Battle of the Falkland Islands The Battle of the Falkland Islands was a British naval victory over the Imperial German Navy on 8 December 1914 during the First World War in the South Atlantic . The British , after a defeat at the Battle of Coronel on 1 November , sent a large force to track down and destroy the victorious German cruiser squadron . Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee — commanding the German squadron of two armoured cruiser s , and , the light cruiser s , " Dresden " and , and three auxiliaries — attempted to raid the British supply base at Stanley in the Falkland Islands . A larger British squadron — consisting of the battlecruisers and , the armoured cruisers , and , and the light cruisers and — had arrived in the port only the day before . Visibility was at its maximum , the sea was placid with a gentle breeze from the northwest , a bright , sunny , clear day . The advance cruisers of the German squadron had been detected early on . By nine o ' clock that morning the British battlecruisers and cruisers were in hot pursuit of the five German vessels , these having taken flight in line abreast to the southeast . All except " Dresden " and the auxiliary " Seydlitz " were hunted down and sunk . Background . The British battlecruisers each mounted eight guns , whereas Spee ' s ( " Scharnhorst " and " Gneisenau " ) , were equipped with eight pieces . Additionally , the battlecruisers could make against Spee ' s ; thus , the British battlecruisers could both outrun their opponents and significantly outgun them . An obsolete pre - dreadnought battleship — — had also been grounded at Stanley to give a stable gunnery platform and to act as a makeshift fortress for the defence of the area . Spee ' s squadron . At the outbreak of hostilities , The German East Asian squadron which Spee commanded was outclassed and outgunned by the Royal Navy and the Japanese Navy . Both Spee and the High Command did not believe that the Asian possessions could be defended or even that the squadron would survive . Spee therefore tried to get his ships home by heading across the Pacific , but was pessimistic of their chances . Following von Spee ' s success at Coronel off the coast of Valparaíso , Chile , [ where his German East Asia Squadron sank the cruisers ( Admiral Cradock ' s flagship ) and ] , von Spee ' s force put into Valparaíso . As required under international law for belligerent ships in neutral countries , the ships left within 24 hours , moving to Mas Afuera , off the Chilean coast . There they received news of the loss of the cruiser , which had previously detached from the squadron and had been raiding in the Indian Ocean . They also learned of the fall of the German colony at Tsingtao in China , which had been their home port . On 15 November , the squadron moved to Bahia San Quintin on the Chilean coast , where a ceremony was held to distribute 300 Iron Cross es second class , amongst the crew , and an Iron Cross first class to Admiral Spee . Spee was advised by his officers to return to Germany if he could . His ships had used half their ammunition — which could not be replaced — at Coronel , and had difficulties obtaining coal . Intelligence reports suggested that the British ships , " Cornwall " and " Carnarvon " were stationed in the River Plate , and that there had been no British warships at Stanley when recently visited by a steamer . Spee had been concerned about reports of a British battleship , " Canopus " , but its location was unknown . On 26 November , the squadron set sail for Cape Horn , which was reached on 1 December , then anchored at Picton Island , where they stayed for three days distributing coal from a captured British collier , the " Drummuir " ; and hunting . On 6 December , the British vessel was scuttled and the crew transferred to the auxiliary " Seydlitz " . The same day Spee proposed to raid the Falkland Islands before turning north to sail up the Atlantic back to Germany . The raid was unnecessary because the squadron already had as much coal as they could carry and was opposed by most of Spee ' s captains , but he decided to proceed anyway . British preparations . On 30 October , retired Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher was reappointed First Sea Lord to replace Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg , who had been forced to resign because of public outcry against a perceived German prince running the British navy . On 3 November , Fisher was advised that Spee had been sighted off Valparaíso and acted to reinforce Cradock by ordering " Defence " , already sent to patrol the eastern coast of South America , to reinforce his squadron . On 4 November , news of the defeat at Coronel arrived . As a result , the battlecruisers " Invincible " and " Inflexible " were ordered to leave the Grand Fleet and sail to Plymouth for overhaul and preparation for service abroad . Chief of Staff at the Admiralty was Vice - Admiral Doveton Sturdee . Fisher had a long - standing disagreement with Sturdee , who had been one of those calling for his earlier dismissal as First