Richard Haking General Sir Richard Cyril Byrne Haking , GBE , KCB , KCMG ( 24 January 1862 – 9 June 1945 ) was a British general , who commanded XI Corps in the First World War . Arguments over the late release of Haking ' s Corps on the first day of the Battle of Loos were instrumental in forcing the resignation of Sir John French as Commander - in - Chief of the BEF . Haking is remembered chiefly for the high casualties suffered by his forces ( including many Australian troops ) at the second Battle of Fromelles , launched while the Battle of the Somme was underway 80 km to the south , although at least one British historian has sought to defend his reputation , regarding him as an " intelligent and capable man " unfairly maligned in the popular mythology of the war . Although blocked from further promotion he continued to command XI Corps - including in Italy in the winter of 1917 - 18 and in Flanders in April 1918 - until the end of the war . Early career . He was probably born in Halifax , the son of a clergyman , and was commissioned into the 67th ( South Hampshire ) Regiment of Foot ( which that year became part of the Hampshire Regiment ) on 22 Jan 1881 . Haking saw active service in Burma 1885 - 7 and was promoted captain in 1889 . He studied at Staff College 1896 - 7 . He was promoted major in 1899 . After serving in the Boer War , he returned to Staff College , first as a lecturer 1901 - 4 , then as Deputy Assistant Adjutant - General ( DAAG ) 1904 - 6 . Haking was GSO1 ( chief of staff – a lieutenant - colonel ’ s position ) to 3rd Division 1906 - 8 then Brigadier - General General Staff ( BGGS ) Southern Command in 1908 . He was honoured with the CB in 1910 . Haking ' s book " Company Training " ( 1913 ) espoused the pre - war belief that morale and leadership were the most important factor in winning a battle . He also argued that the attacker would have the advantage over the defender , and deprecated the idea that modern weapons had made defence superior to attack . The book was reprinted during the first part of the war , at least . The book was considered " first class " and in Gordon Corrigan ' s view " even today . . . has a freshness about it and an insight into human characteristics that would not be out of place in a modern military work " . Western Front : Brigade and Division Commander . Haking was given command of the 5th Infantry Brigade in September 1911 and took it to the Western Front on the outbreak of war in August 1914 , as part of Haig ' s I Corps . On 23 August 1914 ( the day of the Battle of Mons ) , in accordance with a request by Smith - Dorrien ( GOC II Corps ) Haig sent Haking with three battalions to make contact with II Corps ( on Haig ’ s left ) , but Haking reported back that he had made no contact with the enemy . On 14 September his was one of the few units to fight its way onto the Chemin des Dames after the crossing of the River Aisne . Haig ( 14 September 1914 ) recorded that Haking ’ s 5th Brigade made good progress on the eastern slopes of the Beaulne ridges , reaching the ridge of Tilleul de Courtacon , before having to pull back on meeting opposition . However , on that day he received a head wound that required three months ' recuperation . On his return to duty he commanded the 1st Division from 21 December 1914 - taking part in the Battle of Aubers Ridge ( also known as the first Battle of Fromelles ) in May 1915 where the three attacking divisions suffered a total of 11 , 600 casualties , and where he argued for further attacks despite the clear failure of the first assault . His attacking brigades lost over 50 % of their fighting strength in little over an hour . With the BEF expanding massively in size , Haking was one of the divisional commanders ( he was fourth in order of seniority after Morland , Horne and Gough ) whom Haig recommended to the Prime Minister ( 8 July 1915 ) as suitable for command of corps and Armies in due course , although only Horne and Gough attained the latter level of command . Western Front : Loos . On 1 September Haig recommended Haking , as a known “ thruster ” , for command of XI Corps , part of First Army . The promotion was not confirmed until 4 September as Sir John French ( Commander - in - Chief BEF ) was ill . Haking would hold this command until the end of the war . Preparations and First Day . His corps took part as a reserve in the Battle of Loos in September 1915 . Haking later told the Official Historian that he had thought Haig wanted XI Corps to fill the gap between Gough ' s I Corps and Rawlinson ' s IV Corps in the offensive , not act as a reserve at all . Before the battle Haking spoke to the men of 2nd Guards Brigade . One observer recorded that he “ spoke very confidently , comparing the German line to the crust of a pie , behind which , once broken , he said , there is not much resistance to be expected . He ended up by saying “ I don ’ t tell you this to cheer you up . I tell it you