish a more strongly anti - communist government and to keep Diệm as a figurehead president . Recruitment of Đính . The generals knew that without the cooperation of General Tôn Thất Đính , a coup would be difficult as his III Corps forces oversaw the region surrounding the capital . Regarded by his peers as ambitious , vain and impulsive , Đính was a favorite of the Ngô family , and headed the military wing of the Cần Lao Party , a secret Catholic organisation responsible for maintaining Diệm ' s grip on power . Đính converted to Catholicism as Diệm trusted his co - religionists and promoted officers based on loyalty and not competence . Đính was known mainly for his drunken presence in Saigon ' s nightclubs , and the CIA labeled him a " basic opportunist " . Đính privately claimed responsibility for the pagoda attacks , stating to a journalist , " I have defeated Henry Cabot Lodge [ the US ambassador to South Vietnam ] . He came here to stage a coup d ' etat , but I , Ton That Dinh , have conquered him and saved the country . " During this period , Đính claimed he was " a great national hero " . His ego had been played upon by the Ngô brothers , who reiterated this point and paid him a large cash bonus after the pagoda raids . In the heady times after the attacks , Đính told his American advisors that " he was without doubt the greatest general officer in the ARVN , the saviour of Saigon … and soon he would be the top military man in the country " . In a press conference soon after , Đính claimed to have saved South Vietnam from " foreign adventurers " , a euphemism for the United States . After being questioned sharply , Đính quickly became angry . Ray Herndon of United Press International ( UPI ) asked him to name the country that he was referring to , but Đính dodged the question . Herndon lampooned him by saying that a national hero should be able to identify the national enemy , and asked him to call Madame Nhu , the country ' s First Lady known for her anti - American comments , to get help in identifying the hostile country in question . After several reporters derisively laughed at his comments , Đính angrily stormed out of the conference . Đính returned to the officers ' mess at the Joint General Staff headquarters and his colleagues attempted to play on Đính ' s ego to convince him to join their plot . In a series of meetings , the other generals assured Đính that he was a national hero worthy of political authority , and claimed that Nhu had not realised how important he was in the future of the country . Đính ' s colleagues even bribed his soothsayer to predict his elevation to political power . The other generals told him that the people were dissatisfied with Diệm ' s cabinet and that Vietnam needed dynamic young officers in politics , and that their presence would reverse the declining morale in the ARVN . They advised Đính to ask Diệm to promote him to Interior Minister , Dương Văn Minh to Defence Minister , and Trần Văn Minh to Education Minister . Đính and his fellow generals met Diệm at the palace , where Đính asked the president to promote him to the post of Interior Minister . Diệm bluntly chastised Đính in front of his colleagues , and ordered him out of Saigon to the central highlands resort town of Đà Lạt to rest . Đính was humiliated and embarrassed , having promised his colleagues he would be successful . The Ngô brothers had been alarmed by Đính ' s request , and put him under surveillance . Đính found out , further straining his relationship with the palace . Đính agreed to join the coup , although with his ambitious nature , the other officers were skeptical and planned to have him assassinated if he tried to switch sides . Without Đính ' s troops , the coup would not have been possible . Nhu ' s counter - plot . By mid - October , Diệm and Nhu were aware that a group of ARVN generals and colonels were planning a coup , but did not know that Đính was firmly among them , although they grew wary of him after his request for a cabinet post . Nhu then made a plan to outwit the generals with a counter - plot . The generals heard of this and decided that they had to counteract him . The other generals were still suspicious of Đính and whether he would betray them to the palace . Having found out that Đính would be recruited for Nhu ' s plan , and not sure which side he was really on , they promised to make him Interior Minister and other rewards if they helped to overthrow the Ngô family . Having gained a reassurance from Đính , the generals placated the younger officers , whose coup had been integrated into their plans . As part of the generals ' plot , Đính sent Colonel Nguyễn Hữu Có , his deputy corps commander , to Mỹ Tho to talk to the 7th Division commander , Colonel ( later Major General ) Bùi Đình Đạm , and two regimental commanders , the armoured unit commander , both of the 7th Division , and the Mỹ Tho region provincial chief . Exhorting them to join the coup on the grounds that Diệm ' s regime was unable to keep the military going forward , he stated that all the generals except Cao were in the plot , while Đính was going to do so . According to one account , Đính intended for loyalists to report Có ' s activities to Diệm and Nhu so that it would give him an opportunity to orchestrate a stunt to ingratiate himself with the palace . Nhu ' s agents heard of the conversation and reported to the palace . When the Ngô brothers confronted Đính with the report of what had happened in Mỹ Tho , Đính feigned astonishment at his deputy ' s behaviour . He began crying and said " This is my fault , because you have suspected me . I have not really gone to work for the last 15 days but have stayed at home because I was sad . But I am not against you . I was sad because I thought I was discredited with you . So Nguyễn Hữu Có profited from my absence to make trouble . " Đính claimed to know nothing of Có ' s activities , raising his voice , vowing to have his deputy killed . Nhu opposed this and stated that he wanted Có alive to catch the plotters , and tried to use Đính to achieve this . Despite their distrust of Đính , the Ngô brothers told them this was not the case and that they would promote him . Nhu ordered Đính and Tung , both of whom took their orders directly from the palace instead of the ARVN command , to plan a fake coup against the Ngô family . One of Nhu ' s objectives was to trick dissidents into joining the false uprising so that they could be identified and eliminated . Another objective of the public relations stunt was to give the public a false impression of the strength of the Ngô regime . Codenamed " Operation Bravo " , the first stage of the scheme would involve some of Tung ' s loyalist soldiers , disguised as insurgents led by apparently renegade junior officers , faking a coup and vandalising the capital . During the orchestrated chaos of the first coup , the disguised loyalists would riot and in the ensuing mayhem , kill the leading coup plotters , such as Generals Dương Văn Minh , Trần Văn Đôn , Lê Văn Kim and junior officers that were helping them . The loyalists and some of Nhu ' s underworld connections were also to kill some figures who were assisting the conspirators , such as the titular but relatively powerless Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ , CIA agent Lucien Conein , who was on assignment in Vietnam as a military adviser , and Lodge . Buddhist and student dissident leaders would also be targeted . These would be blamed on " neutralist and pro - communist elements " . Tung would then announce the formation of a " revolutionary government " consisting of opposition activists who had not consented to being named in the government , while Diệm and Nhu would pretend to be on the run and move to Vũng Tàu . A fake " counter - coup " was to follow , whereby Tung ' s men , having left Saigon on the pretext of fighting communists , as well as Đính ' s forces , would triumphantly re - enter Saigon to reaffirm