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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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CIA Internal Use Only

Access Controlled by

CIA History Staff

TS#795052

Copy 1 of 2

AGENCY,T

THING BANG OF HIN

OFFICIAL HISTORY

OF THE

BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

VOLUME III

EVOLUTION OF CIA'S

ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES.

1959-JANUARY 1961

(pages 1-203)

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TS#795052

DCI -8

December 1979

Copy 1 of 2

PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

DO NOT DESTROY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL HISTORY

OF THE

BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

DCI-8

Volume III

EVOLUTION OF CIA'S

ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,

1959-JANUARY 1961

December 1979

Jack B. Pfeiffer

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Foreword

This is the third volume of the Official History

of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the

problems of establishing a policy for the United

States Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts

came to power in Cuba.* The policy decided on by the

US Government in March 1960 called for the displace-

ment of Fidel Castro,

and it was by no means a uni-

lateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence

Agency -- although it is demonstrable that the Agency

was far more perceptive than the policy making bodies

in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere

posed by Castro's communist affiliation.

Because the

policy makers feared censure by the United Nations

and/or the Organization of American States, the myth

of "plausible deniability" was the caveat that deter-

mined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for

the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination,

The preceding volumes were:

I - Air Operations

II - Participation in the Conduct of Foreign

Policy.

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"deniability" would be the albatross around the necks

of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, (ê.f.;

15 April 1961) it became the

strangling cord insuring

the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs.

This volume describes the Agency's organization

designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it

records the interaction between the Agency and other

government components (State and the military in

particular), between the Agency and the White House,

and among various CIA components as the program

evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than

harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the

roles played by both

President Eisenhower who author-

ized the anti-Castro program and Vice President Nixon

who has been charged time and again -- unjustifiably

as the record

reveals

with being the mastermind

behind the operation.

Emphasis

also is focused on the drastic change

in the concept of the operation between the spring

and fall of 1960.

From April's plans for the infil-

tration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained

specialists in communications, sabotage, and para-

military operations to provide training and guidance

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to anti-Castro dissidents, November's plans called for

an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support

to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a

by State

controlled

provisional government (approved and spensered by CIA)

could issue its clarion calls for US, UN, or OAS inter-

vention.

Encompassed in this volume are the records of

the policy level meetings which considered such items

as funding the operation, possible use of US personnel

in combat roles; the use of US bases for training or

for operations, types of direct action programs (e.g.,

propaganda drops vs sabotage), and the host of other

problems related to Castro's overthrow. It also makes

clear that various US corporate interests played an

active (sometimes overactive) role in support of the

anti-Castro efforts of the Government.

This volume also examines official records in

light of the allegations of the Senate Select Commit-

tee's investigations that the assassination plans being

developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the

official US Government program to overthrow Fidel

Castro.

There is no basis in fact for this chang

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Finally, the reader of this volume should gain

some insights to the character of various of the

principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency -- who were

involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro

policy during the period from its inception through

the close of the Eisenhower administration. Not all

of these impressions are

flattering; but the author,

who was in no way associated with the operation or

the Directorate of Plans (now Operations), hopes that

the presentation of the evidence has been as free from

bias as possible.

Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valu-.

able contributions of the other two members of the CIA

History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hammond and Mrs. Sharon

Bond, to the completion of this volume. Without their

unfailing willingness to perform either the 'substantive

research or the grimly mechanical tasks required in

preparing a volume such as this, the task could have

been interminable.

For any errors of fact or questionable interpreta-

tions, the author alone is responsible.

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Volume III

Contents

Foreword

Part I

Part II

Part III

Part IV

Part V

Part VI

Part VII

Part VIII

Background .

A.

Watching from the Sidelines

B.

Castro Takes Over

Castro Must Go

A. Organizing for Covert Action

B. Forging the Tool

C. Cooperation and Challenge

D. Personnel and Training

Changing Concepts

Presidential Resurgence

Direct Action Programs

A.

B.

Propaganda

Sabotage and other Exercises

Mr. Nixon's Role

The Question of Assassinations

Conclusions

A.

Appendixes

Memorandum for the Director of Central

Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

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Page

iii

1

17

32

32

80

104

126

143

165

204

204

233

241

277

290

296

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Page

B. A Program of Covert Action Against

the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 : •

..300

C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

1) Letter for Allen Dulles from

Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60

TS (DD/P 0-1436) . .

2) Letter for Gordon Gray from

Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 •

3) Memorandum for

the Special

Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

from Hayan Williams, 16 Mar 60,

sub: US Policy toward Cuba

311

313

318

D.

Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director

(Plans) - Action from, J. D. Esterline,

2 May 60, sub: Liaison with US

Agencies on JMARC Activities . .

332

E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at

Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 •

335

F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting

with

Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959

• . . . • 337

G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice

President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub:

What We Are Doing in Cuba

344

Source References

Part I

Background

347

Part II

• Castro Must Go

352

Part III

Changing Concepts

366

Part IV

Presidential Resurgence

369

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Part V

Direct Action Programs

Part VI :

Mr. Nixon's Role

Part VII Assassination

Part VIII Conclusions

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Page

374

382

386

388

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THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

Volume III

Evolution of CIA's

Anti-Castro Policies,

1950 - January 1961

Part I

Background

A. Watching from the Sidelines

Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the

earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young,

'student leaders' in Cuba, who manages to get himself

involved in many things that do not concern him." y/

Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came

to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence

Agency and to the United States Government (USG) . BY

early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action

program designed to remove the Castro government from

control. of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG

was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency

and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de

Cochinos from 17-19 April 1961.

Beginning in 1948 and continuing even after the

United States had formulated its official policy of

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removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban

Government, the principal questions faced by CIA's

Western Hemisphere Division, by the Department of

State, and by other concerned principals in the United

States were: What is Fidel Castro? By whom is he

controlled? What does he represent?. Is he, or is he

not, a Communist? The nature of the Agency's interest

in answers to these questions is reflected in various

of the records for the period beginning in the mid-

1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended in

considerable part on the reporting from the American

Embassy offices in Havana.

• Commenting on a report entitled "Antidemocratic

Antecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro" prepared

by President Batista's Military Intelligence Service

(SIM) -- apparently in response to a request from the

Buró de Represión a las Activadades Communistas (BRAC) *

- to the Counselor of the American Embassy (Amembassy)

in Havana, Lincoln Vinton Chapin, told the CIA repre-

sentative among other things, that:

* Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities.

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The SIM report is nothing more than

a summary of allegations and accusations

made against Fidel Castro during the

period 1948-1950.

This summary has

apparently been slanted in an effort to

make Castro a "Rojo," but the result

is a rather poor one. 2/

The Department of State reporter refuted, on a

paragraph by paragraph basis, all of the allegations

which indicated that Castro had been tied in with

Communists, or Communist sympathizers, ever since

his university days; and in forwarding the report to

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana

indicated that he was furnishing the information be-

cause of renewed interest by the State Department in

Fidel Castro. 3/

The tenor of State reporting continued in a

similar vein well into 1957. Charges that Castro

was a Communist could not be substantiated, but State

did note that in his student days, he 'was involved

in gangster-type activities." 4/ Havana Embassy

reporting also reflected another of the problems of

continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community --

would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista,

and were his basic feelings toward the US friendly. 5/

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In the mid-1950's, Havana Station ran seven

approved FI projects, most of which were aimed at

the Cuban Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista

Popular). Agency funds also were used to support

the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged

principally in propaganda

activities. 6/

Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General,

apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and

his party to a meeting with President Fulgencio

Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted

the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles,

in praise of the meeting.* I/ In fact, Agency support

for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a

democratically elected successor and amnesty for Castro

and his followers, as well as other anti-Batista dis-

sidents, was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector

General in November 1957. 8/

*

• David R. McLean, a former member of the IG's In-

spection Staff, attached a cryptic note to the copy

of Dulles' letter of response to Batista, which he,

(McLean) included in the file of miscellaneous docu-

ments on the Bay of Pigs, which were inherited by the

present author.

McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick

helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not

confirmed

this story.

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In view of subsequent developments, one inter-

esting suggestion made by the Inspector General in

November 1957 was the following:

On the island of Cuba, probably only

a US citizen, in some way known to be

connected with the US Government and

"assumed" to be backed by Washington,

would. have the ability to act as inter-

mediary between the various opposition

groups in the Batista Government

and

work out a possible "cease fire."

This

would have to be done covertly, and any

results achieved either not ever publicly

announced or certainly not advertised

until after the election.

Any public

attempt to bring peace would be fore-

doomed to failure by each side probably

indicating exorbitant demands and then

being unable to withdraw from its

announced position. * 9/

Although it may have had no relation to the

Kirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957, less

than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum,*

William Wieland of the Department of State notified

Adolf Rerle, one of the country's leading experts on

Latin American Affairs and a former member of the

It is interesting to speculate whether at this

time Kirkpatrick

was thinking of William D. Pawley,

former US Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an

American businessman who operated significant enter-

prises in Cuba, to negotiate with Batista.

Within

a year's time, Pawley, who also stood high in the

ranks

of the Republic Party contributors, was desig-

nated

to undertake such a mission to Cuba.

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State Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, ac-

cording to Berle, "to see whether anything can be

done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an

orderly conclusion." 10/

Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted:

It is rough going, anti-intervention is

all right up to a point.. But we are re-

sponsible for keeping order in the hemis-

phere quite aside from the proprieties, and

a rather bolder policy in that regard

seems indicated. 11/

By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently

concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of

Castro's government,

and particularly the pro-Castro

proclivities of his two principal deputies, Ernesto

Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel's brother, that

penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a

priority concern of the field. At least two agents

were successfully placed in PSP ranks, and in March

1958, one Agency officer managed to join the Castro

forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and

to observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958,

Robert D. Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself

"captured" by Raul Castro's forces in order to be

able to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US

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businessmen

who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro.

In both instances, the Agency representatives returned

unharmed; and both reported on the "radical" and anti-

American

nature of the Castro movement. According

to one source, Wiecha found "definite communist over-

tones" among the Raul Castro forces. * 12/

Additional documentation of the pro-communist

nature of the Castro organization was reported with

great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago

de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's

contingent was communist oriented or not, others such

as Adolf Berle and his friends (both in and

out of

State Department), continued to reflect their concern

about the possible ways to combat the growing strength

of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13/ Berle

was most

hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied

by cooperation among Latin American liberals working

in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans

who had broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos

and Pepín Bosch) with additional support from the OAS

The historian for WH Division provided the figures

on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates

19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured.

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-- and only minor participation from the US Department

of State. 14/

At a time when the Agency's fears about the

Castro movement were increasing, a rather different

proposal was put forward by the Chief of the Para-

military Division, Political and Psychological Staff,

of the Clandestine Service. Rather than trying to

whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the

wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro:

It was apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista

was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's

hostile attitude toward the United States because of

'our efforts to prop up Batista. To accomplish this,

Cox suggested that:

A practical way to protect United

States interests in this matter would

be to make secret contact with Castro,

assure him of the United States sympa-

thy with some of his objectives, and

to offer him support.

The individual

chosen to make the contact should be

of such background that it is clear

that he speaks with the authority of

the United States Government.

Obviously, the support must be given

covertly so as not to endanger United

States relations with Batista. The most

effective means of help to Castro would

be arms and ammunition. Air dropping of

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this equipment might be dangerous from

the security aspect.

Allowing a ship-

load of equipment manned by a Cuban

crew to evade our Coast Guard would

probably be a better method. The most

secure means of help would be giving

the money to Castro, who could then

purchase his own arms.

A combination

of arms and money would probably be

best. * 15/

By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent

that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under,

the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State

supported a plan to have Batista bow out more

or less

gracefully and to have the government of

the country

taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had

been elected in the rigged

election, but by a junta

pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When

•* Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was

biased against. Castro.

One report in the fall of 1958

indicated

that Castro definitely was not a Communist,

citing as a reason for this:

"Ninety-five percent of

his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic

priests have joined Fidel Castro and his forces in

the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro

and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces

under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains,

while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single

chaplain.

(Source comment:

The United States should

not be taken in by President Fulgencio Batista's attempt

to label the revolutionary movement as Communist in-

spired, dominated, or influenced.) " 16/

The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as

one might surmise, a Catholic priest.

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traveling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant

Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King,

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William

D. Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan

which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with

Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out

gracefully. Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and

friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been

running the Cubana Airline.

In return for Batista's support for a friendly

military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his

ouster - the representatives of the Department of

State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be

provided safety for himself, his friends, and his

close cronies, particularly those whose lives would

be endangered should there ever be a truly violent

overthrow of the government. Batista also was to be

provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba.

Various individuals were identified as possible candi-

dates for the junta, and, according to King, the

objective was that various of these members would have .

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sufficient political strength to weaken Castro's sup-

port.

Following the meeting in Miami, Pawley did

undertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba. Arriv-

ing on 8 December in Havana he had a series of pre-

liminary meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister.

who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley

indicated

that he was going to

make. Unfortunately,

however, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was

unlikely that Batista would accept the proposals.

The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took

place on 11 December 1958 when, according to the re-

port from Havana station:

Pawley met with Batista for two hours

this evening. Laid his plan before

Batista without pulling any punches.

B(atista] took it calmly.

He agreed with

much of Pawley's analysis of situation,

but said he could not take the junta

way out. 17/

Batista made no promises, and went through the

reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office --

for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that

there would be a blood bath; and that he had both

moral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana

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noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows:

Batista will not accept plan, and will

make every effort turn government over to

Rivera Aguero [the Batista candidate who

had been named Presidential successor in

a rigged election].

However, unfavorable

developments may produce change of attitude

on part of Blatistal. 18/

Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situ-

ation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of

the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. A

representative of the Archbishop of Havana, Father Bez

Chebebe, approached the American Consul in Santiago to

float some proposals

for resolving the differences be-

tween the two countries. The priest emphasized that

although a Castro take over was inevitable:

Both Fidel Castro

and US interests

had important stake in sugar crop and

both undoubtedly wish resolve problems

caused by present situation. Also said

that there were matters now mostly minor

on both sides which have been sources

mutual irritation and misunderstanding

and that these should be eliminated

soonest, so that they would not grow

to affect future relations, which Father

considers inevitable. 19/

In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of

Havana

indicated to the Amconsul that:

He though[t] US Government could

profitably send person of confidence,

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not necessarily an official, to discuss

mutual problems as discreetly as possi-

ble with Fidel. Implied that such would

be well received. 20/

Despite the fact that the communist proclivities

of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated

by Agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COS

Havana cabled Headquarters strongly supporting the

position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative

had proposed to the American Consulate, saying:

Havana Station feels proposal merits

serious

State/CIA consideration.

Opera-

tion this nature could pay big future

dividends if fully qualified person could

be found for job and dispatched quickly.

Regardless how we may feel about Castro

and his movement, both will be important

political forces for a long time to come.

Perhaps candidate could be found through

National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21/

At about the same time this proposal was being

put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary

Division (PMD) to establish a small contingency task

force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two

representatives of PMD, Lucious I. Rucker and William

G. Redel were sent to Havana -- Rucker to locate and

survey possible drop zones and Redel to get himself

into position to see if he could locate dissidents who

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were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista.

What WH hoped

to

accomplish, presumably, was that

they could organize

these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get

them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro

from taking over the government if Batista should

suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. 22/

On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported

to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in

place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington;

a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and

the Office of Logistics would have an arms load

rigged for a drop by 2 January 1959. 23/

It was not until the last week of December 1958

that President Eisenhower became actively involved in

discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward

Cuba. His interest was precipitated by a 23 December

1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by

the Acting Secretary of State and

sent

to Eisenhower's

National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed

the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 Decem-

ber. The President apparently indicated that he had

not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA

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regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of

the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on

a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject

for discussion.

Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences

of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other

individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the

President's Board of Consultants (later the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to

the discussions, but Dulles rather strongly suggested

that there was

a significant difference between the

discussions which were intended for the Special Group

5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities

for general problems related to foreign intelligence.

Dulles made the specific point that if the Board of

Consultants was going to get involved in the details

of planned covert operations, they were then in a

position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discus-

sion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress

to attempt to oversee covert operations - a point

about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly,

noting that such action by Congress would be an in-

fringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief.. 24/

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At 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958,

there was another high level meeting attended by

Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of

State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke,

the CNO; General Cabell, DDCI; and Gordon Gray at

which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even

as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing

to flee Cuba; and possible US action, including direct

intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that

were discussed. There also was some suggestion that

the US take the responsibility for naming members to

a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting

Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban

Government. 25/

With some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower re-

called this period in the following manner:

During the rush of these last events

in the final days of 1958, the Central

Intelligence Agency suggested for the

first time that a Castro victory might

not be in the best interests of the United

States:

(Earlier reports which I had re-

ceived of Castro's possible Communism were

suspect because they originated with

people who favored Batista.)

"Communists and other extreme radicals

appear to have penetrated the Castro move-

ment, "

Allen Dulles said.

"If Castro

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takes over, they will probably participate

in the government."

When I heard this

estimate, I was provoked that such a con-

clusion had not been given earlier.

At another point, the ex-President wrote:

Though our intelligence experts backed

and filled for a number of months, events

were gradually driving them to the conclu-

sion that with the coming of Castro, Com-

munism had penetrated this hemisphere. 26/

B. Castro Takes Over

During the first few weeks of 1959 following

Castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity

as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the

changes in government.

The Station seemed assured

that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements,.

especially on the developing military capabilities.

In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station

provide support for the Army's covert collection of

military intelligence under commercial cover in Havana,

COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing

the Station's own capabilities in this area. COS was

overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell

assured the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

of the Army that while he was aware that Havana had

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objected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonetheless

had been "instructed" to cooperate. * 27/

In these early weeks of 1959, US representatives

in Havana were predicting that Castro would have a

difficult time holding his government together, and

among other things, one report emphasized the proba-

bility that Castro would soon find that he would have

to get along with the United States. 29/ The most

likely threat

to relations with the United States

was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo

Bay, but neither CIA nor State Department representa-

tives saw any threat to this installation, and this

belief was supported in early March 1959 by a Special

National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro

"sooner or later (is] likely to ask for major increases

*

An interesting side note to the discussions at this

time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned

to use a negro Lt. Col. who was on TDY in Havana to do

a study of the new Castro Army.

In a memorandum to

the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, and to the

Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief,

Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using

the term "black" -- that General Erskine (Army Special

Forces) believed that a "color bar" did exist in the

Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col.

Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could

be made. 28/

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in the nominal rent now paid for

the Guantanamo Base,

revision

of employment practices which appeared to

discriminate against Cuban workers, and perhaps other

changes." 30/

In the early spring of 1959, as Castro made

known that he was planning to visit the United States,

COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the im

portance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters

information that:

Washington visit can make or break

Castro.

Unless he gets

a strong helping

hand from the United States, many serious

observers feel his regime will collapse

within a matter of months. 31/

Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the

new Cuban Government, COS Havana indicated that

Castro's popularity was very low among the middle and

upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that

Castro was "the idol of the masses." 32/ COS Havana'

did an excellent. job of predicting how Castro would

act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting

that Castro would probably make his pitch, not to

the

heads of

the State Department and to the press, but

that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the

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students, and the masses in America to support his

revolution. COS emphasized that Headquarters should

make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not

openly avowed Communist, was heavily infiltrated with

Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to

Communist positions, and, moreover, there was little

question about who

would eventually control the Cuban

Government. COS did suggest

that Headquarters give

serious consideration to planting embarrassing ques-

tions with reporters

to stick to Castro while he was

in the US. 33/ Both the Department of State and COS

Havana were in general agreement about the results of

the Castro visit. COS Havana summarized one of his

dispatches as follows:

It would be unwise to assume from the

minor indications to date that Fidel has

undergone

serious change of heart as a

result of his visit to the United States. 34/

In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisen-

hower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,

Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted

that:

Despite Castro's apparent simplicity,

sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the

United States public, there is little

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probability that Castro had altered the

essentially radical course of his revolu-

tion.

From his experience here, he has

gained a valuable knowledge of American

public reaction which may make him a more

difficult man to deal with on his return

to Cuba.

It would be

to underestimate thi a serious mistake

With all his

appearance of naivete, unsophistication,

and ignorance on many

matters, he is clearly

a strong personality and a born leader of

great personal courage and conviction.

While we certainly know him better than

before, Castro remains an enigma; and we

should await his decisions on specific

matters before assuming a more optimistic

view than heretofore about the possibility

of developing a constuctive relationship

with him and his government. 35/

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in

this period shortly following Castro's visit to the

United States the COS Havana may have misjudged a

significant development which surfaced almost imme-

diately after Castro's return to Cuba. Remarking on

an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appear-

ing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that:

These demonstrations obviously welcome,

but possibly most significant aspect is

demonstration once again, enormous power

Castro, who with few words made anti-

Communism popular position.

By same

token he could reverse trend at any time,

and skeptics speculating that current

stand is sop intended to make it more

difficult for U.S. interests to protest

effectively against stringent agrarian

reform law. 36/

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A follow-up dispatch within two days of that

cited above provided a more accurate insight

as to

the depth of the struggle which was, in fact, being

waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti-

Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by

the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista

Popular (PSP) with reference to the confusion among

party members regarding statements that Castro had

made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante

laid it on the line that there was a struggle between

the left and the right; and he emphasized that the

conservative element was trying to take advantage of

remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in

the United States. According to the source reporting

on Escalante's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told

Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the

Communists, the United States would cut off economic

aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so

serious that he made some unwise statements.

The

source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the

26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario (the

DR), were in control of the revolution, and

that the

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duty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome

the counterrevolutionaries. 37/

In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on The Situation

in the Caribbean through 1959, the intelligence com-

munity again indicated that the internal situation in

Cuba had not been decided. The SNIE commented:

The Communists probably do not now

anto are on tute organi sona-

work. 38/

Through the sunner and into the early fall of

1959, the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism

continued to be a major subject of discussion within

the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting

that was begun by COS Havana in early June, this topic

continually occurred. In August 1959, when the Deputy

Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Rudolph Gomez,

assisted Leo Churn in the preparation of an "Urgent

Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the

Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist

association was prominently featured. At this time,

and reflecting the views of both Western Hemisphere

Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez

had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not

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considered to be a Communist.

His brother Raul Castro,

however, was clearly identified as a hard-core

Com-

munist.* 39/

The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante

had referred in mid-summer came to a head in mid-

October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military leader in

Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of

Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number

of leadership positions which were being turned over

to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than

to members of the 26 July

Movement. Matos resigned

as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and

was arrested on 20 October. During the months prior

to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty

of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a

*

In view of the trend of recent years, it is inter-

esting to note that the Chun report found reason

to

be somewhat critical of

the Senate Internal Security

Committee (Sen. Eastland's Committee) for getting in-

volved in matters which were principally of concern

to the intelligence community. In this case, the

Senate Committee was criticized specifically for

taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who

had defected, and questioning him before turning him

over to the intelligence agencies for initial inter-

rogation.

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number of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos

also broke with Castro. Among these were Faustino

Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired

Property; Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, Minister of Finance;

Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos,

head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro

and replaced by Che Guevera, whose expertise was in

revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has

said, this was the second civil war for Castro. 40/

Coincidental to the internal squabble that led

to Matos's resignation, the Deputy Chief of WH Division,

Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promot-•

ing an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the

PSP. In the course of this tour, the qualifications

of the best of the agents who might conduct this pene-

tration were reviewed with COS Havana and Station

personnel. Gomez also pointed out that the anti-com-

munist efforts in Havana should not be limited to

those who were FI or PP designees, but everyone in

the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities

to push into the Partido Socialista Popular. In re-

porting on his visit with COS Havana, Gomez noted that

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the Ambassador and other members of the American

Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in

the program being advanced; and, in fact, asked Gomez

if CIA could "send a qualified Communist expert to

Havana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officers

on Communist doctrines, particularly on their modus

operandi and how Communists working under cover could

be recognized." Upon his return Gomez received J. C.

King's approval to comply with this request.* 41/

Even as Gomez was promising State's representa-

tives in Havana assistance in understanding Communist

activities, J. C. King, Chief of Western Hemisphere

Division, was going forward to the Director of Central

Intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the

Department of State's failure to provide CIA with a

policy action paper on Cuba -- a paper which, accord-

ing to King, had been promised as early as May 1959,

yet had not been received by the end of October. Nor

was there any indication when such paper might be

*

It would appear from this request that both the DDP

and State were remiss in the training of their overseas

personnel.

a that the station

That the Station had to request Headguarters

for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine.

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expected, despite numerous meetings with Department

representatives. King also was particularly critical

of the fact that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to

Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance

had he called on the Agency for consultation -- this

despite the fact that there had been indications from

the Department that such consultations were to be held. 42/

The ambivalence regarding Castro's relation to

the Communist

Party was illustrated by the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959

in testifying at the hearings of the Judiciary SubCom-

mittee which was investigating the "Communist Threat

to the US through the Caribbean." In response to the

question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C.

P. Cabell stated:

Our information shows that the Cuban

Communists do not consider him a Comnunist

Party member or even a pro-Communist.

On

the other hand, they are delighted with the

nature of his government, which was allowed

the Communists opportunity - free opportun-

ity -- to organize, to propagandize, and

to infiltrate.

We know the Communists

consider Castro a representative of the

bourgeoise ... Our conclusion, therefore,

is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist,

however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. 43/

In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the

dilemma a Related

Mission Directive was approved on

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6 November 1959 and "would remain in effect until

further notice." The RMD stated in part as follows:

For the moment, CIA operations should

be carried

out on the assumption that the

revolutionary government is basically non-

Communist, with legitimate reform goals

that deserve US respect and

support.

ert operations should support overt efforts

to arrive at a rapprochement with the pres-

ent government and to eliminate the con-

ditions described above without resorting

to forceful

means.

If it should be established that the

Cuban government is Communist-led or Com-

munist-dominated, or if that government

cannot be swayed from adopting measures

which intentionally or unintentionally

accomplish Communist objectives, the

question of direct attacks against Castro

will be

re-examined.

In planning for such

a contingency, each existing or new asset

should be evaluated in terms of possible

future

utility from a paramilitary point

of view, nor will the development or re-

cruitment of assets be precluded merely

because they lack a paramilitary capa-

bility.

Under no circumstances would any

asset be apprised of this contingency

planning.

In fact. any disposition to

undertake violent action should be promptly

and emphatically discouraged pending a

change in policy at the policy-making

level.: 44/

Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the

field, another and more significant program was being

evolved in Headquarters. On 1l December 1959, J. C.

King, Chief, WH Division prepared a memorandum for the

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Director of

Central Intelligence, through the Deputy

Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as

its

specific objective "The overthrow of Castro within

one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to

the United States which will call for elections 6

months after assumption of office." To achieve this

objective, Chief, WH/D put forward a program, to in-

clude among other items the following:

1. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba,

from liberal Caribbean countries.

2. Intrusion operations against Castro's

TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.

3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups

to establish by force a

controlled area

within Cuba.

Colonel King

then went on to suggest that:

Thorough consideration be given to the

elimination of Fidel Castro.

None of those

close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul

or his companion Che Guevarra (sic], have

the same mesmeric appeal to the masses.

Many informed people believe that the

disappearance of Fidel would greatly ac-

celerate the fall of the present govern-

ment. * 45/

The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see

page 296) which reproduces the original ll December

1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI.

In light of

subsequent investigations,

earing the ends come to casessination

(footnote continued on following page)

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As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National

Intelligence Estimate, "The Situation in the Caribbean

through 1960," indicated that Castro was in to stay,

despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no serious

threat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed out

that if there was direct US intervention, "Most Cubans

including the military, would react violently." 46/

As 1960 began, General Cabell, the Deputy Direc-

tor of Central Intelligence, held a joint briefing

plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3

of Appendix A show two significant corrections in Allen

Dulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col.

King.

In paragraph 3a, the phrase

•"thorough consider-

ation be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro"

carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the text

read

"removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination."

At a later point in the same paragraph the

original text said "many informed people believe that

the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate

the

fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles has

substituted the word "removal" for the word "disappear-

ance."

These significant changes in the text on the

original copy of King's memorandum -- which the author

has recovered - support the contention that the author.

has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the com-

ponent (WH/4) officially charged with the conduct of

the Agency's anti-Castro program was neither charged

tion.

with the pencilled corrections noted above, was con-

curred in by Richard M. Bissell and approved by Allen

W. Dulles on 12 December 1959.

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(8 January 1960) on Cuba for the Department of State

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the in-

creasing hold that the Communist idealogy and those

affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting

the Castro government. At this time, the DDCI also

discussed the need for increased covert and semi-

covert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological war-

fare, political action, economic action, and para-

military action, all of which had been conducted in

some degree during the past year. 47/ This ? January

1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of

the

serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelli-

gence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs.

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Part II

Castro Must Go

A.

Organizing for Covert Action (January-March 1960)

The first mention of a formal Agency structure

to deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by :

Colonel L. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support,

in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January

1960. White's diary noted:

There was considerable discussion of

the situation in Cuba, and the Director

requested Dick Bissell to organize a

special task force to insure that

we were

attacking this situation from all possible

angles. l/

The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 Jan-

uary 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as

an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban Op-

erations.

The initial Table of Organization totaled

40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station,

and 2 at Santiago Base. 2/

Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere

Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned COS,

Caracas, Venezuela, and formerly one of the principals

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in Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resulted

in the overthrow of the Communist-dominated government

of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Esterline was

the choice of J. C. King,

Chief, WH Division; and to

the best of Esterline's recollection, toward the end

of his two year tour in Venezuela he had been queried

by King about remaining in Venezuela or coming back

to Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It was

shortly after his return to the States in January of

1960 that Esterline became Chief, WH/4. 3/

In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan

episode

and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience

in World War II with the OSS, Esterline thinks that

he got the job because J. C. King "had pretty much

confidence in my judgment."* 4/ The relationship

between Esterline and J. C. King, Chief, WH Division

and the relationship between. King and Richard Bissell,

Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) during the course of

* The author had heard that Esterline had been directly

selected by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of

WH/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is con-

trary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline.

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the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of

considerable speculation ever since the close out of

the invasion. It seems appropriate that some atten-

tion should be devoted to this subject before going

further into detail about the evolution of the covert

plans to oust Castro. One source close to the DDP

at the time of the anti-Castro activity stated flatly:

A task force was formed under Bissell,

excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from

having in fact any control whatsoever

over

the activity. 5/

The WH/D history states:

There was an informal but understood

short cut in the chain of command; basic

decisions were made at the DDP; DCI,

Presidential level. Although some of

the key personnel were detailed from WH

Division, the Cuban Headquarter's unit

was in another building; and no one pre-

tended that J. C. King was running the

show. Jacob D. Esterline

•.. was the

Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the

build-up and invasion attempt and took

his orders from the DDP. 6/

Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen

Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has

indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep

King on the outer edges of the anti-Castro activity;

but according to Elder, Col. King always knew what

was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of

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Pigs activity from its inception until its conclu-

sion. * 1/

Esterline himself declined to comment for the

record on this particular speculation, but indicated

that he was not sure what J. C. King was up to at all

times. It is clear, however, that Esterline was in

very close contact with Col. King throughout the

course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.**

Additional insights concerning J. C. King's

role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by

Richard D. Drain, who was Chief of Operations for WH/4,

and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drain

has stated:

J. C. King never was told, I think for

understandable reasons, to what extent he

*

Elder suggested to the author that "they" wanted

King out of the operation because of his strong Re-

publican affiliations.

"They" were never identified,

but King was well acquainted with highly placed figures

and

contributors to the Republican Party.

** This will become most apparent in the subsequent

discussion of the relationships between WH/4 and

William D. Pawley.

During the author's initial conver-

sation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline

did state, in a manner similar to Elder,

that J.C.

King was out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro

effort, because he had known

Republican Party

affiliations. 8 There was no elaboration indicating

the impact of such affiliations on King's role, and

there is nothing in the record to support this allega-

tion.

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was in it, to what extent he was not in

it:

Therefore, from time to time, he

would protrude. sometimes, saying that

he was sorry to protrude; and then he

would retract; and then he would be in;

and then he would be out ... that's as

a person.

Then again, his Deputy, Ray

Herbert, would call and say "I just don't

understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala

today.

Would you come over and explain

to me what that's all about;" and I would

step out of the maelstrom of JMATE...

they were just working flat out ... and

go over.

There would be the old wH types

doing their thing in the old wH way.

Maybe two cables a week from the stations,

and quite leisurely

... I think what had

happened. to J. C. King was that he had

stayed overlong in the same job; and he

"Mr. WH," by Gawd:

With the excep-

tion of first Guatemala and then Cuba,

there was very little that ever happened

in Latin America which got to be, given

our other worldwide responsibilities in

the DDP, a very front priority matter;

and consequently, at Staff meetings, for

example, they would

go around and talk

about the Soviet Union and China and

Europe

and even Africa.

Then, if there

was any time left, J. C. King would have

his time at bat and report some relatively

minor thing..

Guatemala there was, as everybody knows

aLa there cent

Except in the case of

now, a very substantial paramilitary

operation which was run by Richard M.

Bissell in his capacity as Special As-

sistant to the Director for Planning and

Coordination.

I think that one of the many reasons

... and I never was able to get much in

the way of history on Guatemala as an aid

to the study of the Cuban operation

while the latter was in process ... was

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that this had never set very well with

J. C. King.

He was divested of the

Guatemalan experience, and particularly

when it turned out to be a success

PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb

luck more than anything

else: J.C....

couldn't take any of the bows for it.

All right, that rankled, I am sure. Now

this one comes along, and rather than ex-

pand WH/4, or whatever the hell it was.

ana leave

this JMATE Project within that

Branch, and build up that Branch -- oh,

no.

Once again the same man, Dick Bissell

-- now, however, DDP instead of SAPC --

becomes the case officer for the thing;

and his assistant, Tracy Barnes, is all

over him. One of J. C. King's few very

good men, Jacob D. Esterline, is pulled

aside

and made Chief of the project ...

The old man had a great deal of

amour

propre, J. C. King did. He was very vain.

He had

all of the area

expertise that one

would like to see in a Division Chief,

but he had been at it an awful long time.

It was a very incestuous Division.

In

terms of the rotation, it was solely

within WH.

There were very few people

in WH who had served outside of the

Western Hemisphere, except in Washington.

They were a tight-knit little group, and

here now, for the second time running, one

of their big chances to shine -- there

was a lot of money and all that kind of

stuff -- again had been taken away ...

and it was ... it was tough. 2/

Where Drain implied that J. C. King was cut com-

pletely out of WH/4 activities and operations, Mr.

Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat

different.

In the course of an oral interview, the

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former DDP responded to questions concerning J. c.

King in the following manner:

Question:

I would like to clarify at

this point J. C. King's relationship

to the Bay of Pigs project.

I have

heard it on both sides -- that he was

involved and that he was deliberately

end-run.

Mr. Bissell: There is no doubt in my

mind that that was the case.

I was

going to say that both of the things

that you have heard have an element of

truth in them.

There was a deliberate

decision fairly early in the game --

I doubt if it was as early as March

11960..

In fact,] I am pretty sure

that it wasn't,

[butl I_am reasonably

sure that the decision

I speak of was

made by some such date as June [1960]

- [that] Esterline would take charge

of this Project and Esterline would

have direct

access to me.

He would

not be under the usual requirement of

all the cases going through J. C. King.

Now, as the scope of the scale of this

operation increased, and with the passage

of time, Esterline's direct channel to

me came

to be more exercised; and there

was frequent interchange between Ester-

line and myself that didn't go through

J. C. King in the sense of a command

channel.

On the other hand, J. C.

was brought into all the consultations

and was fully informed from the very

beginning about this operation.

advice was sought and given, and I

usually found it very good and followed

it.

I remember no specific case where

either J. C. King's specific advice or

general attitude

toward the operation

was inconsistent with, or in conflict

with my own.

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Question:

Why did you make this decision

with regard to Jake, coming directly to

you and not going through King? Was it

just a matter of great efficiency, or

what precipitated that?

Mr. Bissell: I think it was in part on

the model of the Guatemalan operation,

and in part, I think, a feeling, probably

on my own part -- in some degree perhaps

on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J.

C. was not effective enough to handle

this kind of very fast moving, quite

large scale, quite complex, paramilitary

operation.

Question: Do you recall any instances

where there was a serious conflict be-

tween what Jake wanted to do and what

J. C.

King thought should be done?

Mr. Bissell: I don't remember many, if

• any, and I believe that the relation-

ships between Jake and J. C. were pretty

good throughout. 10/

Certainly the written record bears out Bissell's.

contention that King was fully informed and that the

relationship between King and Esterline was, if not

love, at least mutually respectful.*

*

The only point of contention between King and Ester-

line that surfaced in the records concerned

the degree

to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs

related to the organization of the Cuban exiles.

At

one point, Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact

with Pawley be cut off, but in sending Esterline's

memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he

was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact

with WH/4.

In fact, Pawley was in continuous contact

- even though in disagreement -- with both Jake and

King until the close out of the operation.

But on tra

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Another of the questions which must be addressed

in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is

the failure of Richard Helms - at that time Chief of

Operations (COPS) for the DDP -- to become more than

marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral inter-

views again provided the best explanations, and, con-

sequently, are entered into this record in rather

full.

detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the

following comments:

Helms was COPS (Chief of Operations].

Either on his own volition, which I sus-

pect or on order - which I doubt - Dick

Helms completely divorced himself from this

thing.

I mean absolutely!

The one time

that I heard from Helms during this entire

project was

... I am sitting down there in

my chair, as COPS of the project, on a

Monday, having spent the entire goddamned

weekend working with the guy who is now

the head of MI-6 -- Maurice Oldfield,

who was then the MI-6 resident in Washing-

ton - trying to get an airplane and some

Cubans out of Montego Bay before the

Brits in Jamaica came back from their

long weekend

... I am sitting there con-

gratulating myself that the plane is out,

and the Cubans are out, and the British

are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and

I get a telephone call from Dick Helms's

long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would

like to speak to you."

Well, fine ...

well, the whole thing on his

part was so

... to me ... incredibly apologetic ...

three times he said to

me in different

parts of the conversation... "As you know,

I have nothing to do with this project."

What he did have to do with, ever since

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the Francis Gary Powers thing, he had

been a member of an inter-Agency com-

mittee that met with periodic regularity.

to discuss air matters of any sensitivity.

I guess he'd had enough to do with this

project so that somebody [whol had [been]

reading the cable traffic told him ...

"Well, those nuts down in Quarters Eye

seem

to have lost an airplane this week-

end." He was going to the regular com-

mittee meeting that afternoon, so he had

to ask me the details... very apologetic-

ally.

The third time that he said, "You

know I have nothing to do with this

project," I said, "Well Mr. Helms, I don't

want to be fatuous about this, but I wish

to Christ that you did have because we

could use your expertise." He said,

"Hahaha... yes, well thank you very much,"

and that was the end of that.

He avoided

the thing like the plague.

One of the

reasons may have been that, of course,

life went on; and if Bissell was getting

increasingly imnersed in this one thing,

somebody had to watch the whole worldwide

store

... which of course Helms was damned

good at.. A less attractive suggestion is

that Helms figured that there was a high

likelihood that this thing would screw up,

and he didn't want to have the tar baby

around him. I don't know. Il/

Bissell, in responding to the question about

Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, com-

mented as follows:

I think that he (Helms] saw most all

of the cable traffic and I think he was

pretty well informed as to what was going

on, very well informed; but he was really

out of the line of command on this opera-

tion.

There was something of a tacit

agreement between us, that he would be

devoting himself to a lot of the other on

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going business of the DDP office, be-

cause this was taking a great deal of

my time.

Question:

This was a tacit agreement,

this wasn't a session in which you

and Helms

..

Bissell: Let me say this was probably

not that explicit. I would make an

observation here, and I don't want

you to infer anything really beyond

what it says, it was not particularly

easy -- I did not find it particular-

ly easy - to discuss things clearly

and derive a clear understanding with

Dick (Helms) about the division of

labor between us when he was my Deputy.

I don't imply by this any sense of

conflict or rivalry, but he would go

ahead and handle certain kinds of

matters, and I would go ahead and

handle certain kinds of matters.

We saw one another, of course, all the

time. Quite often I would consult him

about something that I was handling.

I think rather less often he would con-

sult me.

I don't mean to imply however

in that any kind of concealment from me

-- I never had that feeling at all --

but it really was our habit during the,

whole time that we were in those posi-

tions that the division of labor between

us was more tacit than explicit. 12/

Simultaneously with the decision to create a

separate Branch in WH Division to handle the anti-

Castro activity discussions

were begun by both the

Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as

to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the

many questions raised early in the game was whether

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the US program should be overt or covert, with the

overt implications being the ultimate application

of US military force to oust Castro. DCI Dulles

emphasized that contingency planning should be under-

taken by the Special Group, without necessarily in-

volving either the President or the National Security

Council.

The Department of State was concerned that if

Fidel Castro were deposed, perhaps his successors, Che

Guevara and Raul Castro, would be even worse than

Fidel. As reported in subsequent congressional reve-

lations concerning CIA's role in assassination plots,

it was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January

1960 that the Director of Central Intelligence "empha-

sized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination

of Castro, but rather. actions designed to enable re-

sponsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." 13/

At this same Special Group Meeting, President

Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray,

predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which

would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses

in the

whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation.

According to the report on the Special Group Meeting:

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Mr. Gray commented that a problem

would be posed for administration offi-

cials if a decision should be taken to

change our attitude toward Castro, as

outlined earlier in the meeting.

He

acknowledged that any such decision

must be kept highly secret, but he

foresaw difficulties which would arise,

for example, during testimony by the

before i theat

Secretaries of Defense and Treasury

before Congress, at public gatherings,

etc., if they should have to give an

impression that the US was not doing

anything about Cuba. 14/

This in fact, was the "damned if I do, damned if

I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself

in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United

States found itself with reference to both the United

Nations and the Organization of the American States

throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as

the myth of "plausible deniability" overruled common

sense: Following the initial Special Group meeting,

there was a flurry of activity seeking some solid

proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960,

C. Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDP for Action), J. C.

King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others,

discussed a whole series of

issues which would be

basic to the program from this time forward: identi-

fication of the principal Cuban leaders -- Ramon Barguin,

Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually

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head up the principal anti-Castro organization sup-

ported by the Agency) were mentioned; radio propaganda

operating out of either Third country or US areas

was raised; the training program for both communica-

tors and for PM trainers at Fort Randolph in the Canal

Zone was discussed; and the possible acquisition of

aircraft for support operations and the question of

US business as a cover for the operations of the exile

groups in the United States were all discussed. The

possible involvement of US businesses to put overt

pressure on the US government for the possible imposi-

tion of economic sanctions and as a covert means of

raising money for the support of Cuban exile organiza-

tions also surfaced. This initial meeting also recog-

nized the problem of trying to gain the support of

the more liberal Latin American Governments (e.g.,

that

of Betancourt in Venezuela) • 15/

Al Cox, one of the senior officers in paramilitary

operations was in attendance, and he would subsequently

note:

Stringent security precautions were

placed on JMARC, including the exclusion

of the PP Staff and other Agency compo-

nents from all cable and dispatch traffic

and from access to correspondence between

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the project and the office of the DDP

...

In

point of fact, such restrictive

measures were somewhat meaningless inso-

tar. as keeping awareness of the project's

activities away from PP/PMG.

The A/DDP/P

granted permission to PP/C/PMG to read the

daily project traffic, (with Esterline's

knowledge and permission).

Esterline

personally knew the majority of the PP/PMG

senior officers, and in no time he had

drafted six or seven of these, including

the Deputy Chief, PMG, for assignment to

JMARC

. .

This, of course, was valuable

as a built-in penetration of JMARC in

the best FI and CI tradition. * 16/

Early in February of 1960, Allen Dulles was

briefed in general terms on the planning that was

being initiated by WH. Division, and at the same time

J. C. King told the Director "that the Branch concept

was used lin establishing WH/4] rather than the term

Task Force for greater security and to simplify chan-

nels of command." The Director subsequently explained

to the Special Group (3 February 1960) some of the

activities that were being undertaken, noting that

within the next week or two, the Group would receive

* The crypt for the WH/4 anti-Castro operation was

initially JMARC. Following compromise of this crypt,

the project became JMATE (sometime in the period be-

tween 6-13 December 1960).

Throughout this volume

the project will be identified as JMATE, except in

direct quotations.

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a paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs

which had been initiated against the Castro Govern-

ment. * 17/

The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were

discussed in a DDP review

session on ll February 1960

which was attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline,

Al Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus

was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry, ** propa-

ganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division

had

roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it

was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the

anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars -

an estimate that would, in effect, be some 40 million

short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however,

that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency

reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning ses-

sion, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort

Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and

* In addition to the Special Group, which included

a DOD representative, WH/4 worked directly with other

representatives of DOD regarding current developments

and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis

Cuba: 18/

** "The big sugar sack?"

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here, too, the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnes

for an attitudinal

survey of "Cuban society" which

could have (and should have) caused CIA planners to

re-think the whole anti-Castro effort.* 19/

A very similar briefing, with somewhat more

emphasis on possible paramilitary action, was given

to a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960;

and the agenda for the 17 February 1960 meeting of

the Special Group, again emphasized that the Castro

Government was dependent on sugar revenues for. both

continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric

subversion programs. ** 20/ It was further suggested

to the Special Group that dissidents within Cuba

might. also be stimulated to sabotage, with the ulti-

mate result leading to Castro's ouster. 21/ The

recommendation that the DCI made to the Special

Group was as follows:

* This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is

discussed subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222-226.

** The DOD representatives who were briefed were the

Deputy Secretary, Mr. Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assis-

tant Secretary of Defense for

International Security

Affairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale.

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That CIA be authorized to initiate

operational planning, including covert

spotting and assessment of potential

agents, for eventual sabotage of both

Cuban and American-owned sugar mills.

Should this course of action prove feas-

ible and desirable, the operation would

be designed to deny Castro as much as

possible of the revenues anticipated

from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/

Interestingly enough, although the briefing for

DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary

planning, apparently no mention of the subject

was

made to the Special Group.

On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented

the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he em-

phasized that he was

not asking for permission to

engage in action, only that he was looking for a

Special Group approval. Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secre-

tary of Defense for International Security Affairs)

noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Mr. Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed

to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to

Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the Presi-

dent's reaction.

President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic

about

the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting

that the loss of sugar revenues would impact on

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Castro's ability to continue to finance subversive

activities in other Latin America areas.

President

Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic

sabotage, and he would not agree to the plan to

identify assets specifically for sabotage operations

against the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing

to support a program to identify assets for the sugar :

industry " and other things as well ... including

even possibly things that might be drastic." In

addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the

President also requested that a comprehensive covert

action program be prepared by Mr. Dulles. This, it

was suggested, should go to the Special Group; and

if they approved the plans, then the President wanted

to discuss them. In any event, action on

the PM pro-

gram would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from

his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his

specific approval. * 23/

* The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 Feb-

ruary 1960 also noted that

Mr. Joseph Scott of State also reported

later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the

same point.

