DEPOSITION OF RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS
Originator: HSCA
From: HELMS, RICHARD
Document date: 8/9/78
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK Assassination System

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08/09/1978

198

CIA, METHODOLOGY

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO

RUSSIA

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DOCUMENT TYPE :

TRANSCRIPT

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Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW:

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COMMENTS :

Two duplicates follow in next two folders and Box 3.Box 2.

v9.1

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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978

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U.S. House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Assassination

of John F. Kennedy of the

Select Committee on Assassina-

tions,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m. in

room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives

Preyer, Burke, Dodd, Devine and

Sawyer.

Also present: E. Berning; L. Svendsen; C. Berk; M. Gold-

smith; B. Genzman; J. Blackmer; J. McDonald; G. R. Blakey;

0. Wagner; B. Wolf; W. H. CrosS.

Mr.

Preyer. The Committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes the Clerk of the Committee to read

those who are officially designated to be on the Subcommittee

today•

The Clerk. You, Mrs. Burke, Mr. Sawyer and Mr. Thone are

regular members of the Kennedy Subcommittee. Mr. Devine will

be substituting for Mr. Doda.

Mr. Preyer. The Chair at this time will entertain a motion

that today's hearings and one subsequent day of hearings be held

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in Executive Session since, on the basis of information obtained

by the Committee, the Committee believes that the evidence or

testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate people

and consequently Section 2(k) (5) of Rule 11 of the Committee

rules would apply.

Mrs. Burke. I so move.

Mr. Preyer.

Thank you.

You have heard the motion. All: those in favor will answer

as the roll is called.

The Clerk. Mr. Preyer?

Mr. Preyer. Aye:

The Clerk.

Mr. Devine?

Mr. Devine.

Aye.

The Clerk.

Mr. Thone?

(No response)

The Clerk.

Mrs. Burke?

Mrs. Burke.

Aye.

The Clerk.

Mx. Sawyer?

(No response)

The Clerk. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer..

Thank you.

The Committee will

go into Executive Sesison at this time

and we will ask all those who are not members of the Committee,

all witnesses to please leave the room at this time.

(Pause)

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Mr. Preyer. We will now proceed in Executive Session.

The Chair will ask the witness if he will be sworn at this

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time.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to

give this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and

nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Helms. I do, MI: Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. You may be seated.

As we do to all witnesses, the Chair will give a brief

statement concerning the subject of the investigation.

House Resolution 222 mandates the Committee to conduct a

full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances

surrounding the assassination and death of President John F.

Kennedy including determining whether the existing laws of the

United States

concerning the investigation of the President

and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies

and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforce-

ment and there is full disclosure of evidence and information

among agencies and departments of the United States government,

and whether any evidence or information not in the possession

of anagency or department would have been in assistance in

investigating the assassination; and why such information was

not provided by such agency or department; and to make recom-

mendations to the House, if the Select Committee deems it

appropriate, for amendment of existing legislation or the

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enactment of new legislation.

MI. Helms,

are you represented by counsel?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I have with me, MI. Chairman, Mr. Gregory

B. Craig who is my counsel on this occasion.

Mr. Preyer.

Thank you.

Mr. Craig. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. The Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith at this

time to begin the questioning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, for the record will you

state your name and address?

Mr. Helms. My name is Richard McGarrah Helms, and for

the benefit of the Reporter, the middle name is spelled

M-c G-a-r-r-a-h.

I live at 4649 Garfield Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20007.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you previously served as the Director

of the Central Intelligence?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you serve in that

capacity?

Mr. Helms. I served from 1966 to 1973.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to that time, how many years have

you been associated with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. Since the doors opened in 1947.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a part of your association with the CIA,

were you required to execute a secrety seal?

Mr. Helms.

was.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time I would like, Mr. Ambassador,

to present what has been marked as JFK Exhibit No. 94.

Mr. Helms. I have it in front of me. I have identified

it as a document that I read earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, Mr. Chairman, JFK Exhibit

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No. 94 is a letter from Acting Director Carlucci to the

Chairman of this Committee which was written for the purpose

of authorizing present and former agency employees to testify

fully and truthfully before this Committee and to respond to

questions that are within the scope of the Committee's mandate.

At this time, I would like the Ambassador to be given a

letter, or a copy of a letter, from MI. Carlucci to the

Ambassador dated July 27, 1978. I would request that this

item be introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 125, JFK

Exhibit 125.

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(The document referred

to was marked JFK Exhibit

--

No. 125 for identification.)

Mr. Helms. I would identify this letter as one I received

in the mail.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of this

letter and the previous letter that you were shown, JFK No.

94?

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Mr. Helms. I believe I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. In addition, Mr: Ambassador, I would like you

to examine JFK Exhibit 126, which is a letter dated 8 August

1978 to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director of this

Committee.

Part of that exhibit consists of a letter from MI. Scott

Breckinridge of the CIA and another consists of a letter to

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Mr. Blakey sent by MI. Anthony Lampvan, General Counsel of

the CIA.

I request that be introduced into evidence as Jex exhibit

126.

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Mr. Preyer.

Without objection, so ordered.

(The document referred to

was marked JFK Exhibit No.

126 for identification.)

Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I read this letter before

the meeting started this morning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of that

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letter

Mr. Helms. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Finally, I have one more letter to intro-

duce in the record, a letter from Mr. Blakey to Mr. Breckin-

ridge dated 4 August 1978 which was sent to Mr. Breckinridge

at the request of Mr. Gregory Craig, counsel for the Ambassador.

At this time, I request that that letter be introduced

into the record as Exhibit 127.

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have seen this letter on another

occasion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, I request that this letter

be introduced into the record as JFK No. 127.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

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(The document referred

..

to was marked JKF Exhibit

No. 127 for identification.)

Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Ambassador, what was your position in

1963 when you were with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, I had the title Deputy Director for

Plans.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Would you explain to the Committee what

the organization

function of the Deputy Director for Plans was

in 1963?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans was

the Deputy Director who was in charge of -- I guess the simplest

term is overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received

its mandate from two documents, one known as MSC No. 5 and

the other CID/2 or M-12.

In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to

conduct espionage and counter-espionage and covert action out-

side the continental limits of the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Can you describe generally what your

responsibilities were as head of that unit?

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I was, in fact, in charge of the unit. In

other words, I was under the aegis of the Director of Central

Intelligence, to whom I reported. I was in charge of overseas

operations.

MI. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did the CIA have in the

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investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Helms. After this tragedy occurred and the Warren

Commission was

formed, there was every effort made in the

Central Intelligence Agency to be as responsive as possible

to request' from the FBI who was conducting the investigation

or a major portion of it, and the staff and members of the

Warren Commission.

I would like to take this occasion to say we were all, I

think, in this country egually struck with the tragic circum-

stances and we all felt, in the Agency, that we should do what

we could to be as supportive as we possibly could of these

other entities that had the lead in this investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Am I correct in assuming that -- and under-

standiyyour testimony to be -- that the basic role of the Agency

at that time was to lend support to the FBI and to the Warren

Commission?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Functioning in that capacity, how was the

CIA's investigation organized?

MI. Helms. This is a long time ago that these events took

place. I guess it is all of 15 years.

I do not recall. that, at the outset, that there was any

formal organizational change made to accommodate this investi-

gation. My recollection is that we figured that most of our

contribution would focus on what had occurred in Mexico City --

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in other words, Oswald's activity prior to the assassination

in Mexico City.

It is my recollection that the individual who was sort of

designated to help out from the Headquarters standpoint was

the man who had the desk there in Mexico City. My recollection,

his name was Whitten.

Mr. Goldsmith. Jack Whitten?

Mr. Helms. I think so. That is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with regard

to the investigation that was undertaken by the Agency?

MI. Helms. My recollection is that I felt my responsibility

to be as responsive to whatever requests came from the FBI or

the Warren Commission as we could. I, therefore, tried to see

to it that these requests were fulfilled and that we made the

requisite inquiry or whatever else would be required under the

circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who, if anyone, was primarily responsible

for coordinating the flow of information within the CIA to you

and then from you to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms.

Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall, at this late

date, anyway, any particular flow of information. An inquiry

would come over.

We would attempt to satisfy it and we would

attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual

bits and pieces or as individual items, and my recollection

would be that it would be hard to describe this flow of

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material. Each individual item that came along we took care

of as best as we could.

As the weeks turned into months, we found that we were

looking into matters overseas in Europe and various places,

trying to run down individuals, identify bits and pieces

that the Warren Commission was. trying to clarify, and as a

result of this, it was necessary to deal through all the area

divisions of the so-called Operations Director, or Plans

Director, at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff or unit, if any, within the

CIA was given primary responsibility for coordinating the

investigation?

Mr. Helms. My recollection is that after the Warren

Commission was established and it got its work underway that

this was put into the counter-intelligence staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what

the organizational function or purpose of the counter-intelli-

gence staff was?

Mr. Helms. Under the National Security Council intelli-

gence directive, NSCID No. 5, there was a provision, a special

provision in that document which dealt with counter-intelligence.

I say a special provision, because in the area of positive

intelligence the Agency's charter was to collect raw informa-

tion and then pass it to the various other interested agencies

of government.

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Whereas, in the counter-intelligence field, it had a

mandate to maintain counter-intelligence files and also to do

counter-intelligence evaluations.

To be more specific about this, if there was an allegation

from the FBI that a spy at the United Nations had been trans-

ferred to some unit in Paris and it was the Agency's job, then,

to try to see what that agent was up to. It was also the

Agency's job to make an evaluation of whether he, indeed,

was working for the Russians or the French or whatever the

case might be.

Therefore, the counter-intelligence staff did have an

evaluation function which the foreign intelligence staff, or

the positive intelligence staff, did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that why the CI staff was given primary

responsibility for coordinating the irvestigation?

MI. Helms.

Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall any longer what

considerations went into giving this job to the counter-

intelligence staff. I think it is logical to agree with what

you say, but I do not recall any longer as it having been

or what the controlling reasons were.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Jack Whitten

who originally was given responsibility to coordinating aspects

of the investigation. Do you recall how long he retained this

responsibility?

Mr. Helms.

It is not only my recollection but in an effort

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to clear my mind in preparation for this hearing, I did some

checking with some former colleagues, and my recollection is

that he sort of had the labor for only a couple of months;

after that, the job was turned over to the Counter-Intelligence

Staff.

Do you recall why the transition was made from Whitten to

the CI staff?

Mr. Helms. I think, if recollection serves, that we could

see that this investigation was broadening far beyond Mexico

City and it did not make much sense to have it in the hands

of a man who was running the Mexico City desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Whitten was originally given the

responsibility for coordinating the investigation, was he ever

told by you that he would have exclusive control of the

investigation?

Mr. Helms. I have no such recollection. I would see no

reason to give him -- in fact, I could not see why it would

have occurred to me to want to say that to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether MI. Whitten ever

discussed with you problems that he was having with Mr. Angle-

ton's in some way interfering with the investigation?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not recall this. He might have.

Today

I do not recall this.

If you could identify what the troubles were, it might

refresh my memory.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten has testified before the

Committee in a deposition, and at that time he indicated that

he was intially given responsibility for the investigation and

was. told more or less that he would be given free rein as to

coordinating the information, and, I

guess, sending it to the

Warren Commission.

He indicated to us that Mr. Angleton was in some way inter-

fering with his function as coordinator of the investigation

and that at some time the investigation was turned over from

Whitten to Angleton. Does that refresh your menory at all?

Mr. Helms.

It does not, and may I say, I do not mean

to add to the questions I have not been asked, but I cannot

imagine giving anybody the kinds of assurances which Mr. Whit-

ten claims that he was given. We did not operate that way.

Nobody had those assurances for anything, including me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your position would be that the primary

reason, as you recall it, for the investigation's being taken

from Whitten, in a sense, and given to the CI staff was because

the investigation began to undertake broader tones than was

initially anticipated?

Mr. Helms.

Yes. That is not only my recollection, but

also it would seem to be in the year 1978, to have been a

rather sensible thing to have done under the circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten also testified before the

Committee that Mr. Angleton was talking to the FBI without

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receiving authorization

from anyone. Do you recall whether

...

or not that was a problem at any time?

MI. Helms. Well, Mr. Angleton was responsibile for the

liaison of the Plans Director for the FBI and consequently he

talked to the FBI liaison man and other FBI people every day

of the week and probably several times a day.

Mr. Goldsmith. He was never, after the assassination,

instructed not to talk to the FBI while Mr. Whitten was coordi-

nating the investigation?

Mr. Helms.

Certainly not. We were doing our best to be

as supportive and helpful as we could to the FBI.

MI. Goldsmith. Did you serve as a point of contact between

the Commission and the Agency, or was that responsibility given

to someone else?

MI. Helms. I do not know that anyone in the Agency was

ever designated as point of contact. I had dealings with the

Commission because I had the part of the Agency that was doing

most of the work for the Commission. This was a situation

indicated by the display of forces and activity rather than by

anything else. I do not recall having been designated as a

particular point of contact.

I do not recall anyone else's

having been designated as a point of contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what responsibilities, if

any, were given to Mr. Raymona Rocca?

Mr. Helms.'

I think in the counter-intelligence staff when

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they took over this responsibility, if you want to call it

that, I believe he was the man in the counter-intelligence

staff that was

responsible for pulling things together there.

In other words, these Warren Commission queries would go

to his desk, and the replies would come back from his desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone have

in the investigation?

Mr. Helms. As the Director of the Agency, he had a very

important role. Everything we did was on his say-so and there

was a constant traffic between him and me about what we were

doing with the Warren Commission, how we were handling these

various matters. I believe Mr. McCone testified at the

Warren Commission at one time. We would have had to brief

him in preparation for his testimony and prepare the papers

and so forth.

He had a very real role.

Mr. Goldsmith. He was actually apprised of the develop-

ments and what was being given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Literally not on a day to day basis, but he

was kept informed in general terms and specific terms if

necessary.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how many times a week you

him

would meet with Mr. McCone and discuss with them the develop-

ments with regard to the investigation of the assassination?

Mr. Helms.

I am sorry, I do not. In the Agency procedure,

there was a morning meeting with the Director every day, five

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days a week, and I was at those meetings. What transpired at

those meetings plus what transpired in his office in private

meetings, I could

not conceivably give you any idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you would say that Mr. McCone

was actively apprised and was not on the periphery of the

developments?

Mr. Helm.

Certainly not. He was actively apprised.

He

was very much interested, and we were all very much interested.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to the division

of

responsibility in essence between the FBI and the CIA with

regard to the

investigation. Would you

go into somewhat more

detail as to the relationship between the CIA and FBI at that

time?

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Mr. Helms.

This crime was committed on United States soil.

Therefore, as far as the Federal

government was concerned, the

primary investigating agency would have been the Federal

Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of

the CIA would have been entirely supportive and it would have

beensupportive in -the sense of what material we are able

to acquire outside the continental limits of the United States

with reference to the investigation.

This was the division of labor between the FBI and the CIA.

The CIA's mandate started at the ocean front. Or, to put it

another way, the FBIls mandate started as soon as you crossed

into the continental limits of the United States. For

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investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role

inside the United States at all. So when I used here the

word "supportive,"

I meant that in the literal sense of the

term.

We are trying to support the FBI and support the

Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we

were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my

recollection, were we ever asked to.

Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, was that division of

responsibility satisfactory?

Mr. Helms.

It was law. It was not a question of whether

it was satisfactory or not; it was law.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. One of the purposes

of this investigation is to examine the state of the law at

that time and

the manner in which the Agency has gone about

investigating

the death of the President. So, at this time,

I

am asking you whether in your opinion that statement of

facts was satisfactory towards conducting the investigation

that was involved?

Mr. Helms.

I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith, whether on such

short notice I would want to make such a serious juägment as

that. It does seem to me in any investigation that one

organization has to have the primary role, otherwise you have

great deal of confusion. I think it was proper that the

FBI should have the primary role in this case. I do not

recall ever having felt disadvantaged in any way in the CIA

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by the position we had of supporting these efforts, and that

is the best answer I can give you on such short notice.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there were any

problems between the Agency and the Bureau in conducting the

investigation?

Mc. Helms. The only matter that comes readily to mind was

the difference in the evaluation of the material of the

Soviet defector named Nosenko

gave. My recollection is that

what this man had to say when he arrived in the United States

around the time of the assassination was passed by the FBI

to the Warren Commission exactly as he said it.

The CIA was responsible for handling defectors after they

camé to the United States and did not feel that the bona fides

or the good faith and credibility of this defector had been

established at this stage of the game, and the Central

Intelligence Agency felt it necessary to make that known to

the Warren Commission.

There, indeed, there was a difference between the two

agencies.

Mr. Goldsmith. Aside from that substantive disagreement

in the day-to-day relationship of the Bureau, can you recall

whether there were problems in terms of coordinating the

investigation?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall any other problems.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Was information freely passed between the

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CIA and the FBI? By that, I mean the way the scenario is

right now, the CIA is acting in a support function to the FBI.

Was

the FBI giving information to the CIA?

Mr. Helms.

My best recollection is that there were not

difficulties between the two agencies over this. As I said

at the outset, we were doing our best to be supportive. We

were passing along, I believe, everything that was relative.

I do recall when we

got into certain sensitive areas a

couple of times during the investigation, if we felt we could

not pass a piece of paper to the Warren Commission, for

example, we would go down and talk to the staff man to try

to apprise them orally of what our predicament was.

In other words, I assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that the whole

thrust of the Agency was to be as helpful as we possibly could

and to go over the edge, if necessary.

Mr. Goldsmith.

I understand. In this case, my question

was whether the FBI was also sending information to the

Agency?

In other words, was the FBI sharing information for your pur-

poses?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall any complaints on those grounds.

Maybe they were and maybe they were not. It is a little bit

difficult, sometimes,. to know whether you are getting something

the existence of which you have never heara.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency's investigation reflect any

working hypotheses? By that, did the Agency give any particular

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emphasis to the

• particular areas, geographic areas?

Mr. Helms.

I think that the entire United States govern-

ment, not only the CIA, was

very concerned as to whether there

would be evidence of some foreign conspiracy to assassinate

President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets

were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubans

were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may

have been involved in it.

I think we were all preoccupied with this. There is hardly!

any question there was more discussed during those days as to

who was behind Lee Harvey Oswald, if indeed he was the man who

was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done

the things he had done, and so forth.

So there was a

great deal of conjecturing going on. I

think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, I would like

to make a comment about the various investigations into the

assassination of President Kennedy based on the long years I

have spent in the intelligence business, and

that is, until the

day that the KGB in Moscow of the Cuban intelligence in Havanna

is prepared to turn over their files to the U.S. as to what

their relationships to these various people were, it is going

to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally,

and conclusively.

A great deal of investigation san be done, and has been

done. It has been done conscientiously. I think people have

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tried over the years their very best to resolve a host of

differences. I recognize also that allegations have been made

that certain areas have not been as aggressively investigated

as they might have been. That all may be true.

But it really does not make any difference what is done in

this connection until you can get those governments to lay

before you their records of how they dealt with lee Harvey

Oswald, or anybody else who is relevant in this case.

And, based on past experience, I doubt very much whether

you are going to

get the compliance of the Soviets or the

Cuban government.

But I want to make this comment, because it is extremely

important and very relevant, that these cases are untidy. It

is only in books that they end

up with all the little things

worked out at the end and tied off neatly.

This aura of suspicion and all the rest of it hangs in the

air. Undoubtedly that is why this Committee was formed, so

undoubtedly this could be put to rest. I promise you, there

is this one last step and until it can be taken, this is never

going to be laid to rest.

Mr. Devine. Do you agree, Mr. Helms, that the likelihood

of that happening is remote?

Mr. Helms.

Remote. Yes, sir, I agree with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I believe my question was --

Mr. Helms. Excuse me, MI. Goldsmith. I did not mean to

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digress. I thought that I would like to get this off my chest.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Myquestion was, what areas received primary emphasis. I

think your answer, in part, was the area of foreign conspiracy.

Are you able to give any more detail on what aspects of

the foreign conspiracy question were investigated?

Mr. Helms. I think we were very concerned about the Soviet

aspects of this, primarily. Why? Because Lee Harvey Oswald

had spent time in the Soviet Union, time which never had been

satisfactorily explained as far as we knew.

Nosenko arrives as a defector. There were a lot of very

suspicious circumstances surrounding the whole way and timing

of his defection. So that there were several areas there

that seemed to require not only investigation but thought and

analysis and evetything else that could be given to it.

I would like to say here that when a tragedy of the magni-

tude of President Kennedy's assassination occurs in this

country, it is at this point that in our international relations

we have to suddenly become very careful, because accusing a

foreign government of having been responsible for this act

is tearing the veil about as nastily as one can, and this can

lead to a whole series of counter-actions which might be very

unpleasant.

I think all of us were keenly aware of this. It was not

only true of the Soviet Union, but also true of Cuba, that

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President Kennedy's whole approach to the Cuban government

of Fidel Castro.

So that we were treading very lightly, but I am sure that

we were very concerned at the time as to what we might end up

with. And this was not improved of our mood about this was

not improved when Khruschev runs to Drew Pearson in Egypt when

they were visiting there and tells Pearson that the Soviets,

that this was a conspiracy of the right to assassinate Presi-

dent Kennedy. Why does he make this remark to Drew Pearson?

What is his purpose?" What was behind this?

Is it a smoke screen to cover. up his own complicity?

The air was full of these things. Therefore, we were

very conscious of it and we were doing what we could to make

sense out of it.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Helms, was all information pertinent

to the Warren Commission's work promptly given to the Warren

Commission?

Mr. Helms.

As far as I know. If there are indications

or evidence that it was not, I do not recall having been aware

of any sins of omission at the time.

Mr.

Goldsmith. On the average, would you be able to tell

us how much time passed from the moment that information was

received by the Agency until it went to the Commission?

Mr. Helms. My recollection is that as soon as we were

able to satisfy an inquiry, we sent the reply back. And some

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of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example,

some might involve checking a file which was

in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if

we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform, one act takes longer

to perform than the other.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a

general rule, did you wait to receive

an inquiry from the Commission prior to

giving the Commission

information?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I did, as I recall it.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive

an inquiry from the FBI prior to giving the FBI information?

Mr. Helms. That is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was any member of the

Warren Commission or staff informed by the CIA of the CIA's

anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms.

I do not know. Let's clear this up right now.

There is no sense in your going on asking a whole series of

questions on this. I am glad to tell you what I know about

it.