the Diệm regime . Nhu would then round up opposition figures . Đính , now a double agent , was put in charge of the fake coup and was allowed the additional control of the 7th Division based in south of the capital , which was previously assigned to Diệm loyalist General Huỳnh Văn Cao , who was in charge of the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta . The reassignment of the 7th Division to Đính gave his III Corps complete encirclement of Saigon . The encirclement would prevent Cao from storming the capital to save Diệm as he had done during the 1960 coup attempt . This arrangement was supposed to make Đính ' s task of serving the regime easier , but it was exploited to bring down the Ngô family . Nhu and Tung remained unaware of Đính ' s allegiance to the rebels , and were fooled . Đính told Tung that the fake coup needed to employ an overwhelming amount of force . He said that tanks were required " because armour is dangerous " . Đính said that fresh troops were needed in the capital , opining , " If we move reserves into the city , the Americans will be angry . They ' ll complain that we ' re not fighting the war . So we must camouflage our plan by sending the special forces out to the country . That will deceive them . " Nhu had no idea that Đính ' s real intention was to engulf Saigon with rebel units and lock Tung ' s loyalists in the countryside where they could not defend the Ngôs . Nhu ' s coup would take place on 1 November , All Saints ' Day , when Catholics prepare for All Souls ' Day , which follows the next day . This was so that troops could move freely through the streets , which would be carrying less traffic . The generals decided to start their real coup on the same day to try to exploit Đính ' s liaison with Nhu . Colonel Ðỗ Mậu , director of military security and one of the conspirators , concocted military intelligence reports with false data that claimed that the communist Vietcong were massing outside the capital for an offensive . He convinced Diệm and Nhu to send the special forces out of the capital to fight the communists . Tung and Nhu agreed to send all four Saigon - based special forces companies out of Saigon on 29 October . Another of Diệm ' s brothers , Ngô Đình Cẩn , began to suspect Mậu and told the palace , which told army chief General Khiêm to have Mậu arrested . However , Khiêm , who was also part of the plot , deliberately procrastinated and Mậu remained free . In the meantime , it was too late for the brothers to bring their loyalists back into the capital . Not trusting Có , Diệm put Colonel Lâm Văn Phát in command of the 7th Division on 31 October . According to tradition , Phát had to pay the corps commander a courtesy visit before assuming control of the division . Đính refused to see Phát and told him to come back on Friday at 14 : 00 , by which time the coup would have been in progress . In the meantime , Đính had Đôn sign a counter - order transferring command of the 7th Division to Có . Rebel troop movements in and around Saigon . The insurgent plans were based on three main task forces . The first consisted of two battalions of marines and a company of M - 113 armoured personnel carriers . Two battalions of airborne troops regarded as being pro - Diệm were moved to Bình Dương Province to the north of the capital and replaced with the two marine battalions . The marines and the paratroopers were South Vietnam ' s strategic reserve and were usually deployed near Saigon for protecting the regime against any coups . Another task force consisted of the 6th Airborne Battalion , which was based in Vũng Tàu around 70 km southwest of the capital , and a trainee battalion , supplemented by 12 APCs from the armor school at Long Hải . The final task force consisted of the 2nd Battalion , 9th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion , 7th Regiment of the 5th Division of Colonel Thiệu . The troops involved in the operations in Saigon began preparing to move into the capital on the evening before the coup and in the early morning . The second task force moved in from the southeast and converged with the other two moving in from the north , and some rebel elements from the 7th Division from the southwest . By noon , thousands of rebel soldiers had assembled on the city ' s outskirts , checking equipment and weapons and receiving last - minute orders . Three marine battalions in tanks and armored cars had moved toward the Saigon city center to spearhead the revolt , and some of the 7th Division had arrived from the Mekong Delta to cut the main road from the south into Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base . The enlisted men did not know the truth behind their mission , nor did many lower - ranking officers ; the senior officers told them that they were crushing a police revolt . One airborne lieutenant was suspicious , and as they moved into the suburbs , a colonel revealed that their objective was the Cộng Hòa Barracks of the Presidential Guard . When the lieutenant asked " Who is the enemy and who our friend ? " , the colonel retorted " Anyone who opposes us is the enemy " . The task forces were used to man various parts of the city , guarding the howitzers to be used in the siege of loyalist installations , and to protect the headquarters Colonel Thiệu . Đính had 20 tanks brought to his III Corps headquarters at Camp Lê Văn Duyệt . In all , the conspirators had 40 forty tanks and armoured personnel carriers . Lodge , Harkins and Felt meet with Diệm . At 10 : 00 on 1 November , Lodge , Harkins and Admiral Harry D . Felt , the commander of US forces in the Pacific region , were invited to Gia Long Palace by Diệm . Đôn had scheduled the meeting for the visiting Felt at that time to keep Diệm occupied as the troops were moved in and to keep the president in Saigon . They were accompanied by Đôn , whose desk job meant that his duties consisted mainly of meeting visiting military dignitaries . Diệm gave one of his chain - smoking monologues and said that he would cooperate with US recommendations . According to Lodge , however , Diệm was more direct and to the point than usual . Diệm recounted to Felt about the Ngô family ' s achievements , then complained about American aid cuts in response to the pagoda raids . He blamed the generals , claiming they had attacked the Buddhists , not the special forces , and claimed Tung ' s men were now under the army ' s control and not used as a private army , which was false . Diệm also claimed that aid cutbacks had hindered the army and led to food shortages . At one stage , Diệm said " I know there is going to be a coup attempt , but I don ' t know who is going to do it " , to which Lodge purportedly replied " I don ' t think that there is anything to worry about " . Diệm then asked Lodge to talk to officials in Washington about Nhu ' s future ; Diệm was still refusing to remove his brother from authority . He said " Please tell President Kennedy I am a good and frank ally , that I would rather be frank and settle questions than talk about them after we have lost everything . Tell President Kennedy that I take all his suggestions very seriously and wish to carry them out but it is a question of timing . " Lodge did not discuss anything specific with regards to a regime change , but claimed that he was not worried by rumors that Diệm and Nhu had wanted to assassinate him . Lodge expressed his " admiration and personal friendship " and gratitude for Diệm ' s hospitality . As Harkins and Felt prepared to leave , Diệm took Lodge aside for an individual discussion and repeatedly asked what the Americans wanted , repeating his request for 20 minutes . This was a trick on Diem ' s part , as the fake coup was about to start . In reference to a United Nations inquiry over his repression of the Buddhists , Diệm claimed that Buddhists had been brainwashed by the Americans . Diệm claimed he had closed the because among the students were communists about to throw grenades