This appears to have been one of the few instances

where Department of State representatives indicated

support for possible direct action programs rather

than political solutions to the Cuban problem.

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Despite the rather positive doubts that the

President had about the sugar sabotage activity, J.

C. King charged ahead almost

immediately following

the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960. On

18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed

discussion concerning the disruptive effects which

might result from interference with the Cuban sugar

operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Am-

bassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran,

and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran

had been willing and able to provide valuable assist-

ance to the

Agency in the past. Later in the month,

Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the Assistant Secre-

tary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant

Secretary for American Republic Affairs) who reportedly

was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct

sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King,

Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in

US oil companies deliveries to Cuba and actions which

might cut back on US tourist trade with the island. 24/

Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador

William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements

for the publication of Diario de la Marina in Miami,

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and also "to raise at least a portion of the money,

which would be needed for this operation." In addi-

tion to Pawley, King also contacted Henry Holland in

New York City, suggesting that Holland raise money,

through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for

the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL.

King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors.

that the "money was going to be used on behalf of

non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious

effort to remove Fidel Castro." 25/

In addition to J. C. King's high level con-

tacts, Jake Esterline and Mr. Dulles had a meeting

with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the US In-

formation Agency who

had requested a briefing on the

current state of activities in Cuba -- Washburn was

concerned lest there be a conflict of interests be-

tween USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area.

Washburn presented the Agency with a copy of some

proposals which the State Department had approved

for implementation by USIA in Cuba. USIA's pitch

would be that the long-standing friendship between

Cuba and the United States was being endangered by

the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology

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into Cuba -- at the same time not denying that the

Us was sympathetic to the need

for a change in Cuba.

The Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it would

be advisable for Mr. Washburn, who was planning to

visit Cuba, to meet Jim Noel, COS Havana, and out-

line the USIA program for Mr. Noel's benefit. * 26/

As the propaganda activities were being pushed

forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban

exiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM

action, and other measures against Castro were being

contemplated, a cautionary memorandum apparently was

drafted by one of the individuals most closely con-

cerned with the potential anti-Castro operations.

The memorandum, undated and unsigned, reviewed the

anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of what

was being planned, for Project JMATE: It noted some

of the similarities or differences with respect to

'the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the pos-

sibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light of

the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of the

One result of the meeting with Washburn was a de-

cision to turn over a planned USIA anti-Castro car-.

toon effort to CIA.

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key points made in this memorandum are worth repeat-

ing - even though it is not known who read the piece.

Among other things, for example, the author of the

memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favor-

able factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested

that it was unlikely that any of these would operate

with reference to Project JMATE.

It was noted

that the Guatemalan leadership was

"unusually inept"; that "Communist support for Arbenz

came from the local Communist Party, which was immature,

badly led, and generally weak"; and, that "we had un-

believable luck." 27/ The memorandum also noted that

there were a number of circumstances which would not

recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity.

Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a

weak leader, Castro was obviously a strong leader;

that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high

character and

standing, but no one of similar stature

had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in

Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed

forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he

coula not depend on his army. Castro, on the other

hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled

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the key military positions with his own followers

and "introduced

a system of intense ideological in-

doctrination." Furthermore, the unknown author pointed

out that while Moscow's interest in Guatemala was

compartatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico

City was the nearest Soviet official available to the :

Arbenz Government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and •

propaganda

support from both Moscow and Peiping were

a matter of record. 28/

The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas

where the writer claimed that tactical - not strategic

-- errors were being made. It stated that the blunt

propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US

elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts

should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro,

as a victim of international Communism, and the Com-

munists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was

pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US

commercial radio stations, even if

the time were

legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups,

would be a "kiss of death" for anyone who tried to

deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part re-

lated to the propaganda activities, the planned use

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of US business groups as a cover for the Agency's

support of

the Cuban opposition, particularly the

use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also

hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum

under study. If the author was correct in assuming

that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny,

it would mean that the anti-American contingents would.

have additional ammunition to use against the US.

The memorandum suggested that many of these risks

could be eliminated if propaganda activities were

moved to Third countries and if fund raising activi-

ties were run out of Latin America or Western Europe. 29/

Based on the language, the familiarity with the

Guatemala activity and the nature of the critique,

it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum

in question. The memorandum may have been prompted

in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and

the Cabinet

had been giving to fire bomb attacks on

the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out

of the United States. The Agency fully supported Gen-

eral Quesada's effort to put an end to such flights. * 30/

* Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency.

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From 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed

Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba

and the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960,

when President Eisenhower formally approved the cov-

ert anti-Castro plan, CIA personnel most closely

involved in the anti-Castro effort were fully immersed

in the

efforts to define -- and refine - a US policy.

which would be acceptable to President Eisenhower.

In the course of this two week period, they were en-

gaged in efforts to satisfy the 5412 Group, the National

Security Council, and themselves that they had developed

a viable program which would lead to the downfall and

ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal cohorts, Che

Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elimination of

Communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect,

from the Western Hemisphere.

During this period of evolution of national

policy, WH/4 held its first official meeting as a

branch

a on 9 March 1960.

J. C. King and Jake Esterline

were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general

nature of the programs that were going to be put into

operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo

training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation

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and support from all of the offices that were repre-

sented at the meeting, including, among others, the

Office of Training, the Office of Communications,

the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff,

Personnel (particularly the Military Personnel Divi-

sion), and the Office of Security. At this initial

meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds, •

Deputy Chief, WH/4, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer,

Phil Toomey, Political and Psychological Stategist,

Bob Wedbee, the Economist, and Ed Stanulus, his Plans

and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would

be in contact with other Agency elements which would •

be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also

noted that liaison channels would be established with

other elements of the US Government, particularly with

the Office of Special Operations of the Department

of Defense. 31/

It was during the period between 8-17 March 1960

that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro pro-

gram which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February

1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among

those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing

a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were

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C. Tracy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, Jake

Esterline, J. C. King, and Tom

Parrott, among others.

Those who figured most prominently among the Special

Group representatives at this time were Livingston

Merchant, Department of State; John Irwin, Assistant

Secretary for International Security Affairs, Depart-

ment of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Opera-

tions; and Gordon Gray, the President's National

Security Adviser. Other than the more than a dozen

memorandums and drafts and other papers related to

the development of the policy paper, perhaps a note

from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960

best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency

approached the task of writing a paper for the Direc-

tor. Mr. Helms's note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:

Tom Parrott gave me for security late

this afternoon the attached paper for the

5412 Group outlining the proposed covert

action program against Fidel Castro.

After reading it, I asked Tom to defer

consideration of Cuba until next week

since I feel that this document needs re-

drafting whether it is used by the Direc-

tor for an oral briefing or handed to the

designated representatives for their en-

lightenment.

I think you will agree with me that

the paper is poorly drafted and needs

considerable pointing up in various

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places. I do not disagree with the listed

recommendations in paragraph 6, but I do

Feel that the backup material in paragraphs

2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the

reference to a "short-wave radio station

patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no

way, in my opinion, to describe what we

have in mind.

economic action is not sufficiently precise

A150

Also the paragraph on covert

and raises more questions than it answers.

There are other points, but there is no

sense in belaboring them in this note to

you.

May I ask that you take this matter in

hand and advise WH how to put it in suit-

able shape for use by the Director with

the 5412 Group next week. 32/

In the paper to which

Mr. Helms referred the

problem facing the US was stated rather simply as

follows:

To replace the present Government of

Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with one

that will be acceptable to the United

States; and to cause this change to occur

in such a manner that anti-US repercussions

are not induced in Latin America. 33/

Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role

in the anti-Castro activity, there was a tremendous

concern that there be no "anti-US repercussions,"

not only in Latin America per se, but particularly

among the Latin American representatives in the Or-

ganization of American States and in the United Nations:

The constant quest for plausible deniability would

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become the holiest of grails -- constantly, and un-

successfully, to be sought throughout the course of

the operation by Agency planners.

The proposed paper for the Special Group (the

paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking) empha-

sized those areas highlighted in previous Special

Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, disrup-

tions of the Cuban economy, including large scale

sabotage operations, and the development of instructor

cadres to provide both communications and PM training

cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba.

Interesting, too, is the fact that at this early

stage of US planning mention was made of the offer

from the Guatemalan Government of a training site

for the PM cadres, or "action groups" as they were

called. A financial annex included in the proposals

for the Special Group indicated the need for $900,000

for the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for

FY 1961. * 34/

* Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial

annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement

for fiscal. 1961 which is shown as $1.6 million, was

either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition

- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is $1.7 million.

It also was noted that for the remainder of FY

160.

the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to

meet these "non-program requirements."

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As the paper was being prepared for Special

Group consideration, J. C. King, Chief, Western

Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for

the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him

with additional information for use during the Special

Group discussions; and the transmittal to the DCI

recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr.

Nixon on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered

much the same ground as the paper which went to the

Special Group, but contained considerably more de-

tail about the activities of the Castro Government

which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legiti-

mate governments and replacing them with Communist

oriented governments. Col. King's paper also re-

vealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua - the only

two governments in Latin America which were to

throw

their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro

activity -- had made offers

at this time for both

radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for

training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the

Agency might wish

to sponsor. 35/

Despite President Eisenhower's previous objec-

tions to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's

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sugar industry, King's paper did reflect considerable

emphasis on disruption of that economic sector.

Another item which Col. King

saw fit to include in

his memorandum was the following:

we nave avallable, a drug, which, lt

placed in Castro's food, would make him

behave in such an irrational manner that

a public appearance could have very damag-

ing results to him. * 36/

Even as the Special Group was planning its ses-

sions on the anti-Castro program, so, too, was the

National Security Council being geared up for discus-

sions of the same situation. Again, there was great

concern over the question of possible loss of prestige

should the US act independently of the international

organizations. There also was interest in protecting

US business and in the protection of US lives, and

the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was

of considerable concern to the President's National

Security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray

was advised to recommend to the National Security

council regarding US bases stated:

Take action as necessary, including

military action, to insure the continued

* For comments on this subject see Part VII of this

volume.

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availability to the United States of

bases and base rights in Latin America

that are considered vital to the secur-

ity of the United States. 37/

An additional aspect of the basic national secur-

ity policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was

being encouraged to promote with the National Security

Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that:

In the event of an imminent or actual

Communist seizure of control from within,

take all feasible measurels] to thwart it,

including military action if finally re-

quired and

appropriate to cope with the

situation. * 38/

Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National

Security Council on 10 March 1960, President Eisenhower

approved the following rather innocuous actions:

1. Every effort should be made to in-

fluence the other members of the Organiza-

tion of American States to recognize the

dangers involved in the Cuban situation

and support action with respect to them.

Mr. Gray also was advised to play both sides of the

street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of

non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged

to promote was the following:

The United States should be prepared, if

required to protect US interests, to take

similar actions against

subversion or armed

rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile

to US interests.

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The responsible Departments and

Agencies should keep

current plans to

deal promptly with likely contingencies

which might develop with respect to Cuba,

especially those involving the safety of

US citizens in the Guantanamo Base.

3. The developments with regard to

the situation in Cuba should

be reviewed

by the Council each meeting, for the

immediate future. 39/

Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, •

Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special

Group had set aside a ?-hour session on 14 March "to

discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities

in Cuba." 40/ Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs.

Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum

from Allen W. Dulles offering "some suggestions as to

possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper; use

your own judgment as to adding them." 41/ Among these

starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International

Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load

"dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles

made the following rather unusual suggestion:*

*

In addition to the International Transport Union,

Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to in-

duce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives

that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out,

Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the

dockworkers refuse to do the

unloading.

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Stress point that while the dynamism

is running out of the Marxist-Leninist

revolution in Russia,

it still remains

in China.

This explains ChiCom special

interest in supporting the Cuban revolu-

tion and expanding it, with the ultimate

aim of facilitating mass emigration of

Chinese

to the Latin American continent

to meet their over-population problem.

(This may be premature, but there may be

something to it.) 42/

As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group

Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the

Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members

with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan

for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar

to the participants, but the memorandum of the meet-

ing reflects a number of items worth review. Even

though Dulles's

paper placed heavy emphasis on the

propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged

for covert and overt propaganda

activities, not only

through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation,

but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for

Latin America -- programs which apparently had been

sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question

of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting

activity was again raised and discussed, the question

being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida

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Keys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere.

Somewhat more attention was focused on the para-

military plans during this discussion than had occurred

before, and Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the

Agency estimate that: "it appears no large scale para-

military effort (other than wholly overt) will be

feasible in less than 8 months"; and he wondered if

a crash program was feasible to speed up the training

program. 43/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS

and individual Latin American country involvement, the

• choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the

government in exile, and the question of a budget --

the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1.6-1.7 million

for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion.

One additional subject of disucssion at this

Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King

was:

What would be the effect on the Cuban

scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che

Guevarra[sic] should disappear simultan-

eously. 44/

In the reported context of the discussion it is not

believed that the term "disappear" was

• a euphemism for

assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of

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Castro's government from political power. The para-

graph which had raised the question then continued:

Admiral Burke said that the only orga-

nized group within Cuba today werelsic] the

Communists, and there was therefore the

danger that they might move into control.

Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be

disadvantageous because it would facilitate

a multilateral action by OAS.

Colonel King

said that there were few leaders capable

of taking over so far identified. One pos-

sibility was Nunez Jiminez, the head of the

Agricultural Reform Program. No other

names were widely enough known to be men-

tioned. *

Other discussion, notwithstanding, the focus of

Mr. Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that

the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized

to take a number of steps which were specifically re-

lated to the development of the guerrilla capacity of

the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba..

The Agency should be responsible for broadening its

contacts with such groups and attempting to unify

This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March

1960) by J. C. King that "unless Fidel and Raul Castro

and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package --

which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a

long drawn-out affair and the present government will

only be overthrown by the use of force" were discussed

(pp. 93, 114-116) in SSC report on Alleged Assassination

Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, and it is apparent from

the recollections of the participants in the meetings

that assassination was not the issue in these two

instances.

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them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI

proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting

these groups to develop friendships among various of

the Latin American Governments

which were skeptical

of Castro and that the Agency should be responsible

for identifying and training -- in facilities in the

United States or elsewhere -- those who would be the

leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the

conclusion of the 14 March meeting, it was agreed

that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis

of the discussions and plan to present it to President

Eisenhower later in the week. 45/

As part of the effort to improve the paper on

the proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency pre-

pared additional backup material which could be cranked

into the version which would eventually go to the

President. On 14 and 15 March, the records reveal

copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which

was labeled as "revised version, done by [C. Tracyl

Barnes, evening 14 Mar," which went into more detail

on both the political opposition to Castro and on the

propaganda activities that were being mounted against

Castro.

These papers also noted that paramilitary

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activity would "take the longest to become a usable

asset." 46/

The most important difference between

these papers and the covert action plan presented

by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp,

upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY '61

- from $1.6-1.7 million to $3.5 million -- with the

heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed

paramilitary operation. The sum for PM operations

was revised from an estimated $500,000 in Dulles's

14 March presentation to a total of $1.3 million for

that same year:

From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert

action plan (14 March) until President Eisenhower ap-

proved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of

bi-play between the National Security Council and the

Special Group 5412. One of the principal concerns of

the National Security Council was the proper US re-

sponse should the Cubans try to intervene or inter-

fere with operations of the Naval base

at Guantanamo

Bay, including a possible takeover of the Base. On

16 March 1960, after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised

of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by

Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing

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note from a member

of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk,

for the planned National Security Council meeting

of 17 March which again focused exclusively on the

situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though

Mr. Belk, even though he was a member of the NSC

Staff was completely in the dark as to the planning

that had already been undertaken with regard to

Castro's ouster. At a time when the President had

already indicated that proposals for economic action

or direct sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were

less than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whatever

reason, suggested again that with the new sugar

legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened

out.

In addition, Belk suggested a plan which was

"unconventional and radical" -- having President

Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro telling

him that he was concerned over the deterioration of

relations between the two countries and suggesting

that Castro have private conversations with an emissary

whom the President would personally designate.

Staffer

Belk believed that this was a "can't

lose" situation for the US. If Castro refused to

meet with Eisenhower's representative, then he would

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be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the

other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and

the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet

with the President's representative, then relations

between the US and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/

Mr. Belk's suggestions apparently never went beyond

Mr. Gray.

At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960, MI. Dulles pre-

sented his covert action plan to

a combined meeting

of the National Security Council and the principals

of the Special Group. In attendance with the Presi-

dent were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr.

Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Ander-

son, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell,

Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Eisenhower, and

General A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster's

report on the meeting:

The President said that he knows of no

better plan for dealing with this situa-

tion.

The great problem is leakage and

breach of security. Everyone must be pre-

pared to swear that he has not heard of

it. He said we should limit American

contacts. with the groups involved to two

or three people, getting Cubans to do

most of what must be done ... He under-

stood that the effort will be to under-

mine Castro's position and prestige ...

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The President told Mr. Dulles he thought

he (Dulles) should go ahead with the plan

and the operations.

He and the other

agencies involved

should take account of

all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the

actions that we would take in response to

these

The President said he would

like some groundwork laid

with the OAS to

let the Latin American countries know that

if the Cubans were to start to attack our

people in Cuba we would be obliged to take

action ...

The President said that at the next

meeting, he would want to know what is

the sequence of events by which we see

the situation developing -- specifically

what actions are we to take. He said

our hand should not show in anything

that is done.

In the meantime State

should be working on what we can do in

and out of the OAS ...

Essentially,

the job is to get the OAS to support

us. 48/

During the course of this meeting, Secretary of

the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the

welfare of

the US firms which had investments in Cuba;

and he was pushing for US intervention to protect

these private property rights. The President, how-

ever, cut him rather short on this. Vice President

Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American

business interests in Cuba; and suggested that steps

might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital in-

vestment by US firms in Cuba, terminating private

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businesses already there, and reducing American tour-

ism. * 49/

President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March

1960 covert action program

against the Castro regime

thus set US policy. Briefly restated, the four major

courses of action called for the formation of an anti-

Communist exile political opposition located outside

of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the

anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propa-

ganda offensive against the island, perfection of a

covert intelligence-in-action network organization

within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary

force outside Cuba, with the necessary logistical

support for covert military operations on the island.**

* Col. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting,

but, strangely enough, failed to include a list of the

participants. The fact that the President, Vice Presi-

dent, and Secretary of State were in attendance could

not be known from

King's memo alone. 50/ Not in attend-

ance at this meeting was Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4.

This was one of numerous instances where higher level

personnel - in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and

Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which

Esterline would seem

participant.

to have been an equally legitimate

** Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti-

Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate

was in process and would state that Castro was not

"demonstrably under the domination or control of the

international Communist movement."

(SNIE 85-60,

22 March 1960, p. 3. S.)

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It is particularly important in light of changes which

were subsequently made in the covert action plan to

note the language of the approved policy with reference

to the paramilitary operation:

Initially, a cadre of leaders will be

recruited after careful screening and

trained as paramilitary instructors.

In

a second phase, a number of paramilitary

cadres will be

trained at secure locations

outside of the US so as to be available for

immediate deployment into Cuba to organize,

train, and lead resistance forces recruited

there, both before and after the establish-

ment of one or more active centers of resis-

tance.

At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan

for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of

invasion. The paramilitary activity was clearly to

be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leader-

ship and training to the dissident activities inside

Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States

technicians. * Finally, with reference to the approved

* Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WH/ 4/PM

correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM

operations for Project JMATE that:

The only approved, written policy

governing paramilitary action against

antony ra, 19%0.

Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d of

the Policy Paper approved by the Presi-

dent on 17 March 1960." (Emphasis added

by author.) 51/

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plan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60,

and FY '61 of $4.4 million was approved with the

caveat that should there be cost overruns, these could

be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingen-

cies.*

*

A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action

Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B.

(Appendix B, page 300) .

The reader is also

urged to examine Appendix C, a set of correspondence

between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh

Burke,

and Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of

State

for Political Affairs.

(Appendix C

page 311.)

Admiral Burke apparently had become ex-

tremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power

in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded

a paper on US action in Cuba, to both Secretary Merchant

and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the

Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine

the various options available to the United States to

reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis

the growth of Communist power represented by Castro.

Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were

available to the United States, such as multilateral

action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by

the US, or covert unilateral action by the US.'

Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and

Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance

(the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947) Burke

made a series of recommendations covering the same

ground -- propaganda, organization of the anti-Castro

exiles who were in the US, or direct US military inter-

vention -- which had already been considered at high

levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries

Merchant and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, Merchant replied

to Burke's memorandum noting "a marked degree of simi-

larity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people

here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba

and the methods which

are best calculated to achieve

(footnote continued on following page)

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With reference to his action of 17 March 1960,

President Eisenhower subsequently wrote:

this result."

Merchant then went on to review the

bidding that had already been done, particularly in

the Special Group, on the question of how to handle

Castro, emphasizing, of course, that State was very

much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's

government would work, if not immediately, certainly

in the long run, to the detriment of the United States,

particularly in its relations to the other governments

of Latin America.

Whether the response did not satisfy Admiral

Burke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy,

more than any other US Agency, should be principally

responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not

known.. In any event, on 16 March 1960, he forwarded

another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both

Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles.

Burke's comments on the transmittal sheets to these

two individuals are interesting. To National Security

Adviser Gray he wrote:

Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a

memorandum on U.S. Action in Cuba which

may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours,

Arleigh Burke.

To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote:

Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum

my Staff prepared containing some sugges-

tions which might be useful to you in your

work.

Naturally, I do not agree with

quite all the comments contained in the

memorandum but I know that you will for-

give the impatient young lad for his de-

sire to make sure no opportunity is left

uncovered.

Warm regards. Sincerely,

Arleigh Burke.

Why one. of the recipients was cautioned about "the im-

patient young lad" and the other was not is something

(footnote continued on following page)

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On March 17, 1960, less than two weeks

after my return

from Puerto RiCo, 1

ordered the Central Intelligence Agency

to begin to organize the training of

Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against

the possible future day when they might

return to their homeland. More specific

planning was not possible because the

Cubans. living in exile had made no move

to select from among their numbers, a

of a mystery.

Certainly the proposals. by one J. E.

Pond, Jr., reflect at least, Pond's youth and immatur-

ity. For among other things in his memorandum, Mr.

Pond suggested that the Navy:

"Accept Mr. Merchant's

offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of

a complete briefing of State Department activities

vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod

State to move faster."

Or, with reference to action

that the State Department should take, he suggested:

"Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. nationals

going to Latin America on the Kommunist (sic) threat

in Cuba for further dissemination to host country

Two items which had not appeared in other

of the papers related to the evolution of US policy

to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond,

were that the IADB (Inter-American Defense Board)

become involved in the anti-Castro effort -- an exceed-

ingly naive suggestion considering that the members

of this group were far from unanimous

in condemning

the Castro Revolution.

And the second unique contri-

bution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to

forward to two very senior members of the Executive

Branch, was the spelling throughout the paper of

Communist with a "K".

miral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central

elzingnese

These last proposals that Ad-

Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western

Hemisphere Division.

The memorandum having been sent

down from Mr. Bissell's office, with the following

notation to Col. King:

Admiral Burke sent this over to the

Director on the afternoon of 17 Marchdo

and the latter handed [it] to me.

not believe it requires a reply, but

pass it to you for any value it may

have:

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leader whom we could recognize as the

head of a government in exile.* 52/

* In preparing this comment, the former President ap-

parently had to call on his own memory, on the memory

of Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray.

Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that

neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained

anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly,

Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower:

You may recall that not so very long

after I became your Special Assistant, in

a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and

me you gave instructions that activities

of the so-called "Special Group. should

not be recorded in any place except the

files of the Director of the Central In-

telligence Agency •

You did not wish that

there be other copies. It was for this

reason that

I did not seek a copy of the

March 17th paper for my files, nor did I

make notes at that meeting.

Subsequent to March 17th, I began to

make memoranda of every meeting on that

particular subject because I had a hunch

that someday these might be important, and

I intended to put them in your hands at the

appropriate time, understanding, of course,

that you might wish to have them destroyed.

Incidentally, there were no

carbons or

other copies made of these memoranda.

By

not making copies, and by planning to put

the documents in your own hands for what-

ever disposition you wished to make of

them; I sort of rationalized my violation

of your instructions about not making such

memoranda.

I hope I need not assure you

that it was not my practice to violate

your instructions and this is the only

instance Öf such that I can recall. 53/

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B. Forging the Tool

Following President Eisenhower's approval

• Of

the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the

numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings pre-

viously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced

the problem of acting directly to implement the anti-

Castro program. Problems which had been discussed

philosophically prior to this time now had to be put

to the test of practicality. Among the problems of

principal importance during the period from March to

September 1960 were the following:

The

establishment of the leadership of WH/4 and

the acquisition of personnel for WH/4;

Extensive coordination between Agency representa-

tives and representatives of other US Government

Agencies and, at the same time, a high level of intra-

Agency coordination.

The initiation of a paramilitary training program

for those Cubans who would be directly involved in help-

ing to dispose of the Castro Government:

Attempting to establish project parameters and

to give proper consideration to possible changes in

the concept of the program as time passed;

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And, finally, to retain the credibility and

viability of the operation despite numerous wild

haired proposals that were being put forward at vari-

ous times during the months

under

study - proposals

which never should have been offered let alone given

any serious consideration.

As previously noted, WH/4 was established by

Col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not

until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bissell apparently of-

ficially got around to approving the new Branch, for

in a memorandum for the Deputy Director for Support

(DDS), it was noted:

The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP's

approval of the creation of a new opera-

tional Branch, the abolishment of an

existing section, and the creation of a

new Section within the WH Division Head-

quarters Staffing complement.

The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be

more than

offset by the decrease in the DDP complement.

The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and

Salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved

the various grades that had been proposed and then the

memorandum went on to state:

The approval limits the usage of the

requested positions to the duration of the

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Cuban crisis; after which all the positions

in the new Branch and Section will be re-

viewed for reclassification purposes. 54/

The question of financing and budget for project

JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible

for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon

after the President's approval of the project, the

question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March .

1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that:

"Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved

of the paper calling for the

release of $900,000 frOm

the reserve for Project JMARC." 55/ Indeed the Director

had signed such

a paper calling for the $900,000 as

"an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds

are not available." 56/

In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the

release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director

was

also careful to point out that it would be the

responsiblity of Chief, WH Division to certify that

the funds had

been expended as specified for the

project; that additionally, the DDP or his designee

would have to approve each certification; that the

only Headquarters file on the budget for the project

would be maintained by WH/Division; and that the

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file would be complete as to the purpose of the expend-

Iture, the date, those who were involved as payees,

and any other details; and finally that access to

this financial file would be "limited to persons

specifically authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans)."* 57/

'..

In the first meeting following the Presidential

approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline

called the members of WH/4 together to announce that

the program had been given the crypt of JMARC; and he

further pointed out that l May 1960 was the target

date for the beginning of training at Fort Randolph

in Panama. (This date was predicated on the assump-

tion of a satisfactory report from the Inspection, Team

which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March.)

Medical and security officers

were to be assigned to

the training base and the conmunications link was to

be established with Headquarters. In this early

Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by

the WH/4 Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's

Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the

DDP and Chief, WH Division. Chief, WH/4

was not even

included on the routing for the Director's Memorandum.

The WH/4 Financial Officer, on the other hand, had

suggested that certain of

the responsibilities for

approval of funding be given to the project Chief,

or the Chief, WH/Division. 58/

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meeting, Esterline emphasized that training at the

Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas

of Panama was

going to be extremely limited; and since there would

be no training areas in the United States, third

country training activities would need to be estab-

lished. He emphasized again that secrecy was of

paramount importance if the operation was to succeed, -

and stressed that the establishment of a Government-

in-exile was a key point to making the planned opera-

tion credible.

Esterline further indicated that such

a government hopefully could be announced by the early

part of April and that the Headquarters for such a

government .could

be located either in Puerto Rico or

Costa Rica.

Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to

staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two,

the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be

known as JMWAVE. One interesting point made at this

first meeting was that:

MI. [Scudder] Georgia reported that

the DDS Offices concerned had nominated

nearly all of the personnel required by

1 and 15 April respectively. Action was

being taken to make all these available

at once . ...

(and] it was agreed that DDS

representatives would meet once a week

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to review activities, determine the status

of commitments, and prepare a brief re-

port for Chief, Branch 4. 59/

In another Branch meeting soon after the one

just mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and

others would do throughout the course of the operation,

the need for security practices designed to protect

the fact of Agency involvement in this covert opera-

tion. He also indicated the considerable degree of

cooperation which already was being reguired from

other services.

Dave Phillips provided a specific

example of this, emphasizing that without the close

cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have

been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters

which were going to be installed on Swan Island.

Moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees

would be responsible for constructing the facilities

to house the transmitters and the quarters for per-

sonnel who would conduct the propaganda effort from

Swan Island. Because the activities then established

on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal

Aviation Administration, C. Tracy Barnes. (the A/DDP/A)

was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood

Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were

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involved in establishing this Agency activity on the

island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected

with the United States Coast Guard in order that

•there be no interference with

maritime activities;

and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was

alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban

defectors. 61/

As attempts were being made to establish the

parameters for the operations against Castro, a most

prescient memorandum was directed to Chief, WH/4

from Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division.

Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS,

the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz

Government in Guatemala in 1954; and recalling some

of the "pitfalls

and counter-productive aspects" of

that particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows:

I have the impression that our

basic

JMARC plan commits us to a rather firm

timetable.

In my judgment, we should

have great flexibility in

deciding the

appropriate time for kicking off any

paramilitary operations.

Before such

operations are initiated, we should have

firm evidence that our propaganda and

political action operations have irrev-

ocably undermined Castro's prestige,

both in cuba and abroad.

We should

not

initiate paramilitary actions until we

are convinced that they will not enable

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Castro to recuperate lost prestige and

rally local and foreign sympathy and sup-

port. Generally speaking, current area

attitudes toward the Castro regime are

satisfactory from our (CIA] point of view.

However, this could change radically and

rapidly, if there are any premature para-

military actions. When the time comes

for paramilitary activity, we should make

every effort to conceal any invasion

actions. To avoid or minimize Castro's

counter propaganda, the paramilitary

operations must appear to be an internal

uprising by dissident elements within

Cuba.

this, of course, would require

clandestine infiltration of personnel

and arms before the hostitlities begin.

In my opinion, Castro will inevitably

charge the US with responsibility for

JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans

and other foreign observers will be in-

clined to accept such charges with or

without supporting evidence. Therefore,

what we need is a massive diversionary

effort that will either obscure the fact

of our involvement or make our involvement

palatable.

This diversionary tactic might

be accomplished by exploiting unanimous

Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo

regime

If it became known, or strongly

suspected, that we were supporting opera-

tions to bring about a transition to demo-

cratic government in the Dominican Republic,

the waters would be suitably muddied, and

a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* 62/

*

Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the

Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his

initial comments regarding paramilitary activities

against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously

altered - the operations which would ultimately con-

clude at the Bahia de Cochinos.. As with other of the

cautionary and restrained proposals which would be put

forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed

(footnote continued on following page)

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In mid-April of 1960 WH/4 made the first presen-

tation for the DCI since the basic program had been

approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. In

attendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell,

Mr. Helms (C/OPS), Herman Horton (CI Staff), and C.

Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. This high level

group was informed that broadcasting activity from

Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and

that very special operations were being carried out

in order to provide stories for propaganda use. Ac-

cording to Dave Phillips who made the presentation

apparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals.

About the same time that Oberst's memorandum

was going forward, the DDP was calling for WH/4 to

prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminat-

ing the need for crash-type responses or actions.

In discussing the contents of such reports, it was

indicated that:

The Progress Report should generally

not exceed one page in length, and

that

we should not hesitate to include it in

items which were not favorable to our

progress, in other words, setbacks or

handicaps which we might have encountered. 63/

Also, by way of keeping informed about develop-'

ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted

a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele-

ments of the DDP

"for the purpose of insuring opera-

tional coordination similar to that achieved by the

meeting of support elements every Tuesday morning." 64/

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on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained.

The reports on the evolution of the government in

exile and the buildup of the stay-behind network and

on paramilitary activity indicated that much work

still remained to be done to get these activities

off the ground. Further, it was pointed out to the

DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly

escalating, principally because:

Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment

[werel being charged against the project

which,

in fact, was the major cause of the

project's over-obligation.

It was the

opinion of all concerned that such property

should be held on a Memorandum Receipt

basis without cost to the project, and

that charges, if any, should be reflected

as direct costs only if property was found

unserviceable or was not returned to com-

munications stock supply after the project

is terminated.

The DCI was advised that

this matter would be discussed with the

comptroller for resolution. 62

Most important in connection with this briefing,

was the DCI's comment that:

With respect to personnel needs, he

assured all, no matter whether personnel

were overseas or in the US, he would

arrange to obtain personnel required in

support of JMARC. 66/

The meaning of Chief/WH/4's comments to the DCI,

was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment

No. I to the project was submitted to the Director

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for approval. The amendment concerned the need for

more money and pointed out that:

Not only has the initial $900,000

already been expended, but it is

cur-

rently estimated that

an additional

$1.0 million is immediately required to

carry the activity through 30 June 1960

...

Note is also made ... of possible

contingencies amounting to an additional

$1.4 million for which no funds are re-

quested at this time. 67/

In addition to an early updating for the DCI,

WH/4 also undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisen-

hower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April

1960, General Cabell headed a CIA delegation including

Mr. Bissell, Col. King, and Jake Esterline which

briefed a very high level group of Department of

Defense representatives in the JCS conference room

at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introduc-

tory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was con-

ducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from

* Included among the Defense participants were Thomas

Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman,

JCS; Gen. Shoup, Commandant U.S. Marines;

Admiral

Burke; CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S.

Army; Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, repre-

senting COS/Army: 68/

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J. C. King. Apparently Jake Esterline, the man who

had the monkey on his back as project chief sat

quietly by.

The suggestion which had been made by Paul

Oberst that the "waters be muddied" by making it

appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo

forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced

during the course of this briefing of the JCS, even

though the Dominican Republic was included as a part

of the overall briefing. What did emerge with refer-

ence to the Dominican Republic was a concensus that

if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility

that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic

where he probably would be received as a conquering

hero.

In the course of the discussion which followed

the briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal

"hawk," indicating his willingness to move fleet units

into the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the sug-

gestion had been made that if Castro went into the

Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time

before he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In ad-

dition, Burke made it quite clear that should the

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Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the

Navy was prepared to defend

that base: In Burke's

opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do

that.* 69/

Whether a direct result of this briefing of

the JCS or not, there was a noticeable improvement •

in WH/4's relations with the military services be-

fore the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example,

$150,000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director

of Logistics to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly

as a working fund for the 2750th Maintenance Unit,

Fort Randolph, Canal Zone. This money, of course,

was

to be used for necessary construction, renovation,

procurement of

material, and hire of native labor as

necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site

for the PM insturctor cadre. 71/

Before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's

This briefing for the senior personnel in the Depart-

ment of Defense, would have taken place in any event:

but it may have been prompted

by the reluctance of the

lesignated DOD liaison officer with WH/4, Capt. Burns

Spore (USN), to do much more than listen

to WH/4's re-

quests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the

project and for real estate for use in the training

Program

until he received a

green light from the

SecDef. 70/

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request for overflight photo coverage of the islands

offshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter was

taken up, not only with the Air Force, but also with

J. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Al-

though the authorization and plan for these overflights,

presumably by the U-2, antedated the shootdown of

Francis Gary Power's U-2 in the Soviet Union, it was

recorded that:

Ambassador Berry had called to say

that the Department.. had approved the

mission, but insisted that extremely

tight security be exercised throughout

and that Col. Benson (USAF/Operations)

inform Ambassador Berry before each

sortie so that the Department would be

properly prepared to respond to any

emergency.

72/

The first flight, incidentally, was tentatively sched-

uled for the weekend of 30 April - 1 May of 1960.**

In April of 1960, in addition to working with

the Army, the Agency representatives also began to

work with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of

Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (AE&P) to Ceylon who

was at this time assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence

and

Research.

** Powers

was shot down over the USSR. on I May 1960.

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the Office of Special Operations, Department of De-

fense. One of the

particular problems of concern in

this relationship was that of covert sea transporta-

tion which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro

forces back to the island of Cuba. Even though all

the planning about which there is a record at this

time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare

training and the infiltration of communications ex-

perts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of DDP's

Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and

a Col. Anderson

(USMC) who were members of the DOD/CIA

Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and

discussed among other interesting subjects:

The acquisition from the Navy of two

Landing Ship-Tanks (LST) and four Air-

Sea Rescue Craft (AVR), the training of

the Cuban crews for these vessels, and

the means; of covert transfer of the

vessels from the Navy to the Agency.* 73/

In addition to the requested overhead reconnis-

sance of the Cuban coastline by the Air Force, the

*

It is rather strange that at this early date in

April 1960 discussions were being held concerning

the acquisition of IST's.

There had been no discus-

sions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban

troops back into their homeland; and, consequently,

the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place.

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Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach

gradient problems with the Marine Corps and repre-

sentatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It

was ascertained that much work needed to be done in

order to upgrade information suitable for planning

the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops

and vehicles. 74/

In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's

announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department

of State seemed to be operating in a world. of its own

- making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the

flow of information on Cuba's internal developments.

On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant

Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,

was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which

provided a check list.of current operations and ten

categories of activity related to developments in

Cuba.

From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems

as

though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues

before the Special Group, of the discussions among

CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the

President's approved plan for covert action. Nor

was there any evident awareness of the various overt

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programs with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/

About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to

the Special Group his displeasure that the Depart-

ment failed to consult with the Agency prior to

announcing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US

Ambassador to Cuba. 76/

The Rubottom plan apparently had some impact,

for by the end of April 1960; Gordon Gray was calling

on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to

find someone in the Department - Dillon himself --

•to be "constantly seized of the Cuban problem and

who would take steps to assure that all of the activ-

ities of various groups were in harness and that all

needed decisions

were made when needed."* 7V/ Mr.

Gray also specified some of the problems which would

face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting:

(Livingston Merchant] has set up two

groups, one under the chairmanship of

Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the

Special Group, of which Livie is a mem-

ber, and in his

absence Ray. Hare sits.

Further,

there is a special activity

This, of course, apparently ignores or disregards

the creation of WH/4 and the responsibilities desig-

nated. to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisen-

hower.

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proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob

Anderson, with which you may or may not

be familiar.

Allen Dulles

has

a particu-

lar liaison with Bob in this matter.

The Defense Department, of course, has

many interests. 78/

The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be

made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the

programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with

the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at

a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April, Chief,

WH/4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with

reference to Dillon:

The Agency would not look with favor on

this arrangement.

Mr. Barnes and the

Director, therefore, plan to go over to

State on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960]

• and head off this new development. Mr.

Barnes believes that a short paper setting

forth what we are already doing in the

fields of coordination and liaison should

be adequate to support their point of

view. 79/

Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon

become Chief of Staff for the nation's anti-Castro

program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or

whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State

should take over

the direction of a program which

would basically be carried out by the Agency is not

revealed in the records. Presumably both elements

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entered into the picture.

In any event, Gordon Gray

seemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH/4

and the liaison arrangements which had already been

made. (See Appendix D.) * But whatever the explana-

tion, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for

the nation's Cuban program.

Although it was not included on the list of

Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and con-

tacts at this time, mention should be made of the

CIA-FBI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the

FBI was prohibited from engaging in intelligence

operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief,

WH/4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had plans for

installing a stay-behind network -- using Mexicans

and Cubans - to be activated in case diplomatic

relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief,

WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with

the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an

explanation of the Bureau's plan. 80/ About the

same time that Chief WH/4 was evincing concern about

FBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in

* Appendix D, page 332.

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a memorandum for the Acting Director of Central In-

telligence that:

A thorough investigation has been made

of the relations between the Havana

Station

and the Havana Office of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation.

It has been concluded

that the operations of the FBI have neither

interferred with nor conflicted with the

Station's operations. 81/

Col. King's memo also stated the Bureau's long-

time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to

both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that

-frequently the Station was called on to participate

in, or actually undertake, the debriefing of various

individuals who had come into the FBI offices to volun-

teer information. On occasion, the Bureau had even

turned over specific operations to the Station.

Chief, WH Division went even further when,

during the course of one of the weekly interdepart-

mental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr.

Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its

jurisdiction, and that perhaps this should be brought

before the NSC for consideration. Col. King reported

that he remained non-committal at this time, but did

point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue

should be "soft-pedaled.". He did say, however, that

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the memorandum he had prepared on

this subject was

being held in the files should questions about this

particular Bureau activity ever be raised. King

also recommended that the Agency not take the initia-

tive in raising the question. 82/

Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in

the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal

protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana

area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became

even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded

activities at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH

(later JMWAVE) in Miami. In one report concerning

the number of the Cuban exiles in the Miami area who

were under suspicion of -- or were -- working for

Castro, or who were trying desperately to get sup-

port from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent

made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA repre-

sentative with whom he was exchanging information.

According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent

told me that his personal opinion was

that it would be virtually impossible, if

not completely impossible, to bring about

the overthrow of the Castro regime using

Cuban exiles. He thought the only solu-

tion to the problem, and the one that

stood the best chance of success, was to

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go in with the US Marines. He admitted

that this was only his personal opinion,

but he felt that in view of his experience

and contact with the Cuban exiles, he had

a good point.

I could not help agree

with him. 83/

Agent George Davis apparently was extremely

interested in full cooperation with the Agency, quick-

ly accepting the Agency representative's proposal.

that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each

week to compare notes; and the CIA field representa-

tive, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the

FBI any information which the Agency might acquire

pertaining to FBI interests.*

* The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May

1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second

FOB that had been established

since the formation of

WH Division - the initial base having been set up

during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953-

1954. In general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organ-

ants Ar the operation

ization of Headquarters with FI; CI, CA, Support, and

PM units. FOB reported directly to

the Chief, WH

Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4.

Ini-

tially the satellite communications center for relaying

commo between Headquarters and the field -- including

facilities in the Florida Keys concerning the maritime

operations -- was established; and ultimately the commo

link would connect Headquarters with the operations in

Guatemala and Nicaragua.

The cover firm for the base,

was Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover for

an organization engaged in classified research.

A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on

the FOB, and the reports are available through the

Records

Management Officer of WH Division.

These

(footnote continued on following page)

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In addition to its concern with the interests

of other government agencies in the Cuban problem,

in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required

to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential

and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major politi-

cal parties.

while the intelligence briefings were

scheduled to consider the world situation, consider-

able emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the

Dominican Republic. In preparation

for Mr. Dulles'

briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy,

on 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban brief-

ing paper touching on the principal aspects of the

exile organization, the propaganda plan, penetration

of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (includ-

ing the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

and East Germany), and the play that Castro was making

in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympa-

thizers. In addition, emphasis also was given to the

reports deal basically with the period between 1962

and 1968; and while there is some feeling that the

story of the Bay of Pigs operation should go into

extensive detail on the initial operations of the

FOB, this author has chosen not to do so, focusing

instead on only those broad aspects of the problem

relating to the Miami Base. 84/

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planned program for paramilitary training and opera-

tions under the aegis of CIA. Insofar as can be

determined, however, there is no indication that

in

his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential

candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics

on the Agency's anti-Castro plans. 85/

As mentioned previously, one of the continuing

problems

requiring coordination within the Executive

Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project

JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of

budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made avail-

able for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell.

appeared at a special Group meeting, requesting that

an additional $10.75 million be released from

reserve

funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly

for the paramilitary and propaganda programs.

The

decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's

appeal was that:

This matter should be laid before the

appropriate higher authorities and a

presentation would be arranged hopefully

within the next ten days.

This was be-

lieved to be wise, not because any actions

involving major political risks were to

be taken in the near

future, but because

the Agency would soon become

committed

to various substantial expenditures which

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should not be undertaken without a reason-

able assurance that the operation was to

go forward. 86/

On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr.

Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the

requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made avail-

able from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies * 87/

C. Cooperation and Challenge

As already mentioned, immediately following

the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro

program, there was a considerable degree of coopera-

tion between CIA and other of the concerned Agencies

- the Department of Defense, the Department of State, •

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and

Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued

to expand and develop the various programs -- propa-

ganda, covert action, staybehind networks, and para-

military operations - there were ever increasing

contacts between CIA and the representatives of other

One explanation for the sharply increasing demand

for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel

was being written off upon issue, rather than upon

consumption - an aspect of the operation that was

explained to the author by William E. Eisemann,

formerly Chief, Support WH/4. 88/

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government agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe

the period from the summer of 1960 until the early

fall was as a period of cooperation and

challenge.

Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented

National Policy. Challenge to most if not all of

CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the

nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make-up

of the exile military force which was being organized,

the location of training sites, the types of technical

materiel (including aircraft) being requested, and,

most important by the end of this period, the specific

nature of the military operation which was to be

mounted against Fidel Castro.

By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary

training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to

500 or more trainees -- even though the actual train-

ing of the initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph

in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in

the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo

training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated

that the increased number of PM trainees would be

recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin

American countries where Cubans had taken up residence,

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and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba.

The emphasis on

the PM training at this time was to

be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla

warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was

to be with the M-l carbine, the Garand and Spring-

field rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the

.45 Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the

weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard

arms

packs. 89/

It must be presumed that the call for increases

in the number of PM trainees was related to the con-

tinued importation of Soviet weapons and technicians

and the increasing strength of the Communist Party

in Cuba. An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on "The

Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro

regime was "deeply and increasingly influenced by Com-

munists

.. no longer any prospect of democratic govern-

ment under his (Fidel Castro's] regime."

As was past

estimates, this particular NIE was unable to

answer

the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist.

The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition

leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the

opposition at that time "pose a

serious threat to

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the regime." One weakness touched on by the National

Estimate concerned the Castro militia which was char-

acterized as "only partially armed, and for the most

part poorly trained ... [and] appears to have little,

if any, effectiveness as an organized combat force.

in conventional operations." For either of the fore-

going reasons, perhaps, an increase in the number of

PM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strong

dissident leader to the fore, or (b) develop

the

capability to overcome the Castro militia. 90/

The question of an increased number of PM

trainees surfaced in a late August briefing for Presi-

dent Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and Ander-

son, and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster

by the DCI and Mr. Bissell. After President Eisenhower's

National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized

developments since the March

announcement of the anti-

Castro program, Mr. Dulles provided some specifics

concerning the organization of the FRD and its prin-

cipals, noting that the Headquarters for the FRD had

been established

in Mexico City, in lieu of the invi-

tation of President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit

the ERD to operate from his country. Mr. Dulles

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noted that at this time, it was particularly important

that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed.

