American airborne landings in Normandy The American airborne landings in Normandy were the first United States combat operations during Operation Overlord , the invasion of Normandy by the Western Allies on June 6 , 1944 . Around 13 , 100 paratroopers of the U . S . 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne Divisions made night parachute drops early on D - Day , June 6 , followed by 3 , 937 glider troops flown in by day . As the opening maneuver of Operation Neptune ( the assault operation for Overlord ) the American airborne divisions were delivered to the continent in two parachute and six glider missions . Both divisions were part of the U . S . VII Corps and provided it support in its mission of capturing Cherbourg as soon as possible to provide the Allies with a port of supply . The specific missions of the airborne divisions were to block approaches into the vicinity of the amphibious landing at Utah Beach , to capture causeway exits off the beaches , and to establish crossings over the Douve River at Carentan to assist the U . S . V Corps in merging the two American beachhead s . The assault did not succeed in blocking the approaches to Utah for three days . Numerous factors played a part , most of which dealt with excessive scattering of the drops . Despite this , German forces were unable to exploit the chaos . Many German units made a tenacious defense of their strong - points , but all were systematically defeated within the week . Background . Plans and revisions . Plans for the invasion of France went through several preliminary phases during 1943 , during which the Combined Chiefs of Staff allocated 13½ U . S . troop carrier groups to an undefined airborne assault . The actual size , objectives , and details of the plan were not drawn up until after General Dwight D . Eisenhower became Supreme Allied Commander in January 1944 . In mid - February Eisenhower received word from Headquarters U . S . Army Air Forces that the TO & E of the C - 47 Skytrain groups would be increased from 52 to 64 aircraft ( plus nine spares ) by April 1 to meet his requirements . At the same time the U . S . First Army commander , Lieutenant General Omar N . Bradley , won approval of a plan to land two airborne divisions on the Cotentin Peninsula , one to seize the beach causeways and block the eastern half at Carentan from German reinforcements , the other to block the western corridor at La Haye - du - Puits in a second lift . The exposed and perilous nature of the La Haye de Puits mission was assigned to the combat veteran 82nd Airborne Division , while the causeway mission was given to the untested 101st , which received a new commander in March , Major General Maxwell D . Taylor . Bradley insisted that 75 per cent of the airborne assault be delivered by gliders for concentration of forces . Because it would be unsupported by naval and corps artillery , the commander of the 82nd Airborne , Maj . Gen . Matthew B . Ridgway , also wanted a glider assault to deliver his organic artillery . The use of gliders was planned until April 18 , when tests under realistic conditions resulted in excessive accidents and destruction of many gliders . On April 28 the plan was changed ; the entire assault force would be inserted by parachute drop at night in one lift , with gliders providing reinforcement during the day . The Germans , who had neglected to fortify Normandy , began constructing defenses and obstacles against airborne assault in the Cotentin , including specifically the planned drop zones of the 82nd . At first no change in plans were made , but when significant German forces were moved into the Cotentin in mid - May , the drop zones of the 82nd were relocated , even though detailed plans had already been formulated and training had proceeded based on them . Just ten days before D - Day , a compromise was reached . Because of the heavier German presence , First Army wanted the 82nd landed close to the 101st for mutual support if needed . VII Corps , however , wanted the drops made west of the Merderet to seize a bridgehead . On May 27 the drop zones were relocated east of Le Haye - du - Puits along both sides of the Merderet . The 101st Airborne ' s 501st PIR ( Parachute infantry regiment ) , which had originally been given the task of capturing Sainte - Mère - Église , was shifted to protect the Carentan flank , and the capture of Sainte - Mère - Église was assigned to the 505th PIR of the 82nd . For the troop carriers , experiences in the invasion of Sicily dictated a route that avoided Allied naval forces and German anti - aircraft defenses along the eastern shore of the Cotentin . On April 12 a route was approved that would depart England at Portland Bill , fly at low altitude southwest over water , then turn 90 degrees to the southeast and come in " by the back door " over the western coast . At the initial point the 82nd would continue straight to La Haye - du - Puits , and the 101st would make a small left turn and fly to Utah Beach . The plan called for a right turn after drops and a return on the reciprocal route . However the change in drop zones on May 27 and the increased size of German defenses made the risk to the planes from ground fire much greater , and the routes were modified so that the 101st would fly a more