Battle of Kamdesh The Battle of Kamdesh took place during the War in Afghanistan . It occurred on October 3 , 2009 , when a force of 300 Taliban assaulted the American Combat Outpost ( " COP " ) Keating near the town of Kamdesh of Nuristan province in eastern Afghanistan . The attack was the bloodiest battle for US forces since the Battle of Wanat in July 2008 , which occurred away from Kamdesh . The attack on COP Keating resulted in eight Americans killed and 27 wounded . As a result of the battle , COP Keating was partially overrun and nearly completely destroyed . Observation Post ( " OP " ) Fritsche was attacked simultaneously , limiting available support from that position . The Coalition forces withdrew from the base shortly after the battle . A deliberate withdrawal had been planned some time before the battle began , and the closing was part of a wider effort by the top commander in Afghanistan , General Stanley McChrystal , to cede remote outposts and consolidate troops in more populated areas to better protect Afghan civilians . The Americans " declared the outpost closed and departed — so quickly that they did not carry out all of their stored ammunition . The outpost ’ s depot was promptly looted by the insurgents and bombed by American planes in an effort to destroy the lethal munitions left behind . " Background . Origins of the American military intervention in Nuristan . The key to denying Anticoalition Militia ( ACM ) access to supply lines to Pakistan and extending government control by 2006 was considered to be the provincial reconstruction team base ( PRT ) . By extending these bases to Nuristan , one of the most remote and isolated provinces in Afghanistan , government credibility and power could be demonstrated to the entire Afghan population . These bases were a key element of the American counter - insurgency strategy . This approach was supported by the stationing of Navy Commander Kimberly Evans , a PRT leader in the First Lady ’ s box at the 2006 State of the Union address . Colonel John “ Mick ” Nicholson , Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team ( BCT ) of the 10th Mountain Division had observed that Kamdesh was located at a point where three of the valley systems from the Pakistan border in the north converged . Nicholson and officers of his command believed that much of the flow of weapons and troops from Pakistan could be stopped at Kamdesh . Gul Mohammed Khan , the government administrator for Kamdesh District lived at the intersection of the Landay - Sin and Darreh Ye Kushtoz rivers intersection . These valley and road intersections combined with the political leadership in the area inspired the positioning of the Nuristan PRT . The Nuristan PRT in particular was recommended by Nuristani Province Governor Tamim Nuristani . On July 20 , 2006 , 2 : 00 a . m . all of Cherokee Company and one platoon from Able Troop , 3 - 71 Cavalry Squadron dropped in two Chinooks on Landing Zone Warheit , a cornfield on a ridge near Kamesh , under command of Lieutenant Colonel Howard to garrison the area . The camp was constructed by 3 - 71 Cavalry , 10th Mountain Division ( Reconnaissance , Surveillance , and Target Acquisition ) in the summer of 2006 and was manned by their ABLE Troop element until June 2007 . The area had not been occupied by any conventional US forces prior to 3 - 71 Cavalry ' s takeover , although Special Operations forces , including a Navy SEAL team that took major casualties when their helicopter was shot down by enemy fire in Operation Red Wings , operated in the area . The camp was originally constructed to be a PRT , called PRT Kamdesh , but due to extremely high levels of fighting in the area it remained a fire base instead of a PRT . In December 2006 it was renamed Camp Keating after the death of ABLE Troop 3 - 71 Cavalry 10th Mountain Division ' s Executive Officer Benjamin Keating , who died November 26 , 2006 while conducting combat operations south of the camp . 3 - 71 Cavalry conducted many successful combat missions in the area surrounding the camp and repelled various attacks on the base . The impact of adverse terrain on the Nuristan campaign . The Kamdesh village and most of Nuristan is located in the Hindu Kush . This is a lofty mountain range characterized by steep slopes of enormous granite boulders separated by fast moving rivers in deep narrow valleys . The temperate climate of the area provides hot summers , a monsoon season in the summer , and cold winters of ice and snow extending down into the valleys . The combination of volatile weather and rugged mountains make any kind of travel and life in general difficult and challenging . American military operations in Kamdesh were affected as soon as units began gathering for deployment in the area . Operation Deep Strike began