Zaharije Ostojić Zaharije Ostojić ( ; 1907 – April 1945 ) was the chief of the operational , organisational and intelligence branches of the Chetnik Supreme Command led by Draža Mihailović in Yugoslavia during World War II . Montenegrin by birth , Ostojić was a major in the Yugoslav Royal Air Force prior to the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia , and was involved in the coup that deposed Prince Paul of Yugoslavia on 27 March 1941 . After the coup , he escorted Prince Paul to exile in Greece , and was in Cairo at the time of the invasion in April . In September 1941 , he was landed on the Italian - occupied Montenegrin coast along with a British Special Operations Executive ( SOE ) liaison officer and two companions . He escorted the SOE officer to the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia and introduced him to the Yugoslav Partisan leader Josip Broz Tito then Mihailović . Ostojić soon became Mihailović ' s chief of staff , and after the German attempt to capture the Chetnik leader during Operation Mihailović in December 1941 , brought the Chetnik Supreme staff to Montenegro where they were re - united with Mihailović in June 1942 . During the remainder of 1942 , Ostojić launched a counter - attack against Ustaše troops of the Independent State of Croatia returning to the eastern Bosnian town of Foča where they were expected to continue their genocidal anti - Serb policies . As many as 2 , 000 local Muslims were subsequently killed in the town by forces under Ostojić ' s command . Ostojić later oversaw large - scale massacres of civilians and burning of Muslim villages in the border region between Montenegro and the Sandžak . While the Chetniks were an anti - Axis movement in their long - range goals and did engage in marginal resistance activities for limited periods , they also carried out almost throughout the war a tactical or selective collaboration with the occupation authorities against the Partisans . The Chetnik movement adopted a policy of collaboration with the Axis powers , and engaged in cooperation to one degree or another by establishing " modus vivendi " or operating as auxiliary forces under Axis control . This was demonstrated in late 1942 and early 1943 , when Ostojić planned and oversaw the Chetnik involvement in the large Axis anti - Partisan offensive Case White alongside Italian troops . In 1944 , he became a leader of the Chetnik forces in Herzegovina , and along with Dobroslav Jevđević was involved in attempts to come to terms with the Allied forces . In late 1944 , as the Partisans tightened their grip on the country and the Soviet Red Army captured Belgrade , he re - joined Mihailović in northeastern Bosnia but they could not agree on what course of action to take . Ostojić , along with Chetnik leaders Pavle Đurišić and Petar Baćović and Chetnik ideologue Dragiša Vasić decided to move west to the area of the Ljubljana Gap in modern - day Slovenia where other friendly forces were concentrating . In early April 1945 , faced with attacks by the Partisans and the Armed Forces of the Independent State of Croatia ( HOS ) along their route , the combined Chetnik force was defeated by HOS forces in the Battle of Lijevče Field , after which Ostojić was captured and killed . Early life . Zaharije Ostojić was born in 1907 in the village of Gluhi Do , near the Adriatic seaport of Bar in the Principality of Montenegro . He joined the Yugoslav Royal Air Force and prior to the outbreak of World War II had risen to the rank of major . Little is known of Ostojić ' s early life but apparently he had a sister who was married to Royal Yugoslav Army Brigadier General Ljubo Novaković . To Cairo and back . After the outbreak of World War II , the government of Regent Prince Paul of Yugoslavia declared its neutrality . Despite this , and with the aim of securing his southern flank for the pending attack on the Soviet Union , Adolf Hitler began placing heavy pressure on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact and join the Axis . After some delay , the Yugoslav government conditionally signed the Pact on 25 March 1941 . Two days later a bloodless coup d ' état deposed Prince Paul and declared 17 year old Prince Peter II of Yugoslavia of age . Ostojić was involved in the coup through his close relationship with one of the main instigators , the commander of the Yugoslav Royal Air Force Brigadier General Borivoje Mirković . Ostojić escorted Prince Paul to exile in Greece and then traveled on to Cairo . Following the subsequent German - led invasion of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav capitulation 11 days later , Ostojić remained in Cairo until he was selected to join a combined British - Yugoslavian Special Operations Executive team which was to infiltrate into occupied Yugoslavia and make contact with resistance groups . The other members of the team were Captain Duane ' Bill ' Hudson , a fellow Yugoslav Air Force officer , Major Mirko Lalatović , and a radio operator . They flew from Cairo to Malta on 13 September 1941 , before being landed from the British submarine HMS " Triumph " on the Montenegrin coast near Petrovac between 20 and 22 September 1941 . They quickly came into contact with Montenegrin Partisans , including Milovan Đilas and Arso Jovanović , who escorted Hudson and Ostojić to Partisan - held Užice in the Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia . While Hudson familiarised himself with the Partisans , Ostojić went on to Mihailović ' s headquarters at Ravna Gora , but after briefing Mihailović went back to escort Hudson to Ravna Gora , arriving there on 25 October . When he first arrived at Ravna Gora , Ostojić had delivered a message to Mihailović from the War Minister of the Yugoslav government - in - exile , Bogoljub Ilić , assuring him of the official support of