In the first place, Mi. Allen Dulles who had about -- maybe

a few months before, anyway -- ceased being Director of

Central Intelligence and was replaced by Mr. McCone, was a

member of the Warren. Commission. Id not know what he said

to the members of the Warren Commission.

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Mr. McCone testified before the Warren Commission. I

believe I was with Mr. McCone the day he testified, although I

do not even have a clear recollection of that anymore, and I

have not refreshed my memory from the Warren Commission Report.

These

so-called assassination plots I believe if I may put

it this way - a sloppy term which has come to cover some

devices which the Church Committee found evidence that the

Agency had on its drawing board, if you want to put it that

way -- the only assassination plot that had any even semblance

or substance to it was one involving

a couple of Mafia chief-

tains and which were supposed to have taken place before the

Bay of Pigs invasion.

I guess you could call that an assassination plot.

As far as the AMIASH business was concerned, I had a

a great

deal to do with the AMIASH operation and, as has been publicly

stated before and I will publicly state it again, that was not

an assassination plot. The effort of working with AMLASH was

to see if we could find a political alternative to Castro and

a man who was prepared to lead a revolt against Castro in

political and military terms, inside Havanna.

The assassination aspects of this which have been so

highly publicized was an issue that Mr. Cubella himself kept

raising, which was the simplest way to perform his mission was

to try to

get rid of Castro physically. But he never attempted

it, as far as I know, and President Kennedy had been assassinated

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before there was any possibility of his having attempted it,

at least with the connivance of the Agency.

I think if one reads the record carefully of these various

facts, you will find what I say is supported by the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Cubella.

given any support by the

Agency with regard to his desire to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Helms. In the end he was not, as far as I know.

MI. Goldsmith. Before the end, was he at any time given

any support?

Mr. Helms.

NO .

There is the famous story of the poison pen but he did not

take the poisen pen. He simply returned it to the case officer

who offered it to him. There was no other device

given to

him,

as far as I am aware.

Mr. Goldsmith.

You made reference earlier to Mr. Dulles'

being on the Commission. Do you know whether Mr. Dulles actually

knew about the so-called anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. He certainly knew about the Mafia one that I

mentioned. I think there is abundant evidence that he did know

it..

I do not have that firsthand, because that particular

operation was being handled by Mr. Bissell and Colonel Edwards

with Mr. Dulles and General Cabell and I was not brought in on

it.

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At the time I was not a party to it.

This is all secondhand information I am giving you, based

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on what came out of the Church Committee hearings.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. McCone knew of

the plots against Castro?

1 Mr. Helms.

Yes, I think he did. Well, eventually he did.

I do not know exactly at what juncture he was informed about

them.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, did you at any time inform

the Warren Commission about these plots?

Mr. Helms. I did not talk to the Warren Commission about

them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would your position be that the anti-

Castro plots were not relevant to the Warren Commission's

investigation?

Mr. Helms. I would not put it that way, Mr. Goldsmith.

I would not like to agree with that statement.

Perhaps they were relevant. I think that is a matter of

opinion.

What I would like to say, however, is I have noted in the

last two or three years that various witnesses have come

forward to various Congressional Committees saying if they had

known this or known that or known something else their

investigation, their attitude, their handling of the matter

would have been entirely different. But how it would have

been different is not really explained anyplace that I can

find.

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I would like, Mr. Chairman, to make another comment, if

I may, please. In 1962, in October, we had the Cuban missile

crisis and to recall and refresh your memory, this was the

occasion on which Fidel Castro and Khruschev connived to put

intermediate range ballistic missiles on Cuban soil which had

a range which could fire into the United States at least to

the middle of the country, if not all the way through to

California.

If Khruschev had been able to pull off this trick, it

would have been the military coup of the century. The Russians

would, in the military

sense, achieve what, up to that time,

they had not been able to achieve otherwise -- to hold the

United States hostage.

At that time, the Soviets did not have intercontinental

ballistic missiles with the range of the accuracy to fire

from Soviet soil to the United States.

They have since

achieved this capability but they did not have it in 1963,

I believe the military evidence will show.

Obviously, President Kennedy through some good intelligence

was provided, and by handling the situation with great skill

able to get those missiles withdrawn and also the bombers,

the IL-28's which came with them. But I do not think that

this operation endeared Fidel Castro to John F. Kennedy•

That was in October. In December the brigade which had

gone assure at the Bay of Pigs, the brigade of Cuban exiles

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referred to as No. 2506, was finally gotten out of Cuban jails

as a result of an exchange organized by Attorney General

Robert Kennedy of payments of medical supplies and pharmaceu-

ticals and so forth. And this group came back and they were

brought together in the range Bowl in Miami and President

Kennedy addressed him.

On that ocassion, he said words to the effect that I will

return this flag to this brigade in a free Hananna. I think

those words are unambiguous.

So in this period of the months prior to his assassination,

there certainly was bad blood between President Kennedy and

Fidel Castro. This was known to everybody. Whether this blood

was made worse, or not made worse, by so-called assassination

plots which maybe Castro knew about, or maybe he did not know

about, I am unable to say.

But I think there has been

a gross exaggeration which has

taken place about the role that the so-called assassination

plots might have played in the Warren Commission investigation.

Ladies and gentlemen, what different conclusion would you

suggest that the Warren Commission should have come to?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony

that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact,

were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light

of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why

the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro

• ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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assassination plots.

Mr. Helms. I have never been asked to testify before the

Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission did not know

of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask

you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms. Yes, but how do you know they did not know

about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How

was I to know that?

And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in

the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren

Commission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else

without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever discuss with the Director

whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-

Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. I did not, as far as I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know, in 1963, what consideration

if any the Warren Commission was

giving to the theory that

the Kennedy assassination was part of a Cuban conspiracy, a

Castro conspiracy?

Mr. Helms. I do not know what consideration was given to

it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the issuance of the Warren

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Commission's report, did the CIA at any time have any documents

or other information which indicated that Castro may have known

about the CIA anti-Castro's assassination plots?

mitt

Mr. Helms. I do not recall any, MI. Goldstein. Maybe

there were, maybe there were newspaper articles. I do not have

any recollection of that anymore.. I believe this allegation

has been made. I do not have any firsthand recollection.

MI. Goldsmith. Did the Agency éver conduct ancinvestiga-

tion into this issue?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. During the time that you were DCI, do you

know whether the Agency ever conducted an investigation into

this issue?

MI. Helms.

If it did --

Mr. Craig. Could I clarify what issue you are talking

about here?

Goldmitt

Mr. Helms.

The issue I am concerned about now is whether

the Agency had any information that Castro may have known about

the assassination plots against him.

Mr. Craig. Whether the Agency conducted an investigation of

that issue?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms.

I would have thought, Mr. Goldsmith, that since

the Agency was operating against Cuba not only in 1962, '63,

'64, probably '65, that if those allegations were made by

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agents of the FBI of the Secret Service or the Coast Guard

or the Agency itself that the Agency would have, in the

interests of protecting its operations, would have done its

best to find out if this were true. It is just maybe they

were not able to find out. I would have thought that there

would have been an ongoing series of operations in this regard.

MI. Goldsmith. You do not recall specifically one way or

another?

Mr. Helms. No.

MI. Goldsmith. Was the fact that the Warren Commission was

not told about the anti-Castro assassination plots, at least

by you, did that reflect.: a desire on your part

to avoid

having embarrassed the Agency

Mc. Helms. I do not recall ever having any thoughts of

that kind in regard to the investigation of the Warren Commis-

sion. One of the difficulties I had with this question is

ever since Senator Schweiker's report was made, which made a

great deal out of this, I have never had an opportunity to

talk to the people who were associated with me at the time to

find out just exactly who knew what about what in those days.

The United States, after all, is a nation of Monday morning

quarterbacks and it seems to me this is one of the outstanding

examples of Monday morning quarterbacking.

Mr. Goldsmith. MI. Ambassador, was there any desire on your

part to avoid an international crisis by not telling the Warren

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Commission about the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms.

The thought never occurred to me, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith.. In summary then, is it your position that

the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in

response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible.

There may have been times or circumstances under which something

different might have occurred, but my recollection of those

days is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive

of the. FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for

something, we gave it to them.

As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have

no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. In retrospect, do you think that was a

workable arrangement?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, other than the anti-castro

assassination plots, was there any other information pertaining

motive,

to a possible

mode of means or opportunity to kill the

President that the Warren Commission was not told about?

Mr. Helms.

I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever inform President Johnson about

the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. I do not like the term. You use it over and

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over again. I do not like it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, if you would give me

a term, I will make an effort to accommodate you.

MI. Helms. That would be kind of you. I think what I

would like to say is that i was President Johnson informed

of our efforts to

get rid of Fidel Castro.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you answer that question?

Mr. Helms. Yes, he was informed.

Mr. Goldsmith. At what time?

Mr. Helms. At various times after he became President.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was he told specifically about your efforts

to get rid of Castro prior to the assassination of President

Kennedy?

Mr. Helms. Yes, he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether he was specifically

told about the AMLASH plot?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I ever discussed the

AMIASH plot, or the AMLASH operation, as such. I do not have

any recollection of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether President Johnson

was apprised of the involvement of some of the Mafia figures

¡in this operation?

Mr. Heims.

He was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he was so apprised?

Mr. Helms. I do.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Would you so inform the Committee?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I have not testified to this before

because I have no written documentation to support this, but

I reported these various matters to President Johnson on May

10th, I believe, 1967.

Mr. Goldsmith. How are you able to remember the date so

well at this time, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. Helms. I do not like the implication of the question,

at this time.

Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Ambassador, I am not in a position to

quarrel with you over the way my questions are phrased.. I

would like to know --

MI. Helms.

The implication is that I declined to identify

it on some previous occasion.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. That is not the inference I

was intending to suggest. My question is a very simple one: how

are you able to remember today the specific date?

Mr. Helms. After I returned from Tehran and had some time

available to me, I had an opportunity to dig back and get

ahold of some colleagues and talk to various people to try to

range in on what time period it was that these matters came up

and how they were dealt with, the so-called IG Report that I

asked to have done at the Agency.

Therefore I wanted to try to specify the date on which I

reported to President Johnson about this IG Report. I was able

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to relate it to another matter I discussed with him on that

occasion, and therefore I was able to specify the date.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what effect, if any, did

the CIA's concern with protecting sources and methods as

provided by law have on the information that was provided to

the Warren Commission?

Mr. Preyer.

This is the second bell on the vote. Before

we

go into that answer, the Committee will stand in recess for

about ten minutes.

(A brief recess

was taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its hearing.

I understand that it is agreeable with you to proceed at

this time, even in the absence of a quorum.

Mr. Helms. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I repeat the question that

I asked you prior to the brief recess. What effect, if any,

did the agency's concern for protecting sensitive sources and

methods have in the information that it provided to the Warren

Commission?

MI. Helms. MI. Goldsmith, I cannot recall any specific

circumstances if there were any where this question of protec-

ting sensitive sources and methods caused us difficulty.

As I said earlier this morning, somewhere in the back of

my mind there may have been an instance or two where we did not

particularly want to put something in writing to the Warren

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Commission so that it would come to reside in our files,

become a part of the permanent record.

But in a couple of those cases -- and I believe there were

someone went down and talked to a member, a couple of members

of the Warren Commission staff so that they would be privy to

the information without necessarily having it in writing.

I do want to repeat what I said earlier, that we were

doing our level best to be responsive and we were bending over

backward or frontward, any way you like, to be as responsive

as we could, even when sensitive sources and methods were

involved.

I think that you will find, if I just might add this, that

we turned over to the FBI, for example, material from a mail-

ordering operation which the Agency was conducting in

1 those

days which was considered about as sensitive as

anything that

we were doing.

Mr. Goldsmith. When the Warren Commission staff or members

were informed about information that either reflected a sensi-

tive agency method of information that came from a sensitive

agency source, was the source of that information actually

given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I am sorry, I do not know.

We very seldom gave the names of sources to anybody, under

any circumstances. We usually tried to describe the source in

some fashion which would be helpful in evaluating the material.

--

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But we practically never gave the names of individuals who

were informants or agents or anything of that kind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling the Committee, then, while

the Warren Commission might be told about the substance of

the information generated from a sensitive source or method

of operation that the specific source and method would not

necessarily be disclosed?

Mr. Helms.

Not necessarily, but I do not know what happened

in every instance. I am really trying to

give you what was

the normal operating procedure.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, Mr. Ambassador, I would like

you to refer t what has been marked as CIA Document No. 1907.

For your reference purposes, I would like to indicate that you

have been given a series of volumes of materials, materials

containing CIA documents.

The Agency has numbered those documents for the Committee.

You will note if you open up, in this case, volume number

two, on the lower right-hand corner of each page, it states

page 1 of -- in this case, 212.

There are 212 pages in this volume. That is not the

document number I am referring to. Immediately above that on

leach page there is another number of four digits -- for example,

1874 appears on page 1.

When I say CIA Document. No. 1907, that would refer to

"what appears on page 1034 of 212.

For the future, I will be

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referring only to the CIA identification number.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith.

That is the practice we have been utilizing

and

throughout the hearing in depositions.

CIA 1907 is a brief for presentation to the President's

Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy and I would

ask you to look at CIA No. 1910 and read to yourself paragraph

E.

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Mr. Helms. Paragraph E.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr: Ambassador, does this paragraph

accurately reflect the Agency's attitude towards sensitive

sources and methods

and the way in which information touching

upon sensitive sources and methods was handled with the Warren

Commission?

Mr. Helms.

I believe so. I do not believe any reason to

quarrel with what is in that paragraph.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the last sentence of this paragraph, there

is a reference to channels and procedures that have functioned

very well between the Commission and the Agency. Would you

apprise the Committee as to specifically which channels and

I procedures were established in communicating this information

to the Warren Commission?

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MI. Helms. I would assume, Mr. Goldsmith, that what they

are attempting to say here is certain individuals who are

familiar with the question at issue were authorized to sit

down and talk with the Warren Commission staff members about

the operation or about the information.

I do not recall there was any structured way that this was

taken care of. I think it was.

If you were the individual most conversant with the problem,

you might be authorized to go down, or maybe your Chief would

be authorized to

go down and explain it and sit down with them

and go over it.

MI. Goldsmith. Did anyone from the Warren Commission or

its staff express its concern to you that sources and methods

by virtue of not being provided to the Warren Commission

specifically were causing a problem to the Commission or its

staff?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall this, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, are you able

to state whether Mr. Dulles played any special role in the

Warren Commission in so far as the Agency was concerned.

Mr. Helms. I am not able to make any comment about it

at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state, for example, whether

MI. Dulles represented the interests of the CIA while on the

Warren Commission?

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Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know

what interests he represented. Having known Mr. Dulles for

many, many years; I would have thought that he would have

acted very responsively as a member of the Commission and

tried to represent the United States' interests.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles ever pass on to you Warren

Commission-related information?

Mr. Helms. Not that I recall. In fact, I do not remember

having seen Mr. Dulles at all during this period. If I dia,

it must have been on very rare occasions.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, Mr. Dulles, never briefed you

or any Agency personnel on Warren Commission matters?

Mr. Helms. I did not say that he did not talk to anyone

else in the Agency. I do not recall his ever briefing me.

He was a very responsible individual, MI. Dulles. I cannot

imagine his doing anything that he would have felt was

improper.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I am going

to move. on to another line of inquiry unless you or any other

members have any questions.

Mr. Preyer. Mrs. Bunke?

Mrs. Burke. No.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Gold-

smith. You may proceed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what role, if any, did the

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Mexico City Station have in the Agency's investigation of

the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I believe that the Mexico City

station had a rather key role at the outset because it was

the Mexico City station that produced the information prior to

President Kennedy's assassination that a fellow named Oswald

had indeed visited the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico

City and this had been made a matter of record in the United

States government.

So I think it was in this context that the Mexico City

station obviously after the assassination was being asked

about the circumstances surrounding this report and what

additional information they had and was it indeed Lee Harvey

Oswald.

And then I believe there was a great to-do about the fact

that his name was slightly wrong in the telegram, or the

dissemination that was made.

-

All of these things I have heard in recent times. But

his having been to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico

City, obviously was a very important part of the initial

impressions one had that it was Oswald that had committed the

assassination.

MI. Goldsmith. Is it appropriate to say, relative to the

roles played by other overseas stations, the Mexico City

Station played a greater role in the Agency's mission?

instigation

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Mr. Helms. I think that is a fair statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall who the Chief of Station was

in Mexico City? To refresh

your memory, was it Mr. Winn Scott?

Mr. Helms.

Yes, that is correct.

MI. Goldsmith.

Are you able to give the Committee an

assessment of Mr. Scott's competence as the Chief of Station?

Mr. Helms. Well, in the first place, MI. Scott came to

the CIA after having been an agent for some years of the FBI.

He was a man of experience. He served a long time in Mexico

City, or -a comparative long time if you look at these overseas

assignments in terms of a tour of duty of two or three years.

He spoke Spanish, and he was regarded as one of our more

competent station chiefs.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether or not Mr. Scott

maintained an adequate system of records and files in the

Mexico City station?

Mr. Helms.

I do not have any recollection of this. In

fact, I do not recollect this having been an issue.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Scott had a

personal safe?

Mr. Helms.

NO.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for agency chiefs of station

¡to maintain a personal safe?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that that

was entirely up to them, if they wanted a personal safe or if

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they did not want a personal safe. I see nothing about it

one way of the other.

Mr. Goldsmith.

After Mr. Scott's death in '70 or '71, do

you know why Mr. James Angleton went to Mexico City and removed

documents from Mr. Scott's personal safe?

Mr. Helms.

No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did MI. Angleton ever get materials from

MI. Scott's safe to you?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having seen them. This

was in 1971, you say?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I do not recall having seen them, Mr. Goldsmith.

In fact, I do not recall the trip. I am not for a moment

implying it did not take place, I just do not recall it at

all. I just knew that Mr. Scott died suddenly, I believe of

heart attack. But he had left the Agency at that time, I

believe.

Is that correct?

Mr. Goldsmith.

He had retired.

Mr. Helms.

Retired and living in Mexico City?

Mr. Goldsmith.

That is also correct.

Mr. Helms.

Right.

I do not know what Mc. Angleton took.

Mr. Goldsmith. You never sent Mr.. Angleton to Mexico City

"to remove materials from his safe?

Mr. Helms.

I may have authorized the trip on the basis of

what I was told at the time. In 1978, I do not remember the

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trip.

Let me just say here that this is not solid information

I am giving you, but there may have been some concern that

maybe Scott had something in his safe that might affect the

Agency's work and the Agency just wanted to double check and

be sure there was not anything of that kind there. I think

that would be a normal practice, particularly if a fellow

died so suddenly and there we were.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Ann Goodpasture?

Mr. Helms. Ann Goodpasture, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what capacity did you know her?

caut

Mr. Helms •

She was a staffer of the Agency and I believe

she served in Mexico City for a

time.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know

whether during her stay in

Mexico City she was commonly known as Winn Scott's righthand

person?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall in that connection, but I

believe she was there quite some time.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, Mr. Ambassador,

did you review the cable and dispatch traffic that flowed

between the Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Helms.

After the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Helms.

I certainly saw some of the cables. I am simply

incapable of saying today of what I saw, how many of them I saw,

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because I think, in some circumstances, I would have been

briefed, I would have been told here are the circumstances,

what should we do?

But I do not know whether I reviewed individual cables

or whether I did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was primarily responsible for reviewing

the cable traffic and dispatch traffic between the Mexico

City station and headquarters,

specifically with regard to the

assassination?

Mr. Helms. I think in regard to the assassination the

branch that ran or had the control or support of the Mexico

City station, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere division,

the staff chiefs who are responsible for various aspects of

the operation like positive intelligence and counter-intelli-

gence, I undoubtedly read a number of them myself. I just

do not know which ones anymore.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier we made reference to Mr. Whitten

being responsible for reviewing cable traffic pertaining to

the assassination. After the responsibility for the investiga-

tion was given to the CI staff, do you know whether anyone

on the CI staff was given the responsibility for reviewing

the cable traffic that flowed from the Mexico City station and

(headguarters?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not know that this responsibility was

"given specifically, but I would have thought that if Mr. Rocca,

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whom you mentioned earlier this morning, were handling Mexico

City matters, he would have wanted to review the traffic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any

surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against the Cuban

and Soviet embassy and consulates?

Mr. Helms. My recollection was during that period they not

only had photographic surveillance of both of the embassies,

but they also had telephonic or wiretaps on both of the

embassies.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was information related to Oswald obtained

as a result of these operations?

Mr. Helms.

Yes, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information was obtained?

Mr. Helms. My impression is that when he called one or

the other of the embassies that this was picked up and trans-

cribed and it was in that way that they found out that there

was a fellow named Oswald who had called.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there was any other

information obtained regarding Oswald as a result of these

surveillance operations?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore. It seems to me that

there was a great controversy back at that time over the

photograph of an individual.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. I will repeat my question.

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Other than the information that was obtained concerning

Oswald as a result of the telephonic surveillance operation,

was any other information obtained about him as a result of

the surveillance operations that you had in Mexico City?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not remember. I remember,

obviously, the telephone thing because that became such a key

issue later on.

I do not remember whether they had other

information on them or not.

Ms. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission given information;

on Oswald's contact with the embassies?

Mr. Helms.

As far as I know, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall at that time whether the

Commission was specifically told about the source of the

information?

Mr. Helms. I believe this is what this must refer to here.

When you are asking me to read paragraph E, that I would have

assumed that the technical questions involved here was those

surveillance devices.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the Warren Commission

was told about the specific surveillance operations?

Mr. Helms. No.

MI. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would ask you to refer

to CIA document number 2144 which also appears in Volume 2.

Mr. Helms. My volume 2 only goes up to 2071.-

MI. Goldsmith. I am sorry. I stand corrected. It is in

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Volume 3.

Mr. Helms.

Fine.

2144?

Mr. Goldsmith.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Helms. Right. I have

got it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the first paragraph.

(Pause)

For the record, this is a cable dated 20 December 1963 to

Mexico City from the Director.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Paragraph I makes reference to the Agency's

intention to eliminate mention of the telephone taps in dealing

with the Warren Commission. Do you recall how long the Agency's

plan:

to eliminate mention of these taps in communicating

with the Warren Commission remained in effect?

MI. Helms. I have

no idea.

I am sorry. I have no information whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain, however, that the warren

Commission was

told specifically about the telephone operations?

Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I just assumed that it was at

some point.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, to what extent, if any, did the

Agency's concern for protecting under the law sensitive sources

and methods interfere with the information that was being given

to the Warren Commission?

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Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I cannot answer the question.

I have been doing the best I can. It was my impression at

the time that one way of another staff members of the commis-

sion were informed of the fact of the way the information had

been acquired because it was rather central to the investiga-

tion.

If this is not correct, then I am wrong. It was my

impression that at some time or other this was made clear

to them, I assume off the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I want to clarify, for

purposes of this record, that I have shown you just one cable

dated December 20th. Subsequently, the Warren Commission was

given information.

I do not want to suggest to you that the information was

not given and the specific sources were not made available

to the Warren Commission.

The Committee, at thispoint, is concerned with what

appears to be an early plan not to make reference of these

sources

and methods, but I do not want you to think that you

are being shown exhibits out of context.

MI. Helms. I do not know whether it has been made, the

Committee has been made aware of the fact that the reason for

the sensitivity of these telephone taps and the surveillance

was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's stand-

point, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with

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the Mexican authorities and therefore, if this had become

public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings

between Mexico and the United States, and that was the

reason.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that you refer

to CIA. No. 177 which appears in Volume 1. For the record,

that is a cable dated October 9, 1963 to the Director from the

Mexico City station.

Mr. Helms. Do you want me to read the cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read it to yourself, sir.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the first paragraph of this cable,

it refers to LIENVOY. ' Is that a reference to the telephonic

surveillance operation?

Mr. Helms.

• I do not recall anymore anything about these

cryptonyms. My assumption in reading this would be that

probably it did. I do not know for sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. From the context of the second paragraph

EMATY

which makes reference to the source being LIANpY, would you

say that that, in all likelihood, refers to the photo operation?

EMATY

Mr. Helms. LIANPY?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I assume so. I do not recall any more.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does paragraph 2 contain a description of

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someone that the Mexico City Station thought was Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I guess it was. That is the only assumption

I can make based on the context of the telegram.

Mr. Goldsmith. The description of the individual involved

is not an accurate description of Oswald, is it?

Mr. Helms. Not based on what I have learned about Oswald

since.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how this individual mistakenly

was linked to Oswald?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City Station ever asked

to explain why it thought that the individual referred to in

paragraph 2 was, in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I have a general impression that there was a

great effort made to clarify who this man was. Is this the

fellow they have never identified? This photograph has been

kicking around for years.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Let me show you that photograph now

to refresh your memory.

For the record, this corresponds with Exhibit No. 1 of

the Warren Commission.

MI. Helms.

Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. That is the

photograph I recollect as being the one that every effort was

being made to find out who that man was. Has he ever been

identified?

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Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, that was my next question.

Was the Agency ever able to identify this individual?

Mr. Helms. Not to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City Station ever explain

Headquarters how this individual was linked to Oswald?

Mr. Helms.

If they did, I was never made privy to it.

think it was obviously a mistake of some sort.

A11 I recall is that a valiant effort was made to find

out who this fellow was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was consideration ever given to the

possibility that this person may have been an Oswald imposter?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not recall the circum-

stances anymore.

I am sorry.

- =

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, it seems to me that the

question of whether this individual was an Oswald imposter

presents a significant issue. By virtue of you not being able

to recall whether or not this was examined, is it fair to say.

that it probably was not considered?

In other words, I am suggesting that, because the issue

is a significant one, had it been considered, you would remember

it.

Mr. Helms. You see, Mr. Goldsmith, I can see the signi-

ficance of the issue, but if we do not know who the man was,

we do not know where he was. How were we going to investigate

this, If I may submit, in fairness, we did not have access to

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the Cuban authorities to go to their embassy and say, who is

this fellow seen coming out of your embassy. We did not have

it with the Russians either. Where were

we

: to go to investi-

gate this matter?

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you do not recall whether

this issue was investigated?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not, but I do not know how it would

have been investigated.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the warren Commission told about

the picture to which reference is made in paragraph 3 of this

cable?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about

the specific connection between the picture and the cable

reporting Oswald's contact with the Embassy?

Mix. Helms. I would have imagined that the Agency did

everything that it could to work with the Warren Commission

staff in trying to find out who this man was, what his signi-

ficance might be. I cannot imagine that this was not thoroughly

gone into.

If there were any evidence not thoroughly gone into, I

would not understand it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where

I felt the warren Commission, by virtue of not having known of

this picture or of the cable perhaps did not ask the Agency

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about it and therefore may not have been apprised of this

photograph.

Mr. Helms. Is my recollection not accurate that we had

the FBI working with us to

try to locate this man? It seems:

to me that everybody we might find who might have conceivably

had some means of identifying him was asked about it. I do not

think we were making any secret of it, that we could not iden-

tify him.

We were trying to get some help to do it.

I do not think this is one of these closely-guarded

secrets, nor did the Agency have any motive for passing that

along to anyone who was

interested.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the purpose of attempting to refresh

your memory on this issue, the way that the Warren Commission,

at least in the record, was apprised of this photograph was

as follows: in February, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified

before the Commission and made reference to a photograph that

she had seen that purported to show Jack Ruby.

The photograph she was referring to was one of the

individuals who appears in the picture we just told you, bdum

Exhibit No. 1. That, at least in the record, is the first

time that the warren Commission was told about this particular

photograph.

Is that consistent with your recollection?

Mr. Helms. How did Marguerite Oswald find out about the

photograph? Had she been shown the photograph?

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Mr. Goldsmith. She was shown the photograph shortly

after the assassination.

Mr. Helms. By the FBI?

MI. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. Begging your pardon, what was the question?

Mr. Goldsmith. The question is, according to the record,

the first time the Warren Commission was told about this photo-

graph in mid-February of 1964, at that time, the person who

informed the Commission about the photograph was Marguerite

Oswald, not the Agency.

Mr. Helms. I have no idea why the Agency had not raised

the question of the photograph. The only supposition I can

make, not knowing who it was, they did not know what to do

about it, and they did not know its relevance or its signifi-

cance.

Mr. Preyer. Excuse me. We have another vote on.

The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

(A brief recess was

taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its

sitting.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you recall whether the

Warren Commission was dissatisfied with the explanation that

had been given to it concerning the photograph of the individual

in Mexico City that initially was linked to Oswald?

Helms

Mt. Breyer. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. That would be

a very difficult question for me to answer. I do not recall

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any official criticism. They may have said something to

members of the

staff, or a member of the staff may have said

something to a member of the Agency about it. I do not have

any personal recollection of it.

soprefer to)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me CIA document No. 2221, which appears

in Volume 3.

Mr. Helms. Volume 3, 2221?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

For the record, that is a memorandum prepared by william

Coleman on March 26, 1964.

Mr. Helms.

I am having trouble finding it. I am sorry.

I am moving as fast as I can here.

2221?

Mi. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I have it. Do you want me to read that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Please.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms.::

All right. I have read it now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Focusing your attention on the second to

last paragraph in CIA 2222, that seems to suggest, does it

not, that at least Mr. Coleman, who was the senior staff

counsel with the Warren Commission, was not satisfied with the

explanation that had been

1 given to him by the Agency concerne

ing that photograph?

Mr. Helms. That does seem to be what he is implying.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that refresh your memory as to whethet

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this photograph created any controversy between the Commission

and the Agency?

Mr. Helms.

I am sorry. It does not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any reason why the Commission

would not have been told about this photograph as early as

December when it was initially formed?

Mr. Helms. I do not have any idea why. It was

later

than that.

The photograph was brought to the Commission's

attention. I have no recollection of this whatsoever. My

recollection is confined almost entirely to the efforts made

at some point. I do not even know exactly what period this

was to try to find out who the man was.

Mr. Goläsmith. At this point, would you please refer to

CIA 2139.

MI. Craig.

Is that also Volume 3?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

MI. Helms.

I an zeroing in on it. I have got it, 2139.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is an internal note

dated 5 March 1964 from Raymond Rocca to Dick -- I assume that

is Richard Helms:

Mr. Helms.

You assume it is who?

Mr. Goldsmith. Richard Helms, yourself. If my assump-

tion is incorrect, please clarify the record.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms.

I have read it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. The reason I assumed the memo was

addressed to you was that someone wrote in in parentheses

DDI immediately above the name Dick.

Mr. Helms. I see that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever receiving this memo?

Mr. Helms.

No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the second

paragraph of the memo, does it make reference to the famous

six photographs that were not of Oswald?

Mr. Helms. It does. It says, for example, the famous

six photographs that were not of Oswald. I did not realize

there were six photographs.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I should indicate they

eventually located as many as twelve photographs of this

individual.

Drawing your attention to the second paragraph, why

was there a preference on the part of at least some of your

staff to wait out the Warren Commission with respect to,

among other things, these photographs?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I assume it has to do with

the way they were taken. Is that not a reasonable inference,

that it was a question about wanting to put on the public

record the fact that we were photographing people going in and

out of these embassies.

Mr. Goldsmith. The issue here is not putting anything in

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the public record. The issue is explaining what happened to

the Warren Commission.

Mr. Helms. I do not know if it was something else.

I do

not have any idea what it is any longer, but I assume you have

had an opportunity to speak to Mr. Rocca or. Mr. Angleton of

somebody. Maybe they have a better recollection than I. I

do not recall if I got this memorandum what I did about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. If this case involving the photograph

an example of a situation where the Agency's concern for

protecting sources and methods under the law prevented it from

giving the Warren Commission all of the information that the

Commission was asking for?

Mr. Helms.

It may be they were not getting it promptly

in the form in which they wanted it. It seems to me that the

entire thrust of this memorandum was that they were getting

the information, in any event, in some form or another, by

some means or other. •

MI. Goldsmith. The Oswald contact with the Soviet. Embassy,

turning to another issue not dealing with this document, that

contact was reported to Headquarters by cable, I believe the

cable recited earlier. Why would a cable be used to report

this contact as opposed to some other way of communicating

the information?

Mr. Heims.: I think that since this was an American, since

they thought it was an American who had gone to a Soviet

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Embassy, that they would report it by cable. That was a

reasonably routine way of doing it.

MI. Goldsmith.. Does that suggest that the contact at

the time you would considerato be important?

Mr. Helms.

It does not suggest to me anything like that.

The pouch usually. took a long time. They would have thought

since this was

an American they ought to report on it promptly.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with

the Soviet Embassy, was any importance attached to that

contact?

Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of. I would have thought

that the evidence would have indicated to the contrary.

The FBI apparently paid no attention to the report.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask you to refer

to CIA No. 179 that appears in Volume li for the record, that

is a cable dated 10-10-63 consisting of Headquarters' response

to the earlier Mexico City station cable.

I would ask you to read through CIA 179 to 181.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. I have read it.

MI. Goldsmith. This cable contains information reporting

that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union. Once this fact

had been realized did this in any way escalate the significance

of his contact with the Soviet Embassy?

Mx. Helms. This information? Yes. I would have thought

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it would have

escalated it quite considerably.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would some sort of response have been

expected on the part of the Mexico City station, had they

additional information on Oswald?

Mr. Helms.

Yes.

I would have thought that the Chief

of the Mexico City Station, having received this telegram,

if he did get additional information on Oswald he would desire

to pass it very quickly back to Headquarters.

MI. Goldsmith. For example, if the Mexico City Station

had information in its possession and that information had

already been processed to the effect that Oswald had also

cortacted the Cuban Embassy, should that have been communicated

to Headquarters?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought so. I do not know

whether it was or not, but I would have thought it should have

been.

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Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of this cable contains

a correct description of Oswald, ät least a description that

is more accurate than the one that is contained in the Mexico

City Station cable.

Upon receiving this description, did the Mexico City

station ever respond with respect to the discrepancy in the

two descriptions?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. This cable also refers to Oswald as Lee

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Henry Oswald. I believe earlier you made reference to the

fact that there had been some confusion over the middle name.

Do you know how the name Lee Henry Oswald got into the

Agency's records instead of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Helms.

•I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that ever a source of concern to you?

Mr. Helms.

I believe there was an effort to ascertain

what had caused the mistake, but I do not know whether any

satisfactory explanation was ever found.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether any report was

written reflecting that effort?

Mr. Helms. I would have assumed that someone would have

written up the work they had done in an effort to clear up

the discrepancy, but I do not recall the report, and I cannot

say from firsthand knowledge that one existed.

I would have assumed that form would have required the

writing of such a report.

Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to CIA No. 181, the lower left-

hand corner of the page, it indicates that Thomas Karamessinas

was the releasing officer of this cable.

Mr. Helms.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the

Agency as Mr. Karamessinas have been the releasing officer for

a cable like this?

Mr. Helms.

I do not think -- if I may suggest it, with

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due deference, that is not really the way I would have

described what was happening here.

You see, this cable originates in the Western Hemisphere

Division because, not only

through the western Hemisphere

Division, but it also goes to various elements of the CI staff.

Frequently in the procedures that we used in the Agency when

you had both staff and various parts of the staff and the

division and so forth, these frequently went to the so-called

front office for relief, either to Karamessinas or myself.

Since I notice in the cable here questions of policy as

to where this information was going to be disseminated and

things of that kind, I would have found this quite a normal

procedure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you, at this time, refer to CIA

No. 2140, Volume No. 3.

MI. Preyer. We have another vote on. It is final

passage on the defense bill. We will recess for ten minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

MI. Goldsmith.

Mr. Ambassador, would you refer to 2140?

Mr. Helms. Yes. Do you want me to read it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, Please.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is a 10-10-63

dissemination cable sent by Headquarters to various Federal

agencies.

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Mr. Helms.

Yes, I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mi. Ambassador, this cable in particular

has

sparked

some controversy because it also contains an

indirect description öf Oswald. The question I have for you

is why, especially in light of the earlier cable which you

just examined which contained a correct description, this

incorrect description went out in this particular cable.

mith

Mr. Helms. I do not have a clue, Mr. Goldstein.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that issue ever raised by the Warren

Commission?

Mr. Helms. I have no recollection any longer.

I assume

it must have been raised. I would assume this would have been

gone over and picked at and repicked at and every effort made

to find out what had happened and what had gone wrong. But

that is 15 years

ago and I do not have any recollection of the

chain of events.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was

the Warren Commission ever shown these

specific cables?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they

might have been shown this dissemination. I do not think

there would have been any reluctance to show them that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever

obtain a tape-recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Helms. I would have assumed when this telephone

call -- is that what you are referring to by tape recording?

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Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms.

Those telephone calls were taped.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings of

Oswald's voice the station managed to obtain?

Mr. Helms.

No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were these tape recordings in existence at

the time of the assassination?

Mr. Helms. I can only assume that they were. How

frequently they were cleaned up after they were transcribed, I

do not know. I do not know anything about those procedures

anymore, if I ever did.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the tapes were made

available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Whether they were made available?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms...

I do not.

Mx: Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings there

were?

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Mr. Helms.

Of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. No, I do not..

Mr. Goldsmith.

Would it have been unusual for the

Agency not to have had tape recordings in existence in Novemben

of '63, at the President's assassination?

Mr. Helms. I do not know how long they kept those tapes,

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whether they simply transcribed what was on them and cleaned

them up and used them again, or whether they held them. I do

not know what they did with them.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that the

Ambassador be given JFK Exhibit 128, and I would like to have

Exhibit 128 introduced in the record. It is a letter from

Mr. Hoover to MI. Reilly of the Secret Service dated November

23, 1963.

Mr. Chairman, I request that this item be admitted as

an Exhibit.

Mrs. Burke.

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so ordered, without objection.

(The document referred to was

marked JFK Exhibit No. 128 fOI

identification.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read starting on page

4 of the last paragraph on the page.

Mr. Helms. Yes; I have read that document or that

paragraph of the document.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Hoover is referring to a tape record-

ing that his agent listened to. Do you know which tape

recording he is referring to?

Mr. Helms.

I have no idea. I am sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was any issue ever raised in 1963 concern-

ing a tape recording that had been made available which purpor-

ted to contain Oswald's voice, which in the end did not?

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Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I cannot help you.

May I ask, not out of curiosity, but simply by way of

attempting to be helpful, is it possible that what Mr. Hoover

is referring to, that some FBI agent assigned to the Embassy,

the American Embassy in Mexico City, might have been who

listened to this tape recording?

The FBI had a large station in Mexico City. I just

thought that might be what he is referring to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether the question of the

existence of Oswald's tapes was important in 1963?

For example, I raised this with you because the question

has arisen as to whether the person who showed up at the

Embassies in Mexico City was not Oswald. If you had a tape

recording of his voice, that could obviously be tested to

corroborate whether that was Oswald.

Do you recall whether this was an issue in 1963?

Mr. Helms.

If it was, I do not know how it was handled..

I do not recall it as an issue.

As I say here today, I do not ever recall anybody ever

having said to me that it was not Lee Harvey Oswald who called

the

Embassy

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever

obtain a photograph of Oswald as a result of its photo surveil-

lance operation against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies anâ

consulates?

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Mr. Helms.. I do not know. My impression is that they

did not, but I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this time to refer to

CIA No. 248, which would appear in Volume No. 1.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Would you give me the number again?

Mr. Goldsmith. 248.

Mr. Helms. I have 248.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document.

(Pause)

For the record, this is a memo from Mr. Papich of the FBI

concerning the photo-coverage of the embassies dated 27

November 1963.

Mr. Helms.

Who is this memorandum signed by, or who did

it originally come from? Where did it

• originate, so I can tell

what I am reading?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to answer

-

your inquiry.

However, the Agency has made available to us at

this time just the first page of this memo so that the author

cannot be identified at this time.

Mr. Helms. Thank you.

I have read the page.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that according to this

memo the CIA and the Mexico City Station at least attempted to

keep the Cuban and Soviet embassies and consulates under constant

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surveillance, photographically?

Mr. Helms. That was certainly the object of the exercise.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the record -- by the record, I refer

to the Agency's record of Oswald's contacts with the embassies,

and also the Warren Commission's contacts with the embassies,

established that Oswald visited the Cuban and Russian embassies

and consulates at least five times, possibly more than six.

Would you regard it as unusual for the surveillance sta-

tion not to obtain a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Helms.

Yes, I thought it was unusual if he has

been there five or six times.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, there were, in the record, no

Wend

photographs of Oswald that was obtained.

Was the Mexico City Station ever questioned as to why

no photograph of Oswald had been obtained?

Mr. Helms. I do not know firsthand if they were questioned,

but I would assume they were questioned in spades. I would

-

assume everyone would want to know why.

MI. Goldsmith. Were you specifically involved?

Mr. Helms.

I do not remember any more.

MI. Goldsnith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym

AMMUR?

MI. Helms.

NO.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether in 1963 or '64 the

Agency obtained information concerning Oswald from a Cuban

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defector who defected from the DGI?

MI. Helms. I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollec-

tion, please refer to CIA 1879 that appears in Volume 2.

Mr. Helms. 1879?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

Incidentally, I have been informed that the memo you were

just referring to, CIA 248, appears to be a blind memo, just

one page in length.

Mr. Helms. I see. Thank you.

(Pause)

All right. I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before

going into this memo in further

detail, I would like to know whether you think it should be a

source of concern for this Committee specifically, the fact

that, according to the Agency's record, no photograph of

Oswald during his visit to Mexico City was ever taken or

obtained.

Mr. Helms. I think it would be useful if I were to say

that using photographic surveillance of those embassies in a

foreign country was a very tricky matter, not only as to rela-

tions between the countries, but tricky as far as the public

is concerned, and that expecting clandestine technical devices

of that kind to work perfectly is quite beyond the state of the

art, of was in the year 1963, and there is nothing the Congress

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can do to improve that kind of thing. Either the thing works

or it does not work. But there is very little point in trying

to

follow a line of inquiry that is critical of the way the

Agency conducted those operations, because they were done under

the most difficult circumstances;

not under laboratory

circumstances. Therefore, if they worked or did not work, it

was a

great deal of matter of luck, often, than good technical

work or good judgment.

Mr. Goldsmith.

That line of

inquiry is not directed

specifically at any criticism of the Agency. The mode of

analysis goes to

style.

Oswald makes five or six visits to the Embassy. We have

situation where the record suggests that there was an attempt

to have continuous photographic coverage. Even if the photo-

graphic coverage was not 100 percent effective, one would think

if he visited five or six times he would be picked up at

Least once.

From that, the next step would be, if there was a picture,.

why was it not made available? And that is specifically the

issue with which the Committee is concerned.

Mr. Helms..

I can understand the Committee's concern, and

I wish it luck solving the problem.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this particular document, 1879,

is your memory now refreshed about a Cuban defector offering

information to the Agency concerning Oswald, concerning the

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assassination in general?

Mr. Helms. My xerox is so poor here. Is this the one

you are referring to as AMMUD?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr.. Helms. I had forgotten about this defector report

or, if I knew about it, I imagine it was brought to my atten-

tion at the time, certainly, I do not recall anymore.

MI. Goldsmith. Turning to the middle of the page, the

part of the paragraph labelled as "Comment," would you tell the

Committee what the term WH/SA/CI?

MX. Helms. SA, I am not sure anymore what that would have

been. I do not know if that was Special Activities of just

what. I am sorry. Wait

a minute.

No, I cannot help you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether SA referred to the

Cuban Task Force?

Mr. Helms. If it referred to the Cuban Task Force, I

would have thought it would have been SAs. I thought that

what was normally referred to, the Special Activities Staff,

and it was therefore referred to, or would have been

referred

to, as WE/SAS/CI, if that is what it was.

Maybe this is correct.

I do not want to say you are not

correct.

Obviously, you know a great deal more about this these

days than I do.

I can only say I thought it was usually referred to as

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information concerning

the assassination AMMUD provided?

Mr. Helms.

NO.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information he provided

concerning Oswald's contacts with DGI?

MI. Helms. I do not. I just know what I have read on

the sheet.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of the sheet indicates

that Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy on two or three occai...

sions.

Then it says, before, during and after these visits,

Oswald was in contact with DGI, Cuban intelligence.

What follow-up, if any, do you recall being done with

this particular issue?

Mr. Helms.

I am sorry. I do not understand.

MI. Goldsmith. Having received this information, what

was done with it?

Mr. Helms.

I do not know. I do not know what could have

been done with it. So he was in touch with Cuban Intelligence.

What would we do about that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about it?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.. I would have thought they

would have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where

the Warren Commission maybe did not have knowledge of this

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incident, would not have specifically asked you about it.

