Far East Air Force ( United States ) The Far East Air Force ( FEAF ) was the military aviation organization of the United States Army in the Philippines just prior to and at the beginning of World War II . Formed on 16 November 1941 , FEAF was the predecessor of the Fifth Air Force of the United States Army Air Forces and United States Air Force . Initially FEAF also included aircraft and personnel of the Philippine Army Air Corps . It was largely destroyed during the Philippines Campaign of 1941 – 42 . When 14 surviving B - 17 Flying Fortresses and 143 personnel of the heavy bombardment force were withdrawn from Mindanao to Darwin , Australia in the third week of December 1941 , Headquarters FEAF followed it within days . The B - 17s were the only combat aircraft of the FEAF to escape capture or destruction . FEAF , with only 16 P - 40 Warhawks and 4 Seversky P - 35 fighters remaining of its original combat force , was broken up as an air organization and moved by units into Bataan 24 – 25 December . 49 of the original 165 pursuit pilots of FEAF ' s 24th Pursuit Group also evacuated during the campaign , but of non - flying personnel , only one of 27 officers and 16 wounded enlisted men were evacuated . Nearly all ground and flying personnel were employed as infantry at some point during their time on Bataan , where most surrendered on 9 April 1942 . The surviving personnel and a small number of aircraft received from the United States were re - organized in Australia in January 1942 , and on 5 February 1942 redesignated as the Fifth Air Force . With most of its aircraft based in Java , the FEAF was nearly destroyed a second time trying to stem the tide of Japanese advances southward . 1912 – 1941 . Army aviation in the Philippines . In August 1911 , the United States Army ' s Chief Signal Officer , whose Aeronautical Division was the nation ' s air service , recommended the establishment of an air station in the Philippines . Military aviation began there on 12 March 1912 , when 1st Lt . Frank P . Lahm of the 7th Cavalry , detailed to the Division , opened the Philippine Air School on the polo field of Fort William McKinley , using a single Wright B airplane to train pilots . Ultimately attriting four of the Army ' s first 18 airplanes , aviation went temporarily out of business when the last plane crashed into Corregidor ' s San Jose Bay on 12 January 1915 . The first U . S . aviation unit stationed overseas was the 1st Company , 2nd Aero Squadron , sent to Corregidor in January 1916 . It used four Martin S seaplanes to adjust battery fire for Fort Mills , but was demobilized at the end of World War I . A new 2d Aero Squadron returned in December 1919 , and a permanent military aviation presence was established with the organization on 20 March 1920 of the 1st Observation Group of the United States Army ' s Air Service at Fort Stotsenburg , consisting of the 2nd Squadron on Corregidor and the 3rd Squadron at Fort Stotsenburg . An additional squadron , the 28th , was activated on 1 September 1922 at Nichols Field , and the group , now at Clark Field , was redesignated the " 4th Composite Group " on 2 December 1922 . On 25 January 1923 the three squadrons were redesignated , respectively , the 2nd Observation , 3rd Pursuit , and 28th Bombardment Squadrons . The air forces in the Philippines were a component of the Army ' s Philippine Department , and like the Air Corps in the continental United States , operated under split authority . Their nominal head was the " Air Officer , Philippine Department " , a staff member who did not exercise command of any operational units . Actual command of the operational forces ( the 4th Composite Group ) resided with the group commander , who reported through the chief of staff to the commanding general of the Philippine Department , and also through the Air Officer to the Chief of the Air Corps . Installations and airfields were maintained by service forces assigned to the Philippine Department , over which neither officer had any authority . Maintenance of a defensive " status quo " of the Philippine Department was mandated by provisions of the 1922 Conference on the Limitation of Armament , although air power was not specifically mentioned in its terms . On 31 May 1940 , Maj . Gen . George C . Grunert , a mustang officer who had entered the Army during the Spanish - American War , took command of the Philippine Department . From the first he was dissatisfied with the staffing , equipment , and level of training of the department , but in particular the air forces , and intensively lobbied the War Department for modernization and reinforcements . Of thirteen fields available for use throughout the islands , only Clark Field was considered a first rate facility , and the small number of total fields made dispersal during wartime impossible . The 4th Composite Group was a " dumping ground " for aircraft that had become obsolete or worn out , discarded by units in both the Continental United States and the Hawaiian Department . Grunert ' s air force in July 1940 consisted of 28 Boeing P - 26A " Peashooter " fighters ( out of 34 originally shipped to the Philippines in 1937 ) , 17 Martin B - 10 bombers , 10 Douglas O - 46 observation planes ( the newest planes in the department ) , five 1920s - vintage Thomas - Morse ZO - 19E observation craft ( the " Z " modifier indicated they were unfit for front - line duty and could only be used as trainers ) , and three fabric - covered biplanes used for liaison , transport , and courier duties . The group had only 26 of the 51 pilots authorized it by its table of organization and equipment . The senior Air Corps officer in the Philippines was Col . Harrison H . C . Richards , the Department Air Officer . Col . Lawrence S . Churchill , commanding the 