Battle of Lanzerath Ridge The World War II Battle of Lanzerath Ridge was fought on December 16 , 1944 , the first day of the Battle of the Bulge , near the town of Lanzerath , Belgium . It was fought between 18 men belonging to an American reconnaissance platoon , four U . S . Forward Artillery Observers , and a battalion of about 500 German paratroopers . During a day - long confrontation , the American reconnaissance men inflicted dozens of casualties on the Germans and bottled up the advance along a key route for the 1st SS Panzer Division , which had been selected to spearhead the advance of the entire German 6th Panzer Army . The Germans finally flanked the American forces at dusk , capturing them . Only one American , a forward artillery observer , was killed , while 14 were wounded : German casualties totaled 92 . The Germans paused , believing the woods were filled with more Americans and tanks . Only when " SS - Standartenführer " Joachim Peiper and his Panzer tanks arrived at midnight , twelve hours behind schedule , did the Germans learn the woods were empty . Due to lost communications with Battalion and then Regimental headquarters , and the unit ' s subsequent capture , its disposition and success at delaying the advance of the 6th Panzer Army that day was unknown to the U . S . commanders . Lt . Lyle Bouck considered the wounding of most of his men and the capture of his entire unit a failure . When the war ended five months later , the platoon ' s men , who were split between two prisoner - of - war camp s , just wanted to get home . It was only after the war that Bouck learned that , because his platoon prevented the lead German infantry elements from advancing , the schedule for the armored units ' advance was also pushed back by about 20 hours . On October 26 , 1981 , after considerable lobbying , a Congressional hearing , and letter - writing by Bouck , every member of the unit were finally recognized for their valor that day , making the platoon the most decorated American unit of World War II . Background . Prior to the Battle of the Bulge , the U . S . Army was engaged in a campaign to attack the Roer River dams before invading the rest of Germany . The 99th Infantry Division was supporting the 2nd Infantry Division in their attack on the German West Wall at Wahlerscheid . During two days of hard fighting , the U . S . Army had finally managed to slip through the heavily fortified lines and penetrate the German defenses . The Americans were expecting a counterattack in the area , but their intelligence completely failed to detect the German ' s movement of hundreds of armored vehicles and tens of thousands of infantry into the region . Much of the region was relatively quiet , lending the area the title of " Ghost Front . " During early December 1944 , the American ' s defensive line in the Ardennes had a gap south of Losheimergraben . General Leonard T . Gerow , in command of V Corps , recognized this area as a possible avenue of attack by the Germans . This area , which lay between V Corps and Troy H . Middleton ' s VIII Corps , was undefended ; just patrolled by jeep . The patrols in the northern part of the area were conducted by the 99th Infantry Division ' s 394th Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon , whereas those in the south were conducted by the 18th Cavalry Squadron , 14th Cavalry Group , which was attached to the 106th Infantry Division . In the border area between Germany and Belgium , there was only one road network that could support a military advance : It was through the area known as the Losheim Gap , a long , narrow valley at the western foot of the Schnee Eifel . This was the key route through which the German Sixth and Fifth Panzer Armies planned to advance . On December 11 , General Walter M . Robertson , commander of the battle - hardened 2nd Infantry Division , was ordered to attack and seize the Roer River dams . In case he had to pull back , he chose Elsenborn Ridge as his defensive line . General Walter E . Lauer , commanding the 99th Infantry Division , was charged with building up the defenses around Elsenborn Ridge . Lauer knew his front was very long and very thinly manned ; he gave instructions to his division ' s soldiers to dig in and build cover for their foxholes . Prelude . Inexperienced American units . The troops of the 99th Infantry Division , who lacked battle experience , were deployed to the Ardennes in November 1944 , with the 394th Regiment relieving 9th Infantry Division ' s 60th Regiment - which unit Major Kriz , the 394th ' s commanding officer , had fought in during the North African campaign before he was wounded and sent home to recuperate . Among the units were two reconnaissance squads consisting of well - trained soldiers , who had been selected because they were expert marksmen and in peak physical