Charter Commission — Portland, ME
Date: 2022-03-23
Time: 18:00

City of Portland
 Charter Commission Agenda

 March 23, 2022 at 6:00 PM
Due to the existence of an "emergency or urgent issue", the Charter Commission & its Committees will conduct meetings
by remote methods/technology at the Zoom link provided below, in accordance with the requirements of 1 M.R.S. section
403 -B and the Charter Commission Remote Participation Policy.

Allow your computer to install the free Zoom app to get the best meeting experience. If you are not able to attend live, a
recording will be available following the meeting in our Agenda Portal.

For public comment, you will need to use the "raise your hand" feature. To raise your hand via the telephone, please hit
*9. You will be unmuted by the host when it is time for public comment.

 1. Zoom Information
 a. This meeting will be held remotely pursuant to the Remote Meeting Policy adopted by the
 Charter Commission and as authorized under 1 M.R.S. 403-B because of the existence of
 an emergency or urgent issue that requires the committee to meet by remote
 methods. Allow your computer to install the free Zoom app to get the best meeting
 experience. If you are not able to attend live, a recording will be available following the
 meeting.

 For public comment, you will need to use the “raise your hand” feature. To raise your
 hand via the telephone, please use *9. You will be unmuted by the host when it is time for
 public comment.

 Please click the link below to join the webinar:
 https://us06web.zoom.us/j/81506694378?pwd=Z1J1OUQyTXJGenNvaGFqd0E4d213dz09
 Passcode: 590888
 Or One tap mobile :
 US: +13017158592,,81506694378#,,,,*590888# or
 +13126266799,,81506694378#,,,,*590888#
 Or Telephone:
 Dial(for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location):
 US: +1 301 715 8592 or +1 312 626 6799 or +1 646 558 8656 or +1 253 215
 8782 or +1 346 248 7799 or +1 720 707 2699
 Webinar ID: 815 0669 4378
 Passcode: 590888
 International numbers available: https://us06web.zoom.us/u/keCWkF2OPL
2. Call to Order (6:00-6:05 pm)
3. Review and Approval of Draft March 16, 2022 Meeting Minutes (6:05-6:10 pm)


 a. Approval of the March 16, 2022 Draft Meeting Minutes.

4. Deliberation on Governance Models (6:10-7:50 pm)
 a. Description: Commissioners will deliberate on reforms to the basic structure of
 Portland's government.
 Relevant document(s).
 a. Commissioner Sheikh-Yousef's governance model proposal
 b. Governance Committee's governance model proposal
 c. Matrix comparison of two models
 d. Commissioner Barowitz's organizational charts
 e. Commissioner Chann's organizational chart
 f. Commissioner O'Brien's governance model
 g. Relevant research and interviews

 Break 7:50-8:30

 Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Clean Elections proposal from Elections
5.
 Committee (7:50-8:30)
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on
 the Clean elections proposal from the Elections Committee
 Relevant document(s)
 a. Clean elections proposal
 b. Cost Estimate
 c. Memo from James Katsiaficas
 Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Redistricting proposal from Elections
6.
 Committee (8:30-8:55 pm).
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on a
 Council Redistricting proposal.
 Relevant document(s).
 a. Council District Proposal
 b. Council Structure Data
 c. LWV City Council Makeup
 d. NLC-Cities 101
 e. The Trade offs between At Large and Single member districts
 f. The Effect of At- large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S.
 Municipalities
 g. The Context Matters: The effects of Single member versus At-large districts on
 City Council Diversity
 h. Memo from James Katsiaficas
 Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Code of Ethics proposal from Procedures
7.
 Committee (9:00-9:30 pm)
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliverate and vote on a
 Code of Ethics proposal.
 Relevant document(s).
 a. Proposal on Code of Ethics
 Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Participatory Budgeting Proposal from
8.
 Procedures Committee (9:30-10:00)
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on a
 Participatory Budgeting proposal.
 b. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying
 questions on an amended school budget process. There will be no vote on this
 proposal.
 Relevant document(s)
 a. Proposal for school budget process
 First Read of School Budget Process Proposal from Education Committee (10:00-10:05
9.
 pm)
 a. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying
 questions on an amended capital improvement program process. There will be no
 vote on this proposal.
 Relevant document (s)
 a. Proposal for school budget process
 First Read of Capital Improvement Program Process Proposal from Education Committee
10.
 (10:05-10:10 pm).
 a. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying
 questions on an amendment capital improvement program process. There will be no
 vote on this proposal.
 Relevant document(s):
 a. Proposal for capital improvement program process
11. First Read on Revised Governance Proposal
 a. Revised Governance Proposal
12. New Business
13. Adjourn

City of Portland
 Charter Commission Agenda

 March 23, 2022 at 6:00 PM
Due to the existence of an "emergency or urgent issue", the Charter Commission & its Committees will conduct meetings
by remote methods/technology at the Zoom link provided below, in accordance with the requirements of 1 M.R.S. section
403 -B and the Charter Commission Remote Participation Policy.

Allow your computer to install the free Zoom app to get the best meeting experience. If you are not able to attend live, a
recording will be available following the meeting in our Agenda Portal.

For public comment, you will need to use the "raise your hand" feature. To raise your hand via the telephone, please hit
*9. You will be unmuted by the host when it is time for public comment.

 1. Zoom Information
 a. This meeting will be held remotely pursuant to the Remote Meeting Policy adopted by the
 Charter Commission and as authorized under 1 M.R.S. 403-B because of the existence of
 an emergency or urgent issue that requires the committee to meet by remote
 methods. Allow your computer to install the free Zoom app to get the best meeting
 experience. If you are not able to attend live, a recording will be available following the
 meeting.

 For public comment, you will need to use the “raise your hand” feature. To raise your
 hand via the telephone, please use *9. You will be unmuted by the host when it is time for
 public comment.

 Please click the link below to join the webinar:
 https://us06web.zoom.us/j/81506694378?pwd=Z1J1OUQyTXJGenNvaGFqd0E4d213dz09
 Passcode: 590888
 Or One tap mobile :
 US: +13017158592,,81506694378#,,,,*590888# or
 +13126266799,,81506694378#,,,,*590888#
 Or Telephone:
 Dial(for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location):
 US: +1 301 715 8592 or +1 312 626 6799 or +1 646 558 8656 or +1 253 215
 8782 or +1 346 248 7799 or +1 720 707 2699
 Webinar ID: 815 0669 4378
 Passcode: 590888
 International numbers available: https://us06web.zoom.us/u/keCWkF2OPL


 Page 1
2. Call to Order (6:00-6:05 pm)
3. Review and Approval of Draft March 16, 2022 Meeting Minutes (6:05-6:10 pm)


 a. Approval of the March 16, 2022 Draft Meeting Minutes.

4. Deliberation on Governance Models (6:10-7:50 pm)
 a. Description: Commissioners will deliberate on reforms to the basic structure of
 Portland's government.
 Relevant document(s).
 a. Commissioner Sheikh-Yousef's governance model proposal
 b. Governance Committee's governance model proposal
 c. Matrix comparison of two models
 d. Commissioner Barowitz's organizational charts
 e. Commissioner Chann's organizational chart
 f. Commissioner O'Brien's governance model
 g. Relevant research and interviews

 Break 7:50-8:30

 Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Clean Elections proposal from Elections
5.
 Committee (7:50-8:30)
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on
 the Clean elections proposal from the Elections Committee
 Relevant document(s)
 a. Clean elections proposal
 b. Cost Estimate
 c. Memo from James Katsiaficas
 Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Redistricting proposal from Elections
6.
 Committee (8:30-8:55 pm).
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on a
 Council Redistricting proposal.
 Relevant document(s).
 a. Council District Proposal
 b. Council Structure Data
 c. LWV City Council Makeup
 d. NLC-Cities 101
 e. The Trade offs between At Large and Single member districts
 f. The Effect of At- large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S.
 Municipalities
 g. The Context Matters: The effects of Single member versus At-large districts on
 City Council Diversity
 h. Memo from James Katsiaficas
 Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Code of Ethics proposal from Procedures
7.
 Committee (9:00-9:30 pm)
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliverate and vote on a
 Code of Ethics proposal.



 Page 2
 Relevant document(s).
 a. Proposal on Code of Ethics
 Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Participatory Budgeting Proposal from
8.
 Procedures Committee (9:30-10:00)
 a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on a
 Participatory Budgeting proposal.
 b. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying
 questions on an amended school budget process. There will be no vote on this
 proposal.
 Relevant document(s)
 a. Proposal for school budget process
 First Read of School Budget Process Proposal from Education Committee (10:00-10:05
9.
 pm)
 a. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying
 questions on an amended capital improvement program process. There will be no
 vote on this proposal.
 Relevant document (s)
 a. Proposal for school budget process
 First Read of Capital Improvement Program Process Proposal from Education Committee
10.
 (10:05-10:10 pm).
 a. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying
 questions on an amendment capital improvement program process. There will be no
 vote on this proposal.
 Relevant document(s):
 a. Proposal for capital improvement program process
11. First Read on Revised Governance Proposal
 a. Revised Governance Proposal
12. New Business
13. Adjourn




 Page 3
DRAFT




 City of Portland Charter Commission
 Meeting Minutes
 March 16, 2022 (Remote via Zoom)

1. Zoom Information

 The meeting was conducted as a remote meeting by Zoom videoconference in accordance
 with the Commission’s Remote Participation Policy and State law (1 M.R.S. §403-B).

2. Call to Order

 Chair Kebede called the meeting to order at 6:00 p.m.
 Commissioners present were Barowitz, Chann, Eglinton, Houston, Kebede, Lizanecz,
 O’Brien, Sheikh-Yousef, Stewart-Bouley, Washburn, and Waxman; Commissioner Buxton,
 absent. (Quorum established)

3. Review and Approval of Minutes

 On motion by Commissioner Eglinton, seconded by Commissioner Waxman, the
 Commission voted to approve the draft meeting minutes of March 9, 2022 by roll-call vote of
 11-0.