because I really believe it . ” ” He assured his commanders that there would be no German resistance once their line had been broken ( letter of Lt - Col Rowland Feilding to his wife , 16 Sep 1915 ) . Although “ everyone was too optimistic ” , Haking ’ s promises to Regimental officers that there would be “ very little opposition ” were “ altogether misleading ” and a “ most regrettable travesty of the real facts ” ( testimony of various colonels to the Official Historian in the mid - 1920s ) . XI Corps were committed to battle ( 21st and 24th Division , both New Army formations , but not the Guards Division which was to be held back at first ) , tired and hungry after an overnight march to conceal their presence from the enemy , at 2 . 30pm on 25 September , the first day of the battle . Subsequent Attacks . GHQ released the Guards Division to First Army control at 1 . 45pm on 26 September , and it spent the day marching up to the front . Haking was ordered ( at 11 . 30pm ) to submit plans for it to attack the next day . The next day Haig wanted to call off the attack , but Haking felt it would not be possible to do so in time . Haking also lifted the artillery barrage off the German front positions to bombard more distant targets at 3pm , an hour before the attack was due to begin – Rawlinson , who visited him at 10am , thought this a bad idea , but kept his doubts to himself . Under pressure from Haig , XI Corps issued orders to 3 Guards Brigade that they were not to attack unless 2 Guards Brigade had already been successful , but these orders were not issued until the former had already left their trenches . XI Corps suffered another 8 , 000 casualties on the second day . Nick Lloyd agrees with Prior & Wilson that the blame for the decision to continue the attack on the second day lies with Haig , although he points out that Haking took his men forward without any doubts . A subsequent attack ensued on 13 October . Haking persuaded himself that the enemy were “ shaken and disorganised ” ( “ little more than wishful thinking ” in Nick Lloyd ’ s view ) and that enough artillery and gas was now available to win a decisive victory ( in the event the bombardment did little damage to the German positions ) . Once again the artillery bombardment was lifted an hour before the main attack ( despite Haig having telephoned Haking on 28 September to suggest that this had been a bad idea , although in accordance with Army doctrine at the time Haig once again delegated the decision to Haking as the " man on the spot " ) and once again Haking gave a series of highly optimistic speeches to the attacking brigades . The attack went so badly that Lt - Col J . C . Wedgwood MP sent a report to the Prime Minister . Nick Lloyd argues that Haking “ proved unequal to the task ” of welding XI Corps into a fighting formation . Poor relations between staff “ do not reflect well on his managerial skills ” . Although Haking was not personally responsible for the attacks on 25 and 26 September , he offered no dissent to Haig ’ s plans , and his own subsequent plans shared Haig ' s underestimation of the enemy and “ traditional ” view of artillery ( i . e . that it was an adjunct to the infantry attack , rather than grasping the importance of concentrated artillery fire in making such an attack possible ) . Ousting of Sir John French . After the battle the late release of Haking ' s XI Corps on the first day was thought – supposedly – to have thrown away a chance of breakthrough and decisive victory . French blamed poor First Army staffwork and traffic control , whilst Haig alleged that French had released the reserve too late . On the day itself Rawlinson had telephoned Haking at 12 . 20pm urging him to get the reserves forward , and wrote on the telephone log that Haking reported “ traffic ” difficulties . In a letter of 10 October Haking blamed difficulties as his divisions moved through the administration areas of I Corps and IV Corps . However , Haking later – after a meeting with Haig – claimed that this had been based on “ memory of verbal statements made to ( him ) ” by the commanders of 21st and 24th Divisions on the night of 25 September . He now wrote that “ the most careful arrangements were made by First Army to ensure that the roads were kept clear ” . He then blamed “ indifferent march discipline ” ( Haig was blaming the delay on “ bad march discipline ” - almost exactly the same phrase ) . In the final paragraph of his report he wrote that “ there is none to blame except GHQ and they know it ” . Nick Lloyd writes “ it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Haking was deliberately falsifying or “ cooking ” his evidence to make it more palatable to ( Haig ) ” . Haig ’ s and Haking ’ s slur was bitterly resented by a number of officers who later testified to the Official Historian in the 1920s about traffic congestion and poor direction by the Military Police . Haking was also one of those