When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the De-

partment of Defense representative, Mr. Gates, made

it quite clear that he was concerned about the pos-

sibility of US military personnel being involved

directly in the military operations inside Cuba.

Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel in

third countries would be used only as instructors --

not as cadre leaders for either an invasion or a

guerrilla warfare effort.

Bissell did stress, however, that there was

need for a standby force, preferably of non-Americans,

with special training in guerrilla warfare to pro-

vide a leadership complement to the Cubans when "push"

came to "shove," a recommendation that provoked some

differences of opinion during the course of this

briefing for the President when it was suggested

that US officers might be required to direct these

forces.

Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this dis-

cussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk the

matter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined that

the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved

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at this particular time:

of his position at this meeting,

According to his own report

Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be

unwise to mount any kind of an operation

without the determination to see it

through and that an abortive effort would

be worse than no effort at all.

He there-

fore thought that if this backup force

was essential to ultimate

success, full

consideration should be given to it at

this stage in the planning..

Mr. Dulles

again urged

that a decision on this be

deferred. * 91/

In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction

to Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force

would be able to carry off the effort without any out-

side help, the President was reported to have indicated

that

He would go along so long as the Joint

Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we.

have a good chance of being successful.

He wouldn't care much about this kind of

cost [the $10 million increase noted

earlier; indeed, he said he would de-

rend this kind of action against all

comers and that if we could be sure of

freeing the Cubans from this incubus,

$25 million might be a small price to pay.

In light of today's relations between the United

States and other of the major world powers with the

third countries, Gordon Gray displayed -- in the

summer of 1960 -- a degree of foresight with which

he has never been properly credited.

For he noted

at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly

with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other

small nations would be encouraged to undertake harass-

ments of the major powers. 92/

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The President concluded the meeting, by

saying that he would like to urge caution

with respect to the danger of making false

moves, with the result of starting some-

thing before we were ready for it. * 93/

One of the most persistent problems which was

to surface by early fall of 1960 concerned the need

for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk

of the questioning came from the Department of State, •

principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become

the Assistant Secretary of State for American Repub-

lic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some

of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro

activity in his capacity

as Assistant Secretary for

* In his memorandum of a meeting with the President

on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discuss-

ing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in

addition to Messis.

Dulles and Bissell, a thira CIA

officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also

noted that the Vice-President had been invited to at-

tend the briefing.

According to Gray's record, how-

ever, neither the Vice-President nor the third

CIA

representative were in attendance at the briefing of

18 August.

The attendance of the Director and Mr.

Bissell, but with no CIA representative from WH/4,

was further illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism

that at too many high level briefings, CIA's repre-

sentatives were individuals who, high ranks notwith-

standing, were the furthest from the operation

—- yet

they were responsible for informing the nation's policy-

makers about the details of the anti-Castro program. 94/

It is also interesting to note that this off-the-

record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted

only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short

time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary •

Powers. 95/

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Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief,

WH/4 learned from a

member of the Department of State

that Mr. Mann was going to ask for a restudy of the

basic concept of JMATE, Or, if he did

not ask for

that re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate review

and rescheduling of the timetable for the JMATE oper-

ation. At this time and in view of the lack of prog- -

ress both in developing any great cohesion within

the FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba,

the questions seemed in order.

The reaction of Chief,

WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made to

blunt Mr. Mann's efforts, noting for example:

The degree to which we are already com-

mitted in JMARC would pose a monumental

security problem alone if we were suddenly

instructed to cease and desist from further

activity. As of this moment, they have

well in excess of 200 people

engaged in

air, ground, and communications training

in Guatemala.

the-board propaganda activities are being

stepped up daily. A drastic rescheduling

of either activity, therefore, could bring

about serious repercussions. 96/

The precise nature of these "serious repercus-

sions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however,

it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency-

sponsored training activities would loose a flood of

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Cubans back into the exile community; and they would

charge that

the United States feared to undertake the

task of ousting Fidel Castro.

This, in turn, would

mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the

Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline

speculated

that Mann did not believe that the Cubans

were willing to support an insurrection against Castro.

A suggestion which was made to counter the possible

Mann proposals was that:

To strengthen our position, therefore,

we are bending every effort to get at

least one supply airdrop into the target

country, prior to the Assistant Secretary's

return

to the United States

Success-

ful action in this area should weigh

heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann's

alleged new attitude. 97/

Just how one -- or even more -- successful air

drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about

the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a pos-

sible insurrection effort was not explained. That

there were dissidents on the island was unquestioned,

the problem was the degree of strength and effective-

ness that they might be able to demonstrate.*

* Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE,

the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred

did not set the criteria for the continuation or dis-

solution of the project.

This air drop was a complete

(footnote continued on following page)

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Mr. Mann would continue to raise questions con-

cerning the feasibility of discontinuing the training

in Guatemala, and in on-going meetings with Agency

representatives including the DCI, the DDP, Chief, WH,

as well as Chief, WH/4 and others, Mann continued to

raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE

should all the American trainers and Cuban trainees

be pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mann also

questioned the exact timing for Project JMATE. As

he raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary for

Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they

would much prefer that the training of the Cuban

exiles take place in US bases, both for purposes of

security and for efficiency. But they also pointed

out that it had been the decision for the Special

Group and the "highest levels" that such training

should take place in third countries, rather than in

the US. Mann persisted, however, suggesting that

the question of maintaining the training base in

and total bust, the supplies being dropped to the

guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces;

and the aircraft itself made a forced landing in

Mexico and was not recovered.

See Volume I of this

history, Air Operations.

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Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised

again with the Special Group. The Agency's repre-

sentatives agreed to this suggestion

"with the strict-

est proviso that no move from Guatemala could or

should be made until adequate staging facilities in

the Zone of the Interior have been prepared." 98/

Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the

base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in

a somewhat different context than had been suggested

by Esterline and J. C. King. Barnes

recommended con-

sideration be given, among other items, to:

The fact that a move from the present

training

sites to the US should not be

made too

hurriedly and the importance of

avoiding a decision at a later date that

the training in the US is a bar to opera-

tional use.

I realize that this latter

point would be a complete contradiction

of the present theory but, after all,

there is an intervening election; and

political views can shift so that every-

thing possible should be done to avoid

our getting ourselves into the box where

we move to the Us for one reason and then

find that the US move is used against us

to prevent or limit ultimate operations. * 100/

One additional point which was made by Jake

Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations with

Source reference No. 99 not

used.

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Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the

training program in Guatemala might very well lead

to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro-

communist elements which were already in evidence

in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indi-

cated that should the troop training be moved from

Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops.

would be trained

as a special security force for the

Guatemalan government. 101/

During these discussions in the late fall of

1960, Mann also raised the issue of economic sanctions

which had been touched on in the early spring. At

this time however, the Agency's representatives be-

lieved that Mann was talking in terms of a one to

three year quarantine period, in an attempt to dis-

rupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine, however,

which would not interfere with the flow of goods from

the Communist countries. This was a point of some

contention between State and CIA, with the Agency

people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up

any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the

economy of Castro's Cuba. 102/

In the context of a possible move of the train-

ing facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared

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a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need

for training bases to be located in the southern

part of the United States should include an infantry

training base capable of handling 3,000 men with

range facilities, tactical training areas, an air-

field for training air and ground crews in the utili-

zation of B-26, C-46 and C-54 aircraft, aerial gunnery.

and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and

staging facilities. It was suggested that the air-

field logistical base should be located in southern

Florida, and permission to use Ramey Air Force Base

in Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights to Cuba

should be obtained. The maritime facilities would

be located on Viegues Island, Puerto Rico and also

in southern Florida.

In a meeting with the Special Group, the Deputy

Director for Central Intelligence put

forth the pro-

posals concerning the movement of training bases to

the United States; and although he was supported by

the Department of Defense representatives - Mr.

Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant of

the Department of State, normally one of the hard

liners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent

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feelings at this time about the training program.

Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann's arguments

suggesting that the time for military action was

SO

far down the line that US efforts should be concen-

trated on economic sanctions at this time. 103/

Adolf A. Berle, who would become one of the Kennedy

administration's principal advisers on Latin America,

also seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in

favor of economic sanctions, Berle suggesting that

the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of

arms and ammunition both to Cuba and from Cuba to

other parts of Latin America. 104/

Although it has been indicated that the Depart-

ment of Defense would apparently support the Agency

in its request for the establishment of training

facilities in the continental United States, DOD did

balk at the use of military personnel in third country

areas in support of Project JMATE. Although Deputy

Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to ques-

tion whether his department had actually been committed

to support CIA's anti-Castro effort, it seems clear

that policy approval for the use of Department of

Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established

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with the approval of the President's comprehensive

program of covert action against Fidel Castro in

March 1960. 105/

The difficulties encountered with the Department

of Defense concerning the

assignment of Special Force

trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training

bases has already been spelled out in considerable

detail in another volume, but even as the Department

of Defense

was taking a negative attitude toward the

possible use of DOD personnel in either training or

combat activities, the Agency was proposing the re-

cruitment of either American or foreign volunteers

to serve as combat troops for

Project IMATE. The

Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department

of State, however, put the quietus on the plan for

obtaining foreign volunteers; but J. Foster Collins,

the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested to

the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (the

DDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the need

to re-examine the Department of State policy.*

* The problem of the Special Force trainers is dis-

cussed in Volume II of this history, Participation

in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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Collins was particularly enthusiastic about the pros-

spects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and

Turks to

serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's view

prevailed, and there were no contingents of either

American or foreign volunteers. 106/

During the period of buildup and organization

of WH/4 for the JMATE effort against Castro, the

Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy,

but none of these were as serious as the difficulties

encountered with the Department of Defense per se,

the Air Force, or

the United States Army. The exist-

ence of the United States

Naval Base at Guantanamo

Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation in view

of the planning that was taking place. Apparently,

however, there was no disagreement between the Agency

and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo from being

used to mount anti-Castro activities or from being

used

as a safe haven

area for' those who might have

been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or

other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such

restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans

from claiming violations of the legal and binding

international agreement between the United States

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and the Government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo

Bay. So serious was this issue in fact, that the

Agency agreed

that all Cubans participating in over-

flights of Cuba would be told that Guan-

tanamo Naval Base was not to be used as

a safe haven, and that if they landed

there, they would be turned over to the

Cuban authorities. 107/

The Guantanamo Base also presented a major dif-

ficulty for the Department of State. Evidence of this

surfaced in early October of 1960 when it was reported

that during a meeting of the State Working Group on

Cuba a suggestion

was put forward that the us try to

influence Latin American nations to approve US reten-

tion of the base. One proposal had been made that

this be done through

the Inter-American Defense Board

(IADB), where a resolution apparently was about to be

introduced asking for a definition of the relations

between Cuba and the USSR, with the expectation that

this might force Cuba's resignation from membership

on the IADB. According

to Col. John F. Mallard, the

Agency's liaison officer with the State Working Group:

In addition, State desires that the

IADB, make some statement on the impor-

tance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin American

hemisphere defense.

This statement would,

in effect, give Latin American approval

to U.S. retention of this base. 108/

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This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo

Bay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis,

to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief,

Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions

which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were

when they were raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote as

follows:

I realize that this Agency is an

implementing arm of the Executive Branch

and has no right or privilege in the area

of formulation of U.s. national policy.

I believe that within this framework we

who are part of this Agency are permitted

to comment on certain State Department

or other Executive Department propositions

that appear, on the basis of our own

personal observations and experience, to

be counter-productive to the best interest

of the United States.

I am convinced

that the course of action, described in

paragraph 1 [that the U.S. use the IADB

to win Latin American support for the

J.S. retention of Guantanamo] is in fact

within this category.

It is high time that the U.S. take an

understandable public position in matters

of international agreement, compact, con-

tract, and treaty.

The rights of the U.s.

to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clear-

ly and legally described in several docu-

ments which bear the signatures of the

then reigning and cognizant governments

of the United States and Cuba, respectively.

Certainly the assistance of any single or

plural Latin American national entity (ies)

seems to me to be indicative of an admitted

weakness on the part of the United States

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and its conviction of its legal inter-

national rights.

I suggest that this Agency make known

to the State Department its feelings in

this matter, as described above (if ad-

dressees agree). I realize that consider-

able discussion could be waged in terms

of legally and/or logically presenting

our case.

This memorandum is not intended

to meet these requirements.

One observation that might be included

is the fact that the current Chief of

Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke,

has on at least two occasions in U.S. mass

media of sizable circulation stated that

the United States would not tolerate any

invasion. of Guantanamo or hostile abroga-

tion of our treaty arrangements to the base.

I believe it is significant to note that

no responsible member of the Executive

Branch (including the President of the

United States) has contradicted his state-

ments.: On the basis of this evidence, it

would appear to me

that the official overt

position of the United States is crystal

clear and we need not at this time place

ourselves in a position of indebtedness

or vulnerability with any other Latin

American nation in terms of the Guantan-

amo issue. 109/

BY early November 1960 Secretary of State,

Christian Herter, had decided that the matter of

Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level;

and, consequently, he introduced the subject on the

agenda for the National Security Council meeting of

7 November 1960. The Secretary emphasized the need

for coordination of military and political planning

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in case of an attack on the naval base.

Herter

indicated two extreme possibilities: one, that in

case of an attack, the United States respond with

only sufficient military force to protect the base

itself; and another, that the United States decide

that an attack on the base was in fact an

act of war

and apply such military power as necessary. Herter

also suggested, of course, that there would be possi-

ble responses

between the two extremes, with activities

in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on

the US response - the sort of contention that undoubt-

edly must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis

again. The Secretary of State did specify, however,

that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would

be the result of a decision made by the President of

the United States.

As will be pointed out subsequently, the Cubans

would make charges about Guantanamo being the center

for anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few

instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find

refuge within the confines of the base. Overall,

however, there was a surprising degree of neutrality

with respect to the naval installation during the

course of the Bay of Pigs operation.

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It is also important to mention at this time

the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief,

CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison. Before the end of October

1960, the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's

representatives that he believed it impossible for

him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in

the Cuban area properly until he received further

information -- specific information --

about the

Agency's planned operations against Castro. When

this report on Dennison was brought to the attention

of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. P.

Holcomb, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request

for information which he cared to lay on the Agency

would be promptly answered. By this time, Dennison

indicated that he had already been in touch

with

General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the

expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs

by CIA was being laid on.

Holcomb, quite truthfully, indicated that

neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT,

Commander Ray E. Millard, were privy to the planned

operations of WH/4. Once having assured the Admiral

of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide

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him with the necessary information, Holcomb then

noted:

It was the impression of the CIA

officers present that Admiral Dennison is

a cooperative officer and favorably and

objectively inclined towards CIA, and

that if his needs can be met, he will

undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful

course. 111/

On 2 November 1960, Richard Bissell, Jacob Ester-

line,. and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to

Admiral Dennison's headquarters. The CIA representa-

tives received a general briefing by the Navy on con-

tingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return,

they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. Mr. Bissell

gave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline dis-

cussed the political and propaganda aspects, and

Hawkins talked about the PM program, including the

plan for a 1,500-man invasion force to seize a lodge-.

ment on the island of Cuba. Hawkins emphasized that

this last objective could not be met until March or

April of 1961. * 112/

In a telecon with the author of this history on

15 May 1978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it was

extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs oper-

ation before he received any briefing from CIA on the

anti-Castro operation.

He made it sound, in fact,

as though he was not briefed until shortly before

the

(footnote. continued on following page)

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D. Personnel and Training

From the time of the official approval of the

anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the

collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question

of personnel and personnel management for Project

JMATE was of constant concern. Even though the

Director of Central Intelligence "emphasized the

significance of the Project, by saying that he would

recall Agency personnel from any station in the world

if the individual's abilities were required for the

successful achievement of JMATE objectives, " some of

those who were closest to the personnel problem be-

lieved that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that

promise. 113/ Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 has re-

marked as follows:

It was obvious that as the operation

began to increase in size that the Divi-

sions didn't have the personnel, the

senior personnel; to staff out the organ-

ization; or if they did have them, they

weren't about to release them from the

LSD (Landing Ship Dock) which was to carry the landing

craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready

to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion.

As the text above confirms, however, the Admiral was

read into the act relatively early in the game and

should have had plenty of time to make preparations

for the activities of April 1961.

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things they were doing, because they were

considered indispensable, which was probably

correct. It was on that basis, I think,

that when people like Dick Drain came

back home from -- in Dick's case, I think

he came in from Greece - where he had a

pretty good record - but he was not re-

turning to Headquarters to go into an

assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in

the operation with us.

Gerry Droller had

been around Headquarters for a long time,

had been quite a bit of a replacement

problem. He was very bright, he was a

German specialist, had a pretty good

political background; and Gerry and Howard

Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of

selected, not by us, but they were told

they were going to be the people who

would handle the political aspects of

the operation. 114/

Esterline also noted that the shortage of compe-

tent personnel became particularly critical when the

operational concepts began to change and to expand.

He claimed that when serious problems came up none of

the GS-18 case officers were available to make deci-

sions. 115/

Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/4, was more

specific in his criticism of the personnel management

for. Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel

I. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS),

did insure that the support elements got the best

people for Project JMATE, "he [Whitel, directed all

Support office heads that if there was a need for any

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senior officer or any position to be filled that they

would fill it without any hesitation whatsoever." 116/

But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out:

I can't say that was true on the opera-

tional side of the shop.

A Contingency

Task Force, a program developed by the

Clandestine Services, was designed to

make available Agency personnel who could

be pulled out of any position that they

were assigned to and moved into any urgent,.

high priority type of project. JMATE

Project, was a high priority project; and

the Contingency Task Force concept, in my

opinion, failed at that point because the

Clandestine Services did not provide the

tionquality people we needed for the posi-

to be filled. After JMATE Project ...

the Contingency Task Force was completely

abolished.. Many people in the Agency were

designated from the Support and the Opera-

tional side to fill various positions as

they would come up, but it didn't work from

the Clandestine Services side.

We had real

problems, trying to get qualified ... top

qualified people ... to do those jobs. In

my opinion, the Contingency Task Force was

a failure.

It was set up and designed so

that qualified personnel would be completely

immunized and processed and ready to go with

passports at any given time. But you

couldn't get the people you wanted -- I'm

talking about qualified key professionals

in the Clandestine Services -- because the

Division heads in the Clandestine Services

would not release those people. 117/

Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations for

Project JMATE was among the severest of the critics

with reference to the personnel assigned to Project

JMATE. Pointing to his own case; Drain stated:

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I don't mean to be unduly immodest, but

really, I didn't have any qualifications

for this [WH/4] except that I was there

and unemployed - had no Spanish language

whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been

punching cows in Arizona in 1940.

That

doesn't really bring you up much on Latin

America and latinos, and any of that

...

I had never been on an amphibious operation,

and if that was characteristic of my quali-

fications, it really characterized the whole

damned operation... about which, it seemed

to me,

there was a good deal of well-meaning

hypocrisy.

Allen Dulles, always meaning

what he said, would say repeatedly,

"now,

I want the very best people assigned to

this project ... there is nothing more

important that we are doing than this; and

I want directed assignments ... I want

people pulled out of tours overseas if

necessary, this thing must be manned."

Everybody would solemnly nod and, then,

much like the case of Vietnam ... humans

22223

being humans... we would tend to get the

people that the area Division Chiefs found

"excess" -- which normally meant "found

insufficient."

With many notable exceptions,

we did not get the very best people avail-

able. 118/

Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of

the Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the

Western Hemisphere Division:

More of this staffing would have come

from Wh if there had been more competent

people within WH. WH suffered, in my

opinion, from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers

who had been picked up at the time that

the Agency took over from the Bureau in

Latin America ... but there were damned

few of them that had any particular ex-

perience ...

One of the main things

that plagued me was that I could never

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figure out, because nobody ever made it

clear, where the hell the project stood

ViS-a-vis WH ... J. C. King never was

told, I think for understandable reasons,

to what extent he was in it, and

extent he was not in it. 119/

As with other of the principals who were involved

in the WH/4 effort, Drain was

extremely complimentary

of the Support element assigned to WH/4, stating as

follows:

This is

a little ironic, because with

Bissell as the DDP, you would have thought

that if the directed assignment thing

worked anywhere, it should have worked

within the DDP.

It worked less well there

than it did within the DdS.

Red White,

soldierly like he was, took absolutely

sincerely, what the Director said, when

he said

"I want the very best people

assigned to this."

So we got Mike King

to run the finance, not some stumblebum

with

garters on his sleeve ... the best

finance officer they had. Our logistics

support and Bill Eisemann, they were really

hand picked by Red White

...

The DDS or

the DDA, whatever they called it then,

deserved very high marks for being uniquely

the people to put their back into it.

The DDI really wasn't asked; and that

was too bad, because we could have used, '

it seems to me, some input from the DDI.

Our own intelligence report structure

was not bad. The Chief, FI was

a nice

old guy, Whedbee; and we had some reports

officers who were quite competent in the

DDP sense; but the thing was so compart-

mented from the DDI, in any event, that

the idea of drawing down on DDI talent.

to get in on this, was not well received.

I had suggested it because

I had been

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in the DDI and I knew where the talent

was.

For example, on just such a mundane,

but important thing, as topography and

geography and beach

stuff... Christ, I

well knew from the time that I worked for

Lofty Becker ... that there was in old

ORR ... in the geographic thing

... Jim

[Brammell],... Otto Guthe

... I mean,

they would have been glad to supply

people... and we didn't ask.

So you

can't say: that DDI didn't provide, unless

you understand that they didn't provide

because they really weren't asked. * 120/

Although the Agency's own personnel assignments

have been criticized, the assignment of two of the key

military personnel involved in the JMARC operation

proved to be quite

successful. Col. Jack Hawkins,

United States Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Frank Egan,

United States Army, were in charge of the overall PM

activity (Hawkins) and the PM training (Egan) for the

Cuban exile brigade. Hawkins, who was serving on the

Staff of the Marine School-at Quantico, Virginia at

*

Drain's suggestion that-the DDI was left completely

in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates

the case..

As early as January 1959 there is evidence

that Mr. Helms agreed to cut the DDI in on "useful

intelligence to which it would be well for the DD/I to

have access" from State cable traffic on Cuba being

carried over CIA channels.

A "massive" study of

Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR

in the fall of 1960 led Mr. Bissell to send a memo

of commendation for the Communications Branch through

the DDI. Obviously the DDI knew something was a-

foot. 120a/

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the time that he was assigned to Project JMARC, had

taken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor;

had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor;

and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp

at Davao, Mindanao; and joined the Philippine guerrilla

forces, leading raiding parties and harassing attacks

against the Japanese army in the Philippines. After

seven months of such activity, he was evacuated by

submarine from the Philippines in November 1943 and

was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for these

actions. After returning to the United States for

additional training, in November 1944 Hawkins again

returned to the Pacific area where he was an assistant

operations officer taking part in the assault and

capture of Okinawa. For this service, he received a

Bronze Star Medal. During the Korean conflict, he

was Commanding Officer of the lst Battalion, Ist

Marines; and he led the Battalion in combat 'during

the Inchon landing and in subsequent operations in

Korea. For his participation in the Inchon-seoul op-

eration, Hawkins had received the Silver Star Medal

for

heroism. From March 1956 to the summer of 1959

when he entered the Naval War College, Hawkins had

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served as liaison officer with the Amphibious Forces

Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia -- a

pertinent assign-

ment for his transfer to Project JMARC.

Lt. Col. Egan's military record showed a well-

trained infantry officer who had served overseas in

the European Theater during the course of world War

II; an infantry officer including an infantry train-

ing officer in much of the period following world

War II; and a staff officer in the Special Warfare

Division of the United States Army in 1958, serving

with the Director of Plans, in Washington from 1958

to 1960. Immediately prior to his assignment to

Project JMATE, Colonel Egan had been on the Operations

and Training Staff of a Joint Support Group, head-

quartered in Washington. Egan EOD'd with Project JMATE,

27 June 1960, and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960. 121/

Both officers received high marks from Mr. Bissell

and

Jake Esterline, and particularly from Dick Drain,

who stated:

I thought they [Hawkins and Egan] were

first rate

... I mean first rate, not com-

pared with the jaded World War II memory,

but first rate in terms of officers then

serving in the armed forces of the United

States.

The Hawkins selection was an

excellent one. I don't myself, know how

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one could have found a better man.

People

have said

... "Well, the son of a bitch

just worked out in the Philippines

as a

stay behind….. what did he know?" He

knew a lot.

He had written a book on

querrillas. He was sharp, he was smarti

and honest, and not overly ambitious.

am sure that he saw this as a way to further

his career, of course.

Military men, I

think, tend to maximize that more than

Agency people. But that was not his

motivation -- or his primary motivation.

He had around him some really first rate

•. not very high ranking'

we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking

... we needed some hard workers.

Frank

Egan, who went down to do the training,

was the man that I would have picked.

He

was probably the most disputable of

bunch because he was pretty volatile. He

has been condemned for leading the Cuban

manpower to believe that they were going

to get more support than he had any right

to let them know about.

Well, I wasn't

there, but I know damned well that if I

had been, I would have been priming up

the Brigade to do this tough job, not by

counseling them as to the difficulty of

it

... at least, exclusively ... or, giving

them lectures about now you will really

have to do this on your own, because you

are not going to get one iota of assistance

from the armed forces.

You don't normally

train a group to conduct an operation of

this sort by playing on their fears. If,

down there at the end of the line - first

in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan

led them to believe that they were going

to get them more help than he had any right

to let them know, well, I can understand

why that would have happened. * 122/

With reference to Colonel Hawkins, Jake Esterline

has noted:

(footnote continued on following page)

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By way of illustrating some of the problems

encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the

JMATE operation, on the very day that President

Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a

memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for

Plans from the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

noting that two individuals assigned to the Office

of Training were urgently needed for service in WH/4.

Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel

Matt Baird, Director of Training, was agreeable to

the release of the two individuals to serve as PM

trainers, Baird insisted that the men could not be

I guess that it is only fair to say

that that assignment [Project JMARC] cost

him his general's star, and a good many

other things in terms of his record. 123/

The author of this history

attempted to arrange

oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan,

but in neither case would the individuals consent to

such interview. In addition, the author also asked

each man if he would be willing to respond to a series

of written questions, and neither would agree to this.

It was made quite clear to the author that both indi-

viduals harbored considerable resentment about their

relationships and association with the Agency at the

time of the Bay of Pigs.

In a similar manner, Col.

John F. Mallard, United States Marine Corps who was

Liaison Officer

between the Agency and the Depart-

ment of Defense, at the time of the Bay of Pigs, also

rejected the author's request for either an oral inter-

view or a response to written questions.

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released until suitable replacements could be found

to take over their tasks in the Office of Training.

King, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Director for

Plans for their immediate release. 124/

Not only did the Clandestine Service encounter

difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its own

units to serve in Wh/4, it also appeared to draw blanks

in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the strug-

gle against Castro. In response to a November 1959

memorandum to all WH field stations and bases asking

that they supply the names of Cubans who would be

willing to work as agents against the Castro Govern-

ment, WH/4/FI reported the results of its search,

stating that as of June 1960:

Many of the Agents

who were proposed

by other WH Stations for use in Cuba were

either found unacceptable, or did not want

to accept such an assignment. Other sta-

tions were unable to come up with any

assets who might gain access to the de-

sired targets in Cuba. 125/

The problem which Col. Baird had raised back in

March concerning replacement for personnel who might

be assigned to Project WH/4 was not actually resolved

until June of 1960 when:

Colonel White announced that DDS per-

sonnel on full time detail to JMARC

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would be transferred to the project Table

of Organization, effective the beginning

of the first pay period in

July 1960.

employees on detail to the project from

the Clandestine Services offices will not

be transferred since DDP considers them

temporary assignments with the personnel

returning to their parent office when the

project is completed. Colonel White

pointed out, that although DDS personnel

would be transferred to the project, there-

by relieving slots in the various DDS ele-

ments, each office head should keep in

mind that his employees will be returning

to him, and he should plan accordingly. 126/

Colonel White's comments are quite understandable

in view of the fact that of 104 personnel on duty with

JMATE on 7-8 June 1960, only 32 were Clandestine Serv-

ices careerists; and excepting a few with DDI career

designations, the bulk of the personnel were Support

careerists.

BY 14 June 1960, Colonel King was appeal-

ing to the DDP for an increment which would bring

total JMATE personnel to 234, including 131 employees

who were to be in the field. Apparently, however,

the Deputy Director for Plans approved a total ceiling

of only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960;

and in August of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwarded

a revised staffing guide, calling for a total of 274

positions and requesting that "as soon after 15 August

as is possible, a total of 40 additional staff personnel"

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be added to the 158 who were then on duty -- making

a new total of 198.

Although Mr. Bissell approved the recommended

increment, he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C.

Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A, suggesting that Barnes and

Dick Helms (surprisingly) take a close look at the

JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of

duplication, particularly between the field bases and

Headquarters. The DDP suggested that in the areas

of FI and PM there might be slots in either the For-

ward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the

Panama Training Site -- where possibly the staffs

could be transferred during slack periods to conduct

similar operations in other parts of the JMATE opera-

tion. * 127/

* Lest the reader be confused by the term "Forward

Operations Base," this was the JMWAVE activity in the

Miami area, which continued to operate subsequent to

the Bay of Pigs. At the same time that the Bay of

Pigs operation was getting under way,

there was con-

siderable emphasis from various individuals in Head-

quarters for establishment of a "Forward Command Post,"

which also might be located in the Miami area, possibly

in the communications complex.

Some even suggested

the possibility of establishing a sub-command post

in a third country.

In any event, no Forward Command

Post was established. 128/

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By early November 1960, as the concept of the

operation was shifting from

one of guerrilla warfare

and infiltration to invasion, the staffing pattern

for WH/4 was again increased. Mr. Bissell authorizing

a total of 308 positions. Even as he signed the

approval, however, Mr. Bissell noted his reservations,

saying:

I have signed this request to indicate

my approval, but do so with a good deal of

concern.

I realize that this is a very

major and top priority activity and I also

realize that the senior officers engaged

in it continue to be heavily overworked.

On the other hand, I am fearful that the

addition of large numbers of personnel will

not in fact reduce the load on those indi-

viduals who are most overworked, but may

instead create additional burdens of

management without contributing signifi-

cantly to the success of the underlying

activities.

I am concerned also that we

may be simply running out of suitable

people in the Agency in certain categories.

Accordingly, I urge you to re-examine even

the double-starred positions in the staff-

ing guide submitted

with your request to

see whether they are all in fact of a high

order of essentiality. * 129/

*

Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces

back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that

only the best people be assigned to the WH/4 project.

As early as August

of 1960, it had been indicated

that the DDP might

be leaning toward the use of

directed

assignments, but nothing ever came of this. 130/

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Even before Mr. Bissell's memorandum of early

November 1960, indicating the possibility that experts

in certain areas might no longer be available from

within the Agency, proposals had gone forward request-

ing permission for the use of American contract person-

nel in the maritime operations. Unlike the brouhaha

that was precipitated by the early suggestions for the

use of American volunteers from the ground forces,

the authorization for the use of US contracts in mari-

time activities apparently was granted without much

debate. The statement of the requirements for the !

use of the US contracts indicated that US citizens

would be put under contract to act not only as trainers

for the crews of LCI's, LCU's, ICVP'S,

and SK's, but

also, that they would serve in key positions

as LCI captains, ICI diesel engineers, and

ICU coxwains during training and operations,

where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained.

This would require their entering Cuban

coastal waters and, on occasions, touching

on Cuban beaches, when operations

so re-

quire.

It is essential for operations that

these key positions be held by qualified

and dependable men. At this time, it is

not expected

that Cuban trainees qualified

for such positions or possessing the

necessary aptitude and character to permit

successful training will be found. If

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they are located, the use of U.s. contract

personnel will correspondingly be cut down.

Staff personnel will assist in the training

of all crews but will not be used in opera-

tions. 131/

Not only were such contract employees authorized,.

but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters

to the Forward Operations Base noted:

In view degree risk involved rendezvous-.

type mission request Case Officer advise

all Maritime contract personnel bonus this

type mission be hereafter $100.00. Bonus

for Cuban territory beach landings or

caching would remain $500.00. 132/

By the early fall of 1960, the question of rota-

tion of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a

serious matter.

Many of those who had initially joined

the project had come in on 90-day rotation periods,

and in a cable to Headquarters, Ernie Sparks, the

overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS

Guatemala, requested that Headduarters approve a ro-

tational plan since:

Most personnel adjusted family and

business problems to period they told

they be absent and fact they on duty

seven days a

week as well as being con-

fined to training areas which lack

recreation facilities. 133/

Bill Eisemann, who was Chief of Support for WH/4,

was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments,

saying:

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They [the DDP] would bring a man in,

and then another man would come in to

replace him. It was really a tremendous

task to keep up with it, because a lot of

these people had personal problems.

• In

some cases. they would cable and request

release from their assignment for personal

reasons

We attempted to satisfy most of

these requests.

Herb Juul was the assigned

Personnel. Officer within the project.

He

had to constantly keep a check on the loca-

tion of our personnel, and when their time

was up for replacement, he would then visit

with the clandestine Services, and also the

Support components, and give them a list-

ing of the names of potential TDY

returnees.

The Support components and Clandestine

Services then provided names of people who

would be replacements.

That was a hell of

a task, now, believe me. When you have a

full time project running 15 months or more,

you have people returning on a 90 day basis,

and constantly being replaced ... you can't

expect the greatest efficiency in opera-

tions.

134/

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Part III

Changing Concepts

It has already been pointed out that

the initial

planning for paramilitary operations against Castro

was to be based on extremely small units. Two or

three man units, including a communicator, would be

trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work

with a dissident group. One trainer would be the

adviser for the types of guerrilla warfare activities

which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely

and reasonably securely. There had been some signs

of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program

prior to the

summer of 1960. By the late summer of

1960 and through the fall there was to be a

complete

and radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary

operations in which the forces backed by CIA should

engage.

In late August-September, there were some

clues that changes in the nature of operations were

being contemplated. During the last week of August

and in the initial week of September 1960, Savilion

Chapman claimed that he and a Col. Evans, Acting

Chief, PMG/DDP, were "briefed by WH/4 planners on the

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approximate number of troops, tanks, and vehicles

for which sea transport would be required." In that

same period It. Col. Frank Egan and Commander Norman

Imler of the WH/4 staff reported they asked the Mari-

time Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving infor-

mation on the foreign cargo vessels that would be

required for troop transport, including their owner-

ship, their costs, and on the methods of their acquisi-

tion. 1

Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the proj-

ect to become the trainer for the PM forces, it was

apparent that some changes were contemplated. The

reference to the use of vessels for the transport of

tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run

exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October,

Lt. Col. Egan and a representative of the Logistics

Branch of WH/4 had spelled out some additional details

for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations. At

that time, according to Mr. Chapman's report, WH/4

was talking about deck loading of 3 ICV's, with 5

armored tanks, 5 2-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar

dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type

of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guer-

rilla teams. 2/

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By the first week in November 1960, it had be-

come clear to the most senior planners of the anti-

Castro effort -- Jake Esterline, J. C. King, Tracy

Barnes,

and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were

going to have to be made about all aspects of

the

paramilitary program. The basic question being

.

whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis should

be launched at Castro, or whether, at this time, such

a program should become a joint operation between the

Department of Defense and the Agency. In the dis-

cussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions

between Agency personnel and representatives of the

Special Group, and in discussions within the meetings

of the Special Group, the whole gannut of options

was being explored. Barnes, apparently deferring to

Bissell, suggested that rather than small team activi-

ties something on the order of 10-20 man teams be

formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that

what was needed at this time, was a willingness to

run some risks -- including the risk of defeat. Barnes

was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that

the apparent belief of the Group was that every opera-

tion had to succeed; and that if there were "losses,

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failures, or mishaps," the Special Group seemed to

want to cancel everything. This was contrary, com-

pletely, to Barnes' concept of operational activity.

What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms of

the smaller team activity were that:

The implementation of such teams would

indicate whether the dissident elements

in Cuba were likely to rally around such

groups, once it had been established that

such groups could provide

guidance and

supply for the anti-Castro activities:

These teams also would provide a test

of the Castro forces. Could Castro's

militia or his army contain the guerrilla

forces, if such forces were led by cadres

trained by the Agency? Or would the Castro

resistance crumble in the face of effective

dissident elements? 3/

Even as this discussion was going on, it became

clear that the small team concept was going to go by

the board; and when the Agency tried to jump the op-

tion to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment in

Cuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious

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assault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group

in a meeting of 3 November 1960. The Department of

Defense supported the Agency, but State objected

and suggested that perhaps the point where covert

intervention

was possible had passed. Gordon Gray

even went so far as to raise the possibility of a

fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying

overt US intervention. It was

at this same meeting

that Mr. Livingston Merchant of the Department of

State raised the question of whether plans were being

made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and

Che Guevara - at which point General Cabell, the

Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,

pointed out that such activities as assassination

were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA

had no capability for such an operation. 4/

Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was

being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala

(4 November 1960) that the small team concept had

gone by the board and that planning should begin for

training a conventional amphibious assault force of

at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the

infantry training base in Guatemala (JMTRAV), emphasized

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the need to instill an esprit de corps among the

trainees.

To do this JMTRAV was urged to provide

for unit separation, competition in the military arts,

and specific identities for the individual units

through the use of scarfs,. caps, or some other de-

vice. This new training program was to be instigated

in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of

January 1961. 5/

Even as the discussions over the changing con-

cept were going on, the Director of Central Intelli-

gence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled

to brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 Novem-

ber. 6/ The concept to be presented to the President

was that a force of 600 men would be landed by LST on

Cuban shores and that these men would move inland to

create "a safe area in a mountain fastness. These

men, with possibly another 600 man unit in another

area, and those who joined them from within, would

be resupplied by air drop." I In addition, there

would be new recruits in the pipeline to provide sup-

port for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nica-

ragua would be used to support air operations, and

it was intimated that the US and possibly allied

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governments would recognize that the force lodged in

Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional

Government of Cuba. 8/

One strange and contradictory note which appeared

during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan

the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation

with the DCI in briefing the President elect was the

following item stating:

Our [CIA's] original concept is now

seen to be unachievable in the face of

the controls Castro has instituted.

There will not be the internal unrest

earlier believed possible, nor will the

defenses permit the type strike first

planned. Our second concept (1,500-

3,000 man force to secure a beach with

airstrip) is also now seen to be unachiev-

able, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.

Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we

cannot staff nor otherwise timely create

the base and lift needed. 2/

How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the

1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with an

airstrip was envisioned by the senior personnel in

WH/4 as "unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD ef-

fort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 with

only 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What was

being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 be-

came the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs

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Operation in March 1961. Certainly there was no

lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted,

nor in the efficiency of the military forces and

militia that he had at his command by April 1961.*

One of the principal problems posed by Project

JMATE -- both before and after the concept changed

in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity

at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be, or could

be, continued without reflection upon the position

of the United States Government. Thomas Mann of the

State Department became increasingly concerned about

this situation; and the discussions within the Special

Group and among the concerned Agencies during the

period from the middle of November until the end of

the year, focused very frequently on this question.

Considering the continuingly favorable reception to

Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala's

During interviews with the author of this history,

Messrs. Bissell, Esterline, and Drain had only slight

remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16

November 1960 when they ruled out what would be, in

effect, the invasion plan implemented in April 1961

at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the

joint support of the Department of Defense:

This

point was completely overlooked by both the Inspector

General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the

Bay of

Pigs.

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President, State's concern that the training "places

too much strain on the government of Guatemala" appear

unrealistic. The Department's real concerns were

with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN.

Certainly Ydigoras was not interested in the removal

of those military units which could most effectively

guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala

-- the Cubans in training for both air and ground

activities.* 10/

Even as the Special Group was trying to determine

whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala

should be removed, the Agency proceeded apace with

plans for the staffing necessary to put

a 600-man

strike force in training. Chief, WH/4 Personnel

estimated that in addition to 14 staffers, there

would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if

such training were to succeed. Well prior to the

officially agreed-to change in concept, Chief, WH/4

had anticipated a significant increase in funding

* The internal situation in Guatemala vis a vis the

training operations is discussed in detail in Volume

II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Opera-

tion, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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FOI JMARC requesting of the DDP that:

With your approval, in the interim

period las new budget estimates were

being preparedl, project funds will be

used

as required to meet operational

necessity without strict adherence to

the preliminary estimates of last June

[1960] . * 10a/

Although Mr. Bissell approved the request, he made

this interesting comment:

What is disturbing is that the overrun

reported in your memorandum seems to have

occurred long before you could be feeling

any effect of the [planned expansion] in

[PM] plans. 10b/

Contrary to suggestions that the President of

Guatemala was concerned about the Cuban training ac-

tivity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director

from Guatemala indicated that the ground training

base was undergoing a major reorganization because

permission for the establishment of a tactical train-

•ing

area at another of the fincas (estates). controlled

by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was

being undertaken. Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's

right hand man and conducted

the liaison with the

WH/4 representatives for the establishment and operation

The increased budget being suggested was on the order

of $42 million compared to $3 million being discussed

June.

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of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction

in positions between State and the Agency was obvious. 11/

As the Special Group discussions were going on,

Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 was in Guatemala taking

a first-hand look at the air and ground training bases.

As noted in another volume, Esterline went strongly

on record in support of the Office of Logistics en-

gineer who had been responsible for the reconstruc-

tion of the airstrip at Retalhuleu. Jake noted that

even though there had been a sizable cost overrun,

the task had been performed on time under the most

adverse weather conditions; and, consequently, sug-

gestions from Headquarters that there had been gross

inefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded.* Ester-

line's review of the situation at JMTRAV, the ground

training base, indicated that the situation there was

considerably more difficult than what he had encountered

at the air training base. He noted, for example, that

there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers,

stating:

* For details on construction of the airfield at

Retalhuleu, see Office of Logistics, Engineering Staff,

RECD, Agency Engineering Activity, 1947-1966,

Vol. I,

63-67; Vol. II,

132-193.

DDS/HS OL-11, Feb

72.

S.

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While a few of these men [from the

Domestic Operations Base in Miamil impress

me as being good types, for the most part

I found them to be too immature and lack-

ing in experience to qualify for the job

at hand.

In any event, they are not in

my judgment worth the $1,000 per month

which we have to pay them.

I would like

most of them to be GS-4, 5, and 6 students

that (sic] we trained at Fort Benning in

1951-52. Under no circumstances would I

consider putting these people into Cuba

with the Cubans.

In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala,

Esterline presented the following critical observations

of the situation as he saw it. Reflecting on the

mission and on the resources available, he wrote:

I also reviewed the problem in the

light of the many gaps in policy approval

for JMARC, all of which complicate project

planning.

By the time I arrived back at

Headquarters, I had fairly well convinced

myself that it is unrealistic for the

project or the Agency to try to "go it

alone" in opening up another major base

in a third country to train from 1,500 to

3,000 Cubans for a major invasion effort.

I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins

at length, and found that he shared my

view.

AS

a result of this discussion, we

re-evaluated our capability and presented

you (the DDP] with the recommendation that

we limit ourselves to preparing a force

ven to tea

of 600 maximum to be used in the manner

we outlined to you on 16 November.

I

still feel this recommendation is quite

valid given the limitation on real estate

that we are presently working

under.

If

it turns out that we can acquire policy

approval for the real estate in the interior,

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I would then agree that, with limited

additional help from DOD, we could train

a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along

the line outlined during the 16 November

meeting.

Even our present scope of op-

A Mechant are engage ten

to be en-:

[Statel "Working Group."

I cannot empha-

size this too strongly: if we are re-

quired to evacuate Guatemala for reasons

of high policy or because of the situation,

the project will be seriously damaged unless

we have immediately available real estate

where these people can be put to work. 13/

Some relief would be provided for the ground

training program

with the opening up of Alejos finca

near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facil-

ities for the

ground forces would continue to plague

JMARC through the course of the project. Moreover,

even though the discussions concerning plausible

deniability reached near fever pitch during the dis-

cussions of November 1960, at no point did the

Special Group of presidential consultants ever step

forward with à firm recommendation that the United

States assume responsibility and so admit. The most

persistent advocate of this position was Thomas Mann,

of the Department of State, and why his proposals

were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved

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questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.*

Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala

was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence

between the field and Headquarters, with specific

emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground

training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers.

Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority

need to secure Special Force trainers from the Army,

on an ASAP basis.

Requirements for materiel jumped,

particularly in the number of personal weapons which

would be required for added numbers of troops in

training. With the acquisition of the additional

training site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, re-

quests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps

to transport troops to these training areas. The.

*

There also is evidence that at least one of the

principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contrib-

uted to the November confusion. At one point, when

serious consideration was being given to the possi-

bility of increasing significantly the training activ-

ity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced

what amounted to moral objections to the

association

-- or to strengthening the association -- with the

Somoza Government.

Barnes emphasized that this would

go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin

America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much

in line with the position being advanced by the Depart-

ment of State -- Thomas Mann excepted.

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field was aware that the increasing number of trainees

would create problems, but at the same time, there

were indications that the trainers were hopeful that

the infiltration teams that had been developed could

be held intact.: 15/

Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters

area over the nature of the program, so, too, was con-

cern reflected in the field's messages to Headguarters.

A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to

Headquarters requested:

Recent cable traffic suggests major

changes in near future and COS feels it

would be of great assistance to have

complete story to assist in dealing with

Alejos and Ydigoras. 16/

Even as COS Guatemala was requesting information,

the situation in Washington remained in a state of

flux. On 29 November, Col. King made a specific at-

tempt to obtain positive guidance through the office

of the Deputy Director for Plans. Chief, WH/D, out-

lined his understanding of the paramilitary planning

as follows:

(a)

On or about 1 February 1961, land by

amphibious means a guerrilla force of about

600 trained Cubans to establish a perimeter

defense and resistance center in a selected

area of Cuba.

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(b) Continue present operations of in-

filtrating small paramilitary teams to

organize, train, and lead resistance

forces and report intelligence informa-

tion.

(c) Follow up this effort by providing

air logistical support to the 600-man

guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional

guerrilla elements who join to collaborate

with this force. 17/

Having outlined his understanding of the planning,

Col. King then went on:

The following major questions must now

be resolved by the Special Group or referred

to the President for decision before pro-

ceeding further to implement the paramili-

tary aspect of this program as described

above:

a. Does either the Department of

State or the Department of Defense view

the proposed paramilitary concept as

not in consonance with policy or for

any other reason open to question?. If

so, why and what alternatives are pro-

posed; what course of action is ap-

proved?

b. If there is agreement as to the

paramilitary concept, then is there

agreement that training shall continue

in Guatemala?

c.:

If continuance in Guatemala is

disapproved, will DOD air-lift the

present trainees at once from Guatemala

to Saipan for training and provide

similar air-lift for up to 300 additional

men as they are recruited?. The entire

group would later be returned to a stag-

ing area in Nicaraqua for the amphibious

operation.

