PAPER: CLANDESTINE SERVICES CUBAN COLLECTION PROGRAM
Agency: CIA
Originator: CIA
Document date: 01/01/0000
Document type: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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Date: 11/29/99

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JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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: PAPER: CLANDESTINE SERVICES CUBAN COLLECTION PROGRAM

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES CUBAN COLLECTION PROGRAM

I. Factors Favoring Cuban Operations

The clandestine collection effort against Cuba, In Its

present scope and dimension, had 1ts genesis in early 1962

when Task Forõe W was created and the Cuban target was

designated as the highest priority for all components of the

This organizational push, combined

with cortain characteristics of Cuba and the Cubans, resulted

in a truly comprehensive collection program which has endured

to the present time.

Compared to other Soviet Bloc or

Chinese Communist nationalities, the Cubang were omnipresent,

accessible, and easy to recruit.

We were dealing with an

unsettled bourgeois generation only recently subjected to a

Communist regime.

Many, particularly the middle class,

wanted out or, if forced by various reasons to remain, were

willing to cooperate in place. Techniques and tactics of

population control were at a rudimentary stage, while the

habits, customs, and traditions of the entire populace were

Hestern-oriented, particularly towards the United States.

Cubans of all classes and occupations have some understanding

of and sympathy for the U.S.; nearly every Cuban has a close

relative or friend in exile in the U.8., Spain, or Latin

America; most of the population 1s antipathetic to communtsm

and to Eastern Europeans as such.

These factors not only

create a large potential-agent pool, but ease the recruitment

problem.

The Cuban internal security nechanism, though wide-

spread and intensively active, has not yet measured up to

normal denied-area standards.

They are zealous in pursult

of the counterrevolutionary but still fortunately weak in

pursuit of espionage.

Finally, the country itself, being an

Island, must communieate and trade to survive, and these

channels have never been rigidly controlled.

II. Factors Militating Against Cuban Operations

Ranged against these favorable factors, however, are

others which counterbalance our efforts in something resembling

an equal proportion. Cubans generally constitute very poor

agent material. They do not know the meaning of security;

HIH

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they do not take orders well, and the lonesome courage

required for espionage is raroly part of their mako-up.

They make good lighters but poor apies. It should be

noted too that the fOC 1s an exceBaively personalized

regime. To know what 19 going on at the top, 1t 18

necessary to know what Castro and perhaps two or throe

others have on their minds. This severly reduces the

number of potential sources who can provide intelligence

of crucial signllicance.

The soviats in Cuba--the other

half of the major target--have succeeded in achleving

almost complete isolation Iron the Cuban population, with

the consequence that agent collaction against almost any

facet of the soviet presence has been virtually impossible.

Finally, the steadily Increasing Isolation of the island

has worked to our disadvantage by foroing almost complete

rellance upon secret writing and radio, both of which have

severe limitations. Personal meetings

with the resident

agents are all but Impossible. Material supply 18 difficult

and possible only in rare instances. Cameras are of limited

use due to the dangor to the user plus the virtual imposs1-

billty of getting the exposed film off the island within a

reasonable period of time. Cuban economic chaos is so bad

that at times agents must

walt weeks for adequate paper on

which to forward their secrot writing messages, while the

Cuban postal service 1a such that mail to the u.s..

particularly by devious channels, often takes thirty days.

III. The Present Clandestine Collection Program

The main oharacteristics marking Clandestine

services

operations against Cuba are size, complexity, and diversity.

The collection program is not only world-wide, utilizing all

proven collection tochniques, but also parallels action and

support progians such as economic denial, sabotage; a

special program devoted to the utilization of Cuban ships,

sallorg, and alroraft; radio and propaganda, a sizable

paramilitary facility; and numerous axile uses.

Intelligence

collection has a role in all of these programs either as an

essential element on which the activity is based of as &

by-product of a program oriented to some other end. In the

case of econonio dental, for instanoe, sound and pervasive

& requisite. At the present

time our continuing flow of Intelligence relative to cuban

commercial plans, prospects, and intentions far outstrips

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our ability or even the necessity to act against them.

In another instance a sabotage project involving oil and

chemical additives has produced some of our best insights

Into this area of the Cuban economy.

A. Types of Assets and Their Status

For purposes of management and operational

reporting, collection assets portinent to the

Cuban target have come to be categorized into

Resident Agents, Resident Nets, Logal Travelers,

and so forth as discussed below under the respective

headings. Each category of assets epitomizes &

collection technique or function involving 1t8

own disciplines and partloular problens.

