Battle of Savo Island The Battle of Savo Island , also known as the First Battle of Savo Island and , in Japanese sources , as the , and colloquially among Guadalcanal veterans as The Battle of the Five Sitting Ducks , was a naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II , between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval forces . The battle took place on August 8 – 9 , 1942 and was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign , being the first of several naval battles in the straits later named Ironbottom Sound , near the island of Guadalcanal . The battle was the first of five costly , large scale sea and air - sea actions fought in support of the ground battles on Guadalcanal itself , as the Japanese sought to counter the American offensive in the Pacific . These sea battles took place every few days , with increasing delays on each side to regroup and refit , until the November 30 , 1942 " Battle of Tassafaronga " ( sometimes referred to as the Fourth Battle of Savo Island or , in Japanese sources , as the ) after which the Japanese , eschewing the costly losses , attempted resupplying by submarine and barges . The final naval battle , the " Battle of Rennell Island " ( Japanese : レンネル島沖海戦 ) , took place months later on January 29 – 30 , 1943 by which time the Japanese were preparing to withdraw and evacuate their remaining land forces . In response to the Allied amphibious landings in the eastern Solomon Islands , Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa brought his task force of seven cruisers and one destroyer down New Georgia Sound ( also known as " the Slot " ) from Japanese bases at New Britain and New Ireland to attack the Allied amphibious fleet and its screening force . The screen consisted of eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers under British Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley VC , but only five cruisers and seven destroyers were involved in the battle . Mikawa surprised and routed the Allied force , sinking one Australian and three American cruiser s , while suffering only light damage in return . Mikawa ' s force immediately retired following the battle without attempting to destroy the Allied transport ships supporting the landings . The remaining Allied warships and the amphibious force , fearful of additional attacks , withdrew earlier than planned from the Solomon Islands temporarily ceding control of the seas around Guadalcanal to the Japanese . Allied ground forces had landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands only two days before . The early withdrawal of the fleet left them in a precarious situation , with barely enough supplies , equipment , and food to hold their beachhead . Mikawa , fearing Allied carrier strikes against his fleet upon daybreak , decided to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to destroy the Allied invasion transports . This missed opportunity to cripple the Allies supplies on Guadalcanal at an early stage of the campaign allowed the Allied forces to establish a firm position on the island . As a consequence , the Japanese would face difficulties in advancing against the Allied positions in the early stages of the campaign when the Allies were at their most vulnerable , allowing the successful defense of the area around Henderson Field until additional Allied reinforcements arrived later in the year . Background . Operations at Guadalcanal . On August 7 , 1942 , Allied forces ( primarily U . S . Marines ) landed on Guadalcanal , Tulagi , and Florida Island in the eastern Solomon Islands . The landings were meant to deny their use to the Japanese as bases , especially the nearly completed airfield at Henderson Field that was being constructed on Guadalcanal . If Japanese air and sea forces were allowed to establish forward operating bases in the Eastern Solomons they would be in a position to threaten the supply shipping routes between the US and Australia . The Allies also wanted to use the islands as launching points for a campaign to recapture the Solomons , isolate or capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul , and support the Allied New Guinea campaign , which was then building strength under General Douglas MacArthur . The landings initiated the six - month - long Guadalcanal campaign . The overall commander of Allied naval forces in the Guadalcanal and Tulagi operation was U . S . Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher . He also commanded the carrier task groups providing air cover . U . S . Rear Admiral Richmond K . Turner commanded the amphibious fleet that delivered the 16 , 000 Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi . Also under Turner was British Admiral Victor Crutchley ' s screening force of eight cruisers , fifteen destroyers , and five minesweepers . This force was to protect Turner ' s ships and provide gunfire support for the landings . Crutchley commanded his force of mostly American ships from his flagship , the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS " Australia " . The Allied landings took the Japanese by surprise . The Allies secured Tulagi , nearby islets Gavutu and Tanambogo , and the airfield under construction on Guadalcanal by nightfall on August 8 . On August 7 and August 8 , Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times , setting afire the U . S . transport ship " George F . Elliott " ( which sank later ) and heavily damaging the destroyer USS " Jarvis " . In these air attacks , the Japanese lost 36 aircraft , while the US lost 19 aircraft , including 14 carrier fighter aircraft . Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength , anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks , and worried about his ships ' fuel levels , Fletcher announced that he would be withdrawing his carrier task forces on the evening of August 8 . Some historians contend that Fletcher ' s fuel situation was not at all critical but that Fletcher used it to justify his withdrawal from the battle area . Fletcher ' s biographer notes that Fletcher concluded that the landing was a success and that no important targets for close air support were at hand . Being concerned over the loss of 21 of his carrier fighters , he assessed that his carriers were threatened by torpedo - bomber strikes , and , wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces arrived , withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift . Turner , however , believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air cover until all the transports were unloaded on August 9 . Even though the unloading was going slower than planned Turner decided that without carrier air cover he would have to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal . He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart the next day . Japanese response . Unprepared for the Allied operation at Guadalcanal , the initial Japanese response included airstrikes and an attempted reinforcement . Mikawa , commander of the newly formed Japanese Eighth Fleet headquartered at Rabaul , loaded 519 naval troops on two transports and sent them towards Guadalcanal on August 7 . However , when the Japanese learned that Allied forces at Guadalcanal were stronger than originally reported , the transports were recalled . Mikawa also assembled all the available warships in the area to attack the Allied forces at Guadalcanal . At Rabaul were the heavy cruiser " Chōkai " ( Mikawa ' s flagship ) , the light cruisers " Tenryū " and " Yubari " and the destroyer " Yunagi " . En route from Kavieng were four heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 under Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto : " Aoba " , " Furutaka " , " Kako " , and " Kinugasa " . The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night - fighting tactics before the war , a fact of which the Allies were unaware . Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of August 8 and August 9 , when he could employ his night - battle expertise while avoiding attacks from Allied aircraft , which could not operate effectively at night . Mikawa ' s warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St . George in the evening of August 7 and then headed east - southeast . Battle . Prelude . Mikawa decided to take his fleet north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville . The fleet would pause east of Kieta for six hours on the morning of August 8 . ( This would avoid daytime air attacks during their final approach to Guadalcanal . ) They would then proceed along the dangerous channel known as " The Slot " , hoping that no Allied plane would sight them in the fading light . The Japanese fleet was in fact sighted in St George Channel , where their column almost ran into USS " S - 38 " , lying in ambush . She was too close to fire torpedoes , but her captain , Lieutenant Commander H . G . Munson , radioed : " Two destroyers and three larger ships of unknown type heading one four zero true at high speed eight miles west of Cape St George " The warnings , however , were considered vague and the size of the force reported did not suggest an attack was pending . Once at Bougainville , Mikawa spread his ships out over a wide area to mask the composition of his force and launched four floatplanes from his cruisers to scout for Allied ships in the southern Solomons . At 10 : 20 and 11 : 10 , his ships were spotted by Australian Hudson reconnaissance aircraft based at Milne Bay in New Guinea . The first Hudson misidentified them as " three cruisers , three destroyers , and two seaplane tenders " . ( Note : Some accounts state that the first Hudson ' s crew identified the enemy ships correctly but , the composition of enemy forces was changed from the aircraft crews ' report by intelligence officers in Milne Bay . ) The