condition . Some of the men were college - educated and were former members of the U . S . Army ' s abruptly terminated ASTP program . Led by 20 year old Lt . Lyle Bouck , the second youngest man in the unit , for the next few weeks his reconnaissance platoon established and maintained regimental listening and observation posts , conducted patrols behind enemy lines , and gathered information . They lived in a brick building in Hünningen , taking advantage of a basement full of potatoes and a home - made stove to supplement the military C - ration s . The platoon consisted of two nine - man reconnaissance squads and a seven - man headquarters section , which was attached to the 394th regimental S2 section . As the platoon was not intended , nor trained , for combat , they were told to avoid direct engagement with the Germans . Nonetheless , they took part in several missions behind enemy lines , even as far as Losheim behind the front line , to capture enemy soldiers for intelligence . Bouck and several of his men were among the first group in their regiment to be recognized with the Combat Infantry Badge . Most often their patrols consisted of creeping through snow - clogged defiles obscured by fog in an attempt to fix enemy positions . On December 10 , the reconnaissance platoon was ordered by Major Kriz to a new position , about south east of Hünningen , near Lanzerath , Belgium , a village of about 15 homes . The village lay at a critical road junction in the northern part of the Losheim Gap . The 18 - man unit was charged by Kriz with plugging a gap in the front line between the 106th Division to the south and the 99th Division to the north . The only reserve was the 394th Infantry Regiment ' s 3rd Battalion , which was at Bucholz Station . Behind them lay roads that would give the enemy rapid access to the Army ' s rear and allow them to easily flank the thinly placed 99th Division . American defensive preparations . The I & R platoon took over positions on a ridge top immediately northeast of Lanzerath that were formerly occupied by part of the 2nd Infantry Division . They were ordered to improve their foxhole positions and maintain contact with Task Force X , made up of four towed three - inch guns from the 2nd Platoon , Company A , 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion , which was attached to the 14th Cavalry Group , 106th Infantry Division of VIII Corps . They were reinforced by the 22 men of the 820th ' s 2nd Recon Platoon , commanded by Lieutenant John Arculeer , who were mounted on an armored half - track and two jeeps . Members of the Second Platoon took up positions within two homes inside the village of Lanzerath about to the southeast . Together , the two units comprised the foremost units in their sector of the American forces facing the Siegfried Line . The Americans were attacking through the Siegfried Line at Walerscheid about to the north , and a localized counter - attack was expected . Lt . Bouck followed procedure and ordered his men to build fortifications with interlocking fields of fire . Taking advantage of the foxholes left by the previous unit , they dug them deeper so that two or three men could stand in them and fire from the concealed edges . They covered each hole with to pine logs . Their hilltop location was just inside the edge of a forest and overlooked a pasture bisected by a high barbed wire fence . Their position covered about along a shallow ridge line , about above the road and northwest of the village . Their foxholes extended along the ridge line in a northeast direction , almost to a fork in the road at their left flank . Snow fell , covering their dug - in fortifications inside the woods , leaving them virtually invisible from the road below . They took advantage of a small log hut behind their position , which they used as a warming hut . Bouck augmented the unit ' s weaponry with four extra carbines , two Browning automatic rifle s , and one light . 30 calibre machine gun . Avoiding official channels , he traded his unit ' s collection of German memorabilia with an ordnance supply officer for an armored Jeep with a mounted . 50 calibre machine gun . His men dug an emplacement for the armored jeep and its . 