southerly ingress route along the Douve River ( which would also provide a better visual landmark at night for the inexperienced troop carrier pilots ) . Over the reluctance of the naval commanders , exit routes from the drop zones were changed to fly over Utah Beach , then northward in a wide " safety corridor " , then northwest above Cherbourg . As late as May 31 routes for the glider missions were changed to avoid overflying the peninsula in daylight . Preparations . IX Troop Carrier Command ( TCC ) was formed in October 1943 to carry out the airborne assault mission in the invasion . Brigadier General Paul T . Williams , who had commanded the troop carrier operations in Sicily and Italy , took command in February 1944 . The TCC command and staff officers were an excellent mix of combat veterans from those earlier assaults , and a few key officers were held over for continuity . The groups assigned to IX TCC were a mixture of experience . Four had seen significant combat in the Twelfth Air Force . Four had no combat experience but had trained together for more than a year in the United States . Four others had been in existence less than nine months and arrived in the United Kingdom one month after training began . One had experience only as a transport ( cargo carrying ) group and the last had been recently formed . Joint training with airborne troops and an emphasis on night formation flying began at the start of March . The veteran 52nd Troop Carrier Wing ( TCW ) , wedded to the 82nd Airborne , progressed rapidly and by the end of April had completed several successful night drops . The 53rd TCW , working with the 101st , also progressed well ( although one practice mission on April 4 in poor visibility resulted in a badly scattered drop ) but two of its groups concentrated on glider missions . By the end of April joint training with both airborne divisions ceased when Taylor and Ridgway deemed that their units had jumped enough . The 50th TCW did not begin training until April 3 and progressed more slowly , then was hampered when the troops ceased jumping . A divisional night jump exercise for the 101st Airborne scheduled for May 7 , Exercise Eagle , was postponed to May 11 - May 12 and became a dress rehearsal for both divisions . The 52nd TCW , carrying only two token paratroopers on each C - 47 , performed satisfactorily although the two lead planes of the 316th Troop Carrier Group ( TCG ) collided in mid - air , killing 14 including the group commander , Col . Burton R . Fleet . The 53rd TCW was judged " uniformly successful " in its drops . The lesser - trained 50th TCW , however , got lost in haze when its pathfinders failed to turn on their navigation beacons . It continued training till the end of the month with simulated drops in which pathfinders guided them to drop zones . The 315th and 442d Groups , which had never dropped troops until May and were judged the command ' s " weak sisters " , continued to train almost nightly , dropping paratroopers who had not completed their quota of jumps . Three proficiency tests at the end of the month , making simulated drops , were rated as fully qualified . The inspectors , however , made their judgments without factoring that most of the successful missions had been flown in clear weather . By the end of May 1944 , the IX Troop Carrier Command had available 1 , 207 C - 47 Skytrain troop carrier airplanes and was one - third overstrength , creating a strong reserve . Three quarters of the planes were less than one year old on D - Day , and all were in excellent condition . Engine problems during training had resulted in a high number of aborted sorties , but all had been replaced to eliminate the problem . All matériel requested by commanders in IX TCC , including armor plating , had been received with the exception of self - sealing fuel tank s , which Chief of the Army Air Forces Gen . Henry H . Arnold had personally rejected because of limited supplies . Crew availability exceeded numbers of aircraft , but 40 per cent were recent - arriving crews or individual replacements who had not been present for much of the night formation training . As a result , 20 per cent of the 924 crews committed to the parachute mission on D - Day had minimum night training and fully three - fourths of all crews had never been under fire . Over 2 , 100 CG - 4 Waco gliders had been sent to the United Kingdom , and after attrition during training operations , 1 , 118 were available for operations , along with 301 Airspeed Horsa gliders received from the British . Trained crews sufficient to pilot 951 gliders were available , and at least five of the troop carrier groups intensively trained for glider missions . Because of the requirement for absolute radio silence and a study that warned that the thousands of Allied aircraft flying on D - Day would break down the existing system , plans were formulated to mark aircraft including gliders with black - and - white stripes to facilitate aircraft recognition . Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh - Mallory , commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force , approved the use of the recognition markings on May 17 . For the troop carrier aircraft this was in the form of three white and two black stripes , each two feet ( 60 cm ) wide , around the fuselage behind the exit doors and from front to back on the outer wings . A test exercise was flown by selected aircraft over the invasion fleet on June 1 , but to maintain security , orders to paint stripes were not issued until June 3 . Pathfinders . The 300 men of the pathfinder companies were organized into teams of 14 - 18 paratroops each , whose main responsibility would be to deploy the ground beacon of the Rebecca / Eureka transponding radar system , and set out holophane marking lights . The Rebecca , an airborne sender - receiver , indicated on its scope the direction and approximate range of the Eureka , a responsor beacon . The paratroops trained at the school for two months with the troop carrier crews , but although every C - 47 in IX TCC had a Rebecca interrogator installed , to keep from jamming the system with hundreds of signals , only flight leads were authorized to use it in the vicinity of the drop zones . Despite many early failures in its employment , the Eureka - Rebecca system had been used with high accuracy in Italy in a night drop of the 82nd Airborne to reinforce the Fifth Army at Salerno . However a shortcoming of the system was that within of the ground emitter , the signals merged into a single blip in which both range and bearing were lost . The system was designed to steer large formations of aircraft to within a few miles of a drop zone , at which point the holophane marking lights or other visual markers would guide completion of the drop . Each drop zone ( DZ ) had a serial of three C - 47 aircraft assigned to locate the DZ and drop pathfinder teams , who would mark it . The serials in each wave were to arrive at six minute intervals . The pathfinder serials were organized in two waves , with those of the 101st Airborne arriving a half hour before the first scheduled assault drop . These would be the first U . S . and possibly the first Allied troops to land in the invasion . The three pathfinder serials of the 82nd Airborne were to begin their drops as the final wave of 101st Airborne paratroopers landed , thirty minutes ahead of the first 82nd Airborne drops . D - Day results . Efforts of the early wave of pathfinder teams to mark the drop zones were partially ineffective . The first serial , assigned to DZ A , missed its zone and set up a mile away near St . Germain - de - Varreville . The team was unable to get either its amber halophane lights or its Eureka beacon working until the drop was well in progress . Although the second pathfinder serial had a plane ditch in the sea en route , the remainder dropped two teams near DZ C , but most of their marker lights were lost in the ditched airplane . They managed to set up a Eureka beacon just before the assault force arrived but were forced to use a hand held signal light which was not seen by some pilots . The planes assigned to DZ D along the Douve River failed to see their final turning point and flew well past the zone . Returning from an unfamiliar direction , they dropped 10 minutes late and off target . The drop zone was chosen after the 501st PIR ' s change of mission on May 27 and was in an area identified by the Germans as a likely landing area . Consequently so many Germans were nearby that the pathfinders could not set out their lights and were forced to rely solely on Eureka , which was a poor guide at short range . The pathfinders of the 82nd Airborne had similar results . The first serial , bound for DZ O near Sainte - Mère - Église , flew too far north but corrected its error and dropped near its DZ . It made the most effective use of the Eureka beacons and holophane marking lights of any pathfinder team . The planes bound for DZ N south of Sainte - Mère - Église flew their mission accurately and visually identified the zone but still dropped the teams a mile southeast . They landed among troop areas of the German 91st Division and were unable to reach the DZ . The teams assigned to mark DZ T northwest of Sainte - Mère - Église were the only ones dropped with accuracy , and while they deployed both Eureka and BUPS , they were unable to show lights because of the close proximity of German troops . Altogether , four of the six drops zones could not display marking lights . The pathfinder teams assigned to Drop Zones C ( 101st ) and N ( 82nd ) each carried two BUPS beacons . The units for DZ N were intended to guide in the parachute resupply drop scheduled for late on D - Day , but the pair of DZ C were to provide a central orientation point for all the SCR - 717 radars to get bearings . However the units were damaged in the drop and provided no assistance . Combat jumps . Mission profile . The assault " lift " ( one air transport operation ) was divided into two missions , " Albany " and " Boston " , each with three regiment - sized landings on a drop zone . The drop zones of the 101st were east and south of Sainte - Mère - Église and lettered A , C , and D from north to south ( Drop Zone B had been that of the 501st PIR before the changes of May 27 ) . Those of the 82nd were west ( T and O , from west to east ) and southwest ( Drop Zone N ) . Each parachute infantry regiment ( PIR ) , a unit of approximately 1800 men organized into three battalions , was transported by three or four " serials " , formations