Battle of Sittang Bridge The Battle of Sittang Bridge was part of the Burma campaign in World War II . Fought between 19 February and 23 February 1942 , the battle was a decisive victory for Japan , with heavy losses for the British Indian Army , which was forced to retreat in disarray . Brigadier Sir John George Smyth , V . C . — who commanded the British Indian Army at Sittang Bridge — called it " the Sittang disaster " . The Sittang Bridge was an iron railway bridge spanning several hundred yards , so - named because it crossed the River Sittang ( now Sittaung ) near the south coast of Burma ( now Myanmar ) . The 17th Indian Infantry Division had given " everything it had " at the Battle of Bilin River and was already weak . Now in retreat , they finally received permission to withdraw across the Sittang on 19 February . They disengaged from the enemy under cover of night , and fell back 30 miles westwards along the track that led to the bridge . The Japanese 214th and 215th Regiments advanced , aiming to cut the British forces off at Sittang . Field Marshal Sir William Slim , who took command of the Burmese theatre shortly after the battle ended , called the Sittang Bridge " the decisive battle of the first campaign . " Battle . Retreat to the bridge . 21 February dawned bright and hot , and the 17th Division was short of water . Japanese aircraft strafed and bombed them on the road , inflicting serious casualties and forcing them to abandon vehicles and equipment . Many men took cover in a nearby rubber plantation , the Bogyagi Rubber Estate . At 05 : 00 , the 17th Division ' s headquarters came under attack at Kyaikto , but the Japanese were beaten back . A small British Indian force made up of detachments from several different units ( including the Duke of Wellington ' s Regiment ) defended the bridge , but 16th Indian Infantry Brigade and 46th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 17th Division were still further to the east , cut off . Fearing paratroop landings , Smyth deployed the 1 / 4th Gurkhas to the western end of the bridge to hold it against attacks from the rear while the 17th Division crossed . He was obliged to send them back again when the Japanese attacked from the east . Their first charge nearly took the east end of the bridge , and a number of Indian medics were captured or killed . 3rd and 5th Gurkhas , approaching the bridge from the east , were driven off in " a furious battle " . Jungle fighting at close quarters ensued , which lasted most of the day . The bridge was again nearly taken , and the attackers again beaten off . At dusk on 22 February , the British Indian Army still held the bridge . " My unpleasant and devastating news " . Smyth had ordered his sappers to get ready to blow the bridge . In the early morning of 22 February , it became clear that it might fall within the hour . Smyth ' s choices were to destroy the bridge , stranding more than half of his own troops on the wrong side , or to let it stand and give the Japanese a clear march to Rangoon . He decided the bridge must be destroyed , and at 05 : 30 on 22 February , this was done . Smyth reported this " unpleasant and devastating news " to General Hutton , overall commander of the Burmese forces . Slim ( 1956 ) says : " It is easy to criticize this decision ; it is not easy to make such a decision . Only those who have been faced with the immediate choice of similar grim alternatives can understand the weight of decision that presses on a commander . " But Slim does not actually endorse Smyth ' s choice , and indeed Smyth was dismissed . He never received another command . Brigadier " Punch " Cowan replaced him in command of the division . The Official History records that Smyth had wanted to move his troops across the Sittang much earlier , and had been refused . It says : " In view of the great importance of getting 17th Division safely across the Sittang , Hutton might have been wiser , once action had been joined on the Bilin , to give Smyth a free hand . " Aftermath . The Japanese could have wiped out the 17th Division , but they did not . They wanted to take Rangoon fast , and the delays involved in a mopping up operation were unpalatable ; so they disengaged and headed north in search of another crossing - point . Thus later on 22 February , survivors of the 17th Division swam and ferried themselves over the Sittang in broad daylight . After smaller actions at the Battle of Pegu and Taukkyan Roadblock , the Japanese went on to take Rangoon unopposed , on 9 March . Fortunately for the survivors of 17th Division , they had dismantled their roadblocks , so those Indians who had escaped Sittang Bridge were able to slip away to the north . The 17th Division ' s infantry manpower after Sittang was 3 , 484 — just over 40 % of its establishment , though it was already well under - strength before the battle started . Most of its artillery , vehicles and other heavy equipment was lost . Between them , they had 550 rifles , ten Bren gun s and twelve tommy guns remaining . Most had lost their boots swimming the river . Still , 17th Division could be replenished and re - equipped , and it was . The artillery losses were of World War I - vintage 18 - pounders , and the anti - aircraft provision had only been Lewis gun s . 17th Division remained in almost constant contact with the enemy from December 1941 to July 1944 , when it was taken out of the front line just before the Battle of Imphal .