4th Composite Group , was a year his junior in rank . Cooperation and approval by Richards , a West Pointer , was necessary to accomplish support tasks for the 4th Group , but many officers felt he withheld information from Churchill and deliberately sabotaged group operations . While both colonels were fifty - one years old in 1941 , neither had the confidence of Gen . Grunert , possibly because of open animosity each displayed against the other . In March 1941 , Grunert wrote Army Chief of Staff Gen . George C . Marshall requesting that a general officer be transferred to Manila to command the Department ' s air force . Philippine Department Air Force . The " Philippine Department Air Force " was formed on 6 May 1941 as the United States hurriedly attempted to expand its air defenses in the Philippines . After completing a three - week air defense course taught at Mitchel Field , New York , to familiarize him with current concepts of integrating Signal Corps radar s , radio communications , and interceptor forces , Brig . Gen . Henry B . Clagett arrived on 4 May to command the PDAF and set up air defenses . Clagett also had been given a top - secret mission by Marshall to go to China in mid - May for a month of observing and assessing tactics used by the Japanese . The PDAF ' s one major unit , the 4th Composite Group , consisted of five squadrons ( two of which had arrived in November 1940 ) based at two grass fields : Clark and Nichols . A third field , Nielson , lacked facilities and was used primarily as an auxiliary strip for nearby Fort McKinley . An isolated sod strip at Iba on the west coast was used for gunnery training . PDAF ' s materiel was centrally located in the Philippine Air Depot at Nichols Field , easily targeted from the air and highly inflammable . The only existing antiaircraft defenses were a single battery of guns and a searchlight platoon at Fort Wint at the entrance to Subic Bay . In May 1941 its aircraft situation was only marginally better than a year before : only 22 P - 26 fighters , 12 " utterly obsolete , ancient , vulnerable as pumpkins " B - 10s , 56 Seversky P - 35As diverted from a sale to Sweden in November 1940 , 18 Douglas B - 18 Bolo s still in crates after disassembly and shipment from the Hawaiian Department in March , nine North American A - 27 s seized in January from a shipment intended for Siam and distributed to the pursuit squadrons as instrument trainers , several Douglas C - 39 transports , and a small number of varied observation planes . Its only modern aircraft were 31 Curtiss P - 40B fighters , assigned to the 20th Pursuit Squadron . Although assembled in mid - May , they were not operational for lack of engine coolant . PDAF Headquarters was located at Fort Santiago near Manila ; the majority of the planes were at either Clark or Nichols . Except for one small commercial firm in Manila , no oxygen - producing plants existed in the Philippines , severely limiting the service ceiling of all aircraft , but particularly the fighters . Clagett immediately undertook an administrative " shakeup " of the existing organization , marginalized Richards , relieved Churchill of command of the 4th Composite Group ( he retained the position of base commander at Nichols Field ) , created new channels of command , and because of a lack of qualified staff officers , drew senior ( but administratively untrained ) officers from the squadrons to fill his staff . The last move further aggravated a problem created when experienced pilots of the two newly arrived squadrons had been shifted to fill the understrength 4th Group . A lack of cohesion and confidence in command resulted that continued into the war . Richards and Churchill both responded with " obstructionist tactics " that exacerbated the already poor command situation . In July , the P - 40s became operational , but Nichols Field was closed to replace its east - west runway with one made of concrete , and to regrade the north - south runway , both measures taken to correct drainage deficiencies that made the entire field inoperable in the wet season . On the morning of 2 July ( ironically , delayed five days by a typhoon ) , all three fighter squadrons transferred the FEAF ' s 39 P - 35s and 20 P - 26s to Clark and Iba , where the 17th PS moved for gunnery training . Construction of two new fields intended to support heavy bomber operations , at Rosales on the Lingayen Plain and Del Carmen near Clark Field , proceeded slowly . On 26 July 1941 , Gen . Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty from retirement and the United States Army Forces in the Far East ( USAFFE ) was created by the War Department to reorganize the defenses of the Philippines against a Japanese invasion . The PDAF was renamed " Air Force , USAFFE " on 4 August 1941 , and incorporated into its ranks the newly inducted Philippine Army Air Corps on 15 August 1941 . Its headquarters moved to Nielson Field , and although the move had been made to increase the urgency of expanding air capabilities , precious time had been lost that was never re - gained . Creation of the FEAF . Pre - war expansion . In July 1941 , Chief of the Army Air Forces , Major General Henry H . Arnold , allocated 340 heavy bomber s ( not yet manufactured ) and 260 modern fighter plane s for future reinforcement of the Far East Air Force . Work at Nichols continued slowly in the second half of the year , but the 17th PS was forced to return there to accommodate the planned arrival of the heavy bombers , and a high accident rate ensued . By 2 October 81 P - 40s had been shipped to the islands , and a new organization , the 24th Pursuit Group , was constituted on 16 September to control the three pursuit squadrons . Since 10 February 1941 , FEAF had received 203 new pilots ( 140 of which