50 caliber gun , placing it in enfilade down the road along the German ' s possible axis of advance . Once an hour , in an attempt to fill the gap in their sector , they ran a jeep patrol up and down the line to stay in contact with units on their right and left flank and to detect any enemy movement . They hoped they would be relieved soon : " We weren ' t trained to occupy a defensive position in the front lines . We were trained to patrol and get information about the enemy , " Bouck said in an interview 60 years later . On the night of December 16 , they heard the clanking of armor and the sound of vehicles in the distance ; Bouck ordered his men to remain awake . The temperature ranged from to the low during the day . German positions . Many of the German units were recent conscripts with very little experience . Sergeant Vinz Kuhlbach ' s platoon was typical . Most of his soldiers had little combat experience and even less training . The German units had been formed by conscripting teenage boys and men over 50 , men previously rejected as physically unfit for service , wounded soldiers newly released from hospitals , and men transferred from the " jobless " personnel of the shrinking Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe . The German 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division , which had previously acquired a superb combat reputation , had been virtually destroyed during the Normandy Invasion in the Falaise pocket . It had been resurrected by using replacements from the 22nd , 51st , and 53rd Luftwaffe Field Regiments . The German units were usually organized around small cadres of seasoned veterans . Although they carried the new Schmeisser machine pistol and were equipped with rifle grenades , few had ever fired them in combat . The German recruits were told the American soldiers they faced would not have the nerve to stand and fight . Their officers said the Americans were " a gum - chewing , undisciplined half - breed with no stomach for real war . " To preserve the available armor , the infantry of the 9th Fallschirmjaeger Regiment , 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division , had been ordered to lead the attack through Lanzerath and clear the village before advancing towards Bullingen . The German commanders estimated they would face a full division of U . S . troops . The German ' s initial position was east of the German - Belgium border and the Siegfried Line near Losheim . SS Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich ' s plan was for the Sixth Panzer to advance northwest through Losheimergraben and Bucholz Station and then drive through Honsfield , Büllingen , and a group of villages named Trois - Ponts , to connect to Belgian Route Nationale N - 23 , and cross the River Meuse . It was then another to Antwerp . Unfortunately for the Germans , during their retreat earlier that autumn they had destroyed the Losheim - Losheimergraben road - bridge over the railway , which prevented their use of this route . While German infantry were able to use the Lanzerath - Losheimergraben road to advance on Losheimergraben , the railroad overpass could not bear the weight of the German armor . On the first day of the offensive , the German engineers were slow to repair the Losheim - Losheimergraben road , thus forcing Peiper ' s vehicles to take the road through Bucholz Station . Once the infantry captured Lanzerath , Sepp Dietrich ’ s Sixth Panzer Army led by Kampfgruppe SS Standartenführer Joachim Peiper ' s 1st SS Panzer Division would proceed without delay . The infantry would then secure the right flank of the attack route near Losheimergraben . Despite the losses that had brought the Allies to the border of their homeland , German morale was surprisingly strong . The men knew the Allies were demanding an unconditional surrender . They were now fighting for the fatherland , defending the soil of their beloved country , not just fighting for Hitler . Dietrich knew the plan had flaws . The Germans had captured the same terrain during the summer of 1940 in three days . Now they were being asked to do it in winter in five days . The plan counted on bad weather to keep the Allied planes grounded . Dietrich only had one - quarter the fuel they needed ; their plan counted on capturing Allied fuel depots and keeping to an ambitious timetable . Dietrich ' s assigned route ( or Rollbahn ) included narrow roads – in many places single - tracks – which would force units of the Kampfgruppe to tail each other , creating a column of infantry and armor up to long . The roads would prevent the attackers from concentrating their forces in the blitzkrieg fashion which had served them so well in the past . The main roads designated for their use had many hairpin turn s and traversed steep hillsides that would delay his already slow - moving towed artillery and bridging trains . Dietrich knew that a determined fight at one of these critical choke points by even a token U . S . force could seriously impede his schedule . When Hitler ' s operations officer Generaloberst Alfred Jodl gave him his orders , Dietrich yelled , " I ' m a general , not a bloody undertaker ! " Battle . German barrage . On December 16 , 1944 , at 05 : 30 , the Germans launched a 90 - minute artillery barrage using 1 , 600 artillery pieces across an 80 mile ( 130 km ) front , although the American platoon was only aware of what was happening in their sector . Their first impression was that this was