on May 5 , 2006 . This was a re - deployment from the Cowkay and Korangal Valley s to Kamdesh . The pick up zone for Able Troop 2nd Platoon was called PZ Reds , located on the side of an 8 , 000 - foot mountain . It was nicknamed “ Heart Attack Ridge ” due to its steep slope and obstacles hazardous to low flying aircraft . While attempting the pickup , a Chinook transport helicopter crashed in the darkness at 10 : 09 PM when the rear rotor hit a tree , and the helicopter slid down the slope and over a cliff , exploding in flames and killing all the crew and passengers . There was an element of Able Troop 3 - 71 CAV 2nd Platoon still left on the PZ after the crash that worked relentlessly to recover the bodies of their 10 comrades and destroy sensitive equipment left amongst the wreckage . After marching into the proposed site for the Kamdesh PRT , Captain Michael and Cherokee Company ’ s second platoon were confronted by a large boulder in the middle of the site that made use of a helicopter landing area in the PRT site impossible . The rock could not be blown apart without raining fragments into the town of Urmul across the Landay - Sin river . The landing zone was therefore placed on the other side of the river on a rocky peninsula jutting into the river near Urmul . This separation of the landing zone , and the fact that PRT was surrounded by mountains on three sides make the place unappealing from the standpoint of military defense . On August 8 , 2006 , 19 days after the first American landing , the PRT received its first major ACM attack . Captain Frank Brooks , commanding at LZ Warheit was dismayed to discover the PRT could not be quickly supported by LZ Warheit . From the PRTs position , that resembled the bottom of a funnel , it could not be seen or supported with indirect fire due to the multi - level and complicated local terrain . The tall mountains made a joke of two dimensional maps , and rendered pre - determined landmarks useless . Eventually supporting aircraft scattered the attackers , but if the weather had been a problem , air support would not have provided the decisive results . From August 8 to November 25 of 2006 strenuous efforts were made to supply and expand the PRT by supply convoys using the Landay - Sin valley road from Forward Operating Base Naray . Afghan contractors were unable to keep the narrow mountain road in safe condition , and convoys were subject to constant ambush from the surrounding mountains that lined the entire valley to Naray . Use of the road was ended by the death of First Lieutenant Ben Keating in an effort to return an armored supply truck to the Naray FOB . The road collapsed under the weight of the vehicle , Keating was thrown from it , and the truck rolled over him and sank into the Landay - Sin river . Despite the fact that it was against regulations for an officer to drive a convoy vehicle , Keating had done it to avoid risking the lives of his men in what was considered a highly risky trip in on an unstable road with an overweight vehicle . His death had a traumatic effect on the morale of 3 - 71 Cav , and ended use of the Kamdesh - Naray road . Combined with difficult conditions for air supply , and a continuing loss of support from the local population , supply to what was renamed Camp Keating on November 26 , 2006 was steadily strangled . As it became obvious that COP Keating was too isolated , indefensible , and rapidly becoming impossible to supply , plans were made to close it beginning in December 2008 . Hearts and minds , the counterinsurgency effort in Nuristan , 2006 – 2009 . The population of Nuristan is ethnically distinct from the rest of Afghanistan , and divided into four major groups , the Kom , Kata , Kushtoz , and Kalasha . These subgroups were in turn divided into different clans and sects of the Islamic religion , depending on lineages and the interpretations of individual religious leaders . These groups could clash violently over water rights , pasture , and religious beliefs . Five different languages and various dialects are spoken by these groups , making translators from other areas of Afghanistan useless . The Soviets had to contend with a rebel group known as the Dawlet of eastern Nuristan . They were professing a Salafi version of Islam , and hostile to any political rivals . The Nuristanis had resisted Islam as late as the year 1895 and before that had been considered a nation of infidels with a long tradition of violently resisting outsiders , their beliefs , and their invasions . Resistance in Nuristan revolved around a specific group of Islamic fighters known as Hezb - e - Islami Gulbuddin or HIG . During the Soviet occupation HIG received more support from the CIA than any other Mujahideen resistance group . When it came to infiltration from Pakistan , and setting