and perpetrate bombings during the UN visit . The president also claimed that some Americans were planning a coup against him and promised to give Lodge names . The American ambassador replied with a poker face that he was committed to removing any of his countrymen who were involved in plotting , even though he was doing so himself . Lodge was not taken in by Diệm , as Washington had already told Diệm what reforms were necessary , such as the removal of Nhu and the use of the special forces to fight communists rather than dissidents ; Diệm had not responded to US advice . Lodge knew that the real coup was in the offing and did not want to stop it , even if Diệm ' s overtures were genuine . Felt was unaware of impending events — as was Harkins — and hurried to Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base for his noon flight . Before leaving , he held a press conference with Harkins and Đôn while the rebels were rolling into the city . Harkins spoke about the military situation with optimism ; on the morning of the coup , the front page of the " Stars and Stripes " , a military newspaper , featured a piece with Harkins ' sunny outlook , entitled " Viet Victory Near " . While Felt and Harkins were talking , the officers were preparing to launch the coup at a lunchtime meeting at military headquarters next to the airport . Thinking of the situation , Đôn kept glancing at his watch while waiting for Felt to fly out . The three men were standing as they talked , and Đôn , overcome by nerves , chewed his gum " like a threshing machine " , and could not stand still , frequently changing his footing as he talked . After Felt left , the runway was closed , and Đôn brushed off Harkins and quickly went away to get ready for the coup . Up to the last minute , Harkins and Felt remained unaware of the imminent coup , despite Đôn ' s fidgety behaviour . The pair had paid a visit to Đôn to discuss military issues at 09 : 15 , but instead of the Vietnamese general hosting his American visitors as Joint General Staff headquarters , as was the norm , Đôn went to the Military Assistance Command , Vietnam office . Although Felt was surprised , the Americans did not realise the reason for the unusual venue and then pointed at a map and wondered why two airborne battalions appeared to be idling . Đôn replied that they were going into battle , and Harkins nodded , unaware that they were entering Saigon . Harkins had told the generals earlier that he opposed a coup , so Đôn avoided the topic . Felt had been told of the existence of coup plans by Lodge , who falsely informed him that it was not imminent , saying " There isn ' t a Vietnamese general with hair enough on his chest to make it go . " Felt later said that Đôn appeared to be calm and composed . Final preparations . Distrust . On the morning of the coup , there was still some trepidation among the plotters . Khiêm approached Đính and asked him to keep their conversation confidential . After the III Corps commander agreed , Khiêm claimed that he wanted to cancel the coup , saying " Đính , I think we still have time to talk to the old man . I don ' t want to hurt him . Have pity on him ! " Đính contemplated the situation and said that he would still proceed with the overthrow . Khiêm reported this to Đôn , and claimed that he had placed Chinese medicinal oil into his eyes to irritate and redden them and thus give the appearance he had become remorseful about the coup , in order to test Đính ' s loyalty to the plot . Both Minh and Đôn were wary of Khiêm and Đính up to the last minute , as the latter were both Catholics who were favourites of the Ngô family , who had been rewarded for their loyalty not competence . Khiêm was Diệm ' s godson . The other generals remained worried that Đính might switch sides and go through with the second part of Nhu ' s fake coup . The generals were also concerned that they would not have enough forces to overcome the loyalists . Premature start . The first victim of the coup was Captain Hồ Tấn Quyền , Diệm ' s loyalist naval commander , who was shot dead on his 36th birthday before noon . There are varying accounts of Quyền ' s death . According to Stanley Karnow , Quyền had noticed abnormal troop movements and drove off to discuss the matter with a colleague . A jeep of rebel marines followed and intercepted him by overtaking him and blocking the road . Quyền abandoned his vehicle and ran across the open field , but stumbled and fell with the marines in hot pursuit . One of them rebels reached him and shot him in the head point blank . According to Ellen Hammer , however , Quyền started his birthday with an early morning tennis match with fellow officers , who invited him to a lunchtime birthday party . Quyền declined in order to look after his children who were at home alone while his wife was studying in Japan . His deputy , who was part of the plot , followed him home and managed to change Quyền ' s mind . The two men headed for a restaurant on Saigon ' s outskirts , and the shooting took place along the way . Historian and author Mark Moyar wrote that Quyền noticed suspicious troop movements near the capital in the morning . As Quyền prepared to go to the palace to alert the Ngô brothers , his deputy shot him dead on the Biên Hòa highway . The generals were immediately informed of the killing and forced to bring forward intended troop movements into Saigon ahead of schedule . Capture of loyalist officers . On 1 November , the plotters summoned many senior officers who were not involved in the plot to the Joint General Staff headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base , on the pretext of a routine lunchtime leadership meeting . Mậu and Đôn organised the invitations and set up the trap . At 13 : 45 , Đôn announced that a coup was taking place . Most of the officers rose to applaud , while those who did not and refused to turn against Diệm were arrested . The plotters neutralised many Diệm loyalists in this manner , most notably Colonel Tung , who was taken away by Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung , Minh ' s bodyguard . As he was led away , Tung angrily denounced the generals , shouting " Remember who gave you your stars ! " During the early stages of the coup , the rebels forced Tung to order his men to surrender by putting a pistol to his head and forcing him to make a phone call to his subordinates . This meant that only the Presidential Guard was left to defend Gia Long Palace . At 16 : 45 , Tung was forced at gunpoint to talk to Diệm on the phone , telling the president that he had told his men to stand down , but Tung failed to convince the president to surrender . Minh then ordered Nhung to execute Tung as he still commanded the loyalty of his men . The other generals had little sympathy for the special forces commander as he had disguised his men in army uniforms and framed the generals for the pagoda raids . The generals were well aware of the threat that Tung posed ; they had discussed and agreed on his elimination during their planning , having contemplated waging an offensive against Tung ' s special forces . At nightfall Tung was taken with Major Lé Quang Trieu , his brother and deputy , hands tied , into a jeep and driven to edge of the air base . Forced to kneel over two freshly dug holes , the brothers were shot into their graves and buried . Another leading officer who stayed loyal to Diệm was Colonel Cao Văn Viên , commander of the airborne brigade . Viên had been unaware of the plot , and the generals had discussed whether to assassinate him during their planning phase because they knew he was a Diệmist . However , Đính , who played mahjong with Viên ' s wife , convinced Minh to not have Viên liquidated , and promised that Viên would not oppose the coup . Đính ' s prediction that Viên would acquiesce was incorrect . Viên " broke down completely " and took off his insignia and handed it to Minh in resignation . He was then taken into custody , and