4. Deliberation on Governance Models

 Commissioners deliberated on reforms to the basic structure of Portland’s government. Two
 facilitators, Samaa Abdurragib and Hilary North-Ellasante, guided the Commissioners’
 discussion. The Commissioners took a series of non-binding straw poll votes to assess the
 level of consensus for various elements of a governance model.

 a. Mayor as City’s Chief Executive Officer. Chair Kebede began the discussion by
 moving that the Commission take a straw poll vote as to whether the Chief Executive
 Officer of the City of Portland is its elected Mayor and that Portland has a chief
 administrative officer, seconded by Commissioner Washburn. He explained this was a
 way to establish consensus on a basic topic and to enable further discussion.
 Commissioner O’Brien asked to clarify that the straw poll vote was as to whether the
 City’s chief executive officer should be the mayor or a city manager, and Commissioner
 Kebede agreed this was the effect of the question. Commissioner Chann sought to add
 that the Mayor would have oversight over and the support of the city manager or another
 person with professional managerial and financial expertise, to have assurance that there

{P1998513.1} 1


 Page 4
DRAFT
 would be professional management; after discussion, the vote on the motion proceeded
 without amendment. As to whether to hold the straw poll vote, the motion passed by vote
 of 10-1 (O’Brien). As to the straw poll vote on whether the Chief Executive Officer of
 the City of Portland is its elected Mayor and that Portland has a chief administrative
 officer, the Commissioners voted 7 yes (Kebede, Washburn, Barowitz, Lizanecz, Sheikh-
 Yousef, Houston, and Chann) and 4 no (Eglinton, O’Brien, Stewart-Bouley, and
 Waxman).
 b. Mayor’s Powers. Commissioner O’Brien stated that to him, the big question is
 unilateralism – can the mayor act unilaterally, without council ratification or vote, and
 when? The Commissioners then began reviewing the potential powers of an executive
 mayor.
 1) Hiring and Firing. Commissioner Lizanecz moved for a straw vote poll that the
 executive mayor be granted authority to unilaterally hire and fire City staff;
 Commissioner O’Brien seconded. Commissioner Washburn preferred such authority
 be limited to department heads only, since staff are subject to union agreements or are
 subject to the civil service system and personnel policies. Commissioner Barowitz
 wanted to exempt from the motion the mayor’s unilateral authority to hire the
 mayor’s own staff, such as a chief of staff, political director, and constituent services
 person – to be able to hire/fire trusted advisors. After refinement by Commissioners
 Washburn and Lizanecz, the motion was to take a straw poll vote whether the mayor
 shall not be granted unilateral authority to hire and fire department heads and the city
 manager. As to whether to hold the straw poll vote, the motion passed by vote of 10-
 1 (Sheikh-Yousef). As to the straw poll vote on whether the mayor shall not be
 granted unilateral authority to hire and fire department heads and the city manager,
 the Commissioners voted 9 yes (Kebede, Eglinton, Barowitz, Lizanecz, O’Brien,
 Stewart-Bouley, Waxman, Houston, and Chann) and 2 no (Washburn, Sheikh-
 Yousef).
 2) Prepare Budget. Commissioner Sheikh-Yousef moved for a straw vote poll that the
 executive mayor be granted authority to draft/prepare the City’s annual budget;
 Commissioner Washburn seconded. The Commissioners voted 8 yes (Kebede,
 Washburn, Sheikh-Yousef, Barowitz, Lizanecz, Stewart-Bouley, Houston, and
 Chann) and 3 no (Eglinton, Waxman, O’Brien) to approve the motion.
 3) Date of Mayor’s Election. Commissioner Barowitz noted that the mayor currently s
 elected in an off-year election, and suggested there would be more voter interest and
 participation in that election if it were held in a presidential election year. Therefore,
 he moved for a straw vote poll that the election of the executive mayor be held in a
 presidential election year; Commissioner Houston seconded. The Commissioners
 voted 9 yes (Kebede, Washburn, Sheikh-Yousef, Eglinton, Barowitz, Lizanecz,
 Stewart-Bouley, Houston, and Chann) and 2 no (Waxman, O’Brien) to approve the
 motion.

5. First read of Redistricting proposal from Elections Committee
 Members of the Elections Committee presented and fielded clarifying questions on a Council
 Redistricting proposal. There was no vote on this proposal.




{P1998513.1} 2


 Page 5
DRAFT
 Commissioner Chann presented the Elections Committee proposal, which features a
 13-member City Council, with 10 district seats and 3 at-large seats. The Council members
 would elect a chair or president. He explained that an odd number of councilors was chosen
 to avoid tie votes, and that the increase in numbers of councilors is intended to better align
 issues and districts for more effective representation. He, Commissioner Washburn, and the
 Commission recognize the ongoing issues political scientists report in the literature, with at-
 large seats promoting gender equality and district seats promoting racial and ethnic diversity,
 and they decided to bring these issues to the Commission to resolve. Commissioner Stewart-
 Bouley asked about the possibility of a Peaks Island council seat; however, given the
 population of the Island, the population of Portland and the one person-one vote
 constitutional requirement, it appears that doing so would require many more councilors to
 accomplish. Commissioners asked about how districts currently are determined and what
 legal standards apply, and Chair Kebede asked if increases in City Council district seats
 necessarily require an increase in School Board seats – the commission’s legal advisor will
 respond.

6. New Business

 Chair Kebede shared a document from the City’s Finance Director showing that the
 Commission to date has spent approximately $36,500 of its $75,000 budget. Several
 Commissioners inquired whether the legal fees should be counted in that budget, and the
 Chair said he would investigate. The Executive Committee will obtain quotes on the cost of
 outside legal counsel to provide an opinion and the required final report letter on the
 Universal Resident Voting proposal.

7. Adjourn

 On motion by Commissioner Sheikh-Yousef, seconded by Commissioner Houston, the
 Commission voted to adjourn by roll-call vote of 11-0. Meeting adjourned at 10:22 p.m.




{P1998513.1} 3


 Page 6
 City of Portland, Maine
 Charter Commission

 GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE

 WORK PLAN

ELECTION OF OFFICERS & DEVELOPMENT OF WORK PLAN
September 8, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=39849
Minutes: https://tinyurl.com/minutes-sept-8


VALUES MAPPING & DESIRED OUTCOMES
September 22, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40131
Notes about Values: https://tinyurl.com/commission-values

 ● With facilitator David Plumb


MAYORS INTERVIEWS
October 13, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40566
Notes from Mayors interviews: https://tinyurl.com/mayor-interviews

 ● Kate Snyder
 ● Michael Brennan
 ● Panel of Jill Duson, Jim Cohen, and Karen Geraghty
 ● Ethan Strimling


EXPERTS INTERVIEWS
November 8, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41035
Notes from Expert interviews: https://tinyurl.com/expert-interviews

 ● Dr. Chyrl Laird, recent Government professor at Bowdoin, now at U Maryland
 ● Dominick Pangallo, Chief of Staff in Salem, MA
 ● Dr. Jim Svara, UNC researcher/editor of 4th ed. of National Civic League's Model City
 Charter



 Page 7
MANAGERS INTERVIEWS
November 10, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41102
Notes from Manager interviews: https://tinyurl.com/manager-interviews

 ● Joe Gray, former City Manager of Portland
 ● Tanisha Briley, City Manager in Gaithersburg, MD; formerly in Columbus Heights, OH
 ● Kevin Sutherland, ex Chief of Staff in Ithaca, ex City Administrator in Saco, finalist for
 City Manager in Bar Harbor
 ● Sheila Hill-Christian, former Acting City Manager in Portland
 ● Note: Jon Jennings was invited but formally declined


CITY COUNCILORS INTERVIEWS
November 29, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41552
Notes from Councilor interviews: https://tinyurl.com/council-interviews

 ● Belinda Ray, 2015-2021
 ● David A. Marshall, 2006-2015
 ● Pious Ali, 2016-present
 ● Kimberly Cook, 2017-2020


LEADERSHIP MODEL DELIBERATIONS
December 8, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41743
Notes from deliberations: https://tinyurl.com/deliberation-notes

 ● With facilitator David Plumb




 Page 8
Commissioner O'Brien Leadership Model


 THE VOTERS PLAN PROS
 Least fiscal impact
 ELECT THE LEGISLATIVE ARM Council retains most control over fiscal impact
 Mayor's powers/duties/influence strengthened and clarified
 CITY COUNCIL MAYOR Allows Mayor to develop policy proposals in public
 9 Districts President of the Council Allows Mayor to oversee management of the city
 2 At-Large Votes only in case of a tie Prevents the Mayor from acting unilaterally
 At-Large/Mayor run as ticket; Appoints Council committees Does not isolate Mayor from Council
 Individual councilors may Directs draft City Budget Prevents potential Mayor-Council President power clash
 introduce proposal(s) for vote; Issues Council agendas in compliance with Council rules Reduces Manager-Council bypassing the Mayor
 Individual councilor may Advises and consents to Manager's department head nominations before vote by Council Reduces Manager's influence on Council
 sponsor public proposal Meets regularly with Manager re: Council policy implementation/coordinate messaging/ID lobbying needsReduces Manager's role in policy development
 for vote by council rules; Participates in Councilor-Manager meetings (eg, committee chairs meet periodically with manager) Allows for more change agents: mayor, councilors, and public
 Holds public hearing for Chairs Manager's Annual Review / May call executive session of Council to discuss performance Eliminates duplication/confusion of managerial powers
 referendum campaigns Sits on City's Economic Development Team Reduces gatekeeping of city services/information
 May form public task force by right with staffing support for any issue not taken up by Council Provides way for mayor/council/public to examine gov't conduct
 Portland's lobbyist in Augusta/Washington Reduces costs/effort to run at-large by running as a ticket
 Official spokesperson for City and Council Reduces "mandate" conflict between mayor/at-large councilors
 Reduces number of councilors competing on ballot for mayor
 OVERSEE CITY OFFICES Mayor elected with two allies on Council


 CITY MANAGER OFFICE OF INFORMATION CITY CLERK CORP. COUNSEL
 Communications
 Constituent Services
 FOIA Requests
 Meeting Noticing
 Councilor requests for docs/clarifying questions for staff (according to council rules)


 STAFFS REVIEW BOARDS


 OVERSIGHT COMMISSION CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW BOARD
 Renders advisory opinions to Council by request on: As detailed in independent proposal
 Adherence to Rules / Procedures / Ordinances / Charter
 Offers Second Legal Opinions by request
 Offers Second Opinions on Conflict of Interest by request
 Evaluates Program Delivery & Effectiveness by request
 Receives Annual Finance Audit Report, Forwards to Council
 Receives & Refers Malfeasance Complaints, Reviews How Handled
 Receives & Refers Whistleblower Complaints, Reviews How Handled
 Staff research support by Office of Information
 Staff report writing support by Corporation Counsel's Office
 May request funding from Council for independent investigators
 Mayor may submit formal requests
 Council may submit requests by majority vote
 Two councilors may submit formal requests
 Staff may submit whistleblower complaints
 Public may submit formal requests by signature thresholds
 7 members appointed by council
 3-year terms, 3 terms max
 At least 3 volunteer attorneys as members on commission




3/4/2022
 Page 9
 CHANN/LIZANECZ/STEWART-BOULEY TWO-BRANCH COMPROMISE FRAMEWORK

 EXECUTIVE + ADMINISTRATION LEGISLATIVE + OVERSIGHT



 ELECTED OFFICIALS



 MAYOR POLICY COUNCIL

 Can propose policies to Council, gives State of City Address Elects Chairperson

 Prepares and presents City Budget Any councilor can propose policy

 Oversees implementation of policies set by Council, City Votes on and adopts City Budget
 Manager, and implementation of City Budget
 Provides oversight of City Executive, Constitutional Officers,
 Can be removed by 2/3 majority of Council and Administration on behalf voters through Ombudsman




EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE
 CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS
 Joint Exec/Leg Committee Nominates, Council Confirms and Appoints
 Reports to Join Exec/Leg Committee Recommends Dismissal, Council Confirms Dismissal Reports to




 CITY ATTORNEY
 CITY MANAGER Advises Mayor and Council
 OMBUDSMAN
 and represents the City in
 legal matters
 Supports Mayor in managing Assists the Council in providing
 implementation of policies set by Council Constituent Services
 and implementation of City Budget
 CITY CLERK Coordinates fulfillment of FOIA and
 Manages day-to-day operations of the city information requests
 and oversees department heads and staff
 Manages scheduling, notice, Investigates complaints and reports to
 Supports Mayor in preparation of City public meetings Ethics Commission or Council for actiom
 Budget; oversees and coordinates
 preparation of departmental budgets Manages and oversees Enforces conflicts of interest policies and
 elections ordinances



 CITY ADMINISTRATION CITY BOARD & COMMITTEES
 Joint Exec/Leg Committee Nominates Department Heads, Council Confirms and Appoints Joint Exec/Leg Committee Nominates Appointments, Council Confirms and Appoints
 Department Heads manage hiring and firing of staff; no unilateral hiring/firing by Mayor



 FIRE DEPARTMENT POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICE REVIEW BOARD


 PERMITTING & INSPECTIONS PLANNING AND URBAN DEV HISTORIC PRESERVATION RENT BOARD

 HOUSING & ECONOMIC DEV SUSTAINABILITY OFFICE PLANNING BOARD ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS




ADMINISTRATION
 CDBG ALLOCATION COMM. PORTLAND DEV CORP




 OVERSIGHT
 RENTAL HOUSING ADVISORY


 HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES CONTINUUM OF CARE EMERGENCY SHELTER

 DISABILITY ADVISORY


 PUBLIC WORKS JETPORT PARKS COMMISSION SOUND OVERSIGHT

 PARKING PARKS & RECREATION PUBLIC ART COMMITTEE PESTICIDE MANAGEMENT

 LAND BANK COMMISSION


 ASSESSOR HUMAN RESOURCES ASSESSMENT REVIEW CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

 FINANCE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY


 Page 10
 Portland's Current Distribution of Powers & Authority Compared to Proposals for Change

Powers & Authority Current Portland Charter Governance Committee Proposal Shiekh-Yousef Proposal


1) Who is the Chief Executive Officer? City Manager City Manager Mayor


 City Council; Mayor has special right to City Council; Mayor can propose policy
2) Who has policy making authority? City Council form staffed public task force on policy to Council, which would be required to
 not taken up by Council Committee. consider and vote on it.

3) Who oversees policy
 City Manager City Manager Mayor
implementation?
 City Administator, City Clerk,
4) Who are the top city officials?(note City Manager, City Clerk, Corporation City Manager, City Clerk, Corporation
 Corporation Counsel, Public Advocate
1) Counsel Counsel, Chief of Staff (note 2)
 (note 3)
 Mayor chairs committee with at least 2
 Public Advocate is elected. Clerk and
 other Council members to nominate
5) What is the process for filling top Same as current for City Manager, Clerk, Counsel nominated by Public Advocate.
 City Manager, Clerk, and Corporate
city official positions Counsel, and Chief of Staff Administrator nominated by Mayor.
 Counsel. Council confirms by majority
 Council confirms all by majority vote.
 vote.
 Public Advocate may recommend
 removal of City Clerk or Corporate
 Mayor-chaired 3 person Council
6) What is the process for removing top Counsel; Council must approve with
 Committee may recommend removal; No change
city officials 2/3rds vote. City Administrator serves
 Council approves by majority vote.
 at will of the Mayor. Public Advocate
 may be removed by citizen's recall.

7) Who manages day to day operations City Administrator under direct
 City Manager City Manager
of city affairs? supervision of Mayor
 City Manager nominates, Council Mayor nominates, Council approves;
8) How are Department Heads
 approves. Heads serve at will of the City no change department heads serve at will of the
hired/supervised/ removed?
 Manager. Mayor.



 Page 11
Powers & Authority Current Portland Charter Governance Committee Proposal Shiekh-Yousef Proposal

 Mayor is not a member. Council elects
9) Is mayor a member of Council? If yes, Mayor is voting member and chairs the
 no change its own President from amongst its
does mayor have a vote? Council.
 members.

10) Who Creates and Appoints Mayor, but council may override with President of Council can create
 no change
members to Council Committees? 2/3 vote. committees and appoint members.

11) Who appoints members of city PA nominates; Council approves/
 Council no change
boards and commissions? rejects by majority vote.

12) Who has authority for preparing/ City Manager prepares with "guidance" Mayor prepares with assistance from Mayor prepares with assistance of
approving Municipal Budget from Mayor; Council approves. Manager; Council approves. Administrator; Council approves.

 Mayor prepares with School Board
 School Board/Superintendent with
13) Who has authority for preparing/ Chair and Superintendent; School
 guidance from Council; approval by no change
approving School Budget? Board approves and sends to voters; no
 Council and then by voters.
 Council vote.
 Yes Override
14) Can Mayor veto the municipal Yes; 75% majority needed to override
 requires 6 (of 8) votes. Mayor does not No
budget approved by the Council? veto.
 vote.

 Yes -- full veto power over all policies,
15) Can Mayor veto other Council
 No No ordinances, orders, expenditures, etc.;
decisions?
 Council requires 75% vote to override.

16) How long does the Mayor serve in 4 years, corresponding with
 4 years 4 years
office? Presidential election years

17) Are their mayoral term limits? 3 terms 3 terms 2 terms

18) Can Mayor be removed before term
 Via citizens' recall Via citizens' recall Via citizens' recall
is over?




 Page 12
Powers & Authority Current Portland Charter Governance Committee Proposal Shiekh-Yousef Proposal

 Charter Arbitration Panel (note 4) and
 required City Council hearing for
 Referendum Advocates (note 5).
19) Have new powers/authority been
 Not applicable Council required to develop procedures None
proposed for non-city officials
 through which citizens may formally
 propose policies for council
 consideration (note 6).

Notes:


1) For purposes of this chart, current top city officials (other than mayor) include the city manager/administrator, city clerk, and corporate counsel
 as these are often in a town's Charter. New top positions proposed include a Chief of Staff and a Public Advocate.

2) Duties of proposed Chief of Staff: coordinate Council staffing need; receive and track constituent services and FOIA requests; post notices of city meetings
 and post all materials.

3) Duties of proposed Public Advocate: serve as independent ombudsman to improve city government. Provide outside review of
 city agencies, investigate citizen complaints, and make proposals for improvement to Mayor and Council. Respond to FOIA requests.
 Serves as Mayor in case of vacancy or incapacity of elected Mayor.

4) Arbitration panel will convene when called to act by City Council to interpret Charter language and provide a formal decision.
  Panel to consist of 3 members from previous Charter Commission.

5) When a referendum campaign has collected 2/3 of the required signatures, City Council will be required to hold a public hearing.




 Page 13
Structural Examination of Systems of City Government

 A Visual Representation of the Elements of City Government

 Submitted by Zack Barowitz, D3




 Page 14
 One Branch




Defining Characteristics

 1) Council has all executive, legislative, and oversight powers.
 2) Mayor is head of Council, sets meeting agendas, and typically has some other legislative powers no other council member has.
 3) All (most) executive powers delegated by Council to an appointed City Manager

Often Cited Advantages of this form

 a) Executive decisions are made by a professionally trained expert in city management
 b) CEO is not influenced by political considerations relating to his/her own electoral interests
 c) CEO devotes more time to administrative functions including policy implementation than to policy development
 d) No interbranch divisiveness and maximal congruence between policy development and policy implementation

Often Cited Disadvantages of this form

 a) CEO is not accountable to the voters, a fundamental disconnect with the principle that government decision-makers should be accountable to the people
 they serve.
 b) No direct incentive for CEO to be responsive to individual citizen or interest group concerns
 c) Little to no incentive for meaningful oversight of government agencies, programs, and policies or individual behavior of corporate officers



 Page 15
 One Branch + Elected Oversight




Defining Characteristics

 1) Single branch for legislative & administrative
 2) Oversight branch has investigatory and advisory powers but not adjudicative ones


Often-cited Advantages of this form

 a) Branch dedicated to government oversight will lead to more comprehensive investigation and reporting of how city government is functioning
 b) Independence of oversight branch reduces influence of other government officials in determination of what is investigated/researched, what
 recommendations are made, and what final reports actually say
 c) Independent branch dedicated to reviewing operations of city government is best place to house “ombudsman” providing non-judicial recourse
 for citizens dissatisfied with executive and/or legislative branch decisions

Often-cited Disadvantages

 a) Single branch gives less authority to elected officials




 Page 16
 Two Branches




Defining Characteristics

 1) Separate branches for executive and legislative functions
 2) Mayor not a member of the Council


Often Cited Advantages of this form

 a) Leaders responsible for executive and legislative functions are directly accountable to voters
 b) Leaders of both branches have electoral incentives to be responsive to individual citizens and interest groups
 c) Checks and balances between both branches, including legislative branch oversight of city agencies, are typically built-in

Often Cited Disadvantages

 a) CEO (Mayor) typically has little to no city management experience
 b) Potential politicization of city services
 c) Interbranch divisiveness has tendency to develop



 Page 17
 Three Branches




Defining Characteristics

 3) Separate branches for executive, legislative, and government oversight functions, each with elected leaders
 4) Oversight branch has investigatory and advisory powers but not adjudicative ones
 5) Public Advocate position tends to be breeding ground for individuals with ambitions for higher office

Often-cited Advantages of this form

 d) Branch dedicated to government oversight will lead to more comprehensive investigation and reporting of how city government is functioning
 e) Independence of oversight branch reduces influence of other government officials in determination of what is investigated/researched, what
 recommendations are made, and what final reports actually say
 f) Independent branch dedicated to reviewing operations of city government is best place to house “ombudsman” providing non-judicial recourse
 for citizens dissatisfied with executive and/or legislative branch decisions

Often-cited Disadvantages

 b) Additional branch increases likelihood of interbranch divisiveness



 Page 18
 Evaluation of the systems based on goals, values, and anticipated outcomes.

Because values are more easily agreed upon than methods, I think a consideration of goals is a good place to start. My current thinking on structure
of government is to test various models against various values, goals, and expected outcomes.These could include:


 ● Responsiveness of government to constituent needs–and to change, innovation, and unexpected events
 ● Efficient administration
 ● Provide avenues for public recourse
 ● Transparent oversight/daylight to minimize waste, fraud, and abuse
 ● Empower the legislative/elected body
 ● Mitigate red tape
 ● Increase public participation
NB: This is presented for the sake of illustration not necessarily as a methodological framework.