Hudson ' s crew tried to report the sighting to the Allied radio station at Fall River , New Guinea . Receiving no acknowledgment , they returned to Milne Bay at 12 : 42 to ensure that the report was received as soon as possible . The second Hudson also failed to report its sighting by radio , but completed its patrol and landed at Milne Bay at 15 : 00 . It reported sighting " two heavy cruisers , two light cruisers , and one unknown type " . For unknown reasons , these reports were not relayed to the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal until 18 : 45 and 21 : 30 , respectively , on August 8 . Mikawa ' s floatplanes returned by 12 : 00 and reported two groups of Allied ships , one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi . He reassembled his warships and began his run towards Guadalcanal , entering the Slot near Choiseul by 16 : 00 on August 8 . Mikawa communicated the following battle plan to his warships : " On the rush - in we will go from S . ( south ) of Savo Island and torpedo the enemy main force in front of Guadalcanal anchorage ; after which we will turn toward the Tulagi forward area to shell and torpedo the enemy . We will then withdraw north of Savo Island . " Mikawa ' s run down the Slot was not detected by Allied forces . Turner had requested that U . S . Admiral John S . McCain , Sr . , commander of Allied air forces for the South Pacific area , conduct extra reconnaissance missions over the Slot in the afternoon of August 8 . But , for unexplained reasons , McCain did not order the missions , nor did he tell Turner that they were not carried out . Thus , Turner mistakenly believed that the Slot was under Allied observation throughout the day . To protect the unloading transports during the night , Crutchley divided the Allied warship forces into three groups . A " southern " group , consisting of the Australian cruisers HMAS " Australia " and HMAS " Canberra " , cruiser USS " Chicago " , and destroyers USS " Patterson " and USS " Bagley " , patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo Island to block the entrance between Savo Island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal . A " northern " group , consisting of the cruisers USS " Vincennes " , USS " Astoria " and USS " Quincy " , and destroyers USS " Helm " and USS " Wilson " , conducted a box - shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo Island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida Islands . An " eastern " group consisting of the cruisers USS " San Juan " and HMAS " Hobart " and two U . S . destroyers guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands . Crutchley placed two radar - equipped U . S . destroyers to the west of Savo Island to provide early warning for any approaching Japanese ships . The destroyer USS " Ralph Talbot " patrolled the northern passage and the destroyer USS " Blue " patrolled the southern passage , with a gap of 12 – 30 kilometres ( 8 – 20 mi ) between their uncoordinated patrol patterns . At this time , the Allies were unaware of all of the limitations of their primitive ship - borne radar s , such as the effectiveness of the radar could be greatly degraded by the presence of nearby landmasses . Wary of the potential threat from Japanese submarines to the transport ships , Crutchley placed his remaining seven destroyers as close - in protection around the two transport anchorages . The crews of the Allied ships were fatigued after two days of constant alert and action in supporting the landings . Also , the weather was extremely hot and humid , inducing further fatigue and , in Samuel Eliot Morison ' s words , " inviting weary sailors to slackness . " In response , most of Crutchley ' s warships went to " Condition II " the night of August 8 , which meant that half the crews were on duty while the other half rested , either in their bunks or near their battle stations . In the evening , Turner called a conference on his command ship off Guadalcanal with Crutchley and Marine commander Major General Alexander A . Vandegrift to discuss the departure of Fletcher ' s carriers and the resulting withdrawal schedule for the transport ships . At 20 : 55 , Crutchley left the southern group in " Australia " to attend the conference , leaving Captain Howard D . Bode of " Chicago " in charge of the southern group . Crutchley did not inform the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence , contributing further to the dissolution of command arrangements . Bode , awakened from sleep in his cabin , decided not to place his ship in the lead of the southern group of ships , the customary place for the senior ship , and went back to sleep . At the conference , Turner , Crutchley , and Vandegrift discussed the reports of the " seaplane tender " force reported by the Australian Hudson crew earlier that day . They decided it would not be a threat that night , because seaplane tenders