up ambushes , HIG was regarded as the most skillful . In 2006 HIG was actively resisting the Afghan government . When Captain Aaron Swain of Cherokee Co . had sounded out Afghan Border Police Commander Ahmed Shah about setting up near Kamdesh , he was told that HIG insurgents tried to blow up Shah ’ s jeep on his last trip there and it was a bad place . American occupation troops in Nuristan would find themselves directly in opposition to the HIG forces prepared by the CIA to resist the Soviets . Colonel Pat Donahue , the former commander of the 3rd BCT , had believed that Nuristani population was essentially neutral , hostile to any outside groups , and so isolated that resources allocated to the region would be wasted . These resources were limited by the fact that only 5 , 000 American troops were available to occupy a rugged area the size of Virginia that had very little in the way of Infrastructure . A new Counter - insurgency strategy seemed to offer a way around these problems . Known as COIN and refined by General Petraeus , Commander of US forces in Afghanistan , the Army and Marine Counter - insurgency Field Manual FM 3 - 24 would convert the population of Nuristan to American goals in the region . Unlike Donahue , Nicholson was a supporter of COIN in addition to seeing Kamdesh as a decisive control point in the region . The basic approach to victory by the PRT would involve three steps : 1 . Separate the enemy from the people . 2 . Link the people to their government . 3 . Transform Afghanistan by economic development and the creation of a national infrastructure . Nicholson hoped the PRT would seed a process that would be developed by the local Nuristanis rather than completely imposed from the outside . Lieutenant Keating , first commander of the Kamdesh PRT , was determined to make COIN a success in the region . Lieutenant Colonel Mike Howard , Squadron Commander , saw COIN as a process of providing three services in the Kamdesh region . Providing clean water by installing gravity fed pipelines in all the local villages , repairing the hydroelectric plants in Urmul and Kamdesh , and setting up new plants in Mirdesh and Gawardesh . New roads would be the final stage , built and maintained by local contractors , this would improve the local economy while providing improved communications with the central government and the rest of the nation . 1 . 33 million dollars was budgeted for these projects . This had the potential of providing a significant boost to the local economy , which in the past saw little in the way of civic improvements . Keating saw these programs as having mixed results . Villagers and clans who were left out of these projects were resentful , and quick to turn to those who would exploit the resulting divisions . Haji Yunus , a village elder of Gawardesh and contractor for an electric plant was kidnapped and murdered . A note was attached to his body which said : “ Don ’ t work with coalition forces . This will happen to you . ” The note was signed “ Mullah Omar ” . Omar was the top Taliban leader in Afghanistan , but U . S . Intelligence stated HIG had done the killing , giving Omar “ credit ” in order in instill more fear due to Omar ’ s greater reputation . The constant ambushes and fire fights along the road to Naray did little to relieve Keating ’ s doubts . “ The little bastards keep shooting at us every day . ” , represented Keating ’ s assessment of the progress of COIN in Kamdesh . After the death of Keating , and renaming COP Keating after him , a “ Night Letter ” appeared on the door of the Upper Kamdesh mosque on April 29 of 2007 . Part of the letter stated : “ At the present time for those who work and obey the American devils by taking contracts for building schools , road , and power plants : also those who work as police , district administrators , and commanders as well as sold - out mullahs who deny Allah ’ s orders and holy war and deny the holy Quran : We are telling you that we are continuing our holy war in Allah ’ s will … Soon we will start our operations . ” This letter was written in Pashto and signed “ Mujahideen ” . The following day insurgents kidnapped and murdered Fazal Ahad , an elder from the village of Badmuk who was attempting to end the Kom / Kata tribal disagreements by arranging a meeting in Kamdesh . In response to this , the local Afghan officials sent more government troops into the area to increase security . These troops were ambushed on the Naray / Kamdesh road and shot up badly enough to prevent their arrival in Kamdesh . The closeness of the action , and coordinated fire from both sides of the valley indicated that the attackers in this ambush were different than the groups that were using sporadic , long range , harassing fire in the past . The latest acronym for attackers