Sea Lord in 1911 , so he took the opportunity to appoint Sturdee Commander - in - Chief , South Atlantic and Pacific , to command the new squadron from " Invincible " . On 11 November , " Invincible " and " Inflexible " left Devonport , although repairs to " Invincible " were incomplete and she sailed with workmen still aboard . Despite the urgency of the situation and their maximum speed of around , the ships travelled at a steady ; running at high speed used significantly more coal , so to complete the long journey it was necessary to travel at the most economic speed . The two ships were also heavily loaded with supplies . Although secrecy of the mission was considered important so as to surprise Spee , Lieutenant Hirst from " Glasgow " heard locals discussing the forthcoming arrival of the ships while ashore at Cape Verde on 17 November ; however the news did not reach Spee . Sturdee arrived at the Abrolhos Rocks on 26 November , where Rear Admiral Stoddart awaited him with the remainder of the squadron . Sturdee announced his intention to depart for the Falkland Islands on 29 November . From there , the fast light cruisers " Glasgow " and " Bristol " would patrol seeking Spee , summoning reinforcements if they found him . Captain Luce of " Glasgow " , who had been at the battle of Coronel , objected that there was no need to wait so long and persuaded Sturdee to depart a day early . The squadron was delayed during the journey for 12 hours when a cable towing targets for practice firing became wrapped around one of " Invincible " s propellers , but the ships arrived on the morning of 7 December . The two light cruisers moored in to the inner part of Stanley Harbour , while the larger ships remained in the deeper outer harbour of Port William . Divers set about removing the offending cable . " Cornwall " extinguished her boiler fires to make repairs , and " Bristol " dismantled one of her engines . The famous ship — reduced to a coal bunker — supplied coal to " Invincible " and " Inflexible " . The armed merchant cruiser " Macedonia " was ordered to patrol the harbour , while " Kent " maintained steam in her boilers , ready to replace " Macedonia " the next day , 8 December ; Spee ' s fleet arrived in the morning of the same day . Battle . Opening moves . Spee ' s cruisers — " Gneisenau " and " Nürnberg " — approached Stanley first . At the time , the entire British fleet was coaling . Some believe that , had Spee pressed the attack , Sturdee ' s ships would have been easy targets , although this is a subject of conjecture and some controversy . Any British ship that tried to leave would have faced the full firepower of the German ships ; having a vessel sunk might also have blocked the rest of the British squadron inside the harbour . Fortunately for the British , the Germans were surprised by gunfire from an unexpected source : the " Canopus " , which had been grounded as a guardship and was behind a hill . This was enough to check the Germans ' advance . The sight of the distinctive tripod masts of the British battlecruisers confirmed that they were facing a better - equipped enemy . " Kent " was already making her way out of the harbour and had been ordered to pursue Spee ' s ships . Made aware of the German ships , Sturdee had ordered the crews to breakfast , knowing that " Canopus " had bought them time while steam was raised . To Spee , with his crew battle - weary and his ships outgunned , the outcome seemed inevitable . Realising his danger too late — and having lost any chance to shell Sturdee ' s fleet while in port — Spee and his squadron dashed for the open sea . The British left port around 10 : 00 . Spee was ahead by but there was a lot of daylight left for the faster battlecruisers to catch up . Contact . It was 13 : 00 when the British battlecruisers opened fire , but it took them half an hour to get the range of the " Leipzig " . Realising that he could not hope to outrun the fast British ships , Spee decided to engage them with his armoured cruisers alone , to give the light cruisers a chance to escape . They turned to fight just after 13 : 20 . The German armoured cruisers had the advantage of a freshening north - west breeze , which caused the funnel smoke of the British ships to obscure their target practically throughout the action . Author Hans Pochhammer indicates that there was a long respite for the Germans during the early stages of the battle , as the British attempted unsuccessfully to force Admiral Spee away from his advantageous position . Despite initial success by " Scharnhorst " and " Gneisenau " in striking " Invincible " , the British capital ships suffered little damage . Spee then turned to escape , but the battlecruisers came within extreme firing range 40 minutes later . " Invincible " and " Inflexible " engaged " Scharnhorst " and " Gneisenau " , while Sturdee detached his cruisers to chase " Leipzig " and " Nürnberg " . " Inflexible " and " Invincible " turned to fire broadsides at the armoured cruisers and Spee responded by trying to close the range . His flagship " Scharnhorst " took extensive damage with funnels flattened , fires and a list . The list became worse at 16 : 04 , and she sank by 16 : 17 . " Gneisenau " continued to fire and evade until 17 : 15 , by which time her ammunition had been exhausted , and her crew allowed her to sink at 18 : 02 . During her death throes , Admiral Sturdee continued to engage " Gneisenau " with his two battlecruisers and the cruiser " Carnarvon " , rather than detaching one of the battlecruisers to hunt down the escaping " Dresden " . 