became pursuit pilots ) , but all but 28 were fresh from flight schools and required further individual training , which cut into needed unit tactical training . Arrangements were made with the oxygen - producing plant in Manila , which supplied the U . S . Navy ' s shipyard at Cavite , to buy any surplus for pursuit units , but output was so small that only the squadron at Nichols ( which reopened on 17 October ) could be supplied , and on a limited basis . Nine B - 17s of the 14th Bombardment Squadron pioneered an air ferry route from California to the Philippines . Two squadrons of the 19th Bombardment Group followed in October – November . The 14th and 28th Bomb Squadrons ( the latter a longtime part of the 4th Composite Group , which disbanded on 16 November 1941 ) were attached to the 19th BG and a total of 35 B - 17 Flying Fortresses constituted the FEAF ' s heavy bombardment force . Arnold wrote on 1 December 1941 , " We must get every B - 17 to the Philippines as soon as possible . " The War Department scheduled 165 heavy bombers and 240 fighters to be based in the Philippines by March 1942 . B - 17s of the 7th Bombardment Group staged in California and its 88th Reconnaissance Squadron was in transit at the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor . The personnel of two squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group ( the 21st and 34th , their pilot rosters at half strength ) , and three of the 27th Bombardment Group ( Light ) , moved by a convoy of two transports escorted by the cruiser " Louisville " , but without their airplanes , and disembarked at Manila on 20 November 1941 . The pursuit squadrons were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group and acquired P - 35s from the other squadrons for training purposes . A shipment of 24 crated P - 40Es arrived in Manila by freighter on 25 November , the first of those intended for the 35th Pursuit Group , and were trucked to the Philippine Air Depot at Nichols Field for assembly . MacArthur held the position that Japan would not attempt an invasion of the Philippines before April 1942 . Clagett ( described by one historian of the campaign as lacking " the necessary elasticity of mind and body for realistic preparation for total war " ) had twice been hospitalized during mid - 1941 and was not meeting the demands of even this scenario . At the beginning of September Marshall met with Arnold to identify a replacement for Clagett who would infuse the necessary urgency into the Philippine buildup . Maj . Gen . Lewis H . Brereton arrived in the Philippines to command FEAF on 4 November 1941 . Bomber , fighter , and service commands for the FEAF became effective on 16 November 1941 , with Clagett placed in command of the provisional 5th Interceptor Command , and Churchill made commander of Far East Air Service Command . When a war warning from Gen . George C . Marshall was received in the Philippines on 28 November ( Philippine time ) , the next day FEAF began dispatching two B - 17s a day on reconnaissance flights of the sea lanes north of Luzon , but with orders not to overfly Japanese territory on Formosa . Units worked to complete protective and dispersal measures , while interceptors were armed and placed on alert status . The arrival of National Guard units at the end of September provided the first ground defenses for Clark Field . Two battalions of light tanks were positioned at Fort Stotsenburg in late November to protect Clark against seizure by Japanese airborne troops , while the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment ( AA ) provided limited antiaircraft artillery defense with 50 - caliber machine guns and a dozen 3 - inch guns . The " Pensacola convoy " of seven transport vessels gathered at Honolulu and sailed for Manila on 29 November , transporting the 52 A - 24 dive bombers of the 27th BG , 18 P - 40s intended for the 49th Pursuit Group , 48 pilots of the 35th PG , 39 recent flight school graduates on " casual " status , and the ground echelons of five squadrons , all escorted by the USS " Pensacola " . The remainder of the 35th Group ( the remaining pilots , two pursuit squadrons , and group headquarters ) sailed aboard the USAT " President Garfield " for Honolulu on 6 December to join another convoy . Aircraft inventory . All five pursuit squadrons had a Table of Organization and Equipment strength of 25 aircraft , including spares , but because of accidents and other factors , none had that total and decided to use 18 in tactical commission , regardless of the number in their inventory . The 22nd of the 21st PS ' s P - 40s was delivered 7 December and many had not yet had their engines slow - timed . None of its other aircraft had more than three hours of flying time . All of the P - 35As had been over - used for gunnery training and needed engine changes ( none were available , and the Far East Air Depot had neither facilities or personnel for large - scale engine maintenance ) , while their guns were wholly unreliable from poor maintenance . 54 P - 40s and 32 B - 17s were actually fit for combat on 8 December . The Japanese committed 288 first - line combat aircraft in fully trained units of the Navy ' s 11th Kōkūkantai and Army ' s 5th Hikōshidan ( 108 land - based naval bombers , 54 army bombers , 90 Mitsubishi A6M Zero carrier fighters , and 36 Nakajima Ki - 27 ( Army Type 97 ) " Nate " army fighters ) to support its Luzon operations . The numbers below in italicized brackets indicate the number of aircraft in commission on 8 December . If no figure is listed , the number of usable aircraft is unknown . There were 60 additional aircraft in the Philippine Army Air Corps , including one Keystone ZB - 3A bomber . 