So this would be an example of the CIA's initiating information

to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Helms.. It seems to me, having interrogated a defec-

tor and developed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and his

contacts with the Cubans, that the Agency would have volun-

teered this information to the Warren Commission if, indeed,

the Warren Commission was still sitting on 5 May 1964, which

I assume that it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, would you please read CIA

No. 1906, which is a memo dated 12 May 1964, directed to Mr.

Rocca from Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Helms. This is from Angleton to Rocca, right.

(Pause)

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. It says, "I raised with Mr. Helms the

nature of the recent information you are processing that

originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source!'

That

would be AMMUDi

"I informed him that this would raise a number of new

factors with the Commission," et cetera.

What new factors, if any, would the AMMUD case have

raised with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. In 1978, I haven't the foggiest

idea.

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MI. Goldsmith. Was there any reluctance on the part of

the Agency to disclose this information to the Harren Commis-

sion because of the sensitivity of the source?

Mr. Helms. Did you not just tell me he was a defector?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, he was a defector.

Mr. Helms.

And was a defector at this time?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I am not entirely sure why this great question

of sensitivity, unless he was a secret defector and the

Cubans did not know he had defected. That might make it

sensitive.

I cannot figure out what else would have been sensitive

about it. I simply take the word of Angleton who wrote the

menorandum that there was something sensitive about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever tasked

to pursue the leads generated by the source?

Mr. Helms. Ido not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. MI. Ambassador, are you familiar with the

case of the soviet defector Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I am.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did you play with

regard to the handling of this case?

Mr. Helms. I assume - and I have to use the word

assume, because my memory does not carry me this far. I assume

that I was, in one way or another, involved with the Nosenko

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case from the time that contact was made with him in Geneva

through his defection and then through the period after he

defected and was held by the Agency and I was probably in and

out of the case -- and by in and out, I simply mean that at

periodic intervals I would hear some aspects of the case, or

about the case -- until the time that he was eventually

resettled.

In other words, by "resettled," I simply mean he was led

out of the Agency's custody, found a place to live. I thought

he was

given a new identity and assumed a life in American

society in the public domain. But I was in and out of it all

the time. How many decisions I was involved in during this

period. I do not recall anymore.

I do not want to

duck any of them. It was an ongoing

case of great sensitivity, great legal complications, and that

is the best way I can answer your question.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it that, as DDP and then DCI, you

were involved in the decision-making process concerning Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read the three major agency

reports that were written in regard to the Nosenko case?

Specifically, there was a report in

1968 issued by the soviet

Russia Division; another report later in "68 called the soley

Report; another, a third report, in 1976 referred to as the

Hart Report.

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Have you had occasion to read any of those reports?

MI. Helms. It is a cinch I have not read the Fart Report

because I had left the Agency long before 1976. As to the

other two reports, I do not recall anymore whether I read them.

I cannot imagine that I would not have been told what was in

them.

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Mr. Goldsmith. During his defection in 1964 and at his

arrival in the United States, was he in the custody of the CIA?

Mr. Helms.

Yes.

The procedure was that Soviet defectors, of defectors

who were accepted by act of the Inter-Agency Defector Committee,

were handled by the Agency and the United States, and Nosenko

was no exception.

Mr. Goldsmith. By what legal authority do you recall was

Nosenko in CIA custody?

You made reference to normal procedure.

Mx. Helms. I do not know whether the NSC directive have

the power of law or not. I am not a lawyer.

I simply know that it was an agreed-upon device in the

United States government for handling defectors.

Mx. Goldsmith. How long did Mr. Nosenko remain in CIA

custody?

Mr. Helms. Two or three years,. I imagine.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the record would indicate that he was

in custody until October '69, at which point he was admitted

as a resident alien to the United States, would you dispute

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that in any way?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought - I see what you mean.

Excuse me.

I do not think I understood your question properly.

Let me go back.

I have no reason to question the fact that he was in CIA

custody until 1969. I was referring to the fact that he was

under interrogation for, I think, two or three years and then

he was in the Agency's custody under different surroundings

and under different circumstances I believe.

Mx. Goldsmith. Fine. We understand each other.

What unit within the CIA had the primary responsibility

for handling Nosenko in 1964?

Mr. Helms.

My recollection was that he was turned over

to the Director of Security as far as his handling and housing

and so forth was concerned; that his interrogation was handied

by people provided by the Soviet Russian Division, or whatever

the division was known as at that time.

The title of that division, Mr. Chairman, changed through

the years, and I am not sure what it was called in 1964.

Anyway, it was the division that was attempting to run opera-

tions against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying initially the responsibil-

ity for questioning Mr. Nosenko was given to personnel from

the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. Helms.

The interrogating responsibility, yes.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Did they continue to have responsibility

for him until he was released from CIA custody in 1969?

Custody in the sense that you referred to earlier?

Mr. Helms.

We switched terminology here. The Soviet

Russian fellow

were the interrogators.

The housekeepers,

administrators and handlers I believe, if I am not mistaken,

came from the Director of Security. I believe that they con-

tinued this on through during the time that he was in Agency

custody.

Am I wrong about that?

MI. Goldsmith. I am afraid I cannot respond to you at this

time concerning that. You are certainly correct in terms of

personnel who handled him with regard to interrogation.

Mr. Helms. All right. Let me just rest on what I have

is

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said.

Mr. Goldsmith.

So initially, the personnel that handled

the interrogations came from the SR Branch or Division. Did

they continue to have this responsibility until Mr. Nosenko

was released from custody in 1969?

Mr. Helms. I thought the interrogation period was sort

of over when he was turned over to Bruce saley. and selet

was the fellow who was supposed to take care of him and talk

to him and so forth..

My recollection may be wrong. It may be fuzzy. I thought

that there was a change there.

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At the time that he was released from the active or hostile

interrogation, an effort was being made to get him adjusted so

he could assume some kind of life in American society.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was responsibility for handling

Nosenko in terms of questioning him transferred from the SR

Belie

people to Bruce

Soley?

Mr. Helms. My recollection of the circumstances was

I had a problem as Director and it was a serious problem --

that was what to do with Mr. Nosenko. After all, we held him

against the laws of the United States for a period of two or

three years. Even though we had consulted with the Deputy

Attorney General as to what to do about the case we got no

particular help from him because there was no legal precedent

for these things.

In fact, as far as I know today, there has been no effort

made to set up a legal context in which a case like this could

be held.

I was not interested in continuing this any longer than

it was felt necessary to get as best we could to the botton of

the Nosenko case.

So after considering all the factors, the decision was

made to get him out of what I can only refer to as Durence

file and get him into different circumstances and make an

effort not only to resettle him, but find out whether pleasant

and cordial treatment he had any different things to say than

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he had under hostile interrogation.

I want to emphasize the point. I am not trying to anti-

cipate your questions, MI. Goldsmith; it just seems to run

right along

here -- that my motivation as Director of the

Agency was to get that man into a status where he could handle

it in some way that was

proper and legal and all of the rest

of it and

get him out of a status where we were obviously in

violation of the law in holding him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long a period MI. Nosenko

was held in custody or coffinement under violation of the law?

Mr. Helms. I think it was two or three years anyway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall which individual specifically

had primary responsibility for interrogating him in '64?

TO

refresh your memory in part, would David Murphy have been one

of those individuals?

Mr. Helms.

That sounds

good.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you recall anyone else besides MI.

Murphy?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I recall this name

from my recollections as to 1964. It seems to me that Bagley

waS

another fellow involved in the interrogation of Nosenko.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorty, Mr. Helms.

I do not compre-

hend fully your response.

Another individual may have been

involved in the interrogation?

Mr. Helms. An individual knowned as Tennant Bagley.

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Mr. Goldsmith. I understood that.

The record is clear

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on that.

My question now is was another individual who interroga-

ted Mr. Nosenko known as Thomas Ryan?

Mr. Helms. That name, I am sorry, does not ring any

bells with me.

Mr. Goldsmith.

What position did Mr.

Bagley hold with

the Agency?

Mr. Helms.

I think at that time he was

in the SR Division

somewhere.

Mr. Goldsmith.

How were these individuals selected for

handling, Mr. Nosenko?

Why, in particular, were these

individuals chosen?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that

the Chief of the SR Division would pick individuals who knew

the most about Soviet intelligence, Soviet intelligence

methodology, how things were done in the Soviet Union. In

other words, would have provided the most expert interrogators

we could have.

Mr. Goldsmith. How much expertise, if any, did the

individuals have to the Oswald case?

Mr. Helms.. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Nosenko was questioned about Oswald,

was any effort made to have the interrogator have sufficient

expertise concerning Oswald and the JEK assassination?

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Mr. Helms. I do not know. I cannot imagine he would

not have briefed himself on these things. In other words,

what would be the purpose on the part of the interrogation?

What we were trying to do was find out whether Nosenko was

telling the truth of not. This would have been an important

part of finding that out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you also think that the individuals

involved with the questioning of Nosenko were, in fact,

experienced interrogators?

Mr. Helms.

Well, I do not know what experienced interro-

gators are, really. In the American vernacular, a man who

has been doing anything for two weeks has become experienced,

so I do not know how you evaluate that term.

But people like Murphy and Bagley and so forth were

certainly experienced in Soviet Russian matters. Whether they

were

experienced interrogators or not, I do not remember.

The

word interrogator is something from World War II. If you were

an interrogator in a prisoner of war camp, you kind of got that

rubric hung around your neck and that gave you a certain status.

I have never quite understood why, but nevertheless it did.

Whether these fellows ever had that kind of interrogation

instruction or experience, I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Nosenko case was an important one,

was it not?

Mr. Helms. Very important.

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Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, would it be expected

that the people gustioning him would have had a lot of

experience?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought the agency would have

put the best people in it that they could find. Certainly that

was my intention.

Mr

Goldsmith. Who made decisions concerning which areas

of inquiry were going to be addressedto Nosenko?

Mr.

Helms. I think there was a

great deal of cooperation

done within the DDP trying to work out the interrogation of

Nosenko.. It was so important

to us and we had him for so long-

I am certain there there was a lot of consultation and effort

made to figure out ways to arrive at the truth here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the SR branch, which units would

have been involved?

Mr. Helms. I do not know who was involved. That is all

on the record. I think it is fine to ask me these things, but

fifteen years later I do not remember a whole list of names.

MI. Goldsmith. Part of the Committee's problem is that

the record is not all that clear and does contain errors.

Mr. Helms.

The record contains errors? How does the record

contain errors? I am not clear.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am talking in a general sense. Part of

(thet)

the problem that the Committee faces is the record, in fact,

does not speak for itself and that records do contain errors.

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Mr. Helms. I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. I make no comment one way of the other

whether the record contains errors in this particular case.

How frequently were you briefed concerning the results

of Nosenko's interrogation sessions?

Mr. Helms.:lI do not have any recollection whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do joucèver recall being briefed?

Mr. Helms.

Yes. I am sure I was asking from time to

time as to how we were finding out. After all, I felt I had

to go see Chief Justice Warren and tell him that we were not

able to establish Nosenko's bona fides.

I obviously satisfied

myself before I went that we were not able to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did questions concerning Oswald constitute

a major facet of the overall inquiry that was being made of

Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. Yes. No question about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In January, 1968 when the SR Division

Report concerning Nosenko was

issued, what was the Agency's

position concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I do not think the Agency has ever had a

position. The only position I know of that could be called an

Agency position was we did not know whether he is bona fide

or not. I never made a determination as to whether he was

bona fide or not. But I believe unless something has happened

that I never heard of, that it still must be an open question.

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• . .

Or, let us put it this way, a matter of opinion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not so that the SR Report of 1968

indicated that in fact Mr. Nosenko was not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember firsthand what the thrust

of the report was, but obviously this is a very difficult line

of inquiry for me because I read the magazines and newspapers

and books and so forth which have appeared since, and I do not

know what I have read there and what I knew from that time.

I just judge from reading the New York magazine, for

example, that this is still an open question. If the New

York magazine is a bad source,. I have nothing to add.

Mr. Goldsmith. In January, '68, when the --

Mr. Sawyer. If counsel would yield for just a moment,

may

I ask the Ambassador, this is kind of intriguing to me,

we having had a rather long session with Mr. Nosenko. Do you

have an opinion yourself. on that question?

Mr. Helms. No, sir, I do not, because a lot of time has

passed since I have been out of the Agency and. a lot of the

factors that went into this argument and debate, I have now

forgotten about.

I have been under constant appearances in Grand Juries,

Congressional Committees and various investigations on all

kinds of subjects, so my memory is even more wonky than it

would be under normal conditions.

I do not know about Mr. Nosenko. I do know that there

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are differing opinions, however, about him, but I do not have

any personal feeling myself about him.

I am

sorry, I cannot help you. I do not know.

MrS.

Burke. Since Mr. Sawyer has interjected a question

at this time, I have a couple of questions I would like to raise

at this point.

There were many defectors from the Soviet Union and Cuba

during that period of time.

What was the usual procedure for

the housing of those defectors and what was the procedure in

terms of their places of detention?

Mr. Helms. Usually, Mrs. Burke, when these men were

brought to the United States they are put in what is called a

safe house which was usually a relatively isolated residence

where we could control the environment around it, and they

were lodged there -- normally very comfortably and well-fed and

well-taken care of and interrogated. And the normal procedures

did not take terribly long, maybe a month of two or something

of this kind, and then they would be resettled, a new identity

would be given to them, or something would occur.

But the Nosenko case was so central to the whole problem

of trying to establish this

relationship of the Soviet Union

to the assassination of President Kennedy, and since we were

unable to resolve the case satisfactorily to ourselves, this

went on far longer than any other case I have ever remembered.

And I must say also, because I do not want to mislead you

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in any way, that whether of not the handling of defectors, the

way it was done in those days, was in compliance with all the

laws of the United States, I do not know. All I know was

inside the Executive Branch there was an Inter-Agency Committee

on which the FBI and the Army, Navy and State Department and

all these agencies sat, and they were the ones who decided what

was going to happen to these defectors.

I believe -- I am no lawyer, as I said, but I believe

that there is kind of a grey area in our laws as to exactly

what their rights are when they defect because they do sign

papers saying that they want asylum and all the sest of it, so

they do, in a sense, give up certain rights by making this

request.

Mrs. Burke. Were not some of the defectors tried in the

civilian courts?

Mr. Helms. I do not know any case of that.

Mrs. Burke. Not: Soviet defectors? It has to be in time

wof war?

Mr. Helms. I think that is right.

MIS. Burke.

May I inquire about how much longer does

counsel intend to

MI. Goldsmith. This might be an appropriate time for the

luncheon break.

Mrs. Burke. All right.

Mr. - Preyer had to leave.

If there is no objection, his

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suggestion was that we recess until 1:30.

Mr. Helms.

I am at the Committee's disposal. I will be

back anytime you tell me.

Mrs. Burke. Is that convenient for everybody else?

Is there any particular reason why 1:30 would be inconvenient

for you?

Mr. Helms.

Not for me.

Mrs. Burke. If there is no objection, then the Committee

will stand in recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to

reconvene at 1:30 p.m. this same day.)

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Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

Mr. Goldsmith is recognized.

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS - Resumed

MI. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, the Committee will proceed

at this point and i take it, based upon our discussion a few

moments ago, you are willing to proceed this afternoon without

a quorun?

Mr. Helms. Certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

When we broke for lunch, you were into the area of Nosenko

and specifically I want to ask you whether or not in January

of '68

when the SR Division Report concerning Nosenko was

issued, I asked you what the Agency's position regarding

Nosenko's bona fides was.

I believe that your answer was that the Agency, in fact,

had no position. Is that correct?

Mr. Helms. That is correct, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not

recall there having been any necessity at that time for havingi

to establish an agency position.

As the Director, my pre-occupation, as I mentioned earlier

was

to attempt to regularize Nosenko in such a fashion that

he could assume some kind of a life on the American scene.

And I was most anxious, particularly, to change his method of

living which, for a protracted period, as I said this morning,

he was being held without the blessing of a court and I was

entrusted to get him regularized in such a fashion that we

could, in effect, over time, get rid of our responsibility for

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housing him, feeding him and handling him.

In other words, what was known in the intelligence

community as getting him ready to be resettled.

Mr. Goldsmith. The SR Division Report, which initially

was issued, was approximately 900 pages in length. That report

did make a statement regarding Nosenko's bona fides, did it

not?

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Mx. Helms. I do not know if that were the 900 page

report. I do recall that I did not read all of that. I was

just told what the general thrust of it was.

I believe that there was a disagreement between the SR

Division and the CI Staff over Nosenko's bona fides. It did

not seem to me at the time that it was essential that that

had to be 100 percent composed.

My problem was, as

I say, was to get him resettled.

I believe there was a disagreement. I would not be

surprised -I do not know for a fact, but I would not be

surprised -- if that disagreement exists to this day.

Mr. Goldsmith. At that time, the CI staff had not issued

any type of a formal report?

Mr. Helms. No, but they had mouths, and they could tell

the Director what they thought about the case.

MI. Goldsmith. In January of '68 --

Mr. Helms. I am not even sure - excuse me for just a

second -- as to exactly at that time, in 1968, because I do not

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want to mislead the Committee or you, I do not know whether

SR and CI saw this eye to eye and the Security Division felt

differently, or just who took excactly what position.

I am is:

not that clear in my mind anymore.

I just know that there were disagreements inside the

Agency itself.

Mx. Goldsmith. What was the Agency's position in January

1968 with regard to the veracity of the information Nosenko had

provided concerning Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I believe that really this was a matter that

was at fundamental issue because if the information that

Nosenko had provided about Oswald was true, then it led to a

certain conclusion about Oswald and his relationship to the

Soviet authorities.

If it was incorrect, if he was feeding this to the United

States government under instructions from the Soviet service,

then it would have led one to an entirely different conclusion

about Oswald's role and the Soviet identification with it.

It rather strikes me that, as far as I know, to this đay

it has never been satisfattorily resolved. What did Lee Harvey

Oswald represent as far as the Russians were concerned? I

promise you that I do not know.

Mi. Goldsmith. In your view of the analysis, then, is

the veracity of what Nosenko told the Agency about Oswald a

critical factor in evaluating his overall credibility, his

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overall bona fides?

Mr. Helms. It is not only that, Mr. Goldsmith, but the

fact remains that the issue of why Oswald assassinated.

President Kennedy has not been resolved for the satisfaction

of a lot of citizens of this country. I assume that that is

one of the reasons that you are having these hearings.

If ore could accept at face value what exactly Nosenko has

said, it would lead you to one interpretation. If you cannot

accept it, it may lead you to another interpretation. I do

not know how you are going to compose the difference.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

My question, though,

is, from the Agency's perspective, was the information that

Nosenko provided concerning Oswald a major factor in determining

the larger issue in determining the larger issue of whether

Nosenko was a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. It obviously played a role in it.

Mr. Goldsmith. A major role?

Mr. Helms. I do not know whether you could say it was a

major role or not, but it was certainly an important role, let'

put it that way.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might state at this point in the

record earlier you had asked me whether I knew how Nosenko was

handled in terms of the distribution between the Office of

Security and the SR Division.: I wanted to clarify that.

In fact, according to the Committee's sources, MI. Nosenko

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was handled by the SR Division at the time they had the

responsibility of questioning him and dealing with him on an

everyday level. The Security Office personnel were in charge

of overseeing him essentially watching for Security and making

sure he did not go where he was supposed to

.90.

Congressman Sawyer asked you this morning about whether

you have any opinion about the bona fides of Nosenko. Are

you able to give any more specific response to the Committee

at this time concerning that issue?

MI. Helms.

No, I am sorry, Mr. Goldsmith, I am not.

I realize that this is a terribly important question and,

recognizing its importance, I am not attempting to duck or to

show a lack of forthrightness. I just do not know the answer

to the question.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have no opinion on it?

MI. Helms.

No, I do not have an opinion.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the SR Division issued its report -

in 1968, was the Nesenko case

reinvestigated by Bruce Soley?

Sole

MI. Helms. My recollection was that Bruce Soley, whether

he did an investigation or whether he engaged in long dialogues

with Nosenko or just what, but I believe, at some point, satie?

came up with his opinions about Nosenko.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not also true that late in 1967

Soley

was actually given responsibility for handling Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember the date unfortunately.

YOU

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will have to tell me what those dates were. All I know is

that there was a transition between the time that he was being

held in one situation.

Soley entered the picture. He was put

into different housing arrangements and so forth. I do not

know the exact date of that change.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will put aside for the moment

the question of the date, but at one point sally took over

the everyday handling of Nosenko - soley was in and the Sr

people were out. Is that correct?

Mr. Helms. I think by that time the SR people had had

their opportunities to talk to Nosenko. This had been going

on for months.

I believe as that time that sorey a the job was given

to Soley to handle this man, and to try to find some means of

resettling him.

Mr. Goldsmith. The SR people did not have any further

responsibility?

Mr. Helms. I think they had access if they wanted to, but

I do not think there was any responsibility they had.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know whether soley had any particu

lar expertise in regards to the Oswald case?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Soley considered to be an expert in

interrogations?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not think he was. I think that he was

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a

good security officer. He was interested in the case.

He

had become acquainted with it when the Office of Security was

responsible for it, and I think that he was chosen because. he.

was game to try to work with this man.

in Goldsmith. Do whom, is anyone, was soles directly

responsible auring this period?

Mr. Helms. I think he was responsible to the Director

of security and, in turn, the Director of security would have

been responsible to me...

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, again, the 1968

investigation conducted by soley, whether Nosenko was

questioned about Oswald?

Mr. Helms.

I do not specifically, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable in 1968

if soley had been unable to resolve the question of Nosenko's

bona fides?

Let me rephrase that.. If he had been unable to come

forward with a viewpoint concerning Nosenko's bona fides.

Mr. Helms.

What was your question?

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable to the

solie

Agency if Soley

had been unable to come forward with a

position one way or the other concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I do not think by that

time there was any

feeling that there was going to be suddenly a ray of truth

come through and we were going to be able to resolve the case

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of Nosenko. The problem in those days was

to deal with this

soli

man.

The effort was to accomplish that, and Soley was given

that job.

Whatever Soley had come up with, if he were reasonably

successful in keeping the fellow contented, getting him squared

away, getting his English straightned out and all the rest of

these things, I would have thought he was doing a good job.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of what appeared to be the

enormous consequences of the situation where Nosenko, in fact,

were not a bona fide defector, the consequences of that as

far as the American intelligence community was concerned, it

would appear, were quite great.

MI. Helms. For the intelligence community, it would have

had no consequence, for the intelligence community. It would

have had consequences for the country.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will take it step by step.