sentenced to death . Viên had planned with Diệm to allow the president to take refuge at his home in the event of a coup , but the offer was moot as rebels surrounded Viên ' s house after taking him into custody . Viên narrowly avoided execution and was released and returned to command after the coup . General Khang , the commander of the marine brigade , was also put under arrest for remaining loyal to Diệm , as was the head of the Vietnam Air Force Đỗ Khắc Mai , and the national police chief . After the loyalists were taken away , Minh read the coup proclamation and his objectives and taped it and asked the other officers to sign the papers . They then spoke into the recorder , identifying themselves as supporters of the coup . Minh told his subordinates to have copies made of the original , and hid the copies in several places so that his accomplices could not claim that they were not involved if the putsch failed . Minh was to play them over the radio later that day . Seizing control of the 7th Division . With a group of his personal rebel officers , Có flew by helicopter to Mỹ Tho , the division headquarters , to take command on the morning of the coup . Reaching the Mekong Delta town two hours before the scheduled start of the coup , he held a ceremony for the division ' s incumbent officers — who thought the change of command was a routine matter — in a local hall . When the coup started , Có ' s men charged through the doors with automatic guns and arrested the officers , before taking command . He said " Please remain seated quietly . Anyone who rises will be instantly shot " . Có then phoned Cao , further south in the Mekong Delta ' s largest town Cần Thơ , where the IV Corps was headquartered . The rebel colonel assured Cao that the divisional and corps transfer had taken place smoothly . Có , a central Vietnamese , was afraid that Cao , a Mekong Delta native would recognise his fake southern accent , and realize that he was impersonating Phat , another southerner . However , Cao did not notice . When Cao was informed by his subordinates that there was a coup occurring in the capital , he believed it to be part of the false coup , as he had been told beforehand by Nhu ; Cao was one of the regime ' s most loyal and favourites generals and he was going to help stage the second part of Nhu ' s plan . Cao told one regiments and a few tanks to ready themselves for the second part of the plot . Later , Cao realised it was a genuine coup . He sent the 9th Division under Colonel Bùi Dzinh to move north through Mỹ Tho towards Saigon to save Diệm , but Có had already made plans to cut off any attempt by Cao to relieve Saigon . When Cao radioed the 7th Division in Mỹ Tho , Có identified himself and taunted the corps commander , saying " Didn ' t you recognise my accent ? " . Có told the general that he had ordered all the ferries to the Saigon side of the Mekong River , and told Cao not to attempt to cross unless he wanted to die . Seeing that Diệm was lost , Cao later expressed solidarity with the coup . Fighting in Saigon . The rebels encountered little resistance at the start of the attack on Saigon , and this allowed them to generate momentum . This was primarily to Diệm and Nhu ' s complacency and mistaken assumption that the military action was the start of Operation Bravo . The central police called Diệm , informing him that the marines did not appear to be friendly . It was too late as the rebels captured the police headquarters and shut down the secret police , which were directly controlled by Nhu . Wearing red scarves for identification , the rebel marines caught the loyalists off guard and took over control of the building of the Interior Ministry and the national police headquarters . The latter installation was captured by some newly enlisted troops from the Quang Trung Training Camp , led by General Mai Hữu Xuân , who promptly arrested the Diem supporters in the office . The rebels also tried to take control of the Infantry School in Saigon so that they could use the two trainee battalions against Diệm , but the loyalist head of the institution , Colonel Lam Son , foiled their plans . One of Diệm ' s aides called Đính but was told that Đính was not there . Diệm and Nhu remained relaxed , confident that it was the phony coup . When security officials noticed the troop movements , a panicked young officer telephoned Nhu , who serenely said . " It ' s all right , I know about it . " The generals timed the coup to trick Nhu and Diệm , who were always paranoid about threats to their power , into believing that the threat was false . The rebels outnumbered the Diệmists and quickly made inroads against the loyalists , who were caught unawares and confused about whether the coup was real . The generals wanted and needed to finish the operation quickly with as little hand - to - hand combat as possible , as they knew that both factions would have to put aside their differences and regroup to fight the communists after the coup , and because a drawn out mini - civil war would only allow the communists to take over the countryside while the ARVN fought in the capital . Minh had decided to keep the loyalists in their rank afterward if they still wanted to fight the Vietcong . Furthermore , a drawn - out conflict would benefit the Vietcong . Most of the anti - Diệm forces also wanted to avoid killing the president in a large - scale battle for the palace . The rebels quickly took control of Tân Sơn Nhứt to control air traffic , and set up checkpoints and defense installations on the cities ' outskirts to guard against any counterattack that might come from outside the capital . They also blew up government buildings , and took control of the national post office and radio stations . Four AD - 6 fighter - bombers from the Air Force roared above the city centre , adding to the confusion and threatening loyalist positions . Lieutenant Colonel Nguyễn Cao Kỳ , the deputy commander of the air force , sent two T - 28 fighter - bombers over Saigon . They strafed the palace , and fired two rockets while avoiding sporadic black and white clouds of antiaircraft fire . Both shots missed their targets , and the second struck an empty US Marine barracks . The only result of the stray projectile was that the damage to the marines ' lodging resulted in a pet snake escaping . At the same time , some air force fighter - bombers made strafing runs at the headquarters of the naval forces in the capital , where the defenders remained loyal to Diệm . Some anti - aircraft guns on the vessels patrolling in the Saigon River returned fire . Around 15 minutes after the start of the coup , radio transmissions were taken off the air , severing communication with those outside Saigon . Early on during the coup , while the special forces were still fighting before the generals forced Tung to order them to capitulate , one of his subordinates was in Gia Long Palace made a proposal to Diệm . According to the diary of one of Diệm ' s aides , the special forces officer drew up and proposed a surprise counter - attack on the rebel headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt using loyalist infantry and tanks . Tân Sơn Nhứt was located on the northwestern edge of the city , and the officer said that it was only protected by trainee soldiers . He told Diệm there was no chance that the new recruits could resist a loyalist attack and therefore the generals would be easily captured and the leadership of the coup would break down . The aide reported that Diệm turned down the proposal , saying " The brigade should conserve its forces to fight the communists and avoid bloodshed . In the meantime , it should protect Gia Long Palace , the post office and the treasury . " Another aide believed that Diệm did not want to attack the headquarters of the JGS because " it represented the authority of the armed forces " and to avoid " more harm , more death , more suffering for the soldiers " . According to this