did not normally engage in a surface action . Vandegrift said that he would need to inspect the transport unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a withdrawal time for the transport ships , and he departed at midnight to conduct the inspection . Crutchley elected not to return with " Australia " to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage , without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location . As Mikawa ' s force neared the Guadalcanal area , the Japanese ships launched three floatplanes for one final reconnaissance of the Allied ships , and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the upcoming battle . Although several of the Allied ships heard and / or observed one or more of these floatplanes , starting at 23 : 45 on August 8 , none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat , and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner . Mikawa ' s force approached in a single 3 kilometre ( 2 mi ) column led by " Chōkai " , with " Aoba " , " Kako " , " Kinugasa " , " Furutaka " , " Tenryū " , " Yubari " , and " Yunagi " following . Sometime between 00 : 44 and 00 : 54 on August 9 , lookouts in Mikawa ' s ships spotted " Blue " about 9 kilometres ( 5 . 5 mi ) ahead of the Japanese column . Action south of Savo . To avoid " Blue " , Mikawa changed course to pass north of Savo Island . He also ordered his ships to slow to , to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible . Four minutes later , Mikawa ' s lookouts spied either " Ralph Talbot " about 16 kilometres ( 10 mi ) away or a small schooner of unknown nationality . The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at " Blue " , ready to open fire at the first indication that " Blue " had sighted them . When " Blue " was less than 2 kilometres ( 1 mi ) away from Mikawa ' s force , she suddenly reversed course , having reached the end of her patrol track , and steamed away , apparently oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing by her . Seeing that his ships were still undetected , Mikawa turned back to a course south of Savo Island and increased speed , first to , and then to . At 01 : 25 , Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship , and at 01 : 31 , he ordered , " Every ship attack . " At about this time , " Yunagi " detached from the Japanese column and reversed direction , perhaps because she lost sight of the other Japanese ships ahead of her , or perhaps she was ordered to provide a " rear guard " for Mikawa ' s force . One minute later , Japanese lookouts sighted a warship to port . This ship was the destroyer " Jarvis " , heavily damaged the day before and now departing Guadalcanal independently for repairs in Australia . Whether " Jarvis " sighted the Japanese ships is unknown , since her radios had been destroyed . " Furutaka " launched torpedoes at " Jarvis " , which all missed . The Japanese ships passed as close to 1 , 100 metres of " Jarvis " , close enough for officers on " Tenryū " to look down onto the destroyer ' s decks without seeing any of her crew moving about . If " Jarvis " was aware of the Japanese ships passing by , she did not respond in any noticeable way . Two minutes after sighting " Jarvis " , the Japanese lookouts sighted the Allied destroyers and cruisers of the southern force about 12 , 500 metres away , silhouetted by the glow from the burning " George F . Elliott " . Several minutes later , at about 01 : 38 , the Japanese cruisers began launching salvos of torpedoes at the Allied southern force ships . At this same time , lookouts on " Chōkai " spotted the ships of the Allied northern force at a range of 16 kilometres ( 10 mi ) . " Chōkai " turned to face this new threat , and the rest of the Japanese column followed , while still preparing to engage the Allied southern force ships with gunfire . " Patterson " s crew was alert because the destroyer ' s captain had taken seriously the earlier daytime sightings of Japanese warships and evening sightings of unknown aircraft , and told his crew to be ready for action . At 01 : 43 , " Patterson " spotted a ship , probably " Kinugasa " , 5 , 000 meters dead ahead and immediately sent a warning by radio and signal lamp : " Warning ! Warning ! Strange ships entering the harbor ! " " Patterson " increased speed to full , and fired star shells towards the Japanese column . Her captain ordered a torpedo attack , but his order was not heard over the noise from the destroyer ' s guns . At about the same moment that " Patterson " sighted the Japanese ships and went into action , the Japanese floatplanes overhead , on orders from Mikawa , dropped aerial flares directly over " Canberra " and " Chicago " . " Canberra " responded immediately , with Captain Frank Getting ordering an increase in speed , a reversal of an initial turn to port , which kept " Canberra " between the Japanese and the Allied transports , and for her guns