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Will the DOD also provide the

following:

(1)

Thirty-eight Special Force

officers and enlisted men to be used

as instructors in Guatemala or in

Saipan, of both.

(2) One reactivated LST.

(3) Supplementation of logistic

resupply air-lift to resistance after

I February.

(As

detailed an estimate.

as can be made will be forwarded to

DOD if the paramilitary concept is

approved.) 18/

Col. King then closed this memorandum to Mr.

Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary concept

was approved, certain policy approvals would be re-

quired. These were listed as follows:

To use

Opalocka, for One Florida base, such as

air supply missions in sup-

port of guerrilla forces in the target

country.

b.

To use a small number of American

civilian contract personnel in air and

maritime operations.

(No such personnei

are to be used in ground operations.)

c.

To mount air strikes against Cuban

air and other military targets. 19/

Whatever else can be said, it is clear that by

the end of November 1960, the original concept of the

Agency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on the

use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with

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...

the dissident elements located within the country had

gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was

an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as

yet to be determined -- with the concomitant require-

ment for heavy air support for resupply and possibly

for military support as well. Indicative of the con-

fusion which surrounded this period when the concept

was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly

following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he

testified before the Taylor Committee. It appears

as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly

as it turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May

1961 Lt. Col. Frank Egan had indicated to the commit-

tee

that the strike force concept has been in being

since his EOD in June 1960.*

In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony

had been, Esterline reported:

My recollection is that Lt. Col. Egan •

came to us about June 1960 and that he

Egan had actually testified that following the

Guatemalan revolt he had been sent down to organize

the brigade, and he stated that the number of Cuban

trainees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November

1960 and had risen to nearly 600 by the first week

of December. 20/

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arrived with certain ideas which he carried

from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the

Cuban problem.. This, however, did not con-

stitute JMATE policy.

I am sure you [Col.

Jack Hawkins] -- or more particularly, mem-

bers of your staff -- will find that

we had

no approved philosophy of the operation

within the Project until well in(tol Sep-

tember.

The training program which Rocky

Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed

solely toward training an instructor cadre

in small unit or "guerrilla type" opera-

tions.

This cadre, when it arrived in

Guatemala, in addition to working on build-

ing the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued

to train the first recruits in

the same

kind of training they had received.

Another example of my positiveness

that we were not, at Project level, think-

ing of the strike operation is the first

conversation that we held in my office in

Barton Hall when I referred to the fact

that the PM staff had been talking about

the development of a strike operation, but

that I, myself, was not convinced of it at

the time and that I preferred to put small

teams into existing units at the appropri-

ate time. As I

recall, you (Col. Jack

Hawkins] had an open mind at that point;

although without positive study of Cuba

you leaned to the concept I outlined. It

was at a somewhat later date, therefore

(probably before the first of October),

that we talked again, and you (Col. Jack

Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro

could not be overthrown without a major

or catalytic effort being made against

him.

After deliberation, I came to the

same conclusion, and we then began to

think in terms of expanding the force

to the strength of a reinforced battalion,

more or less.

The foregoing is important only be-

cause General Taylor is going into very

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fine points in his analysis of government

policy. It is incumbent upon us, there-

to get the record straight in this

manner, and, although It. Col. Egan may

have had in his own mind the idea of a

strike operation

- and I believe he came

to us with some idea on hitting the Isle

of Pines - this nevertheless was not

approved Project or Agency policy until

quite a few months later.

In point of

fact, as I look back over that period, I

am sure during that period I found myself

drifting along, devoting myself merely to

creating basic

capabilities in a variety

of fields without any clear-cut idea of

what national policy would permit us to

do. * 21/

Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for

Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a

*

In a discussion with the author of this history in

the fall of 1975, Esterline introduced another thought

about the change in concept to wit:

That the small team concept had been planned to

be put into operation early in November of 1960, and

Esterline seems to believe that this would have been

However, the Presidential election of that

year made the Eisenhower administration extremely

cautious about anything that might have an impact on

the outpome of the election; and, consequently, such

delays as were incurred gave added time for the build-

up of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the

election was over, it had become apparent that the

small team concept was no longer viable.

Esterline,

in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the buildup

in the brigade forces came from the White House.

But

even

though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the

Special Group during the period from November to the

end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support

the idea of increasing the size of the force, there

is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this

came from the White House. 22/

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rather more positive recollection of the change in

concept, having noted:

That decision as to the character of

the operation was rather gradually modi-

fied during the late autumn lof 1960J.

put a finger on the exact moment when a

clear decision was made, or the circum-

stances, or, really, the people who made

it.

It

was

a decision rather forced by

circumstances. 23/

When discussing the situation in October of 1975,

however, Bissell volunteered the following observations

about the change in concept for the operation.

He said:

One of the clearest impressions I have

of the whole planning period and of this

change in concept was that by November

[1960] ... and I don't think Esterline

bought this view either as completely or

as soon as 1 did ... I lalso, remember

the feeling that I was well ahead of

King

•. in my belief that we had to place

nearly exclusive reliance for the initial

phase on whatever force it was possible

to land.

so, I also remember very clearly

-- and I think as early as November -- where

I think there were probably under 500 people

in the brigade in training -- I remember

repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline

that if we are really going to have to

place this heavy reliance on a landing

force, this is an all together prepos-

terously inadequate number ... I remember

being told that people did not see how it

would be feasible to get up to the size I

was talking about in the time period; but

be tea about in

secondly ... I have a clear recollection

that he (Jack Hawkins) had a lesser sense.

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of urgency at that point about a buildup

in numbers than I did. I felt that I

was consistently urging upon Hawkins the

necessity of a larger buildup than the

plans then contemplated, and I also re-

member, at a later stage in a somewhat

similar fashion, urging upon Beerli, the

necessity of a significantly larger air

arm than his plans contemplated ... I

think that Hawkins likewise felt that he

had to rely on what the recruiting

mechanism would turn up, which wasn't

really his direct operation, and that

he wasn't at all sure that he could get

the sort of numbers that I was talking

about.

But I do remember an awareness

of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy

of our resources in the light of an altered

concept of the operation. 24/

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Part IV

Presidential Resurgence

The previous section of this volume has examined

the activities that occurred during the period from

the early fall through November of 1960, with the

shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla

warfare type operation to a new concept emphasizing

amphibious invasion. During this period most of the

discussion and the decisions, aside from those within

CIA, were at the level of the Special Group. The

principals involved from the Department of

State were

at the Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary level at

the highest, and at the Agency, both the Director of

Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans

were involved. On 29. November 1960 the level of in-

volvement of the US Government escalated sharply with

the sudden resurgence of interest on

the part of

President Dwight David Eisenhower. In contrast to

the period from July 1960 through the Presidential

election of early November -- when, as noted earlier,

there was, at most, minimal attention to the develop-

ing anti-Castro program at the White House level --

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suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal

decision makers in the period prior to the take-over

by the Kennedy administration.

When asked for an explanation of this sudden

resurgence,

Jake Esterline, then Chief, WH/4 stated:

I can't explain it ... but I will say

this, it probably had a political basis.

They

[the Republican administration]

realized that they had lost, and they

realized that they were going to have

brief a new administration along with the

British on the things that had been going

I suspect that they didn't want to

brief on something that would emerge that

they hadn't been giving anything other

than their full support. I am guessing,

but I would think that

was a pretty good

guess. 1/

On 29 November of 1960, the President had a meet-

ing which included Messs. Dillon and Merchant of State;

Gates and Douglas of Defense; Gray and Goodpaster of

his own Staff; and Dulles and Bissell of CIA. In his

report on the session with the President, Mr. Bissell,

the DDP mentioned among other things the following two

points of particular interest:

The President made it clear he wanted

all done that could be done with all

possible urgency and nothing less on the

part of any department, ...

and the Presi-

dent led a discussion as to how best to

organize the total US effort against the

target.

There was

some feeling that an

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overall coordinating executive might be

desirable, but it was left that the

Director would make Mr. Barnes available

to work closely with a

State Department

officer to be designated.

It was also

felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley's

services,

initially in connection with

Argentina's possible covert assistance. 2/

The points of view attributed to the President

at this time by Mr. Bissell reflect very closely the

position of William D. Pawley who had met with the

President immediately prior to the President's ses-

sion with State, DOD, and the Agency's representatives.

According to Livingston Merchant, who had a long

session with Mr. Pawley on the day prior to Pawley's

meeting with President Eisenhower:

Mr. Pawley said that two things are

necessary, and I inferred that these would

constitute his [Pawley's] principal recom-

mendations to the President.

(1) The President should appoint a

single experienced individual (he said

' he

was personally qualified and would be

available for the job if asked) to conduct

the entire covert operation.

In this con-

nection, he cited

the role which he had

played in the Guatemala case.

(2)

We should recruit several thousand

good young Cubans in Florida and give them

basic

training.

This could be done in five

or six weeks, rather than months, according

to him.

He was extremely impatient at the

thought of moving any Cubans who may now be

in Central America, expressing himself

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forcefully as being sure their host would

object.

• I asked it he was proposing overt in-

tervention by US armed forces. He said

absolutely not.

would be to land in Cuba, presumably ir

he next month or two, a force of 600

trained Cubans, following up this land-

ing with additional Cuban elements and

then installing a government in the bridge-

£o11ouban elemen

head which would call on us for financial

and logistics support.

He mentioned a

number of names which were unfamiliar to

me of Cubans who he said are politically

unblemished in Cuba, neither pinks nor

reactionary rightists.* 3/

On 30 November 1960, a Special Group meeting was

held at which time Gordon Gray:

* Considering that discussions within the Agency and

within the Special Group had only recently arrived at

the figure of 600 men for an invasion brigade, plus

the fact that this brigade would establish a bridge-

head from which a provisional government opposed to

Castro might be announced, one might speculate on the

source of Pawley's information.

Jake Esterline has

tended to denigrate the role played by Pawley during

the course of the Bay of Pigs operation; but, nonethe-

less, throughout the course of the operation Jake was

charged with maintaining close liaison with Pawley.

mande are not

JMATE records indicate not only the numerous face-to-

face meetings between Pawley and Esterline during the

course of the operation, but also reflect an amazing

number of telephone conversations

between the two

during the life of the operation.

In terms of the

operational plan per se,

Esterline appeared to be

most cagy in handling this subject during the dis-

cussions with Pawley.

The recorded conversations

focus on the potential leadership for the FRD -- with

Pawley's "best" leadership choices usually being far

to the right.

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Solicited the Group's assistance in

arriving at a concensus

isicl of views

as to what exactly had been decided as a

result of the high level meeting

• [the

meeting with the Presidentl of the day

before. 4/

According to the memorandum on the meeting,

there was agreement that the US would deny its partic-

ipation in any training activities in Guatemala, that

there would continue to be a prohibition on the train-

ing of Cubans in the United States, and that evacua-

tion plans should be kept in readiness in case the

Cubans in training in Guatemala had to be evacuated

-- the plan to evacuate was not clear

as to whether

the Cubans would be taken into Florida as ordinary

refugees or whether the evacuation would call for

transporting the troops to our Saipan training base.

The problem that apparently created the greatest

difficulty at this Special Group meeting was the Presi-

dent's suggestion that a single individual should be

placed in charge of the anti-Castro program. The

Special Group decided that there should be two indi-

viduals with principal responsibilities -- one to

handle the overt and the other to handle the covert

activities. After reviewing a list of potential

candidates:

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It was finally decided that, taking all

things into consideration, including the

aspect of quick availability, Ambassador

Willauer would probably be the best choice.

On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr.

Barnes. It was recognized that these

nominees

would have to be checked with

Mr. Gray's associates. 5/

When Mr. Mann suggested that Ambassador Willauer

might also assume responsibility for contacts with the

FRD, Mr. Dulles rejected this out of hand, emphasizing

that this liaison must be done

covertly, and that it

must be done by the Agency. There apparently was

unanimous agreement that Mr. Pawley not be given any

official

status with the US Government, but no one

objected to Pawley's plans to visit Argentine Presi-

dent Frondizi in his capacity as a private US citizen. /

Following the President's suggestion of 29 Novem-

ber, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded

a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December

1960 reconmending that, because of the differences

in responsibilities, two senior officials, rather

than one, be charged with managing the anti-Castro

program. Dillon

suggested. that Ambassador Whiting

Willauer be named

as a Special Deputy to Assistant

Secretary for American Republic Affairs, Thomas Mann,

to.act

as the officer responsible for the US Government's

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overt position vis-a-vis Cuba, and with the responsi-

bility of coordinating the covert activities of the

Agency, into that US position. On the covert side

Dillon followed the DCI's suggestion that, C. Tracy

Barnes should be appointed "to devote full time to

the direction of the Agency's program with respect

to Cuba, and to concert

with Amb. Willauer." 6/

Dillon's memorandum then went on to recommend

that the members of the Special Group - Dulles,

Gray, Douglas, and Merchant -- should continue to

exercise general supervision over the covert opera-

tion and to provide the Agency with general guidance

in the operation, and -- now at the tag end of the

Eisenhower administration - went on to say that the

Group

should continue and intensify its general

supervision of the covert operation

...

(and] maintain close and regular liaison

with Secretary Anderson of Treasury or

•his designated representative... [and]

should meet, together with the member's

individual principals, with you from

time to time as it deemed necessary or as

you desire. ?

In response to this recommendation, the Presi-

dent wrote:

I approve of the suggestions regarding

the reorganization of the government's

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program with respect to that country

[Cubal,

except that I think Mr. Willauer

should have a position directly subordi-

nate to the Secretary of State for so

long as Cuba remains a critical problem

in our foreign relations.

There should

be no doubt as to the authority of the

Special Assistant to the State Department

(Mr. Willauer) to subordinate covert and

overt activities; nor as to his responsi-

bility for conveying policy guidance to

the operating agencies.

In their broad

outline, these policies will, of course,

be subject to the approval of higher

authority. 8

An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memoran-

dum is that he elevated the position to be assigned

to Mr. Willauer from that of being a Special Deputy

to Assistant Secretary Mann, the Assistant Secretary

for American Republic Affairs, to that of being direct-

ly subordinate to the Secretary of State. When Thomas

A. Parrott who acted as secretary for the Special

Group meeting transmitted a copy of the draft of Dulles'

memorandum, to tracy Bares, Parrott had been made

aware of the possibility that Eisenhower was in favor

of raising the position of Willauer. In an aside

to Barnes in his transmittal note, Parrott indicated

that even if Eisenhower did want Willauer made

directly responsible to the Secretary of State, in

fact: "He (Willauer] will be instructed that he

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darn well works for Mann anyway, regardless of the

title. "* 9/

Even as the negotiations just mentioned

were

underway, by early December 1960 the Agency's posi-

tion on the nature of the PM action decidedly hardened.

On 8 December at a meeting of the Special Group,

Colonels Hawkins and Egan proposed a military program

which combined the use of infiltrated small paramili-

tary teams as a test to see if the dissident elements

would rally round and, also recommend a training

program for a force of 600-750 men possessing extremely

heavy fire power for amphibious assault. Prior to

an amphibious invasion, however, it was agreed that

there would be sorties into Cuban air space but the

precise nature and number of these was disputable,

ranging from possibly 100 a month for a three month

period beginning on 15 January 1961 -- and including

some B-26 sorties to bomb and strafe military targets

-- to an undefined minimum of sorties for a three

week period to soften up the opposition.

* The Agency apparently thought that it had a pretty

good handle on Willauer because of his long term associ-.

ation as Executive Vice-President, President, and Vice-

Chairman of the Boärd of Civil Air Transport (CAT).

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In the course of these discussions of ground

and air operations there were some interesting contra-

dications among Agency spokesmen as to what was needed

or what was wanted. Tracy Barnes seemed to have a

great deal more to say than was warranted by his

knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned

action. In one discussion with Secretary Douglas,

when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased

number of troops, he stated that the number of anti-

Castro dissidents who might rally round the invaders

would be no different if the size of the invading force

were 600 men or 3,000 men. A rationale such as that

and Barnes's comment to Gen. Lansdale when

he for-

warded one proposal --

Please recognize that this proposal is

a draft and is off the top of the head

without any detailed knowledge of possible

applicable regs and procedures --

help make understandable the consternation within the

ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the

Agency's understanding of which end was up.* 10/

*

There was

also an ongoing discussion during this time

period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Force

trainers to the Guatemala bases.

This is discussed in

detail in Volume II of this history, Participation in

the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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In one of the longer and more detailed papers

being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower

administration, the State Department drafted the polit-

ical action

recommendations and suggested collective

action through the Organization of American States

to effect the ouster of Castro.

Failing in that,

State then outlined a unilateral political action

program for the

United States. The paramilitary and

covert action segments of this paper were prepared

by the CIA. Neither the State nor the CIA paper

introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly dis-

cussed.

These recommendations were made just as if

the Secretary of State, the Special Group, and the

President had approved, or would approve, the courses

of action that were being outlined. This being the

case, it was suggested that the concurrence of the

President-elect should be sought for the proposed

program. In the best of all possible worlds one'

could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach

—- in the pragmatic world it is difficult to under-

stand that anyone'

would go on record with the expec-

tation that

such

recommendations might be followed

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across changing political and administrative lines.* 11/

With WH/4 in the throes of revising the anti-

Castro program on the basis of the increased efficiency

of the Castro military forces, an SNIE, Prospects for

the Castro Regime, was

issued, belaboring the obvious

-- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. . The

SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation

about Castro's military forces:

The militia's overall combat efficiency

is low; many units are still on a part

time training basis. However, there appears

to be emerging a nucleus of well organized,

well equipped, and well trained units loyal

to Castro and strongly Communist-influenced;

we believe that within the next 12 months

or so, these units will develop into a

reasonably effective security force. 13/

The estimate

continued, noting that the Cuban Army

was still disrupted and "combat effectiveness. of the

Air Force is virtually nil." 9/. The concept for

Project JMATE, however, had shifted from small unit

guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of

* President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960,

"Senator Kennedy" came to the White House for a brief-

ing and that among the subjects discussed was Cuba,

this being one of the first three items that Kennedy

wished to talk about and that:

and eh three ne

"He [JFK] had previous-

ly been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and

had some familiarity with the details." 12/

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increased efficiency of Castro's forces and it would

appear that the operators and the estimators were

not making evaluations from the same intelligence

information.

Despite his promotion early in the month, it

was not until 23 December 1960 that Ambassador Willauer

called a meeting with the Agency's principals to ex-

plain both his role and some of the problems that he

anticipated the President wanted him to handle. Ap-

parently it was an inauspicious beginning, for accord-

ing to a memorandum of the meeting:

Mr. Willauer stated that his role, as

explained to him by Secretary Herter, was

to be that of the chairman and major

shareholder of a corporate board with Mr.

Tracy Barnes, the executive director for

operations and minority shareholder. Col.

King asked for clarification on this point,

noting that Mr. Esterline is the director

for operations for CIA with the chain of

command going from the Director to Bìssell

to Col. King to Mr. Esterline.

Mr. Barnes

is a coordinator with

" the other interested

agencies.

Mr. Willauer agreed that this

was the case, noting that he had used the

term operations in the looser sense of

overall coordination. 14/

Once having had the pecking order set straight,

Ambassador Willauer then proceeded

to a discussion

of various problem areas, indicating his very strong

bias in favor of Agency positions as opposed to

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positions being taken by the Department of State.

For example, Willauer noted that there was a strong

aversion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day,

with the opponents basing their arguments on the

fact that the OAS would be sure to get in on the act

and, moreover, that military planning should be deferred

until it could be determined if the economic sanctions

would work to Castro's disadvantage. On the question

of economic sanctions Willauer pointed out to the

people in State that since the Soviet Union was so

strongly committed to support the Castro government,

economic sanctions would have little or no impact on

Castro's position. Willauer also argued that there

was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba,

whether the US had a hand in it or not; and he empha-

sized that, in any event, the US would be blamed for

it.

Both Jake Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins pointed

out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date

concerned the logistics of the troop movement; and

both urged as early a

date as possible because of

the already mentioned improvement in the military

capability, equipment, and training of Castro's

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forces.

Esterline also emphasized that most of the

arguments urging delay of PM planning, particularly

concern re the OAS, had been debated with State for

months, and the time had come for direct action.

The WH/4 representatives also stressed that the

period of training for many of the Cubans had been

extended and re-extended, and that to hold them be-

yond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintain-

ing high morale among the troops. Esterline took

the position that the Cubans the Agency was training

knew that the US had the force to throw Castro out

any time that it so desired, but the months and months

of training was indicative, to them at least, that

the US was not really interested in the welfare of

the anti-Castro Cubans.

During the 23 December 1960 meeting, Willauer's

expertise and familiarity with air operations led

him to ask almost immediately "why the project is

'so thin in the air'." Willauer was told that the

rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews

could be used, and this was the reason for the Agency's

efforts to obtain permission to use contract American

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crews for both resupply and combat. * The air opera-

tions were the subject of considerable discussion.

Concerning the possibility of launching air strikes

for three days before the invading force landed,

Willauer objected, pointing out that this would give

the OAS ample time to get involved in the act. Wil-

lauer then raised the question of whether all of the

tactical bombing could be done on D-Day. The answer

to that from Col. Hawkins was "no," but Hawkins said

that it could be done on D-2, if permission were given

for dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air force

and military targets, with additional sorties during

the course of D-l and follow-up raids on D-Day prior

to the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out that

if an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikes

until D-Day, the Castro air force would have an op-

portunity to attack the ships which would be carrying

the invasion troops.

In a similar manner, a strong case was made for

the use of the Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua air base to

*

Hawkins wanted "pilots who can work over key targets

without tearing up installations we will later need."

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launch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was

some discussion of limiting use of this base to only

two or three days -- at least some of the State De-

partment people pushed this idea -- but wH/4 pointed

out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature

of the planned air operations, that the air support

operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this

period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts

had been made to get permission to use US bases, or

other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but with-

out success. Willauer, himself was positive that no

US bases

would be made available for the strike

against Castro.

One other interesting aspect of this initial

meeting with Willauer, concerned the

transition be-

tween the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Willauer stressed that the ground rule at the Depart-

ment of State was that the Kennedy people could not

be sought out to discuss specific problems unless

they initiated requests for information, and it was

Willauer's opinion:

That the only practical way to get de-

cisions on the project before 20 January

would be to have the Director (the DCI],

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whose position re the new administration

is different than Mr. Herter's, to go to

Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him

committed. It would be very difficult

for State people to'try to approach Mr.

Kennedy via

Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles. 15/

During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the

Special Group, Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on

a meeting that he had participated in the previous:

day in New York, with a group of American business-

men. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland,

who was one of the principal fund raisers for the

FRD, and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice

President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New

Jersey, the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar

Company, the President of the American Sugar Domino

Refining Company, the President of the American &

Foreign Power Company, the Chairman of the Freeport

Sulphur Company, and representatives from Texaco,

International Telephone

and Telegraph, and other

American companies with business interests in Cuba.

The tenor of the conversation was that it was time

for the US to get off of dead center and take some

direct action against Castro.

Suggestions were made to sabotage the sugar

crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane

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fields or ruin the refineries; to interrupt the

electric power supply; and to put an embargo on food..

drugs, and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposed

the embargo. on food and drugs, but the feeling of

the business group was that it was time to get tough

and, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would be

laid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion volun-

teered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship in

Levisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of the

nickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been owned

and operated by the US Government. 16/ In his usual

cautious manner, Gordon Gray suggested that the

Special Group not authorize any action until he had

cleared the matter with his "associate."

This group of businessmen also indicated that

they were going to undertake the publication of

specific papers on issues and programs related to

the post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed to

help Us policy planners.

Mr. Dulles, of course,

emphasized that policy planning was not his respon-

sibility; this was the responsibility of the Depart-

ment of State. He did comment that "what he was

interested

in was getting rid of Castro as quickly

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as possible and in this field he had direct responsi-

bility and would welcome any ideas or suggestions on

how this might be achieved. " 17/

The high-level business group which Dulles met

with was also extremely concerned about the possible

orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile,

particularly that it should not be left-oriented.

Michael Haider, Standard of Jersey's Vice President

•for Latin America, for example, forwarded a memorandum

to Col. J. C. King in early January 1961 identifying

as members of an extreme leftist group which had

formed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, Aureliano

Sanchez Arango, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, and Dr. Raul

Chibas among others.' Mr. Haider worried that unless

more positive steps were taken to

force the conserva-

tive Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization, that

any post-Castro government would automatically be in

the hands of the leftists. * 18/

In addition to strong positive suggestions from

US businessmen, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of

Haider was consistent at any rate -- "leftists"

with Fidel or "Fidelistas sin Fidel" were held to be

equally bad for US business interests.

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Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

also had some suggestions which he made to Mr. Bissell

about

the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program.

For whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale

forwarded to Bissell a number of suggestions which

had been presented to him by an Army reservist who

had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lans-

dale's direction researching Cuban political objectives.

Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to

the study of this subject, and all other aspects of

the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous

insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind

of paper to Bissell. 19/ What response, if any,

Bissell made to this memorandum is not known.

The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960

on 29 December, and there were, in addition to the

standing problem of the use of US air bases to sup-

port the operation against Cuba, the questions of

the use of a Nicaraguan air base, the political organ-

ization of the Cuban exiles, and considerable discus-

sion about the possibility of initiating action against

Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. It was emphasized

that Mr. Pawley was

strongly in favor of intervention

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in the Dominican Republic, even suggesting that an

overt operation against Trujillo be mounted concur-

rently with the Cuban operation.

The members of

the

Special Group, however, were unwilling to buy this

particular plan of action; but they did support Mr.

Bissell's proposals for some limited covert action

operations aimed at the Trujillo regime.

James H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense

questioned the feasibility of "expanding the initial

beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban

Government"; but Mr. Bissell pointed out that such

a project was unrealistic unless "One or all of the

following situations develops: (a) overt support,

(b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive use

of air support." 20/ The Group was apparently in

agreement that the Agency should make every effort

to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections

be attempted to overthrow Castro. 21/

In view of the fact that the US would break

diplomatic relations with Cuba on 3 January 1961,

the minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 Decem-

ber 1960 present an interesting historical problem.

In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his

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meeting with President Eisenhower, on 28 December,

the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 De-

cember read as follows:

The latter (President Eisenhower] made

two points:

(a) it would be desirable to

obtain the cooperation and support of indi-

vidual Latin American Governments, (b) it

would be desirable, if possible, for Us to

break relations with Cuba, in concert with

other countries some time before January

20th. 22/

In contrast to the suggestion that the Us break

realtions with Cuba, prior to the inauguration of

Kennedy, General Goodpaster's record of the Merchant-

Eisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that:

He, [President Eisenhower] thought,

however, that [Presidents] Frondizi,

Prado, and others should take diplomatic

initiative to get Latin American countries

to take a position that they would like

to remove Castro from power, but, lacking

the means to do so, would like the Us to

take the lead..

The President said it was

clear to him that Latin Americans must be

brought to see the necessity of action.

He was inclined to think that it might

be time

to recognize the anti-Castro

front as the Cuban Government.

He added

that he would like to see a definite

move taken in this matter before January

20th, and said that the State Department

should be thinking of some definite

action that could be brought about be-

fore that time. 23/

"Thinking of some definite

action" differs consider-

ably from the suggestion that the President thought

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it would be "desirable" to break relations with Cuba

prior to 20 January of 1961.

At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960,

it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group's

membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to in-

clude Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary Thomas

Mann, and C. Tracy Barnes. 24/ As already has been

noted, in his retrospective view of the Bay of Pigs

operation Jake Esterline was quite forceful in his

opinion that the Agency's representatives at such

high level meetings should have been someone like

either himself or Col. Jack Hawkins who were the most

knowledgeable about the status of the operation and,

indeed, the whole operational plan.*

*

It is the considered opinion of the author of this

history that Esterline had a valid criticism. A re-

view of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, indi-

cates that one of the most voluminous correspondents

was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written

material is repititious

ad nauseam, and that Barnes

belabored issues which were common knowledge to the

principals in WH/4.

Illustrative of this, for example,

was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote

to Jake Esterline.

It began as follows:

"It has been

a little while since we have had an internal DDP hoe

down on your project.

In the meantime, a number of

important points

have been raised." 25/

The memorandum then proceeded to run through all

of the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge

(footnote continued on following page)

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On 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the

United States

Government that it would have to cut

its Embassy staff in Havana to eleven persons. On

3. January 1961, President Eisenhower held a meeting

at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation.

In addition to the President, and the Secretaries

of State, Defense, and Treasury, the participants

included the members of the Special Group, plus

General Goodpaster, Mr. Bissell, Thomas Mann, and

Tracy Barnes. Among principal questions, of course,

were if and when the United States should break off

diplomatic relations with Cuba; and after some initial

hesitation; before the day was over the United States

dia break relations officially with the Cuban Govern-

ment.*

to those who were even marginally involved in planning

the anti-Castro operation and contrihuted nothing in

particular to understanding of any of them.

Similarly, Barnes' memorandum for the DCI in prep-

aration for a

3 January policy meeting, rehashed the

same information that Barnes had presented to Chief,

WH/4, just a few days before. 26/ Barnes appears to

have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea.

* Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic

relations, there was great concern within the Agency

that the COS, a communicator, and a PM officer, and

possibly a fourth individual

be retained as members of

the Staff. 27/

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The other subject of conversation was whether

there now was cause or reason for direct US inter-

vention in Cuba, and the decision was that no such

action should be taken unless the Cuban Government

took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba

or damaged official US property (e.g., Guantanamo) •

In the course of the discussion about the status of

Agency planning for anti-Castro activities, the

question was raised about increasing the number of

trainees. This was ruled out pending the suitability

of training sites to handle additional numbers.

Training sites in the US still were denied, in part,

again, because of the fear of compromising the US

position in the Organization of American States or

in the United Nations.

The high level White House meeting also agreed

that it would be useful to brief members of the new

administration, particularly the Secretary of State,

but' "no definite schedule was agreed upon but the

concensus (sic] of the meeting was that appropriate

briefings should be considered for the near future." 28/

In the few days following the 3 January decision

to break relations with the Castro Government, the

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Agency retained control of US communications out of

Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred

to relieve the female Department of State communica-

tions officer and retain the services of her male

counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic

period, the communications officer was instructed

to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that

which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed,

CIA's Director of Communications indicated "there

would not be any extreme compromise." In any event,

however, the last message from Havana Station -- on

7 January 1961 at 1638z -- stated

This last msg from HAVA Station. All

files and crypto material destroyed

...

on evening 6 Jan (1961] Swiss amb placed

"Carta de Proteccion" notices on emb doors

minimizing possibility takeover of bldg

by GOC. * 29/

Even as the 'debate over the breaking of diplomatic

relations was taking place within the Eisenhower

ad-

ministration, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum

to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 which provided an ex-

cellent summary of the policy decisions which needed

*

Authorization for complete shutdown had been set

for 0300z on 7 January 1961. 30/

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to be made if strike operations were to be conducted

against the Castro government.

In the course of his

eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need

for resolution of the problem that had particularly

bothered the Special Group -- that

was whether the

Kennedy administration was interested in following

through on the plans that had

been made. Assuming

that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow

through on the program which had been initiated,

Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build

up of Castro's military forces the strike operations

be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The ques-

tion of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning

- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the

general question of air operations Hawkins said:

It is axiomatic in amphibious operations

that control of air and sea in'the objec-

tive area is absolutely required. The

Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable

out or neutralized before our amphibious

shipping makes its final run in to the

beach.

If this is not done, we will be

courting disaster.

Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged

the following:

1.

That the air preparation commence

not later than dawn

on D minus I Day.

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That any move to curtail the number

of aircraft to be employed from those

available be firmly resisted.

3. That the operation be abandoned if

policy does not provide for use of adequate

tactical air support.

In order to insure the success of both the air

strike and the air drop operations which would pro-

vide the logistical support for the troops holding

the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had

in the past, authorization for the use of contract

American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto

Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air

bases

in the United States for the launching of

logistical flight operations. * 31/

Much the same ground indicated in Hawkins memo-

randum was rehashed in preparing Mr. Barnes and the

DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961.

* There is no indication that Hawkins ever changed

his attitude about the need for the introduction of

some US pilots into both the strike and logstics

air operations, even though his much quoted cable of

13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high

praise for the

B-26 pilots who were about to under-

take the D-2 air strike.

See Volume I of the Official

History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Air Operations,

Part III, A for discussion of the Hawkins

cable in

the context of the air operations.

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Somewhat more emphasis than Hawkins had given to it

was placed on the political organization and the

needs for structuring the exile political group to

conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans

who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same

focus was to be given to the questions regarding air

bases, the size of the invasion force, and the number

of trainees who could be accommodated in the camps,

and other of the problems that had already been dis-

cussed time and time again. 32/ Similarly, in dis-

cussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of

the Special Group, much of this same ground continued

to be replowed without any positive resolution by

the Special Group members. 33/

During the course of the frequent sessions of

the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower

administration, the Director of Central Intelligence

also was required to make a presentation before the

CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee

on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record

of this meeting stated as

follows:

Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed

picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba,

mentioning the two-pronged program of

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propaganda including radio and publica-

tions

and the paramilitary effort.

Again

he pointed out that this is an expensive

program running to approximately $28

million.

Mr. Dulles discussed the radio

effort and paramilitary effort in some

detail, indicating the numbers of Cubans

being trained and the supply efforts and

the bases. 34/

Because of the subsequent charges which would

be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and

others writing on the Bay of Pigs, it is important

to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attend-

ing this briefing was Robert Amory, JI., the Deputy

Director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger

and some of the later "experts," was supposed to be

in almost total ignorance of any planning for an

operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs.*

* Other Agency personnel in attendance at this brief-

ing were General Cabell, DDCI; Colonel L. K. White,

Deputy Director for Support; Richard Helms, Chief of

Operations for DDP; Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel,

and John Warner, Legislative Counsel. It also should

be noted

I that Mr. William A. Tidwell, Jr. of Amory's

office was appointed

in January 1961 to be Chief of

the Office of Operations

in Miami. 35/ Organizationally

at this time, the Office

of Operations was under the

Deputy Director for Intelligence.

In view of the

efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans

for training in the exile Brigade, it is inconceivable

that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence

were not fully aware of the plans that were being made

to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed

at Playa Giron.

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On 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got

involved in a meeting concerning the planned opera-

tions against Castro. On that day the New York Times

broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops.

in Guatemala. As the ex-President himself wrote:

On the morning of January 10 [1961],

the New York Times carried an article,

with a map, describing the training of

anti-Castro forces in Guatemala

... It

told most of the story.

I decided that

we should say nothing at all about this

article.

Believing that my

successor

might want some day to assist the refugee

forces to move into Cuba, I considered

that we were limited in what we could

say about them. 36/

Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the

appearance of the New

York Times article is not known,

but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call

on the administration to send a representative up to

the Hill on 12 January 1961, in order to provide fur-

ther explanation of the Times article. Of the two

candidates being considered to appear before the Senate,

Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American

Republic Affairs, or DCI Dulles, it was decided to

send Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee.

However, President Eisenhower

raised certain questions as to the right

of a Committee to ask questions on foreign

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policy affecting the security of the

United States.

He [Eisenhower] commented

that

when

this is demanded as a right you

are "sunk," and wondered how much right

have they

got, inasmuch as the Constitu-

tion says

that it is the responsibility

of the Chief Executive. 37/

The culmination of the Special Group discussions,

which had taken place with increasing frequency between

mid-November 1960 and mid-January 1961, was the report

of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on

18 January 1961. The conclusions were predictable --

there were decisions that needed to be made, but these

could not be made until the new

administration became

fully aware

of the extent of the anti-Castro programs

that had been evolving. As Willauer himself said in

his final memo:

• In the absence of these decisions, or

at least most of them, there is a grave

danger that the December 6 plan (updated)

may have to be abandoned, as an effective

means of overthrowing Castro without more

overt support, and that the only practical

course of action for the physical overthrow

of Castro, will be either:

(1) open U.S.

war with Cuba, or (2) a seven-month overt

training by the U.S. on United States soil

of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force,

which will be planned to strike with at

least overt U.S. logistical support. * 38/

* Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December

1960 plan.

See pp. 173 ff.

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Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round

which the Special Group had been riding for at least

two months was Willauer's closing statement:

In our discussions we weighed without

coming to a conclusion the advantages of

a rapid, effective action by direct war

in terms of getting matters over with

without a long buildup of world opinion

vs. the inevitability of such a build up

under any seven month program. 38/

Having reviewed the meetings during the last

few weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it is

interesting to review the comments of some of those

who were principally involved, as they looked back

on that period. One of the most immediate responses

was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for

the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when

he explained the invasion to them. Among other things,

Castro claimed:

That on certain occasions, we have also

been in danger of direct aggression.

This

danger always has been lurking about us

and at certain times has gathered consider-

able support in the minds of leading circles

of the United States.

One of those moments

when this type of direct aggression was

very near was at the end of December [1960]

and the beginning of [January 19611, and

that is to say; during the last days of the

Eisenhower administration. 40/

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So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his

armed forces in a state of alert for a two week period,

covering the transition from the Eisenhower to the

Kennedy administration. 41/

The other principal protagonist at this time,

remembered it in a somewhat different manner. The

former US President wrote of this period in the fol-

lowing manner:

Covert training of exiles for any pos-

sible future operations against Castro

was going forward.

Units were growing

steadily in strength and efficiency

against the time when actual tactical

planning could be undertaken. In Decem-

ber (1960], I suggested to the State

Department that the time might be pro-

pitious for organizing a "front" against

Castro among the refugees, with the

United States recognizing

• the leader

and his associates as the legal govern-

ment of Cuba, with the priviso,

however,

that the exiles themselves would volun-

tarily select from their own number an

acceptable "head of government."

I

added that if they could do so at once,

I'd like to see recognition accorded

promptly - if possible, before January

20 ..

So, to the incoming

administration,

we left units of Cuban refugees busily

training and preparing hopefully for a

return to their native land. Because

they had as yet been unable

to find the

leader they wanted -- a national leader

to be both anti-Castro and anti-Batista

-- it was impossible to make specific

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plans for a military invasion, However,

their hatred of Castro, their patriotism,

and their readiness to sacrifice for the

restoration and freedom in Cuba could not

be doubted. 42/

In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's empha-

sis was on the fact that during his administration

all that took place was a training program -- that

there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba.

This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held

on 10 September 1965 when he said: "There was no

tactical or operational plan even discussed" when he

turned the presidency over to John F. Kennedy. 43/

According to this same interview:

The retiring President stressed that

there had been no decision as to how the

Cuban forces would be used, if at all.

Eisenhower had made no commitments that.

might bind the new President in dealing

with the Castro problem.

In fact, the

armed refugee group was still so small

and relatively unprepared that it could

easily have been disbanded if the incom-

ing administration considered its exis-

tence unnecessary.

And, more specifically,

Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his

judgment that the new administration need

not rush a decision regarding the Cubans.

"At no time did I put before anybody any-

thing that could be called a plan (to invade

Cuba)," declares the former President.

He

emphasizes that there was "no mandate, no

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commitment by me, or by anyone in my admin-

istration," and he doubts that Kennedy felt

"he was frozen to any position by me." 44/

Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National

Security Adviser, also supported his former boss when

queried about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigs

activity, stressing that the emphasis during Eisen-

hower's administration.was on training the Cuban ex-

iles and providing them with equipment. Like the

former President, Gray, too, said that there was "no

military plan".

The definition of a military plan, however,

seems to have focused on an actual site for the land-

ing; and in this sense, Gray certainly was telling

the truth because no such choice had been made at the

time that Eisenhower left office. In his own words,

Gray stated:

There wasn't any military plan formu-

lated by the time the Eisenhower admini-

stration went out. Of course, the Presi-

dent was fully aware of and conversant

with the decision to train and arm indi-

viduals. And the concept was one that

was sort of changing in the Eisenhower

Administration.

in terms of the old infiltration of small

groups.

Then they were thinking of the

possibility of landing of people, unit

sized groups.

And no decisions had been

reached at that time. It was only that

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there was training. That was clearly

authorized, and it was clearly contemplated

that there would be or could be a military

action.

But it simply was not true that

Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't

change.

As a matter of fact, the planning

that was done in his administration was

changed. The Bay of Pigs was not the first

landing point.

That was changed. But none

of that, no planning process in the Eisen-

hower administration had

got to the point

of discussing what would be the landing

point. 45/

What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently ig-

nored, as has been pointed out in the preceding dis-

cussion, was the major change that was made in the

concept in November of 1960. What was to have been

an infiltration of numerous small teams of communi-

cators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion

plan calling for a major enlargement of the exile

Brigade and an air operations plan which

would be

critical to both the Brigade's landing and its ability

to be sustained once ashore in Cuba. What was yet

undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were

the issues which the Special Group had argued through-

out the weeks from mid-November into January -- the

number of troops that should be or could be trained,

the facilities that would be available for training

sites (possibly in third countries or in the United

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States), the possible commitment of the United States

personnel (as "volunteers" or contracts), and possible

overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro. * 46/

*

Despite the availability of documentary records

and autobiographical information about President

Eisenhower's role in

the anti-Castro program, it is

interesting to the historian that the subject of the

Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral

history interviews

conducted with Eisenhower

various of his senior subordinates who were close

the operation.

Included among this group, in addition

to Eisenhower

himself, were James H. Douglas, JI.

(DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (USMC) ,

Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Livingston Merchant

(State) •

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CIA Internal Use Only

Access Controlled by

CIA History Staff

TS# 795052

Copy 1 of 2

OFFICIAL HISTORY

OF THE

BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

VOLUME III

EVOLUTION OF CIA'S

ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES:

1951-JANUARY 1961

(pages 204-388)

TOP. SECRET.

TS#795052

DCI-8

December 1979

COPY I Of ?

PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

DO NOT DESTROY

---

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Volume III

Contents

(pp. 204-388)

Part V

Direct Action Programs

A. Propaganda

B. Sabotage and

other Exercises

Part VI

Mr. Nixon's Role

Part VII The Question of Assassinations

Part VIII Conclusions

Appendixes

A. Memorandum for the Director of Central

Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

B. A Program of Covert Action Against

the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60

C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

1) Letter for Allen Dulles from

Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60

TS. (DD/P 0-1436)

...

2) Letter for Gordon Gray from.

Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60

3) Memorandum for the Special

Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,

sub: US Policy toward Cuba

TOP SECRET

Page

204

204

233

241

277

290

296.

300

311

313

318

---

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D. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director

(Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline,

2 May 60, sub:

Liaision with US

Agencies on JMARC Activities . .

E.

Attack on Petroleum Refinery at

Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961

F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting

with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959..

G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice

President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub:

What We Are Doing in Cuba

Source References

Part I Background • .

Part II Castro Must Go

Part III Changing Concepts

Part IV Presidential Resurgence

Part V

Direct Action Programs

Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role

Part VII Assassination

Part VIII Conclusions •

..:

→. '

TOP SECRET

Page

332

335

337

344

347.

352

366

369

374

382

386

388

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Part V

Direct Action Programs

A.

Propaganda

The desire of WH Division to undertake the propa-

ganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro,

antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by

more than two months; for on 27 October 1959 in a Memo-

randum to the Director of Central Intelligence, J. C.

King proposed:

That CIA undertake clandestine propa-

ganda operations targeted at Cuba.

These

operations would employ primarily radio

broadcasts and other means of propaganda,

and at informing the Cuban masses of the

truth. 1/

Col. King's memorandum pointed out that repre-

sentatives of various of the Cuban opposition groups

organized in the United States had requested Agency

assistance

to set up propaganda operations directed

against the Cuban mainland, and, in addition, he also

indicated that he and the Director of Communications,

Gen. McClelland, had his people studying the best.

methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts.

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King's initial memorandum. contained no information

about potential locations of transmitters, personnel

security, inter-Agency coordination or costs.

Almost immediately following the memorandum from

Col. King to the Director, the subject of propaganda

directed against the Castro government was introduced

to discussions in the Special Group. Following the

first such meeting at which the subject came up seri-

ously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide

more specifics on such matters as requirements for

real estate, recommendations for someone to be in

charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment

that would be reguired, and how the broadcasting might

be controlled. By mid-November, following additional

discussions both within the Agency and by the Special

Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts origi-

nate from the Yucatan Peninsula under the guidance

of Manuel Benitez, and '

•from Costa Rica under the Monte

Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. The pre-

sumption was that the Yucatan operation would be self-

sufficient, but that the Costa Rican operation would

be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency

control. The estimated costs that were mentioned in

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mid-November 1959 were roughly $80,000 each for the

operations in Costa Rica and Yucatan, plus an addi-

tional $12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which would

originate within Cuba. ?/

Before the end of November, the plans to utilize

the Yucatan peninsula had been abandoned because it

was feared that the President of Mexico would not.

give his approval for such an activity; and by the

early part of December, President Figures of Costa

Rica had made it clear that he did not want the propa-

ganda operation to be set up in Costa Rica. Conse-

quently, there was considerable discussion about the

possibility of getting permission from President

Betancourt of Venezuela to agree to permit the broad-

casts from his country. Some members of the Special

Group

, Also suggested the possibility that the anti-

Castro broadcasts might be originated from other

of

the Latin American countries, a project which Mr.

Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable

broadcast facilities that would be available in coun-

tries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Some-

where along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A and

Mr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the

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suggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be

originated from continental United States. How Barnes

came by this proposal is not known, for no such

activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/

By early February of 1960, however, an equivo-

cal agreement apparently had been reached with Presi-

dent Betancourt, for a memorandum from WH Division

indicated that:

One pilot (anti-Castrol tape has been

made and has been played for the benefit

of President Betancourt öf Venezuela.

He

has agreed not to interfere if we initiate

broadcasts from available transmitters in

Venezuela. 4/

Even though thought had been given to the establish-

ment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente

Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would

run the anti-Castro broadcasts, Betancourt had made

it clear that he would not permit the establishment

of special new transmitting facilities in his country.

On or about 17 March 1960, the same date that

President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro

program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its

propaganda program which, after outlining various

phases of the activity, stated:

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It is planned to concentrate all capa-

bilities

available to the U.S. Government

on the (Cuban)

target. In addition, it

will be necessary for CIA to create

such

unilateral, FRD, and third country opera-

tions as may be feasible and useful.

A11

facets of psychological operations will

be exploited through mass media means,

including: radio, television, motion

pictures, press. and publications, books,

leaflets, posters, handbills, and rumors.

The major emphasis will be placed on gray

materials. Liaison will be conducted as

necessary with other U.S. Government

agencies. Black operations will be care-

fully coordinated within CIA prior to im-

plementation.