42 were Stearman 76DC trainers of varying serviceability and utility . FEAF airfields . Within of Manila , the Army had six airfields , two of which were auxiliary strips nearing completion . Another four auxiliary strips were begun in November : O ' Donnell and San Fernando near Clark , San Marcelino northwest of Subic Bay , and Ternate west of Cavite ( Ternate and San Fernando were never finished ) . No strips were planned on Bataan , despite its prominence in strategic war planning . In August and October 1941 , the War Department allocated US $ 9 , 273 , 000 to construct and improve airfields , most of which was spent constructing a concrete runway at Nichols Field ( the only hard - surfaced runway in the Philippines ) , and adding and extending graded strips at Clark Field , with the rest going to the auxiliary fields . The auxiliary strips were dirt - surfaced and without maintenance , servicing , communications , or control facilities . The dust clouds generated by takeoffs at all strips except Nichols seriously hampered flight operations , with numerous mishaps that destroyed many aircraft , killed pilots , and reduced the assigned strength of already tiny combat missions . The use of expedients to cut down the dust , including a molasses mixture deposited by a tank truck , was unsuccessful . Clark Field was originally the only base that could support heavy bomber s , but its all - grass field could not withstand heavy operations when wet , making dispersal nearly impossible . MacArthur and his chief of staff , Brig . Gen . Richard K . Sutherland , favored new bomber bases in the Visayas but recognized that selected sites at Cebu and Tacloban would not support bomber operations without significant and expensive construction of runways . As a compromise , on 25 November 1941 the newly arrived 5th Air Base Group was hurried south to Mindanao by inter - island steamer to begin work 27 November on a second bomber base , Del Monte Field , so named because it was situated on pineapple plantations owned by the Del Monte Corporation . Construction required only cutting of grass to create a hard , all - weather sod runway , and Del Monte No . 1 , the first of seven planned strips on Mindanao , was ready for limited operations by 5 December . A much smaller strip situated on a small golf course nearby was designated Del Monte No . 3 . Sixteen B - 17s were dispersed from Clark to Del Monte No . 1 on the morning of 6 December ( 5 December in the United States ) , but neither maintenance facilities nor barracks had been built , and only a single radio was operating when war commenced . Two understrength ordnance companies arrived 3 December and constructed their own camp a mile away , but the remainder of their personnel and all the materiel required , particularly aviation gas , were not scheduled to leave Luzon until 10 December . On 15 December 1941 , a fighter strip was completed in sugarcane fields seven miles west of Lubao , along Highway 7 near the entrance to Bataan . The 21st Pursuit Squadron moved a detachment into the field to complete construction of revetments and taxiways in preparation for basing a dozen P - 40s and five P - 35s there , flown by a mixed assortment of experienced pursuit pilots from all the squadrons . Lubao Airfield began operations on 26 December and was superbly camouflaged . The 21st PS flew reconnaissance and other missions from Lubao until 2 January 1942 , when the field was evacuated . On 29 December , three pursuits ( two P - 40s and a P - 35 ) were salvaged at the last minute at Clark Field in the face of advancing Japanese units by a volunteer group of mechanics and flown to Lubao , where they were evacuated with the others . Another camouflaged dirt strip at Orani ( ) also opened operations on 26 December . The 34th PS received its transfer orders on Christmas Day and conducted twice daily reconnaissance flights using five P - 40s . The field was camouflaged using rice straw and movable haystacks , and was not attacked before it too was abandoned , on 4 January . The withdrawing aircraft from both fields were flown to an airfield on Bataan near Pilar , which had been graded in rice fields by Filipino hand labor , with revetments built and camouflaged in one day on 26 December by the 17th PS . Operations at Pilar began on 1 January using the final three new P - 40Es of the 25 November shipment , which were assembled in the last week of December at the Philippine Air Depot , relocated to Quezon City . The last mission from Pilar was flown 8 January , after which its nine P - 40 aircraft displaced to Del Monte Field , Mindanao ( only six arrived ) . Bataan Field was originally graded in early 1941 as a dirt strip running uphill from a coastal road , and was dubbed " Richards ' Folly " after the Department Air Officer , who had ordered its construction . Located three miles north of Cabcaben on the southern tip of the Bataan Peninsula , it was widened and lengthened after 24 December to by the 803rd Aviation Engineers in anticipation of future operations . The first aircraft , two P - 35s and an A - 27 displaced from Lubao , arrived on 2 January , and on 4 January the nine P - 40s at Orani were sent down . Combat operations began on 8 January , the aircraft concealed in hidden revetments until they could be launched between raids made by Japanese dive bombers . The P - 35s were flown to Mindanao on 11 January after the A - 27 was lost in a landing accident . Maintenance and operation of the field was assigned to the plane - less 16th Bombardment Squadron ( 27th Bomb Group ) , and damage to the runways from raids was repaired by Company C , 803rd Aviation Engineers . Two other fields were constructed at the end of January 1942 to provide dispersal for aircraft from the often - bombed Bataan Field . At Cabcaben south , a strip in length was hastily graded by civilian