Certainly the American intelligence community would have been.

concerned. The entire issue of Nosenko's being a planted

defector, possibly, planted for the purpose of protecting other

Soviet agendles working within the American intelligence

community.

Mr. Helms.

That is what I was trying to warn the Warren

Commission against, that possibility, that contingency, and

the implications of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the consequence of such a

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contingency, it would appear that the Agency would very much

want to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona fides and would

not be satisfied with the situation where you are in limbo.

Mr.

Helms. MI. Goldsmith, may I ask you a question?

How would you suggest that that be done?

Mr. Goldsmith. My question is, is it not true that the

Agency would feel compelled to try to resolve that issue?

Mr. Helms.

We did the best we could.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. By 1968, you are saying the Agency

did not have a position one way or the other.

Mc. Helms.

That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about at the conclusion of Soley's

work when he issued his report? At that time, did the Agency

have a position with regard to Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I do not believe so. At least during my time

there, I do not recall us ever taking a position as an Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Has the Agency ever taken a formal posi-

tion regarding the truthfulness of Nosenko's story on Oswald's

contacts or lack of contacts with the KGB?

Mr. Helms.

That is the heart of the issue. That is why

I believe on that particular question, the question has never

been resolved, never been satisfactorily answered.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this. If it were clearly

proven that Nosenko's statements concerning Oswald were untrue

what significance could you attach to such a finding in so far

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as the broader question of his overall bona fides is concerned?

Mr. Helms. I think that, if it were established beyond

any doubt that he had been lying and, by implication therefore,

Oswald was an agent of the KGB, I would have thought that the

implications of

that -— not for the CIA or for the FBI, but

for the president of the United States and the Congress of the

United States would have been cataclysmic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you be more specific?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I can be specific. In other words,

the Soviet government ordered President Kennedy assassinated.

i$.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does it necessarily follow that

Nosenko

was lying about Oswald, and that Oswald was, in fact, an agent

of the KGB?

MI. Helms.

It does not necessarily follow. We can do

all kinds of syllogisms here.

The issue before the House is, was he or was he not an

employee of the KGB? It is on that that this whole thing tends

to turn.

Mx. Goldsmith. The initial issue here is the truthfulness

of Nosenko's

statements about Oswald and essentially those

that the

statements are KGB had no contact with Oswald.

If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's statement on

Oswald were untrue -- proven in the sense that it could not be

believed that Oswald did not have contacts with the KGB, but

not proven in the sense that Oswald was, in fact, a KGB agent,

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if just the basic Nosenko story were fundamentally disproved,

without our taking the next step and saying that Oswald is

KGB agent, what significance would that have on the overall

assessment of Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. Well, if the man had been demonstrated to have

lied, it would have had a good deal of an effect on the estab-

lishment of his bona fides, I would think. . What was his

motive for lying? Why did he lie?

MI. Goldsmith. Would you take the analysis so far as to

say if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, if it were clearly

proven that he were lying about Oswald, that in fact he was

not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. That is one of the problems exactly; you put

it very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is your answer to my question yes?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Preyer. If I may

ask one question on that score, of

key concern, of course, to the intelligence agency, was the

broad question of whether Nosenio was a bona fide defector or

a disinformation agent.

Is it not conceivable that he might have been a bona fide

agent and been basically telling

the truth about that, and this

other information concerning other security matters would be

accurate? Then, on Oswald, maybe to ingratiate himself, perhaps,

or to convince the intelligence agencies that he was more

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important than he really was, trying to put a little extra

spin on the ball, that he perhaps overspoke himself on Oswald,

maybe lied on that.

That would still not necessarily determine whether he was

bona fides or not?

Mr. Helms. I think that any of these explanations or

possible or conceivable or may even be the accurate one.

But

let us not overlook, Mr. Chairman, the fact that if I were

down here trying to defend that thesis in front of you, I

think I would have a pretty rough time.

Mr. Preyer. Yes. I think you put it very well. Why

would you lie?

As you have made very clear, this might be a question on

his bona fides that we do not know how to resolve right now

and may never resolve unless there is a flash of truth from

some area.

mith

Excuse me, Mr. Goldsten.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question that arises, Mr. Ambassador,

in light of your statement that the Agency did not have a

position regarding Nosenko's bona fides in 1968 is why, in light

of the absence of any position one way or another, the Agency

never the less paid MI. Nosenko approximately $80, 000 after

taxes in 1968 and then put him on its payroll as a consultant.

Mr. Helms. These

figures are yours, sir. I do not

recall any business about his being put on the Agency payroll

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as a consultant. I thought that any monies that were paid to

him were in an effort to sweeten him up a little bit and get

him prepared to be resettled. I do not recall anybody's ever

telling me that he had been hired as a consultant to the

Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. If, in fact, it were established by the

record that Mr. Nosenko was made a consultant and is, in fact,

consultant today, would that indicate that the Agency has

apparently resolve the issue of his bona fides?

Mr. Helms.

I do not know, sir. I did not know that he

was considered a consultant at the time that I was Director.

I do not recall ever signing off on any piece of paper that

made him a consultant.

Mr. Goldsmith. In order to have made Mr. Nosenko a

consultant, would you have had to sign off?

Mr. Helms.

Not necessarily. I think I would have been

informed that this fellow is now considered to be a consultant

to the Agency and we are sending people down to talk to him.

I never agreed to any such thing.

I do not care what the record shows.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know to what extent, if ary,

Nosenko's story concerning Oswald changed in 1968 from the

one he had given previously when he was first confined?

Mr. Helms. No. I do not remember those details at alla

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether an independent

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investigation ever confirmed any aspect of Nosenko's story

about Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I do not know that, either.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko was given

polygraph tests in 1964, 1966 and 1968?

Mr. Helms. That does not surprise me.

I would have

thought he should have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Mr. Nosenko have been given

three tests?

Mr. Helms.

To find out if he was

telling the truth.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware

that Mr. Nosenko failed

the first two tests and passed the third?

Mr. Helms. I did not remember those figures, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Nosenko was given the

final polygraph test, the one that he passed, approximately

one month prior to the issuance of the 1968 report issued

by Mr. Soley which concluded that he was a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. Maybe that was a part of what soley was going

on when he made that determination, the way he came through on

the polygraph test.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is also possible, however, that Mr.

Soley had completed his report, realized that Nosenko had

failed two polygraphs and decided that, prior to the issuance

of his report, another polygraph test would be administered.

Mr. Helms. I think that he would have, in those days, been

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in a position to make those judgments or decisions. He was

conducting an examination of this case.

I would have thought that he would have liked to have had

another polygraph test to see if it would, in any way, support

the findings that he was maybe establishing in his own mind.

Anyway, my recollection of those days is soley believed in

Nosenko.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Nosenko was asked numerous

questions about Oswald or the second test, the test that he

failed, and was asked only two questions about Oswald on the

final polygraph test?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not know.

MI. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another

vote on. We can recess for ten minutes. I will get back just

as fast as I can.

The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

MX. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, prior to taking this last

recess again, we were discussing, in general, the question

whether the Agency had

a position concerning Nosenko's bona

fides. Perhaps you or I are defining the concept of position

very narrowly. By "position, "

I do not necessarily mean that

the Agency had, in writing, a specific position regarding,

specific posture regarding, Nosenko. By "position," I am saying

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was there a prevailing opinion one way or the other in the

Agency concerning Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. Helms.

I am sorry. I do not know the answer to that

question.

When you say a prevailing opinion, I see what you

are trying to get at.

Obviously, I do not know what opinion

prevailed.

Some people hued: to one line, some to the other. It

was my impression that he hued to it with equal fervor.

Ana I do not know that this question has ever been satisfactor-

ily resolved. As I say, I have been away from the AGency for

five years and maybe some other things have happened in the

interim. But at least as of the time I left, I do not think

that the issue had ever been resolved between these conflicting

forces.

May I say when I indicate that these views are strongly

held, I mean it. It is like Catholics and Protestants; they

simply are not to be swayed.

I think, in order to answer your question properlyi I

would have to say, since there was a division, it was not

possible to get a prevailing view, as such. Some people might

have said, well, I think this and I think that, without having

read the 900-page report, without having been thoroughly

conversant with the details. In other words there were not

many other people in a position to have a calculated, informed

opinion.

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Are you saying there was no prevailing

opinion?

Mr. Helms. I do not think so. I do not know what the

prevailing opinion would have been.

MI. Goldsmith. At the time that the responsibility for

handling Nosenko was initially given to the SR Branch or SR

Division, did the SR Division enter into the situation as

to a neutral party, or did the SR division pretty much think

from the very beginning that Nosenko was not a bona fide

defector?

MI. Helms. I would have thought, at the beginning,

everybody would have

entered into this with some objectivity

in an effort to establish the truth. As events unwound,

I think that this became clear to everyone involved that this

was a terribly important case.

Mr. Goldsmith.

How early in this process did the SR

Division form its opinion that Nosenko was not a bona fide

defector?

Mr. Helms:

I am sorry. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Soley began his investigation,

did he enter the situation as a neutral, outside party, or

someone who represented one of the factions within the Agency

concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms.

I really do not know the correct answer to

that. It was my impression - and I can only give it as my

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impression -- that he had agreed to take on this case, and

I thought he came to it without any particular prejudice one

way of the other, and that he was going to attempt to form his

own opinion.

If other testimony on the record does not confirm that,

I do not insist on what I say. I simoly give you my impression

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, you made reference to Mr. Soley

having a positive viewpoint on Nosenko.

Mr. Helms. I think he developed a positive viewpoint.

It was my impression.

I do not know how

early he had it. I think he had a

positive viewpoing.

Mr. Goldsmith. How was Mr. Soley chosen for this parti-

cular assignment?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember anymore what details went

into this. It seemed to me Howard Osborne, Director of

Security, recommended that he be given charge of this case and

to take it over because we were trying to find a way to

resolve it, to resettle this man, and we were looking for a

way to do this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the President ever ask you whether

this issue had been resolved?

Mr. Helms. Who?

Mr. Goldsmith.. The President.

Mr. Helms. Which President?

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Mr. Goldsmith. President Johnson.

ME. Helms.

Let-me answer it, no President ever asked me.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency, did the Agency ever receive

any pressure from above to resolve this issue?

Mc. Helms. Not that I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Warren Commission told about

Mr. Nosenko?

Mx. Helms. Well, I do not know all the things that the

Commission was told about Mr. Nosenko.. I know that the FBI

told them certain things. I believe the Agency told them

things. I know that I, personally, met with Chief Justice

Warren privately in one of the conference rooms over in the

building where they had their Headquarters. I do not remember

the date of this meeting with him, but I know I cleared it

with Director McCone before I went down there.

I believe that it was not terribly long before the

Warren Commission was going to conclude its hearings because

my point that I felt had to be made to the warren Cormission

was that we had not been able to establish, to our satisfac-

tion, the bona fides of Nosenko and that the Warren Commission

must take this into consideration in compiling their report.

And the means chosen of my going to see Chief Justice

Warren seemed to be the proper way to do it under the circum-

stances so that he could make a determination as to whether

he wanted the matter handled differently or whether that was

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satisfactory to him, or what the case was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told anything

about the substance of Nosenko's story about Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what details

wound up in the hands of the Warren Commission about Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. What other information, besides this issue

of the bona fides, did you convey?

Mr. Helms. That is what I personally talked to the Chief

Justice about.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you met with Chief Justice Warren,

for purposes of clarification now, did you tell him that the

Agency had been unable to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona

fides, or did you tell him that the Agency did not think that

Nosenko was bona fide?

Mr. Helms. I told him we were not able to resolve this,

my point being that, since we had not been able to resolve

it, that they should keep in mind the contingency that maybe

the statements that he had made about Oswald's having no

identification with the KGB were not accurate. Therefore,

they

could not lean on them in the report and therefore they had

to

face the implication that, if he was not bona fide and

come for the purpose of covering up the tracks of Soviet intel-

ligence, that this had implications which should be weighed

in the scales.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you met with the Chief

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Justice, I take it, in some way, you must have been apprised

of the basic Nosenko story concerning Oswald?.

Mr. Helms. I believe that the basic Nosenko story con-

cerning Oswald was given to the Warren Commission very early

in its deliberations by the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Chief Justice Warren's response

to your analysis?

Mr. Helms. Well, he was obviously -- he was not pleased

to hear it, and by that I do not mean that he expostulated,

of anything of that kind, but he was not pleased to hear it

in terms of the difficulties that it made in completing their

report, but that he was perfectly fair and reasonable about

it and accepted what I had to say and said he would report

it to the Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Chief Justice Warren or any Warren

Commission member or staffer ever request to interview Mr.

Nosenko?

Mr. Helms.

Not that I am aware of.

Mx. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission informed in

April, 1964, that Nosenko was being placed into solitary

confinement?

Mr. Helms. The Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

MR. Helms.

I do not know what the Warren Commission knew

about the circumstances under which Nosenko was being ::

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interrogated. I did not say anything to them about it.

Whether anybody else did, I do not know. But the CIA had

custody of Nosenko; they certainly were aware of that.

This was part of my statement to the Chief justice. I

could not tell him that I could not resolve the bona fides

without explaining to him that this our responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than yourself, were any of the

other individuals responsible for handling Nosenko in contact

with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I do not know, but I would not have thought

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Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission had been informed

by the Agency that Nosenko have been placed into solitary

confinement, I take it that you would have been the person

who would have so informed them.

Mr. Felms. Mr. McCone might have informed them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Or Mr. McCone.

Whose decision was it to place Nosenko in solitary

confinement?

Mr. Helms. I think this was a decision taken by various

people. We had to find a place to interrogate him. We had

to try and resolve the case, if we possibly could. We spent

months trying to do this.: And putting him into solitary

circumstances was just part of the effort to see if we could

get at the truth.

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Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals were involved in that

decision-making process?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember who all was involved anymore

I

certainly was involved in it, but there were others who were

involved. I do not know the extent to which Me. McCone was

involved. I do not recall anymore.

Mr. Goldsmith. What input, specifically, did you have

at that time?

Mr. Helms. By input, I assume you mean what influence

did I have on the decision?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms.

I certainly agreed to the fact that this should

be tried.

This would have been proposed to me; not something

that I would have proposed, because at this time someone would

have had to have made up their mind that the method of inter-

rogation that they were using was not

getting anyplace.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please describe, to the best of your

knowledge, the conditions under which Nosenko was placed when

he was put in solitary confinement.

Mr. Helms.

He was put into a small house in the country-

side where he had a perfectly sanitary and satisfactory

living condition. They were just not particularly spacious

or padded, let us say. His bed was perfectly adequate, his

chair was perfectly adequate, the lighting was perfectly

adequate, but it was not particularly comfortable in the

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normal, American sense of the terms.

You will recall that this question of what to do about

him was taken up with the Deputy Attorney General at the time,

Nicholas Katzenbach, at a long meeting as to how we were going:

to continue

to handle this case, and the problem before the

house was clear to everyone but nobody was able to come up

with a very satisfactory solution except that we just had to

go ahead and do what we were doing and see if we could even-

tually come up with a satisfactory resolution, and that satis-

factory resolution never emerged.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the CIA ever able to establish that

it had legal authority for placing Nosenko in solitary confine-

ment?

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Mr. Helms. I do not know how you answer that question.

As you know, I am not a lawyer. I would say that he was there

without the blessing of a court. I would have thought that

having held him that length of time that it would have been

preferable if we did have a court order to hang on to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. YOu indicate that you consulted with MI.

Katzenbach?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other government officials

consulted prior to taking this action?

MI. Katzenbach. There were other people sitting in the

room with Mr. Katzenbach from the Department of Justice. I do

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not think this was brought up with the State Department.

The Inter-Agency Defector Committee was aware of what was

going on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was anyone senior to MI. Katzenbach in the

government apprised of this action?

Mx. Helms. I assume that he told the Attorney General.

I do not know. We went to see him in the absence of the

Attorney General; I think he was Acting Attorney General at

the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like

to have offered as an exhibit a notarized statement given by

Mr. Nosenko to this Committee on August 7, 1978.

MI. Preyer. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to

was marked JFK Exhibit No.

129 for identification.)

MI. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am going to read Mr.

Nosenko's statement to you for the purpose of asking you

whether you agree with his characterization of the conditions

under which he was held in solitary confinement. This is a

statement by Mr. Nosenko given to the Committee August 7,

1978.

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"In accordance with the request of the staff of the

Committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I make

the following statement describing the condition of my

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imprisonment from April of 1964 until the end of 1967.

"On April 4, 1964 I was taken for a physical check-up and

test on a lie detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had

given me a physical check-up and after that I was taken into

another room for the test on a lie detector. After finishing

the test, an officer of the CIA, John, has come in the room and

talked with the technician.

"John started to shout that I was a phony. and immediately

several guards entered into the room. The

guards ordered me

to

stand by the wall, to undress and check me. After that, I

was

taken upstairs in an attic room.

The room had a

a metal

bed attached to the floor in the center of this room.

"Nobody told me anything, how long I would be there or

what would happen to me.

"After several days, two officers of CIA, John and Frank,

started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and in the

evening hours was writing forth on whatever I could recollect

about the KGB.

These officers were interrogating me about

a month or two months. The tone of interrogations was hostile.

Then they stopped to come and see me until the end of 1964.

"I was kept in this room üntil the end of 1964 and the

beginning of '65. The conditions were very poor and difficult.

I could have a shower once a week and once in a week I could

shave.

I was not

given a toothbrush and toothpaste and food

given to me was very poor. I did not have enough to eat and

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was hungry all the time. I had not contact with anybody to

talk: I could not reaa. I could not smoke. I even could not

have fresh air or to see anything from this room.

The only

window was screened and boarded. The only door in the room had

metal screen,

and outside in the corridor two guards were

watching me day and night.

"The only furniture in the room was a single bed and

lightbulb. The room was very, very hot in the summertime.

"At the end of 1964, there were started again interroga-

tions by several different officers. The first day, they kept

me under 24 hours interrogation. All interrogations were done

in a hostile manner.

"AT the end of those interrogations, when I was told it

was the last one and asked what I wanted to be relayed to

higher ups, I said I was

a true defector and being under

arrest about 386 days, I wanted to be put on trial, if I was

found guilty, or released.

"I also asked how long I would continue. I was told that

I would be there 3,860 days and even more.

"This evening I was taken by guards, blindfolded and

handcuffed in a car and delivered to an airport and put into

a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into

a concrete room with bars on the door. In the room was a

single steel bed with a mattress. No pillow, no sheet, no

blanket. During winter it was very cold, and I asked them to

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give me a blanket, which I received after some time.

"Except for one day of interrogation, and one day for a

test on a lie detector, I have not seen anyone besides guards

and a doctor. Guards were not allowed to talk to me.

"After my constant complaint that I needed fresh air at

the end of 1966, I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes

exercise to a small area attached to the cell. The area was

surrounded by a chain-link fence and a fence I could not see

through. The only thing I could see was the sky.

"Being in the cell, I was watched day and night through

the TV camera. Trying to pass the time, a couple of times,

I was making for friends a chess set and every time, when I

finished those sets, immediately guards would enter into my

cell and taking them from me. I was desperately

wanting to

read and once, when I was given toothpaste, I found in the

toothpaste box a piece of paper with a description of compound

of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it under my bianket,

but guards noticed it and again it was taken from me.

"Conditions in both first and second locations were

analogical. I was there until November of 1967. Then I

again was transferred, blindfolded and handcuffed, to another

location. In this new place, I had a

room with much better

condtiions and Mr. Bruce Soley, CIA officer, started to question

me every day, excluding sundays, touching all questions

concerning my biography, career in the KGB, and all cases of

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the KGB known to me.

"I was in prison for the whole five years, and I started

my life in the USA in April of 1969."

Mr. Helms.

an.

There was a word you used there,

"analogical."

What is that? What does that mean.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am only reading to you what the text

says. I am afraid I cannot give you a clar defintion of that

term as it is used here.

Mr. Craig. Could you reread the sentence that that term

appears in?

Mr. Goldsmith. "Conditions in both (first and second

locations) were analogical."

If you would like to examine

the statement --

Mr. Helms.

No.

I just do not understand what he meant

by analogical.

Mr. Golâsmith. Would you agree with Mr. Nosenko's

characterization of the conditions in which he was placed or

held in solitary confinement?

Mr. Helms. I have no means for agreeing or disagreeing.

I did not visit him during the time that he was being held.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the statement consistent with reports

that you received concerning Mr. Nosenko's treatment?

Mr. Helms. I would think so, yes. I remember that

I had two matters of particular interest in connection of this

whole business. One that he should not be physically molested.

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I wanted to be absolutely certain that that was clear to

everybody, and I believe that was complied with throughout.

Secondly, I did not want any drugs or any medicines or

any tricks of that kind used on him.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question. Was Nosenko

ever

given any drugs for the purpose of either harrassing him

psychologically or to compel him to tell the truth?

Mir. Helms. I believe not. I believe that, at one time,

I was asked whether this could be done and so forth, and I

forbade it.

MI. Preyer: MI. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another

vote. I think this may be the last one for some time.

The Committee will stand in recess.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume.

Mr. Goldsmith?

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

MI. Ambassador, I believe earlier you testified the

Agency did not establish or have any position one way of

another regarding Mr. Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. " Despite these efforts we have made.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was precisely the point I was about

to make, or the impression I was going to raise to you. It

would seem then that the Agency, without having any position

one way or the other, went to the trouble to keep Mi. Nosenko

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under the conditions that he just describea.

MI. Helms. We did our very best to resolve this problem

and we certainly would not have taken these steps of putting

him, if you recall, in Spartan circumstances, if we had not

thought there was a possiblity it might get us to a goal that

we were trying to reach. I do not think that we were trying

to reach.

I do not think that we ever under-estimated the impor-

tance of this case, and we did everything we could do to try.

to resolve that, including later on giving him sweet, nice

treatment with money and pleasant living circumstances and all

of the rest-of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does not the fact that Mr. Nosenko was

kept under these conditions reflect that the Agency, in fact,

did have a position regarding his bona fides, and at least

until such time that he was released from these conditions,

the Agency felt that he was not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. I think the Agency was trying to establish

whether or not he was a bona fide defector and it was

decided

to use these means of interrogation. The supposition has to

be that the matter had not been resolved by other interroga-

tion means and this was going to be trying an effort, to see

if this would help.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that, for the three years Mr. Nosenko

was kept under these conditions, the Agency did not have a

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position regarding his bona fides?

Mr. Helms. They were trying to establish his bona fides.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer is, then, during those three

years, the Agency did not have a position regarding his bona

fides.

