Battle of Radzymin ( 1920 ) The Battle of Radzymin ( ) took place during the Polish – Soviet War ( 1919 – 21 ) . The battle occurred near the town of Radzymin , some north - east of Warsaw , between August 13 and 16 , 1920 . Along with the Battle of Ossów and the Polish counteroffensive from the Wieprz River area , this engagement was a key part of what later became known as the Battle of Warsaw . It also proved to be one of the bloodiest and most intense battles of the Polish - Soviet War . The first phase of the battle began on August 13 with a frontal assault by the Red Army on the Praga bridgehead . The Soviet forces captured Radzymin on August 14 and breached the lines of the 1st Polish Army , which was defending Warsaw from the east . Radzymin changed hands several times in heavy combat . Foreign diplomats , with the exception of the British and Vatican ambassadors , hastily left Warsaw . The plan for the battle was straightforward for both sides . The Russians wanted to break through the Polish defences to Warsaw , while the Polish aim was to defend the area long enough for a two - pronged counteroffensive from the south , led by General Józef Piłsudski , and north , led by General Władysław Sikorski , to outflank the attacking forces . After three days of intense fighting , the corps - sized 1st Polish Army under General Franciszek Latinik managed to repel a direct assault by six Red Army rifle division s at Radzymin and Ossów . The struggle for control of Radzymin forced General Józef Haller , commander of the Polish Northern Front , to start the 5th Army ' s counterattack earlier than planned . Radzymin was recaptured on August 15 , and this victory proved to be one of the turning points of the battle of Warsaw . The strategic counteroffensive was successful , pushing Soviet forces away from Radzymin and Warsaw and eventually crippling four Soviet armies . Background . Following the failure of the Kiev Offensive , the Polish armies retreated westwards from central Belarus and Ukraine . Although the Bolshevik forces failed to surround or destroy the bulk of the Polish Army , most Polish units were in dire need of fresh reinforcements . The Polish command hoped to halt the advancing Russian forces in front of Warsaw , the capital of Poland . At the same time General ( later Marshal of Poland ) Józef Piłsudski was to lead a flanking manoeuvre from the area of the Wieprz River , while General Władysław Sikorski ' s 5th Army was to leave the Modlin Fortress and head north - east , to cut off the Soviet forces heading westwards , to the north of the bend of the Vistula and Bugonarew and on towards Pomerania . However , for this plan to succeed , it was vital that Polish forces hold Warsaw . Prelude . The defence of Warsaw was organised by the 1st Polish Army under General Franciszek Latinik and by a part of the Northern Front under General Józef Haller . The army consisted of four understrength infantry divisions : the 8th , 11th , and 15th , with the 1st Lithuanian - Belarusian Division in reserve . In addition , it had at its disposal the battle - weary 10th Infantry Division , two Air Groups ( four escadrille s in total ) , 293 pieces of artillery and three armoured train s . The city was to be surrounded by four lines of defence . The outermost ran some to the east of Warsaw : to the east of Zegrze Fortress , then along the river Rządza to Dybów and south through Helenów , Nowa Czarna and the Białe Błota marshes east of Wołomin . From there it ran through Leśniakowizna , dense forests occupied by artillery training grounds , and then along the Okuniew – Wiązowna – Vistula line . The second line ran a mile closer to Warsaw , along the lines of partially preserved First World War - era trenches built by German and Russian armies in 1915 , separated by a no man ' s land . It ran from the banks of the river Bugonarew at Fort Beniaminów , along the Struga – Zielonka – Rembertów - Zakręt – Falenica line . The two most prominent pivots of this line were the towns of Radzymin and Wołomin . The third line of defence ran in the immediate vicinity of the right - bank borough of Praga , while the Vistula River bridgehead s formed the final fourth line . The 11th Polish Infantry Division was dispatched to Radzymin on August 8 in order to prepare the city ' s defences for the expected arrival of Bolshevik forces . While the unit ' s core was formed around veterans of the 2nd Polish Rifle Division of the French - equipped and trained Blue Army , it had been recently reinforced with fresh , but raw , recruits . The Poles set up defences in front of the town , utilising some earlier German and Russian First World War trenches and digging new positions . The Polish line ran some in front of the town , from the unfinished 1909 Fort Beniaminów at the banks of the river Bugonarew through Mokre to Dybów . The following day the 6th Russian Rifle Division captured Wyszków some to the north - east . On August 12 the