All things considered, the quallty of these

assets 1s good. Their reporting 18 voluminous

and comprehensive, providing a complete and

continuous picture of Cuba and of Cuban government

machinations, both within and without the island.

None of these assets, however, 1s high-level or

privy to the basic political and military decisions

which affect U.S. security. On this score we are

left with putting bits and pleces of information

together as indioations of intent.

There are,

however,

two possibilities for laproving the

collection program implicit in the assets listed

below.

Continued work with these assets could

and will improve their performance in many respocts.

So too the acquisition of additional assets under

any category may well improve our capability in one

direction of another. The fact remains, however,

that the odds are always very much against acquiring

the right asset in the right place at the right time.

Resident Agents

.10

(Comprising a total of 85 persons)

singletons.

Soviet-Bloc Nationals:

. 64

. 1

This pool of resident agents constantly undergoes

slight quantitative and qualitative change. Though

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for the most part the question of agent selection

is a matter of opportunitios available at any

given moment,

every possible neans is utilized

to obtain resident assets who have access to

s1gn1f1cant dats.

These assets roport almost

exclusivoly vie secret writing. though & few

have radios. By far most of these Resets are

In the lavana ares, basically because of the

protectivo anonymity afforded by the metropolis,

plus the fact that communication with the proy-

Inces 1s diffioult. We atteupt to break this

cluster pattern by illegal infiltrations of

assets into the provinces, but success 1s limited

by the many forces which work agalnst illegals.

Although the numbers of agents are respectable

by any standards and their reporting performance

Is good and constantly improving, none of them

1s close to the top political level of the c0c;

none is privy to significant GOf ailitary secrets;

and none can report with any degree of consistency

on the soviet presence on the island. If such &

prospect exists, present approaches vill undoubt-

edly turn him up.

It is not likely that increased

expenditure or inoreased effort in any of the

proven directions will usterially increase our

present chances.

Legal travelers

Periodic Avallablo travelers. •

GoC Kartners (Recruited and Reporting).

Legal Travel Miasions of All Types (1964) : 29

The logal traveler, alsont by delinition le

nover going to bo admitted to aigniiicant secrets in

& country such an Cuba today.

To the extent that such

travelers

are reputed comminists of leftists, their

access is increased, but po outsider of whatever

complexion is going to soquire significant knowledge

of the type with which we are concerned.

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Penetrationg of Cuban Diplomatic Missiong

(Total - 15)

Mexico City.

London. . .

Rome. .

Geneva.

Brussels.

Токуа:

• 2

•

• 1

1

2

• 1

New Delhi

Cairo ..

The Hague

Paris ..

Beirut.

Madrid.

•

1

1

1

1

• 1

Cuban diplomats (and official travelers as well)

provide perhaps the best chance of securing a high-

level agent inside. They are accessible, recruitable

In & decreasing percentage, and can be motivated and

trained.

It 1s hoped and expected that some of those

now recruited will be returned to Havana to & high-

level foreign office or other governmental post. Baged

on our target studies, name checks, and the like, the

present rate of approach to Ilkely recruitees 1a close

to 100 por cent world-wide. Increased effort in

milieu would nerely reduce us to the "cold pitch"this

technique which has proven fallible too often to merit

anything but the most limited and calculatad use.

Audio Operations Againgt Cuban Diplomatic Missiong

(Total - 11)

ROme ..

1

Mexico Clty.. 1

Copenhagen

• 1

Brussels ... 1

Madrid. ....

1

Paris

...

4

Athens . . ..

1

London . ... 1

Telephone Tap Operations

(Total - 14)

London . . .

The Hague.

Berlln .

1

1

1

Santiago

Rome.

Mexico city.:

1

Lisbon.

Madrid

Athens

..

Oslo ...

okyo. .

Paris.

•

1

1

1

1

•

1

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Other Intercopt Operations

(Total - 5)

London

Montevideo

1

Merrid:: :

Berlin

1

Mexico City.

. 1

The typos of operationg listed above are all

and generally expensive in all respects.

they are judged to ba worth the investment in terms

of the general operational information they provide

leading to Identification and often rearuitment of

Cuban officials.

Some, of course, depending an

multitude of circumstances which range from the

location of the transmitter to the habits of the

target personnel, do produce disseminable 1ntell1-

gence information.

None, however,

has produced or

1s llkely to produce high-level milltary or security

Information which 1s simply not avallable outside

Cuba or the Soviet Union 1tself.

Third Country Assets

(Total - 205)

Collectors of Information. . :•:.•: 102+*

Support Assets... . .....