the anticipated counterattack resulting from the Allies ' recent attack in the Wahlerscheid sector to the north where the 2nd Division had knocked a sizable dent into the Siegfried Line . Bouck later said : Many shells exploded in the trees , sending shards of steel and wood into the ground , but the men were protected by their reinforced foxholes . The German guns cut deep holes the size of trucks in the pasture . German advance . German infantry began to advance near Losheim before the artillery barrage lifted , preparing to cross the front line as soon as it ended . They marched under the glow of massive searchlights , bouncing light off the clouds . The armor was located farther back , near Blankenheim , Germany . At 8 : 00 , as the sun rose , the American platoon heard explosions and guns around Buchholz Station and Losheimergraben to the east and north where the 3rd and 1st Battalions of the 394th Infantry Division was located . The 55 soldiers of U . S . 2nd Platoon , Company A , 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion , 14th Cavalry Group was initially ordered south to help protect Manderfeld , but shortly afterwards were redirected to join the active battle near Buchholz Station . They withdrew from the village and left without contacting the I & R platoon . This left the platoon as the only unit in the sector and without armor support . Bouck sent James , Slape and Creger to set up an observation post in a house on the eastern side of the village that had been abandoned by Task Force X . Accompanying them , he spotted in the dawn light a long column of what appeared to be about 500 German troops headed toward them from the east . Their distinctive helmet style told Bouck they were paratroopers , among the best soldiers Germany could field . None of his training or experience prepared him for this situation , outnumbered as he was by perhaps 20 to 1 . Bouck and James scrambled back to the ridge top and the rest of their unit . The platoon ' s telephone land line to 1st Battalion headquarters in Losheimergraben was knocked out , but their SCR - 300 radio still worked . Bouck reached Regimental headquarters at Hünningen on the radio and requested permission to withdraw and engage in a delaying action . He was told to " remain in position and reinforcements from the 3rd Battalion will come to support you . " In town , Creger watched as a forward element of the German infantry advanced , with weapons slung , into Lanzerath . They obviously did not expect to encounter any Americans . Creger radioed Bouck and told him of the Germans advancing through Lanzerath on the road between Creger and Bouck ' s position . Bouck sent Robinson , McGeehee and Silvola to assist Creger , who crept down to the Bucholz Station road and thence up a ditch towards Lanzerath . Before the three men reached Creger , he left the village using a more direct route . As he returned to the American lines , he engaged and killed or wounded most of a German platoon . On the eastern side of the road , Robinson , McGeehee and Silvola attempted to rejoin their platoon , but found the way blocked by German soldiers who threatened to flank them . They decided to head for Losheimergraben and seek reinforcements . They crossed a deep railroad cut and once on the far side encountered soldiers from Fusilier Regiment 27 of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division . Trying to outflank the 1st Battalion , 394th Infantry Regiment in Losheimergraben , they spotted the three men . After a brief firefight , Robinson and McGeehee were wounded and all three were captured . Germans entered the home that Creger and Slape were using as an observation post . Slape climbed into the attic , while Creger only had time to hide behind a door . He pulled the pin on a grenade as the door knob jammed into his ribs . Bullets from the I & R platoon struck the building , and the Germans suddenly left . Creger and Slape exited by the back door and ducked into a nearby cowshed . They crossed a field and then found themselves in a minefield . Picking their way forward , they circled through the woods until they encountered a handful of Germans . Opening fire , they killed them . Creger and Slape spotted Bouck and Milosovich across the road and sprinted towards them , drawing German fire . They made it back to their ridge - top position and Bouck called Regimental Headquarters . He requested artillery support , but when he reported the German column advancing on his position , the voice on the other end of the radio told him " he must be seeing things " . Bouck told them he had 20 - 20 vision and demanded artillery fire on the road in front of his unit . U . S . artillery unavailable . But the platoon ' s position at the southern end of the 99th Division ' s sector was not only outside their own regimental boundary , it was