Polish 1st Lithuanian – Belarusian Division abandoned the first line of defence and withdrew through Radzymin towards Warsaw . Radzymin now found itself at the front line ; by nightfall the first Russian forces appeared in front of Ruda and Zawady , two villages manned by the Polish 48th Infantry Regiment , and Russian artillery shelled Radzymin for the first time . Battlefield . From the north , Warsaw , which spans the Vistula , was effectively shielded by the Vistula , Bug and Narew rivers . The Red Army ' s lack of modern engineering equipment for the river crossings inhibited a flanking attack of Warsaw from the west , which had been Russia ' s historical path of attack , towards Płock , Włocławek and Toruń , where their forces could cross the Vistula and strike Warsaw from the west and north - west over permanent bridges there . While a ring of 19th - and early 20th - century Russian - built forts , part of the Warsaw Fortress , ran mostly along the western side of the Vistula , these fortifications lay in ruins ; Russian forces began demolition in 1909 and had destroyed most by the time of their withdrawal from Warsaw in 1915 , during the First World War . The most expedient approach for a large - scale assault on Warsaw was from the east . Terrain was mostly flat ; numerous roads converged radially along an arc from the Modlin Fortress to the north ( where the Narew flows into the Vistula ) , to Legionowo , Radzymin , and Mińsk Mazowiecki directly to the east . Meanwhile , the only permanent defences in the area of Radzymin were the incomplete Fort Beniaminów and a line of First World War trenches west of Radzymin , neglected since their construction by Russians and Germans in 1915 . Opposing forces . The first and second lines of Polish defences were manned by regular forces . These included three Polish infantry divisions : the 11th ( from the Bug River to Leśniakowizna ) , the 8th ( Leśniakowizna to Okuniew ) and the 15th ( Okuniew to the Vistula River ) . The 1st Army also held the newly arrived 1st Lithuanian - Belarusian Division in reserve ( Marki – Kobyłka ) , while the Northern Front ' s headquarters reserves consisted of the 10th Infantry Division and some smaller units . The third line was manned by units of mobilised State Police and a variety of volunteer units of low combat value . Out of those units , initially only the 11th Division under Colonel Bolesław Jaźwiński took part in the fight . Its 48th " Kresy Rifles " Regiment ( Colonel Łukowski ) manned the Bugonarew - Mokre line , the 46th " Kaniów Rifles " Regiment ( Colonel Krzywobłocki ) manned the Mokre - Czarna perimeter , and the 47th " Kresy Rifles " Regiment ( Lt . Colonel Szczepan ) manned the Czarna – Leśniakowizna line . To the south of the 11th Division were positions around Wołomin manned by the 8th Infantry Division , consisting of the 36th , 21st and 33rd Infantry Regiments , as well as the 13th Infantry Regiment held in reserve , which later took part in the Battle of Ossów . The combat value of Polish units is difficult to assess as they included fresh recruits of the so - called Volunteer Army , veterans of First World War , battle - hardened soldiers who fought in earlier stages of the Polish - Bolshevik War , and civilians with virtually no combat training . Prior to the battle the 46th Regiment received 700 reinforcements : mostly deserter s from various formations , a battalion of volunteer sentry guard s and march companies of sapper s . The 11th Infantry Division , nominally 9000 men strong , in practice had only 1500 soldiers in first - line units . The situation for the Polish Army was so dire that some of the soldiers sent as reinforcements had reportedly " never seen a rifle in their lives " . In addition , most units to make a stand at Radzymin were exhausted after surviving a retreat from Belarus . However , the Polish side had superior intelligence and aerial superiority . The two Russian divisions assaulting Radzymin were battle - hardened Siberian divisions led by experienced front - line commanders . Both divisions were as exhausted as their opponents , whom they had chased all the way from Belarus . However , prior to the battle both divisions received reinforcements from other units , instead of fresh recruits , and were much superior in manpower to other Russian units on the Polish front . Later , in his monograph on the war , Marshal of Poland Józef Piłsudski remarked that the commanding officer of the 27th Rifle Division had achieved what was unheard of in the Polish Army despite numerous attempts : putting rear echelons and stragglers of his division into front - line service . This was indeed a problem for both armies , as the number of " bayonets and sabres " , or soldiers fighting in the first line , was at all times smaller than the number of second echelon troops . On August 15 Polish intelligence reported the strength of the Russian forces as " three to four standard Russian