•103**

**These figures have dropped during the past

three montha mainly due to South American

countries breaking diplomatic relations with

Cuba.

Collection/Support Agents Residing

In the United States

(Total - 259)

Collection/Support Groups •

• 8*47

***These groups consist of an unknown number of

Station assets (Individuals) being used at

varlous times on Cuban targets.

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Debriefing Centers for Cuban Refugees

(Total - 3)

Mexico Clty. . 1 Madrid. . l Hiam1.. 1

The groups of assets listed above have many uses

beyond those implicit in their titles. Aside from the

collectorg whose role is obvious, they congist of

translators,

and a host

of others.

1s one of the best indications of the size of the

Clandestine Services Cuban effort. They are ugeful

and necessary but seldon, in the nature of things,

produce strategic intelligence.

Intelligence Collection by Illegal Infiltrations

After the Bay of Pigs practically all Intelligence

nets in Cuba were completely neutralized. When the

Cuban crisig of 1962 occurred, the Agency had developed

two new controlled and responsive teams with known

contacts or sources amounting to approximately 100

persons.

Both of these nets have now been rolled up.

Ag & result of continued losses of tllogal teams,

the program has been modified.

The nat concept has

been to reduce the size of the black teams to five

men or lesa, infiltrating them for 15 to 30 days to

recruit and train legal residents; operate thelr

two-way radios; and, of course, to report intelligence

Information while they are there. At present we have

eleven such teams organized and prepared in all

respects. Seven of then have been infiltrated into

Cuba one or more times.

There are currently seven

nets established by these means inside Cuba (northern

Pinar del R1o - 1, northern Matanzas - 1, northern

Las Villas - 2, southern Las Villas - 1, northern

Camaguey - 1, and northern Oriente - 1) in vardous

stages of development. Five of the nets have estab-

lished, or are in the process of establishing, two-way

radio communications.

Clearly, this 1s a feasible means of acquiring

new overage. The illegal teams themselves are very

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restrioted in movement and in accoss and for all

substantial Intelligence coverage must rely upon

their ability to establish and exploit logal resident

contacts:

This in turn 18 a tenuous business-

essentially starting the intelligonce process all

over again--with recruitment, training, furnishing

requirements, reporting, communication, and so forth

being essential.

Then

too, protoction against Just

such infiltrations has long been a major preoccupa-

tion of the Cuban government.

Naval and alI patrola,

as well as radar and coast watchers, have steadily

Increased. It is becoming progressively more diffi-

cult and risky to evade the ever-improving Cuban

countertaotics.

Although the nets and contacts established to

date by 11legal infiltrations have been generally

low-level, provincial, and limited in their Intelligence

contribution to visual observation of OB or ground

soars, this does not preclude the possibility that

such an operation could ultimately develop & high-

level source or be designed specifically to recrult

оде.

Sintlarly, the tempo of current In/exfiltrationg

could be stepped up by added investment and commitment

of manpower, but we would have to be prepared to suffer

maritime as well as agent losses. The intelligence

fron this type of operation has been small, and, though

short-term infiltration efforts will continue, it 1s

doubtful that a alzable increase in the number of

1llegal Infiltration operations could significantly

affect the quantity of intelligence produoed on Cuba.

B. Mscellaneous Collection Techniques and Targets

Support Assets as Collectors

The Agency has extensive controt with Nestern

diplomats in Havana, wherever feasible, on a unt-

lateral basta.

These officials have not proved to

be of consistent value as intelligence sources although

the unilateral contacts espectally have proven to be

Indispensable as support issets. He have had much

the sane experiences with cuban sailors and ships

offloerg. The Cuban merchant marine has been systen-

atically exploited by the agency with good results.

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Though the officors and sallorg who have been

racrulted (some 36 at the present time, have not

provided intelligence of aritical value, they have

made recruitments and provided support to resident

assets and, most important, are of key importance

to the subtle sabotago program.

Refugee Reporting

Reporting by refugees from Cuba deserves special

mention.

It will be recalled that some of the first

reports on the introduction of heavy Soviot missiles

into Cuba (mid-1962) were based on refugee debrief-

Ingg which preceded by several montha evidence

produced by aerial photography. Although refugee

reports can nover equal aerial

photography in terms

of rellabllity, timeliness, and detail, they have been

shown to gerre

as a significant corollary to collection

by technical means.

The flow of refugees, however,

has greatly decreased since early 1963.