used by the Americans was AAF , for anti - Afghan fighters . These AAF were more professional and probably represented groups from areas outside of Nuristan . They would be Pashtuns , who hated the Tajiks and Hazara tribes that made up the ANA , or Afghan National Army . The AAF would disguise themselves in ANA uniforms and set up fake checkpoints to extract taxes and tolls from local contractors , and allied themselves with smugglers transporting illegal timber and gems across the border into Pakistan . Urdu and Pashtun HIG warriors bringing in arms and ammunition from Pakistan would cross the border in the other direction . Their fake government check points and “ taxes ” would finance and complete the economic cycle and serve to finance AAF operations . On the whole the AAF was a broader based and more formidable force in 2007 than before the American invasion , and represented a significant escalation . At the end of May , 2007 , Bulldog Troop , 1 - 91 Cavalry Squadron , 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team , arrived at COP Keating . They were commanded by Captain Tom Bostwick , the next leader to inherit the responsibilities associated with the Kamdesh area of operations . The first of these would be “ Operation Mountain II ” , and effort to extend a series of observation posts west to control the villages between COP Keating and the Afghan village of Saret Koheh . Extending control further along the Landay - Sin river would hopefully provide a counter to the expansion of AAF organization and activity in the summer of 2007 . The AAF responded to this advance with a well - organized and coordinated ambush on July 26 , 2007 in the river valley at Saret Koheh . The AAF forces involved fit the pattern of the improved AAF , in that they were uniformed and equipped as Afghan Army and police forces , with the latest weapons and radios issued to government Afghan forces , along with black knit ski masks to conceal their identities . They made sustained attacks over a two - day period , drawing American support forces and widespread air forces into the battle . Despite air and artillery support the American forces suffered significant losses from the enemy fire that rained down on them from both sides of the valley . Captain Thomas G . Bostick was killed by a rocket propelled grenade , along with Staff Sergeant William " Ryan " Fritsche who was killed by rifle fire . Seven other Americans and one ANA soldier were wounded . The Battle of Saret Koheh made good on the threats of the “ Night Letter ” posted in Kamdesh beginning the campaign season of 2007 . It also confronted Lieutenant Colonel Kolenda commanding American forces in the area in Naray , with the fact that COIN operations in Nuristan were facing a crisis . AAF operations in the area were expanding , involving a greater proportion of the local population , and were being supported by Taliban organizations in Pakistan . American forces were strung out in a thinly held and poorly supplied picket line from Naray to Kamdesh along the Landay - Sin River . The American forces were too outnumbered to survive in sustained combat with the local population . Something had to be done to put the Americans and the Afghans of Nuristan on the same side . The first effort in a new COIN campaign was made by First Lieutenant Dave Roller . He decided that the appearance of American soldiers in their “ battle rattle ” war gear gave the impression of soulless killing machines . Encased in armor , helmets , and weapons , Americans appeared to be looking for a fight . As a contrast Dave attended his next meeting with the Kamdesh village leaders dressed in a T - shirt and shorts . When he spoke to them he discussed their common values as leaders of families and communities working toward a better future for their children . Mawlawi Abdul Rahman of Kamdesh was a local elder much impressed with this new approach . He began building a consensus of village elders in support of the Afghan government . Through the rest of the summer and fall of 2008 , Captain Joey Hutto , the new commander of COP Keating , and his troops expanded this initiative . Hutto had worked for years on COIN campaigns in Central America , and put his skills to good use in Nuristan . The Hundred Man Shura . By October 2007 the elders and mullahs of the Kamdesh area had been inspired by Rahman to gather at Kamdesh for a mass meeting , or shura to plan the future of Nuristan . This series of meetings over two days involved more than 800 representatives of the people of Nuristan , and had the goal of bringing order and economic development to the region . The village leaders elected a representative council of 100 members to form a shura that would produce a regional security plan and obtain an agreement with the American military