Example:

 Current
 System Enhanced One Branch
 (One One w/elected Two Branches: Thee Elected Branches:
 Branch) Branch oversight Council-Mayor Council-Mayor-Oversight


Efficient Admin


Empowered Elected
Officials


Public/Transparent
Oversight


Avenues for Public
Recourse
Cost


 Page 19
Proposed Process for Commission Decision Making
 1) Using the above charts, commissioners discuss how many branches Portland’s government should have

 2) At the end of discussion, a straw-vote is taken on the above question.

 3) After straw vote is taken, the Powers/Authority Matrix is used to flesh out the specific powers of the officers in whichever
 government form has won the most votes. A “Commission Proposal” Column has been added to the previous Matrix to
 facilitate this “fleshing out”. All of the cells in that column are currently blank. Some will be filled in as a result of the
 above straw-vote (i.e., who is the CEO? And who manages day-to-day operations of city staff?). The Commissioners will
 then proceed (row by row) to decide how to complete each unfilled cell in the Commission Proposal Column, picking from what’s
 been proposed in the other columns for each row or coming up with some other option entirely. After discussing all the options for
 each row, further straw-votes would be taken on what goes into each blank cell.

 4) After all cells are completed on a straw-vote basis, the Commissioners would then take a final vote on what is contained in
 the Commission Proposal column as a whole. Presumably some commissioners may disagree with how some of the cells have
 been completed, but they may still decide to vote in favor of the Commission Proposal as a whole.

Note: To speed up the process described in (3) above, one idea is to give each commissioner their own matrix and have them complete
each blank cell themselves. Then all the individual responses could be tabulated (anonymously) to see how much agreement or
disagreement there is in terms of each cell. Cells where there is substantial disagreement would (presumably) be the place where
discussion and debate would begin.

[NB: This process in particular, and much of the work on this document generally, was developed by Valerie Kelly and Phil Steele, who worked in
close collaboration with Cmsr. Barowitz.]




 Page 20
 CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE
 CHARTER COMMISSION
 GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE

 CITY LEADERSHIP MODEL RECOMMENDATIONS
 January 11, 2022


PURPOSE

This report serves to summarize the activities and recommendations of the Portland Charter
Commission’s Governance Committee in its objective to propose structural changes to the
leadership model of Portland’s municipal government.


COMPOSITION

The Governance Committee comprises four members of the Portland Charter Commission:

 • Robert O’Brien, Chair Elected in Portland District 2
 • Ryan Lizanecz, Vice Chair Elected in Portland District 5
 • Nasreen Sheikh-Yousef, Secretary Elected At-Large
 • Shay Stewart-Bouley Elected in Portland District 1


RECOMMENDATIONS

The Governance Committee met eight times in the fall of 2021 and interviewed 17 speakers
with experience in municipal government, in addition to phone calls, emails, and conversations
that committee members may have had with engaged members of the public and public
officials.


Several issues emerged about Portland’s leadership structure:




 Page 21
 1
 • No elected mayor has been provided the opportunity to meaningfully influence the
 development of the city’s draft budget, as specified in the current Charter. • There are no
 clear mechanisms by which an elected mayor may propose policies outside of the Council
 committee structure.
 • Council procedures make it difficult for individual councilors to advance policies outside
 of the committee structure.
 • City Councilors’ access to staff has been inconsistent over several administrations. •
 There is no method for holding the Council accountable to its own rules or for keeping the
 administration in line with the Charter.

As such, these shortcomings have led to public impressions that the city manager is
unaccountable and that the mayor is ill-equipped to pursue a policy platform. Furthermore, the
limitations of developing policy only in Council committees has diminished the city’s ability to
be agile and proactive amid changing societal dynamics and a gentrifying economy. As a result,
the Council is frequently reacting to external urgencies, and referenda campaigns have
increased in number and success at the polls.

To address these issues, the Governance Committee recommends the following changes to
Portland’s leadership structure.

Regarding the Mayor

 • Ensure that the elected mayor has a prominent role in the development of the city’s
 draft budget with access to department heads and staff support.
 • Allow the mayor to form by right a staffed public task force around any policy endeavor
 not taken up by Council committee.

Regarding access to City Hall staff

 • Create a new Chief of Staff who reports directly to the Council and whose office shall: o
 Coordinate Council staffing needs and requests for direct access to staff. o
 Receive, initiate, and track constituent services.
 o Fulfill all Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.
 o Notice all City meetings and post all materials.

Regarding policy development at the Council

 • Formally allow individual councilors to introduce a policy proposal not on a Council
 committee at a Council workshop or public hearing.
 • Allow a member of a Council committee to “call the question” (initiate a vote) on a


 Page 22
 policy that has been assigned to the committee for more than 90 days.
 • Allow a councilor to sponsor a policy initiative on behalf of a constituent that is not
 already assigned to a Council committee.


 2
 • When a referendum campaign has reached a threshold of two-thirds of the required
 signatures, initiate a public hearing at the City Council.

Regarding accountable governance

 • Require a duly elected Charter Commission to nominate three of its standing members
 and one alternate to serve on an arbitration panel after the Commission has been
 dissolved (and until such time as a new Commission is elected).
 • The arbitration panel will convene when called upon by act of the City Council to
 interpret Charter language and provide a formal decision. These decisions will be
 binding for City business unless appealed to a court of law.

These recommendations are referred to the Charter Commission by unanimous consent of
three members of the Governance Committee: Commissioners Robert O’Brien, Ryan Lizanecz,
and Shay Stewart-Bouley. Commissioner Nasreen Sheikh-Yousef was absent from the
committee’s December 8 deliberations and has since sponsored her own proposal to the
Charter Commission.


METHODOLOGY

At its meeting of August 11, 2021, the Charter Commission assigned these topics to the
Governance Committee to examine:

 • Redistricting and Council Structure
 • Mayor/City Manager Roles, Powers, Duties, Accountability
 • School Board/City Council Relationship
 • Community and Neighborhood Boards
 • Office of Public Advocate
 • Home Rule
 • Human Rights Commission
 • City Staff Relationship to Elected/Appointed Officials

From this list of topics, on September 8, 2021, the Governance Committee distilled related
structural themes into one, overarching leadership topic:

 1. City Leadership Structure: powers & duties, relationships, districts, terms.
 a. Administration
 b. Mayor Position

 Page 23
 c. Council
 d. Council-Appointed Positions (Clerk, Corporation Council)
 e. Neighborhood Voices




 3
The remaining topics assigned by the Commission were set aside for later examination.

At the meeting of September 8, all four committee members agreed to design a leadership
model on a zero-basis, founded on input from research and interviews, rather than adopting
or hybridizing an existing model.



WORK PLAN

Election of Officers & Development of Work Plan
September 8, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=39849
Minutes: https://tinyurl.com/minutes-sept-8

Values Mapping & Desired Outcomes
September 22, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40131
Notes about Values: https://tinyurl.com/commission-values

 • With facilitator David Plumb

Chair O’Brien researched and sought input from fellow committee members on the speakers
invited for interview sessions. Speaker nominations were derived from the personal knowledge
of committee members, proposals from engaged members of the public, and discussions with
the Maine Municipal Association (MMA) and the International City/County Management
Association (ICMA).

Mayors Interviews
October 13, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40566
Notes from Mayors interviews: https://tinyurl.com/mayor-interviews

 • Kate Snyder
 • Michael Brennan
 • Panel of Jill Duson, Jim Cohen, and Karen Geraghty
 • Ethan Strimling

Experts Interviews

 Page 24
November 8, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41035
Notes from Expert interviews: https://tinyurl.com/expert-interviews

 • Dr. Chyrl Laird, recent Government professor at Bowdoin, now at U Maryland •
 Dominick Pangallo, Chief of Staff in Salem, MA


 4
 th
 • Dr. Jim Svara, UNC researcher/editor of 4 ed. of Nat. Civic League's Model City Charter

Managers Interviews
November 10, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41102
Notes from Manager interviews: https://tinyurl.com/manager-interviews

 • Joe Gray, former City Manager of Portland
 • Tanisha Briley, City Manager in Gaithersburg, MD; formerly in Columbus Heights, OH •
 Kevin Sutherland, ex Chief of Staff in Ithaca, NY; ex City Administrator in Saco; finalist for
 Town Manager in Bar Harbor (later hired)
 • Sheila Hill-Christian, former Acting City Manager in Portland
 • Note: former Portland City Manager Jon Jennings was invited but formally declined

City Councilors Interviews
November 29, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41552
Notes from Councilor interviews: https://tinyurl.com/council-interviews

 • Belinda Ray, 2015-2021
 • David A. Marshall, 2006-2015
 • Pious Ali, 2016-present
 • Kimberly Cook, 2017-2020

Leadership Model Deliberations
December 8, 2021
Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41743
Notes from deliberations: https://tinyurl.com/deliberation-notes

 • With facilitator David Plumb


FINDINGS

All committee agendas, minutes, and materials may be found at this link:
https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/1Vivn114pB2mnff7fjbLUT0PYpZvmetFA



 Page 25
Values

On August 25, 2021, the full Charter Commission ratified this Guidance Statement:

 Create a structure of government which maintains expert administration while
 also promoting robust democratic representation, and public participation. This
 structure should ensure accountability, transparency, and accessibility while


 5
 increasing equity, inclusion, diversity, and justice.

On September 22, 2021, facilitator David Plumb led Governance Committee members in
articulating which values they sought to be reflected in a leadership model. The results were:

 Accountable and Responsive
 • There are channels for concerns that are accessible and result in actual responses. •
 There is a clear chain of command, and clarity on who you can speak with about your
 interests and concerns.
 • People see the connection between the public voice and decision-making.

 Transparent and Communicative
 • People know what is going on and there is easy access to information.

 Participatory
 • There are vehicles to participate.
 • Barriers to participate are removed – we recognize that time is a major barrier for
 working people.

 Representative and Giving Voice
 • Decisions are made considering the whole community.
 • Local government includes people with different experience and background. •
 Access to government is not defined by money.
 • The systems work for everyone.

 Efficient and Showing Leadership
 • City can tackle problems and reach conclusions. Local government is seen a place of
 solutions.
 • The city policy-making process works to address interests and concerns – people use it
 and see their interests met.
 • The city has big plans and develop bold ideas though a democratic process.

 Integrity



 Page 26
Key Takeaways: Mayors Interviews

 • All three recent mayors (Snyder, Strimling, and Brennan) said there is
 misunderstanding by residents about the current mayor position’s limited powers to
 pursue constituent services, to direct city services, or to enact executive orders.
 • All three recent mayors said they had inadequate input on the city manager’s draft
 budget.