divisions " . Even post - war memoirs by General Żeligowski mention " [ t ] hree Russian infantry divisions , that is 27 battalions , though admittedly understrength , against one of our own " , though in fact the Russian forces only had two divisions . Battle . August 13 . Both Polish and Russian planners expected an attack on Warsaw — and Radzymin in particular — from the east . Yet the first fights started to the north - east of the Polish capital . Warsaw was to be assaulted from the east by the 16th Red Army . At the same time the 14th Red Army ( under Ieronim Uborevich ) captured Wyszków and started a fast march westwards , towards Toruń . It was then to cross the lower Vistula and assault Warsaw from the north - west . However , its 21st Rifle Division remained on the south side of the Bug River and headed for Warsaw directly , under orders from Russia ' s Leon Trotsky . Aided by the Russian 27th Rifle Division , it came into contact with the Polish forces at Radzymin on August 12 , and prepared for an assault the following morning . The Soviet probing attack began at 07 : 00 hours , but the 21st Rifle Division achieved no breakthrough . After the Soviets had been repelled , the defending 11th Infantry Division received some artillery reinforcements . The artillery commanders wanted to use the church tower of Radzymin as an observation post and to move the batteries forward , closer to the front line . However , before the relocation of the artillery was complete , a new Soviet attack began at around 17 : 00 , this time carried out by four brigades of the 21st and 27th Rifle Divisions , reinforced with 59 artillery pieces . The Russians achieved a 3 : 1 superiority in firepower . Deprived of artillery support , the inexperienced and overstretched 1 / 46th Infantry Regiment , defending the village of Kraszew , broke , and the Soviets gained entry to Radzymin . The Polish unit withdrew in panic , and soldiers left their arms and backpacks behind . One of the artillery officers noted that the Russians achieved complete tactical surprise : " I ordered my dinner prepared when my aide came shouting ' Lieutenant Sir , the Reds are in the city . The retreat was made even more serious by the fact that the gendarmes , tasked with stabilising the front and catching deserters , also fled in panic . The town itself was badly damaged , and the commanding officer of the 46th Regiment , Colonel Bronisław Krzywobłocki , was forced to order the retreat of the remainder of his forces south - west from the town . The rest of the division had no option but to fall back to the line of First World War trenches . During the chaotic withdrawal all the artillery sub - units got lost . By 19 : 00 hours the town was in Russian hands . Although the Polish division was defeated , the Russian forces did not pursue . This allowed the Poles to mount a night counterattack . A single machine gun battalion attacked a position behind Radzymin . While ultimately unsuccessful , the battalion forced the Russian troops to remain stationary overnight , giving the Poles badly needed time to regroup and receive reinforcements , which came in the form of a single regiment from the 1st Lithuanian - Belarusian Division . Instead of retreating to the third line of defences , the Poles remained outside the town , hoping to retake it the following day . News of the defeat at Radzymin reached Warsaw the same day , causing panic among both the government and ordinary people . The following day the battlefield was visited by , among others , Prime Minister Wincenty Witos , papal nuncio Achille Ratti ( the future Pope Pius XI ) , Maciej Rataj and General Józef Haller , the commanding officer of the Northern Front . General Haller ' s dispatch of 01 : 00 hours the same night called the Polish defeat at Radzymin " ignominious " , and ordered the commanding officers of the 46th Infantry Regiment and divisional artillery to be immediately court - martial led . The commanding officer of the 46th Regiment was immediately relieved of command and replaced with Major Józef Liwacz . The gravity of the situation was well - understood by the Polish Commander - in - Chief Józef Piłsudski , who remarked that all the battle plans for his counteroffensive were based on the assumption that Warsaw would hold , and suggested to General Tadeusz Rozwadowski that he reinforce the Radzymin area with any forces available , including an " en masse tank attack " . Despite this suggestion , out of 49 tanks of the 1st Tank Regiment available in Warsaw at that time , only about six took part in the battle . The loss of Radzymin also forced General Władysław Sikorski ' s 5th Army , fighting north of the Bug River and along the Vistula , to start a counteroffensive from the Modlin Fortress earlier than planned . Rozwadowski and General Maxime Weygand , a member of the French Military Mission to Poland , even suggested that Piłsudski also hasten his preparations for a counteroffensive , but he refused and decided to follow the original plans . The Russians considered the capture of Radzymin a crucial accomplishment . The Polish intelligence intercepted and decrypted a euphoric , but completely untrue , report by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the 3rd Army dispatched to Moscow , informing the Russian government that " the brave units of the 3rd Army have captured the town of Radzymin on August 13th , at 23 : 00 hours . In pursuit of the enemy , they are not further than 15 verst s from Praga . ( . . . ) The workers of Warsaw can already sense that their liberation is near . The revolution in Warsaw is ripe . Workers demand that the city be handed over to the Red Army without a fight , threatening to prevent armed soldiers from leaving the city [ for the front ] . The White Poland is dying " . The commanding officer of the Russian 3rd Army , Vladimir Lazarevich , informed Tukhachevsky that " Poland is now on fire . Only one more push is needed and the Polish fracas will be over " . To counter the threat of a Russian breakthrough , General Latinik ordered General Jan Rządkowski to assault the town the following day with all available forces . To strengthen the assault , the 11th Infantry Division ( under Colonel Bolesław Jaźwiński ) was drawn from the reserves and dispatched to join the assault which was scheduled for 05 : 00 hours the following morning . However , the Polish forces were far from sufficient for the task . Rządkowski argued that he had been promised substantial reinforcements which did not arrive . The battle - hardened Siberian Brigade was at that time tied down in the Modlin Fortress , although the promised cavalry units did arrive — but without their ammunition trains . August 14 . The plans for the Polish assault had to be changed due to unexpected Russian actions . The Polish forces expected heavy opposition from at least two Russian divisions . However , in the morning the Russian 21st Division resumed its advance along the Białystok – Warsaw road towards Marki and Warsaw , while the 27th started its march towards Jabłonna . The 21st Division achieved some early successes when its 5th and 6th Rifle Brigades pushed the Poles back from the Czarna River some to the west . However , at the same time it was advancing right in front of Polish forces which were preparing to assault Radzymin . At 10 : 15 hours the Polish 81st and 85th Infantry Regiments from the 1st Lithuanian - Belarusian Division assaulted the left flank of the unsuspecting Russians , continued along the Warsaw – Białystok road , and broke through to the town . The attack was led by Lieutenant Colonel Kazimierz Rybicki , who had personally witnessed the defeat of the 46th Regiment the previous day , on his day off . This time spirits were high and the Polish infantry advanced in order , with officers in the first line and the soldiers singing Dąbrowski ' s Mazurka . By noon the town was liberated . The success did not last long , as the Russian 27th Rifle Division turned around and arrived at Radzymin just in time for its 81st Brigade to push the exhausted Polish forces back towards the village of Słupno . Threatened by further attacks from Słupno and Wieliszew , the 85th Regiment retreated after suffering heavy casualties , including the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion , Captain Ryszard Downar - Zapolski . This time the Soviet 81st Rifle Brigade ( 27th Rifle Division ) pursued the Poles and managed to pierce Polish defences near Wólka Radzymińska and Dąbkowizna , breaking through the second line of defences , which were the last before the city limits . The Polish headquarters at Warsaw was " petrified to hear of the complete destruction of the 19th [ Lithuanian - Belarusian ] Division " , a report that fortunately for the Poles proved to be false . The threat to the northern flank was halted , with heavy casualties on both sides , thanks to the intervention of the division ' s commanding officer Jan Rządkowski , as well as Front commanding officer Józef Haller , who arrived on the battlefield to personally organise an ad - hoc line of defence west of Wólka Radzymińska , with Polish artillery units shelling the advancing Russians with direct fire . The Soviet advance was halted , and this time chaos in the Polish ranks was avoided , but again lack of reinforcements behind the main line of defences proved a serious problem . In the evening Generals Lucjan Żeligowski , Józef Haller , Jan Rządkowski and Franciszek Latinik met in Jabłonna and again in Struga to prepare a plan for retaking Radzymin once again . It was decided that , since the Soviet 27th Division was bogged down around Radzymin and had not resumed its march towards Jabłonna , the Polish 10th Infantry Division was no longer needed in that sector , and instead could be used to achieve a breakthrough at Radzymin . The division was relocated to Nieporęt , where General Rządkowski discovered