All direct dealings with

members of the FRD will'be under unofficial

cover. 5/

The outline of the propaganda program made it

clear that funding of the propaganda operation was

going to be a major problem, and it was also clear

that CIA was going to be responsible for a consider-

able portion of this. But even as the propaganda

program was being formulated, Col. J. C. King was in

New York working with Henry Holland to approach a

number of American businessmen whose companies had

interests in Cuba. Their objective was to raise funds

to support the FRD propaganda operations which might

be operated through Station WRUL in New York, a sta-

tion that was directed by Mr. Walter Lemon who worked

closely with the CIA. Lemon, in fact, was ready to

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mount radio program operations almost immediately

pending receipt of material and guidance from the

Agency. * 6/

With reference to King's approach to Mr. John

Loeb, of Loeb, Rhodes & Company, the businessman

stated that he would contribute his personal funds

to the anti-Castro propaganda effort; and in addition,

he would approach the directors or heads of other

companies that were also involved in Cuba -- individ-

uals whom he thought were well enough off to make

personal contributions. With reference to contribu-

tions of this nature:

It was decided that personal contri-

butions were most advisable because they

would not reguire action and approval by

Boards of Directors, and therefore could

be most easily concealed... The sum dis-

cussed was $50,000. ** I/

The plan for private funding of WRUL was in

trouble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief

*

Among those that Col. King met with on 15 March

1960, were Mr. John Loeb of Loeb, Rhodes & Company,

Mr. Lapham of Banker's Trust Company, and the president

of the Freeport Sulphur Company, Mr. Wright.

**

Other companies, including American and Foreign

Power Co. and the Freeport Sulphur Co., made donations

in the company names and the Agency notified the Com-

missioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so

that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions. 7a/

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WH/4 had requested Chief, WHD's permission to obligate

JMATE funds for support of the station; but Chief,

WHD refused, indicating that private money would be

available.

In October 1960 a similar proposal was

made and rejected for

the same reasons.

By December

1960, however, payment from JMATE funds was authorized

because private funds were unavailable. 7b/

In terms of the broadcast facilities that were

to be established under the propaganda program, CIA

was to create and control both short and medium wave

shipborne radio broadcasting operations, and to investi-

gate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmitter

capable of black broadcasts into Cuba.* Aside from

the broadcast operations, there were a number of ad-

ditional programs calling for printing facilities for

the production of propaganda materials and secure

*

The airborne medium wave transmitter apparently

was ruled out early in the planning stages because

it was

"a terribly expensive operation.

Based on

DPD's estimates, Phillips figured that three flights

per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others,

period would show operating costs in excess of $83,000,

plus an additional $f0,000 for transmitting equipment

on a C-54, and a cost of $250,000 if the C-54 were

lost. 7c/.

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editorial offices so that the propaganda materials

could be prepared. 8/

It was shortly after the formulation of the

propaganda program that David A. Phillips became

Chief of the WH/4 Propaganda Activity. Phillips

had done propaganda work for the Agency at the time

of the Guatemalan activity, but subsequently retired

and had been in private business in Havana. Accord-

ing to his own story, he had intended to stay in

private business; but in the course of Castro's rise

to power, he was recontacted by Agency personnel and

persuaded to take on the job of running the Agency's

propaganda campaign against Castro.*

According to one interviewer:

In the Guatemalan campaign, Phillips

had worked with a handful of completely

controlled Latin American propaganda

writers, and had been able to develop a

single credible propaganda line.

Now,

however, he had to work under Washington

orders, to offer radio broadcasting time

to all the major and competing Cuban

exile groups.

Much of the Phillips'

* For Phillips' own story of his employment and his

re-employment by the Agency, see his book The Night

Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977) •

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effort went into overcoming the idea that

CIA financed radio programs should become

a forum for the varying views of rival

exile splinter factions. Phillips was

principally in Washington... [butl there

were frequent trips to Miami and New York,

and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert

broadcasting with Henry Loomis, Director

of USIA's Voice of America. 2/

All indications are that Phillips had an excellent

staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely

busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.*

The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda opera-

tion was to be the 50,000 watt radio transmitter located

on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called

"larger" island being roughly 1 3/4 miles long by 1 1/4

miles wide. US possessions, the Swan Islands are located

roughly 100 miles NE of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.

Already located on the island was a Federal Aviation radio

beacon, and a Department of Commerce weather station. In

April 1960,'the cover story-which was devised for the

*

Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and

Psychological Section in WH/4, were William Kent, John

Isaminger, Phillip A. Toomey, Earnest I. Harrison, Paul

Oberst, and Michael J. Maney. 10/

Illustrative of the

desire to placate the various exile factions was the

proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the

spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating

basis to present the position of the particular group.

FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming

on I December 1960, and was of the opinion that such

programming would "have desired effect on creating

semblance (of] united anti Castro opposition." 10a/

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→"""

operation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000

watts and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy

was going to purchase scientific signal time from the

Gibralter Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary,

which was nominally the operator of a commercial

radio station then being established.

The loading of the transmitters, the unloading,

the construction of the facilities to house the trans-

mitters, and the installation of the transmitters

was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of

Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James

Burwell, a logisitcs officer who was thoroughly in-

volved in the JMATE operation, reported that the con-

struction activity at Swan Island required the move-

ment of 180,000 pounds of equipment from the Washing-

ton Depot, aboard Agency trucks

for delivery to Norfolk

and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to

locating the transmitters and constructing the facili-

ties for housing the transmitters, a crude landing

field also was cleared. The total time involved was

approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under

$225,000.

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The first test signals from Swan Island were

sent on 17 May 1960, and from that time until the

close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the station

was one of the two or three principal voices aimed

at Castro's government. 1l/ Shortly after the initi-

ation of the broadcast from Swan, a true tempest in

teapot was brewed over the question of whether or not

export licences

were

going to be required for goods

moving from the mainland to support operations at

Swan Island. Involved in this brouhaha were the

Department of Commerce, the US Customs Service, and

numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff, Commercial

Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of

Security. Bill Eisemann, WH/4's Chief of Support,

had his hands full! Common sense ultimately prevailed

and the question of export licences was dropped. 12/

Even before Swan went into operation, there

was some question within the government as to whether

the CIA or the United States Information Agency should

be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts

directed at Cuba. Within a few weeks following the

beginning of operations at Swan, this question was

resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which

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• included representatives

from the Agency, Mr. Abbot

Washburn, the Director of the United States Informa-

tion Agency, and various of Mr. Washburn's

senior

people.

The meeting made clear that the Agency was

"doing medium wave broadcasting directly into Cuba.

Although it was not specified at the meeting in

Mundt's office, CIA also was supporting station WRUL,

which had made a direct application on its own initia-

tive for funding such broadcasts -- even though the

Agency was behind such broadcasting and such financ-

ing. 14/

The Navy, however, got goosey about the cover

story which was being presented. Despite a strong

effort on the part of senior Agency representatives

to convince Rear Admiral S. B. Frankel -- who was

designated as the Chief representative of the Office

of Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste, then Director

of ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement in

supporting the cover story. * The hassle with the

• The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefing

for Adm. Frankel was that the USN was already so heavily

involved in the project that it would do them more harm

than good to withdraw.

Information on this meeting

with the Navy and other information pertaining to the

development of the Swan Island facility is contained in

the sources listed under Reference 14/•

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Navy was successfully resolved when the Agency found

that through its own resources it would be able to

provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs,

including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE

in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty.

The problem of security of the island -- particu-

larly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs

to the island -- was never put to any real test.. In

fact, what might have been the only serious security

incident was most successfully resolved by Robert

Overjord, the Security Officer for the island and

the Deputy Chief of Base. The incident took place

in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students

landed to assert a claim to sovereignty of the Swan

Islands by the Republic of Honduras, and it was re-

ported as follows:

A potentially dangerous situation was

averted by the tactful handling of the

group by Mr. Overjord who persuaded them

to leave their armament of 13 pistols and

three submachine guns aboard their boat

and conducted them on a tour of the island.

The group leader indicated that he wanted

to take a census of the population, and

was furnished with pertinent information,

with no divulgence of Agency interest in

Radio Swan or its personnel. Upon comple-

tion of the census, the group was permitted

to raise the Honduran flag, was given lunch

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and refreshments, and departed shortly

thereafter.

The good judgment and dis-

cretion of Mr. Overjord are felt to be

directly responsible for avoidance of

what could have been a serious incident

involving loss of lives, or injury to

Agency and other island personnel. * 15/

The question of the exact nature of the broad-

casts from Swan was the subject of much discussion,

both prior to the opening of the station and subse-

quent to its first broadcast. The Deputy Director

of Central Intelligence, for example, called Jake

Esterline, Chief, Project JMATE to report on conver-

sation that he (General Cabell) had with "a person

of considerable importance who was very familiar

with Cuba," concerning the nature of the propaganda.

which should be aimed at the Cuban population. Cabell

stated that according to this important person, if

tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired

and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the

Cuban population for hours on end, the effect would

be "to bore the people horribly with Castro, but would

The island was manned by 24 people, all but nine

of whom were CIA personnel. The nine were unwitting

technicians of the Philco Corporation.

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also pointedly reveal the inconsistencies of his

statements." Following receipt of this call from

the Deputy Director, Esterline passed the word on to

Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps

such broadcasts might be used as filler during the

intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broad-

casts. * 16/

By early August 1960, however, the official

policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at

Cuba, was to be "the Revolution Betrayed." This

theme was formalized by the Department of State; and

at the direction of the Secretary of State, copies of

a 105 page document addressed to this theme were pre-

sented to members of the National Security Council,

to members of the

Inter-American Peace Committee, and

to US Embassies in the Latin American countries.

COS Havana forwarded another suggestion for a pos-

sible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960

issue of Confidential magazine, which apparently car-

ried an article called "An American Mother's Terrifying

Story -- Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter."

It

was COS Havana's suggestion that wide publicity be

given to this article in the Spanish language, pre-

sumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan. 17/

Available records do not indicate whether this sug-

gestion was adopted.

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Instructions were

that the Embassies could furnish

copies of the document to the foreign ministers and

to other high officials in their respective countries.

Additionally, the NATO Council also received a copy

of this document; and it was the hope

of the Depart-

ment of State that the document would have some im-

pact on the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers

of the western Hemisphere countries, which was to

be-

gin 16 August 1960 in San Jose, Costa Rica. According

to one interview of WH/4's propaganda chief, Dave

Phillips, the theme of the Revolution Betrayed

Hammered across the idea that Castro

had double-crossed the Cuban people by

abandoning the programs and promises

that originally won him support.

None

of CIA's propaganda, spoken or printed,

ever urged the populace to rise up against

Castro. This appeal, suicidal before the

invasion, would be used when, and if, a

Provisional Government obtained a lodge-

ment on the island. 18/

According to Phillips's interviewer:

Friendly third country diplomats in

Havana monitored CIA's principal broad-

casts and confirmed that the signals were

loud and clear. To verify its audience

the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts

(ball point pens were a favorite) to any

listener who would write to the station.

considering the police controls inside

Cuba, listeners' letters were an act of

defiance to the regime. There was a

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a flood of letters including, during

freak radio propagation periods, re-

quests for ball point pens from

New

Zealand. * 19/

Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcasts

was related

to the Director of Central Intelligence by

Col. King, Chief, WH Division, who pointed out that WH

had a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who, in

the form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan, made it

clear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud and

clear. 21/

Before the end of the summer of 1960, Swan was

on the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for a

total of 10 hours a day, in addition to which they

also began to utilize programs that had been prepared

by the FRD. One problem which would plague Radio Swan

- as well as other elements of Project JMARC -- was

the shortage of Spanish language capability. Among

*

It appears that perhaps baseball cards also were

going to be offered as an inducement to get listeners

to indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast.

A propaganda note from WH/4 for 9 August 1960, for

example, reported:

"M[aney] spoke to Ken Harris,

Special

Acquisitions. He has contacted a company

making baseball cards who claim 'this most unusual

order ever received.'

Will get cards, but curious

what was wrong with bubble gum." 20/

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other evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish

language capability immediately available at Radio

Swan, were the following: A machine-run of Agency

employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient

Spanish language to undertake

an announcer's job;

inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a Venezue-

lan child by a pro-Castro goon, could not be turned

to US advantage; and by mid-November 1960 WH Division

was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the

Department of Defense for a serviceman with native

fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer

at Radio Swan.*

* In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan

child, the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the

story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan.

The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been

caused by a counter-revolutionary. (Sources for the

foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish

language capability are listed in reference 22/-)

The lack of Spanish language capability was felt

throughout the project, not only in the propaganda ef-

fort. As late as January 1961, for example, the train-

ing facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters

for the

services for

a two week period of an Air Force

sergeant who was fluent in Spanish.

The training base

wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debrief-

ing an infiltration team.

The request was denied,

how-

ever, because there was a greater need for the man's

services as an instructor at the air training base in

Guatemala. 22a/ In another instance, a request from

COB Miami

for promotion of a clerical from GS-4

to

GS-5 was based on the fact that "her services as a

translator have been of the greatest importance to the

Base since her arrival. " 22b/

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Despite the handicap imposed by the lack of

Spanish language capability at the Station, Radio

Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activi-

ties supported by the Agency; and with Station WRUL,

New York, these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts

were the most effective means of providing the general

Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition. Addi-

tionally radio propaganda -- via both short and medium

wave transmitters. -- was to play an important role

immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro

forces on Cuban soil. 23/

Aside from radio broadcasts, other media activi-

ties in which WH/4 PP engaged were the newspaper Avance

in Exile and the magazine Bohemia Libre. Both of these

were published in Miami by the exile groups, and at

one time Bohemia Libre was reputedly the most widely

circulated Spanish language weekly in the world. Al-.

though barred in Cuba, selected items from both publi-

cations were broadcast by Swan or WRUL. 23a/

One of the strangest of all activities in which

WH/4 PP engaged was a public opinion survey conducted

by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes

of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime. If WH/4's

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planners expected that the survey would show a strong

core of internal opposition to the Castro government,

they were to be sadly disappointed. Working with "a

competent Cuban research organization" Free's report

was based on a series of a thousand interviews with a

cross section of the urban population of Cuba "both in"

Havana and in other cities, towns, and villages through-

out the island." Among the findings of the Free survey,

the following comments were included in the summary

report of mid-August of 1960:*

The great majority of Cubans surveyed

felt that both they personally and their

country were very much better off than

during the days of Batista.

The prevail-

ing mood was one of hope and optimism.

Attesting the apparently genuine en-

thusiasm of the great majority for the

Revolution, the Castro Government and its

program were the replies when the sample

was asked about the worst aspects of life

in Cuba today. Despite the fact that'

this question was designed to illicit un-

favorable comments, a very sizable major-

ty named as the worst aspects of the

oresent situation items which implrea

sympathy or support for the present regime.

At the top of the list (mentioned by one-

third of all respondents) was regret or

apprehension over the fact that there is

opposition to the Revolution and to the

Revolutionary regime; land] that there

are misguided counter-revolutionaries and

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Even in describing the worst aspects

of the present situation, only 30% of all

respondents mentioned items which could

be construed as criticisms,

explicit or

implicit, of the Castro regime.

Only. a

few such subjects received significant

mention, with each being referred to by

only a small minority of total respondents:

=.g., the danger of or trend toward Com-

munism (7%); criticism of the Revolution's

program (7%); economic difficulties (7%);

unemployment (6%); confusion and disorgan-

ization (5%).

In view of the overwhelming popularity

of the Revolutionary program, it is patently

clear that critroisms of Castro's program,

as such, will fall very largely on barren,

if not counter-productive ground.

The only positive statements that appeared in the Free

report, insofar as the objectives of wH/4 were con-

cerned, were to the effect that successful attack on

the Castro Government should be made in terms of the

inability of the government to meet the projects it

had outlined because of "the unwise and unrealistic

means it is employing in the execution of its program";

and "the Revolution and its program are being perverted

through the insidious influence of the Communists."*

The information concerning the Free report, is

contained in source reference 24/•

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It is interesting to record the reaction within

the Agency to the Free report:

C/JMARC lamented the

fact that the

Lloyd Free report evidently has gotten

into the hands of the Cuban Government

and will probably be used with devastating

effect at some point during the meeting

Ithe upcoming OAS Conference scheduled

for San Jose, Costa Rical. He tola ADDP/P

that he felt the Department of State. would

have to be prepared to sacrifice Mr. Free's

report on the proverbial "alter of gold."

The point was made strongly to ADDP/A

that the Free report, in fact, is not at

all valid other than for a limited

ADDP/A

"ged, at the cite dat not think state

should be made aware of the fact CIA

actually paid for the report.

He further

indicated that he was still endeavoring

to find out how the report copy of which

CIA never received in full -- got out of

control.* 25/

The substance of the Free Report appeared in the

New York Times and also in a Peter Edson column which

was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers. In

passing this information on to the DDP, Chief, WH/4

suggested that "the survey, in the opinion of WH/4

*

Chief, WH/4 apparently misread the significance

of the free report because, as the report points out,

the most serious opposition was, in fact, in the

Havana area, which included

I the heaviest sampling of

opposition sentiment.

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Prop, will be used in Cuban propaganda" -- something

of an understatement! * 26/

* Logic would seem to indicate that if WH/H's princi-

pals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey's

that WH/4/PP might have been tasked to make a

serious

study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his

achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public

to resist outside interference.

In an interview with

the author of this history, Dave Phillips stated that

that so

Enno Hobbing had provided the editorial guidance for

WH/4's propaganda efforts; but that to his (Phillips's)

knowledge, no study ever was conducted of the Castro

propaganda effort. In retrospect, Phillips indicated

that this probably was an oversight. 27/

On the subject of surveys of questionable value

during the Bay of Pigs Operation, mention should be

made of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein and

Saks

to initiate a

survey of Cuba's present

[May 1960] economic position that will

also contain an outline of proposals that

would sound (sic] as a platform for a suc-

cessor government to the Castro regime.

The cost, which will be borne by JMARC,

will be about $20,000.

This is merely the

first phase of the projected comprehensive

economic program.

Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in the

Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and

Reports) and the surfeit of government economists fa-

miliar with Latin America, WH/4 thought it necessary

to negotiate an outside contract for a study such as

indicated is truly incomprehensible! That the Klein

and Saks contract was not blocked at the DDP or DCI

level is equally incomprehensible.

The company's

•"Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Govern-

ment Platform to Serve the Interests of the People of

Cuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of the

Hemisphere and the Free World of Which Cuba is a Part"

-- which

was presented in typescript -- was 15 pages

of platitudes about the best of all possible worlds. 28/

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WH/4 PP also became involved in the propaganda

activity that was intended to offset the planned

visit of Nikita Khrushchev. to Cuba in the summer of

1960. In an Eyes Only memorandum to the Director of

Central Intelligence, Col. J. C. King informed Allen

Dulles that it had been learned that Khrushchev had

accepted an invitation from the Government of Cuba

to visit that country. Working with Havana Station,

a two-pronged program was being developed with the

intention of

either forcing the cancellation of the

trip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban people

to Communism.

Havana Station was to be responsible

for organizing church opposition to the visit, and

WH/4 and other elements of WH Division would be re-

sponsible for instigating rumors throughout Latin

America that an assassination attempt would be made

on Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba.

One of the WH/4's contacts suggested that leaf-

lets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upside

down, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion,

and that these leaflets should be distributed widely

through Cuba. 29/ There is no indication that this

particular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least

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one instance, the Hammer and Sickle was used to form

the 'T' in the word Iraidor on a sticker that was

being prepared for propaganda

use. 30/ In anticipa-

tion of the possible visit, 10,000 stickers of an

anti-Khrushchev, anti-Soviet nature were forwarded

from Headquarters to Havana Station. The legend

on one of these was "Cuba, Yes; Russia, No; Khrushchev,

No;" and a second item showed a prisoner behind bars

formed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words

sin Palabras. -- "Without words."* 31/

Despite these advanced preparations, no oppor-

tunity was presented to utilize the propaganda stickers.**

Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendance:

at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in

New York, 19-28 September 1960, and even though Castro

flew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet, the Khrushchev

visit did not materialize at this time.***

See following two pages for copies.

**

More detailed information on propaganda leaflets

and the dissemination of such materials by air drop is

given in Volume I of this history, Air Operations.

*** Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscow

at the close of the UN session.

On 22 October 1960 in

the course of an interview in Moscow with a Cuban

journalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visit

Cuba and its people as soon as possible. 31a/

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If not particularly successful in projects other

than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack

of imagination. Among other projects, it was proposed

that the Office of Medical Services' psychiatric study

of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was

not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader; and

the Castro image also would have suffered if a dis-

orienting drug could have been placed in Castro's

food. These proposals were

similar in intent to

others aimed at the Castro "image" as revealed in the

Senate Select Committee investigation of CIA plots

against the Cuban leader.

In light of a rumor that had been picked up to

the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting

some of their British Sea Fury aircraft with the

American flag -- said planes to be used in a provoca-

tion action to discredit the United States -- WH/4

investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos

of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in

order to forestall any such provocations by the Cubans.

Unfortunately, however, the Agency art shop pointed

out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt

to make such fake photos. With the idea in mind of a

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propaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's

militia (and apparently at the request of Col. Jack

Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM) , WH/4/PP gave some thought

to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's

militia to establish an "elite suicide squad" which

would fight on even after the defeat of the other

troops. The gentleman who would later become infamous

in connection with the Watergate activity, E. Howard

Hunt, and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of

sending a white painted "flight of truth" airplane

on a trip to several of the Latin American countries,

bringing -- in a "Billy Graham type operation" -- the

message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution.

But this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the

planning stage. 32/

None of the foregoing proposals however, were

in the same league with the propaganda plan that came

to be known as "the Dripping Cuban." The WH/4 Propa-

ganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated:

P[hillips] dispatched cable on Special

Operation to HAVA.

(Cuban jumping ship in

Bosphorous) • 33/

In fact, the cable that Dave Phillips had orig-

inated was addressed not only to Havana, but also to

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Istanbul, Ankara, and to the Forward Operations Base

in Miami.

Remembering that Dave Phillips himself

was something of an actor, as

well as a newspaperman,

it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its

entirety. The cable read as follows:

1.

FYI: HQS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOW-

ING OPERATION: SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN

BOAT HOMEWARD BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH

BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE

IN TURKEY. HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL

PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT

SENT TO RUSSIA FOR IMPRISONMENT.

CUBAN

SUBJECT WILL CONTACT LOCAL LATIN AMERICAN

CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION,

THEN RETURN LATIN AMERICA.

AFTER BRIEF

BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN "ATTEMPT"

WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE. FOR THIS

REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO "THEY"

WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM.

2. FOR HAVA: REQUEST STATION RECRUIT

SUBJECT:

OBVIOUSLY HE MUST BE SUPERB

ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE

IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS

NEWSMEN.

HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE OF

RETAINING THOUSANDS OF "DETAILS" ABOUT HIS

ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY. HE MUST BE

KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN

HE IS "ARRESTED."

AN ARTICULATE STUDENT

TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SWIMMING ABILITY

DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL.

3.

SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT, STATION

STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN

PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA,

BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED.

THUS SUB-

JECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING

WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF

SOVIET CONTROL IN CUBA. STATION ALSO

AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING, LATER

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RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PER-

MISSION WEEKEND WITH ALL THE WORKS IN

PARIS, ETC.

4.

IN RECRUITMENT, IT SHOULD BE

STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS

OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN

INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY

ON SECURITY.

HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST

REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND

STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF

HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT

FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGA-

TIONS.) •

5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS

SELECTED.

HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME.

HOPE HE MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE

AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH.

6. FOR ANKA, ISTA:

APPRECIATE YOUR

CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT COOP-

ERATION LOCAL SERVICE AND NEWSPAPER ASSETS.

SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT

NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FOR-

WARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. 34/

A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above

went to Chief, WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chief

of WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandum

read as follows:

The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helms

discussed this cable on 24

August [1960]

and concluded that since Fidel Castro is

definitely identifying himself more and

more with the Russians, it is not worth

the candle to launch an operation such

as that one proposed in subject cable.

Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly try

to find a body for this operation, provia-

ing we play it very carefully and do not

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let the body in on what we definitely

have in mind; also, that any further

cables which go out on this proposed

operation are to be signed off by him.

Examined in retrospect, it would appear that Mr. Helms

had good reason to be nervous about the proposal! * 35/

B. Sabotage and other Exercises**

Where WH/4/PP was successful in putting Radio

Swan into operation and in supporting Station WRUL in

* This proposal provided another of the very few in-

stances where. Mr. Helms' name surfaced in relation to

a Bay of Pigs related problem.

* *

. Because so many of the sabotage activities of the

Cuban dissidents were uncoordinated, uncontrolled, and

did nothing to impede the extension of Castro's control

or lessen his support, the author has tried only to

illustrate something of the scope of those sabotage

operations over which the wH or WH/4 could exercise a

degree of control.

In responding to the Taylor Com-

mittee's request for an assessment of the effectiveness

of its sabotage program, the best that WHD could say was:

There are numerous acts of sabotage re-

ported from all provinces of Cuba.

These

acts included the burning of cane fields,

damaging of power and communication lines

and sugar mills, burning of schools and

commercial buildings and damaging of petro-

leum and sugar refinery (siel.

It is ex-

tremely difficult to verify just what

sabotage damage were (sic] the result of

our team's (sic] activities; however,

they.

have claimed the burning of cane fields,

the firing of commercial stores, (high]

tension lines, and the damage to the oil

refinery at Santiago de Cuba was the re-

sult of

a raider operation by one of our

(footnote continued on following page)

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its broadcasts into Cuba, Project JMATE could claim

no similarly successful or continuing program of

sabotage and disruption. In fact, one of the earliest

and most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs against

Cuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry --

was a complete and total bust. Being suggested even

before President Eisenhower's authorization of the

anti-Castro program, attempts to sabotage and inter-

fere with

the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineries

continued until well into the middle 60's -- with at

least one of the sabotage "experts" displaying the

same notable lack of success, but excess of foolish-

ness, that characterized his activities during Project

external action groups.

In addition,

we feel that a great deal of the other

sabotage were (sic] the results (sic]

of the demolitions we supplied to the

various teams and other action groups

in Cuba with which we were in contact.

Approximately 10-15,000 lbs. of the

over 100,000 lbs. of material (sic]

placed in

the hands of internal assets

were demolitions supplies for sabotage

action.

35a/

The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by Rip

Robertson, but his exciting cable about the action

greatly overemphasized the damage; and the plant op-

erations were quickly restored to

normal.

At the

time, however, the DCI reported it to the Special

Group (Chester Bowles, Roswell Gilpatrick, and

McGeorge Bundy) as a

"successful" operation. 35b/

Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E (p. 335).

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JMATE. It is a story worth recording here, because

of the extremely close and continuing relationship

between one of the major US oil

companies operating

a refinery in Cuba, Standard Oil Company of New

Jersey (SONJ), and WH Division.

As early as 9. March 1960, the minutes of a

Special Group meeting reflect conversations that

both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the

problems being faced by the major petroleum companies

operating in Cuba -- SONJ, Texaco, and Shell -- and

particularly the need for "discreet means of inter-

company consultation" in order to avoid possible

anti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of planned

para-military operations against Cuba, it was report-

ed that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western Hemisphere

Division was approached "by the Standard Oil Company. ,

He (Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared that

Standard will be willing to cooperate, perhaps even

carry the ball. on certain selected (sabotagel targets.

DD/P gave authority to push this contact immediately "* 36/

Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among

the specific sabotage targets to be considered for at-

tack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960,

were petroleum targets. 37/

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By August of 1960, WH/D had approved a program

of

"subtle sabotage paying off, without resorting to

the more risky and sensational type of sabotage."

Unfortunately, however, there was a communications

gap between the operations people and the intelli-

gence analysts most familiar with the world petroleum

industry and a number of demonstrably unworkable --

though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught.*

The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked

to as an economic-political target as well as a

sabotage target. When the US refineries operating

in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet

crude oil, WH/4 began to think in terms of disrupting

the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis

and other

independent shipping operators to refuse

to carry the Soviet oil. It was predicted that such

The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledge-

ability -- both technically and economically -- on a

worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch

(later the Fuel's Branch) of the Office of Research

and Reports (later the Office of Economic Research) •

Aside from the constant irritation of having to work

half in the dark in response to WH/D Or WH/4, ORR/F&P

was constantly having to correct errors, to make

apologies, or mend fences with the major US petroleum

companies

as a result of the lack of coordination be-

tween DDP and DDI components.

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a plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortage

of tanker bottoms in the world market) to transport

its own crude to Cuba and to "provide technicians

and make modifications in existing refineries to

process their crude." This, in turn, was supposed

to alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally among

Cuba's crude suppliers.* 39/

In addition to petroleum refineries as targets.

for sabotage, plans were also made to disrupt the

Cuban microwave system. Unlike the plans to disrupt

the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly

involve properties of the international oil companies

-- the sabotage program for the microwave networks,

as late as

February of 1961, specifically stated that

attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net

with "hands off RCA and Dumont systems, which are to

remain intact for later consideration.": 40/ Also

In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves

did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the

use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the

Standard Oil refinery commented to this effect after

reviewing the all source intelligence materials avail-

able on the plant.

He was pleased - at least in

one sense -- to note that Standard's training program

has apparently been quite successful!

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prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on

Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C.

King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc

targets by resistance forces not controlled by the

Agency were far less efficient than such attacks

would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 41/

In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Divi-

sion's anti-Castro activity also included extensive

plans for the formation of goon squads throughout

much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the

pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This

goon squad program also was of considerable interest

to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Be-

cause of its areawide nature, the activities of the

goon squads were run out of WH/D rather than out of

WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit

for were the following: The disruption in Mexico

City of about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to

celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use

of stink bombs set off in the meeting place; in Lima,

Peru a counter demonstration against some 200 Castro

sympathizers also gathered to celebrate the 26th of

July movement; and in San Jose, Costa Rica, "A meeting

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of the Amigos de Cuba was broken up by an agent at

the Station, who sprayed the two principal speakers,

prominent Costa Rican leftists with 'Who, Me?'

• "* 42/

Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose to

mention in the same context with the goon squads were

the Secretary to the President of one Latin American

country:

Who can promote action of any of the

National Security Forces.

In another country, an:*

Agency member integrated into the

Public Safety Program serving as an

Advisor to the President on Security

matters is in a position to recommend

police action to the President.**

43/

In what may have been a ploy intended principally

to obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations,

*

"Who, Me?"

was an obnoxious scent.

**

In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activ-

ities by the Senate Select Committee in the mìd 1970's,

it is interesting

that the reference to the "Action

Squads" described above also included with reference

to the Dominican Republic an agent:

In contact with a group of dissidents

capable of violent action, including assas-

sination. This group has killed a number

of agents of the servicio de Inteligencia

Militar (SIM), Dominican Secret Police. 45/

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rather than in direct action programs against Cuba,

representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter-

intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire

a vessel which -- for its acquisition, operational

maintenance, crew, including incentive bonus would

run roughly $200,000 for a 6-month period -- could

also be used in deception operations against Castro.

In responding to this suggestion from the Special

Projects Group, Col. Jack Hawkins quickly put the

quietus on this request, noting that it was doubtful

that the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radar

or commo gear so

that they would react to "the false

radar presentation, deceptive communications traffic,

noise makers, signals, smoke, explosions, etc." Con-

sequently Hawkins concluded:

In vier of the high cost involved,

and the other factors mentioned above,

I do not concur in the acquisition of

this craft for decertion purposes as

proposed in the reference.

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Part VI

Mr. Nixon's Role

Like so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs

story a great deal has been said about the role that

Richard M. Nixon played in the operation during the

course of his Vice Presidency, but woefully little

solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either

the pros or cons on the subject. Because of the

continuing repetition of many of these stories, a

careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA

records of the operation in order to recover those

items pertaining to Nixon's participation directly

or indirectly -- through his aides, assistants, or

correspondence - in the Bay of Pigs operation.

During the course of his unofficial visit to

the United States in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro

accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the

United States to meet with Mr. Nixon in his official

office in the Capitol for an informal discussion.

Nixon has stated that the meeting was

arranged at the

request of the Secretary of State Herter, who suggested

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that the administration might profit if one of its

leaders could gain additional inside information about

what made Castro tick.

Nixon has said that he had a 3 1/2 hour meeting

with Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result of

the meeting, he prepared a 4-page secret memorandum

and sent copies to President Eisenhower, Secretary

Herter and to Allen Dulles.* 1/ In part at least,

Mr. Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro was

made public as early as November 1964 in an article

he wrote for the Reader's Digest, and these views

were repeated in somewhat more detail in his recent

memoirs, RN. The thrust of the meeting was that Nixon

was emphasizing the need for Castro to establish a

democratic form of government as he (Nixon) understood

it, with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the

In his Reader's Digest article of November 1964 Nixon

indicated that copies.of the memorandum went to the

three individuals as noted in the text above, however,

in his recent Memoirs, RN, Nixon states that a copy

also went to John Foster Dulles.

John Foster Dulles

was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959,

on which date he was

succeeded by Christian Herter.

At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro,

however, Mr. Herter had been acting in Mr. Dulles'

place.

Dulles's

death occurred 24 May 1959:

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type of government he believed in was that which was

expressed most vocally by the people. Nixon's most

widely known remark about Castro as a result of that

meeting was his statement that: "Castro is incredibly

naive about communism, or is under communist discipline."

Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with

the meeting either, for according to a member of his

party when Castro emerged from the meeting he "was

angry. He swore and added, "This man has spent the

whole time scolding me'."* 2/

Subsequent to his meeting with Castro in April

of 1959, Agency records do not reflect any particular

interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban

activities until the end of January 1960. On 27 Janu-

ary, and again on 23 February, Col. J. C. King, Chief,

Western Hemisphere Division, briefed Gen. Robert Cushman,

Mr. Nixon's Aide, at the Vice President's Office.

Cushman made it clear that the Vice President was

*

It was only after making a direct request to Mr.

Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained.

No copies were found in the files of CIA, State, or

the Eisenhower Library.

The copy obtained was from

Mr. Nixon's personal files.

The memorandum was, in

fact, classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET.

A copy of the memorandum is attached as Appendix

F.

2a/

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interested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within

and outside. of Cuba, including goon squads or other

direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro

groups in Cuba.

Among the other subjects discussed with General

Cushman on 23. February 1960 were propaganda attacks on

the Castro government and the possibilities of economic

sanctions similar to those which had been suggested

by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland,

whose views on the

need for economic sanctions had

not only been discussed with Agency representatives,

but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's

office.

Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro ef-

forts which were of some interest to the Vice-Presi-

dent were CIA's relations with the Department of State,

which obviously was not one of the Vice President's

favorite organizations; but Col. King made it quite

clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only

after policy approval. 3/ After it was pointed out

to Gen. Cushman that the Department of State's knowl-

edgeability about Agency operations was on a strict

"need-to-know" basis, even for

the Ambassador in Cuba,

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Cushman then showed Col. King some derogatory informa-

tion that the FBI had provided the Vice President

about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of

the Bureau of American Republic Affairs. Col. King's

memorandum provided no details about the nature of

this information, but the probability is that both

were accussed of being too tolerant of Castro and

communists. 4/

During one of these meetings in the early part

of 1960, Gen. Cushman- noted that the Vice President

had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to

consult with, or acquire the services of, Col. Edward

Lansdale, a member of Gen. Erskine's Special Operations

Staff in the Department of Defense. Lansdale's activ-

ities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the

Philippines, apparently were well known to Nixon. =/

On 2 March 1960, the Director of Central Intel-

ligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing

on "What We are Doing in Cuba:" The T-page briefing

paper which had been given to the Director provided

information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities,

on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda ef-

fort which was being supported by Agency financing,

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and went into details concerning attempts to rally

anti-Castro support, not only in the other Latin Ameri-

can nations, but in the Near and Far East and in Africa.

Details were given on the preparations being made for

resistance activities including the acquisition of

training bases in third countries, and both Ydigoras

Fuentes, President of Guatemala, and President Luis

Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers

of support for this country's anti-Castro activities.

Plans for economic warfare against Castro were

also outlined for the Vice President. Delaying de-

liveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar indus-

try, tightening credit by oil companies to restrict

delivery of the essential petroleum products, and

possible restriction in sugar quotas were

mentioned

as under study. One other item which was mentioned

in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the

fact that the Agency had "a drug, which if placed in

Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irra-

tional manner that a public appearance could have very

damaging results to him." 6/ It' should be emphasized

that at the date of this briefing (2 March 1960), the

United States did not yet have an official anti-Castro

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policy - that would not come until 17 March of 1960.

Subsequent to that announced policy, the author has

found no other references to drugs or other types of

attack which were being considered upon Castro's

person, or the persons of any of the other Cuban

leaders, as a part of the Agency's official program.*

There is some question as to whether it was the

Director of Central Intelligence himself, or whether

it was Mr. Bissell, or, perhaps, whether it was Col.

King who actually briefed the Vice President on

2 March 1960. A stamp on the copy of the original

Memorandum for the Director reads: "Noted by DCI

28 March 1960." This copy was sent to the DCI through

the DDP and carries Mr. Bissell's initials. The car-

bon of the memorandum does not show this stamp and

the presumption is that it was the Director who did

the briefing. A third version of the memorandum is

* See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the

Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the defini-

tion of the Agency's official policy regarding the

anti-Castro program, as contrasted to the unofficial

program.

The author assumes that regardless of reader's

biases regarding the former Vice President, that the

fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a

briefing will not be construed to make him a member of

a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the

Cuban leaders.

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dated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read:

For the Director's use at the NSC 5412

Representatives Meeting which will con-

sider the Cuban covert action program

paper:

(This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's

briefing.)

This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI

did in

fact do the briefing. While the briefer may not be

positively identified, there is no question however,

that the Vice President did receive a detailed brief-

ing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro

prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation.*

In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr.

Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba,

the Vice President was also

a participant in the

10. March 1960 meeting of the National Security Council

when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a

danger, that he wanted

contingency plans drawn up, and

that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all

future National Security Council Meetings. Mr. Nixon

attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President

* See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each

of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice

President on ¿ March 1960.

(For Appendix G see p. 344).

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gave a formal "go" to the Covert Action Plan of the

Agency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group.

Mr. Nixon's only reported comments during this meet-

ing concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba,

the pulling out of private American firms, and the

possibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flow

of American dollars into Cuba. I/

Perhaps one of the reasons why Vice President

Nixon has been attributed with playing a major role

in the Bay of Pigs activity has to do with the re-

lationship between Nixon's office and Mr. William D.

Pawley, former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil and

a US businessman with extensive investments in Cuba

and interests in various other parts of Latin America.

Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Repub-

lican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon's cause. Ap-

parently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secre-

tary of State for Latin American affairs - assuming

a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential

election - Pawley was a widely known conservative.

In the spring of 1960, shortly following Presi-

dent Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castro

program, Pawley's contacts with the Agency (particularly

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with WHD) and with Nixon's office became increasingly

frequent and

apparently quite close. On 21 March 1960,

four days after formal approval. of the anti-Castro

program, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a

meeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence which

would include the DCI, Col. King, Gen. Cushman, and

Walter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United States

Steel

and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as

Mx. Pawley. Of the session with Pawley, Chief, WH/4

wrote:

Details and the agenda were not dis-

cussed other than to say the principal

emphasis would be on reviewing what work

could be done throughout the hemisphere

and public opinion on the pending opera-

tion against Castro. Mr. Pawley was told

that the time had arrived for careful coor-

dination of all activities; that permission

had been granted for an all-out operation;

a government in exile will be formed post.

haste;

that the acceptable non-Batista

groups will be put into contact with each

other almost immediately; and that Mr.

Pawley's contact, Rubio Padilla, will

figure prominently in this effort...

It

was carefully explained to Mr. Pawley that.

any action involving exiles now should be

most carefully coordinated with Chief,

WHD and Chief, Branch' 4 to avoid any flaps.* 8/

Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that

Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican

Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond

CIA until he, Pawley, had the opportunity to give the

information directly to Vice President Nixon.

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The meeting mentioned in the foregoing para-

graph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on

I April 1960, and the Agency's representatives briefed,

among other things, on the problems being

faced by

the Cubans in exile who were trying to form a govern-

ment. There was considerable discussion as to who

should be the nominal leaders of this government in

exile, with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr. Rubio

Padilla and the Agency's representatives suggesting

DI. Antonio Varona. For the benefit of the Vice

President's representative, it

was stressed that none

of the Latin American countries seemed particularly

anxious to provide a base of operations for the

government in exile. The group was informed by the

Director of Central Intelligence and by Col. King

that, in addition to US Government financing, arrange-

ments were being made to have private confidential

sources help defray the costs of the Cuban government

in exile. Col. King pointed out that over and above

a bond issue

which will be floated in the name of the

government in exile with Mr. Pawley's

Float vien

help, that donations are being made by

private citizens and corporations.

indicated that confidential arrangements

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have already been made with the Bureau

of Internal Revenue to permit individuals

or corporate entities making donations to

claim these donations as contributions to

the US Government for tax purposes.

He

cautioned that this arrangement was being

limited to a very small group. 2/

The question also was raised about the relation-

ship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of

American

States •

Mr. Pawley suggested that rather than

lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the

US Military Mission in the Latin American countries,

especially having them pass the word on about the dangers

of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western

Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were dis-

cussed by the group

were the planned propaganda program

and "the present pathetic effort on the part of the

Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in

Cuba. "

This meeting demonstrated that from the very

outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy'

Mr. Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that

were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and

that certain private American citizens were closely

involved in the planning. Within a very short time

after the April meeting at Pawley's residence, however,

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senior Agency personnel -- notably C. Tracy Barnes,

the ADDP/A -- began to question the Agency's rela-

tionship with Mr. William Pawley, particularly as

Pawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparently

intended to establish a group of Pawley supported

Cubans in exile in opposition to the FRD, the Agency's

supported exile group.

Barnes's concern was that

if the US continued to support the extremely conserv-

ative element represented by pawley's group, it

would be charged that any anti-Castro action under-

taken by the US would be "on the basis of protecting

economic royalists."

What Barnes stressed to Mr. Bissell, the DDP,

was the need for the

US to decide whether or not it

wished

to be charged with supporting reactionary

movements in Latin America, not only in Cuba, but

in the rest of the Central American and Caribbean

areas as well. Once having made up its own mind,

Barnes suggested that CIA's position be worked out

with State "and thereafter take it to Mr. Nixon,

giving him at that time, a thorough and complete

briefing so that there can be no doubt in his mind

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as to where we stand, and what we propose to do. "* 10/

When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get

together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere

Division that he was withdrawing

from support of the

Agency's anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told Col.

King that he intended to make his views regarding the

FRD known

to Vice President Nixon. In addition,

Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower

on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his

opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and

probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley's

recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of

the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and

others, discussed the pros and cons of cutting off

the communications

channel between Pawley and the

Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was pro-,

vided by the Agency's communications facility.

Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that

the communications channel should be continued because

*

Mr. Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to

Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Group

on 19 May 1960, the DCI categorized the Cubans sup-

ported by Pawley as "unreconstructed reactionaries." 10a/

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it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley

group. Moreover, the Pawley group had a duplicate

channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been

restricted by denial of the Agency channel.. A restric-

tion was placed on the transmittal of communications

which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba;

but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of

the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western

Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable

traffic, however, was to be the responsibility of

Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.

Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhower

administration, the Deputy Director for Plans agreed

that the discussion regarding Pawley should be brought

to the attention of the Director of Central Intelli-

gence and

that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bring

this matter before both President Eisenhower and Vice

President Nixon. ll/ By the first week of June 1960,

however, Jake. Esterline apparently had reached the

end of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP,

he wrote:

It is our firm conviction, based on

months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley's

views on the Cuban situation are highly

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personal and rigid. These views in our

opinion are inimical to the best interest

of the United States.

Mr. Pawley has re-

fused to budge from his position and has

continued. to

seek official endorsement of

his views at the high levels of the govern-

ment.

The flagrant disregard for security

reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated

4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to

recommend that all contact with the Rubio-

Pawley group be immediately and finally

severed. If such action is not taken,

no guarantee can be made for the security

of the JMARC operation.

In point of fact,

the information in the foregoing message

indicates that security already has been

damaged severely. 12/

Among other things, the Havana cable which had

aroused Chief, WH/4 stated that the following infor-

mation was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in

Cuba:

US Government now backing Rubio group

and no other group.

Group has entre to

veep.

For a time Pawley was having

trouble with an Agency or Agencies who

Pawley offered (to] withdraw completely,

he was talked out of doing so, and given

land this] resulted resignation person

backing other group. 13/

Headquarters prepared a priority cable

to be

sent to both

Havana and to the Forward Operations

Base, which had also picked up the disinformation

being spread by the anti-FRD group. The text of the

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cable read in part as follows:

You have been authoritatively advised

that US Government is not (repeat not)

backing Rubio group and that it has no

intention of ever doing so. It complete

fabrication that Pawley was given US

Government assurance that only his group

would be backed.

No resignations of any

kind occurred, nor are any foreseen.

Mention Veep in such context and on this

particular level sheer foolhardiness and

can only reflect most adversely on those

Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of

facts and severest indiscretions. 14/

The cable apparently was never forwarded to

either Havana or to Miami, presumably because of op-.

position from Col. J.C. King who had noted and ini-

tialed on his copy of the Memorandum from Jake Ester-

line recommending that all contact with the Rubio-

Pawley group be "immediately and finally severed"

the following: "I do not concur with severing of

all contacts. "* 15/

As will be noted subsequently, whether it was

political expediency or conviction that Pawley could

actually do some good, the relationship among Pawley,

Chief, WH Division, and Chief, WH/4 continued through-

out the course of

the Bay of

Pigs Operation. If any-

thing in fact, the relationship between Pawley and

Jake Esterline appears to have become mutually sup-

portive, particularly as the operation drew to its

unsuccessful conclusion.

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On 20 June 1960 at the request of General

Cushman, Jake Esterline joined him for lunch, the

purpose being to provide the General with sufficient

information on the state of the anti-Castro program

so that he could bring the Vice President up to date

from the time of the Miami meeting that had taken

place at William Pawley's house.* Among the points

covered

were the developments related to the organ-

ization of

the FRD and the fact that Mr. William

Pawley's candidate, Señor Rubio, had decided not to.

join the Frente. According to Esterline's memorandum:

DI. Rubio's failure to join the Frente,

however, has not held up progress in form-

ing the junta, and/or the other important

aspects of the operation.

General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarters

were to be established in Mexico, and it was on this

occasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman to

E. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico with

the Frente.**

The meeting of 21 March 1960.

** Insofar as can be determined, this probably was

the first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard the

name of E. Howard Hunt.