contractors and was operational on 6 February . The 21st PS was recalled from infantry duties on 12 February to operate and maintain both it and Bataan airfields . The previous liaison dirt field at Mariveles was abandoned on 7 January , but a road adjacent to the field was extended and widened to provide a strip in width and long . Its orientation to the overlooking heights was such that once a pilot was committed to landing , he had no choice but to continue , and was subject to severe tail - winds . The 20th Pursuit Squadron was also recalled on 12 February to complete defensive position preparations , camouflage revetments , and maintain the field , which became operational on 23 February . Warning systems . The " Warning Service " of the Philippine Department was directed by Lt . Col . Alexander H . Campbell , who had originally transferred to the Philippines in October 1939 to command a battalion of the 60th Coast Artillery ( AA ) . Functioning as an office of the Intelligence Section ( G - 2 ) of the department headquarters , the Warning Service operated an interim Information and Operation Center at Nielson Field that included an electrically lighted map to plot sightings that indicated origins of reports with twinkling lights . In lieu of working detection equipment and trained personnel , the Warning Service maintained a primitive system of 509 observation posts manned by 860 civilian watchers , unschooled in aircraft identification , who would report airplane movements by five radio , two telegraph , and ten telephone networks manned by members of all three U . S . military services , the Philippine Army and constabulary , the Philippine postal system , and civilian companies in the provinces . Interpreters were required for the many dialect s used by the observers . Message processing encountered significant delays between the time of observation and time of report . On 4 May 1941 , the Warning Service was shifted to the new PDAF as the " Air Warning Service " . A newly trained 194 - man Signal Corps air warning company arrived by transport on 1 August to operate two SCR - 271C fixed - location air tracking radar s planned for deployment on Luzon , each with a range of . Campbell immediately prepared a study for Clagett recommending 24 - hour operations and modern aircraft detection equipment , specifically two mobile SCR - 270B units and nine SCR - 271s , allotting eight units to Luzon and three to Mindanao , and expanding the force to a 915 - man battalion . He also suggested that radars be established at some future time on the islands of Lubang , Samar , Palawan , Jolo , Basilan , Tablas , Panay , and Negros . His specific recommendation was in line with the one SCR - 270 / seven SCR - 271 recommendation of the Air Defense Board just received by the War Department , and was endorsed by MacArthur on 8 September with a recommendation for funds . MacArthur was notified by wire the next day that an SCR - 270 and two SCR - 271s were already in transit to the Philippines by ship for use by the air warning company , with three more SCR - 270s to follow in October . However by 15 November , when the AWS was integrated into the new 5th Interceptor Command , plans for the fixed - location radar sites were only five percent complete and no date to begin construction had been set . The 557th Air Warning Battalion was designated to provide the expanded early warning defense , and was at its port of embarkation at San Francisco on 6 December . The AWS received seven SCR - 270 mobile units but only two were operating on 8 December : one in full operation at Iba , Zambales , and a Marine Corps unit training at Nasugbu , Batangas . The latter was assigned to the Air Warning Detachment of the 1st Separate Marine Battalion in late November to provide protection to the Navy base . The Iba unit had been operating since 18 October and was fully functioning . Three Army detachments with mobile units and the Marine detachment were ordered into the field on 3 December with instructions to be in operation by 10 December . Of the Army detachments , at the onset of hostilities one had just reached position at Burgos , Ilocos Norte , in northwest Luzon ; another was at Tagaytay , Cavite , with a damaged set ; and the third was newly established at Paracale , Camarines Norte , in southeastern Luzon , where it had just completed calibration tests . The two fixed - location SCR - 271s were in storage . USAFFE also received 11 sets of SCR - 268 antiaircraft radar s , a searchlight - control radar that could also be used for gun laying of AA weapons . After the FEAF was forced to withdraw into Bataan to continue operations , its primitive fields were subject to frequent attack from Luzon - based aircraft of the Japanese Army . An SCR - 268 of the 200th Coast Artillery was placed in operation on the hillside above Cabcaben Airfield . Used in conjunction with the sole surviving SCR - 270B unit , hidden in the jungle a mile from Bataan Field , it served as an early warning system and was linked to headquarters of the 5th Interceptor Command at Mariveles . Takeoffs and landings by the Bataan Field Flying Detachment required towing of P - 40s off the runways to and from hidden revetments , and were vulnerable to strafing . The ad hoc system facilitated coordination of field operations , and while imperfect , no aircraft were lost during takeoffs or landings . World War II . Operations in the Philippines . Japanese air operations against FEAF airfields on Luzon were scheduled to take off from their Formosan bases beginning at 1 : 30 am on 8 December , with attacks to commence 21 minutes after dawn ( and approximately four hours after offensive operations began in Hawaii ) , at 6 : 30 am . However , reconnaissance flights dispatched to check weather