containing 36 , 45 , or 54 C - 47s , and separated from each other by specific time intervals . The planes , sequentially designated within a serial by " chalk numbers " ( literally numbers chalked on the airplanes to aid paratroopers in boarding the correct airplane ) , were organized into " flights " of nine aircraft , in a formation pattern called " vee of vee ' s " ( vee - shaped elements of three planes arranged in a larger vee of three elements ) , with the flights flying one behind the other . The serials were scheduled over the drop zones at six - minute intervals . The paratroopers were divided into " sticks " , a plane load of troops numbering 15 - 18 men . To achieve surprise , the parachute drops were routed to approach Normandy at low altitude from the west . The serials took off beginning at 22 : 30 on June 5 , assembled into formations at wing and command assembly points , and flew south to the departure point , code - named " Flatbush " . There they descended and flew southwest over the English Channel at MSL to remain below German radar coverage . Each flight within a serial was behind the flight ahead . The flights encountered winds that pushed them five minutes ahead of schedule , but the effect was uniform over the entire invasion force and had negligible effect on the timetables . Once over water , all lights except formation lights were turned off , and these were reduced to their lowest practical intensity . Twenty - four minutes out over the channel , the troop carrier stream reached a stationary marker boat code - named " Hoboken " and carrying a Eureka beacon , where they made a sharp left turn to the southeast and flew between the Channel Islands of Guernsey and Alderney . Weather over the channel was clear ; all serials flew their routes precisely and in tight formation as they approached their initial points on the Cotentin coast , where they turned for their respective drop zones . The initial point for the 101st at Portbail , code - named " Muleshoe " , was approximately south of that of the 82d , " Peoria " , near Flamanville . Scattered drops . Despite precise execution over the channel , numerous factors encountered over the Cotentin Peninsula disrupted the accuracy of the drops , many encountered in rapid succession or simultaneously . These included : Flak from German anit - aircraft guns resulted in planes either going under or over their prescribed altitudes . Some of the men who jumped from planes at lower altitudes were injured when they hit the ground because of their chutes not having enough time to slow their descent , while others who jumped from higher altitudes reported a terrifying descent of several minutes watching tracer fire streaking up towards them . Of the 20 serials making up the two missions , nine plunged into the cloud bank and were badly dispersed . Of the six serials which achieved concentrated drops , none flew through the clouds . However the primary factor limiting success of the paratroop units , because it magnified all the errors resulting from the above factors , was the decision to make a massive parachute drop at night , a concept that was not again used in three subsequent large - scale airborne operations . This was further illustrated when the same troop carrier groups flew a second lift later that day with precision and success under heavy fire . First wave : Mission Albany . Paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division " Screaming Eagles " jumped first on June 6 , between 00 : 48 and 01 : 40 British Double Summer Time . 6 , 928 troops were carried aboard 432 C - 47s of mission " Albany " organized into 10 serials . The first flights , inbound to DZ A , were not surprised by the bad weather , but navigating errors and a lack of Eureka signal caused the 2nd Battalion 502nd PIR to come down on the wrong drop zone . Most of the remainder of the 502nd jumped in a disorganized pattern around the impromptu drop zone set up by the pathfinders near the beach . Two battalion commanders took charge of small groups and accomplished all of their D - Day missions . The division ' s parachute artillery experienced one of the worst drops of the operation , losing all but one howitzer and most of its troops as casualties . The three serials carrying the 506th PIR were badly dispersed by the clouds , then subjected to intense antiaircraft fire . Even so , 2 / 3 of the 1st Battalion was dropped accurately on DZ C . The 2nd Battalion , much of which had dropped too far west , fought its way to the Haudienville causeway by mid - afternoon but found that the 4th Division had already seized the exit . The 3rd Battalion of the 501st PIR , also assigned to DZ C , was more scattered , but took over the mission of securing the exits . A small unit reached the Pouppeville exit at 0600 and fought a six - hour battle to secure it , shortly before 4th Division troops arrived to link up . The 501st PIR ' s serial also encountered severe flak but still made an accurate jump on Drop Zone D . Part of the DZ was covered by pre - registered German fires that inflicted heavy casualties before many troops could get out of their chutes . Among the killed were two of the three battalion commanders and one of their executive officers . A group of 150 troops captured the main objective , the la Barquette lock , by 04 : 00 . A staff officer put together a platoon and achieved another objective by seizing two foot bridges near la Porte at 04 : 30 . The 2nd Battalion landed almost intact on DZ D but in a day - long battle failed to take Saint - Côme - du - Mont and destroy the highway bridges over the Douve . The glider battalions of the 101st ' s 327th Glider Infantry Regiment were delivered by sea and landed across Utah Beach with the 4th Infantry Division . On D - Day its third battalion , the 1st Battalion 401st GIR , landed just after noon and bivouacked near the beach . By the evening of June 7 the other two battalions were assembled near Sainte Marie du Mont . Second wave : Mission Boston . The 82nd Airborne ' s drop , mission " Boston " , began at 01 : 51 . It was also a lift of 10 serials organized in three waves , totaling 6 , 420 paratroopers carried by 369 C - 47s . The C - 47s carrying the 505th did not experience the difficulties that had plagued the 101st ' s drops . Pathfinders on DZ O turned on their Eureka beacons as the first 82nd serial crossed the initial point and lighted holophane markers on all three battalion assembly areas . As a result the 505th enjoyed the most accurate of the D - Day drops , half the regiment dropping on or within a mile of its DZ , and 75 per cent within . The other regiments were more significantly dispersed . The 508th experienced the worst drop of any of the PIRs , with only 25 per cent jumping within a mile of the DZ . Half the regiment dropped east of the Merderet , where it was useless to its original mission . The 507th PIR ' s pathfinders landed on DZ T , but because of Germans nearby , marker lights could not be turned on . Approximately half landed nearby in grassy swampland along the river . Estimates of drowning casualties vary from " a few " to " scores " ( against an overall D - Day loss in the division of 156 killed in action ) , but much equipment was lost and the troops had difficulty assembling . Timely assembly enabled the 505th to accomplish two of its missions on schedule . With the help of a Frenchman who led them into the town , the 3rd Battalion captured Sainte - Mère - Église by 0430 against " negligible opposition " from German artillerymen . The 2nd Battalion established a blocking position on the northern approaches to Sainte - Mère - Église with a single platoon while the rest reinforced the 3rd Battalion when it was counterattacked at mid - morning . The 1st Battalion did not achieve its objectives of capturing bridges over the Merderet at la Fière and Chef - du - Pont , despite the assistance of several hundred troops from the 507th and 508th PIRs . None of the 82nd ' s objectives of clearing areas west of the Merderet and destroying bridges over the Douve were achieved on D - Day . However one makeshift battalion of the 508th PIR seized a small hill near the Merderet and disrupted German counterattacks on Chef - du - Pont for three days , effectively accomplishing its mission . Two company - sized pockets of the 507th held out behind the German center of resistance at Amfreville until relieved by the seizure of the causeway on June 9 . D - Day glider landings . Pre - dawn assaults . Two pre - dawn glider landings , missions " Chicago " ( 101st ) and " Detroit " ( 82nd ) , each by 52 CG - 4 Waco gliders , landed anti - tank guns and support troops for each division . The missions took off while the parachute landings were in progress and followed them by two hours , landing at about 0400 , 2 hours before dawn . Chicago was an unqualified success , with 92 per cent landing within of target . Detroit was disrupted by the same cloud bank that had bedevilled the paratroops and only 62 per cent landed within . Even so , both missions provided heavy weapons that were immediately placed into service . Only eight passengers were killed in the two missions , but one of those was the assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne , Brigadier General Don Pratt . Five gliders in the 82nd ' s serial , cut loose in the cloud bank , remaining missing after a month . Evening reinforcement missions . On the evening of D - Day two additional glider operations , mission " Keokuck " and mission " Elmira " , brought in additional support on 208 gliders . Operating on British Double Summer Time , both arrived and landed before dark . Both missions were heavily escorted by P - 38 , P - 47 , and P - 51 fighters . Keokuck was a reinforcement mission for the 101st Airborne consisting of a single serial of 32 tugs and gliders that took off beginning at 18 : 30 . It arrived at 20 : 53 , seven minutes early , coming in over Utah Beach to limit exposure to ground fire , into a landing zone clearly marked with yellow panels and green smoke . German forces around Turqueville and Saint Côme - du - Mont , on either side of Landing Zone E , held their fire until the gliders were coming down , and while they inflicted some casualties , were too distant to cause much harm . Although only five landed on the LZ itself and most were released early , the Horsa gliders landed without serious damage . Two landed within German lines . The mission is significant as the first Allied daylight glider operation , but was not significant to the success of the 101st Airborne . Elmira was essential to the 82nd Airborne , however , delivering two battalions of glider artillery and 24 howitzers to support the 507th and 508th PIRs west of the Merderet . It consisted of four serials , the first pair to arrive ten minutes after Keokuck , the second pair two hours later at sunset . The first gliders , unaware that the LZ had been moved to Drop Zone O , came under heavy ground fire from German troops who occupied part of Landing Zone W . The C - 47s released their gliders for the original LZ , where most delivered their loads intact despite heavy damage . The second wave of mission Elmira arrived at 22 : 55 , and because no other pathfinder aids were operating , they headed for the Eureka beacon on LZ O . That wave too came under severe ground fire as it passed directly over German positions . One serial released early and came down near the German lines , but the second came down on Landing Zone O . Nearly all of both battalions joined the 82nd Airborne by morning , and 15 guns were in operation on June 8 . Follow - up landing and supply operations . 325th Glider Infantry Regiment . Two additional glider missions ( " Galveston " and " Hackensack " ) were made just after daybreak on June 7 , delivering the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment to the 82nd Airborne . The hazards and results of mission Elmira resulted in a route change over the Douve River valley that avoided the heavy ground fire of the evening before , and changed the landing zone to LZ E , that of the 101st Airborne Division . The first mission , Galveston , consisted of two serials carrying the 325th ' s 1st Battalion and the remainder of the artillery . Consisting of 100 glider - tug combinations , it carried nearly a thousand men , 20 guns , and 40 vehicles and released at 06 : 55 . Small arms fire harried the first serial but did not seriously endanger it . Low releases resulted in a number of accidents and 100 injuries in the 325th ( 17 fatal ) . The second serial hit LZ W with accuracy and few injuries . Mission Hackensack , bringing in the remainder of the 325th , released at 08 : 51 . The first serial , carrying all of the 2nd Battalion and most of the 2nd Battalion 401st GIR ( the 325th ' s " third battalion " ) , landed by squadrons in four different fields on each side of LZ W , one of which came down through intense fire . 15 troops were killed and 60 wounded , either by ground fire or by accidents caused by ground fire . The last glider serial of 50 Wacos , hauling service troops , 81 mm mortars , and one company of the 401st , made a perfect group release and landed at LZ W with high accuracy and virtually no casualties . By 10 : 15 , all three battalions had assembled and reported in . With 90 per cent of its men present , the 325th GIR became the division reserve at Chef - du - Pont . Airborne resupply . Two supply parachute drops , mission " Freeport " for the 82nd and mission " Memphis " intended for the 101st , were dropped on June 7 . All of these operations came in over Utah Beach but were nonetheless disrupted by small arms fire when they overflew German positions , and virtually none of the 101st ' s supplies reached the division . Fourteen of the 270 C - 47s on the supply drops were lost compared to only seven of the 511 glider tugs shot down . In the week following , six resupply missions were flown on call by the 441st and 436th Troop carrier Groups , with 10 C - 47 ' s making parachute drop and 24 towing gliders . This brought the final total of IX Troop Carrier Command sorties during Operation Neptune to 2 , 166 , with 533 of those being glider sorties . Ground combat involving U . S . airborne forces . " This section summarizes all ground combat in Normandy by the U . S . airborne divisions . The U . S . Army does not designate the point in time in which the airborne assault ended and the divisions that fought it conducted a conventional infantry campaign . " After 24 hours , only 2 , 500 of the 6 , 000 men in 101st were under the control of division headquarters . The 82nd had consolidated its forces on Sainte - Mère - Église , but significant pockets of troops were isolated west of the Merderet , some of which had to hold out for several days . The dispersal of the American airborne troops , and the nature of the hedgerow terrain , had the effect of confusing the Germans and fragmenting their response . In addition , the Germans ' defensive flooding , in the early stages , also helped to protect the Americans ' southern flank . The 4th Infantry Division had landed and moved off Utah Beach , with the 8th Infantry surrounding a German battalion on the high ground south of Sainte - Mère - Église , and the 12th and 22nd Infantry moving into line northeast of the town . The biggest anxiety for the airborne commanders was in linking up with the widely scattered forces west of the Merderet . Many continued to roam and fight behind enemy lines for up to 5 days . Most consolidated into small groups , rallied by NCOs and officers up to and including battalion commanders , and many were hodgepodges of troopers from different units . The Air Force Historical Study on the operation notes that several hundred paratroopers scattered without organization far from the drop zones were " quickly mopped up " , despite