outside their Division ' s boundary and V Corps boundary . The division prioritized artillery fire for targets within its boundary . Bouck waited in vain for the sound of incoming artillery . He called Regimental Headquarters again , asking for directions . He was told to " hold at all costs , " which essentially meant until dead or captured . Bouck knew that if his platoon gave way , the 99th Division ' s right flank , already thin and undermanned , could be in grave danger . Radio operator James Fort attempted to contact headquarters on the SCR - 284 radio mounted on a jeep by the command post and found that German martial music jammed the channel . He then used a side - channel and Morse code , hoping the Germans weren ' t listening , to send a status report to regimental headquarters . German attack . As the German forces moved through Lanzerath and in front of their positions , Bouck and his men allowed lead members of the unit to pass , hoping to surprise the Germans . They were preparing to fire on three men who they believed were the Regiment ' s officers when a girl from the village emerged from one of the homes . Talking to the officers , she pointed in their general direction . An officer yelled a command , and the paratroopers jumped for ditches on either side of the road . The Americans thought she had given their position away and fired on the Germans , wounding several . ( In October 2006 , more than 50 years later , a writer found the now adult woman , still living in the village . She told him she did not know the Americans were still in the area , and was pointing out the direction the Tank Destroyer unit had departed , towards Bucholz Station . ) Four members of a Forward Observation Team from Battery C , 371st Field Artillery had been in the village when the Tank Destroyer unit withdrew . Lieutenant Warren Springer and the other three men , Sergeant Peter Gacki , T / 4 Willard Wibben , and T / 5 Billy Queen joined Bouck ' s unit on the ridge where they could continue to observe the enemy movement . Bouck distributed them among the foxholes to help reload magazines and reinforce their position . The German infantry deployed and about two platoons of the 2nd Company , 1st Battalion , then attacked the Americans head - on , bunched together in the open and charging straight up the hill , directly at the platoon ' s hidden and fortified positions . The Americans were surprised at the inexperienced tactics . For the Americans , it was like " shooting clay ducks in California at an amusement park . " Several attackers were killed trying to climb over the - high barbed wire fence that bisected the field , often shot at close range with a single shot to the heart or head . Lt . Springer used his jeep - mounted SCR - 610 radio to call in coordinates for artillery fire . A few shells landed near the road outside Lanzerath , but they did not hinder the German attack . His jeep was then struck by machine gun fire or mortar shrapnel and his radio was destroyed . Slape and Milosevich fired continually , as fast as they could reload . Slape thought the Germans were mad to attack in such a suicidal manner , straight across the open field . He later recalled that it was one of the " most beautiful fields of fire " he had ever seen . After only about 30 seconds , the firing stopped . Nearly all of the attacking Germans had been killed or wounded . McConnell , shot in the shoulder , was the only American casualty . During a second attack made around 11 : 00 am , Milosevich fired the . 50 caliber jeep - mounted machine gun until enemy fire drove him back into his foxhole . In both the first and second attack that morning no German soldier got past the fence in the middle of the field . Bodies were piled around it . German medics waved a white flag late in the morning and indicated they wanted to remove the wounded , which the American defenders allowed . The Americans again suffered only one wounded on the second attack , when Pvt . Kalil was struck in the face by a rifle grenade that failed to explode . The Germans mounted a third attack late in the afternoon , around 3 : 00 . Several times German soldiers attempted to penetrate the American lines . The Americans left their foxholes and in close combat fired on the attackers to push them back down the hill . At one point PFC Milsovech spotted a medic working on and talking to a soldier he felt certain was already dead . As mortar fire on his position got more accurate , Milsovech noticed a pistol on the supposed medic ' s belt , and decided he must be calling in fire on their position . He shot and killed him . Bouck contacted Regimental Headquarters once more , seeking reinforcements . At 3 : 50 , Fort sent the unit ' s last update to Regimental headquarters in Hünningen . He reported they were still receiving some artillery fire but were holding