conditions between Formosa and Luzon neither returned nor reported as launch time approached , and a thick fog over southern Formosa set back the timetable by 90 minutes . The commanders of Japanese units were disturbed when monitoring of American radio traffic indicated that the weather flights had been detected despite the darkness and attempts were made by Iba - based P - 40s to intercept . Although all the interceptions failed , Iba Field was then substituted as a target in place of Nichols ( where it was assumed that two squadrons of B - 17s had dispersed ) to deal with the new interceptor threat . Further radio monitoring revealed to the Japanese that the U . S . Asiatic Fleet had been alerted at 4 : 00 am of the attack on Pearl Harbor , and they expected attacks on their own bases by B - 17s ( bombing through the fog undercast ) at any time after 7 : 00 am The air defense weaknesses of the FEAF were mirrored by those of the Japanese , who had prepared only for offensive operations , but no attack came before a final revised plan was issued at 7 : 50 am , ordering the main attack force of Japanese land - based aircraft to launch at 9 : 15 am and attack at 12 : 30 pm Brereton attempted in person to obtain authorization for attacks on Formosa soon after word of events in Hawaii reached Manila , but was twice prevented from speaking with MacArthur by Sutherland . The authorization was refused , apparently a misinterpretation of standing orders not to make " the first overt act . " The P - 40 squadrons at Clark , Iba , and Nichols moved to alert takeoff positions at 6 : 00 am as news of war spread among the units . A large force of aircraft was detected flying south towards Luzon , prompting the takeoff at 8 : 30 am of 15 of the 19 B - 17s at Clark with orders to patrol within communications range of its control tower , while the 24th Pursuit Group launched its three P - 40 squadrons and the P - 35 squadron at Del Carmen to patrol central Luzon for intruders . At 8 : 50 am and 10 : 00 am , telephone attempts to obtain authorization from USAFFE headquarters for a B - 17 attack was also rebuffed by Sutherland . However MacArthur himself called Brereton at 10 : 15 am and released the bomber force to employ at his discretion . Brereton immediately ordered two bombers to conduct reconnaissance flights and recalled the rest to prepare for a late afternoon bombing mission . The B - 17s and the fighters , which were low on fuel , all landed by 11 : 00 am to refuel and prepare for afternoon operations . Japanese naval bombers and fighters took off according to their revised schedule and approached Luzon in two well - separated forces , both of which were detected by the Iba radar detachment just before 11 : 30 am . Despite an hour ' s warning , only the P - 40 squadron at Iba took off , and it ran low on fuel in futile response to confusing instructions from the 24th PG that resulted from changing analyses of Japanese intents . The Iba P - 40s were in their landing pattern when the Japanese struck . The aircraft at Clark and Iba were caught on the ground when the attack began at 12 : 35 pm . 107 two - engined bombers divided into two equal forces bombed the airfields first , after which 90 Zero fighters conducted strafing attacks until 1 : 25 pm ( the fighters strafing Iba concluded at 1 : 05 pm , after which they flew to Clark and resumed attacks ) . Nearly the entire B - 17 force , one - third of the U . S . fighters , and its only operational radar unit were destroyed . The Japanese lost only seven fighters and a single bomber to combat . Follow - up attacks on Nichols , Nielson , and Del Carmen fields followed in the next two days , destroying both the offensive and defensive operational capability of the FEAF , and a decision was made late on 10 December to save the surviving fighters for reconnaissance and avoid direct combat . Fourteen surviving B - 17s , after just three days of small and unsuccessful attacks on Japanese amphibious forces , were transferred to Batchelor Field , Australia , for maintenance between 17 and 20 December , bringing Clagett with them . Brereton evacuated FEAF headquarters on 24 December to Darwin , Northern Territory by way of the Netherlands East Indies , leaving the new head of the 5th Interceptor Command , Col . Harold H . George ( promoted to brigadier general 25 January 1942 ) in command of units in the Philippines . Reduced to a single squadron - sized composite force , his pursuit fighters were carefully husbanded for reconnaissance duties and forbidden to engage in combat until forced to evacuate to fields hurriedly built on the Bataan peninsula , to which the entire USAFFE withdrew by 6 January 1942 . Combat and accidents reduced but did not eliminate the P - 40 complement , and a group of pursuit pilots , called the " Bataan Field Flying Detachment , " continued to fly missions until the last day of the campaign , employing mainly 30 - pound fragmentation bombs and machine gun fire as ordnance . Four of the six P - 40s sent to Del Monte on 8 January were recalled to Bataan two weeks later , but only three arrived , leaving the detachment still with just seven P - 40Es and two P - 40Bs . The small detachment , gradually attrited , had a few notable successes : A single flyable P - 40E remained at Bataan Field , although by 5 March mechanics had repaired the damaged P - 40B at Cabcaben using P - 40E parts , facetiously calling the composite a " P - 40 something " . Occasional individual reconnaissance flights were made in the following month by the two craft . Brig . Gen . George was evacuated by PT boat on 11 March , ending the effective usefulness of the detachment , whose pilots were severely debilitated by starvation and disease . Churchill eventually succeeded to nominal command 12 days