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Chief, WH/4 also touched on the programs that

were being beared out of Swan Island, on the prepara-

tion being made for training paramilitary types,

base

communications, planned paramilitary activities, the

choice of a Third Country's staging area, and that the

operation was still scheduled to begin during the

month of November 1960. Gen. Cushman noted that the

Vice President requested this information in order to

prepare for an upcoming NSC meeting at which he would

be a senior official. The Vice President's aide also

asked if there were any particular problems with re-

lation to the operation that Chief, WH/4 wished to

have brought to the attention of the Vice President.

Esterline reported that the only problems that had

occurred concerned political differences among the

exiles, but that for the moment all factions seemed

to be quiescent. Chief, WH/4 also indicated to Gen.

Cushman "that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other

countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC

would have adequate support at the eleventh hour. "* 16/

On 22 June 1960, General Cabell -- Acting DCI

at the time -- briefed a special meeting of the National

Security Council on the Cuban situation. The Vice

Except for Guatemala

and Nicaragua, such support

would never be forthcoming.

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President presided and the meeting was attended by

the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the

Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobiliza-

tion, the Acting Attorney General, a representative

of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and,

among others, Messrs. Bissell, King, Esterline, and

McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency * 17/

A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the

FRD and its leadership -- their policies, their back-

ground, and the internal difficulties and bickering.

The propaganda picture also was discussed, with partic-

ular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan

Island. Gen. Cabell stated that the paramilitary

plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would be

divided into 25 20-man teams. The teams would go

into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident,

groups. Cabell emphasized that the implementation

of the paramilitary program depended on the existence

* Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy

Director for Intelligence

- that component of the

Central

Intelligence Agency which, according to some

of the "authorities" on the Bay of Pigs, was presum-

ably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's anti-

Castro program.

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of viable dissident forces which "have not emerged

in strength."

The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create an

anti-Castro air force, but his comments about this

air force (even at this time) were very much in error.

According to General Cabell:

Some trained Cuban fliers are currently

available and we hope soon to have access

to additional numbers. "Sterile" aircraft

for their use have been mothballed by the

Department of Defense and earmarked for

CIA usE.

These craft can be made available

in a matter of hours. 18/

As reported in an earlier volume of this history, nei-

ther the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would be

available for missions against Castro's Cuba until

late in the fall of 1960.*

In the NSC briefing, Cabell also made some inter-

esting comments about the resistance that might be

encountered in an attempt to oust Castro, emphasizing

that intelligence reports had indicated that' Cuba

might organize "a 'foreign legion' comprised of highly

trained regular military personnel, drawn from Com-

munist nations,

mainly the eastern satellites. Should

this eventuality occur it would seriously affect the

*

See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of

Pigs Operation, Air Operations.

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probable success of any purely clandestine paramili-

tary operations." Cabell then introduced a suggestion

which would be heard right up to the time that the

invasion fleet was being boarded -- that "volunteers"

be acquired for the anti-Castro forces, such volunteers

to be drawn from US Special Forces. * 18a/

As the presiding officer at the special National

Security Council meeting, Vice President Nixon raised

a number

of questions with the Department of State

representatives concerning support that the Organiza-

tion of American States would likely give to this

country's anti-Castro efforts; and he also posed a

series of questions concerning the economic pressures

that, the United States might put on Cuba. The ques-

tions concerned sugar, oil, and tariffs in particular;

and

the Vice President urged that "strong, positive

action (be taken] to avoid becoming labeled "Uncle

Sucker." 19/

* No such volunteers were permitted in the case of

the ground forces, but in the last two days of the

Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted

for combat air operations.

See Volume I of this

History, Air Operations.

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On 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an inter-

esting telephone call from General Cushman,

contain-

ing two messages from the Vice President.

First, Mr.

Nixon was interested to know if there were any obsta-

cles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis other

agencies in support of JMATE; and if there were, the

Vice President indicated that he personally would

help to resolve such problems. The second request

was a bit more sticky.

Gen. Cushman said

that the Vice President has

• commissioned

him to keep Mr. William Pawley happy and,

in connection

with this, he has also been

instructed to keep Mr. Pawley briefed on

how things are moving. General Cushman

said he realized that this is much against

our desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, but

the fact remains that he [Pawley] is a

"big fat political cat" and, as such, the

Vice President cannot completely ignore

him. 20/

Esterline allowed that he understood the General's

problem and suggested that with a few hours advance

warning the Agency would provide the Vice President,

or the General, with such briefing materials as nec-

essary for any given meeting with Mr. Pawley - after

first clearing the paper with the appropriate agency

officials and within the security regulations that

applied to Mr. Pawley. Esterline indicated in his

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memorandum that he immediately informed the Deputy

Director for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Director

for Plans, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes, respectively,

about the call from General Cushman.*

Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice Presi-

dent's offer to help CIA with difficulties it might

have with other agencies to

heart. In a memorandum

from C. Tracy Barnes, concerning a more effective

commercial cover for Radio Swan, it appears, from

Barnes's response, that Esterline must have suggested

that the services of Vice President Nixon be engaged

to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the

FCC over

the use of commercial advertising to make

*

The following interesting comments also appeared

in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with

General Cushman:

This information [regarding Cushman's

telephone calll could not be given to Col.

King, as he had just departed on a three-

day trip..

This memorandum will be avail-

able to Col. King, however, upon his re-

turn Wednesday, 6 July.

Contrary to the opinions of many who have sug-

gested that Col. J. C. King was read out of the anti-

Castro operation, this memorandum would indicate that,

in fact, extreme care was being taken to make sure

that J. C. King was read into the act.

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Swan appear more legitimate.

Barnes, however, took

exception and recommended that the US Government

should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broad-

casts. * 21/

It was also in July 1960 that Vice President

Nixon's office, principally through the person of

General Cushman, first indicated an interest in the

activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. Garcia

was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive back-

ing both within the Cuban community in Miami and

among dissidents inside Cuba. At one point he claimed

that he could raise a force of 2,000 men in the Miami

area and 10,000 men inside of Cuba -- if he were given

proper financial support for training and equipping

these men. Garcia's name first came before the Agency

in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a

Cuban exile who was an Agency contact. During this

Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr. Nixon or whether

a determination was made concerning the increased use

of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in

doubt.

But Barnes's suggestion of official USG par-

ticipation in Swan was rejected.

A note from ester-

line on the official routing slip from Barnes for-

warding this memorandum read: "I believe Mr. Bissell

reversed this position?"

To this query King noted

"Yes" on the buck slip.

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initial meeting Garcia claimed that he had large

stores of military equipment in Spain, that he had

additional promises of assistance from General Franco,

and that he had contacts in the White House who had

given him the "go ahead" for an invasion of Cuba!

Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI, to

General Cabell, and apparently to the Office of Vice

President Nixon. In any event, on 9 July 1960 Jake

Esterline met with Mr. Marshall Diggs, a Washington

lawyer and Garcia's sponsor, where he was told of

Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro. In a

follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July, Mr.

Phillip Toomey, WH/4/Prop met with Garcia, Cameron

Pulley, and two reputed underwater demolitions ex-

perts. Garcia went into his act about how his force

could overthrow the Castro Government, assuming that

he could get some financial assistance for training

and equipping the troops. Mr. Pulley proceeded to

tell Mr. Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a

program that was being promoted by former Senator

Owen Brewster for the entire Caribbean area -- appar-

ently a program designed to eliminate all the bad

guys. Following another meeting on 13 July and after

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listening to Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as

Communists -- as well as being unimpressed by his

credentials -- on 15 July 1960, Marshall Diggs was

informed that the Agency had no interest in support-

ing Mr. Garcia. On 20 July 1960, Chief, JMATE met

with General Cushman to tell him that a full study

had been made of the representatives of Señor Garcia;

and as a result, the DCI probably would get in touch

with Mr. Diggs and/or Senator Brewster and explain to

them "the wisdom of their desisting from pushing Garcia

as an outstanding Cuban military leader."

The subject dragged on, however; and at one

point Mr. Pulley, who with Mr. Diggs and ex-Senator

Brewster, was a strong supporter of Mi. Nixon, indi-

cated that the administration's policies with regard

to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in the upcoming

election. Moreover Pulley

also is reported to have

indicated that a congressional investigation of the

anti-Castro plan was possible. The Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence was advised on 26 September that

because of Garcia's threats to expose everything he

had learned about possible Agency involvement in the

anti-Castro effort, including the Cuban exile

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organization in the United States, that the time had

come for Diggs and Pulley to be asked "to forego

their efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga."

This recommendation was approved by General C. P.

Cabell on 13 October 1960 * 22/

Insofar as the available records show, the con-

tacts between Vice President Nixon's office, and the

More nonsense from Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga would

surface again in the summer of 1961 following Castro's

offer to free the Bay of Pigs prisoners in return for

US tractors when Garcia bounced up with another pro-

posal for the planned escape of the prisoners - pro-

viding, of course, that he be given a bundle of bucks.

In fact, the hand of Garcia reached from beyond

the grave to touch on the BOP operation.

On 2 August

1976, almost a year after Garcia's death, the Washing-

ton Star carried a UPI dispatch saying that Rep. Thomas

N. Downing

(D., Va.) had affidavits claiming that:

In return for support of the invasion

lof cuba from Mario G. Kohly, a popular

right-wing leader who was exiled from

Cuba, then Vice President Nixon agreed

in October 1960. to order the CIA to

arrest the leftist leaders and turn

them over to Kohly for "elimination"

after Premier Fidel Castro was thrown

out of office.

The affidavits

reportedly came from a former CIA con-

tract agent and Mario G. Kohly, Jr., son of the would-be

invasion leader.

These materials

were supposed to have

some bearing on House of Representatives's investigation

of the assassination of President Kennedy; but there is

no indication that they were given any credence. 23/

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Central Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia

case -- for all practical purposes ended by August

1960.*

The only other significant involvement between

the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency,

prior to the change of administration on 20 January

1961, concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates

for President and Vice President of the United States,

prior to the 1960 election.

On 23 July 1960, fOllOW-

ing the Democratic convention, Allen Dulles briefed

Sen. John Kennedy, and on 28 July Senator Lyndon

Johnson. In his

memorandum to President Eisenhower,

who

had directed that Dulles give these briefings,

the DCI reported that in the two hour period for each

briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet

Union, developments in the Berlin situation, in the

Whether this reflects the concentration of the Vice

President's activities on the upcoming November elec-

tion,

whether the principal contacts came to be main-

tained between Col. J. C. King and Nixon's office --

with the consequent reference memoranda being included

in J. C. King's files, which have disappeared from the

sight of God and man -- or whether, in fact, this is

an accurate reflection of the limited contacts, the

author cannot confirm.

His inclination is to believe

that the contacts probably were as limited as described.

above.

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Congo, and in Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on

19 September 1960, and again the briefing touched

on relations with the Soviet Union and on the trouble

spots in the world, including Cuba. The White House

was informed of this briefing prior to the event; and

subsequent to the briefing of Kennedy, MI. Dulles

reported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of the

White House Staff and also to Brigadier Genéral Andrew

Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President. 24/

The exact nature of the

"briefings that Dulles

gave to Kennedy on Cuba is of particular historical

importance in terms of the election of 1960. In the

last of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixon

and Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, in the course of condemning

the Castro regime and suggesting that the United States

take stronger action against Castro, made the statement

that:

We must attempt to strengthen the non-

Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in

exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer

eventual hope of overthrowing Castro.

Thus

far, these fighters for freedom have had

virtually no support from our Government. 25/

Based on his knowledge and interest in supporting

the

anti-Castro program that had been authorized by

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President Eisenhower in March 1960, Nixon was put in

a Catch-22 situation; for as he said:

President Eisenhower had instructed

Illen Dulles, head of the cIA, to brief

he Democratic candidate on all opera-

tions, including Top Secret operations.

I knew that Kennedy had already received

two briefings from Dulles. I immediately

had a member of my staff call the White

House on the security line to ask if

these briefings covered Cuba. A member

of the White House Stäff indicated they

had. (Several months after the election,

Allen Dulles was to state that his brief-

ing of Kennedy had included Cuba but not

the training program for Cuban exiles.)

At the time of the debate, however, and

after checking with the White House, I

had to proceed with the assumption that

Kennedy had been briefed on the secret

program.

I was faced with the heads-he-wins,

tails-I-lose proposition.

If in the TV

debate I were to reveal the existence of

the training program and point out that I

had been one of its strongest advocates. I

would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's

position.

But if I did so, the project

would be doomed, and also the lives of the

brave men, both

inside and outside of Cuba,

who were receiving training and assistance.

I had only one choice:

to protect the

security of the program, I had to oppose

Kennedy on his position of advocating that

the United States openly aid anti-Castro

forces inside and outside Cuba. 26/

It is interesting to observe that Nixon became

more philosophical about the impact of the final TV

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debate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 elec-

tion as time passed. In 1964 he would write "Most

observers agree that our positions on the Cuban

issue could well have been the decisive factor lin

the outcome of the election]." But in his recent

memoirs he expressed doubt that any single factor

in such a close election could really have changed

the outcome. * 27/

Following the TV debate in which Kennedy had

raised the issue of assistance for Cuba, Nixon quickly

lashed back at Kennedy. The result of the introduc-

tion of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the

*

In an interesting conversation with Fawn M. Brodie

who is writing a Nixon biography, the author of this

history, in response to Brodie's concern about the

fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public,

emphasized that plausible deniability was of real con-

cern at the time of the TV debate.

He also emphasized

the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by

Nixon.

The author also suggested to Mrs. Brodie that

it seemed equally valid to infer that perhaps Kennedy

had been leaked detailed information about the anti-

Castro program and that he used this device to put

Nixon in a corner during the TV debate.

Arthur Schles-

inger, of course, claimed that the Kennedy comments

"were no more than a rhetorical flourish.

Neither

Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army

in Guatemala." 28/

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election campaign, struck sensitive nerves within

the Agency; and on 26 October 1960, General Cabell

met with Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National

Security Adviser, indicating that the discussion and

debate about Cuban issues were touching on

areas which, in the end, might be damaging to the

nation's

interest.

On 27 October at the Special

Group meeting, Mr. Gray reported that he had talked

to "certain Nixon people in the White House" in an

attempt to enlist their support to bring such dis-.

cussions to an end. 29/

It was not until 18 November 1960 that Presi-

dent-elect John F. Kennedy was fully briefed by Direc-

tor of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and the

Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, on the

extent of the anti-Castro activities being plannèd

by the United States Government. 30/ Mr. Nixon's

misconception of the extent of the briefing that

Kennedy had received in the pre-election period was

not finally clarified however, until 20 March 1962

when Allen Dulles addressed

a memorandum to John A.

McCone, his successor as Director of Central Intelli-

gence, stating as follows:

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I have read the portions of Mr.

Nixon's book with regard to the intel-

ligence briefings which he understood

Senator Kennedy had been given by me

with respect to Cuba during the campaign.

I have also seen the White House state-

ment issued today on this subject.

There has been here, I believe, an

honest misunderstanding. This was

probably due to the nature of the mes-

sage Mr. Nixon writes he received as to

these briefings.

The Cuban situation

was, of course, dealt with in the

briefings I gave to Senator Kennedy.

The last briefing I gave him was over a

month before the debate,in which the

issue arose.

My briefings were intelligence brief-

ings on the world situation.

They did

not cover our own Government's plans or

programs for action -- overt or covert. 31/

As previously noted, however, by 1964, if not earlier,

Mr. Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an

error in assuming that Kennedy had received a more

detailed briefing than in fact he truly had.

By way of concluding this segment on Richard

Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity, it

should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination

was Nixon "the architect of the Bay of Pigs."* 32/

A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn

Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden, an old CIA man, •

in a TV documentary on the CIA made by the Canadian

Broadcasting Corporation.

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It is equally clear that Mr. Nixon, principally

through his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.,

was fully read into the plans that were being

developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for

the ouster of Fidel Castro. This interest was

especially strong in the period from the winter of

1960 through the late

summer of 1960. It also

should be apparent to the reader that while some

of the Vice President's interest -- particularly

in his insistence on placating William Pawley,

especially in giving undue attention to Pawley's

concerns that the Agency-sponsored Cuban-exile

organization was being taken over by the pro-Com-

munist groups -- was politically motivated, his

basic concern was the fear of the establishment

of a communist government in the Western Hemis-

phere. Certainly his constant interest and offers

to provide help for the Agency in its relations

to other branches of the US Government fall into

the latter,, rather than the former, category. The

unanswerable question, of course, is whether Cuban

Communism would play such a large role in international

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affairs in 1979; particularly in the third world

countries, if Richard Nixon had been elected Presi-

dent in 1960.*

* Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon

would have had the US play was the comment that he

reportedly made to William Pawley several weeks be-

fore the 1960 election, when Nixon indicated that he

Favored breaking relations with Cuba -- at that time

- recognizing a Government-in-exile, and then assist-

ing that Government in its efforts to oust Castro. 33/

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Part VII

The Question of Assassinations

In his testimony before the Senate Select Com-

mittee to Study Governmental Oerations, Intelligence

Activities, Richard M. Bissell, formerly CIA's Deputy

Director for Plans, testified fully and completely

to the role that he, Sheffield Edwards, and William

Harvey played in negotiations with Robert Maheu and

Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana

on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro. In

addition to the individuals just named, it also appears.

highly probable that Allen Dulles, the Director of

Central Intelligence (and possibly both Presidents

Eisenhower and Kennedy) was aware that Castro was an

assassination target. Unfortunately the Senate Com-.

mittee Report and the media coverage of the investi-

gation of the Central Intelligence Agency's partici-

pation in assassination plots made it appear that the

Mafia involvement was a

fundamental part of the Agency's

response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authori-

zation for CIA to be principally responsible for the

ouster of Fidel Castro. In fact, the activities of

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Messrs. Bissell, Edwards, and Harvey, with Maheu and

the Mafia

remained strictly compartmented and isolated

from the officially authorized Project JMARC -- the

Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs

operation. Bissell himself stated:

I don't remember.

I have no recollec-

tion that (there was] any specific other

plot against Castro during this period

when the Bay of Pigs operation was in

preparation.

I do remember my own feel-

ing that the Mafia plot had a very modest

chance for success, and that it was not

something to be depended on in any way.

I don't remember others. 1/

Bissell also told the author of this history that:

Shef (Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director,

Office of Securityl would occasionally let

me know what was going on lvis-a-vis the

Mafial. In effect, he and his immediate

subordinate were case officers for that

activity; and I don't think anybody else

(was] involved. I think probably Tracy

[Barnes] may have known about it, but I

don't think anybody else involved with the

Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about

it, whatever.

My recollection is that it

never went to the Special Group, and that

is the view of (McGeorgel Bundy.* 2/

Interestingly enough, at the same time that Col.

Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro,

CIA's Deputy Director for Support, Col. L. K. White,

noted:

Shef Edwards and I met with General

Cabell and Jack Earman (on 22 March 1961]

to point out to them that we were not

(footnote continued on following page)

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Jacob D. Esterline, who was Chief, WH/4, the

component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically

created to run the anti-Castro project, disclaimed

either responsibility or knowledgeability about the

Mafia connection. * 4/ Richard D. Drain, who became

Chief of Operations for WH/4 was more voluble on the

subject of the assassination attempts which were re-

ported by the Senate Select Committee. In an inter-

view which touched, among other things on the planned

assassination of Castro by the Mafia-types Drain com-

mented:

furnishing the Director the personal

protection which we should be furnish-

ing in these critical times, particu-

larly with regard to the dangers inherent

in the Cuban situation.

General Cabell

agreed to talk with the Director about

this, and to try to obtain his approval

to increase Mr. Tighe's force to six

people. 3/

*

Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief,

WH/4 he refused to grant Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH

Division, a blank check when King refused to tell

Jake the purpose for which the check was intended.

Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN

number from the Office of Finance and that the money

was used to pay the Mafia-types. It was subsequent

to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found out about

this, and Esterline told the author of this history

that he expressed his strong opposition to the fund-

ing of such activities to J. C. King. 5/

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I've been giving you lessons here about

[how] a COPS

should know a little about

everything...

Well, I promise you, until

it came out in 1975, this allegation, at

least, that Shef Edwards and Mr. Maheu

were working with the Mafia to assassinate

Castro, concurrent with the Bay of Pigs

Operation, that is the first time I ever

heard about it.

Ever! ... My thought, when

I saw this, was Jesus Christ, I must have

been a little over-compartmented, because

we had spent a considerable amount of

nervous energy figuring out how are we

going to get a shot at the old son-of-a-

bitch concurrent with the landing. If

anybody with whom I participated in

planning for that ... something that we

never had figured out how to do, because

so many of our agents went down just prior

to the invasion.

If anybody that was in-

volved in that ever spoke a word about any

other exercise

going on to get Castro, I

never heard it; and my initial reaction

when all this came out, during this last

year was

... well... why did they give

me the idiot treatment? Then it occurred

to me that maybe there was very good reason

for me not to know.

You don't need to

know

... compartmentation ... even from

COPS is not unheard of ...

well, mind you, I am not saying what

I've just said in any kind of pique; and

I certainly don't want to leave you -- or

this tape recorder -- with the impression

that had I known about this, I would have

seen opposed.. I must say, I don't think

I would have enjoved the instrument very

much -- whereas we put out an awful lot

of bullshit to the Cubans about the res-

toration of democracy and all that.

Those

Cubans, that were working with us were not,

• submit, working for the re-establishment

of the Mafia as a controlling factor in

Havana. I had a helluva lot rather, in

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contemplating the assassination of Castro,

contemplated in the way that we were con-

templating it - that is, can we get a

Rip Robertson close to him?

Can we get

a really hairy Cuban -- I mean a gutsy

Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one

thing in mind? We surveyed all of our

agent material to see who could take a

shot at him, but the assassination of

that charismatic guy, coincidental with

the invasion, would have been a highly

desirable thing.. Whether the instrument

to be picked should have included the

Mafia, I think I might have questioned at

the time.

It was part of my job... to

ask, "Now wait a minute ... What are we

doing here? ... If this

comes out ...

what will we look like?" Not only to our-

selves,

which is important, but to the

Cubans." 6/

In light of Drain's comments about the desira-

bility of having the good guys in the white hats elim-

inate Castro, rather than the Mafia guys in the black

hats, a

specific attempt was made to see what the

official records revealed about such plans. Although

far from satisfactory or complete, there is evidence

to indicate that the white-hatted guys would have had

no objection -- as reported by Mr. Drain -- if a suc-

cessful assassination attempt could have been made.

Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of

Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for

Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking

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"direct positive action" against the Castro brothers

and Che Guevara, WH/4 records reveal interest, and

possibly limited, direct participation, in a number

of such activities:*

For the most part, however, the various pieces

of evidence that

seemed to implicate WH/4 in assas-

sination plots against Castro or other of the Cuban

leaders proved to be cold trails. The peripatetic

Howard Hunt claimed, even prior to the Senate inves-

tigations, that after a visit to Havana in the spring

of 1960, he prepared a report recommending among other

things that the Agency should:

Assassinate Castro before or coincident

with the invasion (a task. for Cuban patri-

ots) ... Barnes and Bissell read my report

... and said it would weigh in the final

planning... So far as I have been able

to determine no coherent plan was ever

developed within CIA to assassinate

*. As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,

Cabell: pointed out to Mr. Merchant that such action

was highly dangerous both in conception and execution,

and, further, he indicated that it was beyond the

Agency's capability. I/ The Senate Select Committee

chased its tail at some length over the interpretation

of the term "direct positive action," as used by

Merchant.

Only someone (even a

Senator) who consist-

ently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a

problem understanding the meaning to be anything other

than assassination.

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Castro, but it was the heart's desire of

many exile groups.* 8/

In another instance, it appeared possible that an

agent named Rivero, a Cuban exile, might have been in

training to make an assassination attempt because it was

reported that he

was taken to the Warrington (sic], Virginia

firing range: where he was checked

out in

the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi-

hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol,

single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer;

carbine with folding stock; and a 7. 65mm

British Welrod with silencer.

He is to be

also checked out this week in the use of a

sporting rifle with telescopic lens attach-

ment.

It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration

into Havana, Rivero had two principal sabotage missions --

one against the Esso refinery and the other aimed at the

Havana Electric Company - 2/

In mid-July 1960, theré reportedly was an internal

Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither

WH/4 nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago

de Cuba reported:

* Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status

of his recommendation he was told that it was

"in the hands

of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery

(Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of

Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared

by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any

such report.

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On 15 July 1960, the Cuban Government un-

covered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel

Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit

to Mina del Frio, an army camp in the Sierra

Maestra mountains, between Bayamo and Manza-

11110. In Oriente Province.

Three captains

and approximately 100 soldiers had been ar-

rested and

more arrests are expected. 10/

In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain, Jake

Esterline the Chief of Project JMATE was also very emphatic

in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban lead-

ers was a part of the JMATE Program. In response to a

question of whether various of the special arms that were

being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for

use against the Cuban leadership, Esterline responded:

No, I think it (silenced weapons in par-

ticularl is for hit and run operations, where

they could do their maximum damage and

get

out without necessarily alerting people

...

I know of no -- within JMARC as I knew it --

I know of no attempt, no plans that were made

to assassinate.

As a matter of fact, the

constant battle with Cubans during those

years'

was to tell them that we weren't

going to get involved in any assassination,

that if there was going to be an overthrow,

it was going to be, obviously, a bloody op-

eration; but no Cubans were going to be

sent in there, to "make an assassination attempt."

It was going to be a ground-roots revolution. * 11/

Some contradictory evidence, however, indicates

that WH/4, if not principally responsible, was certainly

*

It is known that at least one assassination plot

against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men

using US rifle-grenades - was proposed by anti-Castro

Cubans to COS Havana, but the COS gave the originator of

the plan "no encouragement whatsoever." ila/

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aware of some sort of planned assassination activity.

One of the principals of wH/4 recorded that on 24 Feb-

ruary 1961 he:

Asked Ed (Stanulis], Dave P(hillips],

[Ed] Hinkle, [Bob] Moore, and Jake [Ester-

linel why not proceed with Operation

AMHINT to set up a program of assassina-

tion. 12/

Although the author of that remark was Chief of

Operations for Project JMATE, he was unaware, as re-

ported earlier in this chapter, of the Mafia connection;

but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that

the invasion might lead to the death of Castro.* In

response to a specific question

about the AMHINT pro-

gram, all he could say was:

I said that I was not failing to give

some attention to the business of assas-

sination.

Now, here on the 24th of Feb-

ruary, when I asked Ed, Dave Phillips,

Hinkle, Moore, and Jake, "why not proceed

with Operation AMHINT to set up a program

of assassination," either none of those

bastards knew anything about Sheffield

Edwards

and Maheu in the Mafia ... or

some of them did, and didn't see fit to

say "Drain, take your AMHINT and stuff

it .

We've got this thing pretty well

*

See pp. 279-281.

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covered." What I would love now lis] to

see

an outline of AMHINT. * 13/

A few days after the reference to the AMHINT assas-

sination program, WH/4 Propaganda Notes contained the

following statement: "I[saminger] phoned following line

to Wilkinson from Swan:

... attempted assassination of

Guevara"; and Chief Operations WH/4 made a cryptic note:

"CI and D watch Gueverra (sic] assassination attempt." 15/

When asked about the possibility that wh/4 was directly in-

volved in an attempt to assassinate Che Guevara, the former

Chief of Operations for the project wrote:

My only memory of this is that we did not

plan a Che assassination, but must have gotten

intelligence that an attempt on him had been

tried, planned, discovered or speculated

on. 16/

If one can assume that the statement "CI and D watch

Gueverra (sic] assassination attempt" translates as "Counter-

Intelligence and Division D watch Guevara assassination

* The author of this history has unsuccessfully tried to

track down this particular project.

AMHINT was related

to the work of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil

(DRE), an anti-Castro organization inside Cuba.

The only

evidence that has been found which might have been related

to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request

of 14 January 1961 for "Silenciadores Rifles de marilla

telescopica."

(A request for rifles with silencers and

telescopic sights.) This might have had to do with a DRE

plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather

than a plan to kill Castro.

When the FOB in Miami heard•

about the plan against the Soviet official they "immedi

ately sent ... (word] to AMHINT-1 forbidding planred

'atentado' (assassination]." 14/

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attempt" then the comment from Chief of Operations appears

eminently sensible, for Counter-Intelligence and Division

D (which was responsible for intercept traffic) would be

the two most likely sources to pick up information should

an attempt be made on Guevara's life -- particularly since

such an item probably would not be reported overtly in the

Cuban press or radio:

One final item which was surfaced during the course

of research concerning the possibility that wH/4 had

actually included an assassination program as part of its

operational planning concerns a carbon copy identified

only as "Must Go List."

The single sheet of unknown prov-

enance lists and identifies in the following order eleven

individuals:

Che Guevara - Minister of Industries

Raul Castro Ruz - Chief of Cuban Armed

Forces, and wife,

Vilma Espin de Castro

Blas Roca - International Communist leader

and Secretary General of Communist Party

Ramiro Valdez Menendez - Minister of

Interior (G-2)

Carlos Olivares - Deputy Foreign Minister

Carlos Raphael Rodriguez - Communist leader,

editor of newspaper HOY

Lazaro Pena - Communist leader - labor

movement

Abelardo Colome - Deputy in G-2

Captain Rogelio Acevedo - Chief of Militia

Anibal Escalante - Communist leader

Armendo Hart Davalos - Minister of Education,

and wife, Haydee Santamaria de Hart

Pencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a

note:

"List forwarded E. L. by C/WH/4 in Nov (1960]."* When

*

A copy of the list follows p. 287. The list should

read Armando, rather than Armendo, Hart.

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asked if he could identify the "Must Go List" the

former Chief of WH/4 stated:

Well, I know all these people ... Some

of them I know personally, like Armando

Hart ... I entertained Hart in my home a

number of times... the miserable bastard.

I have never seen that list in my life,

but this is the whole top gang at that

time.

Now many of them were later elimi-

nated from the power structure by Castro,

and by Raul Castro... They got rid of

Olivares, and Roca was pushed aside

...

Armando Hart was also half nuts at this

point, and he still is.

I guess he is

still

fairly prominent, but he is not

really in the power structure.

Abelardo

Colome

_- I don't even know who he is.

I wish to help you, but I don't know. 17/

The former Chief of Operations for WH/4, in re-

sponse to the question of whether the "Must Go List"

meant anything to him, replied as follows:

No! Huh! "List forwarded E. L. by

Chief WH/4", ... Eddie Lansdale ... E. L.

would be Eddie Lansdale.

Chief, WH/4

was Jacob D. Esterline. In November, I

was there

..: No "Big

Daddy. " Well,

whether this

"Must Go" is in terms of

the assassination, or in terms ... (of]

nobody, none of these people must be

allowed to have a role in the new govern-

ment.

I guess "Must Go" came to pass

eventually in the case of number one on

this list, Che Guevara.

Raul ... I myself,

contemplating the future government, thought

it might be interesting to try to keep

Raul in, with Fidel out. Capture what

magic there was in the name of Castro,

but do it with that little homosexual,

instead of with Fidel, the real man.

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don't even know the rest of these guys --

Hart;

Escalante, etc. 18/

By way of summarizing, it would appear that CIA's

official anti-Castro program as reflected in Project

JMATE did not include assassination as an integral

part of its operational planning, but would not have

been averse to eliminating Castro or other of the .

Cuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded.

Based on records, however, WH/4's principals were in

no way privy to, or participants in, the Mafia assas-

ination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs.

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Part VIII

Conclusions

This volume has traced the history of the CIA's

official anti-Castro program from its inception in

1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration

in January of 1961. It emphasized that in the initial

period when Castro's revolution was taking place, the

Agency, reflecting the policies of the Us Government,

was caught betwixt

and between -- to move with Castro

or to move against Castro. Shortly following his take-

over, it became clear that Castro had little or no in-

tention - nor apparently concern -- for establishing

cordial relations with the "Colossus of the North."

Instead, he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies

for military, technical, and economic assistance. It

became clear that a new philosophy was being intro-

duced into the Caribbean basin and that this philosophy

was directly contrary to the interests of the United

States Government and to the governments of many of

the Latin American nations, whether democratically

governed or governed

I by dictatorships of the right.

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As Castro's threats became more serious, and

as increasing pressures were put on legitimate eco-

nomic interests of the United States in Cuba, pressures

within the United States Government led to a decision

that Castro must go. With great concern about the

impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the

United States Government would have on the United

Nations and on the Organization of American

States,

it was decided that a covert plan of action would be

adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program

approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960.

It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda,

and paramilitary programs which would be implemented

in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was to be

the principal action agent for the bulk of the program.

Once the official US position was announced,

CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy.

A separate Task' Force within the Western Hemisphere

Division was established under the leadership of Jacob

D. Esterline, on whose

shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief,

Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial

concepts. of the Central Intelligence Agency called

for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio

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station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed

radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City.

Strong support was to be provided for anti-castro

publications launched in the area of Miami. Para-

military programs initially called for the training

of cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructors

who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and

training for the numerous dissident elements that

reportedly were ready to move against Castro.

Unfortunately, however, as the summer of 1960

drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro's

military strength and training programs were sharply

improving and that the initial plan to infiltrate

small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was

feasible. Consequently, the concept changed to one

of a landing in force, the acquisition of a defensible

base in Cuba from which a Provisional Government might

call for assistance from the United States Government

if the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient

support to force the overthrow of Castro.

This volume emphasized that following his decision

in March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro pro-

gram, President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the

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question of developments of the anti-Castro program

until late in the fall, following the election of 1960

and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that time Mr. Eisen-

hower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated

action to the point where some of CIA's planners hoped

that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was

already underway -- paramilitary operations might be

initiated. Apparently this was feared by Castro,

too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs

he said:

When our country was in danger of

direct aggression and mobilized itself,

it waited for the (Kennedy] presidential

inauguration thinking that this man

[Kennedy] would do something different,

because all in all, we didn't understand

why a man who assumed the administration

of the United States would want to bear

the guilt of someone else's mistakes.* 1/

This was not to be, however, for

aside from considerable

emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only

limited support for sabotage activities prior to the

* Raul

Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that

in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon

and General C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most

vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell

proposing air and naval protection for the invasion

and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the

beachhead. 2/

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end of Eisenhower's administration.

There was con-

siderable concern over the necessary formalities of

diplomacy in order that the United States not be in-

volved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS

for its anti-Castro program.

Because it has been so widely publicized that

ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the prin-

cipals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation, this

volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon

played into the proper context. It was the role of

an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch,

and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's

role be construed to have had a major impact on the

development of operational planning by the Central

Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort.

Similarly, because of the sensationalism which

surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on

Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,

including Fidel Castro and the implications that the Mafia

plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay

of Pigs Operation, thorough examination of the evidence

was undertaken to determine if

this allegation was sup-

portable. It was not. The Mafia operation was run

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aside from, apart from, and independent of

the formal

anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At

most, four or five senior officials - Allen Dulles;

Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards,

Bill Harvey, and pos-

sibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable

about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu.

In terms of Project JMATE itself, the few bits

of information which indicate the possibility of as-

sassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also

fail to demonstrate any responsibility for their ini-

tiation on the part of WH/4. If anything, the evidence

would indicate that WH/4's position was one of watchful

waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans

would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara.

The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons

might be involved in such an attempt cannot be ruled

out. 3/

Obviously it would be foolish to contend that

those principally responsible for developing CIA's

anti-Castro program would have objected to the assas-

sination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this

was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of

the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency:

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Appendix A

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence

from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

---

## Page 309

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIZD

INTERNAL

USE

• "YLY

RUUTING AND RECORD SACET

CONFIDENILAL

SECRST

...i

FROM:

Chiel, Westera demispoete Dirision

TO):

fOrteer resigration, room number, ano

buildingl

DATE

NO.

DAiS

12 DESERT 1959

COMMENTS (Nunder each comment lo shou trona minor

so whom.

"row e line across column 'afier each commeni.)

RECEIVED

OFFiCER'S

FORWARDED

pist priso

2.

3.

d.

•5

7.

?.

1:0.

Ti.

1 :2

i8.

'"!!

Phence se

EO:T:O.NS

SECRET

CONFIEROG

INTERNAL

[J UNCLASSIFIED

'==!

---

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-:

11 Decenses 1959

MEVORANLOM DOR: Direcios of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deprity Director (P1225)

SENECT:

Cribes Problems.

This pinoracm reguests approval by the Direstor be the recomin-

cations concated In paragrapa 3.

Lo Estimata Of the Situstion.

¿. A dictatorship oi the isr lait 1s nor established. I

is not only uniriendly to tae ualted sirtes in oral crlilalan, bot

has taien action against darlara properties, both industriai and

agricuitural, uhick, li permitied to stend, will ercinuings sinili

actions azalasi U.s. boidings in oteer Latin American commiries.

l We do dad just expect a rajor iccreasa 1y the scals saù

eitectireness of cubst aid and participation in cavolutionary

sotions againsi, other countries oi latin inerica nos =riendly to

tha Uniteil States. In analtion in tnose cast bays aiready been

Targuts -ilcaragua, Paruno, tue Donizicon Rupuollo saù faisi,

recont intelligence indicates a dicect interest by Castru in

Colombia and Paru. Batarcourt's position in Venezuela soul ie

pavely weekened by Caatro succeases, anù 1, 13 barioved caly a

quastion di line before an alliance rould be estaolished bebacen

the cowarful Commuist Party Of Veneziala and the Castros.

Papid nailocalizstion of the banks, industry and cormerce

1s reportedly contemulated. Il this occura, the smali arouy in

control will have at its disposttion several madred million dollars

Irou tine sale ai the sugar crop euly l= 1960. Part of shesa trails

may us used to further their ravolutionry objectives against ottes

cortales of the Caribbean and South Anèries.

a. Castro una lost the support di the voner class aad noist of

te middle class,

is arcbably still has a saificient loliovine tron

the masses in rainialn control until inther ibroadi can ba nada in

his popular suoport, unn the unpoaltion nore effectively unifiea.

Propagands sction is iance his follorics, valle easential,

1n a63el? will proosuly son be conch in dislodze ain. Mis approachits

suzanglecold on cuca m1li be brotan only by visiant action.

I. It is my persocal opinion trei il Castro 15 successiul in

consolidatiag his position sau remaining in pover for tro nor jesca,

207

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## Page 311

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-2-

lastiay davage may occur to the Gaiteà States' aLready vendead

poaltion oì leadership In Latia Amarie"

z. Los. Cojestire.

Toe overthroy of Castro within ose year, and his asplacerent by a

jurta triacaly to the United States wich viii cail cor elections cis

contas greer assuption oi oifice.

3o Reccamended Acton:

¿. Clandestine radio attacks iron Caribbean countries di the

Liberal gerous, working closely with us and using cuben antionals for

broadcastinz.

b. Intrasion operations against Castin's I and zadio, in

be santed from vitals Cube.

co The encouragement of pIo i.s. oaposition urs, eccasies

Estista and lasierrer aupporters, to establisa by force a controllai

area withl Cuba. Taig moulà bove the following sivratages:

(2) It souid pernit ine establismeat si a zaûio station,

long nara, vaice vola reach ell of the suzüions in Cuba.

Since it would be on cuben soil, the pricians os joint opera-

cinna with other countries told be elininated.

(2) A controiled area would be a rallying point 1o-

the growing opposition to Castro in the same manner that tae

25ch of July novement in lie hills of Oriente baceme the

rallylas poiut of leay woo tured azalast batista.

(3) It would be a masons of tasting the strengüh and. fibre

oi to oppoaltion, and separating be men iron the boys.

(4) The reporiadly Irige imzemented elevenis of the

constitational Cuban Ary vaud jare e gloce to 8o.

15, A sireable guerrilla invierent within Guos wouid

curtall Castro's plans for rerolutionary action agaiust

coker countries.

¿. Porougi consideration ba given to the eltmination o1 I1ãa1

Castio. lone di those closa to Tidal, such aa his brother deul

298

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-3-

or bis coucanion che Guevarms, naie the same bewerie 3a92al to

Èse nasses, Nany iniomted Jogle beliava taat tha dEdaucgimance

Di jidel vould (reatly accelerica the isli oi the preseat Govsrarent.

reKrna

Caser, 'este tenisohennlbatiion

CC: DDCI

leaur:

Deputy

cher 2 Vi.len

Siractor (Plaas)

me reccmendation /contalnad 1

paragrepà 3 isierorored

Director of denseri iniatllgenge

1÷ 016 1036

lzte

299

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## Page 313

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Appendix B

A Program of Covert Action

Against the Castro

Regime

16. Mar 60

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## Page 314

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EVES ONLY

SECRET

This document is our basic policy

paper. It was approved by the

President at a meeting in the

White House on 17 March 1960.

EVES ONLY

SECRET

300

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## Page 315

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SECRET

)

-

1ó March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring

about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true

interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S.

in such a manner

as to avoid any appearance of U.S, intervention. Essentially the method of

«ccomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct

action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort

that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative.

Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be

provoked by circumstances beyond controi of the U.S. before the covert action

program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it

out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to

act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of

action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing

and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared

as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba.

It is hoped

that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of

a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition

groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact.

The couscil will be encouraged to adopt as its slogar "Restore the

EYES ONLY

301 .~

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SECHET

**2

Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan,

and to address itself to the Cuban people as

an attractive political

alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet

for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various

opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA

controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of

popular support undermined, it is recessay to develop the means for

mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda

offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition.

The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and sort

wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.

The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supple-

mented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by

private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written

material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert

intelligence and action organization within Cuba waich will be respon-

sive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a.

network must have effective communication and be selectively manned:

to minimize the risk oi penetration. An effective organization can

probably be created within ó0 days. Its role will be io provide hard

EYES ONLY

302

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SECRET

intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration

of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal

propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals

and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of

an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms

for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on

the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after care-

ful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second

phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations

outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into

Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both

before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of

resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of

six months and probably closer to eight. "In the meanwhile, a limited

air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already

exists uader CLA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when

the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this

with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial

operation in another couatry.

3.

Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry

among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the

EYES ONI

REPRET

303

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SECRET

opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent,

non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence

of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various

parsonalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract,

control, and lead the several forces.. As the possibility of an overthrow of

Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S.

support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of

the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of thai entity

(insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however,

have to nave direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect

these, will nake use of a carefully screened group of Ü.S. businessmen with

a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They

will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the

directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will

be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the

cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources

to

support the opposition.

$100, 000 has already been piedged from U.S. sources.

At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floaied by the council (as an

obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2, 000, 000.

5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately $4, 400,000 of CIA funds

wiil be requized for the above progeam. On the assumption that it will not

EYES ONLV

• 304

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SECRET

• 5

reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated

requirements for EY-1960 funds is $900, 000 with the balance of $3, 500, 000

required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could,

of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingenies

which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6.

Recommendations:

That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized

to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for

this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5, from the Agency's Reserve for

contingencies.

EVES ANY

305

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SECRET

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups

(the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These

all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are

for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former Zoth of July

members--and are not identified with either Satista or Trujillo. They are

anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July

platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination

and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly

the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from

representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of

other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Couacil

but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable

poiats. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The

following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject

to strong Sino-Soviet influezce.

b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based

on free elections.

There is no hope of this

as long as Castro throttles

the rights of legitimate political paties

and the freedom of expression.

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SECRET 306

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## Page 321

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SECRET

2

c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual

ownership of the land must be put into effect.

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in

commerce and education must be eliminated.

e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.

A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine

and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above

platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

BIES ONLY

SECRET

307

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## Page 322

13-00000

Tab B

EYES ONLY

SECRET

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun.

Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private

individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have

been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts

(short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras

have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts

from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished suppori to these efforts

through encouragement, negotiating help ard providing some broadcast

material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at

least one "gray" U.S. -controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island

and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial

Dower. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these vill be

transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience

and as the operation progresses, it may be dasirable to supplement the Swan

Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all

parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility

mighi be installed on a U.S, base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be

made o a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from

Florida.

SECRET

308

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SECRET

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is plannea

for the future. Avance,

a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been

confiscated as has El Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario de la Marina,

one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana,

is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already

been rade to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba

clandesticely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As

other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions

will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CLA-controlled action group is producing and distributing

anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact wit

groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for

clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They

will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be

to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western

Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as

will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American

travel.

EVES ONLY

SEGRET 309

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SECRET

Tab C

FINANCIAL ANNEX

I.

Political Action

Support of Opposition Elements

and other Group Activities

FY-1960

150, 000

FX-1961

800, 000

I. Propaganda

Radio Operations and Programming

(including establishment of trans-

mitters)

Press and Publications

400, 000

100, 000

700, 000

500, 000

ilI. Paramilitary

In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air

Support Material and Training

IV. Intelligence Collection

Totals

200,000

50, 000

#900,000

1,300, 000

200, 000

3, 500, 000

These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not

occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies

over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action crogram should be

accelerated, additional funds will be required.

31n

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## Page 325

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Appendix C-1

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:*

1)

Letter for Allen Dulles

from Arleigh Burke,

17 Mar 60

---

## Page 326

13-00000

•1 UNCLASSITIEDI...

LI USEL

81884800870

ROUTINEND GECK RO ENEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)

:3OM:

Lt irom danical üir:

"r.

DD/P

¡O: (Officer designation, room number, and

surtaing)

1.

C/WH Division

2.

3.

s.

c/W/ 4

5.

RECEIV:O

DATE

(ADAWARDED

OFFICERS

1NIT1S15

1o diaren ley

COMMENTS !Number easi comment lo shan from whom

to whon.

Doris a line ucross columa utter eoch commeni.)

gee

1. Admiral Burka sent this

aver is the Disector on the

aitarnoon of 17 March and tha

latter handed to me. I do not

believe it requires a reply

jut pass it to you for any

value it may have.

RM3jr.

Sales head Chare

3.

CWH Cuba Fil

311

510

570067.

ryl!

1: 9161a8616169

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## Page 327

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10-41361

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS........._.

TOP SESSI

PERSONAL - TOP SECRET

17 March 1960

Dear Allen:

Enclosed is a memorandur my staff pre-

pared containing some suggastions which might be

useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not

agree with quite all the comments contained in the

memorandum, but I know that you will forgive

the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure

no opportunity is left uncovered.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable

Allen Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

PERSSTAL - TOP SECRET

312

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## Page 328

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Appendix C-2

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

2) Letter for Gordon Gray

from

Arleigh Burke,

16 Mar 60

2\

p. 21

313

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## Page 329

13-00000

.....

-CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

TOP. SECRET

15 March 1950

Daai Gordon:

Enclosre is a copy oi

achorandu on t.s. action in

Cuba which may be of interest

to jou.

Sincerely your's,

The Honorable

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

The White Rouse

Enclosure

-..

TOP

314

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## Page 330

13:00000

timenand

05-103D/300

16 Mer 1950

0-02

2ha029

tic:

Np-u3e

U.S. iction in üuba (5)

1, The recon ondatiois coniained in lic papor on "j.s. Actions in Cuba" were

intended ori inally to provide tic hroad outlire for a carcfully laic out

piura: for causing the astro regim to be replaced by a friendly overment.