their valor and inherent toughness , by small German units that possessed unit cohesion . Particularly in the areas of the 507th and 508th PIRs , these isolated groupings , while fighting for their own survival , played an important role in the overall clearance of organized German resistance . On June 6 , the German 6th Parachute Regiment ( FJR6 ) , commanded by Oberst Friedrich August von der Heydte , ( FJR6 ) advanced two battalions , I . / FJR6 to Sainte - Marie - du - Mont and II . / FJR6 to Sainte - Mère - Église , but faced with the overwhelming numbers of the two U . S . divisions , withdrew . I . / FJR6 attempted to force its way through U . S . forces half its size along the Douve River but was cut off and captured almost to the man . Nearby , the 506th PIR conducted a reconnaissance - in - force with two understrength battalions to capture Saint - Côme - du - Mont but although supported by several tanks , was stopped near Angoville - au - Plain . In the 82nd Airborne ' s area , a battalion of the 1058th Grenadier Regiment supported by tanks and other armored vehicles counterattacked Sainte - Mère - Église the same morning but were stopped by a reinforced company of M4 Sherman tanks from the 4th Division . The German armor retreated and the infantry was routed with heavy casualties by a coordinated attack of the 2nd Battalion 505th and the 2nd Battalion 8th Infantry . 101st units maneuvered on June 8 to envelop Saint - Côme - du - Mont , pushing back FJR6 , and consolidated its lines on June 9 . VII Corps gave the division the task of taking Carentan . The 502nd experienced heavy combat on the causeway on June 10 . The next day it attacked the town , supported by the 327th GIR attacking from the east . The 506th PIR passed through the exhausted 502nd and attacked into Carentan on June 12 , defeating the rear guard left by the German withdrawal . On June 13 German forces using assault guns , tanks , and infantry of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division ' s 37th SS - Panzergrenadier Regiment , along III . / FJR6 , attacked the 101st southwest of Carentan . The Germans pushed back the left of the U . S . line in a morning - long battle until Combat Command A of the 2nd Armored Division was sent forward to repel the attack . The 101st was then assigned to the newly arrived U . S . VIII Corps on June 15 in a defensive role before returning to England for rehabilitation . The 82nd airborne still had not gained control of the bridge across the Merderet by June 9 . Its 325th GIR , supported by several tanks , forced a crossing under fire to link up with pockets of the 507th PIR , then extended its line west of the Merderet to Chef - du - Pont . The 505th PIR captured Montebourg Station northwest of Sainte - Mere - Èglise on June 10 , supporting an attack by the 4th Division . The 508th PIR attacked across the Douve River at Beuzeville - la - Bastille on June 12 and captured Baupte the next day . On June 14 units of the 101st Airborne linked up with the 508th PIR at Baupte . The 325th and 505th passed through the 90th Division , which had taken Pont l ' Abbé ( originally an 82nd objective ) , and drove west on the left flank of VII Corps to capture Saint - Sauveur - le - Vicomte on June 16 . On June 19 the division was assigned to VIII Corps , and the 507th established a bridgehead over the Douve south of Pont l ' Abbé . The 82nd Airborne continued its march towards La Haye - du - Puits , and made its final attack against Hill 122 ( Mont Castre ) on July 3 in a driving rainstorm . It was " pinched out " of line by the advance of the 90th Infantry Division the next day and went into reserve to prepare to return to England . Aircraft losses and casualties . Forty - two C - 47s were destroyed in two days of operations , although in many cases the crews survived and were returned to Allied control . Twenty - one of the losses were on D - Day during the parachute assault , 7 while towing gliders , and the remaining 14 during parachute resupply missions . Of the 517 gliders , 222 were Airspeed Horsa gliders , most of which were destroyed in landing accidents or by German fire after landing . Although a majority of the 295 Waco gliders were repairable for use in future operations , the combat situation in the beachhead did not permit the introduction of troop carrier service units , and 97 per cent of all gliders used in the operation were abandoned in the field . D - Day casualties for the airborne divisions were calculated in August 1944 as 1 , 240 for the 101st Airborne Division and 1 , 259 for the 82nd Airborne . Of those , the 101st suffered 182 killed , 557 wounded , and 501 missing . For the 82nd , the total was 156 killed , 347 wounded , and 756 missing . Casualties through June 30 were reported by VII Corps as 4 , 670 for the 101st ( 546 killed , 2217 wounded , and 1 , 907 missing ) , and 4 , 480 for the 82nd ( 457 killed , 1440 wounded , and 2583 missing ) . German casualties , amounted to approximately 21 , 300 for the campaign . The 6th Parachute Regiment reported approximately 3 , 000 through the end of July . Divisional totals , which include combat against all VII Corps units , not just airborne , and their reporting dates were : Troop carrier controversy . In his 1962 book , " Night Drop : The American