Mr. Helms.

There may have been differing views, depending

on whether this view obtained of that view obtained. Different

people may have altered their position, but the Agency did nota

have any position during this period. As I was saying, we were

trying to resolve the issue.

Mr. Goldsmith.. You

would say that this was a technique

in attempting to resolve the overall issue of bona fides?

Mr. Helms. That is exactly what I am saying.

Mr. Goldsmith. Later, when Mr. Nosenko was given -- and

I think the record would demonstrate that, of corroborate that

was given approximately $80,000 after taxes and was allowed

to work for the Agency on a contract basis or as a consultant

do those factors reflect on the part of the Agency the position

that, by this time, Nosenko was considered to be a bona fide

defector?

Mr. Helms.

I do not want to take any position or voice

any opinion about anything that happened in the Agency after

February, 1973 when

• I left.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, if the Committee is able

to demonstrate to you from the record that these actions

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concerning Nosenko were taken prior to your departure as

DCI, would you then be willing to respond to the question?

MI.

Helms.

No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even --

Mr. Helms. I did not know that he was a consultant at the

Agency or considered a consultant of the Agency. If, indeed

he was, I would like the word defined as to what that entails

and what that was supposed to signify.

Mr. Goldsmith. You did not know that Mr. Nosenko was

given approximately $80,000?

Mr. Helms. You said $8,000 and $80,000 on another. Which

is the correct figure?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry if I

gave you an incorrect

figure. It is $80,000.

Would the fact that he had been given $80,000 after taxes

suggest to you that the Agency did have a position regarding

his bona fides?

Ms. Helms. I think that we were trying to resettle him.

I think that we recognized that he had been

given a pretty

rough time, and I think that we were trying, through

.good

treatment and handling him properly and so forth, to not only

resettle him, but find out if these means would help resolve

the case.

If it has been resolved in the last five years, I am glad

to hear it. I know nothing about that.

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Mr. Goldsmith. How would giving him $80,000 and

resettling him further resolve the case? It would seem by that

point that the case has been resolved, to the best of the

Agency's capabilities.

Certainly after you have given him

$80,000 you are not providing him with any incentive to change

his story.

Mr. Helms.

What would you have done with him?

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to answer my questions.

Mr. Helms. I think this line as inquiry has been taken

as

far as I can take it.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are unable to comment, then, on the

significance --

MI. Helms. I am unable to comment. I am trying to say

we were trying to resettle him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, I asked you whether Nosenko

had ever been given any drugs for the purpose of harrassing

him psychologically or for the purpose of compelling him to

tell the truth.

Are you able to state categorically that he was not given

drugs for this purpose?

Mr. Helms.

I would never state anything in this life

categorically, including that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the best statement you can give

us on that?

MI. Helms.

The best statement I can give you on that is

40-1o

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that I believe on one occasion some people wanted to try and

use aids to interrogation in the form of drugs and I said I

wanted none of this done. I believe my wishes were carried

out. I have never heard anything to the contrary, but I cannot

swear to it.

Mr. Goldsmith.

When did this incident take place?

Mr. Helms.

I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the individuals involved?

Mr. Helms.

It seems to me that some of the interrogators

who were involved in talking to him wanted to try truth serums

ox something of that kind, sodium penathol or whatever those

drugs are which are considered to be aids to interrogation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. Bagley or Mr. Murphy? Were

they of the feeling that drugs should be administered?

Mr. Helms. I would assume it was

someone like that. I

am

not sure who brought the question to me anymore.. I do have

in the back of my head the fact that this did come up.

MI. Goldsmith. If the Agency did administer drugs to

Nosenko, would there have been a record of this fact?

Ms. Helms.

I certainly would have thought so.

Mr.. Goldsmith.

would you dispute testimony to this

Committee by Mr. Nosenko that he was drugged by the CIA and

then interrogated?

Mr. Helms.

He would have to demonstrate. that this was

the case.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Would any decision concerning the use

of drugs necessarily involve Dave Murphy at some point?

Mr. Helms.

It might have. You see, I do not remember

whether, all during this period, Murphy was in charge of the

SR Division or whether he was in charge for a time when someone

else took over. I do not have the agency -

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe for this entire period Mr.

Murphy was in charge of the SR Division.

Mr. Helms. He would have been involved in it. He is in

charge of these people in his division. He was obviously

attempting to counsel with them how it was to be conducted,

so I would have thought he would have been a party of any

inquiry at that time, or reference to me for permission at

that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my line of

inquiry with regard to this area. Do you have any questions?

I would defer to you.

MI. Preyer. I have no questions on that area, but before

you recess to

go on your deposition hearing, I have a couple

of questions in another area which I would like to ask.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Craig. Before leaving that area, I might inguire,

you mentioned, you asked a question whether Ambassador Helms

would dispute any evidence to the effect that Mr. Nosenko

was drugged. If such evidence does exist, you might be able

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to bring that to Mr. Helms' attention and he might be able to

comment on it.

Mr. Goldsmith.

As I said, the Committee has received

testimony by Mr. Nosenko in which he specifically stated that

he was drugged and then,

after being drugged, he was interro-

gated.

That is why this is an issue before the Committee at

this time.

Mr. Craig. Thank you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, turning to another area,

specifically back to Mexico City, dise the name Luisa Calderon

familiar to you?

Mr. Helms. I just read it in one of the documents you

gave me here this morning.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollec-

tion a bit further, I would ask you to look at CIA No. 1936,

which appears

• in Volume No. 2 and specifically on pages 1950

through 1954.

Mr. Helms.

You want me to go -- I have 1936.

Mr. Goldsmith. I want you to look at 1936, only so that

you would see the document that you are

going to be reading

from, but the relevant pages are 1950 thorugh 1954.

Mr. Helms.:

Just a second.

(Pause)

I see.

What is the date of this document, Mr. Goldsmith?

Was this back at the time of the Warren Commission?

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Mr. Goldsmith.: No.. This document is a 1975 document

prepared by Raymond Rocca in response to a 15

i April 1975

letter by David Belin: of the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Helms. I see. That is the same David Belin that

was on the Warren Commission and later ghost-wrote the book

for President Ford about the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know about the book on President

Ford, but it is the David Belin who was the Warren Commission

staffer.

Mr. Helms. That is the same one, then.

Mr. Goldsmith.

I would ask you specifically to read

through pages 150 through 1954.

MI. Helms.

1950 through 1954, all right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Starting with paragraph number 18.

MI. Helms.

All right.

(Pause)

end

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Mr. Helms.

Where did you want me to stop reading?

-..

Mr. Goldsmith. 1954.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I have a couple of pages to go.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please stop once you have gotten to the end

of paragraph number 23.

Mr. Helms. Fine.

All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. After having read this document, which

describes the conversation involving a wman named Luisa Calderon,

or someone whom it appears as Luisa Calderon, is the name familiar

to you at all?

Mr. Helms. It doesn't bring back any memories. Just as I

said, I identified it from that document you showed me this

morning but I don't remember anything about her.

Mc. Goldsmith. Now, the pages that you read pertain to a

conversation involving Luisa in which there is some suggestion

of foreknowledge on her part, foreknowledge of the assassination,

and, of course, the significance of that foreknowledge, the sig-

nificance of her statement standing alone really is not very

great.

However, in light of the fact Luisa Calderon had connec-

tions or may have had connections with Cuban intelligence, the

significance of her statement suggests the foreknowledge has

escalated.

Do you recall ever having had the statement brought to your

attention, this conversation

brought to kout attention?

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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Mr. Helms. I do not remember it ever having been brought

to my attention.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Do you know if that conversation was

brought to the attention of the warren Commission.

I know nothing about it. To the vest of my recollection

this is the first time I have seen reference to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you now refer to CIA 1843?

Mr. Helms. 1843?

Mr. Goldsmith. That is in volume 1.

Mr. Helms.

Yes sir. It is in volume 1, is it? This one

stops at 1874. There we are.

Yes sir, I have that in front of me.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read the handwritten

notation on this page.

Mr. Helms.

Is this ICC or just CC for copy? I guess it

is copy. CC for copy. Original and translation sent to Galbon

via Kingman,

nothing to Bureau yet.

(2), one copy original and trans to luisa Calderon and a

a big P.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know whose handwriting that was?

Mr. Helms.

No, I don't.

Mr. Goldsmith. I indicate for the record that the

reference to Luisa Calderon P would probably refer to her P

file, which is the local file in the Mixico City station.

Mr. Helms.

I see. I don't know whose handwriting that is:

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know who Galbon of Kingman --

Mr. Helms. I know who Galbon is. This is Cononel J. C.

King.

Who Kingman was I have forgotten.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why anyone would have wanted

this transcript from the Bureau?

Mr. Helms. It just says nothing to Bureau yet. I don't

interpret that to mean it was withheld, it just hadn't got to

them yet.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Your reading of that is correct, it says

nothing to Bureau yet. I will rephrase the question. In light

of that do you know why there would have been a desire to with-

hold this transcript even temporarily from the Bureau?

Mr. Helms.

No, I don't. No, I don't. Over in the column

here it says 22 November LIN, which I assume from what we were

saying this morning is

the cryptonym for the telephone taps,

Luisa Calderon and the man outside. Those would be simply

descriptive?

MI. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this time to CIA number,

1929?

Mr. Helms. That is in volume 2, then, isn't it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

For the record, that is a blind memo dated 10 April 1964,

labeled material from P 8593, shown to Warren Commission.

Station House --

Mr. Helms.

Yes, I have looked at that page now.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any indication from that page

that the Calderon conversation was shown to the Warren Commis-

sion staffers when they went to Mexico City?

Mr. Helms. English translations of calls made by Oswald

to

the Russian Embassy; English translation of conversations

between Dorticos Armas. It doesn't look that way. Is there

something I ahve missed?

Mr. Goldsmith. No. At this time would you refer to CIA

number 2205 and 2206.

That would appear in volume 3. When

you get to 2205 --

Mr. Helms. I have got 2220. I am closing in on it.

That

goes back up again.

MI. Goldsmith. For the record, I would indicate that

2205 is a memo for the record dated 1l April 1964, the subject

of which is a visit by three staff represenatives of the Warren

Commission. I would ask you to read paragraph 7 on page 2206.

Mr. Helms. All right. Somebody has slapped a reproduc

tion of a prohibited stamp all over this and it makes it a

little hard going. If you will forgive me, I am going as

fast

as I can.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Helms. All right, I have read paragraph 7.

Mr. Goldsmith. Having read that paragraph, is there any

reference in that paragraph to the Luisa Calderon conversation

being shown to the Warren Commission staff?

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Mr. Helms.

All it says, reviewed the tape from the tele-

phone taps.

I assume that means for the days 27th, 28th, 1

Cotober, Oswald, at both Cuban and Soviet Embassies. I assume

those are only on Oswald's conversations since the Calderon

conversation you were talking about was with some unidentified

man. I don't know they regard that as Oswald or include it.

Mr. Goldsmith. It was also dated 22 November, 1963.

Mr. Helms. Right. Then I guess that was not included

here:: At least I don't see any evidence in this statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was this transcript

ever given to the Warren: Commission?

Mr. Helms. Of Calderon?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms.

I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it should have been given

to

the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I can't see any particular rsason not to have

given it to the warren Commission. I can think of no reason.

Mr. Goldsmith. Especially in the light of the fact the

Agency had information that Luisa Calderon was #GI or possibly

connected with EGI?

If this material had been given to the Warrent Commission

- by this term I am referring to the Calderon transcript,

would a record of such transmission be available anywhere?

MI. Helms. I would have thought so. I thought they were

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trying to keep reasonably careful records as to what was sent to

the Warren Commission. After all, the intelligence agencies

usually are and should be careful about what kind of documenta-

tion goes out of their building to anyone, and there is usually

a record of it, particularly if it is highly classified and

sensitive.

So I would have thought there would be a record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Luisa Calderon connected in any way with

the CIA?

Mr. Helms. I nver heard of any connection she had with the

CIA. If she did it was unknown to me.

MI. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer at this time to

CIA number 2950. It appears in volume 3.

MI. Helms. 2950, right.

Mr. Goldsmith.

This is not a very good quality reproduc-

tion, so take your time reading it.

Mr. Helms. 2950?

Mr. Goldsmith.

Yes sir.

Mr. Helms. All right, I am there now.

Let me read this

öut loud to see if I am reading the same thing that you are.

In paragraph 4, of the Litawil 9 contact report for 17 July,

"attached to reference L-9 reported that Luisa Calderon has a

sister residing in someplace in Texas, married to an American

of Mexican descent. I-8 can further identify the sister."

I can't read that next word.

Mr. Goldsmith. Domestic.

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MI. Helms. "Domestic Exploitation Section might be in a

position to follow up on this lead. Please levy this requirement

on I- at the next opportunity.

MI. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what is the Domestic

Exploitation Section?

MI. Helms. Well, I don't know that I recall exactly what

it is, unless it was an interrogation unit that the Miami

station used to interrogate refugees and other people coming

over from Cuba. If it is not that, I don't remember what the

Domestic Exploitation Section was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that the Domestic Exploita-

tion Section could have been a component within SAS?

Mr. Helms. Possibly. But then SAS had control over the

Miami station and I would have thought it was somewhere in that

complex.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the use of the Domestic Exploitation

Section in any way violate the AGency's charter?

Mr. Helms.

Not that I ever heard of. I think the :

Domestic Exploitation Section was there, FBI knew about it,

the intelligence community knew about it, it had a specific

purpose, I don't think there is anything about it that violated

the Agency charter. As far as I know I never considered it

in that category.

Mr. Goldsmith. What again was the specific purpose of this

section?

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Mr. Helms. I don't know. If it is what I thought it was,

it was a group that interrogated refugees that came from Cuba.

Mr. Goldsmith. Might this section have been used as a means

by which an effort could be made to contact Luisa Calderon

and take advantage of her possibilities as a cIA agent)ras a

source of information?

Mr. Helms. I don't understand your question. I am sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, could this Domestic Exploitation

Section have been used for the purpose of establishing a contact

between the Agency and Luisa Calderon so that her assistance

or services could be solicited for the Agency?

Mr. Helms. My recollection is I don't recall any Domestic

Exploitation SEction that was recruiting agents.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than A. M. Mug, the Cuban defector

to hwom you made reference earlier today, did the AGency obtain

additional information pertaining to Oswald and the assassina-

tion from sources or agents connected in some way with DGI?

Mr. Helms. I don't honestly know. I would have hoped

there would have been more than just one defector, but I may be

wrong.

We were having a very difficult time getting intelli-

gence inside Cuba and maybe we didn't get anything from anybody

else. I would have hoped we would have gotten something more

from refugees or agents or somebody like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963 and 1964, did the Agency have any

agents or sources of information within the Cuban Embassy or

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Consulate in Mexico City?

Mr. Helms. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this point to CIA

number 2977. That would appear in volume 3, I believe.

Mr. Helms.

2977?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

Mr. Helms. That would be volume 2.

All right. Memoranda from MI. J. Lee Rankin.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please skim through the memorandum and

then read the next page.

Mr. Helms. And then read the next page.

Mr. Goldsmith. To yourself, sir.

Mr. Helms. Right:

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mt. Ambassador, Silvia Duran, who is

someone of important concern to this Committee, and my question

here is not directed towards the substance of the memo but

rather to the source of the information, appatently here the

Agency received information concerning Duran from someone who

had direct personal knowledge. Do you know who the source of

this information was?

Mr. Helms.

No, I don't know who the soruce was, Mr.

Goldsmith, but if you are asking my opinion in reading this,

I would assume this just is our way of covering up the fact

this came from a telephone tap.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Do you know whether or not Silvia

the)

Duran at any time had any connections with CIA was she an agent

or source of information for the AGency?

Mr. Helms. Not that I have heard.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to refer specifically to

language in this memo that would indicate that the source of

the information was a telephone operation?

Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I simply was voicing the

opinion that when it says a reliable and sensitive source, well

informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban

Embassy and Consluate in Mexico City, I am simply assuming

that

in order to cover up the fact this information came from various

telephone conversations they simply are using this descriptive

rubric: to cover that fact. I am not sure of this; that is

just my assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the

name Teresa Proenza?

Mr. Helms. Whom?

Mr. Goldsmith.

Teresa Proenza.

PRoenza, the Cultural

Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City?

Mr. Helms.

I don't recall here name, no. I think I wouldi

-- Proenza Proenza.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency in 1963 in Mexico Cith have

any penetration agents and sources of information within the

Soviet Embassy or Consulate?

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Mr. Helms. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar generally

with th- allegations that were made after the assassination

Alvarado

by a Nicaraguan named Alarada to the effect he had witnessed

Oswald receive $6500 in cash from a redheaded negro at the Cuban

Embassy?

Mr. Helms. I do recall vaguely this Alvarade allegation

and it was my impression that that all fell to pieces, that this

fellow was just trying to sake somebody down for some money,

or it was self-importance, but never had been able to prove

that this was the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer now to 2101,

which appears in volume 4, which is a polygraph result summary

and rather than raading the entire document, please refer to

paragraph number 7.

Mr. Helms. I see.

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, paragraph number 7 indiates that this

allegation apparently was resolved when Alvarada admitted he

had made a mistake and he essentially admitted that he had

with respect to the polygraph devices a means of testing one's

truthfulness.

The issue which the Committee is concerned with at this

time, however, appears on page 2100, the top of the page, where

Alarada is quoted, where

it is indicted to have stated, and I

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reading now, that he wanted to protest his unjust treatment and

the fact he was given money since he does not believe in :

negotiating over death.

Perhaps it would be good if you did read paragraph 1, so

we are not talking out of context here.

Mr. Helms. Is this Alarada we are talking :--

Mx. Goldsmith. Pardon?

Mr. Helms. It says subject here. Is that Alarado?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir. This is the Nicaraguan who made

the allegations concerning Oswald receiving money.

Mr. Helms.

I see.

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, do you know whether Alarada was given

money in reference to the allegations that he was making about

Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I have no recollection of this at all. The

only thing that twigged a memory cell in my head was the

redheaderd negro.

That always seemed to be a silly story that

stuck in my head over all these years. The other details I

don't recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. The statement in here that is of concern

to the Committee is the one that suggests that either for

making the story

for detracting the story Afarade was given

money.

I am wondering if this issue was ever investigated by

the Agency?

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Mr. Helms.

I don't know. He was apparently dealing with

the State Department people down there, is that correct?

Mr. Goldsmith. MI. Ambassador, I believe OSS refers to

ODACIO

the FBI.

Mr. Helms.

State Department.

Mr. Goldsmith. I won'targue with you over that one, sir.

In any event, the record indicates that.

Mr.

Helms.

I will show you in another one of your docu-

ments that the FBI had a different cryptonym. If you look at

the document with dissemination of öriginal Lee Harvey Oswald

report to local authorities, you remember the one that goes

back --

MI. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. -- you will find the thing broken out and

you will find that, I think, in those days the FBI was known

as ODNV. And the State Department was ODACID.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that you are correct in that

score, MI. Ambassador.

Mr. Helms. I don't know but that is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith.

My source in this room tells me you are

correct.

In any event, do you know anything about Alãrada receiving

money?

Mr. Helms. No sir, I do not, nothing whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about

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his moreorless cryptic reference to being offered money and

negotiating over death?

Mr. Helms. I don't know what they knew about the Alarada

case except from what you showed me earlier. They apparently

were briefed about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission

would have been given a copy of this polygraph summary?

Mr. Helms. I don't know. If they asked for it I suppose,!

other wise I wouldn't have thought so. Plesgraph summaries are'

usually pretty closely held.

That is not a very scientific

instrument.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, if they had been given this

summary, would there be a record of that somewhere at the

Agency?

MI. Helms. I would have thought so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where that record would be?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea. Probably in the Security

Office somewhere.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am finished

with another line of inquiry. I note that it is 3:25 and

that we have to leave this room at 4. If you have questions

I would certainly defer to you at this point.

Mr. Preyer.

There is one question I wanted to ask, which isn't

directly related to our inquiry here, although it is indirectly

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related to the Mexican aspects of it.

Recently Premier Castro made a very harsh speech attacking

the United States, as we have read in the paper, and over the

course of this Youth Festival that was held there several others

were brought forward. (1), the Consul in the Mexican Embassy

there, Mr. Azcue, apparently made a speech to the Youth Festival

which in effect said the man who came to the Cuban Embassy

in Mexico, was not Oswald, or he had questions about whether

it was Oswald. So for some reason, perhaps on his own of his

government, he has floated the idea of two Oswalds.

Now, whether to confuse the issue or not, I don't know?

I think this Committee can probably demonstrate that

conclusively by good hard evidence that there was only one

Oswald and that Mr. Azcue is wrong on that score.

The other point which gives

me more concern is the attack

Mr. Castro made in his allegations that CIA in this country had

foreknowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy and that

they deliberately tried to pin the blame on the cuban Government.

That apparently is the new line and he has made that charge in

a public forum, for all the world to hear. How much the world

would believe that, knowing the source it comes from, I suppose

is debatable, but I imagine many Marxist countries of the

world are taking that as gospel now.

So the question I wanted to ask is on the second point,

and it is as to his charge that the CIA had foreknowledge of

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the assassination to pin it on the Cuban Governement.

Do you have any oments that you would like to make on

thât, sir?

Mr. Helms.

Sir, the only comment I would like to make

on that was, of is, not was, that I never knew of anyone in

the CIA that alleged that he knew about President Kennedy's

assassination

beforehand. I never heard that asserted by a

single soul,

ever. I don't believe there was anyone in the

CIA who had any foreknowledge.

I recall personally that I was sitting having lunch with

Director McCone and two or three other CIA officials when his

Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, walked into the room and

said President Kennedy had been shot, and if I have ever seen

surprise and hooror on the group of faces around me it was

on that occasion.

So I can't conceive that either Director

McCone or I had ever heard of this thing and I have never heard

it alleged that anybody else had, and I would like to make one

further comment about Mr. Azcue, and that is that in a Communist

state individuals of the local government do not appear at

international conferences and make speeches (a), without speci

fic authorization, and, (b), specific instructions as to what

they are to say and what they are to cover.

I found it equally interesting that Mr. Cubela, the famous!