account , Diệm " was confident that his forbearance would make the coup forces realize that he was a president who always stood on the side of the masses of the population " . To stop the loyalist forces near the palace from escaping , armoured and artillery units commanded by Colonel Thiệu placed their tanks and howitzers shoulder - to - shoulder , in preparation for the shelling of the Cộng Hòa Barracks of the Presidential Guard , located near the palace . Armored personnel carrier brought more rebel troops with machine guns to surround the Cộng Hòa Barracks , where the defenders were armed with artillery , mortars and machine guns . Under the command of Thiệu , the siege of the barracks started , and rebel artillery shells soon reduced the buildings to rubble , but the pro - Diệm loyalists fought on , a scant five blocks from the palace . Presidential Guard tanks returned fire , severely damaging nearby roadways . After an hour , Diệm and Nhu suspected that something was amiss and attempted to call Đính ' s office for a second time and again were told Đính was not there . Not believing Đính had double crossed them , the Ngô brothers were heard in the background speculating that Đính had been arrested by the rebels . The generals then phoned Gia Long Palace with an ultimatum . If Diệm resigned immediately , he and Nhu would be safely exiled . If he did not , they would launch air strikes and start shelling the palace within the hour . The generals said that there would be no negotiation , only a yes or no would be acceptable . Diệm made no reply . Shortly after 16 : 00 , Diệm telephoned JGS headquarters . Đôn answered and stated " the time has come when the army must respond to the wishes of the people " because Diệm had failed to reform his leadership . The pair had a robust argument and Diệm asked the commanders to visit him the palace to negotiate and work on a reform plan . The generals , remembering that he bought time for loyalists to come to his aid during the 1960 coup attempt by stalling the coup with talks and a false promise of reform and power - sharing , turned down his suggestion . At 16 : 30 , the generals officially announced the coup over national radio , repeating the recorded message at five minute intervals . Their message called on Diệm and Nhu to give up power , and many officers identified themselves as participants . The recorded pledges made at JGS were also played . Minh said " The day the people have been waiting for has come . For eight years , the people of Vietnam have suffered under the rotten , nepotic Diem regime , but now the armed forces have come to their rescue . " It further said " Soldiers in the army , security service , civil defense force , and people ' s force . . . The Ngo Dinh Diem government , abusing power , has thought only of personal ambition and slighted the fatherland ' s interests . . . The army has swung into action . The task of you all is to unite . . . The revolution will certainly be successful . " The proclamation was endorsed by 14 generals , 7 colonels and a major . It further added that " We have no political ambitions . . . We act not for fame or benefit , but to save our beloved fatherland . " However a technical malfunction interrupted the broadcasts with twist and cha - cha music ; under the Diệm regime his sister - in - law had banned dancing and associated music under a series of " morality laws " . In the meantime , VNAF transport planes dropped rebel leaflets over Saigon , asking the population to rally to the anti - Diệm cause . Concurrent to the generals ' radio broadcast , Diệm telephoned Lodge at the US Embassy . Diệm angrily shouted in French , and Lodge had to hold the receiver away from his ear . Diệm ' s voice was loud enough that Lodge ' s aides could hear the message from a distance . Lodge reported the following exchange to Washington : It later emerged , however , that Lodge had not given a full account of the conversation to his superiors at the State Department . The Australian historian Anne E . Blair said " there can be no doubt that Lodge silenced some of Diệm ' s rejoinder , supremely confident as he was in his ability to control not only the American press by the official government records as well " . Lodge ' s aide , Frederick Flott , claimed that in the middle of the conversation Lodge offered to send his staff to Diệm ' s palace to have the Ngô brothers taken to the airport and safely exiled and exhorted him to leave . Lodge wanted to send Flott to the palace in a taxi marked with American flags , to negotiate his way into the building and take the brothers to the airport , where he would be flown aboard an American aircraft to a military base in the Philippines . Diệm mistakenly presumed that Lodge ' s offer implied American reinforcements against the coup . One account from a US embassy official added the following passage , omitted by Lodge . Diệm ' s bodyguard would claim decades later that the president further said : Through the afternoon and into the night , the loudspeakers on the grounds of Gia Long Palace carried Diệm ' s recorded exhortation to loyalists that " We shall not give in " . These were mixed with passages of military music . At the same time , the US military ordered units of the Seventh Fleet to move into the waters near Saigon as a " precautionary measure " in case the fighting endangered Americans lives and to deter an opportunistic communist offensive . Siege on Gia Long Palace . Gia Long Palace , the presidential mansion had once served as the home of French governor general . For security reasons , the surrounding streets were regularly sealed after sunset , the building had many bunkers and an intricate tunnel system , including a half - block long escape route to the basement of the City Hall . On the morning of 1 November , Diệm had reinforced palace security with more soldiers and barbed - wire barricades . The palace was surrounded by walls of around 2 . 1 m , and defended by 150 troops of the Presidential Guard . The building was protected by machine and antiaircraft guns , ringed with pillboxes , tanks , and 20 - mm cannons mounted on armoured vehicles . As Diệm refused to surrender , vowing to reassert his control , after sunset , Thiệu led his 7th Division in an assault on Gia Long Palace . They used artillery and flamethrowers and it fell by daybreak after Diệm finally gave the order to the Presidential Guard to surrender . The coup results pleased the anti - Diệmists . The casualties were light : 9 insurgents killed and 46 wounded , 4 dead and 44 injured Presidential Guardsmen . The greatest casualties were from the populace , who suffered 20 deaths and 14 injured . I Corps . When Tri was informed that coup was imminent , he left Huế on 29 October for Đà Nẵng so that he would be away from Ngô Đình Cẩn , who ruled central Vietnam from Hue for his family . The coup took place on 1 November , and Tri helped to prevent any loyalist actions by causing diversions . He scheduled a meeting with the province chief and other pro - Diệm officials during the time that the coup was to take place . As a result , Diệm loyalists were stuck in a meeting room and were unable to mobilise the Republican Youth and other Ngô family paramilitary and activist groups . Surrender and execution of Diệm and Nhu . In the early morning of 2 November 1963 Diệm agreed to surrender . The ARVN officers had a meeting intended to exile Diệm and Nhu , having promised the Ngô brothers safe passage out of the country into an " honorable retirement " . Not all of the senior officers attended the meeting . General Nguyễn Ngọc Lê strongly lobbied for Diệm ' s execution . There was no formal vote taken at the meeting , and Lê attracted only minority support . Conein reported that the generals had never indicated that assassination was in their minds , since an orderly transition of power was a high priority in achieving their ultimate aim of gaining international recognition . Minh and Don