their position against an estimated enemy strength of about 75 , who were attempting to advance from Lanzerath towards the railroad to the northwest . As dusk approached and their ammunition ran dangerously low , Bouck feared they could be flanked at any time . He planned to pull his men back just before dusk , when they would have enough light to escape through the woods . Bouck ordered his men to remove the distributor caps from their Jeeps and to prepare to evacuate to the rear . He dispatched Corporal Sam Jenkins and PFC Preston through the woods to locate Major Kriz at Regimental HQ and seek instructions or reinforcements . Bouck tried to contact Regimental headquarters on the SCR - 300 radio for instructions . A sniper shot the radio as Bouck held it to his ear . The sniper also hit the SCR - 284 radio mounted in the Jeep behind Bouck , eliminating any possibility of calling for reinforcements or instructions . The German troops were reluctant to attack head on once again , and Sergeant Vinz Kulbach pleaded with the officers of the 9th Fallschirmjaeger Regiment to allow his men to flank the Americans in the dusk . Fifty men from Fusilier Regiment 27 of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division were dispatched to attack the American ' s southern flank through the woods . Just as Bouck was about to blow his whistle to indicate withdrawal , German soldiers penetrated their lines and began overrunning their foxholes . Several attackers were killed by grenades rigged to wires and triggered by Americans in their foxholes . Each of the positions spread out over the ridge top were overrun in turn . Surprisingly , the Germans did not simply kill the defenders in their foxholes . Bouck was pulled from his foxhole by an officer with a machine gun , and he thought he would be shot when the German put his weapon in his back and pulled the trigger ; it was empty . Both Bouck and the German officer were then struck by bullets . The German fell seriously wounded , while Bouck was struck in the calf . Sergeant Kuhlbach asked Bouck who was in command , and Bouck replied that he was . Kuhlbach asked him why the Americans were still shooting , and Bouck said it was not his men doing it . Bouck surrendered and helped carry his wounded men down to the village . Conclusion . During their dawn to dusk fight , the 15 remaining men of the I & R platoon plus the four men of the 371st Artillery Forward Observation Team repeatedly engaged elements of the 1st Battalion , 9th Fallschirmjaeger Regiment , 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division of about 500 men . The Germans reported 16 killed , 63 wounded , and 13 missing in action . Other reports say the Americans inflicted between 60 and five hundred casualties on the Germans . Only one American , forward artillery observer Billy Queen , was killed ; in Bouck ' s platoon , 14 out of 18 men were wounded . The small American force had seriously disrupted the schedule of the entire 6th Panzer Army ' s drive for Antwerp along the entire northern edge of the offensive . After virtually no sleep during the preceding night and a full day of almost non - stop combat , with only a few rounds of ammunition remaining , flanked by a superior enemy force , the platoon and artillery observers were captured . Aftermath . The German military took over several homes in Lanzerath and turned them into aid stations for the wounded of both sides . The rest of the homes were commandeered as temporary quarters . German armor advance . Kampfgruppe Peiper , the lead element of the Sixth Panzer Army ' s spearhead , 1st SS Panzer Division , consisted of 4 , 800 men and 600 vehicles . On December 16 , it started as much as to the east in Tondorf , Germany , and was unable to advance at its scheduled rate because of road congestion . The road from Scheid to Losheim was one solid traffic jam , in part due to two blown railroad overpasses blocking access to Losheimergraben , but also due to American resistance . Peiper ' s lead units did not reach Losheim until 7 : 30 pm , when he was ordered to swing west and join up with the 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division , which had finally cleared the route through Lanzerath . Peiper was furious about the delay . En route to Lanzerath , Peiper ' s unit lost five tanks and five other armored vehicles to American mines and anti - tank weapons . Kampfgruppe Peiper finally reached Lanzerath near midnight . Lt . Bouck , held in Café Scholzen , turned 21 years old at midnight on December 17 . At midnight , he watched as a senior German officer ( who he later identified as Peiper ) attempted to obtain accurate information about the U . S . Army ' s strength in the area . Peiper was told by Obersturmbannführer i . G . von Hoffman , a former Luftwaffe general staff officer from Berlin and commanding officer