who criticised French ' s deployment of the reserve to King George V when the King visited the front in October , as part of the moves which led to French ' s enforced resignation . After Loos . The future Air Vice Marshal Philip Game , then serving as GSO1 to 46th Division , wrote frequently in letters to his wife ( 10 , 11 , 24 November , 8 , 10 , 20 December 1915 ) of how Haking interfered frequently with his planning . Game described Haking as “ a vindictive bully ” ( letters of December 1915 and April 1916 ) . In May 1916 Haking complained that a unit had “ dirt on their clothes ” – they had in fact just come out of the trenches . Haking claimed in May 1916 that no division could be considered a fighting unit until they had carried out a successful trench raid . In John Bourne ’ s view “ Haking had already begun to achieve a reputation as something of a loose cannon … he did more than anyone in the BEF to encourage trench raids and “ the spirit of the bayonet ” ” . Haking launched what John Bourne describes as “ an unnecessary and unsuccessful attack ” against a German position called the Boar ’ s Head ( 19 – 30 June 1916 ) . Western Front : Fromelles . Planning . Haking suggested a First Army attack towards Fromelles , not towards Lille as originally planned . Bourne writes : “ that ( Fromelles ) took place at all owed most to the ambition and willingness of Haking to carry it out , and his unshakeable confidence that it would work . Fromelles is difficult to justify as the point for an attack , even a feint attack ” as it was flat ground , broken up by water obstacles , and overlooked by Aubers Ridge . Fromelles lay near the boundary of Second and First Armies , opening the possibility of participation by Second Army , whose GOC Plumer was reluctant to mount a diversionary attack at Ypres or Messines . Haking ’ s plan did not take into account the earlier failure on the same ground in May 1915 . Haking “ was most optimistic ” about the upcoming Somme offensive ( Millward War Diary , 22 June 1916 ) . At a conference of his corps commanders ( 8 July ) Monro ( GOC First Army ) said that the Battle of the Somme was progressing “ favourably ” , but ordered Haking to prepare a plan on the assumption that he was to be assisted by a division of Second Army and some extra artillery ( on the same day 4th Australian Division was ordered south to the Somme but instructed to leave behind its artillery ) . Haking presented a scheme to Monro ( 9 July ) for a two - division attack over a front of 4 , 200 yards , aiming to capture part of Aubers - Fromelles Ridge , which lay a mile or so behind the German line . Monro initially rejected this plan in favour of a Canadian attack at Vimy Ridge , but after pressure from GHQ – caused by the movement of German reserves from Lille to the Somme sector – informed Haking ( 13 July ) that it was to go ahead . That day Haking ’ s plan was approved at a conference at Choques , attended by Maj - Gen Butler ( Deputy Chief of Staff , BEF ) with Major Howard in attendance , Maj - Gen Barrow ( Chief of Staff First Army ) and Maj - Gen Harington ( Chief of Staff Second Army ) . Plumer ( GOC Second Army ) also approved the plan at another meeting that day , and at another subsequent meeting , and it was agreed that the bombardment – by the equivalent of five or six division ’ s worth of artillery - should start on 14 July , with a view to an attack on 17 July to capture and hold the German first line . Haking now learned that Second Army were only allocating him the equivalent of two divisions ’ worth of artillery ( that of 4th and 5th Australian Divisions ) , not three as promised . Haking was also concerned at the shortage of ammunition and the inexperience of the Australian gunners . He therefore reduced the planned width of the attack to around 3 , 500 yards , apparently in the belief that he had sufficient artillery to cover this effectively . General Walker refused to let 1st Australian Division take part in Fromelles , for which insubordination he would most likely have been relieved had he been commanding British troops . Instead the 5th Australian Division under J W McCay took part – the division was inexperienced and had only been in France a short time . The attack was overlooked by a German fortification called the Sugar Loaf . Butler reiterated Haig ’ s conditions that sufficient guns and ammunition for counter - battery work be available at a meeting with Haking , Monro , Plumer , Barrow and Harington on 16 July , and at the meeting pointed out that intelligence reports of the movement of German reserves meant that the attack was no longer so urgently required . Haking was , however , “ most emphatic ” that the troops were “ worked up … ready and anxious ” to attack and that a delay would be poor for morale . Butler again reiterated Haig ’ s concerns in a memo ( 17 July ) . Preparation . Haking told his divisional commanders ( at a conference on the