the government - in - exile , but stating that " a rebellion would not be tolerated " . Ostojić also told Mihailović that the communists had taken control of Montenegro . Ostojić and Lalatović then assumed senior staff positions in Mihailović ' s supreme command headquarters . Move to Montenegro . After Mihailović went on the run in early December 1941 in the wake of Operation Uzice , Operation Mihailovic and the split with the Partisans , Ostojić maintained a small headquarters consisting mainly of the intelligence branch , which remained close to Mihailović and his small personal staff as he moved around the Rudnik mountain area during the remaining winter months of 1941 – 1942 . Mihailović eventually made his way to Montenegro , where he arrived in June 1942 . Ostojić , Hudson and other officers joined him soon after , travelling through Italian - held towns by truck disguised as troops of the Nedić regime . In August 1942 , Ostojić launched a counterattack against Ustaše troops returning to Foča as the Italians withdrew their garrisons from the hinterland . The Chetniks feared the Ustaše were about to unleash another round of genocidal violence on the Serb population in the area . At least 2 , 000 local Muslims were subsequently killed in Foča by forces under Ostojić ' s command . In November 1942 , Ostojić was encouraged by Mihailović to wage a campaign of terror against the Muslim population living along the borders of Montenegro and the Sandžak , and subsequently reported that Chetniks had destroyed 21 villages and killed about 1 , 300 people . Between 30 November and 2 December 1942 , Ostojić represented Mihailović at the Conference of Young Chetnik Intellectuals of Montenegro at the village of Šahovići near Bijelo Polje in the Sandžak , which was also attended by Đurišić . The conference was dominated by Đurišić and its resolutions " expressed extremism and intolerance " , as well as an agenda which was focused on restoring the pre - war status quo in Yugoslavia implemented in its initial stages by a Chetnik dictatorship . It also laid claim to parts of the territory of Yugoslavia ' s neighbors . Operation Weiss . A few weeks after the conference , Mihailović sent Ostojić to establish a forward headquarters in Kalinovik in south - eastern Bosnia . Ostojić was to command an operation aimed at encircling and destroying Partisan forces in Bosnia , which was to utilise Chetnik units serving as Italian auxiliaries in Herzegovina and Montenegro , as well as other Chetnik units in the Lika region , northern Bosnia and northern Dalmatia . The plan was predicated on an Allied landing on the Dalmatian coast , which Mihailović believed was imminent . The outline concept was that the Chetniks would set up a corridor through the Italian occupied zone of the NDH as far as the Partisan liberated area in western Bosnia and Lika , neutralising the Italians through a combination of vague promises , encouraging them to surrender , and disarming them if necessary . The plan was finalised by early December 1942 at Mihailović ' s headquarters in Montenegro , and operations were planned to commence on 5 January 1943 . However , the plan assumed that Mihailović ' s forces were unified , which they were not , and also that his authority extended to many more Chetniks than it did in reality . However , what transpired instead was that the Chetniks that were preparing for the " march on Bosnia " were drawn into closer collaboration with the Axis during the second phase of Case White that took place in the Neretva and Rama river valleys in late February 1943 . During this offensive , between 12 , 000 – 15 , 000 Chetniks fought alongside Italian forces , and in one case alongside German and Croatian troops against the Partisans . Despite the fact that the Chetniks were an anti - Axis movement in their long - range goals and did engage in marginal resistance activities for limited periods , their involvement in Case White is one of the most significant examples of their tactical or selective collaboration with the Axis occupation forces . In this instance , the participating Chetniks operated as legalised auxiliary forces under Italian control . Ostojić believed that it was actions such as these that would cost the Chetniks the support of the Allies , and he wrote to Mihailović that the Allies would probably have supported the Chetniks had they been more involved in fighting the occupation . Ostojić told Mihailović that his officers also held this view , and proposed that Chetnik collaboration be reconsidered . However , upon receiving Ostojić ' s message , Mihailović did not even consider changing his strategy . The plan that Ostojić drew up called for the Chetniks to remain south of the Neretva to avoid being outflanked by the Partisans . However , this essentially defensive strategy was rejected by Herzegovinian Chetnik commanders such as Dobroslav Jevđević and Bajo Stanišić , who wished to follow the Axis - led offensive strategy . This placed Ostojić in a very difficult position , with some of his key detachment commanders following the orders of the Italians rather than his , while the Chetniks were reliant on Italian air and artillery support , particularly around Jablanica . Ostojić subsequently changed his mind and supported the Italian offensive plans , launching an attack against the Partisans retreating from Jablanica to Prozor on 27 February 1943 . The attack was indecisive and Ostojić reprimanded the detachment commanders responsible , particularly Stanišić . During this phase Ostojić first asked Jevđević to obtain more supplies from the Italians , and then when they refused , threatened to declare war on them . By early March , just as the Partisans were forcing a crossing of the Neretva at Jablanica , Mihailović joined Ostojić . In a letter to one of his other Montenegrin