Mr. AMLASH, who has dotted the transcripts of lord knows how

many Congressional hearings, also appeared, having been released

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from jail, as stated in the Washington Post, to assert that he

had never been a double agent, that he had only worked for a

certain period of time for the CIA. Why he was asked to make

the statement, why he was released from jail for the purpose

of doing it, I don't know. I could hazard an opinion. But I

can only say that these conferences are orchestrated and they

are orchestrated very skilifully and orchestrated for a purpose

MI. Preyer. Do you know anything of any 23 page document

that I understand Mr. Castro says he has outlining or substan-

tiating his charges?

Mr. Helms. No sir, I don't know anything about it.

Didn't he give Senator McGovern a document one time that

Senator brought back with him, or was it Senator Church?

I sawi

something in the newspapers about this. I haveno firsthand

knowleage.

Mr. Preyer. I got the impression this was a recent com-

pilation.

MI. Helms. I see.

Mr. Preyer.

Probably on the order of MI. Cubela and Mr.

Azcue's appearances. It always seemed to me a little surpris-

ing Mr. Cubela, if he was guilty of all the things alleged,

that he wasn't preemporily shot, rather than being in prison.

Well, I appreciate your comments on that. That is very

helpful.

Mr. Goldsmith.

This would be an appropriate time,

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for us to break, rather than continue getting into a new area

-..

and break for the deposition, so I would recommend that at this

time.

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Mr. Preyer. Very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that if

we do break at this time, that under the Committee Rules, the

Ambassador would be entitled to make a statement at this time.

I would also be prepared to have the Ambassador make a state-

ment at the deposition.

Mr. Preyer. Yes. Under our rules each person who testi-

fies, at the conclusion of the Committee portion of the hearing

is entitled to make a statement of five minutes, if he cares

to, explaining any aspect of the testimony further, or any

statement he may care

to make.

Mr.

Helms.

You mean if he has anything left to say?

Mr. Preyer.. Yes.

Mr. Helms.

Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Ambassador Helms. We appreciate

very much your cooperation in this. Sorry we have interrupted

you a number of times today, but I hope we will be able to

complete the testimony.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would like to clarify

that I don't believe that the Committee will have a Notary

available for the deposition that is about to begin in about a

half an hour or so, so I would like to indicate for the record,

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Mr. Helms, you understand you will still be under oath for the

deposition?

Mr. Helms. I understand that, ortainly.

Mr. Preyer. The Committee stands in recess until 10:00

tomorIoW.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned,

to reconvene at 10:00 d'clock Thursday, August 10, 1978.)

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°TOP SEGRET

• HEARINGS

Balore The

John F. Kennedy Subcommittee

of the

SELECT COMMITTEE OY ASSASSIVATIO IS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS

Washington. D.C

August 9, 1978

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IUY DIGICA

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TESTIMONY OF:

Richard McGarrah Helms

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ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

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Wednesday, August 9, 1978

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U. S. House of Representatives,

John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D. C.

Deposition of

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RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee,

pursuant to notice, in Room 304, Cannon House: Office Building,

beginning at 4:00 p.m., when present on behalf of the respec-

tive parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ., Staff Counsel

FOR THE DEPONENT:

GREGORY B. CRAIG, ESQ., Attorney At Law,

Washington, D. C.

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Mr. Goldsmith. It should be noted that this is a continu-

ation of a hearing that was conducted today, which started at

approximately 9:30 and ended at 3:30. Mr. Helms has consented

to allow the Committee to take his statement under oath in the

form of a deposition rather than at a hearing. This arrange-

ment is acceptable to the Committee.

Thereare a few preliminary matters that I need to dispose

of.

Essentially, they are as follows. Mr. Helms, do you undert

stand that your statement to me at this deposition is completely

voluntary.

Whereupon,

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RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS

having previously been sworn by the Honorable Richardson

Preyer, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the assassination of

John F. Kenney, was examined and testified as follows:

MI. Helms. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. And you also understand that you have a

right to counsel?

MI. Helms. Thank you.

Mr. Goldsmith. And you have counsel here today?

Mr. Helms. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, normally, a witness has a right to

receive a copy of his deposition statement. By that, I mean he

has the right actually to receive the transcript itself. That

is not the case with executive session testimony. In the case

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of executive session testimony you have a right to review the

transcript but not to recieve it. The Agency has asked us to

request of present and former Agency employees and associates

to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript

because the transcript will contain a lot of classified infor-

mation.

So what I am asking you now is whether you are willing

to waive your right actually to receive a copy of the tran-

script, with the understanding that you, would of course be

given an opportunity to review it for accuracy?

Mr. Helms. I understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. And you are willing to waive that right?

Mr. Helms.

I guess

SO.

Mr. Craig. Could I inquire as to whether or not the rules

governing the executive sessions as to the release of informa-

tion only by vote of the full Committee will apply to this

testimony? The Prior testimony today could only be released

by vote of the full Committee or used in public session because

it was held in executive session.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is right.

Mr. Craig. We would request that for this, too, if it is

at all possible.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is a reasonable request and we will

act on this deposition as though the rules of executive session

govern.

Mr. Helms. Thank you. I am glad to waive my right to

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receive the documents.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Finally, I should note for the record the court reporter

will be asked to certify this as a true and accurate transcrip-

tion of the testimony that is going to be given here today.

Mr. Ambassador, what is a 201 file. We are getting back

to the basics now.

Mr. Helms. My recollection is that a 201 file is a file

opened in the registry of the Clandestine Services on an

individual. In other words, the Michael Goldsmith file would

be a 201 file.

MI. Goldsmith. What would be the criteria for the opening!

of such a file, generally?

Mr. Helms. That there was information available on

Michael Goldsmith and it was determined to keep it and, there-

fore, a file would be opened.

Mr. Goldsmith. And that information would be relevant

to some legitmate purpose of the Agency, I take it?

Mr. Helms. That is the assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file normally be opened on

someone who was perceived to be a counterintelligence threat?

MI. Helms. I am awfully rusty on this stuff, it has been

a long, long time since I was involved in these details, but

I thought that counterintelligence cases - well, maybe they

would involve a 201 file, too, even though they would have been

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included in the counterintelligence file. A card, at least,

would be there referring to the file. I think 201 just applies

to the fact there is a file on an individual in the Agency

regardless of what category of individual it is. Is that

correct? I ahave forgotten all this.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am in the posture here where I have to

ask the question,

so I an afraid I can't --

Mr. Helms. I am doing the best I can and that is my

recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is a 201 file a presonality file?

Mr. Helms. I thought so. As I say, it has been long

Years since I have really dealt with these details.

MI. Goldsmith. And if the file were opened on Oswald,

for example, would that reflect the fact that Oswald was per-

ceived at the time to be a potential counterintelligence threat?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought that if a 201 file was

opened on Oswald it was because Oswald has come to the Agency's

attention and they wanted to maintain the papers on him, so

they would have opened a file.

MI. Goldsmith. And would it have been in the context of

Oswald posing a counterintelligence threat?

Mr. Helms. Not necessarily.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give another example of how a

file might have come to be opened on Oswald?

Mr. Helms. We might have, I don't know, if we got

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information, as yeu have

pointed out, that we did from those

telephone taps on a man named Lee Oswald they would have imme-

diately opened a file on him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, in those telephone taps, if the

individual was simply expressing an interest in going to the

Soviet Union, that would have been sufficient to have opened a

201 file?:

Mr. Helms. An American citizen, yes, I would have thought

SO.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 796. This is

a State Department telegram dated October 31, 1959, and I would

ask you to read it, please.

Mr. Helms. Lee Harvey Oswald.

All right, I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the information contained in this

telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought so, an American who was

defecting to the Soviet Union would be of counterintelligence

interest and that would have been quite sufficient to have

caused the Agency to open a file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, if someone is an agent or operational

source for the Agency, would operational information concerning

him be located in this 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that information be?

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Mr. Helms. Operational information was usually kept in

the individual divisions or branches where the agent was being

handled.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that be kept in a projects file or

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operational file?

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Mr. Helms. Probably.

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Mr. Goldsmith. If a person were connected with the

Agency either as an agent or as a source of information, would

he always have a 201 file.?

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Mr. Helms. Not necessarily. I am not sure how that was

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done. If you will forgive me, my recollection is that when an

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individual was anlagent of the Agency that all the papers on

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him were taken over by the division that was handling him, and

there was nothing available in the central records to identify

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him as an agent. Now, there obviously would be exceptions to

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that but in the case where there were exceptions, I think all

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that would be in the file, the central file, would be a card

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Mr. Goldsmith. Well, wouldn't that then be a dead give-

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away, if all you had in a file were a card, which referred

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the researcher to a particular division, that would automatically

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indicate that the person was an agent. It seems to me that

would be contrary --

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Mx. Helms. It was my impression this was not the case in

most cases, but I said in a case where there was a file, that

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might be the way they would try to handle it. My impression

was, the original impression, all the papers were kept in the

Division that was handling

the agent.

Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone was an agent he would have

his papers kept with the division, but you don't know whether

or not those papers would simulteneously be kept in the 201

file?

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Mr. Helms. They would not be. In fact, I am sure they

would not be simultaneously kept in the 201 file except under

certain maybe unusual circumstances.

I am just leaving room for an exception.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. YOu have been very

clear on the fact operational information would not.

Mr. Helms. For the reason you yourself have cited, this

would be kind of a giveaway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Now, if someone were an agent,

would he in most cases have a 201 file?

Mr. Helms. Well, I don't know whether you would call it

a 201 file. He certainly would have a file. It would be in

the possesion of the division. Whether you call them 201 files

I don't know anymore.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would an ordinatry name trace always

refer to an agent's or source's 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I don't remember anymore how this dilemma was

resolved about running traces, and on a fellow who was already

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an agent and how we dealt with the problem of protecting that

fact, I don't remember, I don't recall anymore.

Mx. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the fact of a relationt

ship with the Agency would always be noted in the 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I don't know. It isn't only 15 years, it is

I don't know how many years since I actually was in a division

handling these matters and that is why I am so rusty on that.

Mr. Goldsmith. When, if ever, is it permissible to remove

a document from a 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I am just trying to think. I don't believe

that documents are removed from the 201 files except under a

destruction mechanisn for dead files, in other words, files

where clearly the individual has died or something of that

kind. So I don't think that papers were removed from files, at

least legally removed from files, or properly removed from

files. I don't think that was permitted.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a recess to check on that noise

next door.

(A short recess was taken)

Mr. Goldsmith. When a document is removed from a 201

file is any record required to be kept noting that fact?

Mr. Helms. Yes sir, my recollection is that if you have

to remove a document from a basic file of the Agency then you

leave a nottation in there as to where the document is.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the Agency maintain a dual system of

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of 201 files?

Mr. Helms. A dual sytem?

MI. Goldsmith. By that I mean are there situations where

an individual might have one 201 file which contains primarily

biographical information and another 201 file containing either

more sensitive biographical information or information of an

operational significance?

Mr. Craig. You asked whether the Agency presently does?

Do you mean to ask during the period of time or --

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you, I appreciate that. Let's go

back to the period between 1959 and 1964.

Mr. Helms. My recollection is that there was one 201

file.

That is basically, I believe, a biographical file.

There were also operational files but they weren't called 201

files, as

I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. So while the files would contain different

types of information, they would also go by different names?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you know whether during!

the period 1960 through 1964 there were categories of opera-

tional files, in other words, is thete a difference between a

projects file and an operations file or production file?

Mr. Helms. You see, we did different kinds of operations.

There were positive intelligence operations, there were countert

intelligence operations, there were covert action operations

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there were paramilitary operations; and my recollection is that

the files were somewhat different in these various categories

because of the requirements of the case. In other words, they

contain different kinds of things.

But, as I say, I am so long away from all of that I am

not very helpful to you, I am sorry to say.

The whole point of this operation here was to maintain a

maximum of security and, therefore, a file might contain all

of Michael Goldsmith's biographical information, and all of

the operational cables about the use of Micahel Goldsmith might

be in different files, they might be in the same safe or they

might be in different safes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are operations or project files ever

maintained on a covert basis, in other words, there might be

one official file, and then one file that contains other more

sensitive information?

Mr. Helms. I

would

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say that had never happened. I

wouldn't be surprised if there were occasional cases where the

thing was so sensitive that somebody made a separate file

in order to protect a certain category of information. But,

that would always be known to somebody, it would be known to the

case officer, the branch chief, the division chief, this was

the case because the system was designed to be as secure as

possible but also nobody was interested in encouraging people

to be so secretive you could never get hold of the information.

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So, if a man maintained a file in his office or a private safe

or something because he was handling something so sensitive that

the didn't want it played around with by any of his associates,

at least one would know he was

responsible for that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you cite an example of where that might

have taken place?

Mr. Helms.

Well, there were a couple of Soviet cases that

at various times were terribly sensitive and I think that the

material was very closely restricted and handled. Whether it

was just by one man or two men I just honestly don't recall and

can't come up with actual names of the cases. But I think that,

if I understand the thrust of the discussion, there was no

leniency about any officer who hid information from his superiors

about these things, in other words, in the case of an agent,

unidentified, who was extremely sensitive, there would never be

any question that anybody checked around to find out who that

agent was, if the Director wanted to know if that agent was on

the payroll, which he seldom ever did, Directors liked to distanbe

themselves from the identify of agents - if some person in

authority wanted to know about this, that fellow had absolutely

no right to say that he didn't know anything about it. He would!

" get fired for that.

Mr. Goldsmith. So under the way the system operated, some

individual with authority would have to have known about a file

¡ being maintained on a covert type basis?

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Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym 4. R.

Rifle?

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Mr. Helms. I became familiar with it during the Church

Committee hearings and I didn't become too familiar with it.

In other words, I never got back into all of the details about

it, but my recollection is that it applied to a project that

was set up by Bissell, in his time, whereby some individual whose

nationality I have now forgotten, was hired as a professional

killer or assassin or something, and I believe he was maintained!

on the payroll for a time.

The %.R. Rifle project as such, when I became Deputy

Director, in other words, thekilling or assassin aspect of that

was just put on the shelf. I said we weren't going to have any

of that stuff, and since we had the fellow on our hands, the

case officer,

as best I recall, found something more useful for

hiin to do.

Nir. Goldsmith. Was the program itself continued, other

than the assassination aspect?

no. Mr. Helms.: I don't know whether the name L R. Rifle was

continued but I believe the individual was continued for sometime

after that in an effort to find some gainful way of employing

him.

I believe he was released later on becuase the project

never worked out in any respect. He apparently didn't have any

use, as I recall -- I am trying to think about him. He was an

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Austrian.

Mr. Goldsmith. Belgian.

According to two memos. that we have here, CIA number 3319

and 3320, one of them dated 19 February 1962, and the other is

6 March, 1963, indicates that you gave authorization for this

project to continue.

Mr. Helms. The project so it could be funded, but my

distinct recollection is that I told the case officer who was

incolved with this that this was to be changed in its concept,

in other words, there was absolutely no point in having a

professional killer on the payroll as such, and that he was to

try and find something else for him to do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about this

project?

Mr. Helms. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever tell the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms: I nver dia.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the case officer who handled this

project named William Harvey?

MI. Helms. I thought it was Justin O'Connell. Maybe

Harvey started it and O'Donnell took it over later. Maybe that

is what happened.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know William Harvey?

Mr. Helms. Yes, sure. How could I have missed him?

MI. Goldsmith.

What is your assessment of his capability?

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Mr. Helms.

well, that is a hat full. Harvey came to the

Agency back in I guess the late forties or early fifties, after

many years with the FBI, in which he handled the Elizabeth

Bentley case, among others. He was considered to be a very

capable FBI agent and he had a lot of important jobs in the

Agency, but toward the end of his career he became an alcoholic,

of very close to it, and had to be put on the bench; then he had

to be let go.

Mr. Goldsmith. So in the end Harvy was let go?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. How much control was exercised over Harvey

when he was running the ¼.R. Rifle program?

Mr. Helms. I don't know. He was working for Bissell in

those days and I didn't have anything to do with it. In fact,

I didn't even know about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the 4.R. Rifle project

used fake or cover 201 files?

MI. Helms. No, I don't. I don't know what was done.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's review some documents. At this point

I would like to refer to CIA number 3307, which I am about to

hand you.

CIA number 3307 consists of handwritten notes that run

several pages. My impression is that these notes were attributed

to MI. Harvey and I would ask you to refer specifically to CIA

number 3311, paragraph number 9.

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Mr. Helms.

"Should have phoney 201 in RI. To backstop

this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look

like a CE file."

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, would you examine CIA number 3314 and

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Mr. Helms. Okay. I have 3314.

Mr. Goldsmith.' And does that make reference to the use of

RIS cover caution?

Mr. Helms.

Which part of that page am I to read here?

Mr. Goldsmith. Look at the top of the page.

Mr. Helms.

Magic button, Narcotics Bureau, RIS 201 cover

caution bankruptcy, no star, eyes, Jim A, Contradestruck,

not ATSD problem, Doodle, from you to -- arrow down, apply ha:

brakes.

--

Mr. Goldsmith. Maybe we can expedite this by my pointing

out the sepcific part.

Mr. Helms. Please do.

Mr. Goldsmith. The upper right hand corner of the page,

does it refer to RIS 201 cover?

Mr. Helms. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the next line caution.

Mr. Helms. Yes sir. If I were to make a guess, inciden-

tally -- I am contributing something here -- if I were to.

"guess I would say this was Harvey's writing and this was not.

Mr. Craig. Referring to 3311?

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Harvey's?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And the writing in 3314?

Mr. Helms. Are part of what I would say was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, at the bottom of 3314 there is a

reference to the term never mention the word assassination.

MI. Helms. Never mention word assassination, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at 3315, paragraph 7.

Mr. Helms. Right. No project of papers except for --

Mr. Goldsmith. Cover?

Mr. Helms. I guess

; that is cover. I can't read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. And paragraph number 12?

Mr. Helms. Cover file from RIS or what is that -- I don't

know.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Well

MI. Helms. Or did it, it looks like.

MI. Goldsmith. In any event, whoudl youagree that here is

a case where, at the very least, agency personnel were contem-

plating the use of a fake 201 file and possibly a fake opera-

tional file.

Mr. Helms. YEs, it looks like that. But then his boss

would have known about this. He would have had to get permis-

sion to do that. Somebody would have known about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again for the purposes of clarification,

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when a file is faked in the manner suggested by the author

of these particular papers, how many people would know about it?

Mr. Helms. Well, the person who instructed it be done,

I assume his boss, the person who would do it, and whether

anybody in the RI or the Regestry would know about it is =

problamatic, they probably would not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the cryptonym s. R.

Taffy refers to? Let me show you CIA 3577 which contains no

substantial information in it but may refresh your memory.

Mr. Helms. ½. R. Taffy?

Mr. Goldsmith. That is a dispatch which I believe was

sent to you?

Mr. Helms.

I must confess it is very familiar to me, the

name 4. R. Taffy, but what it referred to, I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have necessarily related to 4.R.

Rifle?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought not.

MI. Goldsmith. Even though the same diagraph --

Mr. Helms.

I don't know what category of diagraph that

came from. But 4. R., no, I associate 4. R. Taffy with nothing

of ½. R. Rifle type at all.

Let me see if I can possibly come up with what z. R. Taffy

referred to. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you know what a black

tape 201 file is?

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Mr. Helms. Black tape 201? No, never heard the expression

before today, to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible this kind of file is a 201

file which has been designated to be extremely sensitive?

Mr. Helms. I don't know. I honestly don't know. I have

never heard the expression, to the best of my recollection, and

most of those trade expressions I have heard at one time.

I never remember hearing that. ¼. R. Taffy certainly I heard

and am sorry I can't remember that because that has kicked

around for a long time, it seems to me.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you recall an incident where the Mexico!

City station sent headquarters information pertaining to an

individual, an American, who had provided the Soviets with

military secrets, military handbooks?

Mr. Helms.

An American?

Mr. Goldsmith. That may in some way be related to the

L.R. Taffy project.

MI. Helms: Yes. Was this an FBI case which we were try-

ing to do some work on for them?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. Yes, I do vaguely recall this. I do vaguely

recall this.

Mr. Goldsmith. The handbooks were passed in October of

1963 in Mexico.

Mr. Helms. To the Russian Embassy?

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Mr. Goldsmith.

Right.

Mr. Helms. I am wondering whether ¼. R. Taffy was simply

an indicator that permitted material to be sent directly to me

bypassing the division.

Is that possible?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, I would say that is a possibility.

Mr. Helms. That maybe, which is why it is so familiar to

me, becuase it would keep

showing up in various places, some-

body was trying to send me

something.

Mr. Helms. Where would such a procedure be used, MI.

Ambassador?

Mr. Helms. It would be used, because the way we operated

in the Clandestine Services, there were certain things which

I wanted to maintain control over myself from time to time.

There were disciplinary matters, thwere were a variety of things

where a station chief ought to have a right to deal directly

with the fellow in charge of the operation rather than through

the division or through a subordinate, and there were indicators

set up for that purpose, just like things in the military.

Theoretically,, when a field commander reports back to

headquarters his report goes through various staff echelons,

but he should have a direct appeal to the commanding general.

Mr. Gold smith. What does the term CI/SIG refer to within

the CI staff?

Mr. Helms. Let me see.

Was that back in the same era of

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Mr. Goldsmith. We are talking about in the period from

1959 through 1964.

Mr. Helms. SIG?

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it refer to Counterintelligence

Special Investigations Group or Special Investigatory Group?

Mr. Helms. What I am trying to wrack my brain about was

that inside the staffs there was a group that was known by

various names at various times and various indicators, which

was

a group the purpose of which was to attempt to get codes

and ciphers in foreign countries and there was a special unit

whose

sole focus in life was to try and accomplish this objec-

tive, and this had a team of breakin artists and all kinds of

things.

I am just trying to remember whether SIG was that unit of

whether it was one that dealt more specifically with NSA or just

what it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe SIG was a unit that was headed

by Burch O'Neill. Does that refresh your merory?:

Let me give you more background and tell me if this agrees

with your impression of the purpose of that unit. CI/SIG I am

told, refers to Counter Intelligence/ Special Investigative

Group, and the purpose of that unit was to determine whether

any agency employees had been penetrated by a foreign intelli-

gence service. The unit work-d closely with the Office of

Security.

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Does that sound familiar to you?

Mr. Helms. It doesn't sound right. It doesn't sound right.

It sounds to me like a unit that had another purpose. That

may have been one of its purposes. But it seems to me that was

the unit that was a highly secret, highly sensitive one.

Do you all have clearances for communications intelligence?

Does the reporter have all those clearances?

This is one of those problems I thinkwe have gotten

into here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify the problem, Mr.

Ambassador, andwe will see how we can possibly resolve it --

not today.