Airborne Invasion of Normandy " , Army historian S . L . A . Marshall concluded that the mixed performance overall of the airborne troops in Normandy resulted from poor performance by the troop carrier pilots . In coming to that conclusion he did not interview any aircrew nor qualify his opinion to that extent , nor did he acknowledge that British airborne operations on the same night succeeded despite also being widely scattered . Marshall ' s original data came from after - action interviews with paratroopers after their return to England in July 1944 , which was also the basis of all U . S . Army histories on the campaign written after the war , and which he later incorporated in his own commercial book . General Omar Bradley blamed " pilot inexperience and anxiety " as well as weather for the failures of the paratroopers . Memoirs by former 101st troopers , notably Donald Burgett ( " Currahee " ) and Laurence Critchell ( " Four Stars of Hell " ) harshly denigrated the pilots based on their own experiences , implying cowardice and incompetence ( although Burgett also praised the Air Corps as " the best in the world " ) . Later John Keegan ( " Six Armies in Normandy " ) and Clay Blair ( " Ridgway ' s Paratroopers : The American Airborne in World War II " ) escalated the tone of the criticism , stating that troop carrier pilots were the least qualified in the Army Air Forces , disgruntled , and castoffs . Others critical included Max Hastings ( " Overlord : D - Day and the Battle for Normandy " ) and James Huston ( " Out of the Blue : U . S . Army Airborne Operations in World War II " ) . As late as 2003 a prominent history ( " Airborne : A Combat History of American Airborne Forces " by retired Lieutenant General E . M . Flanagan ) repeated these and other assertions , all of it laying failures in Normandy at the feet of the pilots . This criticism primarily derived from anecdotal testimony in the battle - inexperienced 101st Airborne . Criticism from veterans of the 82nd Airborne was not only rare , its commanders Ridgway and Gavin both officially commended the troop carrier groups , as did Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Vandervoort and even one prominent 101st veteran , Captain Frank Lillyman , commander of its pathfinders . Gavin ' s commendation said in part : " The accomplishments of the parachute regiments are due to the conscientious and efficient tasks of delivery performed by your pilots and crews . I am aware , as we all are , that your wing suffered losses in carrying out its missions and that a very bad fog condition was encountered inside the west coast of the peninsula Yet despite this every effort was made for an exact and precise delivery as planned . In most cases this was successful . " The troop carrier pilots in their remembrances and histories admitted to many errors in execution of the drops but denied the aspersions on their character , citing the many factors since enumerated and faulty planning assumptions . Some , such as Martin Wolfe , an enlisted radio operator with the 436th TCG , pointed out that some late drops were caused by the paratroopers , who were struggling to get their equipment out the door until their aircraft had flown by the drop zone by several miles . Others mistook drops made ahead of theirs for their own drop zones and insisted on going early . The TCC personnel also pointed out that anxiety at being new to combat was not confined to USAAF crews . Warren reported that official histories showed 9 paratroopers had refused to jump and at least 35 other uninjured paratroopers were returned to England aboard C - 47s . General Gavin reported that many paratroopers were in a daze after the drop , huddling in ditches and hedgerows until prodded into action by veterans . Wolfe noted that although his group had botched the delivery of some units in the night drop , it flew a second , daylight mission on D - Day and performed flawlessly although under heavy ground fire from alerted Germans . Despite this , controversy did not flare until the assertions reached the general public as a commercial best - seller in Stephen Ambrose ' s " Band of Brothers " , particularly in sincere accusations by icons such as Richard Winters . In 1995 , following publication of " D - Day June 6 , 1944 : The Climactic Battle of World War II " , troop carrier historians , including veterans Lew Johnston ( 314th TCG ) , Michael Ingrisano Jr . ( 316th TCG ) , and former U . S . Marine Corps airlift planner Randolph Hils , attempted to open a dialog with Ambrose to correct errors they cited in " D - Day " , which they then found had been repeated from the more popular and well - known " Band of Brothers " . Their frustration with his failure to follow through on what they stated were promises to correct the record , particularly to the accusations of general cowardice and incompetence among the pilots , led them to detailed public rejoinders when the errors continued to be widely asserted , including in a History Channel broadcast April 8 , 2001 . As recently as 2004 , in " MHQ : The Quarterly of Military History " , the misrepresentations regarding lack of night training , pilot cowardice , and TC pilots being the dregs of the Air Corps were again repeated , with Ambrose being cited as its source .