afternoon of 16 July ) that he wanted to avoid a repetition of what had happened on the Somme on 1 July , when the Germans had had time to man their parapets before the British crossed No Man ’ s Land . The artillery was to stay “ on , not over ” the German positions until the infantry attacked ( although he thought that the bombardment over a relatively narrow frontage would “ reduce the defenders to a state of collapse before the assault ” ) , and that the infantry were to be deployed in No Man ’ s Land ready to “ rush forward together ” when the signal was given . Haking issued a letter “ to be read to all troops ” , although he “ trust ( ed ) them not to disclose it to anyone ” . The letter gave details of the artillery bombardment , including plans for a feint - deepening of the range of the bombardment and “ show ( ing of ) bayonets over the parapet ” - to tempt the Germans from their front - line dugouts so that they could then be shelled again - and also disclosed that the objective was to be limited to the German first line . The plan was thus well known , even to “ the Mademoiselles ” behind the British lines , although in practice the Germans , holding the high ground , could see enough of the British lines to guess that an attack was coming . In the event the attack was postponed because of rain ( which made it hard for artillery to register targets ) . Haking opened his advanced corps HQ at Sailly at 6am on 17 July – a sign that he did not expect the attack to be postponed for long , let alone cancelled . At 8 . 30am he sent a despatch in which , contradicting the assurances he had given , he admitted that many of the Australian gunners had never fired on the Western Front before , and that many of the infantry were “ not fully trained ” and “ do not appear to be very anxious for the attack to be delivered ” . Eventually the start times ( 11am for artillery , 6pm for the infantry attack ) were fixed for 19 July . Although only the German front line was the target , plans were being discussed for further advances , possibly by night , in the event of complete success being achieved . Initial Attack . A “ surprise ” attack was launched after an 11 - hour bombardment , at 6pm on 19 July . He launched an attack by two divisions ( 61st British Division - consisted of 182nd , 183rd and 184th Brigades - and 5th Australian Division ) which cost 7 , 000 casualties . 18th and 14th Australian brigades managed to cross No Mans Land , but then suffered greater casualties in the retreat than in the original attack . 15th and 184th Australian brigades suffered severe casualties crossing No Mans Land for no result . Controversy over Plans to Renew the Attack . A further attack at 9pm was cancelled by 61st Division , but one Australian battalion attacked alone and suffered severe casualties . This earned the undying disgust of the commander of the Australian 15th Brigade , Brigadier - General Harold ' Pompey ' Elliott , who had seen 80 % of his two assaulting battalions killed , wounded or captured by night - fall . The truth appears to be slightly more complicated . Haking , in possession of incomplete information , initially ordered a renewal of the attack the next day . Having received fresh information about the three brigades of 61st Div . at 8 . 20pm he ordered the 9pm attack to be abandoned and that 183 and 184 brigades return to or remain in their own front line . The 5th Australian Division was ordered to consolidate its gains , ready to assist another attack by 61st Division the following morning , whilst McCay was ordered not to reinforce Elliott ’ s 15th Brigade but rather to withdraw any survivors of the initial assault . These orders were then confirmed again by XI Corps HQ just after 9pm . Pompey Elliott received orders , time stamped 9 . 25pm , telling him that he might withdraw 59th Battalion if he thought its attack unlikely to succeed . Elliott later claimed in his notes on the battle that McCay had only learned at 8 . 35pm , from 61st Division , that the latter ’ s attack had been cancelled , too late to stop 58th Battalion going forward , and that the blame therefore lay with Haking . Paul Cobb puts the blame with McCay and his staff for not processing Haking ' s orders quickly enough . Whilst 58th Australian Battalion were attacking , Haking changed his mind again on the basis of fresh information : McCay informed him that 8th and 14th Brigades were holding their positions in the German lines , whilst an RFC plane had misinterpreted flares , probably let off by Germans , as indicating the presence of BEF troops . At 10pm Haking ’ s chief of staff , Brigadier - General W . H . Anderson , met with McCay and his chief of staff Lt - Col Wagstaff . Haking now ordered British 184th Brigade to attack the Sugar Loaf at 3am to assist the Australians , whilst McCay was authorised to reinforce his forward positions . McCay had information about 8th and 14th Brigades , but sent a message ( 10 . 