of the 9th Fallschirmjaeger Regiment , 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division , that his men had run into stiff resistance . He reported that the woods and road ahead were packed with American troops and tanks . He had bedded his troops down for the night and planned to probe the forest for Americans at first light . Their expectations of further resistance was all based on the stiff defense offered by Bouck ' s force of just 18 men . Peiper asked the Battalion commander and a Hauptmann ( captain ) in the same unit about the American resistance . Both said they had not personally seen the Americans , but that the woods were heavily fortified . Peiper learned that no patrols had been conducted into the woods and no one had personally reconnoitered the area . Disgusted , Peiper demanded that von Hoffman give him a battalion of paratroops to accompany his tanks . At 4 : 30 on December 17 , more than 16 hours behind schedule , the 1st SS Panzer Division rolled out of Lanzareth and headed east for Bucholz Station . The entire timetable of their advance on the River Meuse and Antwerp had been seriously slowed , allowing the Americans precious hours to move in reinforcements . Peiper ' s lead units entered Bucholz Station without resistance at 5 : 00 am . They found only two rifle companies from the 3rd Battalion , 394th Infantry Regiment had been left to defend it ; these were quickly captured , except for a headquarters company radio operator . Hidden in a cellar , he called in reports to division headquarters until he was finally captured . Driving east , the Germans entered Honsfield at 6 : 00 am where his column merged in the dark with an American column . In Honsfield , they encountered one of the 99th Division ' s rest centers , which was clogged with still sleeping , confused American troops . They killed many , destroyed a number of American armored units and vehicles , and took several dozen prisoners , who were later executed by elements of his force . Based on the noise to the northeast , Peiper decided that the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend was encountering more resistance than expected . Unable to contact his division headquarters , and with his vehicles low on fuel , Peiper decided to switch his planned route to the south through Büllingen , where he believed an American fuel depot existed . His units entered the town at 8 : 00 am and easily captured of fuel for his vehicles . He was apparently unaware he had nearly taken the town and unknowingly bypassed an opportunity to flank and trap the entire 2nd and 99th Divisions . Peiper turned south to detour around Hünningen , interested only in hurrying west as quickly as he could . The unit gained notoriety when on this route they encountered a lightly armored American convoy and apparently murdered 84 U . S . prisoners of war in what became known as the Malmedy massacre . The German advance never recovered from its initial delay , and Kampfgruppe Peiper only got as far as Stoumont , where the remaining vehicles ran out of fuel and came under heavy attack from American artillery and tanks . Having advanced less than half - way to the River Meuse , they were forced to abandon more than a hundred vehicles in the town , including six Tiger II tanks . The soldiers were left to find their own way back to the east on foot . Having started the offensive with about 5 , 800 men , 60 tanks ( some Tigers ) , 3 flak tanks , 75 half - tracks , 14 20mm Flak Wagons , 27 75mm assault guns , plus 105 and 150mm SP Howitzers , Hitler ' s prized Kampfgruppe was reduced to 800 S . S . troopers creeping through the brush at night , trying to get back to their own line . The task of defeating the 99th Division was the objective of 12th SS Panzer Division reinforced by additional Panzergrenadier and Volksgenadier divisions . On December 17 , German engineers repaired one of the road bridges over the railroad along the Losheim - Losheimergraben road and the 12th Division ' s armor began advancing towards the key road junction at Losheimergraben and the twin villages of Rocherath and Krinkelt . However , in more than ten days of intense battle , they were unable to dislodge the Americans from Elsenborn Ridge , where elements of the V Corps of the First U . S . Army prevented the German forces from reaching the road network to their west . Due to the determined resistance of the 99th Division , which was composed of relatively inexperienced troops , along with the 2nd and 23rd Divisions , the northern shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge was a sticking point for the entire offensive operation . Had the Americans given way , the German advance would have overrun the vast supply depots around Leige and Spa and possibly have changed the outcome of the Battle of Bulge . Prisoners of war . The I & R