Document date: 04/17/2018
Document type: PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA

RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10304

RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: William H. Brubeck

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : NUFK

FROM :

TO :

TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record

DATE : 11/8/1962

PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :

DOCUMENT TYPE :

CLASSIFICATION :

RESTRICTIONS :

CURRENT STATUS :

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

: COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 382: Congo 11/62. Box 3.

IW 19061. DocId: 32626822

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SECRET

November 8, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KAYSEN

SUBJECT: Indications that the UN May Resort to Force in the Congo

There immediately follows excerpts from a series of State cables

on the subject;

The Canadian Charge in Leopoldville said that at the meeting of

the Congo Advisory Committee on October 12th U Thant thought there

would be only two effective ways to show Tshombe that the UN means

business: (a) use of overt force, but the UN has no specific mandate to

defeat Ishombe and lacks the necessary force; or (b) to cut off the flow

of revenue to Tshombe -- which he preferred as the most practical

solution. He noted that implementation of the latter might bring about

severe fighting (Leopoldville A-174, October 30).

October 18th: The SYG and Bunche were much concerned over a

report they had received that Katanga aircraft had been carrying out

bombing raids in North Katanga. While the raids had apparently not

been directed at the UN, Gardiner had been instructed to protest to

Tshombe, warning that if the bombing continued UN aircraft might have

to intervene (New York 1348, October 18).

October 19th: Gardiner told McGhee that he was ready to take

decisive action against the above-mentioned Katanga aircraft which he

alleged were piloted by mercenary pilots. Gardiner said he was

authorized to issue a stiff warning that this air activity cease and that

if the warning were disregarded to shoot down the planes caught while

operating offensively (Leopoldville 962, October 19).

October 19th: A member of the Pakistani UN Mission told Carl

Rowan that U Thant was quite pessimistic in a meeting of the Congo

Advisory Committee. U Thant expressed fear that another round of

fighting would become necessary. He said that if fighting erupted again

he doubted the ability of present UN forces to cope with the situation

(New York 1356, October 19).

October 24th: A member of the UN Field Service telephoned a

member of the USUN Mission to obtain the reaction of the USG to a

possible UN request to supply napalm bombs for ONUC F-86s

(New York 1446, October 24).

SECRET

HH 19061 DocId:32626822 Page 2

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SECRET

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October 25: Ambassador Gullion reported that ONUC offensive

capability was crippled by the absence of bombs. He said that the main

mission of the ONUC was the destruction of enemy aircraft on revealed

fields if hostilities break out. He said that it is against these deficiencies

that the ONUC request for napalm bombs must be made (Leopoldville 1002,

October 25).

October 31st: Bunche told Carl Rowan that the UN wants to "buy,

charter, borrow, or beg"' two C-130s. or C-24s. He said these were

vitally needed for a period of a month to transport heavy vehicles in the

Albertville and Kamina areas. He said the UN would have to fight if it

moved the vehicles over land (New York 1571, October 31).

October 31st: Bunche reportedly told a member of the Belgian

Delegation that the UN would not take military action to resolve the Congo

problem (New York 1572, October 31).

November 7th: A well-placed UN source in Elizabethville said he

believed there was "a possibility the UN might provoke" an incident

within two weeks to start a fight. Another UN source stated that

Gardiner will arrive in Elizabethville on November 8 and will give

Tshombe a two-week ultimatum to implement the UN Plan

(Elizabethville 717, November 7).

November 7th: Bunche, in assessing the situation in the Congo,

told Harlan Cleveland that the UN was militarily stronger now because of

the ability of the ANC to perform functions which formerly tied down UN

personnel. Bunche saw a gradual, continuing attrition of Tshombe's

position and said it would not be long before the UN would be in Kolwezi

and Jadotville (New York 1672, November 7). •

S<B

Samuel E. Belk

SECRET

MH 49061

DocId: 32626822

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