Chetnik commanders , Mihailović stated that he was managing the whole operation through Ostojić , although Mihailović later denied that he was in charge of the operation when questioned during his trial by a Partisan court after the war . Mihailović and Ostojić realised that the large concentrations of Chetnik troops in and around Mostar and the nearby bauxite mines were likely to draw German attention , and while they were focused on this issue , the Partisans forced a crossing of the Neretva . Within a week of Mihailović ' s arrival the Partisans had successfully crossed the Neretva , and within another week they had forced the Chetniks to withdraw , losing Nevesinje then Kalinovik to the Partisans before the end of March . During the fighting , Chetnik commanders had been ill - disciplined and had failed to cooperate , causing Ostojić to threaten them with courts martial and summary execution . Mihailović ordered Ostojić to pull the Chetniks back towards positions on the line of the Drina - Piva rivers , some kilometres southeast of Jablanica . By this point the Chetniks had suffered heavy losses , and the Partisans broke through the combined Italian - Chetnik defence line in early April . In a report dated November 1944 , Colonel S . W . " Bill " Bailey , the senior British liaison officer with the Chetniks during the war , stated that both Ostojić and Major Vojislav Lukačević had been very critical of Mihailović ' s " foolhardy , though brave , tactical handling " of Chetnik forces during Case White , which had " contributed largely to the failure of operations " . However , Ostojić himself did not possess the necessary authority with his subordinate commanders , had been unable to cope with the rapidly changing situation , had adopted an unpopular and ineffective defensive strategy , and had then blamed the detachment commanders for the Chetnik failures . 1943 – 1944 . In July 1943 , the Montenegrin Partisan leader Đilas contacted both Ostojić and Baćović to establish their willingness to work jointly against the Axis occupiers , given that a new government - in - exile was about to be established without Mihailović . They reported this contact to Mihailović who threatened to exclude them from his Chetnik organisation if they maintained contact with the Partisans . By September 1944 , Ostojić had been promoted to lieutenant colonel , and was the Chetnik area commander in eastern Bosnia . In early September 1944 , as Mihailović had been removed as Minister of the Army , Navy and Air Force with the demise of the Purić government - in - exile , Ostojić tried to make contact with Allied forces in Italy , and agreed with Lukačević to issue a proclamation to the people explaining that they were going to attack the Germans . After 12 September 1944 , when King Peter called for all in Yugoslavia to rally around Tito , he and Baćović warned Mihailović that their men were losing their will to fight the Partisans . Concerned that the Russians would hand the Chetniks over to the Partisans , he then contacted the United States Office of Strategic Services ( OSS ) liaison officer with the Chetniks , Colonel Robert H . McDowell , but was unable to arrange for the Chetniks to be placed under American command . Retreat and death . After the fall of Belgrade on 20 October 1944 , Mihailović and a force of a few hundred of his Chetniks withdrew from Serbian territory , crossed the Drina and based themselves in the Majevica mountain area north of Tuzla in north - eastern Bosnia . Ostojić , who was commanding Herzegovinian Chetniks , was joined by Đurišić and his Montenegrin Chetniks and together they withdrew towards Mihailović . From the time he joined Mihailović in northeastern Bosnia , Đurišić was very critical of Mihailović ' s leadership , and argued strongly for all the remaining Chetnik troops to move to the area of the Ljubljana Gap in modern - day Slovenia . At this point Ostojić and Baćović were also questioning Mihailović ' s plans . When Mihailović remained unconvinced , Đurišić decided to move to the Ljubljana Gap independent of Mihailović , and arranged for Dimitrije Ljotić ' s forces already in the Ljubljana Gap to meet him near Bihać in western Bosnia to assist his movement . When he left Mihailović , he was joined by Chetnik ideologue Dragiša Vasić and the Chetnik detachments commanded by Ostojić and Baćović as well as a large number of refugees . In order to get to Bihać , Đurišić made a safe - conduct agreement with elements of the Armed Forces of the Independent State of Croatia ( HOS ) and with the Montenegrin separatist Sekula Drljević . The details of the agreement are not known , but it appears Đurišić , Ostojić and Baćović and their troops were meant to cross the Sava river into Slavonia where they would be aligned with Drljević as the " Montenegrin National Army " with Đurišić retaining operational command . The Chetniks however , appear to have tried to outsmart the HOS forces and Drljević by sending their sick and wounded across the river , but retaining their fit troops south of the river , after which they began moving them westwards . Harassed by both the HOS troops and Partisans , they reached the Vrbas river , which they began to cross . In the Battle of Lijevče Field , north of Banja Luka , the combined Chetnik force was badly beaten by a strong HOS force which possessed German - supplied tanks . Following this defeat and the defection of one of their sub - units to Drljević , Đurišić was induced to negotiate directly with the leaders of the HOS forces about the further movement of the Chetniks towards the Ljubljana Gap . However , this appears to have been a trap , as he was attacked and captured by them on his way to the meeting . Following this , Đurišić , Vasić , Ostojić and Baćović were killed , along with some Serbian Orthodox priests and others .