asked Conein to secure an American aircraft to take the brothers out of the country . Two days earlier , Lodge had alerted Washington that such a request was likely and recommended Saigon as the departure point . This request put the Kennedy administration in a difficult position , as the provision of an airplane would publicly tie it to the coup . When Conein telephoned the Saigon CIA station , there was a ten - minute wait . The U . S . government would not allow the aircraft to land in any country , unless that state was willing to grant asylum to Diem . The United States did not want Diem and Nhu to form a government in exile and Roger Hilsman had written earlier that " Under no circumstances should the Nhus be permitted to remain in Southeast Asia in close proximity to Vietnam because of the plots they will mount to try to regain power . If the generals decide to exile Diem , he should also be sent outside Southeast Asia . " He further went on to anticipate what he termed a " Götterdämmerung in the palace " . After surrendering , Diệm rang Lodge and spoke to the American envoy for the last time . Lodge did not report the conversation to Washington , so it was widely assumed that the pair last spoke on the previous afternoon when the coup was just starting . However , after Lodge died in 1985 , his aide , Colonel Mike Dunn said that Lodge and Diệm spoke for the last at around 07 : 00 on 2 November , moments after Diệm surrendered . When Diệm called , Lodge " put [ him ] on hold " and then walked away . Upon his return , the ambassador offered Diệm and Nhu asylum , but would not arrange for transportation to the Philippines until the next day . This contradicted his earlier offer of asylum the previous day when he implored Diệm to not resist the coup . Dunn then offered to personally go to the brothers ' hideout to escort him so that the generals could not kill him , but Lodge refused , saying " We just can ' t get that involved " . Dunn said " I was really astonished that we didn ' t do more for them " . Having refused to help the Ngô brothers to leave the country safely , Lodge later said after they had been shot : " What would we have done with them if they had lived ? Every Colonel Blimp in the world would have made use of them . " Dunn claimed Lodge put Diệm on hold to inform Conein where the brothers were — they had sneaked out of the palace so that the generals could capture them . When confronted about Dunn ' s claim by a historian , Conein denied the account . One of Lodge ' s staff told Conein that the plane would have to go directly to the faraway asylum - offering country , so that the brothers could not disembark at a nearby stopover country and stay there to foment a counter - coup . Conein was told that the nearest plane that was capable of such a long range flight was in Guam , and it would take 24 hours to make the necessary arrangements . Minh was astounded and told Conein that the generals could not hold Diệm for that long . Conein reportedly did not suspect a deliberate delay by the American embassy . In contrast , a United States Senate investigative commission in the early 1970s raised a provocative conundrum : " One wonders what became of the U . S . military aircraft that had been dispatched to stand by for Lodge ' s departure , scheduled for the previous day . " Escape to Cholon . Minh traveled to Gia Long Palace in a sedan with his aide and bodyguard , Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung to arrest the Ngô brothers . Minh had also dispatched a M - 113 armored personnel carrier and four jeeps to Gia Long to transport Diệm and Nhu back to JGS headquarters for the ceremonial handover of power during a nationally televised event witnessed by international media . Diệm and Nhu would then " ask " the generals to be granted exile and asylum in a foreign country , which would be granted . Diệm ' s escape . Minh instead arrived to find that the brothers were missing . In anticipation of a coup , they had ordered the construction of three separate tunnels leading from Gia Long to remote areas outside the palace . Around 20 : 00 the night before , Diệm and Nhu hurriedly packed American banknotes into a briefcase . They escaped through one of the tunnels with two loyalists : Cao Xuân Vy , head of Nhu ' s Republican Youth , and Air Force Lieutenant Ðỗ Thơ , Diệm ' s aide - de - camp , who happened to be a nephew of Ðỗ Mậu . Diệm and Nhu emerged in a wooded area in a park near the Cercle Sportif , the city ' s upper class sporting club , where they were picked up by a waiting vehicle . Historian Ellen Hammer disputes the tunnel escape , asserting that the Ngô brothers simply walked out of the building , which was not yet under siege . Hammer asserts that they walked past the tennis courts and left the palace grounds through a small gate at Le Thanh Ton Street and entered the car . The loyalists traveled through narrow back streets in order to evade rebel checkpoints and changed vehicles to a black Citroën sedan . After leaving the palace , Nhu was reported to have suggested to Diệm that the brothers split up , arguing this would enhance their chances of survival . Nhu proposed that one of them travel to the Mekong Delta to join Cao ' s IV Corps , while the other would travel to the II Corps of General Nguyễn Khánh in the Central Highlands . Nhu felt that the rebel generals would not dare to kill one of them while the other was free , in case the surviving brother was to regain power . According to one account , Diệm reportedly turned down Nhu , reasoning that " You cannot leave alone . They hate you too much ; they will kill you . Stay with me and I will protect you . " Another story holds that Diệm reportedly said " We have always been together during these last years . How could we separate during these last years ? How could we separate in this critical hour ? " Nhu agreed to stay together until the end . The loyalists reached the home of Ma Tuyen in the Chinese business district of Cholon . Ma Tuyen was a Chinese merchant and friend who was reported to be Nhu ' s main contact with the Chinese syndicates which controlled the opium trade . The brothers sought asylum from the embassy of the Republic of China , but were turned down and stayed in Ma Tuyen ' s house as they appealed to ARVN loyalists and attempted to negotiate with the coup leaders . Nhu ' s secret agents had fitted the home with a direct phone line to the palace , so the insurgent generals believed that the brothers were still besieged inside Gia Long . Neither the rebels nor the loyalist Presidential Guard had any idea that at 21 : 00 they were about to fight for an empty building , leading to futile deaths . Minh was reported to be mortified when he realised that Diệm and Nhu had escaped in the middle of the night . After Minh had ordered the rebels to search the areas known to have been frequented by the Ngô family , Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo was informed by a captured Presidential Guard officer that the brothers had escaped through the tunnels to a refuge in Cholon . Thảo was told by Khiêm to find and prevent Diệm from being killed . When Thảo arrived at Ma Tuyen ' s house , he phoned his superiors . Diệm and Nhu overheard him and fled to the nearby Catholic Church of St . Francis Xavier . Lieutenant Tho died a few months later in a plane crash , but his diary was not found until 1970 . Tho recorded Diệm ' s words as they left the house of Ma Tuyen as being " I don ' t know whether I will live or die and I don ' t care , but tell Nguyễn Khánh that I have great affection for him and he should avenge me " . The Ngô brothers walked through the shady courtyard . It was speculated that they were recognised by an informant while they walked through the yard . A few minutes later , just after 10 : 00 , an armoured personnel carrier and two jeeps entered . Lieutenant Ðỗ Thơ had earlier urged Diệm to surrender , saying that he was sure that his uncle Mậu , along with Đính and Khiêm , would guarantee their safety . Tho wrote in his diary later that " I consider myself responsible for having led them to their death " . Execution . The convoy was led by General Mai Hữu Xuân and consisted of Colonels Quan and Lắm . Quan was Minh ' s deputy , and Lắm was commander of Diệm ' s Civil Guard . Lắm had joined the coup once a rebel victory seemed assured . Two further officers made up the convoy : Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa and Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung . Nhung was Minh ' s bodyguard . Nhu expressed disgust that they were to be transported in an APC , asking " You use such a vehicle to drive the president ? " Lắm assured them the armor was for their own protection . Xuân told them it was selected to protect them from " extremists " . The brothers ' hands were tied behind their backs . One officer asked to shoot Nhu , but turned him down . After the arrest , Nhung and Nghĩa sat with the brothers in the APC , and the convoy departed for Tân Sơn Nhứt . Before the convoy departed for the church , Minh reportedly gestured to Nhung with two fingers , which some have claimed was to be taken as an order to kill both brothers . The convoy stopped at a railroad crossing on the return trip , where by all accounts the brothers were killed . An investigation by Đôn later determined that Nghia had shot the brothers at point - blank range with a semi - automatic firearm and that Nhung sprayed them with bullets before repeatedly stabbing the bodies with a knife . Attempted cover - up . When the corpses arrived at JGS headquarters , the generals were shocked . Although they despised and had no sympathy for Nhu , they still respected Diệm , and several lost their composure . Đính later declared " I couldn ' t sleep that night " , while Đôn maintained that the generals were " truly grievous " , maintaining that they were sincere in their intentions to give a safe exile . Đôn charged Nhu with convincing Diệm to reject the offer . Lodge later concluded " Once again , brother Nhu proves to be the evil genius in Diệm ' s life . " Đôn ordered another general to tell reporters that the brothers had died in an accident . He went to confront Minh in his office . At this time , Xuân walked into Minh ' s office through the open door , unaware of Đôn ' s presence . Xuân snapped to attention and stated " " Mission accomplie " " . Shortly after , the CIA sent word to the White House that Diệm and Nhu were dead , allegedly due to suicide . Vietnam Radio had announced their deaths by poison , and that they had committed suicide while in the APC . Unclear and contradictory stories abounded . General Paul Harkins reported that the suicides had occurred either by gunshot or by a grenade wrestled from the belt of an ARVN officer who was standing guard . Minh tried to explain the discrepancy by saying " Due to an inadvertence , there was a gun inside the vehicle . It was with this gun that they committed suicide . " When Kennedy learned of the deaths during a White House meeting , he appeared shaken and left the room . Kennedy later penned a memo , lamenting that the assassination was " particularly abhorrent " and blaming himself for approving Cable 243 , which authorised Lodge to explore coup options in the wake of Nhu ' s attacks on the Buddhist pagodas . Kennedy ' s reaction did not draw unanimous sympathy . The Americans became aware later of the true reasons for the deaths of Diệm and Nhu through Conein . Later , photos appeared showing the two dead brothers covered in blood on the floor of the APC . The images appeared to be genuine , discrediting the generals ' claims that the brothers had committed suicide . Once the news of the cause of death of the Ngô brothers began to become public , the U . S . became concerned at their association with the new junta and began asking questions . Lodge initially backed the false story disseminated by the generals , believing that they had shot themselves . Lodge showed no alarm in public , congratulating Đôn on the " masterful performance " of the coup and promising diplomatic recognition . Đôn ' s assertion that the assassinations were unplanned were sufficient for Lodge , who told the State Department that " I am sure assassination was not at their direction . " Minh and Đôn reiterated their position in a meeting with Conein and Lodge on the following day . Several members of the Kennedy administration were appalled by the killings , citing them as a key factor in the future leadership troubles which beset South Vietnam . The assassinations caused a split within the leadership of the junta and repulsed American and world opinion . The killings damaged the public belief that the new regime would be an improvement over the Ngô family , turning the initial harmony among the generals into discord . The criticism of the killings caused the officers to distrust and battle one another for positions in the new government . According to Jones , " when decisions regarding postcoup affairs took priority , resentment over the killings meshed with the visceral competition over government posts to disassemble the new regime before it fully took form . " Culpability debate . The responsibility for the assassinations was generally put on the shoulders of Minh . Conein asserted that " I have it on very good authority of very many people , that Big Minh gave the order , " as did William Colby , the director of the CIA ' s Far Eastern division . Đôn was equally emphatic , saying " I can state without equivocation that this was done by General Dương Văn Minh and by him alone . " Lodge thought Xuân was partly culpable , asserting that " Diệm and Nhu had been assassinated , if not by Xuân personally , at least at his direction . " Minh later blamed Thiệu for the assassinations . In 1971 , Minh claimed Thiệu was responsible for the deaths by hesitating and delaying the attack by the 5th Division on Gia Long Palace . Thiệu stridently denied responsibility and issued a statement that Minh did not dispute : " Dương Văn Minh has to assume entire responsibility for the death of Ngô Đình Diệm . " During the presidency of Richard Nixon , a Kennedy opponent , a U . S . government investigation was initiated into American involvement , convinced that Kennedy secretly ordered the killings , but no evidence was found . Conein asserted that Minh ' s humiliation by the Ngô brothers was a major motivation for ordering their executions . He reasoned that Minh had been embarrassed by arriving at the presidential residence in full ceremonial military uniform to take power , only to find an empty building . One CIA employee said " They had to kill him [ Diệm ] . Otherwise his supporters would gradually rally and organise and there would be civil war . " Several months after the event , Minh reportedly said privately that " We had no alternative . They had to be killed . Diệm could not be allowed to live because he was too much respected among simple , gullible people in the countryside , especially the Catholics and the refugees . We had to kill Nhu because he was so widely feared – and he had created organizations that were arms of his personal power . " Trần Văn Hương , a civilian opposition politician who was jailed in 1960 for signing the Caravelle Manifesto that criticised Diệm , said : " The top generals who decided to murder Diệm and his brother were scared to death . The generals knew very well that having no talent , no moral virtues , no political support whatsoever , they could not prevent a spectacular comeback of the president and Mr . Nhu if they were alive . " Reaction . The reaction to the coup was mixed . The coup was immediately denounced by the Soviet Union and the People ' s Republic of China , asserting that the coup had brought a US " puppet " government . The remainder of the world expressed the general hope that the junta would end persecution against Buddhists and focus on defeating the communist