platoon members who were able to walk were sent to Germany . James and Kalil , who were seriously wounded , were loaded onto trucks and eventually transported to hospitals in Frankfurt and Hanover . McConnell , also wounded , ended up like James in Stalag XI - B near Bad Fallingbostel , the most primitive POW camp in Germany where about 6 , 000 Soviet prisoners had died of typhus during 1941 . After two days of walking through the cold , Bouck and the remainder of his platoon were loaded into a boxcar in the village of Junkerath . They spent 11 days traveling deep into Germany , as the POW camps were overflowing with prisoners . Their unmarked trains were prime targets for Allied aircraft , who attacked Bouck ' s train on December 21 , killing and wounding several POWs . The prisoners were allowed off only once , and were given only some bread and water during the entire trip . Bouck and his men were finally imprisoned in Stalag XIII - D in Nuremberg and later in Stalag XIII - C in Hammelberg , where the non - commissioned and enlisted men were split , with the officers sent to Oflag XIII - B . Corporal Sam Jenkins and PFC Preston were captured before they reached Allied lines , and they later joined Bouck and the rest of the platoon in the prison . The men barely survived , most suffering from the advanced effects of malnutrition . When Task Force Baum from Patton ' s 4th Armored Division attempted to liberate the camp , Bouck pretended to be a field grade officer and accompanied the task force as it attempted to return to the front lines . However , almost the entire task force was captured or killed , and Bouck was returned to prison for the remainder of the war . When he was freed , he was too weak to file a combat report , and he did not think his men had accomplished that much . " We were in those foxholes and . . . what we did was to defend ourselves and try to live through it . " Unit recognition . All who were wounded and captured recovered to return home after the war . In 1965 , the U . S . Army published a multi - volume history of World War II , including one on " The Ardennes : The Battle of the Bulge . " Author Hugh M . Cole only briefly mentioned Bouck ' s platoon , which upset former platoon member William James ( who had changed his name from Tsakanikas ) . James contacted Bouck and encouraged him to get his men proper recognition . Bouck contacted his former division commander , Maj . Gen . Walter E . Lauer , who nominated Bouck for a Silver Star . In June 1966 , a Silver Star arrived in Bouck ' s mailbox , but no other platoon member was recognized . Bouck was shortly afterward interviewed by John S . D . Eisenhower for his book " The Bitter Woods " , which described the actions of the unit in detail . Columnist Jack Anderson unsuccessfully campaigned for William James ( Tsakanikas ) to be awarded the Medal of Honor . Congressional hearings on the men ' s action resulted in a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that Bill James be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor . The U . S . Army and U . S . Air Force concurred , but the Marine Corp responded that James failed to show sufficient " intrepidity " . The hearings also resulted in Public Law 96 - 145 , which waived the time limitation exclusively for members of the platoon . It was signed by President Jimmy Carter on December 14 , 1979 . On October 26 , 1981 , after considerable lobbying and letter - writing by Bouck , the men of the unit were finally decorated . Fourteen of the 18 were present at the ceremony hosted by Secretary of the Army John O . Marsh . Every man was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation . Four received the Distinguished Service Cross , five the Silver Star , and nine got the Bronze Star with V device for their 10 - hour struggle against a 500 - man strong German battalion . Platoon members and the citations they received were : Lieutenant Warren Springer and his three - man artillery observation unit — Sergeant Peter Gacki , T / 4 Willard Wibben , and T / 5 Billy Queen - also joined the men in battle . Queen was killed in action before the remainder were captured . All four were awarded the DSC for their valor at Lanzerath . In 2004 , the book " The Longest Winter " was published , documenting the defensive actions of the platoon . Bouck cooperated with the author , Alex Kershaw , but imposed one condition , " I told him that other authors never wrote about the other men in the platoon , just me . I said I wouldn ' t talk to him unless he promised that he ' d also write about the other men . " On May 12 , 2005 , veterans of the 99th Infantry Division and local citizens of Lanzerath , Belgium , dedicated a monument composed of a small brass plaque alongside a bench and a United States flag to commemorate the fight on the grassy hill overlooking the village .