Mr. Helms. In order to identify the problem I have to

tell you what the problem is and, therefore, I have to breach

security.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, I understand the problem and I am

just asking --

MI. Helms. This has to do with codes and ciphers. In

other words, that category of material is largely dealt with

by NSA.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this now you are referring to --

MI. Helms. SIG, I think, if I am correct about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's refer at this time to CIA number 788;

Can you indentify this form?

Mr. Helms. I have looked at the page here.

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Mr. Goldsmith. What is that form?

Mr. Helms. It says it is a file request for information

coming from a 201 file itself to headquarters RI from CI/SIG

and Egerter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that the basic form that is used to

request the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I guess it is. It looks like it to me.

MI. Goldsmith. What does the term RI stand for?

Mr. Helms.

Records Integration. In other words, that was

a name given to what in normal parlance would be called an

intelligence registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. The second line of this document says from

CI/SIG Egerter, andithen down here, where it says soruce docu-

ment, the term CI/SIG is used again. Does that help you in

any way towards resolving. the gestion what the term CI/SIG

refers to?

Mr. Helms. I think I know what it refers to.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the topic we were unable to

discuss?

Mr. Helms. If I am wrong about it, which I apologize for,

you have asked me to do the best I can and I am doing the best

I can.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might indicate for the record what we

will attempt to do is find someone in our staff with the ?

appropriate clearance -- I believethe Chief Counsel has it --

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to pursue this issue.

Mr. Helms. I think you ought to go out to the Agency and

go into this matter out there because I don't think it is going

to help your investigation, particularly if I may suggest it,

to come back to me on that. He ought to make up his own mind

whether it is important to the investigation or not, and if it

is, then he has got a real hell of a problem about the tran-

script and so forth.

Mr. Goldsmith. I agree with you. What we intend to do is

contact the Agency and have

someone with an appropriate

clearance take care of that, and if there is need to get back

to you on it we will. I understand the problem you are refer-

ring to.

Mr. Helms. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to this document, aaction was

taken on Oswald's 201 file on 9 December, 1960. Was that

correct?

MI. Helms. That is what I would think, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier we saw a document that was a

cable which had been received on 10/31/50, a State Department

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Mr. Helms.

The one you showed ne a few minutes ago?

Mr. Goldsmith. Which made reference to Oswald intending

to defect and give military information to the Soviets. Why

did it take more than one year to open a 201 file on Oswald?

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I might add, this is an issue which is somewhat controversial

in this case.

Mr. Helms. I can't imagine why it would have taken an

entire year. I am amazed. Defect to the USSR October 1959.

This is December 1960. There wasn't a 201 file already in

existence, I am amazed. Are you sure there wasn't?

Mr. Goldsmith. The opening of the file, according to the

record, is 9 December 1960.

Mr. Helms.

Yes, I understand that by Miss Egerter, but

the SI Division, had they not opened a file alot earlier?

Mr. Goldsmith. According to the record that the Committee

has seen the first opening of any file on Oswald was 9 !

December '60.

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Mr. Helms. I can't explain that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the Oswald file was opened

up in the name Lee Henry Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was anyone ever questioned about this?

Mr. Helms. There was controversy at the time, it seems

to me, as to why it was wrong. It was wrong in the dissemina-

that went out?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, we looked at this morning.

Mr. Helms. I am sure that there was an intense preoocupa-

tion at the time as to how this mistake had been made but I

recall no longer whether it was resolved or whether it wasn't.

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wasn't resolved or whose fault it was. I notice, interestingly

enough, that this notation was made in 1975.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right; the notation you ae referring to is

one that was made by Mr. Raymond Rocca and it : refers to --

there is an arrow drawn to the middle name Henry, a circle is

drawn around the name Henry, and Mr. Rocca wrote down NB: Harvey

so at the time the correction was made. I might add, Mr.

Rocca has given testimony to that effect.

Would a routine file check or name trace for Lee Harvey

Oswald have resulted in a reference to this file which was

opened under the name

Lee Henry Oswald?

MI. Helms. I think I can safely say yes. When traces

were run they would run lee Oswald and every other modification

of Oswald they could think of. That is one of the reasons that

keeping files at the Agency was so difficult. It was particu-

larly difficult with the word Johnson, which is spelled so

many different ways.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, in the middle of the page there is a

box marked for identification by the number 1, and within that

box the letters AG have been inserted. Do you know what the

letters AG are referring to?

Mr. Helms. No, I don't. I have no idea. No idea.

That

must run along here. Here is his birth date and country of

birth and then the city of town, then there is radio operator

and all that stuff. But I have never seen the initials AG and

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they obviously refer to some idntification of Oswald, but I have

no idea what that would refer to.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to this document, at the bottom

of the page, it indicates that the file was a restricted file.

Do you know why this file would have been restricted?

MI. Helms. At that time?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

Mr. Helms. Only because of this identification SIG, I

would assume. With SIG I would assume..

Mr.. Goldsmith. Thank you..?

At this time I would like to refer to CIA number 943.

CIA number 943 is a xerox copy of three file cards.

wouldask you to refer to the top file card on: that page.

I

Mr. Helms. The one that says recent defector USSR, former

Marine?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Looking at the upper right hand

corner of that card, what is the CI project/RI referring to?

MI. Helms. I don't know. I guess I did once but I don't

know now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, was Oswald involved in any CI staff

project?

Mr. Helms. Not that I heard of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was he the subject of any CI project?

Mr. Helms. No, I don't know of any. I didn't know he had

any identification with the AGency at all. I have testified

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it seems to me to the Warren Commission that the Agency never

used Lee Harvey Oswald. That is what I believe to be true to

this day. I don't know what the RE refers to. Down here it

has see SIG Egerter. I don't know. Has anybody been able to

identify what RE stands for?

MI. Goldsmith. We have had people give some explanations.

Mr. Helms. You obviously have talked to the right people.

I don't know what it means.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this time to CIA 784 and

read that document. It should be in the same volume.

MI. Helms.

784?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

Mr. Helms.

Yes. Here, I see that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read that docu-

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ment?

Mr. Helms.

Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. This document makes reference to some,

believe, 37 items that were missing from Oswald's 201 file.

Mr. Helms. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this document ever brought to your

attention previously?

MI. Helms. Not that I ever heard of. I have never seen

the document before, to the best of my knowledge. If it was

brought to my attention I don't recall it today.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever informed that at least

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sometime there were 37 documents missing from Oswald's 201 file?

Mr. Helms. No, I have no recollection of this. What is

the significance of it?. Carelessness or where were the

documents?

Mr. Goldsmith. We are trying to determine the significance

of it.

Is there anything unusual of improper about documents,

in particular, 37 documents missing from Oswald's 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I noticed 25 of those are cables. Maybe they

were cables considered

to be sensitive and were being held in

the W. H. Division rather than sent to the 201 file and the

registry, because they had to do with telephone taps and so

forth. That would be a good reason for not putting them in

the 201 file.

MI. Goldsmith. In fact, today those cables, at least the

cables pertaining to the surveillance operations, are in the

201 file, so it is not clear whether those cables refer to the

Mexico City ones or some other ones, but this document,

at least from the face of it, gives rise to the possibility that

there were documents missing from Oswald's 201 file.

MI. Helms. Well, I have given you the best explanation

I can or likely assumption as to why the cables might have been

missing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, a minute ago when we examined the card

that made reference to the CI/ER, or CI/project RE, does that

in your mind give rise to the possibility that Oswald in some

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way was connected with the Agency?

Mr. Helms. No, I don't. I don't know what RE stands for.

But, you know, this is 1978. If there was a confusion on the

part of anybody that Oswald had ever worked for CIA, except for

some

newspapermen who are always asking these questions, it

should have been resolved long before now.

As I say, I have testified to the fact he didn't work for

the CIA. I don't know anybody that alleges in the CI that he

did work for them. Even Epstein in his book of 40 questions for

Admiral Turner doesn't raise that allegation.

MI. Goldsmith. Is the information contained in the document

particularly sensitive?

Mr. Helms. This document here?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, the one you have just been examining,

number 784?

Mr. Helms. The exact words here are not sensitive, no.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Then why would the document be marked

secret for eyes only?

Mr. Helms. There was a lot of overclassifying inside the

agency. Whoever wrote this document obviously didn't want it

to go all over the place, he wanted it to go the the chief CIRA:

There were lots of documents marked eyes only I think in

retrospect that really didn't need to be eyes only and it

wouldn't have been.

MI. Goldsmith. Should that document be of concern to the

Committee because of the fact it suggests there were materials

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missing from Oswald's 201 file?

I might add this is a document that was not released undet

FOIA for some reason.

Mr. Helms. Having no explanation except the one I gave

you for why they are not in the 201 file, you know this file

was opened in 1960, wasn't it? Along come these results of a

very sensitive operation in Mexico City. I can understand the

Division not sending those down to the 201 file. I see nothing

sinister about that at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, I should say for the record at

thetime of the assassination the 201 file was in the possession

of the Western Hemisphere Branch. I can't say for sure whether

or not the cables were in the file at that time. But it would

appear that cable was in the 201 file, as I say, mainly because

the file was in the possession of the Western Hemisphere i

Branch.

You have been shown what has been marked as CIA 3572,

paragraph (b) of which makes reference to the cable of October

10 from the Mexico City station, and a Warren Commission

staffer named A. Stern, who wrote this memo, indicates that the

October 10 cable was one of the documents that he examined.

This document was, according to Stern's memo, located in

Oswald's 201 file, so apparently these materials were in the

file.

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I would like to ask you to examine Warren Commission

Exhibit number 870, which was the affidavit that was prepared

by MI. McCone.

Mr. Helms. I have read it.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you know at whose request, if anyone,

this affidavit was prepared?

MI. Helms. I have a vague recollection it was prepared

for the Warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it prepared because the Warren

Commission requested it or because MI. McCone thought it would

be a good idea?

MI. Helms. I thought the Warren Commission requested it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the affidavit also represent the

Agency's position at that time that you vere DCI?

Mr. Helms.

Yes, as far as I know.

MI. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the allegation was first

made that Oswald was connected in some way with the CIA?

Mr. Helms.

I thought that there were these allegations

kicking around right at the time, right after the President's

assassination. I don't know where they started but it seemed

to me they were kicking around. FBI was charged with having

used him too, I believe.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to read CIA number 1912

through 1913. Let me indicate for the record that this is part

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of the brief that had been prepared for Mr. McCone's presenta-

tion to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Helms.

Do you want me to read the next page?

Mr. Goldsmith. 1912 and 1913, please.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. You may hold on to that.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. On page number 1913, the first full para-

graph, it indicates we have traced the sponsorship of that

campaign, meaning the campaign to link Oswald to the Agency,

directly to individuals and components within the Soviet Police

State apparatus.

Are you able to state which individuals and components

within the Soviet Police State apparatus were responsible for

initiating the campaign that Oswald was a CIA agent?

MI. Helms. I am not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was any report ever done specifically

focusing on this issue?

Mr. Helms. I don't recall. I don't recall. I would have

thought that a statement like this would be based on FBI inter-

cepts and things of that kind showing that this had been a

propaganda broadcast from the Soviet Union, Black radio broad-

casts, things of that kind. I think when the man says indivi-

duals and components it just follows like night the day if a

Soviet broadcast says something then the Soviet Government is

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behind it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, did you ever see any written

reports dealing with this issue?

Mr. Helms. Not that I remember, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever conduct an investiga-

tion to determine whether Oswald in fact had ever been connected

with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. On, certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. And would you indicate for the record

when that investigation was conducted and by whom?

Mr. Helms. I think right after the assassination every-

body checked around to find out if there had been any contact

with him. This could have happened very quickly and I think it

would have been very easy to ascertain there had been no

contacts.

The Agency would not have put its Director in the position

McCone was put in the affidavit had been morally certain after

careful examination that this was the fact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall who was involved in this

investigative effort, specifically who was charged with it?

Mr. Helms.

No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was any investigative report generated

in 1963 or '64 pertaining to this issue?

Mr. Helms. I don't remember. Certainly we were all

interested to find out the truth of this matter and we all came

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down with the sensation that this was an accurate statement

that Mr. McCone was being asked to make. After all, it would

have been our jobs if this had been wrong.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what the AGency's investiga-

tion involved? Was it simply checking files, talking to

individuals?

Mr. Helms. We would have checked with files, checked with

individuals, checked with various parts of the Agency to find

out if they had any contacts. They would have consulted their

records.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a mere file check definitely resolve

the question of whether Oswald was connected in any way with

the Agency?

Mr. Helms.

No, I think this went further than a file

check.

People were physically asked, I think the Domestic

Contact Division was asked if they had any record of this man.

I am certain that people would have been gone to and said have

you ever heard of this fellow, has everybody identified with

us? We checked the file, we checked people's memory, we would

have been careful about this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that your investigation

would have been hampered in some way by the problems of fake

files?

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Mr. Helms. I can't imagine that it would have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain why not?

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Mr. Helms. Simply because I can't imagine why you would

have wanted to have a fake file on a man like Lee Harvy Oswald.

What would have been the purpose of it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, my point is if Oswald was an agent

that it is possible for someone to have a fake file and con-

cealed the fact of that Agency relationship.

Mr. Helms. I suppose anything is possible in the world

but it didn't happen anyway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever have an operational

interest in Oswald?

Mr. Helms. Not that I know of. But that is not to say

that somebody might not have thought why don't we double that

fellow Oswald, why don't we see this, that of the other about

him, but no record was everestablished that contact was in fact

made with him for these purposes, and if there is anybody who

made such a contact my statement is wrong, I have never heard

about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I woüld like to show you a document that

suggests at the very least a contact with Oswald was contem-

plated.

Mt. Helms. I think Epstein says this in his book, doesn'ti

he?

Mr. Goldsmith. I will show you CIA document number 3367.

Make that CIA number 3369. Please read this.

Mr. Helms. It looks plausible enougt..

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Mr. Goldsmith. Now, incidentially, that document makes

reference to a Harvey story. Do you know which Harvey story

that would be referring to, which Harvey that would be referring

to? For example, is it possible that it is referring to

William Harvey?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea. No idea what it refers to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Mr. Ambassador, at the very least,

wouldn't the Agency have had an interest in debriefing Oswald

upon his return form the USSR, in order to attempt to obtain

information on his experience there?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought that that were so but I

also would have thought that we would have relied on the Marine

Corps or Navy Intelligence to do that job, since he was a

Marine.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any working relationship between

the Agency and DOD which would have ensured that either DOD or

CIA would have debriefed Oswald?

Mr. Helms. Certainly I don't think there is any question

but it would have been fully expected that the Navy would have

interrogated him, if not also the FBI. But normally the Agency

didn't interrogate other agencies of the government personnel

when they came back. We interrogated other people who dian't

have any government affiliations but not usually other govern-

ment agencies, unless there was some particular reason for it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald may have positive

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information by virtue of his employment in the radio factor

in Minsk, you don't think that the Agency would have had an

interest in him?

Mr. Helms. I think they might have had. This fellow

indicates that he had an interest for quite a different reason,

but I would have thought that it would have been left to the

Navy to debrief him and if he had anything of particular

interest it would have been passed to us and we might want to

follow up at some point. There is no evidence any follow up

was ever made even though there might have been interest there.

It is the facts we are dealing with, not the supposition that

you might

have done it or not done it. It is the facts we

--

are dealing with.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, the following factors have

been cited by the Warren Commission critics as circumstantial

evidence indicative of Oswald having had connection with the

American intelligence community. I would like to read to you

briefly the list and have you comment upon it.

The First one, the absence of any commercially available

aircraft transportation for Oswald to have traveled from England

to Helsinki at the time that he did.

Secondly, the ease with which Oswald received his discharge

from the military.

Third, the ease and speed with which Oswald received his

visa into the USSR.

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Fourth, the ease and speed with which Oswald was reissued

a passport in 1963, despite his earlier attempt to defect to

the USSR.

And fifth, the relative ease with which Oswald was permitted

to return to the United States by US officials after his stay

in the USSR.

These factors taken in conjunction with questions that

have been raised by th- Oswald file, for example, the delayed

opening of the file, the CI/SIG unit initiating the opening of

the file, the absence of any record indicating that Oswald had

been debriefed by the Agency, have been advanced, as I said, as

circumstancial evidence that Oswald did have connections with

the intelligence community.

What weight, if any, should be given to these factors in

evaluating whether Oswald was an agent, source or employee of

any American intelligence agency?

Mr. Helms. My understanding is that he was not an employee

of any American intelligence agency, therefore, the weight that!

one gives these conjectures

should be determined by the

individual who is doing

the weighing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Talking hypotehtically now, if you

approached these factors without the advance knowledge as to

what the result is in this case, what weight would you give

these factors?

Mr. Helms. I wouldn't give very much weight to them.

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They are just casual comments -- the speed with which, the ease

with which. What the hell does that mean?

Mr. Goldsmith. I would be glad to go into detail for you,

if you would like me to.

Mr. Helms. In other words, it was six days instead of

six weeks, or it was this, that or the other thing. What have

you found out? The more interesting things, why were these

things done, why did he get his

passport back so guickly from

the State Department, what do the State Department people say?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry that I am not able to respond

to your questions.

The Committee Rules prohibit me from

responding.

Would you care to make any comment upon these

factors

that,

as I say, have been advanced by Warren. Commission critics as

circumstantial evidence of intelligence association by Oswald?

Mr. Helms.

My only comment is the United States is a

nation of Monday morning quarterbacks.

Mr. Goldsmith. What factors, Mr. Ambassador, would you

emphasize in attempting to resolve this issue?

Mr. Helms.

Resolve which

• issue?

Mx. Goldsmith. The issue of whether Oswald was an agent

or source of information for the CIA.

MI. Helms. I just told you that he wasn't and I am morally

certain that he was not and I don't want to get into any more

hypothetical discussion of this because I have never seen any

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evidence that he was. I have never talked to anybody that

talked to him. I have never discussed this matter in any

context which indicated to me that he had worked for CIA and,

therefore, these conjectures are conjectures.

MI. Goldsmith. You wouldn't consider these factors as

circumstantial evidence then?

Mr. Helms. They don't bother me any.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, during the time that you

were both DCI and earlier DDP, in any event, during that time

period, were your telephone conversations either tape recorded

or transcribed by a stenographer as a matter of routine?

Mr. Helms. When I was DDP from time to time a note or

two may have been taken by my secretary depending on whether

I asked her to or not. It was not routine. There was usually

a record kept of who had called or who I had called. When

I was Director, I had the capacity to tape the telephone con-

versations I had if I wanted to, but 99 percent of the time

I didn't do it.

MI. Goldsmith. What type of information goes into the

executive registry?

MI. Helms. The mail that comes to the director's office

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and the deputy director's office. That was simply a device

four routing and holding and disseminating the director's mail,

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or the mail of the director and the deputy director's office.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were these personal files or would the

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executive regestry contain personal letters, for example?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier today LBJ was told

in 1967 about the effort to get rid of Castro?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. Johnson was

given a copy of the 1967 IGR or whether anyone from his staff

was given a copy of this '67 IGR?

Mr. Helms.

Whose staff?

Mr. Goldsmith. I will rephrase the question.

Do you recall whether either President Johnson or any

member of his staff was permitted to read the 1967 Inspector

General's Report?

Mr. Helms. Certainly no member of the staff. I took the

report with me when I went to see President Johnson and he asked

me to tell him what was in it and I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the

case of a defector named Minktenbaugh, who defected from the

us to the soviet Union in 1959, and came back to the United

States in 1963, approximately, with a Soviet woman?

Mr. Helms. It is an unusual name and it certainly is

familiar to me, but these facts that you are citing here about

when he defected and coming back, I didn't know anything about

this woman and I am not even sure that I focused particularly

on when he came back.

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Mr. Goldsmith. The next point I was about to make was

Minktenbaugh and his woman companion were KGB. Once Minktenbaugh

had gone. to the Soviet Union the KGB contacted him and attempted

to solicit his assistance. When he came back to the United

States his effort toasist the KGB was discovered and he was

convicted, I imagine, of espionage.

Now, the facts of this case are somewhat similar to

Oswald's case.

Oswald defected to the Soviet Union and came

back with a Soviet wife. There is a question as to whether

Marina may have had KGB connections, but we will leave that

for another day.

Do the parallels in that case that I have just described

have any significance, in your opinion, with regard to Oswald's

case?

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Mr. Helms. The intelligence parallels are useful but they

don't prove anything. There is so many circumstantial things

that go on in intelligence work that you have to have some

independent way of checking whether it is the same or justseems!

to be the same. Obviously the great hole in this whole case is

what the Soviets had to say to Lee Harvey Oswald when he was

in the Soviet Union during all those months, and we don't really

know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I just have one final question. There have

been allegations made through the years that former agency

employee Howard Hunt was involved in the assassination of the

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of the President. Do you have any information that would shed

light upon that allegation?

Mr. Helms.

No, I can't shed any light upon it except that

I don't believe it.

Mr. Goldsmith.

Do you know whether Mr. Hunt was in Dallasi

on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Helms. I believe it has been ascertained he was not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge one way

or the other?

MI. Helms. I don't have any personal knowledge one way of

the other. I remember this coming up in some connection, maybe

it was in connection with the Church Committee hearings.

. Mr. Goldsmith. Or Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Helms. Yes, or Rockefeller Commission. I have

testified so many times it is now all a blur, I mean before so

many different groups.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr.

Ambassador, I would like to thank you

for testifying here today. As Chairman Preyer indicated to

you this morning, under the Committee Rules you do have an

opportunity to make a statement on the record. If you woula «

like to make some statement at this time, please feel free to

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do so.

Mr. Helms. Thank you very much.. I don't think I have

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anything to add to what I have said. I appreciate the courtesy

with which you have dealt with me and I appreciate very much

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your making an extra effort to finish the hearings today.

don't have any substantive comments to make in addition to what

I have testified to here, except to say that I think that you

are in charge of a very difficult investigation, particularly

one taking place so much later than the events themselves,

and that it seems to me you have gone at it with great thorough-

ness and care. I think that does it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE OF STENOTYPE REPORTER

I, Robert B. Thomas, stenotype reporter, do hereby certify

that the testimony of the witness which appears in the fore-

going deposition was taken

by me in stenotype and thereafter

reduced to typewriting under my direction; that said deposition

is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that

I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the

parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and

further, that I am not a relative or employeed of any

attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, or finan-

cially of other wise interested in the outcome of the action.

Milet B

i learney

Stenotype

Reporter

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