190 of " Gneisenau " ' s crew were rescued from the water . The battlecruisers had received about 40 hits , with one man killed and four injured . Meanwhile , " Nürnberg " and " Leipzig " had run from the British cruisers . " Nürnberg " was running at full speed but in need of maintenance , while the crew of the pursuing " Kent " were pushing her boilers and engines to the limit . " Nürnberg " finally turned for battle at 17 : 30 . " Kent " had the advantage in shell weight and armour . " Nürnberg " suffered two boiler explosions around 18 : 30 , giving the advantage in speed and manoeuvrability to " Kent " . The German ship then rolled over at 19 : 27 after a long chase . The cruisers " Glasgow " and " Cornwall " had chased down " Leipzig " ; " Glasgow " closed to finish " Leipzig " which had run out of ammunition but was still flying her battle ensign . " Leipzig " fired two flares , so " Glasgow " ceased fire . At 21 : 23 , more than southeast of the Falklands , she also rolled over , leaving only 18 survivors . Outcome . Casualties and damage were extremely disproportionate ; the British suffered only very lightly . Admiral Spee and his two sons were among the German dead . Rescued German survivors , 215 , became prisoners on the British ships . Most were from the " Gneisenau " , nine were from " Nürnberg " and 18 were from " Leipzig " . There were no survivors from " Scharnhorst " . One of " Gneisenau " ' s officers who lived had been the sole survivor on three different guns but was pulled from the water saying he was a first cousin of the British commander ( Stoddard ) . Of the known German force of eight ships , two escaped : the auxiliary " Seydlitz " and the light cruiser " Dresden " , which roamed at large for a further three months before her captain was cornered by a British squadron off the Juan Fernández Islands on 14 March 1915 . After fighting a short battle , " Dresden " ' s captain evacuated his ship and scuttled her by detonating the main ammunition magazine . As a consequence of the battle , German commerce raiding on the high seas by regular warships of the Kaiserliche Marine was brought to an end . However , Germany put several armed merchant vessels into service as commerce raiders until the end of the war ( for example , see Felix von Luckner ) . Secret Service trap . After the disaster , German naval experts were baffled at why Admiral Spee had attacked the base and how the two squadrons could have met so coincidentally in so many thousands of miles of open water . Kaiser William II ' s handwritten note on the official report of the battle reads : " It remains a mystery what made Spee attack the Falkland Islands . " See Mahan ' s Naval Strategy . " It is generally believed that Spee was misled by the German admiralty into attacking the Falklands . He called a meeting of his officers and announced that he would attack the base which was acting as a coaling and wireless relay station for the British , as his intelligence , received from the German wireless station at Valparaíso , reported the port to be free of Royal Navy warships . Despite objections by the captains of three of his ships , the attack proceeded . However , in 1925 the German naval officer , Franz von Rintelen , interviewed Admiral William Reginald Hall , Director of the Admiralty ' s Naval Intelligence Division ( NID ) , who said that the Spee squadron had been lured towards the British battlecruiser squadron by means of a fake signal sent in a German naval code broken by British cryptographers . Broadcast of a false order in a broken naval code would have been against the British Naval Staff ' s policy as noted by Rear - Admiral Herbert Hope " In a very few months we obtained a very good working knowledge of the organisation , operations and internal economy of the German Fleet . Had we been called upon by the Staff to do so , we could have furnished valuable information as to the movements of submarines , minefields , mine - sweeping , etc . But the Staff was obsessed by the idea of secrecy ; they realised that they held the trump card and they worked on the principle that every effort must be made to keep our knowledge up our sleeves for a really great occasion such as the German Fleet coming out in all their strength to throw down the gauge of battle . In other words the Staff determined to make use of our information defensively and not offensively " No less than Winston Churchill replied most sharply to Admiral Jellicoe , even mentioning the subject by telegraph specifically , so sharp was the concern that the breaking of the German Naval codes might be uncovered .