 6
 • All three recent mayors said access to city staff changed dramatically among
 administrations, from virtually no prohibitions in the past to being highly regulated
 more currently.
 • The panel of past councilor-mayors (Duson, Cohen, and Geraghty) said: o
 Councilor-mayors typically had outside employment and volunteered part
 time at City Hall.
 o Councilor-mayors relied on a trusted, collaborative, and communicative
 relationship with the City Manager to pursue the mayor’s objectives.
 o Councilor-mayors’ goals were reliant on their relationships with fellow
 councilors.
 o Jill Duson noted that just prior to the last Charter Commission (2009-2010),
 the Council had gradually abdicated its policy-making powers to staff. The
 cultural norm on the Council had become for staff to present policies to
 Council for deliberation and endorsement.


Key Takeaways: Experts Interviews

 • Dr. Chyrl Laird told the committee that the national movement to professional
 management of municipal government in the early 20th century was in response to
 corruption in political patronage systems, like Tammany Hall in New York City.
 • Dr. Laird also said the city manager system served to insulate the business class from
 more populist sentiments on city councils. At-Large council seats further diluted
 populist momentum.
 • Dominick Pangallo serves as chief of staff an executive mayor in Salem, MA (pop.
 43,252). The current mayor, Kim Driscoll, has been a city manager in the past and has
 those professional skills. Salem’s mayor does not sit on the council and the council
 elects its own president, who also chairs the school board.
 • Mr. Pangallo said an executive mayor can see the city’s needs universally, similar to an
 at-large councilor, and can direct resources and programming to areas most in need. • Mr.
 Pangallo also said a mayor tends to be more responsive to public needs than a city
 manager on account of their elected status.
 • Mr. Pangallo said a four-year term is a very long time for an incompetent or destructive

 Page 27
 mayor to run a city hall largely unchecked. Salem’s proximity to Boston benefits the city
 by the number of residents with professional skills who could run for mayor.
 • Dr. Jim Svara said the National Civic League’s Model City Charter endorses the council
 manager form of government.
 • Dr. Svara said a mayor should serve by the power of persuasion rather than executive
 authority, being the chief diplomat of city hall, interfacing between the council,
 manager, public, business interests, and outside officials.
 • Dr. Svara later emailed the committee to say that upon reading Portland’s Charter, he
 sees Portland’s conflicts deriving from the partial powers extended to the mayor,
 leading to confusion and posturing.


 7
Key Takeaways: Managers Interviews

 • Joe Gray has 30 years of experience at Portland City Hall. He was first hired as an Urban
 Planner during the Urban Renewal era. Mr. Gray was installed as city manager on
 December 24, 2000 upon the untimely death of popular City Manager Bob Ganley. Mr.
 Gray retired on February 11, 2011. Mr. Gray served in a council-manager form of
 government.
 • Mr. Gray said effective leadership required constant and diverse input from the mayor,
 individual councilors, neighborhood groups, service providers, and business interests.
 Open, honest, frank, and regular communication was necessary to achieve productive
 outcomes.
 • Mr. Gray saw his job as listening to the mayor’s and council’s goals and setting up the
 systems to deliver on them.
 • Tanisha Briley is the city manager in Gaithersburg, MD (pop: 69,657), and formerly of
 Columbus Heights, OH (pop: 44,571). She talked about seeking out citizens where they
 are for input, namely events where she is likely to talk to busy parents.
 • In Gaithersburg, all council seats are at-large and Ms. Briley appreciated that for their
 city-wide perspectives. She valued councilors as crucial for “ears on the ground.” • Kevin
 Sutherland was once employed as chief of staff for an executive mayor in Ithaca, NY (pop:
 30,569).
 • He mentioned that staff can sometimes drag their feet to wait out an elected mayor
 rather than implement a directive they disagree with.
 • Ithaca had to add the chief of staff position more recently to provide the mayor the
 professional expertise to run a city. Prior to hiring a chief of staff, mayors’ budgets led to
 excessive spending in efforts to fulfill their platforms.
 • In addition to managing city services, the chief of staff served as the gate keeper
 between the Council and City Hall staff.
 • In Saco (pop: 19,497), where Mr. Sutherland was the city administrator, the mayor was
 full-time with an office at City Hall. The mayor nominated the city administrator for hire
 to the Council. The mayor there chaired the Council but only voted in the event of a tie.
 Their primary responsibility was to build and bridge relations between the
 administration, the Council, and the public – which takes a great deal of effort and is

 Page 28
 time-consuming.
 • In Bar Harbor (pop: 5,535), where Mr. Sutherland was soon to be hired as town
 manager, all ordinances go to public vote at the Town Meeting.
 • Sheila Hill-Christian has served as chief of staff in Richmond, VA (pop: 226,622), for both a
 council-manager form of government, and an executive mayor form of government. • She
 said in a council-manager system of government, there is more neighborhood focus. The
 council’s and manager’s staffs talked daily.




 8
 • With an executive mayor, Ms. Hill-Christian observed, there is an emphasis on political
 agenda and political relationships. There is a closer relationship between mayor's office
 and administration than there is with the administration and the council.
 • Ms. Hill-Christian said the mayor's platform was considered to represent the public's
 goals, but the day-to-day operations of delivering city services do not always come into
 consideration. It can be hard for City Hall to focus on the day-to-day when dealing with
 political issues. Executive mayors, she said, struggled with oversight of chief
 administrative officers.
 • In Ms. Hill-Christian’s view, mayors tend to think a few years out, not as long term as
 career professionals. Mayors wanted groundbreakings and ribbon cuttings to keep
 getting reelected.
 • Ms. Hill-Christian also had these thoughts on at-large councilors versus district councilors:
 Local constituencies that people can refer to is important; many small districts force
 local councilors to come to the table and compromise to get their fair share; smaller
 districts allow more communities to have more voice and not be ignored; smaller
 districts allow more people to participate in politics.


Key Takeaways: Councilor Interviews

 • Belinda Ray served on the Portland City Council for District 1 from 2015-2021. •
 She shared:
 o Council holds annual goal-setting meeting every winter. Goals reflected in the
 city manager’s budget in the spring.
 o Policy initiatives from councilors, the mayor, and administration all go to Council
 committees.
 o All councilors have access to city staffers for support services and research upon
 request.
 o She met regularly with City Manager Jon Jennings and had an honest and frank
 rapport with him. She found the administration to be responsive to her requests. o
 Policy adoption reflects the temperament of the Council – some ambitious goals
 could be scaled back, while other ambitious goals could be expanded.
 • David Marshall was elected to the Portland City Council for District 2 and served from


 Page 29
 2006-2015.
• Mr. Marshall:
 o Had advocated before the last Charter Commission (2009-2010) for a much
 stronger mayor than what we have today, though the current iteration is an
 improvement over the councilor-mayor model from before.
 o Observed the current model today with the mayor as a member of the Council
 limits the elected mayor’s ability to pursue a platform.
 o Felt the newly required annual goal-setting meeting on the Council was an odd
 process to evaluate the merits of policy ideas.




 9
 o Saw the city’s government oscillate between “strong manager-weak council” and
 “weak manager-strong council” over different managerial styles. It was a matter
 of personalities, not the Charter structure.
• Pious Ali is on the Portland City Council as an At-Large member. He was first elected in
 2016.
• Mr. Ali says:
 o It is difficult for councilors to move policies outside of the committee structure. o
 If the administration or staff are against your policy goal, they can interfere with its
 progress.
 o The mayor currently has no mechanism for moving policy proposals outside of
 committee structure.
 o Councilors are at the mercy of staff to fulfill individual requests or constituent
 requests. He has experienced some requests go unfulfilled.
 o He supports at-large councilors on the council makeup for their balancing of
 universal needs over local district desires.
• Kimberly Cook represented District 5 on the Portland City Council from 2017-2020. •
Ms. Cook observed:
 o There are no written, formal processes: the city manager will add items to the
 agenda as he sees fit.
 o The manager assigns staff, and how much a Councilor is helped depends on how
 much the manager supports an idea.
 o The difficulty of pushing forward big policy ideas on the Council is why Portland
 has seen public referenda in recent years.
 o Council rules are enforced only by Council, and inconsistently followed. There is
 no grievance mechanism when rules are breached. There is no means of holding
 the City responsible for its own rules of procedure.
 o Only one annual performance review of the city manager took place while she
 was on the Council, in 2020. The review was too narrow in its scope; there was
 not enough opportunity to ask questions, gather information, or engage the
 public.




 Page 30
[END OF REPORT]




 10




 Page 31
Governance Committee Colleagues,

I present the below proposal so that we can consider a system of government for Portland that
more fully moves us away from our current undemocratic City Manager. It was developed based
on the principles I told the voters I would represent, one-on-one feedback from fellow
commissioners who also ran on these principles, testimony from our committee hearings
(although we need to expand that input as described below), emails and comments many of us
have received, my own research, and input from community members.

The core components of the model I am proposing are:

 • Democracy first;
 • Strong checks and balances between both branches;
 • Efficient administration;
 • Public accessibility/accountability.

What I outline is based on the Mayor-Council forms of government that almost all other states in
America have in their largest cities (see attached document). Of particular note, I looked at the
eight other northeast states, which all have elected mayors in their largest city (From Bridgeport
to Manchester to Providence to Boston, etc.). I also looked closely at Wilmington, Delaware.
Wilmington is perhaps the closest to Portland in terms of population vs ratio to the state (70,000
in Wilmington/1,000,000 in Delaware). It is also Delaware’s service center, economic engine,
and one of its most diverse cities, much like Portland.

That said, no individual model from another city will work perfectly for us. After reviewing and
discussing the below proposal, I would suggest the committee invite a number of elected
mayors from neighboring states to join us by zoom. We could then get their direct input on how
their model works and what they would advise as we develop ours.

As you will see, I have tried to address some of the committee concerns regarding the day-to-
day operations and ensuring that our elected Mayor does not get bogged down in the minutia,
while still ensuring public accountability that services are being implemented according to our
values.

Additionally, please note that my proposal contains an elected public advocate (PA). The public
advocate position, as you’ll see, is a bit of a bridge, but also creates third party accountability. It
will be able to fulfill some of the roles that were described in the committee’s version of a council
chief of staff. The particulars are outlined below.

Thanks, and I look forward to discussing this further.

-Nasreen




 Page 32
Strong Council & Elected Mayor

Powers of the Council

City Council becomes the chief policy-making body of the city, including powers to enact all
policy proposals, approve/reject all nominees for department heads and boards/commissions,
approval of the city budget and all revenue changes (including ongoing scrutiny of
expenditures/revenues), and emergency power approvals (further detail of these powers
described in sections below). Councilors serve three-year terms, rotating, sworn in on the first
Monday in January after the November election. No term limits.