the artillery units that were believed to have been destroyed by the Russians the previous day . A single battalion from the 28th " Kaniów Rifles " Regiment from the 10th Division , led by 1st Lieutenant Stefan Pogonowski , was ordered to entrench in a forest near Wólka Radzymińska and organise an ambush . The rest of the Polish forces were to start an all - out assault at 05 : 00 hours the following morning , with General Żeligowski in command over the ad - hoc corps . The forces amassed for the assault had a nominal strength of 17 , 000 infantry , 109 artillery pieces , and 220 machine guns . In the evening the 5th Army , operating north of the Bug and Narew rivers with its base of operations in the Modlin Fortress , started a limited counteroffensive with the aim of lessening the pressure on the Polish forces at Radzymin . Grossly outnumbered , the 5th Army could not break through the Russian lines , and got bogged down in intense fights along the Wkra river . However , although initially unsuccessful , the Polish attack prevented the Soviet 5th , 15th and 16th Armies from reinforcing the two divisions already committed to Radzymin . Only the 4th Red Army , the furthest from the battlefield , operating in the north along the East Prussia n border and moving towards Toruń , kept advancing almost unopposed . This however did not pose an immediate threat to the defenders of Warsaw , as its advance was finally halted at the outskirts of Włocławek , and it was forced to start a hasty retreat eastwards . August 15 . In the early hours of August 15 the Russian forces resumed their attacks on the Polish lines , intending to break through the second line of defences to the area of Nieporęt and Jabłonna . However , as they bypassed a small forest outside Wólka Radzymińska , they were assaulted from the rear by the 1st Battalion of the 28th Infantry Regiment , which had been concealed there earlier . Simultaneously , the remainder of the 28th Regiment began a badly coordinated and half - hearted attack from Nieporęt . Both Polish assaults were bloodily repelled , with the casualties including Lieutenant Pogonowski who was posthumously awarded the Virtuti Militari medal for his bravery leading the charge , but they did force the Russians to retreat to their initial positions . When the front - line stabilised , the Polish headquarters threw all its reserves into a counterattack . Beniaminów was reinforced with the 29th Infantry Regiment . The Polish attack began around 05 : 30 , after a 20 - minute artillery barrage . Soon the entire 10th Infantry Division started a push along the southern bank of the Bugonarew river in order to outflank the Russian forces from the north , while the 1st Lithuanian - Belarusian Division pushed directly towards the town . Although the Russian side had superior artillery and brought several Austin - Putilov armoured cars , this time the Polish assault was supported by five Renault FT tanks and numerous aircraft . Despite suffering from mechanical failures , the tanks successfully broke through the Russian lines , and the infantry of the 85th " Wilno Rifles " Regiment from the 1st Lithuanian - Belarusian Division followed them into the town . After a short struggle the Polish forces once again controlled the town . However , as soon as it was taken , General Żeligowski decided to reorganise his division and could not support the 85th Regiment with fresh forces . Yet another successful counterattack by the Russian 61st and 62nd Infantry Brigades forced the Polish 1st Division to retreat back to its initial positions . At the same time , on the northern flank , the 10th Division was much more successful . Instead of waiting for orders from General Żeligowski , the commanding officer of the 10th Division , Lieutenant Colonel Wiktor Thommée , started a push along the southern bank of the Bugonarew . The 28th and 29th " Kaniów Rifles " Infantry Regiments managed to reach the village of Mokre , on a small hill overlooking Radzymin and the Białystok - Warsaw road , directly behind the Russian lines . The Russians tried to push the Poles back from that position , but ultimately failed . Their assault on the village of Wiktorów also ended in failure . Soon the Polish positions in Mokre were secured , and further reinforced with the remainder of the 1st Battalion , 28th Regiment . With the northern flank safely in Polish hands , General Lucjan Żeligowski ordered his Lithuanian - Belarusian Division to complete the encirclement of Radzymin . The division reached a position a few hundred metres from Radzymin by way of the village of Ciemne to the south of the town . Fearing envelopment , the Soviets abandoned the town and withdrew east . A single company from the 30th " Kaniów Rifles " Regiment entered Radzymin unopposed . The town was completely empty ; both the civilians and the Russian soldiers had fled , and one officer remarked that " not a stray dog was left behind in the ruined city " . Aftermath : August 16 and the following days . Although the battle was over and Radzymin was secure , the Soviet forces continued to threaten the Polish northern flank . In the early hours of August 16 the Russians mounted yet another assault on Radzymin , reinforced by several armoured cars and led personally by the commanding officer of the 27th Rifle Division , Vitovt Putna . However , by this time the morale of the 27th Division was already broken , and the assault was easily thwarted by the Polish infantry and the three remaining operational FT tanks . The armoured cars withdrew as soon as the Polish tanks opened fire , and the Russian infantry followed . Other Russian forces were more successful to the north of the town , where they managed to capture the village of Mokre from the 28th Regiment . The regiment counter - charged the village , but was initially driven off . However , approximately 80 pieces of emplaced Polish artillery laid a 30 - minute barrage on the village . It was the greatest concentration of artillery fire in the war up to that point , and had a tremendous effect on the morale of the Russian defenders . After the barrage ended Lieutenant Colonel Wiktor Thommée personally led his forces in a bayonet charge ; the regiment re - entered Mokre at noon and the Russians fled . The entire 13th Red Army stalled because of its defeat at Radzymin . After that success the Poles slowly but steadily pushed the Soviets back beyond the first line of defences that had been overrun several days before . By the end of 16 August , the 28th and 30th Infantry Regiments manned most of the trench line along the Rządza River , near the village of Dybów . Although initially the Russian command wanted to use the outskirts of Radzymin as a pivot for a tactical withdrawal to the Radzymin – Brześć line , the following day the Soviet commander ordered a full retreat towards Wyszków and later Grodno . Meanwhile Piłsudski ' s 4th Army outflanked the surprised Russians and went as far north as the left wing of Nikolai Sollogub ' s 16th Red Army , which at that time was constantly pressured from the front by the 10th and 15th divisions . This made existing Russian plans obsolete , and Polish forces started a pursuit that ended with the victorious Battle of the Niemen River in September . On the day of Polish victory the Soviets issued a propaganda poster in Moscow proclaiming : " Warsaw has fallen . With it the Poland of yesterday became history . It is nothing but a legend now while the truth of today is the red reality . Long live the Soviets ! Long live the invincible Red Army ! " Result and assessment . The battle was a success for the Poles at both the tactical level ( the battle of Radzymin itself ) and the strategic level ( its role in the battle of Warsaw ) . After several days of constant fighting for the town of Radzymin and its immediate vicinity , the Russian attack was repelled and the Poles were able to mount a successful counteroffensive , forcing the Russian armies out of Poland and in the end destroying them completely . However , the conduct of the Polish forces and their commanders at Radzymin in the early part of the battle has been criticised by historians since the 1920s . It was noted by General Lucjan Żeligowski that the importance of the northern approach to Warsaw was poorly understood by the Polish commanders prior to the battle , and that the untested and relatively weak 10th Division was chosen for the task of defending Radzymin " out of sheer incompetence " . In his memoirs he also heavily criticised the commanding officers of the division , whose " military prowess and punctuality in carrying out orders was little more than irony " . Other post - war authors argued that on August 13 , when the first Russian forces appeared in front of Radzymin , the 1st Army had more than enough time to reinforce the weak Polish forces there . Instead , it took several days to recapture what could have been held from the start . Despite the lack of strategic flair in the Polish defence of Radzymin , it was one of the cornerstones of the overall success in the Battle of Warsaw . Although it was Piłsudski ' s Assault Group that defeated the Russians , the forces at Radzymin and Sikorski ' s 5th Army were responsible for stopping them at the gates of Warsaw . Żeligowski noted in his memoirs that " Warsaw was saved thanks to Polish successes at Mokra , Wólka Radzymińska and Radzymin " . The battle in popular culture and the media . As one of the crucial battles of the war of 1920 , the battle for Radzymin has been featured in novels , memoirs and historical monographs . It was also portrayed in the 2011 film " Battle of Warsaw 1920 " , although the battle of Radzymin sequence was shot mostly in Piotrków Trybunalski . Since 1998 a re - enactment of the battle has been held annually on August 15 in Ossów and Radzymin , organised by various re - enactment groups and a local powiat administration .