before the surrender , but was unable to evacuate and became a prisoner of war . Accidents put all three P - 40s based on Mindanao out of commission by 9 February , leaving just two P - 35s that had escaped from Bataan . Transfer of a propeller put a P - 40 back in commission two days later , and shipment to Cebu by submarine of parts taken from wrecks on Bataan put another back in operation by mid - March , when a fire destroyed one of them on the ground . Three new P - 40Es , still in crates , were shipped from Brisbane , Australia , by blockade runner on 22 February but ran aground on 9 March on a reef between Bohol and Leyte . Carefully hidden and moved by barge at night , the crates reached Mindanao on 26 March , where a makeshift air depot had been established in a coconut grove at Buenavista Airfield using mechanics of the 19th Bomb Group and the 440th Ordnance Company . By 2 April , all three P - 40s were assembled and flight - tested , making the Mindanao P - 40 force twice as large as that on Bataan . The two P - 40s on Bataan both flew out on 8 April , the P - 40E to Iloilo City on Panay , where it landed wheels up , and the P - 40B to Cebu . The two P - 35s on Mindanao flew to Bataan Field on 4 April , and they also evacuated three pursuit pilots in their baggage compartments . A Navy Grumman J2F Duck that the 20th Pursuit Squadron raised from Mariveles Bay and placed in service again on 24 March evacuated five officers . Bataan surrendered the next morning . The P - 40B reached Mindanao but crashed on 14 April trying to land at Del Monte No . 3 in a heavy rain . The three new P - 40Es and the sole remaining P - 35 operated out of Maramag Field in central Mindanao until 3 May . The P - 35 was transferred to the Philippine Army Air Corps and two surviving P - 40Es were ultimately captured intact by the Japanese army on 12 May . Against the overall loss from all causes of 108 P - 40s and 25 P - 35s , FEAF pilots were credited by USAF Historical Study No . 85 , " USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft , World War II " , with 35 aerial victories between 8 December 1941 and 12 April 1942 . 33 pursuit pilots were killed in the campaign and 83 surrendered to become prisoners of war , with 49 of those dying in captivity . 95 % of enlisted men became POWs , and 61 % of those died before they could be repatriated . Operations in the Netherlands East Indies . On 29 December 1941 , Brereton and his small staff arrived in Darwin , where his only combat forces were 14 B - 17s of the 19th Bomb Group that had come south from Del Monte , and reestablished FEAF headquarters . By 1 January 1942 , eleven of the bombers had been shifted northwest to Singosari Airfield on Java . The 19th BG flew its next combat mission on 4 January against Japanese shipping off Davao , utilizing Samarinda Airfield , Borneo , as a staging base , but on 11 January , when the first aircraft of the 7th Bomb Group arrived , FEAF conducted its operations solely for the defense of the Netherlands East Indies . FEAF became a part of the American - British - Dutch - Australian Command created to unify forces in the defense of the NEI . On 18 January , FEAF headquarters moved to Bandoeng . The " Pensacola " convoy for the Philippines was diverted on 13 December to Brisbane , where it disembarked its Air Corps personnel on 23 December , then continued to Darwin with field artillery reinforcements on 29 December . The pursuit and partially trained pilots began training as assembly of the crated aircraft went forward at Archerfield and Amberley airdromes . 21 pilots of the 27th Bomb Group and 17 from the 24th Pursuit Group were flown to Australia in the last two weeks of December to ferry back the aircraft , but no engine coolant had been sent for the fighters and the guns of the dive bombers were missing key electrical and mounting components , hampering not only reinforcement of FEAF but limiting flight training of the new pilots . The " President Garfield " , 500 miles at sea en route to Honolulu , reversed course after receiving word that war had begun in Hawaii and returned to San Francisco . The USAT " President Polk " , a cargo liner impressed into service as an Army transport , embarked 55 P - 40s , an equal number of pilots and ground crews gathered from four groups based in California ( including 27 pilots off the " President Garfield " ) , and sailed without escort on 18 December , reaching Brisbane on 13 January 1942 . There the " President Polk " embarked the ground echelons of two squadrons of the 7th Bomb Group ( based at Jogjakarta ) and continued to Java , escorted by the heavy cruiser USS " Houston " , arriving in Surabaya on 28 January . By mid - January , Japanese advances southward cut the anticipated aircraft ferry routes to the Philippines and reinforcement was no longer feasible . Instead , using aircraft and personnel at hand , provisional fighter squadrons were organized in Brisbane to assist the Royal Netherlands Indies Air Force ( ML - KNIL ) in defending the NEI . The 17th Pursuit Squadron ( Provisional ) was established on 14 January , and 13 of its 17 pilots had previously been with the 24th PG . With 17 P - 40s delivered by the " Pensacola " convoy ( assembly of the 18th could not be completed because of a lack of parts ) , it flew across northern Australia from Brisbane to Darwin , then to Java via Penfoie Airdrome at Koepang and Den Pasar Field on Bali between 16 and 25 January . Only 12 Warhawks arrived at the designated FEAF fighter base at Ngoro Field , the others lost to accidents , combat , and pilot illness . The 20th Pursuit Squadron ( Provisional ) , incorporating pilots of the 35th PG , took off from Darwin in 25 P - 40s on 2 February , but only 17 reached Java , the remainder shot down over Bali or damaged