City Council elects 2-year Council President from its own ranks with majority vote (removal by
2/3rds). The Council President is the voice of the Council and meets with the Mayor regularly.
President chairs Council meetings, sets Council rules/agenda, and creates/appoints/removes all
standing committees/committee members/chairs. The President may create and appoint
members to any ad-hoc committee to investigate a particular policy and/or investigate
government malfeasance. Plus, any/all other duties bestowed upon the office by a majority vote
of the Council. Council Presidents may not serve more than 4 consecutive terms.

The City Council will have its own independent staff to meet its responsibilities, policy
development, public communications, and administrative tasks. Council’s budget will be
determined within the annual city budget proposed by the Mayor and reviewed in accordance
with the budget process.

Powers of the Mayor

Elected Mayor ensures the implementation of policy and oversees the efficient administration of
the city. No longer a member of the Council and does not have a vote. Does have the ability to
propose policy for Council review and must sign/veto all legislation enacted by the Council
(described below).

The Mayor will nominate for Council review and approval a “City Administrator” who will be
responsible for the day-to-day supervision of all Department Heads, also nominated by the
Mayor, and city operations. The “City Administrator” will serve under the direction of the Mayor,
however, will be required to attend any Council Committee meeting when a committee chair
requests it.

Mayor is elected on the same cycle as the US President (effective 2024) and sworn in on the
first Monday in January after the November election. May serve only two consecutive 4-year
terms.

Nomination and Oversight of Department Heads

The Council reviews/approves/rejects all Mayoral nominees of Department Heads to lead city
staff (Chief of Police, Director of Public Works, Director of HHS, etc.). Council approves/rejects
each nominee with majority vote after the council committee of jurisdiction holds public
hearings/vote on each nominee (for instance: Public Safety Committee reviews nominee for
Chief of Police). Staff below department heads are hired by their respective supervisors and do
not need Council approval.




 Page 33
All Department Heads, after review/approval by Council, will report to and serve at the will of the
Mayor after approval by Council, with day-to-day oversight administered by the City
Administrator. All Department Heads, or designee, are required to provide all requested
information to council committees of jurisdiction and testify to committees when called upon. All
Department Heads may request to attend a Committee meeting to report on any matter
pertaining to the committee’s jurisdiction.

Policy Development

All policy proposals must go through Council for public review/amendment/final disposition.

All Councilors and the Mayor will have the right to submit policy proposals for Council
consideration/review/action. All Department Heads, or their designee, will be available to
elected officials for the purpose of any proposed policy development. (If a staff member or
constituent wants to propose an idea for Council consideration, they can ask an elected official
to sponsor the proposal).

All policies, ordinances, orders, expenditures, revenue changes, etc. approved by Council must
then be signed into law by the Mayor or vetoed within 10 days of passage. Council may override
all vetoes within 15 days, with 75%+ super-majority. If Council overrides, policy is enacted. If
council fails to override, policy is not enacted. If Council fails to override, Council may amend to
generate 75% support of Council or to gain Mayor’s signature.

Council actions that solely impact the operations of the Council (rules, procedures, committee
structures, vacancies, etc.) or that are non-binding statements do not need to be signed by the
Mayor nor can they be vetoed.

Development, Passage and Implementation of Budgets

Mayor develops/proposes City budget, excluding education expenditures, for Council
consideration. Council amends/approves after public hearings. Same veto standard.

The Mayor oversees implementation of the City budget through Department Heads. Council
monitors implementation of the budget through committees of jurisdiction. May request that any
Department Head under their jurisdiction attend their committee meeting to present budget
progress and answer any questions.

Mayor develops/proposes schoolwide education budget, in consultation with School Board
Chair and Superintendent, for School Board consideration. School Board amends/approves
after public hearings and sends to voters for approval. The city council no longer votes on the
school budget.




 Page 34
Compensation

Council salaries increased to $17K a year (from $6K), with annual COLA based on CPI (likely
proposal from Procedures Committee member). Current benefits (HC/Pension, etc.) not
changed. Commensurate for School Board members.

Mayor salary increased to twice the average income for a family of four in Portland as defined
by the annual census (up from 1.5x to recognize the increased responsibilities). Adjusted at the
start of each new term.

Succession Plan

In the event of a vacancy or incapacity of the Mayor, the “Elected Public Advocate” (described
below) is first in line to replace the Mayor. Council President is second.

In the event of a Council or School Board vacancy, the Mayor nominates three people for
consideration. Council or School Board may only seat from the list of nominations. Should they
reject all three, the Mayor must nominate three others. Once seated, the nominee remains in
place until the next general election. The seated individual may run for the seat.


Elected Public Advocate

The Elected Public Advocate serves as an independent ombudsperson for city government
whose mission is to improve the transparency, responsiveness, and accountability of City
government. An additional set of eyes and ears on the council and mayor branches.

Public Advocate is elected on the same cycle as the US President (effective 2024). May serve
only two consecutive 4-year terms.

Duties of the Public Advocate

Public Advocate is charged with meeting constituent needs (direct or referred by any other
elected official), providing outside review of city agencies, responding to FOIA requests,
investigating citizens' complaints about city services, and making proposals to address
perceived structural shortcomings or failures for Mayor or Council consideration. Public
Advocate has authority to propose structural changes to city government and/or greater
oversight controls for Council deliberation and consideration. In the event of a vacancy or
incapacity of the mayor, the Public Advocate is first in line to become Mayor until the end of the
elected term.

Nomination of the City Clerk

The City Clerk, overseeing elections and Clerk functions, becomes an independent office of the
executive and legislative branches by being nominated by the Public Advocate at the beginning
of their term. City Clerk is approved/rejected by the Council. Once approved, the City Clerk
reports to the Public Advocate and may not be removed without recommendation by the Public
Advocate and 66% approval by the Council. The City Clerk is not term-limited and may cross
over administrations.




 Page 35
Nomination of the City Attorney

The City Attorney, providing legal advice to the Council/Mayor and constituents, becomes an
independent office of the executive and legislative branches by being nominated by the Public
Advocate and approved/rejected by the Council. Once approved, the City Attorney reports to the
Public Advocate and may not be removed without recommendation by the Public Advocate and
66% approval by the Council. The City Attorney is not term-limited and may cross over
administrations.

Development, Passage and Implementation of Budget

The Public Advocate’s office will be funded with no less than .05% (half a percent) of total
revenue to the city in order to keep it independent of Mayor/Council determinations (current City
Clerk/Attorney budgets total $1.5M). If they need additional funds, they may request such from
Council for approval through the normal budget process.

Appointments to City Committees and Boards

The Council reviews all nominations to board and commissions for final approval/rejection,
which are now made by the Public Advocate through an open and transparent application
process. Council approves/rejects each nominee with majority vote after the council committee
of jurisdiction holds public hearings/vote on each nominee.

Public Advocate’s Salary:

Public Advocate will be paid 1.5x the average salary for a family of four in Portland as
determined by the annual census.

Succession Plan

In the event of a vacancy or incapacity of the Public Advocate, the Council will appoint a Council
member to fill the role, and a special election will be held to fill the term of the Public Advocate
vacancy at the next general election.


Cost Analysis

This proposal is projected to be revenue neutral.

Implementing this Strong Council and Elected Mayor will save approximately $200,000. With the
elimination of the City Manager, the City will save about $250,000 in salary and benefit costs.
$50K of that would be used for the enhancement of the Mayor’s salary/benefits. The salary for
the proposed City Administrator salary can be pulled from the current Chief of Staff position in
the City Manager’s office.

The Public Advocate’s salary will be covered by shifting the current Deputy City Manager salary
(will save about $50K) and the Clerk and Attorney budgets will stay the same. The department




 Page 36
will then have around $250,000 for community liaisons, administrative work, and investigation
costs.

The cost for the increase to Councilor’s salaries is being explored by the “Procedures
committee” and will be priced out in that committee. This proposal should take into account that
a future Council may want to provide an additional stipend for the Council President.

All that said, obviously if this passes, the annual city budgeting process will determine whether
any particular provision should receive more or fewer resources.




 Forms of government for the largest city of every state


State Largest City Population Chief Executive

Vermont Burlington 42,899 Mayor

West Virginia Charleston 47,215 Mayor

Wyoming Cheyenne 63,957 Mayor

Maine Portland 66,417 Manager

Delaware Wilmington 70,635 Mayor

New Hampshire Manchester 112,525 Mayor

Montana Billings 116,827 Mayor

North Dakota Fargo 124,844 Mayor

South Carolina Charleston 136,208 Mayor

Connecticut Bridgeport 144,900 Mayor

Mississippi Jackson 164,422 Mayor

Rhode Island Providence 179,335 Mayor

South Dakota Sioux Falls 181,883 Mayor

Arkansas Little Rock 197,881 Mayor

Utah Salt Lake City 200,591 Mayor

Alabama Birmingham 208,928 Mayor

Iowa Des Moines 216,853 Manager




 Page 37
Idaho Boise 228,790 Mayor

New Jersey Newark 282,090 Mayor

Alaska Anchorage 291,538 Mayor

Hawaii Honolulu 347,397 Mayor

Kansas Wichita 389,225 Manager

Louisiana New Orleans 399,187 Mayor

Minnesota Minneapolis 427,728 Mayor

Virginia Virginia Beach 450,189 Manager

Nebraska Omaha 468,262 Mayor

Georgia Atlanta 504,527 Mayor

Missouri Kansas City 507,928 Mayor

New Mexico Albuquerque 560,218 Mayor

Wisconsin Milwaukee 592,025 Mayor

Maryland Baltimore 599,827 Mayor

Kentucky Louisville 620,578 Mayor

Nevada Las Vegas 647,829 Manager

Oklahoma Oklahoma City 649,021 Manager

Oregon Portland 661,189 Commission

Michigan Detroit 672,662 Mayor

Tennessee Nashville 681,928 Mayor

Massachusetts Boston 699,927 Mayor

District of Columbia Washington, D.C. 702,455 Mayor

Colorado Denver 716,492 Mayor

Washington Seattle 749,627 Mayor

Indiana Indianapolis 867,125 Mayor




 Page 38
North Carolina Charlotte 881,819 Manager

Ohio Columbus 895,477 Mayor

Florida Jacksonville 903,889 Mayor

Pennsylvania Philadelphia 1,587,828 Mayor

Arizona Phoenix 1,660,272 Manager

Texas Houston 2,325,502 Mayor

Illinois Chicago 2,705,994 Mayor

California Los Angeles 3,994,928 Mayor

New York New York City 8,879,928 Mayor


 Total Population 39,829,721

 Pop. Mayor Cities 34,206,907
 % in Mayor Cities 86%


 Almost 90% of Americans, in comparable cities to Portland, operate with a
 directly elected mayor.