It has interic tai state would lo ically control and coordinaie allapects

and provide the quidance as to the specific actions required of tic otror

departents of tis governrent. The paper was not interpreted in this namer

by those no received it and the scarci: appcars ron to be for specific actions

whic cun üe mcd to accomplish the end dosirca.

2... 1e istlo:int are ofierea as possible specific actions wiich can be taken

in support of our positior on Cuba - You might desiro to have 00 inject

these iics into the lsh rceting, l6 sarch.

IACE - Choirnan, or the Chief of the j.S. Delgation, attempt to have

a ¿clogation othor than U.S. introduce a rotion

for the board to consider tre

cap in henispicric defense resulting fros the Cuban situation or for the

Board to rocommend that the vas study the incluence oî Komunise in Cuba..

t, Copercial - Dil companies are not being paid by Cuba. State could

roquest ine oil companies to point out to the governments sho produce the

oil the eifcois on incir economies of thic loss of the Cuban variet.

c. Schools and Far Colleyes - Tie Services could include in courses for

foreign officers the afrect on hemisphere defenso of the establishrent of a

sonist dictatorshin in Cuba.

¿. Commercial - Do latin Aucricans hold stock in the expraprialed properties

in Cuba? Il so,

Staie could request the companies concerned to include in

their dividend mailings, infomation pointing out the effect on the companies'

-earnings and the stockholders' dividends of expropriation of property without

corpensation and, for the oil conpanies, non-payuent for oil relivered.

c. State

in conjunction with CIA, puolish a icekly or bi-ncekly letter

cocurienting

tric actions of the Castro Covemient for tàe previous perica.

Included would be:

(1) Violations of human rights.

(2) Kummist tronos and actions.

(3) Dictatorial and undezocratic actions.

.*.

raair 2. nil entirs

::::

Pare 1 of 3 copies

315

JOP SET

TOP SECKET

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## Page 331

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id. Jenn

ilji: u3. diplomtic posts.

tary on tur force for surthor distribution to units or

officers in cuntact with latin aericans.

For idd a ialking points to:

(1) Biscredit do Castro reino.

(2)

Build support for tir J.s. position.

(3) Alert latin acricano as to tue jonnunict assocts.

is rest tonise specta.

í. 13l Geraigne - Ironare and distributr spcech ratorial suitable for

irclusion in variois iypos of addresses. Maierial shouli cover:

(2) 20-aunistic aspects of proseat Cuban Covernment.

(2)

Treat of konnunion in Cuns to remisphoric defense.

(3) The dictaioria), aspecis of tro Cuban rejino.

(4) The Cubar: roguic's actions against the basic humn rights.

(5)

Tic stratogic importunce of tre Guantanano raval base.

(ó) The

logic of lie firnness of the treaties by which we bold

Cuantanano aid the forcal concitrent oi the Castro regine on taking power

to honor Cuba's international comitients.

Distribute this natorial to the services and to theii Leagues und

Associations for raxinus we in jublic specches.

Lo ITB - kavo ereral Skacr, as Direcior of the Staïf, LDB, inject

into the mont: ly intelligence briefings at the luB inforation on the latest

Soviet Bloc actions and the progress of International Kousunisa in Cuba.

h. State, in confunction with CI. and the Service intelligence agencies,

hold speciai üricfinis ace each month on the general situition in Cuba mith

special emphasis on the komunistic aspects for the folloing:

(1) U.S. officials of the Dis and üN.

(2) J.S, personnel of the Staii of the inib.

(3) Orficial .s. personnel in lashington having cuties involving

close contact witl: ratin Avericans.

1. ill sorrices provide sascial briefings on a onc-tie basis alorg the

Line of hi, abova for officers and enlisted persomol of units proceding to

Caribusan or South Accrican ports.

j. davy endeavor to haic a good reporter or authos prepara a story con-

tainis the rary's vicus on Guantanano for publication in a national magazine

vitr. side circilation in Latin Aierica.

Page 2 or 3 pages

TOP SECREE

177 : 9.0100:o

316

i1.

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## Page 332

13-00000

T0F SCAT

in his letter of marca 1u

to icical curio di a coroloto brielin oi State invartient activities

vis a vis the Cuba: siination in an cffort to prod State to nove fastor.

1. State - ries all individuals and, roups of us. rationals coin: to

lutin irrica on the commist treat in Cuia for lurther disconinution to

bost cuuntry personnel.

Very respoctfully,

J. I. POND, Jhi.

317

Pagè 3 of 3 pages

TOP SPASTR

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Appendix C-3

CNO Correspondence with Department of State

and NSC:

3) Memorandum for the Special

Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,

sub: US Policy toward Cuba

---

## Page 334

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY CF DEFENSE

LASHINGTON 25. D.C.

tain 1 6 1960

INTERNATIONÁL SECURITY AFFALIS

MEMORANDUM FOR TLE SPECIAL ISSISTAL TO THE PRESIDES

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy towara Cuba

Enclosed 1s en exchango of letters ou too above

subject between Adniral Purko and Tadur Sucratury Murchant, botia

of whos bave authorized that I saka the corraspondence availablo

to you for whatever kolp it say be is connoculon with the dis-

cussion of this subject at tho Council nasting this coming

Thursday.

Hain sistian

Deputy asslatant Secretary

2

• Decls

A/s

318

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## Page 335

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SECRET

I sad cash laterantad in your paradial loctor of february as,

1950, an Cuor Led tsa Cartboses altuatica, la nich I ratod a scrid

dares of siallerity la the sugreatloro of the lauy and as cur peoplo

his concomino tha raci to somedo the trend la Cuss cad tha meroes

unica ars boat calculated to conlovo this result.

AL jOU DIE COLDLIIDO PLATO 1101 tRE DE CALE UNICA DIEN MESOTTOS

101 dave l Jolat ChloIS a Stutt a Jenuary a, 1960, EssE of tas

euroc of actina sunfasted in ta sagastries toadsd "Roscandarions

for U.S. Actiono in Cuss," nich you treasaitred sith your lotter,

coso inftlarad soos thes ago sal era constantly being literasilos.

rampitalado, a cza thinking on tia Cuber situtica so it solatas

to cosmica dad car oa decurity inicrodro loo beca so follonas

a. Ths carlam ablecting a Intercational Casuale

In tha leadiato Titure-lo una consolIdatica of a radical,

TALIOAESIICON REVALLIION ITLEAdLY tO UNB LOSK In CUOR End USe

uLllisation al Cuba as a bose to prOsote Blellar retoletlorry

corsistro in les Caribbean.

To minima co activo or ta

to sets to United stoos poy as higa frica do fusible tor

ths allairation at the undspirablo tonturas of the Citas

Revolution. In particular, the Coumulato atond to gala by

proveting us laio asued interranties, os otberulas torino

Interventionise cotions in violation of cor cosistenato 1s

a emer trich could be nada to agpaco as 1l tsa Valtod Statos

ractod ths ears may es the Sorlors Old In Hungary ood olhas

antoilitas.

Do Ualesa

Adairal Arlass Basks,

Chiel of Heral Operations,

Defartragt of to lavy.

SECRET

ISMA&0) FILE COPY

319

112988/60

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## Page 336

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SciT ET

-2-

D. Unlaso no vese inderinitely to occupy cusc cilitazily,

tis caly soluisaa to the Cubin prablea 19 secasacaily tha

tasesadag las couresy along lines sosoplablo is tho Cuban

sople ced along lias conclatent vith basle U. S. polley

UE opcE lo LIlis Agerios.. This olll tais t1ea.

ELECA diDa U.S. corea er olasI orore inicsuerica aula

1cag perulvo aus villarial. An le otros, desito cas 0s

Longentradia alagivincs comering Castro, sE 10 Fa Inascep

si caly la cua but clocasto in the baloptaso, taludiao.

La eta Vastad Statoccos, so a lestar estera, ln 12920201b1a

wouitaly, hão sasona frogres cilil enjoy vozy comasderablo

Catito, Lavo you do fina en allarrailue lectoresip Esch try

amorallo esa cord cot coteblich a cratie gorozraãt.

comolidos sea shar alent be esopiablo to coco aso

segâning to orgaito soo cigcatavaly bas, di booz, se vill

d. Tho paltasy ebjativa al U. 3. Lodley diaria lo tao

COONICSELOA DI EDO GICOISCA dI EA CISCANTO, INSTIOLIO ENTO

cast irlesaly to the tnlir sisto vitsin toro and cont

ES lO CRESTO, IDOLE dE ES ENS Cale tO do D0, u Olicata La

ENI tO CIDODE CE SUMATO LIL COLIODOSSESOS lE RESTE OffOZCO

lo dEslous polillaal en comalo augios los cEta by rolleg

so todasana, ue gave en sustantion al usa evoni cocivicios

SE ELtiE 081011IC10 d0 TE TOT

CE Eus benlapera da Cuales Cocota 0l Esa Citica probica.

320

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## Page 337

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SECRET

lifeseir is segmaible los political and casuarie dotariona

ad lat the lenited grad suits then COlosso pollica 19

¡00RC0JSB1C IDE CEDRIS GISSIGULEION

Do diy cadas sons sacacalo attor by tha Faired Slico do

so lose sign es me erlijon! luit liit na solvisa vill to

do ROMEliCO tO sea the Camalat un Caner superto el lia

Escany setbasily to elter sigas quores da les readeral

talegal sad ts tara developed and asg faiting ista asicas

porgetos.

USES

321

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## Page 338

13-00000

Elza SenIE dO C38 Rico Daleso, a El Egatini alarm 1y 6l0s.

lávi leadinga do cangi cad to commies calcativaly los cablua. ?des

Else, dá 28a pulag to have, ue ballete, to esentles restralst fica

Eler say bo drairabis do a enors of encouraging ta aitrenatit Cuss

Artiala 53 es sho la Charter even li ve angual that any sotton taisen

ty tAs dis coratituted caly recossadition" to pussuerto. Mule

80210005018100 that setion in thO CS-let t tO trioR LeT

Me Cartor sy carratias a catting el Fostign Flalotor, es 0ell as

pallores at tha rigid sonust sattor tsan is a coms or guarustlalag

ua have estad to bo sculoudica sol tie la Cesaa Governcan to

yor aboradare the 6206, 1l wild to dillious in a shert lls le

paranda less tall-nasad trans sun o politial irrita

¿lent el dies are mies Erderational Conscalat matioi e

Manor: yes

-

322

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## Page 339

13-00000

Saatà you again fos delirg ci a dry of juar paoraãea.

40 559

KaTg, CO Ii 15 LOsplrg tRs CuUsa probles Uatco CorTicat DrutiÃT,

hasing dicoiçad le da cors dalall at lto demosy l4 estiiag ca1 cgala

Sile cisaig. Ht tho siest of tha sactings, the Soutetary o1 Stalo

merliles ehe tolley toresá cuta tècia hal boer erprovea by trs pradideã,

Elt tla CareLa dE MU1S SOSliT'O DOZEIãA mo trsL thio polLay is

eoosliell+ 50555060

Ee ealielparo GheR, de futura sestinga os Ebo Dot,

Risso till bo furgios diacusilano cancesnitig Clca to ttesairo 42s980s

thuse sicild de o sodllicocioa aí folloy felara that couriro. la viou

c tùo tal that taduyls li aresing Iadieated Casirasd +pue0st E

so ralidlty al lha paidey dsccusacd la Januety, dt cruld tmzaae

ImEEssUSS lO dsNilOD nes pliGy dsGsittiCa El thia tles, copoodally

E lãE Me posalS li joi Essy sucocasdla chusciy panallul Iolicios Ldes

Era aistãd eesaay. Shaula you, os jour collocgio ca tra jofat Chieso,

dapfIC a furtss bilesiny ca uu sltiera and epcoational pions to erzy

OÓ EE IO1ICH, 1 SEE DO ROTO 40T ALEA t ETRIZO iE.

Basecasty,

Lérángatos?. Berabeas

CCEr SOTOLY fOS POiLliaNL AISaiTI

323

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## Page 340

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26 FEB 1960

SECRET

Fear Livies

I am becanirg increasingly cunscinod over actericrating con-

citions in the Caribbcano I si capiciaily corcoined over tire

present situation in Can, in lose security the divy is dircctly

inierested by resson of tis island's strateric location vith

respect ia t'a ses appruaches to the southern nited States and

the ramina Gaml, and beccuse ci tio location there of the Cuar

teraco daval land. Cila ampous to de in the process of falling

unior the corination ci intomutional scianisno Should this trero

continue motocked aid a co-aurice douincued or "ironi roverient»

bacose a rocliu, l direco shocat to bia security of tro talüca

States mould bo presentudo idditicaaliú, a co:runist controlled

state in tuba vosid serve is a base oi ogerauicrs for tie further

spread of commistic in luence is ine estera femisphere having

as its aim the isolation oi the üniued States froa lutin faerica.

eccause of my concern, I ei taking tie liberty of sandira you

the attached paper as irdicative of curent lavy thircing in this

mattor, - naucly that positive action to reverse the preseat tread

siould be initiated to ino eri thai the communist threat is clini-

nated and a stable, triendly soverent establissed in cuba.

action tases ron in tho case oi Guca vill also iscilitaio and pro

vide a fomiation for ary sinilar actions which may be necessary to

prevent the spread of comunisa in latia fuerica and to stabilive

other arcas where acrest is appearing.

I am also serding a copy of this letter aml the enclosure to

jack Irrin.

Sincerely,

ARLISE BURKE

Too lonrable Livingston To Licrehani

New State Departont suilding

Rashington 25, Do Go

raclosuro: Paper on tos. notice ia Cuaa

copy to;

úTo do lo Irvin II, (0S0/ISa) =/esclosura

324

FEASONAL

SIST

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## Page 341

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¿.??

1. 30D C110%

1, to castro dominot in cuba is a vondels ly mich international coicnisa

appery do ba cuinii. a lostiola in tre icatert inisgera. li the present

mim Galling, lt 11al soon be too lair lor tiz inited states to sien

te Sovict

incursion into this imrisphere.

This situation, in its zany

racificitions, grosents an incante throat to thc security at tis üritod

Slates and to tat of did inortant sotgtb0re in fort! and Jout! itorica.

12122

2. vet sotio: con la valion to mavent tre cotablishment of a communist

sinto in Cuba and to restore a stable, friendly jovermont?

3o is i. 9. las aires rancancoa the toroc Doctrine. This sas maffireà

i; icerotary of itato bulles in his accrass to the lation on July 12, 105h,

an Internatical Connunion in Suitcala, In Tot address, i. Dillics

"For several jeers internatioral commurism has boca probing hera

and tiere for rastin; places in tie Aericas. It finally chose

Guateula as a spot thich it could turn into an official base

fran wrich to brecd

subversion which would extend to other

haerican Repunlics."

"This intrusion of Soviet despotisu was, of course, a direct

challerge to our lionroe Loctrire, the first and nost funda-

nental of our foreiin policies."

The irited states is bound by treaties which comit it to seek settle-

Int o1 renesparric disputes by peacciul scans, buù nrich also provice for

actior: in tho event of aggression cither Iron outside the herisptere or

si thin.

ärticle 5 of the Inter-cerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

sigied at iio de Jarciro,

1947, requires each contracting party to senc

to the securt coincid of tre ta complete iniomation "concerning tie

actititics undertaken ...

for the purpose of saintaining Inter-inerican

peace and security."

Article ó of this treaty states:

"If tie inviolability or the intogrity of the territory or tue

sovercisnty or folitical independerce of any luciácan State stio.=:

so airecteù ly an auression mich is not an assed attace ... in

vy any other suct or sitsation that light endanger the jace of

Licrica, tho irgun of consultation shall soct imediately in

Page 1

325

Jesteril

11

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## Page 342

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1..

order to agros an on. the crasures wich shoald be taken for the

cotion delunso and for tie ininiciance ci tie poace as security

of t'a Continoat."

Tuc icclaration adopted by the Tents Inter-ierican Coniorence at

Caracas, Voiciuela, Zarch 1ä5k, states:

"That the coviration or conirol oî the political institutions

of aiy torical State of tie international cominist soverent,

extemira to tuis berinaero tre golitical sysicr ol an extrâ-

cortinental pcici, tole constitute a tircat to tie sovercignty

ara political lidspanicaco of tha Mirican States, endangering

the poace ai micrica, and could call for tre icetiri of condultation

to asicer tre adoption oi appropriate action in accordanes vita

cristing treaties."

The 2oth si July ore-ent succcoded in cisplacing Batista on 1 jan 1959.

Since that tino the Castro regi-e las follo:ca increasingly tie classic

strators for establishing a connist state.

ie conunist time table is

delineatca in Moricon inbassy Lavana Dispatch io, 303 datea 29 Lecerber

1959.

üs ruthless elinination of the opposition, assuption of dictatorial

DoTE, suspeasion of clection, the "jate Morica" camaign, the studica

ircaiuo of the cooty and confiscation oi proverty, the initiation of

rolatio: an 1raio with tie soviet inion, iro ioroiddirt of anti-commist

activity und the broadown and reconstitution of tie irued Sorvices and

police are ali typica comurist marcavors.

Ine rajority of the Cubars aro rot jet convitted to the acceptance of

continisa por are they anare of the treid of the Revolution in this cirection.

Ano Icer classes, korever, continue to Live full support to Castro and the

Rovolution.

It has not yet been proved that Castro limeli is a cosmnist, liorever,

some o1 his principal acputies as sell as other leacers are believed to to

comaurists.

In my case, injividuals susceptible to corzunist Influence are

occuoyiri roy positions in the covermen as sell as in all important organ

isaiiora and traco unium. Tis devaloments are noticeable. Communists

posizions.

tidion concurists in ice zoth of July Kovement

aro taking

positions in seemini opposition to the opes corsurists.

At prasent the Cuban dred torces are disorjarized aid apparently capable

only o1 aperrilla variare.

Intolligence raports indicate that the Sovici

Eloc say be supaljin technicians to

assist in training, the ren forces ard

subelging and to the ren governent. There is no preseat indication that

¿o fall of the Castro tovernont is iminant.

I it sbould fall, horever,

te covernieni sould sost probaoly energe as a cosmunist joverment becauso

Page 2

326

STORET

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## Page 343

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op unition laura tara been diahaied and tiere appear do is no Icaders of

stature itali

sown man miti-üastro/anti-Coratist reoples could rally.

Shod. Casiro lad us in assussirated, to action wide: mould probanly

sult nold jropardiso dio sarcty of lucricans in cuis. Finaliy, in the

ret cattai, the roscibilit, of circad saipor for Cuba by tho Suvict

aloc, ever to thin eatent of an open mutual scourity agreciat, cannot ic

4a. Torce basic curses di action are o on to the laS.

no saltilatora •ciion torouga dro 9.2.

b. jilüteral vert rotion by treü. s.

Co Covert inilateral iction by tun u.s.

All subsidiary ectios, such as ecoronic pressure and coral siacion,

wich ill aucist in achivvir tie objective should aiso be taica in accition

to the aboic.

The rachiner; exists ir the declaration end agrecconts of the vis

for the j.S. to roguest

convocatio, of tre urgan of Consillation of the

Dis itt, sulsequent investigation of the covernment in Cuba, and, if

aparoval of the manher states is obtaired, intorvertion to prevent a

Communist takc-over.

(1) savantares:

(a) It could be in consorance vita our national policy ard

our treaty comitreuts under the 0Aã.

(b) It would strangthen the üis and tould reassure the free

forld and the iatia Aerican States of J. S. millingnuss to live ip to

cozitrents.

(2) lisadvantares:

(a) üncertainty of support for dis action by other Latin

American tates.

(b) Delay in lis action could result in a communist controlled

front covernient being a "fait accompli" in Cuba.

(c) Could result in the entire probion endiss in the Security

Page 3

Battisini

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## Page 344

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coucil oi the in sacre tie posiet univa las a veto.

D. 2LC0L&D0MSLIXX86.

the l. so lan tin caciality to seize cuba by direct military

actio:, arc after a consolidation period, cause the establishnent of a

friendlj, so=-cozulunic: coveraert.

(I) Arrantages:

(a) It toali be in coucorance with the lonroe Ioctrice,

wich is still rasic i j. policy sith raspect to the icstern lewisphere,

aid could solve tie problen.

(b) It sould sora notice to tie "orld trot the u.s. vill

not tolerate tho estallicront of a commist or comunist "front" regime

in the restom lenisprare.

(c) It tile re-caplacice to tic torld that the ü. 5. will not

lositato to ict tien its security iù atrotako.

(d). It soule dispel ary illusions by the rorid at lorgo trat

the j.S. is millin, sui able to act a0 tütter that the provocation.

It could also procably stop tre "baiting of tre ü.s." in which sonG tinor

porers throughout the zorld indulge.

(2) Visadvanta: es:

(a) It rould violate our dis comitaents to sock settlerant

by peaceful neans.

(b) It rould lead to charges oi augression against tie U.S.,

both in the dis and in the United racions, with the resulting possivility

oi di and cas action ajainst tac J.s.

(c) It sould provo tist tha y.S. Is not milline to abide by

its treaties if ü. S. intorosus dictate otherise.

(a) It coillü isulate tim U.S. fron the other Mierican States.

(e) It sould violate the principle oi son-intervention.

C. COVETE INILATIRAL ACTION DE DUE V.S.

The to so couln assist rebel sour covertly to overtaron tie

missant coverwent and reestablish a friandly coverint. Corcercatly,

¡i cord take all possible spasures to alcit all fricholy nations anà tie

15, people and branches of the 1. 5. Governonü to iho danger in the tireat

Page 4

1370:

SEchat

328

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wrl opinion io tre side si lie ü.s.

Ya, j. do mia not be charged mila sucression.

(ü) Ii carried un successfully, iroc forld aid latin diciican

abimion ruudi il favorable du tie s

(2) Lisserenta. 25:

da) Moro io mo acrtaint; of sucress.

(ü) ine effort might seil come too lalo.

In considerin and costario die abovo courses si action, the basio

essuption liai tho mdted states cinot and must not purut nithla the

osiorn anis pur: tie estcblisiment of any covurasa coninatedur the

International Cornaistois Fariscurt.

inerefore, if othor courses of

action fail, the ü. d. nüü, sisa in tro fuce of advarse curle opiaion,

¿als arilaloral iction io provint suel as occurrerce.

¿ntil tiE JilLation rescien t'C stago vrore direct unilatcral action

by the du, is tus only maus isit, it apocais tiat a concination of those

FortS DI COurIES DICtion A aid C MiCh LUE & iLir Che:CO of s:ccess

should la fullorcd la arder to cuilize tha prisa edvantage divon under h,

1.=., the cooscration and cood will oi the ottor Arerican States.

5. pho followin conclusions are rasciod:

a. Ise csiablistauri of a concucist goverment, or a "frunt" coverment

follorini cannist Erecepte, la Cuba tould de a druct thruat to the •

security of täc j. d. anc muld aidanger hoaisporic security.

¿. The ê. So saoula initiie positivo action 1u elinirate the thrcat

before a diamiat co "fron'" jovorzucat in cuba is a "Iait accompli."

co 1h0nn the zorolitior suill bas tus support of the nauses, the

resultino joverment la cuba la follonins the path of internationai

coranien. Atout they ara noi yot anare of tle trand toard communism,

Castro has tie personal jojalty oi tie sasses.

co abricai solin aro ciri wiliscated. mericas lives ruy to

enGagereu il stable, resporatole covernäual is not ersurec.

e. Era auros Doctrine is sifli basic i. s. policy with respect to thi

restera ienisphero.

Pajo 5

SF.CHET

329

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i. Mucouro cosis wier to loclaration uf Caraecs to rogurst action

Dj to un excurat a Cocamist treat to icrispieric socurity.

¿. Tho to do studld proceed to docuant the extest of infiltration of

commuis inin joy posiêion in Disa id tie extont of extra-lestorn

aispinto contanist support of the prosent Cuban rogire.

to ta to so siculo intlate a camula to apprise all l. s. agencies,

to :. 3o public, and the other arcrican states of the threat in order to

jai: supact dos zoy future astion diat may he taken.

1, The j. so should cuertly sapport the Cular opposition.

do cel. do, after laving cried the required support, should preseat

its case refore die d's in order that joint action by the tombers of tie

dis ray d: tame to eli duste the corenist trueat airl cotaulish a friendly,

stable overconi in Cuba.

as a last resort, shouid take unilatoral ailitary action

to clinime the threat.

RECES ENDAG IONS

6. To accurplish the above, tre follosini plan si action is reconsezied:

a. Immediately accurent ibe coxurist tim table ara the communist

ta'it-over in Cuba.

b. lse all rosources and redia to la're the j.s. and the other Azerican

states aware of the threat. The followire srould be utilized to accomplish

tis:

(1) Irtelligence briefings of:

(a)ü. S. Goramment officials.

(b) Rewspaper representatives and caitors.

(c) U.S. businessuen operatirE abroad and goint abroad.

(a) The WinS nonbars and latin imprican diplomatic persomel

and nilitary attachas..

(e) Bc Catholic Church (possibly through the Apostolic Pelegate).

(1) Church groups operating in Latin Sterica.

(E) latin hierican officials visiting tha U.S. and J.S.

installations.

Paje 6

330

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## Page 347

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.:.

(2) uricatation ci racio broadcasis aid mus reports, doth corer-

12) cio to do Inforaidon Sorvice.

(a) all country tea.

c. Covertly sumi the cuban opposition. seluct aar groon trusted

susana dù soprugristo to assia reaponsible posto in a friciuly covermont.

d. Eo praguruá do me fores to suregard and dracuate to a. lationale

should tho situation deteriorate 1o the point tiers dicy are eidargored.

(2) ase= 100 actica to call on Cula to place herself mier dis

suspices lin prior to presento the revolutio for the people aud rcuent

communist take-oyer, " and;

(2) Joci Uni action to intervune by force in tie evaut tlic above

farle, and;

e) In untever joint aroug is forred to accomplish the a'ove, «cep

i s, participation to a ninian in order to force the latin serican

states iu assime their resporibilitios to the lonisphere and to coünter

accasations of U.S. inperialier.

1o. In the event tire dues not permit completion of the above, or as a

last 20s0rt, be projaica to tale milateral silitary action to establish

a non-consanist goverment in Cuba.

-..

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Appendix D

Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) -

Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60

pill

41

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## Page 349

13-00000

EYES

ONLY

SE

CRE T

COPY

2 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action

SUBJECT

: Liaison with United States' Agencies on JMARC Activities

1. This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director

(Plans) - Action.

2.

The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States'

Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made

on a regular basis, such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of

State, and to offices which, we must contaçt quite frequently to solicit their

support, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of

the Executive Branch including:

a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon's military

assistant.

b. NSC 5412 Representatives.

c. Certain United States' Senators and Representatives, particularly

Senator George Smathers of Florida.

4. In the early stages of JMARC we had almost daily contact with Rear

Admiral S. B. Renkin, USN, who was the action officer on the movement of two

radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island.

5. Through Raymond Millard (Mallard?], the Agency is in close touch with

CINCLANT at Norfolk.

Robert Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, has briefed selected

senior officers on JMARC 4.

Mr. Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for

the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for

Cuba..

J. D. ESTERLINE

Chief, WH/4

Attachment:

Chart mentioned in paragraph 2:

SECRET

EYES ONLY

337.

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## Page 350

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OFFICE

Office Inter-American Affairs (ARA)

(Mr. Rubottom)

Cuba Working Group (State, USIA)

(Chaired by Ambassador Mallory)

Consular & Security Affairs

(Mr. John Haynes)

Office of Intelligence & Research

(Ambassador J. Lampton Berry)

Inter-departmental Defector Committee

Latin America. Task Force

(Chaired by John H111 (ARA)

Office of Special Operations

(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)

Office of Special Operations

(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)

Collateral Support Section, -

Office of Naval Intelligence

(Cdr. Frank Day, USN)

Operations Branch, Collection

Division, ACSI (Army)

(Col. Stewart McKinney)

SECRET

EYES

ONLY

NATURE OF DISCUSSION

STATE DEPARTMENT

Policy

Overt Programs

Passports for Aliens

"Talent" Matters

Cuban "Defectors'

Program Coordination

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Defense Support

Briefing

Cover

Cover

SECR

EYES

E T

N

L Y

CIA REPRESENTATIVE

Col. J. C. King

Robert Whedbee

Mr. Pennington (OS)

E. A. Stanulis

Robert Whedbee

Paul E. Oberst

COPY

FREQUENCY

Weekly

Daily

As required

As required

As required

Weekly

E. A. Stanulis

Robert Young (CC)

J. D. Esterline

Robert Young (CC)

As required

Weekly

As Required

Robert Young (CC)

As required

Continued

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## Page 351

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COPY

OFFICE

SECRET

EYES ONLY

NATURE OF DISCUSSION

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Coordination

CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY

Director, Voice of America

(Henry Loomis)

David A. Phillips Weekly

Office

of the Director

(Mr. Hennessey)

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

U: S. Entry of Cubans

Mr. Pennington (OS) As required

334

Y

E

S

ONLY

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## Page 352

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Appendix E

Attack on Petroleum Refinery at

Santiago de Cuba

13-14 March 1961

---

## Page 353

13-00000

50,31810

=iawAreRs

"T."

14 MiR 61

SEi-

LIR1I

BELL. 15'

00/c, COO, ADDP/A, Wil 3, O0 6u

BEld -iC

MAR 14 0720z 81

• OPERATIDRLAL IMESINTE

IN 3307

"H BILL KOLA MAUE CITE RAS

IZIP, TASDAR CORMO

FOLLOLI.E REGEJYED FROMG BARBAI.. .

+T 14563828

NR4 14565OZ

2ng в

RE TOUR MSS ANBER 49. CLDICIC SEND

DEBARKED 130045R MARCHANC

ANEP PAST, SEVERAL

CAYO RATONO

MISLAND COVEI 5O

ETHE BRUSHE ANDY TRCES.

JITHOUT DI STURETA

accleAvis do

JLAND NEAR SEF INCRYVEN

C STOrN

TiWr.

OUT

258

UUNERY FOR CLEANA

CHA IHE

MTAiTS

"IN

a ctin

208 ROUNDS

13 CAUSING B

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ONIDER

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durrivce

CUT POF IERY

WOSICNS

GATYAL MARSTOR

MYY DOMA

GIZaa

WAS DROPPED- INTU WATER.

SKOTORS DN

---

## Page 354

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GHASSIZED NESSAGE GI

33÷3

PACE

UAT. AJIT BUT RESTARTED IN FEW MINUTES. AT HASOR ENTPANCE AT

AST

POPI CALLERES ANO

ARO MILIMETER ENGAGED US PLUS PLENTY SALI

::SAID 'ONE STRONG SEARCHLIGHT. LEFT SEARCHLIGHT POINTING

OHTY INTO SLATER AND SILENCED 2Ó MILLIMETER SUT JE'S FOLLONEO

ACUR OÚT TO SEA WHERE BARSARA L MAÑE FINE PICK ÜP SIGHT OIN

AT IOS O

DEL COrLETED AT 1384805.*

[Tune Screwed up?)

see pie li

2

AT NO TIME DID TEACUE FISCAT AIN EXCEPT THOSE DEXIOUSLY

AMING ABOUT PREVENTINGETE ACUR'S DEPARTURES:

BAGUPA COOLEST/SEE

"CAC:CH "'DATE. SUGGEST FOUR OF

LATERIAL AND HOS COLD USE THEM IN PRECTAVASION

TED AROUND THEM

END OFAMESSAG

336

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## Page 355

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Appendix F

Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum

on Meeting with Fidel Castro,

19 April 1959

---

## Page 356

13-00000

RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

July 27, 1979

am enclosing

of the summary

of my conversation with fidel Castro

In 1959, as you requested in your

letter of July 19th.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer

CIA Historian

Washington, D.C. 20505

enclosure, 4 pages

337

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## Page 357

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COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

"COPY

COPY

April 19, 1959

Summary of conversation between The Vice President and

Fidel Castro:

When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed

somewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he had

not done as well on "Meet the Press" as he had hoped. He

was particularly concerned about whether he might have irri-

tated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard

to him.

I reassured him at the beginning of the conversa-

tion that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult pro-

grams a public official could go on and that he had done ex-.

tremely well - particularly having in mind the fact that he

had the courage to go on in English rather than to speak

through a translator.

The subjects

we discussed were no different from

those on which he had made public statements on several

other occasions.

A brief summary, however, might be of in-

terest, particularly in view of the comments I made with re-

gard to the positions he took.

I suggested at the outset that while I understood some

reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to

have elections it would nevertheless be much better from his

viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it

would be aslong as four years before elections would be held.

I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having

elections at the earliest possible date and that four years

would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before

elections were scheduled. He went into considerable detail

as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not hola-

ing elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did

not want elections because the elections in the past had pro-

duced bad government."

He used the same argument that he was simply reflect-

ing the will of the people in justifying the executions of war

criminals andhis overruling the acquittal of Batista's avia-

tors.

In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that

it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people

COPY

COPY

COPY

338

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## Page 358

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COPY

COPY

COPY

-2-

whatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It

was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United

States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get

a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan

but to win support for his policies from American public

opinion. "

It was this almost slavish subservience to prevail-

ing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than

his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of

understanding of even the most elementary economic principles

which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader

he might eventually turn out to be.

That is the reason why

I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he

had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the respon-

sibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion

but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to

give the people what they think they want at a time of emo

tional stress but to make them want what they ought to have.

I pointed at that it might be very possible that the people

of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections

and representative government were concerned but that this

placed an even greater responsibility. on him to see that

elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby

to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes.

Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictator-

ship against which he and his followers had fought so gal-

lantly•

I used the same argument with regard to freedom of

the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial

court, judge and jury, and on other issues which came up

during the course of

the conversation. In every instance he

justified his departure from democratic principles on the

ground that he was

following the will of the people.

I, in

my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we be-

lieve in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and

that there are certain individual rights which a majority

should never have the power to destroy.

I frankly doubt that I made too much impression

upon him but he did listen and appeared to be somewhat recep

I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms

of how this place in history would be affected by the courage

and statesmanship he displayed at this time.

I emphasized that

the easy thing todo was to follow the mob, but that the right.

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thing in the long-run would be better for the people and,

of course, better for him as well.

As I have already in-

dicatedhe was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist

threat ad apeared to have no fear whatever that the Commu-

nists might eventually come to power in Cuba.

He said that

during the course of the revolution there had been occasions

when the Conmunists overplayed their hand and "my people put them

in their place."

He implied that this would be the situation

in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come

to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Com-

munism, both internally and from an international standpoint,

he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had sounded to me

when I visited Indonesia in 1953.

In our discussions of

Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of

his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution

which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban

people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure

that

the Communists did not get into the positions of power

and influence.

On this score I feel I made very little im-

pression, if any.

Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged

him

at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong

men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to

them in the economic and other areas where he presently was

making

I tried to point out that unless he

did thish would have a workload which would be so great that

he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the

Cuban people needed for the great issues.

I put as much em-

phasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsi-

bility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.

It was apparent that while he paid lip service to

such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion

his primary concern was with developing programs for economic

progress.

He said over and over that a man who worked in

the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved

the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house

and some clothing and didn't care

a whit about whether he had

freedom alongwith it. I of course tried to emphasize that

here again as a leader of his people, he should try to de~

velop support for policies which could assure economic pro-

gress with freedom rather than without it.

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He indicated that it was very foolish for the

United states to furnish

arms to Cuba or any other Carib-

bean country. He said "anybody knows that our countries

are not going to be able to play any part in the defense

of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out.

The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used

to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the

revolution.

It would be far better if the money that you

give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for

capital investment."

I will have to admit that as far as

his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I

could disagree with!

We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could

get the investment capital it needed for economic progress.

He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he

gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that

owned enterprises.

I told him quite bluntly that his best

hope

as far as the United States was concerned was not in

capital.

I explained that government capital was limited be-

cause of themany demands upon it and the budget problems we

presently confronted.

I pointed out that private capital on

the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving

the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which

would attract it,

I pointed out that there was competition

for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that

it would not go to a country where there was any considerable

fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate

against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable

length, tried to explain why he had said and done some of

the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up

to this time.

Here again on this point I doubt if I made too

much of an impression.

He explained his agrarian reform program in consider-

able detail justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba

needed more people who were able to buy the goods produced

within the country and that it would make no sense to pro-

duce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands

of consumers was increased.

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He rather bitterly assailed the United States press

for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution

ifter he came to power. I, of course,

tried to explain

that speaking from some personal experience, it was neces-

sary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and

unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with

iticism

regard to 88x8tsn might eventually lead him to take some

rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press

in the future.

He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was

a sery disturbing attitude on the part of the American press

and the American people generally.

His argument went along

this line:

"yours is a great country - the richest, the

greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, there-

fore, should be proud and confident and happy.

But every-

place I go you seem to be afraid - afraid of Communisu,

afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little

rice and the market for your rice will be reduced - afraid

that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American

factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they

have previously. You in America should not be talking so

much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba

or in some other country in Latin America, Asia Or AfriCa -

you should be talking more about your own strength and the

reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any

other kind of dictatorship."

In my turn of course I tried to explain that we wel-

comed the industrialization and development of Latin America,

that one of our best customers was Canada, for example,

which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions

improved in any country this was not only good for that coun-

try but good for us as well. I also tried to put our atti-

tude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Commu-

nism was something more than just an idea but that its agents

were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power

and to set up dictatorships. I also emphasized, however,

that we realized that being

against Communism was not enough

-- that it was even more important that we make it by our

actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we con-

vince people every place that we want to help them achieve

economic progress

in a climate of freedom.

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Several other subjects were discussed but none

that I think are worth roting at this point.

Significantly

enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar

quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with

regard to economic assistance.

His primary concern seemed

to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a

Communist and that his policies had the support of the great

majority of the Cuban people.

My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed.

The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those inder

finable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever

we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the

development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American

affairs generally.

He seems to be sincere, He is either

incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discip-

line -- my guess is the former, and as I have already in-

plied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy

are less developed than those of almost any world figure I

have met in fifty countries.

But because he has the power to lead to which I have

referred, we lave no choice but at least to try to orient him

in the right direction..

Y

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Appendix G

Memorandum for DCI

(for Briefing Vice President Nixon],

29 Feb 60

---

## Page 364

13-00000

SEBRET

29 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

SUBJECT:

What we are doing in Cuba.

I. This memorandum 1s for information only, and 1s for the Director's

use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intelligence

Some highlights of recent Intelligence which justify the actions being

taken or planned against Cuba are:

a. Rapid build-up of events waich indicate slide toward Commnist orbit

and Intensified efforts Implement internal programs towards establishment

Carmunist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class

Cubans and students has reached new nigh on Commütist issue ant nunsious

station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation

cannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Commulsts control

Cuba.

b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities In Mexico 1s on a trip

through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of

a pro-Castro revolutionary movement In each country aimed at the over-

throw of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.

S. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to

establish an operational relationship wite guerrilla groups in Colombia

with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.

d. French Intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including

Martinigue and Guadeloupe In & Carlbbean Federation beaded by him.

344

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29 February 1960

MEMORANDUN FOR: Diretor di Contral Intelligenco

VIAi

Deputy Diroctor (Plans)

SUBJECIS

What we are doing in Cuar.

1. Ida menorandon 1s for intoration onlJ, end la fos the Director's

use at meeting with the Vict President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intolligence

sona highlights of recout Intelligence which justliy the sotions berag

teicen or plamed agalast Cuba are:

3. Rapid bulld-up of events which Indicate slide toward Coucuniot Orilt

and Intenstiled efforts implement interal progremo toverda establisbment

- Commist dictatorship. Publia feeling anong nladlo und upper clasa

Cubens and studenta has reached new high on Commist istue and mmerous

station contacts ranging froa left to right bave declared tust situation

connot ba tolerated, and that they are son convinced Commulata coatral

Cuba.

b. The thies of Cuben Intalligenco ectivition In Hexico 15 On a trip

through central duerica to taitlato activition for the establiahment of

3 pIo-Gastro revalutionary movement in esca country simed at toe over

throw of estating goverment, Cuben incasales serve as coyas.

S. Consideriola IntollIgence has been recolved of Cuban attempta to

estadlisa an operational relationsaia sita guestilla groupa in Calombia

with ultimate goal ol overthrowing the Calonbira goversment.

d. Freach Intalligence reparta "Che" Guerara la taliding of Including

Martinique asd Gusdeloupe In a Caribbean Federation Leaded by him.

345

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8 March 1950

MOVORANDUM FOR: Director si Central Inüelligenca

VIA:

Deputy Director (ilans)

SURJECTE

Knat we are doing in Cuba.

1. Tils renorandum is for information on's, and is for the Director's

use at the NSC 5412 Ropresentatives Keeting which will consider the Cuba

covert action progran paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briofing.)

2. Intelligence

Some highllents of recent intelligence which justify the actiong being

taken or plenned against Cuba are:

= Rapid build-up of events wich indicate slide tovard Cormunist orbit

and Intensified efforts Imulerent internal prograns tonsrds establishment

Corminist dictatorship. Fublic feeling anong middle and upsur class

Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous

station contacts ranging from left to right nave declared that situation

cannot bo tolerated, and that they are now convinced Cormunists control

Cuba.

b. The Chici of Cuban intelligence activitles in Mexico is on, a trip

through, Central America to initlate activities for the establishment of

= ro-siro revol: tionary novenent in each country aimed at the over

throw of existing government. Cuban Enoasies serve as cover.

≤. Considerablo intolliganca has been recalved of cuban attempts to

establish an operational relationahip vita guerrilla groups in Colombia

with uleinste goal of overthroving die Colombian govarnment.

¿. Fronch intelligence ropots "Cha" Guevara is talking of including

H'artiniqua and Guadalouse In a Caribbean Feisration headed by him.

SEGRET

I Pie: 798 22 Jus74

346

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TOP SECRET

Source References*

Volume III

A.

Part I

Background

Watching from the Sidelines

L. State, Amembassy Havana: Memo from V. Lansing

collins, 11 Nov 48, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz.

2. Memo for Chief, WHD from COS Havana, 20 Dec 55,

sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. S. (HKH-A-2261)

3. Ibid.

4. State, Memo for Mr. Braddock from (Army?) Attache,

14 Oct 57, sub:

Fidel Castro Ruz.

(Memo No. 185 .)

5. State, Memo from Vinton Chapin, 19 Jun 57, sub:

Biographic Information Concerning Fidel Castro

Ruz.

(Memo No. 869). C.

6. David R. McLean, Western Hemisphere Division,

1946-65, Vol. I, 191-192 (DDO/HP 324, 2 Dec 73) .

S.

7. Letter to General His Excellency Fulgencio Batista

y Zaldivar from Allen W. Dulles, 7 Jul 56. (ER-8-

4007/a) .: U.

8. Memo (no addressee) from Lyman B. Kirkpatick,

• 19 Nov 57, sub:

How to Bring Peace in Cuba.

9. Ibid.

10. Beatrice B. Berle and Travis B. Jacobs (eds),

Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971, (N.Y., 1973),

p. 681.

U.

* Unless otherwise specified all sources are SECRET.

Copies.or notes of all sources cited are filed under

HS/CSG 2632.

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12. MR [no author], 27 Jan 61, sub: WHD Reporting

on the Cuban Revolution and the Rise of Fidel

Castro to Power, p. 6. S.

McLean, Western

Hemisphere Division, op. cit.,

I, 213-216.

S.

Hugh Thomas, Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom (N.Y.

1971), pP. 1000-1001.

U.

13. Berle and Jacobs,. op. cit., pp. 685-686.

Following CS reports (S) :

3,345,281, 13 Feb 58

3, 345,282, 13

Feb

58

3,347,126,

Mar 58

3, 351,466,

15 Apr 58

3, 354,755, 12 May 58

3, 367,468, 21 Aug 58

3, 373,470, 10 Oct 58

14. Berle and Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 685-686.

15.

Memo for Chief, PP Staff from Alfred T. Cox,

25 Aug 58, sub:

US Course of Action in Cuba. S.

16.

TDCS 3/376, 032, 30 Oct 58, sub: Fidel Castro

Ruz and

Forces Strongly Catholic, Non-Communist.

S.

17.

MR from J. C. King, 20 Nov 58, sub:: Cuba - Dis-

cussion of Pawley Proposal.

Cables to Director from Havana:

0661 (IN 35522); 11 Dec 58, HAVA 006

9 D-

r.n

18.

Cable to Director from Havana, 11 De

0668 (IN 36486). S.

19.

20.

State, Incoming Telegram from Anconsul Santiago

de Cuba, No. 341, 15 Dec 58.

S.

Ibid.

p. 61

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21. Cable to Director from COS Havana, 18 Dec 58,

HAVA 0704 (CHECK NO. 453) .

S.

22.

Alfred T. Cox, Paramilitary Activities at the staff

Level,

15 Sep 55 - 31 Dec 61, II, 374-375 (CSHP 183,

Mar 70).

23.

Memo for Bob Dahlgren from Alfred I. Cox and Col.

C. H. Heinlen, 31 Dec 58, sub:

Support Arrange-

ments. S.

24.

Memo for the President from Acting Secretary lof

Statel, 23 Dec 58, sub:

Cuba.

TS. [no number].

(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records,

1952-61,

"Cuba" folder, Box 27(?) .)

(Minutes of Special Group Meeting on Cuba Ifrom.

Thomas A. Parrott?), 7 Jah 59.

[Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from

Thomas. A. Parrott?], 7 Jan 59. S.

Handwritten notes on Department of State Meeting

on Cuba lby Gordon Gray?1, 31 Dec 59:

(Dwight D.

Eisenhower Library:

Gordon Gray Records, "Cuba"

folder, Box 27:) U.

26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (N.Y., 1965),

pp. 521, 524.U.

27.

B. Castro Takes Over

Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Jan 59, DIR 07542

(OUT 60805). S.

Cable to Director from Havana, 15 Jan 59, HAVA 0900

(IN 47617) • S.

Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

(Army) from C. P. Cabell, 6 Feb 59, sub: Proposed

US Army Operation Against the New Cuban Armed

Forces.

(ER 11-409a.)

S.

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28.

Memo for Chief WHD from Alfred T. Cox, 30 Jan 59,

sub: Research Project on Castro Movement.

S.

29 .

30.

31.

Cable to Director from Havana, 3 Feb 59, MSGNR

0984 (CKNR 747) • S.

Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Armyl Attache, 16 Feb

59, sub: Situation Report, Memo No. 412.

Board of National Estimates, Threats to the

Stability of the U.S. Military Facilities Posi-

tion in the Caribbean Area and Brazil, SNIE 100-

3-59, 10 Mar 59, p. 1. S.

Cable to Director from Havana, 9 Apr 59, MSGNR

1191 (CKNR 004) •

S.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 13 Apr 59, MSGNR 2000 (CKNR 017); 15 Apr 59,

MSGNR 2016 (CKNR 039) •

34.