on the ground by air raids . Likewise , 25 P - 40s of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron ( Provisional ) departed Brisbane , but because of accidents involving novice pilots , only 18 reached Darwin on 8 February . Just nine eventually reinforced Ngoro ; an entire flight of eight was lost when it exhausted its fuel after its LB - 30 navigation guide aircraft became lost in a storm trying to find Koepang . Survivors of both the 3rd and 20th provisional squadrons were integrated into the 17th PS . The 33rd Pursuit Squadron ( Provisional ) was en route to Java at Darwin when it was nearly annihilated by a Japanese air raid on 19 February . Of 83 P - 40s assembled and flown from Brisbane , only 37 arrived at Ngoro Field , and by 15 February less than 20 could be mustered for operations . The 91st Bombardment Squadron was re - manned in Brisbane with pilots from the 27th BG , and dispatched eleven A - 24s to Java on 11 February , but the Japanese threat to Timor prevented the other two squadrons of the 27th from following . Inadequate facilities at its new airfield near Malang delayed maintenance of the dive bombers and prevented their operational use until 19 February . 32 assembled P - 40s were collected at Maylands Airfield near Perth , Western Australia , towed to Fremantle on the night of 19 – 20 February , and loaded on the flight deck of the seaplane tender USS " Langley " . The " Langley " sailed at noon 23 February for Java and all the aircraft were lost when it was sunk on 27 February . 31 of the 33 pilots of the 13th and 33rd Pursuit Squadrons ( Provisional ) perished in the sinking . The next day 27 unassembled P - 40s destined for the 51st Pursuit Group and shipped in crates on the freighter MS " Sea Witch " were destroyed in Tjilatjap harbor to keep them from being captured by the Japanese . On 3 February the Japanese opened a series of air attacks on ABDA bases on Java , and the 19th BG was again caught on the ground , losing five of its B - 17s in a raid on Singosari , four of them on the ground . On 20 February , just back from a mission to bomb the invasion force at Bali , seven B - 17s of the 19th BG were caught on the ground by Zero strafers while re - arming and five more were destroyed . Although 38 of the more capable B - 17E Flying Fortresses and a dozen LB - 30 Liberators incrementally reinforced the FEAF , losses were severe and the slow rate of reinforcement was unable to keep pace . Despite dispersal and elaborate camouflage , a lack of antiaircraft artillery and poor warning / communication systems resulted in the loss of 65 FEAF aircraft on the ground alone . Evacuations of personnel from Java and diversion of resources to India and Australia began 20 February . By 24 February only ten heavy bombers , four A - 24 dive bombers , and 13 P - 40 fighters remained flyable against Japanese forces . ABDA Command was officially dissolved the next day . The ground echelons of both heavy bomb groups began evacuation by sea on 25 February , while the bombers , carrying up to 20 passengers each , made daily six - hour flights to Broome , Western Australia , an intermediate evacuation point for all aircraft fleeing Java . Malang / Singosari closed on 28 February and Jogjakarta the next night , following the final bomber sorties . 260 men , including the remnants of the 17th Pursuit Squadron , were evacuated by five B - 17s and three LB - 30s . 35 passengers crammed the final LB - 30 that took off at 12 : 30 am of 2 March . On 3 March , nine Japanese fighters attacked Broome , destroying two of the evacuated B - 17s . Of 61 heavy bombers based on Java , only 23 escaped : 17 B - 17Es , three LB - 30s , and three of the original B - 17Ds of the 19th BG . Only six had been lost in aerial combat , but at least 20 were destroyed on the ground by Japanese attacks . Every fighter ( 39 ) and dive bomber ( 11 ) that arrived on Java was destroyed . Against these losses , the provisional pursuit squadrons were credited with the destruction of 45 Japanese aircraft in aerial combat . Heavy bombers had flown over sixty missions and at least 300 bomber sorties , but 40 % of the bombers turned back or otherwise failed to find their targets . Brereton ' s evacuation to India on 23 February 1942 effectively ended existence of the Far East Air Force , which had been re - designated " 5 Air Force " on 5 February . Its headquarters was not re - manned until 18 September 1942 in Australia , when it was designated Fifth Air Force . Fifth Air Force along with Thirteenth Air Force in the Central Pacific and Seventh Air Force in Hawaii was subsequently assigned to a higher echelon on 3 August 1944 , the newly created United States Far East Air Forces also with the acronym FEAF . This FEAF was subordinate to the U . S . Army Forces Far East and served as the headquarters of Allied Air Forces Southwest Pacific Area . By 1945 , three numbered U . S . air forces — 5th , 7th and 13th — were supporting operations in the Pacific . ( 35th Pursuit Group headquarters never arrived in the Philippines and is not listed for that reason . ) Strength of the FEAF , 8 December 1941 . Support units and personnel . The August strength of " Air Force USSAFE " was 2 , 049 enlisted troops under the command of 254 officers . Final FEAF peacetime strength is disputed . One source stated that , as of 30 November , its strength was 5 , 609 : 669 officers and 4 , 940 enlisted troops . Another put the 7 December strength as 8 , 100 . The Philippine Army Air Corps constituted another 1 , 500 members , with units at Maniquis Field ( Cabanatuan ) , Zablon Field ( Manila ) , and an auxiliary strip at Batangas , all on Luzon ; and a detachment at Lahug on Cebu . The numbers in italicized brackets indicate the number of personnel , as of 30 November .