 Page 39
 COST ESTIMATE FOR
 CLEAN ELECTIONS PROGRAM IN PORTLAND, MAINE

Cost Estimate Compiled By: Commissioner Marpheen Chann (At-Large), Chair, Charter
Commission Ad Hoc Elections Committee

Initiative: Establishes a Clean Elections fund to be administered by paid staff within the Office
of the City Clerk, funds to be allocated by the City Council on an annual basis.


 COST ESTIMATE FY 23-24 FY 24-25
 POSITIONS 1.00 1.00
 Personal Services $87,733.73* $90,365.75
 All Other $200,000** $200,000

 TOTAL COST ESTIMATE $287,734.73 $290,366.75




*Grade: 2022 BAND C42 (37.5), Step: 0 (https://www.portlandmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/31790/Order-
254-2021); City Clerk Correspondence; Benefits = 36.9% on average for City of Portland Non-Union Employee. FY
24-25 figure calculated with standard 3% COLA.
** Estimate from League of Women Voters Presentation on Clean Elections on September 21, 2021 (Slide
11)(attached).

 Page 40
 Marpheen Chann <mchann@portlandmaine.gov>



Clean Elections Position in the clerks office
Katherine Jones <klj@portlandmaine.gov> Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 3:56 PM
To: Marpheen Chann <mchann@portlandmaine.gov>

 Hi Marpheen

 Currently the Business License administrator's salary is around $56,000. The Principal Administrative Officer's pay range
 is roughly $65,000. I would think that the position of overseeing the Clean Elections for the City would require a financial
 background and an understanding of elections. So my best guess would be somewhere in the vicinity of $65,000.
 Does this make sense?
 Kathy
 Katherine Jones, City Clerk, CCM, CMC,Registrar
 City of Portland
 389 Congress Street
 Portland, ME 04101
 (207) 874-8614
 (207) 874-8612 Fax




 Page 41
 CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE
 FY22 Proposed Non-Union Pay Plan (2.0%)
 Effective 07/04/21

Grade / Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

BU #2000:
NON UNION

2002 BAND B21 (37.5) (H) $18.1800 $18.7300 $19.2900 $19.8700 $20.4600 $21.0700 $21.7200 $22.3600 $23.0300 $23.7300 $24.4300
  Period / Weekly $681.75 $702.38 $723.38 $745.13 $767.25 $790.13 $814.50 $838.50 $863.63 $889.88 $916.13
  Annual $35,451.00 $36,523.76 $37,615.76 $38,746.76 $39,897.00 $41,086.76 $42,354.00 $43,602.00 $44,908.76 $46,273.76 $47,638.76

2003 BAND B22 (37.5) (H) $19.8300 $20.4300 $21.0400 $21.6800 $22.3200 $22.9900 $23.6800 $24.3900 $25.1200 $25.8800 $26.6600
  Period / Weekly $743.63 $766.13 $789.00 $813.00 $837.00 $862.13 $888.00 $914.63 $942.00 $970.50 $999.75
  Annual $38,668.76 $39,838.76 $41,028.00 $42,276.00 $43,524.00 $44,830.76 $46,176.00 $47,560.76 $48,984.00 $50,466.00 $51,987.00

2004 BAND B23 (37.5) (H) $21.4800 $22.1300 $22.8000 $23.4800 $24.1800 $24.9100 $25.6500 $26.4300 $27.2100 $28.0300 $28.8800
  Period / Weekly $805.50 $829.88 $855.00 $880.50 $906.75 $934.13 $961.88 $991.13 $1,020.38 $1,051.13 $1,083.00
  Annual $41,886.00 $43,153.76 $44,460.00 $45,786.00 $47,151.00 $48,574.76 $50,017.76 $51,538.76 $53,059.76 $54,658.76 $56,316.00

2006 BAND B24 (37.5) (H) $23.5500 $24.2700 $24.9900 $25.7400 $26.5100 $27.3100 $28.1200 $28.9700 $29.8400 $30.7400 $31.6600
  Period / Weekly $883.13 $910.13 $937.13 $965.25 $994.13 $1,024.13 $1,054.50 $1,086.38 $1,119.00 $1,152.75 $1,187.25
  Annual $45,922.76 $47,326.76 $48,730.76 $50,193.00 $51,694.76 $53,254.76 $54,834.00 $56,491.76 $58,188.00 $59,943.00 $61,737.00

2008 BAND B25 (37.5) (H) $26.0300 $26.8200 $27.6200 $28.4500 $29.3000 $30.1800 $31.0800 $32.0300 $32.9800 $33.9700 $35.0000
  Period / Weekly $976.13 $1,005.75 $1,035.75 $1,066.88 $1,098.75 $1,131.75 $1,165.50 $1,201.13 $1,236.75 $1,273.88 $1,312.50
  Annual $50,758.76 $52,299.00 $53,859.00 $55,477.76 $57,135.00 $58,851.00 $60,606.00 $62,458.76 $64,311.00 $66,241.76 $68,250.00

2010 BAND B32 (37.5) (H) $26.0300 $26.8200 $27.6200 $28.4500 $29.3000 $30.1800 $31.0800 $32.0300 $32.9800 $33.9700 $35.0000
  Period / Weekly $976.13 $1,005.75 $1,035.75 $1,066.88 $1,098.75 $1,131.75 $1,165.50 $1,201.13 $1,236.75 $1,273.88 $1,312.50
  Annual $50,758.76 $52,299.00 $53,859.00 $55,477.76 $57,135.00 $58,851.00 $60,606.00 $62,458.76 $64,311.00 $66,241.76 $68,250.00




FY22 2000 NU Grade Band-B Non-Union Proposed Pay Plan (2.0 Pct) 2 04/28/21
 Page 42
 CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE
 FY22 Proposed Non-Union Pay Plan (2.0%)
 Effective 07/04/21
Grade / Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

BU #2000:
NON UNION
2020 BAND C41 (37.5) $31.2939 $32.2317 $33.2011 $34.2011 $35.2211 $36.2816 $37.3632
  Period / Weekly $1,173.52 $1,208.69 $1,245.04 $1,282.54 $1,320.79 $1,360.56 $1,401.12
  Annual (A) $61,023.00 $62,852.00 $64,742.00 $66,692.00 $68,681.00 $70,749.00 $72,858.00

2022 BAND C42 (37.5) $32.8645 $33.8435 $34.8539 $35.9040 $36.9755 $38.0973 $39.2395
  Period / Weekly $1,232.42 $1,269.13 $1,307.02 $1,346.40 $1,386.58 $1,428.65 $1,471.48
  Annual (A) $64,086.00 $65,995.00 $67,965.00 $70,013.00 $72,102.00 $74,290.00 $76,517.00

2024 BAND C43 (37.5) $34.5067 $35.5368 $36.6083 $37.6989 $38.8317 $40.0045 $41.1979
  Period / Weekly $1,294.00 $1,332.63 $1,372.81 $1,413.71 $1,456.19 $1,500.17 $1,544.92
  Annual (A) $67,288.00 $69,297.00 $71,386.00 $73,513.00 $75,722.00 $78,009.00 $80,336.00

2026 BAND C44 (37.5) $36.3939 $37.4851 $38.6072 $39.7701 $40.9632 $42.1872 $43.4517
  Period / Weekly $1,364.77 $1,405.69 $1,447.77 $1,491.38 $1,536.12 $1,582.02 $1,629.44
  Annual (A) $70,968.00 $73,096.00 $75,284.00 $77,552.00 $79,878.00 $82,265.00 $84,731.00

2030 BAND C45 (37.5) $39.0155 $40.1883 $41.4021 $42.6360 $43.9211 $45.2373 $46.5835
  Period / Weekly $1,463.08 $1,507.06 $1,552.58 $1,598.85 $1,647.04 $1,696.40 $1,746.88
  Annual (A) $76,080.00 $78,367.00 $80,734.00 $83,140.00 $85,646.00 $88,213.00 $90,838.00

2032 BAND C51 (37.5) $36.3939 $37.4851 $38.6072 $39.7701 $40.9632 $42.1872 $43.4517
  Period / Weekly $1,364.77 $1,405.69 $1,447.77 $1,491.38 $1,536.12 $1,582.02 $1,629.44
  Annual (A) $70,968.00 $73,096.00 $75,284.00 $77,552.00 $79,878.00 $82,265.00 $84,731.00

2034 BAND C52 (37.5) $39.0155 $40.1883 $41.4021 $42.6360 $43.9211 $45.2373 $46.5835
  Period / Weekly $1,463.08 $1,507.06 $1,552.58 $1,598.85 $1,647.04 $1,696.40 $1,746.88
  Annual (A) $76,080.00 $78,367.00 $80,734.00 $83,140.00 $85,646.00 $88,213.00 $90,838.00

2040 BAND D61 (37.5) $41.3611 $42.5955 $43.8701 $45.1861 $46.5432 $47.9501 $49.3784
  Period / Weekly $1,551.04 $1,597.33 $1,645.13 $1,694.48 $1,745.37 $1,798.13 $1,851.69
  Annual (A) $80,654.00 $83,061.00 $85,547.00 $88,113.00 $90,759.00 $93,503.00 $96,288.00

2042 BAND D62 (37.5) $43.4216 $44.7272 $46.0632 $47.4405 $48.8784 $50.3373 $51.8467
  Period / Weekly $1,628.31 $1,677.27 $1,727.37 $1,779.02 $1,832.94 $1,887.65 $1,944.25
  Annual (A) $84,672.00 $87,218.00 $89,823.00 $92,509.00 $95,313.00 $98,158.00 $101,101.00

2044 BAND D63 (37.5) $45.5939 $46.9611 $48.3789 $49.8168 $51.3165 $52.8565 $54.4373
  Period / Weekly $1,709.77 $1,761.04 $1,814.21 $1,868.13 $1,924.37 $1,982.12 $2,041.40
  Annual (A) $88,908.00 $91,574.00 $94,339.00 $97,143.00 $100,067.00 $103,070.00 $106,153.00

2047 BAND D64 (37.5) $49.7760 $51.2651 $52.8056 $54.3968 $56.0184 $57.7016 $59.4360
  Period / Weekly $1,866.60 $1,922.44 $1,980.21 $2,039.88 $2,100.69 $2,163.81 $2,228.85
  Annual (A) $97,063.00 $99,967.00 $102,971.00 $106,074.00 $109,236.00 $112,518.00 $115,900.00

2045 BAND D65 (37.5) $51.5611 $53.1117 $54.7032 $56.3445 $58.0379 $59.7827 $61.5672
  Period / Weekly $1,933.54 $1,991.69 $2,051.37 $2,112.92 $2,176.42 $2,241.85 $2,308.77
  Annual (A) $100,544.00 $103,568.00 $106,671.00 $109,872.00 $113,174.00 $116,576.00 $120,056.00