30pm ) to Elliott ’ s brigade asking for an update . Elliott was himself none the wiser – he knew that 60th Battalion were trying to hold their position in the German lines , but as yet had no information about 58th Battalion attack , and replied ( at 11 . 30pm ) that although he was concerned about German machine gun fire he was willing to make another attempt on the Sugar Loaf provided he was reinforced by 57th Battalion . An hour later Elliott learned of the failure of 58th Battalion attack , and notified McCay at once . Haking then cancelled the night attack at 12 . 10am after learning that 61st Division had suffered too many casualties already and that trenches were blocked with wounded men . A 5am conference was held at Sailly , with Monro , Mackenzie , McCay and Barrow . During the meeting an up - to - date report was received from 5th Australian Division HQ , and Monro and Haking ordered that 14th Brigade was to be withdrawn from the German front line rather than reinforced . Haking regarded the battle as over on 2pm on 20 July , when 5th Australian Division returned to the command of II ANZAC Corps . His advance Corps HQ at Sailly closed down an hour later . Monro and Haking concurred with McCay ’ s veto of a proposal ( 21 July ) that an informal local truce be negotiated in the Australian sector to allow the wounded to be collected , although this was in accordance with official GHQ policy at the time . Reports and Recriminations . Four days after the battle , Haking ’ s four - page report accompanied Mackenzie ’ s paper to First Army Headquarters . He wrote that 61st Division was “ not sufficiently imbued with the offensive spirit to go in like one man at the appointed time ” . He conceded that the Australian Division had “ attacked in the most gallant manner and gained the enemy ’ s position ” but added that they “ were not sufficiently trained to consolidate the ground gained ” , a phrase which caused angst in the Australian press and was quoted by Bean in the Australian Official History . He claimed that “ The artillery preparation was adequate . There were sufficient guns and sufficient ammunition ” and that “ the wire was properly cut and the assaulting Battalions had a clear run into the enemy ’ s trenches ” , omitting to mention that on 17 July he had mentioned that some gunners had never before fired on the Western Front , and that the many of the casualties resulted from machine guns fired from positions that the bombardment had failed to suppress . He claimed that “ the lessons to be learnt from the attack apply more to the Divisions which took part than to ordinary trained Divisions ” … " the attack , though it failed , ha ( d ) done both divisions a great deal of good " … and that “ with two trained Divisions the position would have been a gift after the artillery bombardment ; with these two new Divisions there was a good chance of success but they did not quite attain it ” , omitting to mention that he had had a good Division ( the 1st ) in May 1915 . He also wrote that “ the attack … has done both Divisions a great deal of good ” and also listed the chronology of dates and postponements , claiming that he had been “ directed to attack ” . An intelligence report of 14 August wrote that no withdrawals of German troops had taken place from the Fromelles sector . Gordon Corrigan stresses that the battle " did prevent the Germans from shifting reserves south to the Somme battlefield , and cannot be said to have been without point " . By 26 July Haking had received McCay ’ s report and was more generous in his praise of the Australians , although he blamed 61st Division for failing to take the Sugar Loaf . Wilson ( diary 30 July 1916 ) described Fromelles at the time as “ a botch job ” . Captain Philip Landon testified to Edmonds in 1938 that it had been “ as good an illustration as there was of the " reckless extravagance in expenditure of life " ( italics in original ) which ruled the minds of some of the subordinate commanders , like Gen Haking , at this stage of the war ” … “ the weakness of GHQ lay in not seeing that a Corps Commander , left to himself , would also be tempted to win glory for his Corps by spectacular success , and would be prodigal in using the Divisions which passed through his hands for this purpose ” . Colonel E . R . Clayton later testified to Edmonds that Haking ’ s “ undue optimism was one of the direct causes of failure ” of the attack at Fromelles . In the Official History Wilfrid Miles later wrote scathingly of the lack of preparation and the pointlessness of an attack by inexperienced troops , to seize a position which they could not possibly have held against counterattacks , and blames First Army for not cancelling the operation . Harold Elliott later ( in 1930 ) criticised Haking for exaggerating the amount of artillery that would be available , and for attacking without surprise . He exonerated McCay and argued that Haking , after Major Howard ’ s report ( which Haig had annotated to permit the attack only on condition that sufficient guns and ammunition were available ) had persuaded Monro , who in turn persuaded Butler , and that Haking had been keen to win glory for himself . He also stressed how Haking had ignored suggestions from Monro that the attack be postponed because of the rain , and was scornful of Haking ’ s after - battle report . Passed over for Army Command . Sheffield describes Haking as acquiring a reputation as a “ butcher ” and an organiser of pointless “ stunts ” . Haking was one of the few First World War generals to have gained this label while the fighting was still taking place rather than after the war ended . However , it has also been claimed that he acquired the nickname amongst Australian troops from his propensity for ordering trench raids , and that " it is not even known how pejorative the appellation really was " given that amongst Australians " " bastard " is almost a term of affection " His promotions may have resulted from Haig ' s patronage , but later attempts by Haig to obtain an Army command for him were unsuccessful . Monro ( 3 August 1916 ) recommended Haking as his successor as GOC First Army . When it became known that Haking was the front - runner , Wilson – who had been acting Army Commander earlier in the year and who was also considered for the promotion this time – wrote ( 5 August ) “ it only shows how hopelessly out of touch GHQ is with what we all think of Haking ” . Haig placed Haking in acting command of First Army from 7 August to 29 September 1916 . A letter from the CIGS Robertson ( 10 August ) said that the War Committee vetoed Haking ' s promotion . The command went instead to Horne . The affair may have caused a curtailing of Haig ’ s powers to make senior appointments . Haking believed that the Germans on the Somme were “ very tired , confused & rather demoralised ” and “ in a bad way ” ( Wilson diary 29 August 1916 ) . Haking was honoured with the KCB in 1916 . Later War . Liddell Hart later claimed that Haking had reported Broadwood ( 57th Division ) in early 1917 for “ lack of fighting spirit ” . Haking protested to Horne ( GOC First Army ) on 18 March 1917 about how he was expected to hold a four - division stretch of front with two divisions , putting too much strain on the units involved . Horne met with him personally to discuss his concerns . After being sent to reinforce the Italian Front following the disastrous Battle of Caporetto from November 1917 to March 1918 , XI Corps was returned to the Western Front and was stationed at Béthune . It was almost immediately engaged by the assault in the German Spring Offensive of that year . Overall , the Corps protected the Channel ports , although some sections of the Corps were all but destroyed by the German " Georgette " Offensive . In particular the 2nd Portuguese Division suffered 7 , 000 casualties and 300 officers ( out of a divisional strength of 20 , 000 ) in the Battle of Estaires . Haking and his Corps " did well " in the halting of this offensive . Haking was not a believer in “ defence in depth ” , but Andy Simpson argues that this was not necessarily a bad thing , as 55th Division under his command – fresh troops holding old fortifications – were able to hold their positions and even establish a defensive flank despite the rout of the Portuguese division to their south . Lloyd George told the War Cabinet ( 11 April ) that the Liberal War Committee ( a committee of backbench MPs ) had made “ very serious protests ” to him that afternoon against the retention of “ incompetent ” officers like Gough ( who had just been sacked after his Fifth Army had borne the brunt of the German March Offensive ) and Haking . Unlike Gough , Haking retained his command . General Gomes da Costa later wrote ( in " O corpo de exercito portugues na Grande Guerra : A batalha do Lys " ) of “ the esteem in which I held General Haking … who always showed himself through his knowledge of the Portuguese language , extremely intelligent and clever , a fine soldier and a loyal friend ” . That autumn Haking " earned a high reputation in the British Offensive which ended the war " . Haking was honoured with the KCMG in 1918 . PostWar . After the war " his . . . career was distinguished " : he served as chief of the British section of the Armistice Commission , 1918 – 1919 , commander of the British military mission to Russia and the Baltic Provinces , 1919 , commander of Allied troops in the plebiscite area of East Prussia and Danzig , 1920 , High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig , 1921 – 1923 . Haking was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire ( GBE ) in the 1921 New Year Honours . He served as General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt , 1923 – 1927 . He was promoted to full General in 1925 before retiring in 1927 . He died of secondary colon cancer in 1945 .