Ground Observers

Ground observation of the camps and sites may

provide Information on missile sites. This 18 gained

by recent refugees who have lived in the neighborhood

and who can report the existence of camps and camp

activity, such as movement of personnel in and out,

major construction work, and movement of equipment.

Sullar information comes Iron travelers or resident

agents who pass by the sitas, elther regularly or on

one or two occasions. It must be emphasized that the

coverage is spotty. An Increase in quallty could

posgibly be obtained by selective use of black box

operations agalast key misafle sites.

Port Hatchers

some sources can observe the arrival and unloading

of ships,

and their descriptions of the cargo unloaded

can sometimes reveal the delivery of missile-related

equipment. such reports are valuable if the descrip

tlons are olear enough; but again the coverage 15

spotty.

He do not have sources covering all important

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IV.

Cuban ports 24 hours a day.

Analogous to this is

road-watching. Sometimes missile oquipaent can be

seen en route from the port to the camp or from

a route Bron

one camp to another, and agents do report on the

movement of convoys.

Military Sources

such less Irequently, intormation 1s obtainec

from military personnel

stationed at the camps ir

question, or having access to them. These sources

are in &

position to report on what is actually

present at the camps.

On rare occasions a source

who has acoess to high government officials 1s able

to report statoments by such officials concerning

the presence of missiles.

such reporting 1s sporadic

at best.

The Soviet Target

Coverage of Soviet Installations in Cuba by

the Clandestine Services has been spotty.

failure to provide adequate coverage, however, 1a

by no means due to lack of sustained effort.

Many

attempts have been made to develop assets with

ACOBSS

to this target, but we have never succeeded

1n developing a source capable of reporting on this

subject on & continuing basis. Rather, we have had

to be satisfied with a number of sources on the

periphery of the target, whose cumulative reporting

provided some insight into the target but insuffi-

olent, broadly based intelligence to serve the needs

of the community.

Human and Technical Limitations

A. Recruitment - Motivation

Within the past 12 months the Agency has

experienced the emergence of a new attitude anongst

most of the Cubane who it has attempted to recruit.

He can epitonize this attlitude in the phrase

"standard denied-area mentality." Though Cubans

of all walks of life continue to exhibit an unusual

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willingness to meet with our case officers for

to respond to our efforts to recruit via the malls),

they demonstrate, increagingly, an unwillingness

to accept rearuitment. The reasons given sor

rejection of our proposals turn essentially upon

the complex of fears found in any of the old-lino

police states.

Whereas even 12 months ago nearly

60 per cent of all persons approached would express

readiness to serve as sources of intelligence on

suba (aotual periormance rate, of course, was much

Lower), we are now receivine turn downe

at a ratio

of 4 to 1.

The causes of this quiet "crisis 1n notivation"

are many.

By and large they are a function of the

entire history of the Irustrations experienced by

most Cubans over the past five years.

01 late the

objective conditions bearing on the durability of

Castro's regime have shifted in our favor.

The

shift has ocourted essentially becruse of

the

pollteration of severe economio problems, and

though there exists a genuine possibility that

astro a government will ultInataly collapse iron

ranagerial ineptitude.

the shift has been subtle,

nondramatle, and ts not easily worked into the

structure of the rocruitment pitch. Those officlal

Cuban tärgets on assignment outside Cuba may well,

as they sense impending disaster, becone increns-

lagly susceptible to rocruitment or defeotion, but

residents of Cuba will, 1l anything, become even

leas prone to rink-taking, particularly as the

Intornal security system tightens.

Agalnst this background the question of tho

avallability of tunds 1s not particularly relevant,

since esperience has clearly demonstrated that money

as such is not the eritloal factor in Inducing the

Cubans to conduat espionage.

In rare instances the

promise of high pay has perhaps been the stone in

the balance, but, particularly in regard to resident

agents, noney has not and will not serve as a stroug

inducement.

In any event, vere the salaries of all

existing agents doubled and these rates applied to

all future recruits, the sums involved would be

relatively modest.

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B. Technical lactors

to afford the comprehensive intelligence coverage

necessary to the polley sakers..

Thus though efforts

to recruit such officials vill be sustalned, we

must continue & nafor effort to pursue the intensive

exploitation of resident agents and the complex

process of acquiring additional on-island assets.

These tro enterprises, at once interrelated and

independent, are inhibited sost profoundly by the

problen of cosmunications. Basically, this matter

has two major lacets, discussed below.