to train out and fire at any targets that could be sighted . Less than one minute later , as " Canberra " s guns took aim at the Japanese , " Chōkai " and " Furutaka " opened fire on her , scoring numerous hits within a few seconds . " Aoba " and " Kako " joined in with gunfire , and within the next three minutes " Canberra " took up to 24 large caliber hits . Early hits killed her gunnery officer , mortally wounded Getting , and destroyed both boiler rooms , knocking out power to the entire ship before " Canberra " could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships . The cruiser glided to a stop , on fire , with a 5 - to 10 - degree list to starboard , and unable to fight the fires or pump out flooded compartments because of lack of power . Since all of the Japanese ships were on the port side of " Canberra " , the damage to the ship ' s starboard side occurred either from shells entering low on the port side and exiting below the waterline on the starboard side , or from one or two torpedo hits on the starboard side . If torpedoes did hit " Canberra " on the starboard side , then they may have come from a nearby Allied ship , and at this time the US destroyer " Bagley " was the only ship on that side of the Australian cruiser and had fired torpedoes moments earlier . The crew of " Chicago " , observing the illumination of their ship by air - dropped flares and the sudden turn by " Canberra " in front of them , came alert and awakened Captain Bode from " a sound sleep " . Bode ordered his guns to fire star shells towards the Japanese column , but the shells did not function . At 01 : 47 , a torpedo , probably from " Kako " , hit " Chicago " s bow , sending a shock wave throughout the ship that damaged the main battery director . A second torpedo hit but failed to explode , and a shell hit the cruiser ' s mainmast , killing two crewmen . " Chicago " steamed west for 40 minutes , leaving behind the transports she was assigned to protect . The cruiser fired her secondary batteries at the trailing ships in the Japanese column and may have hit " Tenryū " , causing slight damage . Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the southern force , of which he was still technically in command . More significantly , Bode made no attempt to warn any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship headed away from the battle area . During this time , " Patterson " engaged in a gun duel with the Japanese column . " Patterson " received a shell hit aft , causing moderate damage and killing 10 crew members . " Patterson " continued to pursue and fire at the Japanese ships and may have hit " Kinugasa " , causing moderate damage . " Patterson " then lost sight of the Japanese column as it headed northeast along the eastern shore of Savo Island . " Bagley " , whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after " Patterson " and " Canberra " , circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column ; one or two of which may have hit " Canberra " . " Bagley " played no further role in the battle . " Yunagi " exchanged non - damaging gunfire with " Jarvis " before exiting the battle area to the west with the intention of eventually rejoining the Japanese column north and west of Savo Island . At 01 : 44 , as Mikawa ' s ships headed towards the Allied northern force , " Tenryū " and " Yubari " split from the rest of the Japanese column and took a more westward course . " Furutaka " , either because of a steering problem , or to avoid a possible collision with " Canberra " , followed " Yubari " and " Tenryū " . Thus , the Allied northern force was about to be enveloped and attacked from two sides . Action north of Savo . When Mikawa ' s ships attacked the Allied southern force , the captains of all three U . S . northern force cruisers were asleep , with their ships steaming quietly at . Although crewmen on all three ships observed flares or gunfire from the battle south of Savo or else received " Patterson " s warning of threatening ships entering the area , it took some time for the crews to go from Condition II to full alert . At 01 : 44 , the Japanese cruisers began firing torpedoes at the northern force . At 01 : 50 , they aimed powerful searchlights at the three northern cruisers and opened fire with their guns . " Astoria " s bridge crew called general quarters upon sighting the flares south of Savo , around 01 : 49 . At 01 : 52 , shortly after the Japanese searchlights came on and shells began falling around the ship , " Astoria " s main gun director crews spotted the Japanese cruisers and opened fire . " Astoria " s captain , awakened to find his ship in action , rushed to the bridge and ordered a cease fire , fearful that his ship might be firing on friendly forces . As shells continued to cascade around his ship , the captain ordered firing resumed less than a minute later . " Chōkai " , however , had found the range , and " Astoria " was quickly hit by numerous shells and set afire . Between 02 : 00 and 02 : 15 , " Aoba " , " Kinugasa " , and " Kako " joined " Chōkai " in pounding " Astoria " , destroying the cruiser ' s engine room and bringing the flaming ship to a halt . At 02 : 16 , one of " Astoria " s remaining operational main gun turrets fired at " Kinugasa " s searchlight , but missed and hit " Chōkai " s forward turret , putting the turret out of action and causing moderate damage to the ship . " Quincy " had also seen the aircraft flares over the southern ships , received " Patterson " s warning , and had just sounded general quarters and was coming alert when the searchlights from the Japanese column came on . " Quincy " s captain gave the order to commence firing , but the gun crews were not ready . Within a few minutes , " Quincy " was caught in a crossfire between " Aoba " , " Furutaka " , and " Tenryū " , and was hit heavily and set afire . " Quincy " s captain ordered his cruiser to charge towards the eastern Japanese column , but as she turned to do so " Quincy " was hit by two torpedoes from " Tenryū " , causing severe damage . " Quincy " managed to fire a few main gun salvos , one of which hit " Chōkai " s chart room 6 meters ( 20 ft ) from Admiral Mikawa and killed or wounded 36 men , although Mikawa was not injured . At 02 : 10 , incoming shells killed or wounded almost all of " Quincy " s bridge crew , including the captain . At 02 : 16 , the cruiser was hit by a torpedo from " Aoba " , and the ship ' s remaining guns were silenced . " Quincy " s assistant gunnery officer , sent to the bridge to ask for instructions , reported on what he found : " Quincy " sank , bow first , at 02 : 38 . Like " Quincy " and " Astoria " , " Vincennes " also sighted the aerial flares to the south , and furthermore , actually sighted gunfire from the southern engagement . At 01 : 50 , when the U . S . cruisers were illuminated by the Japanese searchlights , " Vincennes " hesitated to open fire , believing that the searchlight ' s source might be friendly ships . Shortly thereafter , " Kako " opened fire on " Vincennes " which responded with her own gunfire at 01 : 53 . As " Vincennes " began to receive damaging shell hits , her commander , U . S . Captain Frederick L . Riefkohl , ordered an increase of speed to , but shortly thereafter , at 01 : 55 , two torpedoes from " Chōkai " hit , causing heavy damage . " Kinugasa " now joined " Kako " in pounding " Vincennes " . " Vincennes " scored one hit on " Kinugasa " causing moderate damage to her steering engines . The rest of the Japanese ships also fired and hit " Vincennes " up to 74 times , and , at 02 : 03 , another torpedo hit her , this time from " Yubari " . With all boiler rooms destroyed , " Vincennes " came to a halt , burning " everywhere " and listing to port . At 02 : 16 , Riefkohl ordered the crew to abandon ship , and " Vincennes " sank at 02 : 50 . During the engagement , the U . S . destroyers " Helm " and " Wilson " struggled to see the Japanese ships . Both destroyers briefly fired at Mikawa ' s cruisers but caused no damage and received no damage to themselves . At 02 : 16 , the Japanese columns ceased fire on the northern Allied force as they moved out of range around the north side of Savo Island . " Ralph Talbot " encountered " Furutaka " , " Tenryū " , and " Yubari " as they cleared Savo Island . The Japanese ships fixed the U . S . destroyer with searchlights and hit her several times with gunfire , causing heavy damage , but " Ralph Talbot " escaped into a nearby rain squall , and the Japanese ships left her behind . Mikawa ' s decision . At 02 : 16 Mikawa conferred with his staff about whether they should turn to continue the battle with the surviving Allied warships and try to sink the Allied transports in the two anchorages . Several factors influenced his ultimate decision . His ships were scattered and would take some time to regroup . His ships would need to reload their torpedo tubes , a labor - intensive task that would take some time . Mikawa also did not know the number and locations of any remaining Allied warships and his ships had expended much of their ammunition . More importantly , Mikawa had no air cover and believed that U . S . aircraft carriers were in the area . Mikawa was probably aware that the Japanese Navy had no more heavy cruisers in production , and thus would be unable to replace any he might lose to air attack the next day if he remained near Guadalcanal . He was unaware that the U . S . carriers had withdrawn from the battle area and would not be a threat the next day . Although several of Mikawa ' s staff urged an attack on the Allied transports , the consensus was to withdraw from the battle area . Therefore , at 02 : 20 , Mikawa ordered his ships to retire . Aftermath . At 04 : 00 on August 9 " Patterson " came alongside " Canberra " to assist the cruiser in fighting her fires . By 05 : 00 , it appeared that the fires were almost under control , but Turner , who at this time intended to withdraw all Allied ships by 06 : 30 , ordered the ship to be scuttled if it was not able to accompany the fleet . After the survivors were removed , the destroyers USS " Selfridge " and USS " Ellet " sank " Canberra " with torpedoes and gunfire . Later in the morning of August 9 General Vandegrift advised Admiral Turner that he needed more supplies unloaded from the transports before they withdrew . Therefore , Turner postponed the withdrawal of his ships until mid - afternoon . In the meantime , " Astoria " s crew tried to save their sinking ship . " Astoria " s fires , however , eventually became completely out of control , and the ship sank at 12 : 15 . On the morning of August 9 , an Australian coastwatcher on Bougainville radioed a warning of a Japanese airstrike on the way from Rabaul . The Allied transport crews ceased unloading for a time but were puzzled when the airstrike did not materialize . Allied forces did not discover until after the war was over that this Japanese airstrike instead concentrated on " Jarvis " south of Guadalcanal , sinking her with all hands . The Allied transports and warships all departed the Guadalcanal area by nightfall on August 9 . In the late evening of August 9 , Mikawa on " Chōkai " released the four cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 to return to their home base at Kavieng . At 08 : 10 on August 10 , " Kako " was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine USS " S - 44 " 110 kilometers ( 70 mi ) from its destination . The other three Japanese cruisers picked up all but 71 of her crew and went on to Kavieng . From the time of the battle until several months later , almost all Allied supplies and reinforcements sent to Guadalcanal came by transports in small convoys , mainly during daylight hours , while Allied aircraft from the New Hebrides and Henderson Field and any available aircraft carriers flew covering missions . During this time , Allied forces on Guadalcanal received barely enough ammunition and provisions to withstand the several Japanese drives to retake the islands . Despite their defeat in this battle , the Allies eventually won the battle for Guadalcanal , an important step in the eventual defeat of Japan . In hindsight , if Mikawa had elected to risk his ships to go after the Allied transports on the morning of August 9 , he could have improved the chances of Japanese victory in the Guadalcanal campaign at its inception , and the course of the war in the southern Pacific could have gone much differently . Although the Allied warships at Guadalcanal that night were completely routed , the transports were unaffected . Many of these same transports were used many times to bring crucial supplies and reinforcements to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months . Mikawa ' s decision not to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity would prove to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese . A formal United States Navy board of inquiry , known as the Hepburn Investigation , subsequently prepared a report of the battle . The board interviewed most of the major Allied officers involved over several months , beginning in December 1942 . The report recommended official censure for only one officer : Captain Howard D . Bode . The report stopped short of recommending formal action against other Allied officers , including Admirals Fletcher , Turner , McCain , and Crutchley , and Captain Riefkohl . The careers of Turner , Crutchley , and McCain do not appear to have been affected by the defeat or the mistakes they made in contributing to it . Riefkohl , however , never commanded ships again . Captain Bode , upon learning that the report was going to be especially critical of his actions , shot himself in his quarters at Balboa , Panama Canal Zone , on April 19 , 1943 , and died the next day . Crutchley was gazetted with the Legion of Merit ( Chief Commander ) in September 1944 . Admiral Yamamoto signaled a congratulatory note to Mikawa on his victory , stating , " Appreciate the courageous and hard fighting of every man of your organisation . I expect you to expand your exploits and you will make every effort to support the land forces of the Imperial army which are now engaged in a desperate struggle . " Later on , though , when it became apparent that Mikawa had missed an opportunity to destroy the Allied transports , he was intensely criticised by his comrades . Admiral Turner later assessed why his forces were so soundly defeated in the battle : Historian Richard B . Frank adds that , " This lethargy of mind would not be completely shaken off without some more hard blows to ( U . S . ) Navy pride around Guadalcanal , but after Savo , the United States picked itself up off the deck and prepared for the most savage combat in its history . "