insurgency . Both North Vietnam and the Viet Cong were caught off guard by the events in Saigon . Hanoi initially did not comment apart from repeating the news , as they had not been prepared . On one hand , the communist leaders were disheartened that they could no longer exploit Diệm ' s unpopularity . On the other hand , they were confident that Diệm ' s successors would be weak , fall apart easily and facilitate a communist revolution . The official newspaper , the " Nhan Dan " , opined that " " By throwing off Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu , the US imperialists have themselves destroyed the political bases they had built up for years . The deaths of Diem and Nhu were followed by the disintegration of big fragments of the . . . [ government ] machine . " " On the night of 1 November , as Gia Long Palace was besieged , Vietcong radio in South Vietnam had urged the Vietnamese people , the National Liberation Front and ARVN loyalists to resist the coup . However , the general ' s quick and successful coup prevented any joint action . Within a week of the coup , the Vietcong had regained its direction and launched more than one thousand attacks . A communist spokesperson expressed shock that the Americans had appeared to support the removal of Diệm , believing him to have been one of their strongest opponents . The leader of the Viet Cong , Nguyễn Hữu Thọ termed the coup a " gift from Heaven for us " . Some Vietcong officials were so surprised that the Americans would remove Diệm that they thought it was a trick . They felt Diệm ' s removal was a blunder on the part of the Americans . Tho said “ Our enemy has been seriously weakened from all points of view , military , political and administrative . ” Thọ said : For the same reasons , the coercive apparatus , set up over the years with great care by Diệm , is utterly shattered , specially at the base . The principle chiefs of security and the secret police , on which mainly depended the protection of the regime and the repression of the revolutionary movement , have been eliminated , purges . Troops , officers , and officials of the army and administration are completely lost ; they have no more confidence in their chiefs and have no idea to whom they should be loyal . From the political point of view the weakening of our adversary is still clear . Reactionary political organizations like the Labor and Personalism Party , the National Revolutionary Movement , the Republican Youth , the Women ' s Solidarity Movement etc . . . which constituted an appreciable support for the regime have been dissolved , eliminated . The deposition of the Ngô brothers was greeted with widespread joy by the South Vietnamese public . Large spontaneous street demonstrations took place . The offices of the " Times of Vietnam " , the Ngô family ' s propaganda mouthpiece , were burned . Elsewhere , the crowd smashed windows and ransacked any building associated with Nhu . The tension released by the downfall of the regime sparked off celebrations similar to Lunar New Year celebrations . Americans were treated and received with great enthusiasm and Lodge was mobbed by the Saigon public and it was joked that Lodge would win any Vietnamese election by a landslide . Lodge recommended immediate recognition of the new regime by Washington , asserting that the popular approval of the Vietnamese for the coup warranted it . Lodge reported : " Every Vietnamese has a grin on his face today " . The crowds swarmed onto the grounds of Gia Long Palace in a carnival atmosphere , punctuated by celebratory ARVN gunfire , while a sea of Buddhist flags flew throughout the city . As Lodge traveled from his residence to the US embassy , the crowds cheered his convoy , and when he walked past the Xá Lợi Pagoda , the focal point of violent government raids by Nhu ' s Special Forces on 21 August which had left a large death toll , he was mobbed by jubilant Buddhists . The people were very happy with the soldiers , giving them fruit , flowers and garlands of roses . Madame Nhu , who was in the United States at the time , denounced the coup and angrily accused the Americans of orchestrating it . When asked about whether the US was involved , she replied " definitely " , elaborating that " no coup can erupt without American incitement and backing " and declaring that she would not seek asylum " in a country whose government stabbed me in the back " . She said " I believe all the devils of hell are against us " and that " whoever has the Americans as allies does not need enemies " . The United States publicly disclaimed responsibility or involvement in the coup . Many , including Harriman , General Maxwell Taylor , and Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman , denied involvement , although Hilsman admitted that American disapproval of Diem ' s policies would have encouraged the generals . Privately , the White House was elated the coup , as it had been relatively bloodless . The White House fostered the impression that the coup was purely Vietnamese and claimed to have no knowledge of it . A year later , Trueheart was quoted that the United States had been aware of the generals ' actions . Transition of power . Even before the start of the coup , the generals had been in contact with civilian opposition figures and more moderate members of Diệm ' s regime . Once the coup was confirmed to be finished , negotiations by the generals and dissidents began . All of Diệm ' s ministers were forced to resign , and no further reprisals were taken . Diệm ' s Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ had discussions with Minh over the interim government . The Americans also pressured the generals to give Thơ a prominent role so as to give the impression of civilian rule . They promised to resume the Commercial Import Program , their main aid initiative to South Vietnam , which had been suspended due to relations with Diệm . The Military Revolutionary Council as it called itself , dissolved Diệm ' s rubber stamp National Assembly and the constitution of 1956 . They vowed support for free elections , unhindered political opposition , freedom of the press , freedom of religion , and an end to discrimination , and that the purpose of the coup was to bolster the fight against the Vietcong . They condemned the recent legislative elections as " dishonest and fraudulent " , imposed martial law , announced a curfew and ordered the release of political prisoners jailed by Diệm . The MRC announced that a new constitution would be written . In the interim , an appointed body known as the " Council of Notables " replaced the legislature in an advisory capacity . The generals decided on a two tier government structure with a military committee overseen by Minh presiding over a regular cabinet that would be predominantly civilian with Thơ as Prime Minister . The new government was announced on 5 November . Minh was named President and Chief of the Military Committee ; Thơ was listed as Prime Minister , Minister of Economy , and Minister of Finance ; Đôn was named Minister of Defense ; and Đính was made the Minister of Security ( Interior ) . Only one other general was in the cabinet of 15 , which was dominated by bureaucrats and civilians with no previous political experience . This was followed by the release of Provisional Constitutional Act No . 1 , formally suspending the 1956 constitution and detailing the structure and duty of the interim government . On 6 November , Saigon radio announced the composition of the Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council . Minh was Chairman , Đính and Đôn were Deputy Chairmen , and nine other senior generals , including Kim , Thiệu , Khiêm , Trần Văn Minh and Phạm Xuân Chiểu . A notable omission was the II Corps commander , General Nguyễn Khánh , who was transferred to the I Corps , the northernmost Corps and the furthest away from Saigon . The Americans recognized the new government on 8 November .