Timeliness of Information

Many factors conspire against timely reporting

from Cuba, prinary amongst then being the 1ne1f1-

ciency of the Cuber postal systen and the impoverish-

ment of the Cuban transportation facilities.

without

benefit of Oil, the exchange of secret writing

mossages betreen Esvans and the fest consumes an

average of four weeks. The introduction of ofVL

dan cut this to ten, sometines seven days.

For the

Immediate future there will be no ready solution to

the tining probles.

He rust live with the seven-day

minimun except for those few agents who can utilize

their own W/T set.

Commintcations Materiel

Though teciniques hare been developed whereby

agents can be placed on two-vay secret wrlting vla

the mails, thus greatly expanding the potential

agent pool, the technique ta time-consuning and 1n

its initial stages very complex.

The problen is not

only to get the 1der of nessago development and

carbon technique across to the prospective agent,

but to hold hin to tax long enough to train and

provide him with ever more adequate, secure

materials.

In order, horever,

to make these

"boot

strap" operations genulnely effective, it is neces-

sary to introduce OfVl. Forceful efforts are being

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made to perfoct the development of a secret writing

key text and developer system which can be forwarded

to the agont vis the mails.. Clearly, success 1n

this effort would not only enable us to increase the

number of agents on OfVL but would make them nore

effective operationally by reducing the s-6 week

exchange tine involved in two-way gecret writing.

To date all agents operating with OWVL have received

their naterials vis dead drops, with one or two

having been delivered by courier. Except for a

low dead drops by intiltrated teams, ald dead drops

have been sade by im diplomat, one of whom, &

untlateral asset, uns made a prodigious number of

drops.

The other diplomat, more conservative and

under tight control by hig

service, will Increase

his dropping activity, but only to a limited degree.

There are definite limits to the number of diplomat

available for drop-making and limits to the drop

process itsell.

Hiniaturized medium-speed W/T sets can be and

have been cached and recovered. It will always

be a rather major undertaking to cache & W/T set

and a major task to recover it. St1ll neither

undertaking is as massive as that of rendering

A vast assortment of lactora

here render definite, very narrow limits to the

number of /T operations we can expect to activate

and saintain within a 12-to-18-month pertod.

V. Conclusion

The problem facing the Clandestine Services in the

present context is one of developing a sufficient number of

rellable assets with adequate access to the target and

effective cormunloation, who could serve as sources of

continuing, timely, and

rellable reporting. There is no

simple solutlon to

the problem, and an Increase in funds

would help to solve it only partially.

Availability of

funds has never been an obstacle.

Bather, the problem has

and mill continue to revolva arouna one critical 188u0: to

rind, recrult, and train agents in place. By increasing the

number of competent case officers we can expand the effort

In most categories and improve the over-all intelligence

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take but only to a limited degree owing to the 11m1tat1018

previously cited.

However, should the Agency, despite these

Initing frotors, be called upon to replace the coverage now

provided by the U-?, it rould be necessary to reorient the

present

broad collection miasion and concentrate on "early

warning" colloction specifically relating to the reintroduction

of missiles and associated delivery systems.

In such a situation, the order of prioritles would become:

Cuban nilitary structure:

soviet military presence;

Cuban political developments;

Export of the Revolution;

cuban soonomy:

Chinese Communist Involvement; and

Anti-regime conspiracy.

To meet these objectives, existing agent networks in

Cuba would need to be expanded and redirected and new assets

would have to be recruited in the hope that a minimal decept-

ablo lovel of early warning intelligence could be produced

In timely fashion, thereby filling the gap created by

discontinuing U-2

111ghts. Cessation of U-t overflights,

however, would most certainly be taken by the people of Cuba

as further evidence of a U.S. polley of "coexistence with

Castro. "

To combat this and to bolster norale of those cubans

who might otherwise have been ready to assist us, it would be

essential to step up those portions of our psychologloal

warfare program almed at stiffening the Cuban patriot's will

to resist.

such an accelerated progran of operations agalnst cuba,

backed by increases in tunds and personnel, would undoubtedly

Increase the quantity of our milltary carly varning latelligence.

It 1s unltkely, however, that it could ever be made to equal

the intelligence now avallable through a collation of photo-

graphic intelligence with the current volume of clandestine

and other reporting. This conolusion is based essentially on

the recognition that in an era of nuclear confrontation, polley

makers will not accept agent feporting as the hard intelligence

needed before momentous decisions can be made. In thia context,

It 1s belloved that our expanded intelligence

effort would be,

àt best, an early warning net designed to datoct signs of

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strategic missile reintroduction. When these signs are

1dentifled, U-2 flights and other technical collection

techniques would have to be launched to confirm or deny

the intelligence produced by agent assets.

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