and the Afghan Karzai government . This agreement would recognize the authority of the Hundred Man Shura , and provide funds for economic development . Formalized as “ The Commitment of Mutual Support ” the agreement also provided the Shura would provide local security in return for an end to uninvited American military searches of local towns and mosques . From November through January 2008 members of the Shura traveled the villages of the Kamdesh area , informing the residents of the support agreement and stating that the era of holy war was over , and that local government would bring peace and prosperity . This agreement did bring down the level of combat in the Kamdesh area . In the year that followed the agreement , ANA and American deaths dropped from thirty to three . The shura began to falter by October 2008 . The initiating ISAF forces of 1 - 91 Calvary had returned home , replaced by 6th Squadron , 4th Cavalry Regiment , 3rd Brigade Combat Team , 1st Infantry Division . On October 28 , the commander of COP Keating , Captain Robert J . Yllescas , was severely wounded in a targeted assassination attempt with an remotely detonated IED less than 400 meters from the outpost — he later died from his wounds . The assassin was later found in Urmul and appeared to have the assistance of one of the Afghan day laborers at Camp Keating and the acquiescence of Urmul ' s elders . Yllescas ' s charismatic relations with the Shura had supported the transition from 1 - 91 Calvary to 6th Squadron , and the Shura ' s influence and collaboration with ISAF forces declined from this point . The final months of Combat Outpost Keating . COP Keating became increasingly isolated in the summer of 2009 . Ground resupply became almost impossible due to the area ' s limited roads and the threat of insurgent attacks . Furthermore , Camp Keating ' s location , surrounded by mountains on three sides , exposed helicopters and the outpost ' s garrison to insurgent fire . Towards the end , resupply flights were limited to moonless nights when near total darkness offered some protection to helicopter crews and their craft . The nearest attack helicopters were located in Jalalabad , a thirty - minute flight away . OP Fritsche was established to provide overwatch for COP Keating and was manned by a mix of US and Afghan national forces . US Army soldiers at both outposts had been ordered to prepare to evacuate them and had informed local Afghan leaders of their intention to do so . COP Keating was manned by Bravo Troop , 3rd Squadron " Destroyers " , 61st Cavalry Regiment . In addition , Afghan national forces manned checkpoints and roadblocks at various locations around the area . At the time , Afghan national forces were under the supervision and were being trained by members of the Latvian Operational Mentor Liaison Teams . COP Keating was planned to be closed by August 2009 , but the move was delayed because of other military operations in a nearby district . Because Keating was scheduled for closure in the near future , coalition leaders had decided not to make more than minimal efforts to improve fortifications at the base . Coalition forces received three human - source intelligence reports sometime before the battle indicating that insurgents were planning an attack on the outposts . Because the reports had not been verified by other intelligence sources , such as electronic intelligence , the reports were discounted . Battle . About 3 : 00 am on October 3 , insurgents ordered all Kamdesh villagers to leave the area . At 6 : 00 am , the fighters opened fire from all sides of the outpost with mortars and rocket - propelled grenades , immediately putting the Americans ' mortar pit out of action . Observation Post Fritsche was attacked simultaneously , limiting available support from that position . Coalition forces responded with small arms fire , mortars , and by the afternoon , helicopters , heavy artillery , and airstrikes . The attackers overran Keating ' s perimeter defenses about 48 minutes into the battle . Breaches occurred at a latrine area close to the perimeter wire ; also the main entrance where civilian Afghan Security Guards were overwhelmed ; and from the eastern side — where Afghan National Army soldiers were stationed . Despite the efforts of two Latvian military advisors , who tried to convince the Afghan National Army forces not to flee , the Afghan defenders quickly broke and ran . US soldiers reported that none of the Afghan soldiers held their ground . During and after the battle , some of the Afghan soldiers stole items , including digital cameras and protein drinks , belonging to American soldiers at the base . Once inside , the attackers set fire to the base , burning down most of the barracks . Within the first hour , the American defenders had