Dispatch to Director from Havana, 15 May 59, HAVA

2161. S.

35.

Memo for Gordon Gray from Robert Murphy, 1 May 59,

sub: Forwarding Tentative Evaluation of Castro

Visit. C.

36. Dispatch to Director from COS Havana, 26 May 59,

HAVA 2197•

37.

HKH-1964, 4 Jun 59, sub: Comments of Cuban Com-

munist Leader on Castro's Trip to US. C.

Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (N.Y. 1962).

pp. 48-57. U.

38.

Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the

Caribbean through 1959, SNIE 80-59, 30 Jun 59. S.

39. Memo for DCI from Rudolph Gomez, 4 Aug 59, sub:

Mr. Leo Cherne. S.

350 ÷

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"1'

Dispatches:

To Director from Havana, 5 Jun 59,

HAVA 2233, 5 Jun 59; To COS Havana from

9 Jun 59,. DIR 30041.

S.

DIR,

40. Draper, op. cit., pP. 61-62, 65-69.

Thomas, op. cit., pp. 1234-1271.

41.

42.

Memo for Col. King from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Oct

59, sub: Visit of Mr. R. E. Gomez to Havana,

Cuba, 15-18 Oct 59. S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub:

Discussions between the Department and Chief,

WHD on Cuba. S.

43.

IS Senate, 86th Congress,

Ist Session, Judiciary

Sub-Committee Hearings on "Communist Threat to

the US through the Caribbean," Part III Testimony

of Gen. C. P. Cabell, PP. 162-163.

U.

44. Dispatch for COS Habana and COB Santiago de Cuba

from Chief, WHD,

18 Dec 59, sub: RMD -- Cuba,

HKBW[3] 3214.

TS (No number).

45.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59, sub:

Cuban Problems. S.

(DD/P 4-9871.)

46. Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the

Caribbean through 1960, SNIE 80/1-59, 29 Dec 59,

pp. 1, 4, 7, 13.

47.

Office Memo to Doris

from Pauline, 11 Jan 60,

sub: General Cabell's Briefing of JCS-State,

8 Jan 60.

S.

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Source References

Part 11

Castro Must Go

A. Organizing for Covert Action, Jan-Mar 60

1. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 8 Jan 60. S.

2. CIA Inspector General's Survey of the Bay of Pigs

Operation, Oct 61, p. 5. TS 173040. (Hereinafter

cited as I. G. Survey.)

3. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by

Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, p. 2.*

4. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

5. Memo for James E. Flannery, 12 Dec 73, sub: Review

of (E. Howard] Hunt's Book [Give Us

This Dayl. S.

6. David R. McLean, Western

Hemisphere Division, 1946-

1965, II, 242-243. (DDO HP 324, Dec 73.)

S.

7.

Conversation between Walter Elder and Jack B.

Pfeiffer, 14 Jun 74. U.

8. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 3 Oct 73, sub: Brief

Conversation with Jake Esterline.

9. Oral History Interview: Richard Drain by Jack B.

Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Tape 1, pp. 6-8.

10. Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack

B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 1, PP. 2-3.

11. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

pp. 15-16.

This and all other Oral History Interviews conducted

by Jack B. Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIED.

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12.

Oral History Interview:

Richard Bissell by Jack

B. Pfeiffer, 17. Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 5-6.

Proposed Agenda [for thel Special Group Meeting,

12 Jan 60.

13:

MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, sub:

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 13 Jan 60. S.

US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activi-

ties, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign

Leaders, 20 Nov 75, p. 93.

(94th Congress, Ist

Session, Report No. 94-465.) U. (Hereinafter SSC.)

14. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott), 13 Jan 60, op. cit.

15. Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 21 Jan 60, sub:

Cuba.

16.

Alfred T. Cox,

Paramilitary Ground Activities at

the Staff Level, 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dec 61, II, 384-

385 (DDO HP 183, Mar 60). S.

17.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 2 Feb 60, sub: Meeting

with the DCI. S.

[MR from Thomas A. Parrott] 3 Feb 60, sub: Minutes

of Special Group Meeting - Cuba.

S.

18.

MR from J. C. King, 26 Jun 60, sub: Meeting with

DOD representative on Cuba. S.

MR from E. Scott, 3 Feb 60, sub: Meeting, 3 Feb

{601, 0900 hours - 1015 hours.

S.

Memo for the DDS from Bruce Cheever, 4 Feb 60,

sub:

Request for Special Allowance

for CIA Rep-

resentative to CINCLANT. S.

19.

[MR from Jim Flannery?], 1l Feb 60, sub: A/DDP/P

Review of Status of Plans for Cuban Operations. S.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 12 Feb 60, sub: Briefing.

of Deputy Secretary of Defense on Cuba. S.

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20.

Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC

5412/2 [from Thomas A. Parrott?] (15-16 Feb 60?],

sub: Covert Action Operations Against Fidel

Castro.

S.

21.

22.

Memo to Designated Representatives under NSC 5412/2

115-16 Feb 6071, op. cit.

Ibid.

23. [MR from Thomas A. Parrott?] Minutes of Special

Group Meeting - Cuba, 17 Feb 60.

Memo of Meeting with the President (on 17 Feb 60]

from Gordon Gray, 19 Feb 60.

TS 189337-1.

24.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60, sub: Conversa-

tion with J: C. King, 1100 hours, 18 Feb 60.

S.

MR from J. C. King, 25 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Mr. Thomas

Mann on Cuba.

S.

25. MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60,. sub: Conversa-

tion with J. C. King, 1100 hours, 18 Feb 60. S.

26. MR from J. D. Esterline, 19 Feb 60, sub: Meeting

with the DCI on Cuba.

27. Memorandum Ino authox, no date, presumed written

between 24-25 Feb 601, sub:

Covert Action Against

Cuba.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30 .

Minutes of OCB Meetings: 2 Mar 60; 9 Mar 60.

S.

(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Files of the Office

of the Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs, Gordon Gray (A67-64), Box 67.)

31.

MR [from E. A. Stanulis?l, 9 Mar 60, sub: First

Meeting of Branch 4 Task

Force.

s.

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32.

Note to Mr. Barnes from Richard Helms, 8 Mar 60,

sub: [Revision of 8 Mar 60 paper for 5412 Group].

S.

33.

(Memo] to Designated Representatives Under NSC

5412/2 [from T. A. Parrott, 8 Mar 60], sub:

Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro.

S.

34.: Ibid.

35.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 8 Mar 60, sub:

What We Are Doing in Cuba.

S.

36. Ibid.

37.

Memo for Mr. (Gordon] Gray from Samuel E. Belk,

9 Mar 60, sub:

Cuba. (TS 189337-2) • (Dwight

D. Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 6

(Cuba] .)

38.

Briefing Note for NSC Meeting of 19 Mar 60, from

S. E. Belk, 9 Mar 60, sub: Cuba.

S. (Dwight

D. Eisenhower Library: Clean-Up Files, Box 6.

(Cuba] :)

Memo for MI. Gray from Samuel E. Belk, 9 Mar 60,

op. cit.

39.

Memo for the NSC from

James S. Lay, JI., 15 Mar 60,

sub:

U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. TS (no number).

(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

Gordon Gray

Records, 1952-61, "Cuba". Box (27?].)

40.

Memo of Meeting with the President on 12 Mar 60

from Gordon Gray.

TS (no number). (Dwight D.

Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 7, 1960,

Meetings with the President. Vol. I.)

41.

Memo for Mr. Bissell and Col. J. C. King, from

Allen W. Dulles, 14 Mar 60, sub: ["Starters"

for Our Cuban Paperl.

S.

42. Ibid.

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43.

MR from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60,

sub:

Special Group

Meeting, 14 Mar 60.

Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2

[14 Mar 60], sub: Covert Action Operations Against

Fidel Castro. S.

44.

MR from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub:

Meeting, 14 Mar 60.

Special Group

45. Ibid.

46. Two draft papers on the Clandestine Service's

anti-Castro efforts, 14 and 15 Mar 60.

(15 Mar,

6 pp. plus Financial Annex; 14 Mar 60, 5 pp.,

no Financial Annex. S.

47.

48.

Memo for MI. (Gordon] Gray from S. E. Belk, 16 Mar

60, sub: Cuba (Briefing Note for NSC Mtg 17 Mar

60).

S.

Memo of Conference with the President, 2:30 p.m.;

17 Mar 60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60.

TS

(no number). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White

House Office, Clean-Up Files, Gordon Gray, et al,

1953-61, Box 40(71.)

49. Ibid.

50. [Memo from] J. C. King. 21 Mar 60, sub: Policy

Meeting on General Covert Action Plan for Cuba,

17 Mar 60. S.

51.

MR from Col. Jack Hawkins, 5 May 61, sub: Record

of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Govern-

ment of Cuba (CSHP 105) •

52.

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Waging Peace (New York,

1965.), p. 533.

U.

53.

Letter to William Colby from Gordon Gray, 3 Dec

74, sub: Letter to DI. Don Wilson. (ER

74-6355/4).

U.

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B. Forging the Tool

54.

Memo for DDS from John E. O'Gara, 24 Mar 60, sub:

Establishment of a New Branch and Section within

Headquarters WH Division. S.

55. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 24 Mar 60. S.

56.

Memo for Comptroller, CIA from Allen W. Dulles,

24 Mar 60, sub:

Project JMARC. S.

57:

Ibid.

58. Memo for J. D. Esterline from M. J. King, 18 Mar

60, sub:

Branch 4 Financial Support.

Memo for Ed Stanulis from Mike King, 22 Mar 60,

sub: Per Diem for Domestic Base:

59. MR - No. 2 [no authorl; 25 Mar 60, sub: JMARC.

S.

60.

MR - No. 3 [no author], 31 Mar 60. S.

61. Ibid.

Savilion H. Chapman,. The Cuban Invasion: Maritime

Aspects, 1961, P.7. (CSHP 86, NOV 66.) S.

62.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from P. E. Oberst, 31 Mar 60,

Sub: JMARC - Timing and Tactics. S.

63.

64.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R[obert] Reynolds,

4 Apr 60, sub:

Daily Progress Reports.

S.

Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 15 Apr 60,

sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report for 14 Apr 60.

S.

65.

66.

MR from Eleanor,

27 Apr 60, sub:

[by} WH/4, 14 Apr 60:

S.

Ibid.

DCI Briefing

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67.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 26 Apr 60, sub:

ProjeCt JMARC, Amendment No.

1.

S.

68. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub:

Briefing of the JCS on Cuba

and the

• Dominican

Republic. S.

69.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 6 Apr 60, sub:

Briefing of JCS on Operations in Cuba.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub:

Briefing of JCS on Cuba and the Dominican

Republic. S.

70.

71.

MR from E. A. Stanulis, 10 Mar 60, sub: Meeting

with Capt. Burns Spore, USN.

S.

Memo for Director of Logistics from William E.

Eisemann, 19 Apr 60, sub: Funding of JMARC-3.

72.

Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 27 Apr

60, sub:

Aerial Coverage of Cuba and the off-

Shore Islands.

S.

73. Chapman, The Cuban Invasion, op. cit., p. 8.

74. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

75.

Memo for the. Secretary (of State] from R. R.

Rubottom, JI., 25 Mar 60, sub: Coordination of

Activities Relating to Cuba.. C. (Dwight D.

Eisenhower Library Cuba" :)

Gordon Gray, Records 1952-61,

Box 29, Folder:

• 76. Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 23 Mar 60

from T. A. Parrott, 24 Mar 60:

S.

77. Memo for Honorable Douglas Dillon from Gordon

Gray, 29 Apr 60, sub:

Personal and Confidential.

U.

(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Gordon Gray

Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder:

"Cuba".)

78. Ibid.

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79.

Minutes, of Special Group Meeting of 28 Apr 60

from T. A. Parrott (29 Apr 603].

Memo for E. Stanulis from J. D. Esterline, 30 Apr

60, sub: Review of Coordination with other

Agencies. S.

80.

Memo for Chief, JMARC/CI from Jacob D. Esterline,

14 Jun 60, sub: Bureau Stay-Behind Activity. • S.

81. Memo for Acting Director of Central Intelligence

from J. C. King, 23 Jun 60, sub: Operational

Activities of the FBI in Cuba.

s.

82. MR from J. C. King, 30 Jun 60, sub: FBI Intelli-

gence Operations in Cuba and Mexico. S.

83. Dispatch to Chief WHD from COB JMASH, 30 Aug 60,

sub:

Forwarding of Memorandum (UFGA-113). S.

84. Official Routing Slip for Bill Byrne from Don

(Ewing], 6 Mar 69, sub: [Review of papers on

JMWAVE] . S.

85.

Memo for the President through the Secretary of

State from Allen W. Dulles, 9 Jul 60, sub: (Brief-

ing of Presidential Candidates) (ER-62-1750]. S.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Clean-Up Files

(Gordon Gray, et al), BoX 64, Actions by the

President, Miscellaneous Action Notes, 18 Jul 60,

Lynder ans to son. J

John F. Kennedy and Sen.

U.

Memo for Mr. C. T. Barnes from John H. Dyer,

20 Jul 60, sub:

Briefing Material.

C.

Memo for Mr. C. I. Barnes from E. A. Stanulis,

21 Jul 60, sub: Cuban Briefing Paper. S.

Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles,

3 Aug 60, sub: (Briefing of JFK, 23 Jul 60,

and LBJ, 28 Jul 60]. ER-60-6067. S.

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86.

(Minutes of) Special Group Meeting [from T. A.

Parrottl, ll Aug 60. .S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 12 Jul 60, sub:

Project JMARC, Amendment No. 2.

Memo for George H. Reingruber (P) from J. C.

King, 19 Jul 60, sub:

Instructions for the

Obligation and Expenditure of JMARC Funds.

S:

Memo for the DCI from J. C. King, 19 Aug 60,

Sub: JMARC, Amendment No. 3.

S.

87 :

[Memo for] MI. Bissell from T. A. P(arrott),

23 Aug 60, sub:

(Release of $10 million from

the Agency Reserve for Project JMARC]. S.

88.

Oral History Interview:

William E. Eisemann by

Jack B. Pfeiffer, 14 Nov 75, Tape 3,: pP. 33-34.

C. Cooperation and Challenge

89. Cables to: MASH and RAND from Director, 6 Jun 60,

DIR 33225 (OUT 82950); MASH from Director, 22 Jul

60, DIR 41283 (OUT 99274); OARSMAN, GUATEMALA,

PANAMA, 4 Aug 60, DIR 43756 (OUT 54882). S.

90.

NIE: 85-2-60, The Situation in Cuba, 14 Jun 60,

pp. 1, 5-6.

S/NOFOR.

91. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60

from Gordon Gray, 22 Aug 60.

TS 208101. (Dwight

D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project

Clean-Up. Records of Gordon Gray, et al, 1953-1961,

Box 40.)

92.

Special Group Papers, 15 Apr 60 - 31 Dec 62,

Vol. I, 30 Jun 60. S.

93.

Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60,

op. cit.

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94.

Memo of Meeting with the President, 17 Apr 60

from Gordon Gray. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,

White House Office, Project "Clean-Up Records of

Gordon Gray et al, 1953-61," Box 7, 1960 Meetings

with the President, Vol. II, 22 Aug 60.

T'S

(no number).

95.

96.

The President's Appointments, 1960 (Dwight D. Eisen-

hower Library, A 70-29/1.) U.

Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 7 Sep 60, sub:

Attitude of Asst. Secretary of State for Latin

America, Thomas Mann, on JMARC. S.

'97.

Ibid.

98.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Re-

view of Cuban Situation far Asst. Sec. State for

L. A., Thomas Mann. S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub:

Observation on Briefing of Asst. Sec. State, Thomas

Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operations on 20 Oct 60.

S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Meet-

ing with DCI and Asst. SecState for L.A., Thomas

Mann, on Cuba. S.

99. Not used.

100. Memo for DDP/EMB from c. Tracy Barnes, 31 Oct 60г

sub:

Attached Paper for Special Group.

101.

MR. from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub:

Meeting with DCI and SecState for L.A., Thomas

Mann, on Cuba. S.

102.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Review

of Cuban Situation for Asst. SecState

for L.A.;

Thomas Mann.

S:

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub:

Observations on Briefing of Asst. SecState,

Thomas Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operation on

20 Oct 60.

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103.

Memo for DDP from J.. C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub:

JMARC U. S. Base Requirements. S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub:

Meeting with DDCI.

S.

104.

105.

MR from J. C. King, 7 Nov 60, sub: Dinner with

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

MR E James A Douglin, Se sep.60 sub:

6O, sub: Meeting

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from E. A. Stanulis, 12 Sep

60, sub:

Policy Approval for the Use of DOD

Personnel in Project JMARC. S.

106. Memo for DDP from J. Foster Collins, 15 Sep 60,

sub: Foreign Volunteers+for JMARC.

S.

Memo for Chief, WH Division from Alfred I. Cox,

12 Oct 60, sub: Recruitment of American Volun-

teers. S.

107. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 Sep 60,

sub:

JMARC Progress Report for 12-16 Sep 60.

108.

Memo for Chief, WHD from E. A. Stanulis, 5 Oct 60,

sub:

Guantanamo Bay. S.

109. Ibid.

110. Briefing Note for NSC Mtg, 7 Nov 60 from CAH

(Christian A.. Herter], 4 Nov 60, sub: U.S.

Policy

Toward China.

S.

111.

Memo for DCI from F. P. Holcomb, 28 Oct 60, sub:

Concern Expressed by Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT.

S.

112.

MR from J. Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this

date. at HQ CIC Atlantic and Supreme Commander,

Atlantic on Project JMARC. S.

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113.

D. Personnel and Training

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterlines. 14

Apr 60,

sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report.

114.

Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op.

cit., Tape 1,

pp. 3-4.

115.

MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 26 Oct 73, sub: Brief

conversation with Jake Esterline.

116. Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

p. 2.

117.. Ibid., Tape 1, pp. 2-3.

118.

Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

p. 5.

119. Ibid., Tape 1, pp. 6-7.

120. Ibid.,. Tape 1, pp. 9-10.

120a.

Memo for Executive Officer, DCI from Richard Helms,

19 Jan 50, sub:

Dissemination of Intelligence to

DD/I. (ER 11-552). S.

121.

David Coffin, Development of Ecnomic Intelligence

in the Office of Research and Reports, 1950-1967,.

II, 44-45.

(DDI/OER 2, Oct 74.) S.

Military biographic sheets on Hawkins and Egan.

U.

JMARC Daily Progress Reports, 27 Jan and 29 Aug 60.

S.

122.

Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

pp. 10-11.

123.

'Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

p. 5.

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124.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 17 Mar 60, sub:

Personnel Assignments to Branch 4, WH Division.

S.

125.

WH Field Memo. No. 12-60 to Chief: All WH Field

Stations and Bases, from Oliver G. Galbond (P)

19 Feb 60, sub: Agent Candidates for Possible

Use in Cuba. S.

Book Dispatch No. 1881 to All WH Field Stations

and Bases from Chief, WHD, 22 Apr 60, sub:

Re-

cruitment of Cuban Nationals.

S.

R and R to WH/FI from WH/4/FI, 12 Sep 60 forward-

ing FI activity reports for months of Mar through.

Aug 60. S.

126.

DDS Chrono Files: Minutes of DDS Staff Meetings,

20 ApI, 18 May, and 29 June 60. S.

127. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Jun 60,

sub: JMARC Progress Report for 7 and 8 Jun 60.

S.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 14 Jun 60, sub:

Staffing Guide for JMARC.

S.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub:

Personnel Requirements for WH/4 - JMARC. S.

128.

129 .

Memo. for A/DDP/A from Richard M. Bissell, Jx..

25 Aug 60, sub: Personnel Requirements for

WH/4.: (DDP-0-4402.)

MR from John F: Mallard, 6 Sep 60, sub: Meeting

with Mr. Tracy Barnes.

S.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,

5 Nov 60, sub:

Personnel Requirements for WH/4-

JMARC.

(DDP-0-5858 .)

S.

130:

JMARC Daily Progress Reports - Support, 19 Aug 60.

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131. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 19 Oct 60, sub:

Use of US Contract Personnel for JMARC Maritime

Operations.

S.

132.

133.

Cable to JMASH from Director, 9 Nov 60, DIR 10738

(OUT 90611).

S.

Cable to Director from MADD, I NOv 60, MADD 8452

(IN 36407) • S.

134. Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

p. 7.

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Source References

Part III

Changing Concepts

1.

savilion h. Chapman,. The cuban Invasion -- Maritime

Aspects, 1961, PP. 11-12. (CSHP 86, Nov 66.)

2. Ibid., p. 13.

3.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,

2 Nov 60, sub:

[Memorandum on Project JMARC]. S.

Memo fOX DDP/EMB from FrançiS W. Barkley, 2 Nov: 60,

sub: WH/4 Paper for Submission to Special

Group on

3 Nov 60.

4. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting

with DDCI. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from T. A. Parrottl,

3 NOV 60. S.

5.

Cable to Guat from Director, 4 Nov 60, DIR 09972

(OUT 88974). S.

Cable to Director from MADD, 5 Nov 60, MADD 0487

(IN 38552) . . S.

Memo for Chief, TRAV from Jack Hawkins, 7 Nov 60,

sub: Organization and Training of Strike Force.

S.

6.

Memo for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft

Cuban Operational Briefing (forl President-Elect. S.

MR from Jack Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this

date at Hq: CIC Atlantic and Supreme Allied Com-

mander, Atlantic.

MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC

Meeting with DDP.

S..

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7.

MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC

Meeting with DDP.

S.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Memo for General Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Dulles,

1 Jun 61, sub:

(Briefing of President-Elect, John

F. Kennedy, 18 Nov 601.

S.

Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, sub:

Points re Cuba from Discussion at Special Group Meet-

ing, Saturday, 19 Nov 60. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott),

16 Nov, 19 NOV, and 23 NoV 60. S.

10a.

Budget. ODD/P 0-58665: King, 26 Oct 60; sub: JMARC

10b.

Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, JI..

7 Nov 60, sub:

JMARC Budget. (DD/P 0-5866).

S.

11.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 Support from Herbert B. Juul,

22. Nov 60, sub:

Staffing Requirements for

• 600 Man

Strike Force Training.

Cable to Director from Guatemala, 22 Nov 60, GUAT

584 (IN 46427). S..:

12. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Nov 60,

sub: Major Problems Confronting Operation JMARC. S.

13. Ibid:

14. Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, op. cit.

15. Cables to Director from JMTRAV: 23 NOV 60, TRAV 0141

(IN 46775) ; 25 Nov 60, TRAV 0148 (IN 47383) .

S.

16. Cable to Director from Guatemala, 28 Nov 60, GUAT

605 (IN 48628).

S.

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17.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 29 Nov 60, sub: Para-

military Policy re Cuba. S.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20.

Taylor Committee Reports, MR's of PM Study Group

Meetings, 7th Meeting, I May 1961, p. 3.

S.

21.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 PM from Jacob D. Esterline,

2 May 61, sub:

Straightening Out Dates of Strike

Force Concept for the Taylor Committee. S.

22.

23.

24.

Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by

Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 3, p. 39.

Oral History Interview for the John F. Kennedy

Library: Richard Bissell by Joseph E. O'Connor,

25 Apr 67, pp. 3-4. U.

Oral History Interview:

Richard M. Bissell, JI.

by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75.

81

p. 81

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Source References

Part IV

Presidential Resurgence

1.

2.

3.

4.

Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by

Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, Pp. 13-14.

MR from Richard D. Drain, 29 Nov 60, sub: JMARC

Meeting with DDP.

Memo of Conversation with William D. Pawley from

Livingston T. Merchant, 28 Nov 60.

S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.

Parrottl, 30 Nov 60.

S.

5.4. Ibid., 6 Decto.TS

Memo for (Allen W. Dulles] from Livingston T.

Merchant, 10 Dec 60, sub:

Proposal to the President

and President's Reply. TS (no number).

7.. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Bot

10. Minic to ey Testing on thoma a ma, 50 a 60, 5.

Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline,

6 Dec 60,

. Four JMARC Problems for 8 December Meeting of

Special Group.

Memo for Gen. Lansdale from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60,

sub: [Problems for Special Group Meeting of 8 Dec 60].

S.

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60, sub:

Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60.

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11.

MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 8 Dec 60, sub:

of Special Group Meeting,

8 Dec 60..

Memo for Tracy Barnes from Joseph W. Scott, 8

60, sub: [A Suggested Program for Cuba] •

number).

Minutes

12.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York, 1965) ,

pp. 603, 712. U.

13.

SNIE 85-3-60, 8 Dec 60, Prospects for the Castro

Regime. S/NOFORN.

14.

MR from Michael F. Taylor, 23 Dec 60, sub: Meeting

with Ambassador Wilhauer [sic].

15. Ibid.

16. Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas

.A.

Parrottl, 22 Dec 60.

MR frOm R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub:

Meeting

arranged by Henry Holland, 21 Dec 60.

17.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.

Parrott], 22 Dec 60.

MR from R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub: Meeting

arranged by Henry Holland,, 21 Dec 60.

18.

Memo] for Attention of Col. J. C. King from MiKe

Haider, rec'd 10 Jan 61, sub:

Anti-Castro Leftists].

19.

20 .

Memo for Mr. Richard Bissell from BG Lansdale,

28 Dec 60, sub: Cuba.

S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.

Parrottl, 29 Dec 60.

21.

Ibid.

22.

Ibid.

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23. Memo of Conference with the President, 29 Dec 60,

from A. J. Goodpaster, 6 Jan 61. S.

(Dwight D.

Eisenhower Library, DDE Clean-Up Files, Box 51 -

Cuba.)

24. Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 Dec 60,

.op. cit.

25.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 28 Dec 60,

sub: (Cuba]. S.

26.

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 2 Jan 61, sub:

Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba, 3 Jan 61. S.

27.

Memo for Mr: Frank Devine from J. D. Esterline,

3 Jan 61, sub: Personnel for US Embassy in Havana.

S.

Cable to Havana from BELL, 3 Jan 61, BELL 0174

(OUT 5669) . S.

28 .

MR from C. Tracy Barnes, '3 Jan 61, sub: Outline

of 3 Jan 1961 [White Housel Meeting.

S.

29. I. K. White, Diary Notes, 3 Jan 61. S.

Cable to BELL from Havana, 7 Jan 61, HAVA 7405

(IN 1184). S.

30.

•31.

Cable to Havana from Director, 7 Jan 61, DIR 19746

(OUT 60701) . S.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 4 Jan 61,

sub: Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of

Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba. S.

32.

33.

MR from R. D. Drain, 4 Jan 1960 (siel, sub:

Meeting with A/DDP/A.

S.

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 5 Jan 61, sub:

Material for the 5 Jan Special Group Meeting. S:

Memo for ADDP/A from J. D. Esterline, 9 Jan 61,

sub:

Material for the 12

• Jan (61) Special Group

Meeting. S.

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Minutes of Special Group Meeting (from Thomas A.

Parrott, 12 Jan 61]. S.

34.

MR from John S. Warner, 9 Jan 61, sub: DCI Appear-

ance

before CIA Subcommittee on House Appropriations

Committee, 6

Jan 61. (TS 174817).

35.

Daily Progress Reports, WH/4/Support: June 1960 -

March 1961: 28 Dec 60, 30 Dec 60, 3 Jan 61.

S.

36. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 614. U.

37. MR from J. C. King, 1l Jan 61, sub:

Meeting to

Discuss Proposed Release to the Press re NYT Story

of 10 Jan 61 on Training of Guerrillas in Guatemala.

S.

38.

Memo for Under Secretary Merchant from Ambassador

Willauer, 18 Jan 61, sub:

The Suggested Program

for Cuba Contained in the Memorandum to You dated

6 Dec 60. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.

Parrottl, 19 Jan 61. S.

39.

Memo for Under Secretary Merchant from Ambassador

Willauer, 18 Jan 61, op. cit.

40.

Playa Giron:

Derrota del Imperialismo (Habana:

Ediciones R, 1961), I, 405.. U.

41. Ibid., 436.

42. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., pp. 613-614.

43. Newsday, 10 Sep 65, p. 50. U:

44. Ibid., pp.

50-51.

45.

Interview with Gordon Gray by Paul D. Hopper,

19 Jul 67, Columbia University Oral History Project,

Part 7, PP. 274-277. U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower

Library copy.)

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46.

The following Oral History Interview filed in the

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:

OH-14

OH-5.7

OH-117

OH-183

OH-206

OH-288

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 Jul 64.

Thomas C. Mann, 23 Feb 68.

Livingston Merchant -- Part I, 4 May 67;

Part 2, 13 May 68.

Thomas S.

• Gates, JI., 3 Aug 67.

Gen. David M. Shoup, 29 Aug

James H. Douglas, 23 Oct. 12.

€ 12.

72.

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Source References

Part V

Direct Action Programs

A. Propaganda

1. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub:

Propaganda Operations in

the Caribbean.

2. Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 Oct 59 [from

T. A. Parrottl.

Memo for A/DDP/A from Sherman Hoar, 29 Oct 59, sub:

DCI Comments on Cuban Proposal.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 3 Nov 59, sub: Opera-

tion Against the Regime of Fidel Castro.

Memo for Acting Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell,

JI., 16 Nov 59, sub:

Anti-Castro Broadcast Opera-

tions.

Memo for DCI from R. E. Gomez, 17 Nov 59, sub:

Anti-Castro Broadcast Operations.

3.

Minutes of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott]:

18 Nov 59; 9 Dec 59.

Memo for Chief, WHD from C. Tracy Barnes, 20 Jan 60.

sub: Cuba (DD/P-0-308).

4. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Feb 60, sub: Report:

on WHD Plans and Activities Concerning Cuba, etc.

5. JMARC Propaganda Program (March 1960]. S.

6. MR's

with

from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: [Meetings

Messrs. Lemon, Loeb, Lapham, and Wright].

7.

Ibid.

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7a. MR from J. C. King, 9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur

Co. Contribution to Support of Anti-Castro Radio

Program:

Memo for Mr. Lawrence R. Houston from J. C. King,

9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur Co.

MR from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub: Contribution

to Cuban Broadcasting Program.

Ltr to Hon. Dana Latham, Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 10 Aug 60 from John S. Warner.

Memo for Col. King from R. E. Gomez, 19 Aug 60,

sub: Telecon with Henry Holland, 1y Aug 60.

7b. Memo for Chief, WHD from I. D. Esterline, 25 Oct 60,

sub:

WRUL Radio Effort

Cable to Director from MASH, 19 Nov 60, MASH 1744

(IN 45083) •

Cable to JMASH from Director, 23 Nov 60, DIR 13132

(OUT 95725) .

Request for Payment of Confidential Funds to JMARC/

Finance from D. Phillips, 21 Nov 60.

Memo for JMARC/Finance from C/WH/4/Prop, 23 Nov 60,

sub: WRUL Monthly Payments.

Cable to JMWAVE from BELL, 27 Dec 60, BELL 0022

(OUT 5074) .

Memo for Chief, WHD from David A. Phillips, 25 Jan

61, sub: Approval for Continuing Payments from JMATE

Funds for WRUL Radio Program.

7c. Memo for Chief, Ops Branch, DPD/DDP from Chester H.

Vincent, 29 Apr 60, sub:

JMARC Progress Report

(DPD 3505-60) .

Memo for DPD/AS from D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub:

Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60)•

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Memo for DDP from D. A. Phillips, 27. Jun 60, sub:

Estimates for Aircraft Broadcasts to Cuba.

8. JMARC Propaganda program, op. cit.

MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Interview

with David A. Phillips.

10. Ibid.

10a. Cable for Director from JMASH, 22 Nov 60, MASH 1805.

(IN 46419).

11. Memo for C. T. Barnes from E. A. Stanulis, 21 Jul 61,

sub:

Cuban Briefing Papers.

12. (Memo for] Mrs. Geraldine S.

DePuy, Director,

Operations Division and John P. Hebrew, Director,

Investigation Staff, Bureau of Foreign Commerce,

Dept. of Commerce from R. W. Lindsay, Intelligence

Division, Investigation Staff, Bureau of Foreign

Commerce, Dept. of Commerce, 20. May 60, sub:

Swan

Islands

(FC-2040; 2-37) •

Ltr. for Harold W. Reeves, Collector of Customs,

Tampa; Fla. from

Geraldine

S. DePuy, 25 May 60,

FC-2650-FLB.

Memo for Chief, WHy from Chief, Wi/4 Support,

27 May 60, sub: Shipment of Supplies and Equip-

ment to Swan Island.

MR from [R. S. Kraus?], 27 May 60, sub: JMHOPE.

13. MR

from David A. Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub: Briefing

of Senator Mundt on CIA Radio Operations against

Cuba.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from T. A.

Parrottl; 12 May 60.

14.

Memo for Chief, WHD from William E. Eisemann.

27 Jun 60, sub:

Administrative Plan for the

JMARC/4 Phase of Project JMARC.

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Phillips, David A.,

The Night Watch (New York:

Atheneum, 1977) , pp. 90-91.

U.

MR from Richard R. Bennett, 22 Apr 60, sub:

Proposed Implementation Plan for Cover Plan

for

JMARC/ 4.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline,

sub:

25 Apr 60,

JMARC Daily Progress

Report 22, 23, 24,

28 Apr 60:

R and R Sheet for E. Stanulis from David A. Phillips,

5 May 60, sub: Annex A, Operational Plan for JMARC/4.

Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 28 Apr 60,

sub:

Cover for JMARC.

Burwell, James, Logistics Support

for Operations

in Cuba, March

1960-October 1961, DDS/HS OL-7,

Apr 71.

15. [Memo from] WH/Security for Cuban History (May 61],

sub: (Security of Swan Islandl.

16.

Memo for Mr. David Phillips from J. D. Esterline,

29 Mar 60, sub:

Random Notes of 29 Mar [60] which

Require Attention.

17.

Cable to Director from Havana, 30 Mar 60, MSGNR

3940 (CKNR 208) •

Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Mar 60, MSGNR

18435 (CKNR 098) •

18.

MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Inter-

view with David A. Phillips.

Memos for the NSC from James S. Lay, JI., sub:

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba:

20 Jul and 5 Aug 60.

oUO.

(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon:

Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder "Cuba.")

[Dept. of State, ARA], Progress Report on Cuba,

22 Jul 60. C.

(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:

Gray, Gordon:

Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder

"Cuba.")

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19.

MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. cit.

20.

21.

WH/4 Prop Notes for 9 Aug 60.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 1 Sep 60, sub:

Radio Swan.

22.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Aug 60, sub:

Radio Swan.

(DD/P 0-4013) .

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 30 Aug 60,

sub:

JMARC Progress Report for 25-29 August 1960.

WH/4 Prop Notes for 23

Sep 60.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 27 Sep 60,

sub: JMARC Progress Report for 23-26 Sep 60.

Memo for Mobilization and Military Personnel Divi-

sion from J. C. King, 19 Nov 60, sub:

Reguest for

Personnel from Department of Defense.

22a. Cables to BELL from RAND: 7 Jan 61, RAND 0172

(IN 1158): 10 Jan 61, RAND 0179 (1360) .

22b. Dispatch to Chief, WHD from COB, JMWAVE, 20 Mar 61,

sub:

Request for Promotion/Fitness Report.

23. [Memo from] C. T. Barnes, 15 Mar 61, sub: Propaganda

Effort.

23a. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. cit.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 May 60,

sub:

JMARC Progress Report, 28 Apr-5 May 60.

WH/4/Prop Notes for 20 Oct 60, 21 Oct 60.

24.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60, sub:

Conversation with ADDP/A.

Free, Lloyd A., "A Summary Report on Attitudes

of the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime"

(August 1960]. (ER 60-5982) .

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25.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60; op. cit.

26. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 12 Aug 60,

sub: JMARC Progress Report for 10 and 11 Aug 60.

27. Interview of David A. Phillips by Jack B. Pfeiffer,.

11 Mar 75.

28. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 May 60,

sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12-19 May 60.

Klein and Saks.. "Preliminary Outline of Economic

and Financial Government Platform, etc," 17 Jun 60.

29. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 5 Jul 60, sub:

Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to

Cuba.

(ER 60-5254) -

WH/4 Prop Notes for 5 July 1960, 6 Jul 60.

30. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Aug 60.

sub: JMARC Progress Report for 19-22 Aug 60.

31-

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Sep 60,

sub: JMARC Progress Report for 8 and 9 Sep 60.

3la. Information on Khrushchev destinations from John

Zabotto, OCR/USSR Div/Pol-Mil Br., 23 Aug 78. U.

32. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Aug 60,

sub:: JMARC Progress Report for 8 Aug 60.

WH/4 Prop Notes for: 21 Oct 60; 1, 2, and 1f Nov

60; and 1 Dec 60.

Memo for DCI from J: C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What

We Are Doing in Cuba.

Cable to JMASH from Director, 2 Dec 60, DIR 14634

(OUT 98992).

Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots

Involing Foreign Leaders (94th Cong, Ist Sess, Rpt

No. 94-465) , 20 Nov 75, p. 72. U.

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33. WH/4 Prop Notes for 19 Aug 60, 22 Aug 60.

34. Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara, JMASH from

Director, 19 Aug 60, DIR 46287 (OUT 60198) .

35.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R. E. Gomez, 24 Aug 60,

sub:

Outgoing Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara,

and MASH, OUT 60198 of 19 Aug 60.

B. Sabotage and Other Exercises

35a. [Information Requested for Green Studyl, Job 63-289,

Box 1, Folder 9.

35b. MR [from T.A. Parrott], 16 Mar 61, sub: Special

Group Meeting - Cuba.

36. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 9 Mar 60, sub: Minutes

of Special Group Meeting, 9 Mar 60.

Ibid., Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 14 Jul 60.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 15 Jul 60, sub: Paramilitary

Meeting with DDP.

37.

Transmittal Slip to Chief, WH/D from (Chief] WH/4/PM,

21 Jul 60, sub:

Paramilitary Op Plan 1.

38.

Routing and Record Sheet to WH/FI from WH/4/FI,

12 Sep 60, sub:

Monthly Reports of FI Activity,

March-August 1960 (See Aug 60) .

MR from [WH/4/PM?] 30 Nov 60, sub: Operation to

Subtle Sabotage Oil and Kerosene in Storage lin

Cubal •

Cable to BELL from WAVE, 31 Jan 61, WAVE 3322

(IN 3361).

39 .

Cable to Paris from Director, 23 Jun 60, DIR 36353

(OUT 89214) •

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40.

41.

MR [from J. C. King?], 29 Nov 60, sub: Sabotage

[of] Cuban Television

Services.

TS (no number).

Cable to JMWAVE from BELL, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1924

(OUT 9992).

Cable to JMWAVE from Director, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1929

(OUT 5001).

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 1 Nov 60, sub:

Request for Approval for Sabotage attacks against

Soviet and Soviet Bloc Targets in Cuba.

42:

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 18 Nov 60, sub:

Development of Action Squads by WHD.

Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Ji.,

10 Nov 60, sub: Goon Squads.

43. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 18 Nov 60, op. cit.

44. Memo for Chief, JMARC from John D. Corbett, 12 Sep 60,

sub: Approval

of Special Operations.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 14 Sep 60,

sub: Special Operations.

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Source References

Part VI

Mr. Nixon's Role in the BOP Operation

1.

Richard on No la, Cast 20 2nd John

F. Kennedy,"

Richard M. Nixon, RN:

The Memoirs of Richard Nixon

(N. Y., 1978), pp. 202-203. U.

Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (N. Y., 1962),

pp. 62-63.

2. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. cit.

Nixon, RN, op. cit., p. 202.

Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months with Castro

(Cleveland, 1966), P. 107. U.

2a. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 18 Jul 79, sub: Telecon

with Bob Zunzer re writing letter to Richard Nixon.

U.

Letter to Richard M. Nixon from Jack B. Pfeiffer,

19 Jul 79. U.

Memo for Jim Pittman from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 5 Mar 79,

sub:

Memo of Meeting with Fidel Castro on 19 Apr 59

(ER 79-7295). U.

3.

MR's from J. C.. King: 27 Jan 60, sub: Meeting in

Vice President's Office on Cuba; 27 Jan 60, Meeting

with Mr. Henry Holland on Cuba; 25 Feb 60, sub:

Meeting with General Cushman, Aide to the Vice

President.

4. Ibid., 25 Feb 60.

5. Ibid., 27. Jan 60.

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6. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 29. Feb 60, sub: What

We Are Doing in Cuba.

7.

Minutes of the 436th Meeting of the NSC [from Gordon

Grayl, 10 Mar 60.

(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:

Gordon Gray, Box 79-NSC, Minutes and Agenda 1960.)

TS (no number) •

Memo Of Conference with the President"s (no number).

60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60.

8.

9.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Review of

the Cuban Operation and

Examination of Possibilities

for Hemispheric Support for Liberal Governments

(DDP 0-1956) •

10.

Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 17 May 60, sub:

Project JMARC.

10a. [Minutes of] Special Group Meetings - Cuba: [from

Thomas A. Parrottl, 19 May 60.

11. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 May 70, sub: Review

of Swan Island

Operation and

[William

D. Pawley's]

Apparent Unilateral Decision

to Work with Cuban

Exiles Independent of CIA.

12:

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60,

sub:

Rubio-Pawley Group.

13.

Cables to Director: from Havana, 4 Jun 60, HAVA

4820 (IN 48003); from MASH, 9 Jun 60, MASH 0041

(IN 49533) •

14.

Official Routing Slip to C/WHD from Gerard Droller

[4 Jun 60].

15.

Memo to DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60, sub:

Rubio-Pawley Group.

16.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 11 Jul 60, sub: Lunch

[on 20 Jun 60] with General Cushman, Vice-Presidential

Aide.

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17.

(Minutes of] Special Meeting of the NSC on 22 Jun

60 (from James S. Lay, Jr.]. (Dwight D. Eisenhower

Library:

Gordon Gray:

Records, 1952-61, "Cuba"

folder.) IS (no number).

18.

Routing and Record Sheet for Chief, WHD from Chief,

WH/4, 21 Jun 60, sub: Copy of NSC

Briefing Paper

sent General Cabell on 20 June.

18a. Ibid.

19.

Memo for Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Jun 60,

sub:

Notes on Policy Discussion which Followed the

CIA Briefing of the NSC on Cuba, 22 Jun 60.

Memo for Mr. Jacob D. Esterline from James S. Lay,

JI., 29 Jun 60, sub:

Esterline memo of 25 Jun 60.

[Notes on Policy Discussion at Special NSC Meeting

of 22 Jun 601.

20.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 1 Jul 60, sub: Tele-

phone Conversation with General Cushman.

21. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Jul 60,

sub:

Swan Island Broadcasts.

22. Memo for DCI from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Sep 60, sub:

Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. (ER 60-7645) -

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 18 Jul 60, sub:

Contacts with Mario Garcia Kohly.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing

of General Cushman.

23.

WH/4 Prop Notes Jun 60 - Jul 61: 18, 19, 20, 21,

26, 29 Jul; 1 Aug; and 11, 17 Oct 60.

MR's from Robert W. Andrews, 23 and 26 Sep and 4 Oct

60, sub: " William Jackson Powell.

Memo for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor from Allen W. Dulles,

17 Jun 61, sub: Marshall Diggs Proposals on Behalf

of Garcia Kohly.

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Washington Star, ? Aug 76. U.

24.

Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles, 3 Aug 60,

[sub:

Intelligence Briefing for Democratic Candidates,

July 1960]. (ER 60-6067). U.

Memo for the Record from Allen W. Dulles, 21 Sep 60,

(sub: Briefing of Sen. John F. Kennedy on 19 Sep 60].

25. New York Times, 21 Oct 60. U.

26. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. cit.,

pp: 286-288.

Nixon, RN, op. cit., pp. 220-221. U.

27. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. cit.,

p. 288.

Nixon, RN, op. cit.,

p. 221.

28.

MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 1 Mar. 78, sub: Meeting.

with Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie.

Schlesinger, Arthur M..

JI., A Thousand Days (New

York, 1965), p. 225.

29 .

New

York Times, 23 Oct 60. U.

MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 27 Oct 60, sub: State-

ments by Presidential Candidates.

30. Schlesinger, op. cit.. p. 164. U.

Memo for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft

Cuban Operational Briefing:

President Elect.

31.

32.

33.

Memo for the Honorable John A. McCone from Allen

W. Dulles, 20 Mar 62, sub: (Intelligence Briefing

of President-elect Kennedy].: U.

Letter to Admiral Stansfield Turner from Fawn M.

Brodie, 4 Jan 78. U.

MR [from WH/4], 15 Nov 60, sub: [Transcript of

Tape of] Telephone Conversation between C/JMARC

and William D. Pawley on 14 Nov 60.

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Source References

Part VII

Assassination

1. Oral History Interview:

Richard M. Bisssell, Jr.

by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 2, p. 18.

2. Ibid., p. 17.

3. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 22 Mar 61.

4.

Jacob D. Esterline by

Jack. B.

sation.)

5. Ibid.

6.

Pral Me yanterview RicharD- Drain by Jack B.

7.

MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 3 Nov 60, sub: Minutes

of Special Group Meeting, 3

Nov 60.

8. Hunt, Howard, Give Us This Day (New Rochelle, N.Y.,

Arlington House, 1973), pp. 38-39. U.

9. Daily Log - [WH/4] PM Section, 18 Jul 60; 14 Oct 60.

(No author], Key to Map of Potential Paramilitary

Assets, Ino date, but after 6 Aug 60].

10.

Cable to Director from SACU (Santiago, Cubal, 18 Jul

60, MSGNR 609 (CKNR 170) •

11.

Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview.

to, tape i,

pp. 16-17.

Ila. Cable for Director from Havana, 9 Dec 60, HAVA 7133

(IN 14488) •

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12: Richard D. Drain, Personal Notes.

13.

Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 3,

p. 60.

14.

Job 63-605/58, Folders 1, 2, 3: AMHINT-Operations,

19-132-16/1-3.

Cable

to BELL from JMWAVE, 24 Feb 61, WAVE 3931

(IN 0915) •

15. WH/4 Prop Notes for 27 Feb 61, 28 Feb 61.

Richard D. Drain, Personal Notes, 28 Feb 61.

16.

Letter to Jack B. Pfeiffer from R[ichard] D. D[rain],

24 Jan 76.

17.

Letter to Richard D. Drain from Jack B. Pfeiffer,

22 Jan 76.

Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

pp. 15-16.

"Must Go List"

18. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1,

p. 21.

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Source References

1.

2.

3.

Part VIII

Conclusions

Playa Giron:

Derrota del Imperialismo (Habana:

Ediciones R, 1961), I, 436.

U.

Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel

Castro

• (Berkley, 1972), P. 89.

U.

Playa Giron: Derrota, op. cit., III, 387. U.

Oral History Interview:

Richard D. Drain by Jack

B. Pfeiffer, & Jan 76, Tape 1, p. 21.

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