collapsed to a tight internal perimeter , centered on the two buildings that were not burning . Regrouping there , they pushed out teams to retake much of the outpost . They expanded the perimeter all the way back to the entry control point and to the buildings on the western edge of the outpost , which became their final fighting position . US air support directed by Sgt . Armando Avalos and Sgt . Jayson Souter , including attack helicopters , A - 10 s , a B - 1 bomber , and F - 15 fighters , destroyed the local mosque , where much of the insurgents ' heaviest fire originated . Once OP Fritsche soldiers gained control of their mortar pit , Sgt . Avalos began directing indirect support to help the defense of COP Keating . Two USAF F - 15E fighter bombers circled overhead , led by Captain Mike Polidor , for almost eight hours , helping coordinate airstrikes by 19 other aircraft . The insurgents began to retreat later in the day . Quick reaction forces from 1st Battalion , 32nd Infantry Regiment did not reach the outpost until 7 : 00 pm that day , while insurgents remained in parts of the outpost as late as 5 : 10 pm . Relief may have been slow in reaching COP Keating due to bad weather . Aftermath . Eight US soldiers were killed and 27 wounded ; eight Afghan soldiers were wounded , along with two Afghan private security guards . The US military estimated that 150 Taliban militants were also killed as a result of repulsing the assault . The US soldiers killed in the battle were : Justin T . Gallegos ( Tucson , Arizona ) , Christopher Griffin ( Kincheloe , Michigan ) , Kevin C . Thomson ( Reno , Nevada ) , Michael P . Scusa ( Villas , New Jersey ) , Vernon W . Martin ( Savannah , Georgia ) , Stephan L . Mace ( Lovettsville , Virginia ) , Joshua J . Kirk ( South Portland , Maine ) , and Joshua M . Hardt ( Applegate , California ) . The outpost was evacuated two days later , and bombed on October 6 by a B - 1 bomber to prevent insurgents from looting the munitions abandoned in the hasty withdrawal . American forces had already planned to pull out of the area as part of a plan to move forces to more densely populated areas , so closure of the base was imminent when the attack occurred . The attack accelerated those plans , with the troops ' departure taking place so quickly after the battle that some munitions were abandoned . " The outpost ’ s depot was promptly looted by the insurgents and bombed by American planes in an effort to destroy the lethal munitions left behind . " On October 5 and 6 , Coalition troops conducted operations in the area in an attempt to locate and destroy the Taliban forces responsible for the attack on the outposts . Another 10 Afghan soldiers and 4 Taliban were killed during these operations . The flight crew of a United States Air Force F - 15E was later decorated for actions during the battle . Captain Mike Polidor , pilot , and the weapons system officer were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for coordinating strikes on the attacking Taliban by 19 coalition aircraft during the battle . The flight crews of three United States Army AH - 64D Apaches were later decorated for actions during the battle . Captain Matthew Kaplan , CW3 Ross Lewallen , CW3 Randy Huff , CW2 Gary Wingert , CW2 Chad Bardwell , and CW2 Chris Wright were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for conducting close combat attacks on the Taliban during the battle . Investigation . Following the battle , the US Central Command conducted an investigation on what had occurred , led by US Army General Guy Swan . The report , released to the public in June 2011 , concluded " inadequate measures taken by the chain of command " facilitated the attack , but praised the troops fighting at the base for repulsing the attack " with conspicuous gallantry , courage and bravery . " Four US Army officers , a captain , a major , a lieutenant colonel , and a colonel , who oversaw COP Keating were admonished or reprimanded for command failures . In the report released to the public , the US Army concealed the names of the four disciplined officers . Medals of Honor . On February 11 , 2013 , President Barack Obama awarded the Medal of Honor to Staff Sergeant Clinton Romesha , a survivor of the battle . He became the fourth surviving soldier from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts to be awarded the Medal of Honor due to the courageous nature of his actions during the battle . Staff Sergeant Ty Carter , formerly a Marine prior to joining the U . S . Army , was awarded the Medal of Honor for his courageous actions during the Battle of Kamdesh . The ceremony took place on August 26 , 2013 . The Battle of Kamdesh was thus the first battle for which two living Americans were awarded the Medal of Honor since the Battle of Ap Bac in 1963 .