2046 BAND D71 (37.5) $48.0933 $49.5312 $51.0205 $52.5611 $54.1211 $55.7533 $57.4261
FY22 2000 NU Grade Band-C and D Non-Union Proposed Pay Plan (2.0 Pct) 3 04/29/21
 Page 43
 CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE
 FY22 Proposed Non-Union Executive Pay Plan (2.0%)
 Effective 07/04/21

Grade / Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

BU #1100:
EXECUTIVE

1101 BAND E81 (37.5) $54.6517 $56.2939 $57.9872 $59.7211 $61.5061 $63.3627 $65.2595
  Period / Weekly $2,049.44 $2,111.02 $2,174.52 $2,239.54 $2,306.48 $2,376.10 $2,447.23
  Annual (A) $106,571.00 $109,773.00 $113,075.00 $116,456.00 $119,937.00 $123,557.00 $127,256.00

1102 BAND E82 (37.5) $57.3851 $59.0989 $60.8840 $62.7099 $64.5765 $66.5245 $68.5235
  Period / Weekly $2,151.94 $2,216.21 $2,283.15 $2,351.62 $2,421.62 $2,494.67 $2,569.63
  Annual (A) $111,901.00 $115,243.00 $118,724.00 $122,284.00 $125,924.00 $129,723.00 $133,621.00

1103 BAND E83 (37.5) $60.2517 $62.0568 $63.9235 $65.8307 $67.8099 $69.8499 $71.9411
  Period / Weekly $2,259.44 $2,327.13 $2,397.13 $2,468.65 $2,542.87 $2,619.37 $2,697.79
  Annual (A) $117,491.00 $121,011.00 $124,651.00 $128,370.00 $132,229.00 $136,207.00 $140,285.00

1104 BAND E92 (37.5) $68.1467 $70.1867 $72.2973 $74.4600 $76.6939 $78.9995 $81.3656
  Period / Weekly $2,555.50 $2,632.00 $2,711.15 $2,792.25 $2,876.02 $2,962.48 $3,051.21
  Annual (A) $132,886.00 $136,864.00 $140,980.00 $145,197.00 $149,553.00 $154,049.00 $158,663.00




FY22 1100 NU Executive Pay Plan Proposed Pay Plan (2.0 Pct) 1 04/28/21
 Page 44
Clean Elections: Context and Best Practices
  Presentation to Portland Charter Commission, Elections Committee
  Anna Kellar, Executive Director, Maine Citizens for Clean Elections

 Page 45
Nationwide Examples
 New York City, NY 1988, 2018 Small Donor Match

 Maine (1st State!) 1996, 2015 Clean Elections Grant

 Arizona 1998 Clean Elections Grant

 Boulder, CO 2001 Small Donor Match

 Connecticut 2005 Clean Elections Grant

 Santa Fe, NM 2008 Grant + Small Donor Match

 Seattle, WA 2015 Voucher

 Washington, DC 2018 Small Donor Match

 Portland, OR 2018 Small Donor Match

 ...and more!
 Page 46
Goals


● Eliminate corruption or appearance of corruption
● Expand political equity
● Improve representation by allowing diversity of candidates
● Limit cost of elections




 Page 47
Key Features
 A Starting Point: Public Funding Charter Amendment


Section 12. Public Financing of Municipal Elections

The city council shall establish and fund a mechanism providing public campaign funds to qualified
candidates for mayor, city council, and school board. The mechanism must provide sufficient funds
to allow candidates who meet qualifying criteria to conduct competitive campaigns, must be
voluntary, must limit the amount of private funds a candidate may raise, must only be available to
candidates who demonstrate public support, and must be limited to candidates who enter into a
binding agreement not to accept private contributions other than those allowed by the public
funding program. The mechanism must be available by the 2021 municipal elections.




 Page 48
Key Features
1. “Provide sufficient funds to allow candidates who meet qualifying criteria to conduct
 competitive campaigns...”

 Candidates who use public funding must receive sufficient funds to get their message out to
voters and respond to messages from opponents. However, competitive does not mean unlimited
funding. Seed money or Seed Grants are also important elements.




 Page 49
Key Features
 2. Must be voluntary

 The US Supreme Court has ruled that public funding programs are constitutional so long as
they are not mandatory. This means that no candidate can be legally compelled to participate. It
also means that the overall campaign finance regulatory system cannot make it impossible or
impractical to conduct a viable campaign with private funding.




 Page 50
Key Features
 3. May limit the amount of private funds a candidate in the program may raise

 Early campaign reforms focused on limiting candidate spending. But over three decades ago
the Supreme Court ruled that limits on candidate spending are unconstitutional unless they are part
of a voluntary system. The public strongly supports limits on campaign spending, and experience
with the Maine Clean Election Act shows that candidates also like spending limits.




 Page 51
Key Features
 4. Must only be available to candidates who demonstrate public support

 Public funding should support viable candidates, who are willing to work hard and have the
support of a significant number in the community. For example, under the Maine Clean Elections
Act, candidates demonstrate public support by collecting a set number of $5 contributions from
their constituents before they qualify for public funds. This ensures that limited public resources are
targeted to candidates who can show that they are truly viable.




 Page 52
Key Features
 5. Must be limited to candidates who enter into a binding agreement not to accept
 private contributions other than those allowed by the public funding program

 A voluntary public funding system not only allows for overall spending limits, but it also allows
strict limits on what any one contributor may give to a candidate. This helps prevent corruption and
the appearance of corruption, freeing elected officials to vote their conscience and the best
interests of their constituents. With private funding, a single contributor can often give a very large
amount, making many candidates feel a sense of obligation and indebtedness.




 Page 53
Additional Considerations
● Dedicated fund w/ annual appropriation and rollover, insulated from politics
● Independent administration w/ commission
● Public education and engagement mandate
● Allowing those with low/no disposable income to participate
● Date for implementation




 Page 54
Types of Programs
● Grant (ME, CT)
● Small Donor Match (NYC)
● Voucher (Seattle)
● Cost of fund is similar
 ○ Approx 100,000-250,000 per year
 ○ Less than 0.05% of budget




 Page 55
What to consider
● Variation between administrative burdens
● Equity - how many people are donors? How can they participate?
● Albuquerque and Santa Fe examples




 Page 56
 Questions?
 Mainecleanelections.org
anna@mainecleanelections.org
 Page 57
 CLEAN ELECTIONS PROPOSAL

 Sponsored by Commissioner Catherine Buxtion (At-Large)

Section 12. Public Financing of Municipal Elections

The City Council shall establish and fully fund a mechanism
providing public campaign funds to qualified candidates for
elected municipal offices. The Council will provide an independent
allocation from the City’s budget each year in order to ensure the
program is sustained and can be made available to candidates for
each election.

The mechanism must:
 ● Provide sufficient funds to allow candidates who meet
 qualifying criteria to conduct competitive campaigns.
 ● Be voluntary.
 ● Limit the amount of private funds a candidate may raise.
 ● Only be available to candidates who demonstrate public
 support.
 ● Be limited to candidates who enter into a binding
 agreement not to accept private contributions other than
 those allowed by the public funding program.
 ● Require that all unused funds from a participating
 candidate’s campaign are returned to the public election
 fund within 100 days of election.
 ● Be limited to candidates who agree to participate in at
 least one city-sponsored debate or voter education event.

The mechanism must be available by the 2024 municipal election.

The mechanism shall be administered by the City Clerk. The Clerk
shall ensure there are adequate resources, including paid staff,
to ensure effective administration of the program.

The city council may adopt additional regulations and ordinances
not inconsistent with this section.

Section 13. Campaign Finance Rules for All Candidates




 Page 58
a. Corporate Contributions. A business entity may not make
 contributions to any candidate for municipal office. The
 term business entity refers to a firm, partnership,
 corporation, incorporated association or other
 organization, whether organized as a for-profit or a
 nonprofit entity.
b. Campaign Contributions Reporting. All contributions to
 campaigns for candidates or ballot questions must be
 reported to the City Clerk, aligning with all state
 guidelines. The Clerk must establish a searchable online
 publicly accessible database to include all reported
 campaign finance information.




 Page 59
 MEMORANDUM

To: Portland Charter Commission

From: Jim Katsiaficas

Date: March 22, 2022

Re: Legal Issues – Charter Revision Question(s); Districting Questions

At a recent Charter Commission Meeting, Commissioner O’Brien asked who decides whether
and how to organize charter commission revisions into one or more ballot questions. The answer
is that the Charter Commission determines this by majority vote. Title 30-A M.R.S. §2105(1)(A)
provides “A. If the charter commission, in its final report under section 2103, subsection 5,
recommends that the present charter continue in force with only minor modifications, those
modifications may be submitted to the voters in as many separate questions as the commission
finds practicable. The determination to submit the charter revision in separate questions under
this paragraph and the number and content of these questions must be made by a majority of the
charter commission.”

Commissioners have asked how City Council districts currently are determined and what legal
standards apply, and asked if increases in City Council district seats necessarily require an
increase in School Board seats.

Article II, Section 1 of the current Charter provides for the division of the City into five districts
for purposes of all City elections:

 For the purpose of all elections the city, including its islands, shall be divided into
 five (5) districts to establish compact and contiguous districts of approximately
 equal population.

 The city council for voting purposes may by ordinance divide the election districts
 into voting districts.

The number of both City Council and School Board district seats are based on this
provision. Article II, Section 2 provides for election of one City councilor to “be elected
from each of the five (5) districts heretofore provided for [in Article II, Section 1].”
Article III, Section 1 provides for five School Board members to be elected from each of
the five districts established under Article II, Section 1.


ONE CANAL PLAZA, PO BOX 426
PORTLAND, ME 04112-0426
207.774.2635
FAX 207.871.8026
www.perkinsthompson.com
{P1999664.1}



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March 22, 2022


State law (30-A M.R.S. §2503) requires municipalities that have districts to reapportion their
districts through enactment of a reapportionment ordinance by the municipal legislative body
within one year after the Maine Legislature completes its reapportionment, which follows each
decennial national census. In that reapportionment, “Each district must contain as nearly as
possible the same number of inhabitants as determined according to the latest Federal Decennial
Census, but districts may not differ in number of inhabitants by more than 10% of the inhabitants
in the smallest district created.” This is the result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring
equal weighting of votes. The City Council, as Portland’s municipal legislative body, establishes
district reapportionment by ordinance. The City currently is conducting its reapportionment,
which must be completed by August 10, 2022, 90 days before the November election.

As noted above, the City Charter establishes five districts for purposes of all City elections, and
so this sets out the number of districts and district seats for both Council and School Board
elections. Except for the current Charter, I know of no other legal requirement that the number
of School Board district seats equal the number of City Council district seats.

However, there is the practical issue of conducting City elections if there were differing numbers
of Council and School Board districts, since there would be two different sets of districts with
different boundaries. Election workers at polling places would have to offer multiple district
ballots since Council and School Board district lines would not be the same. This already
happens where State legislative district lines divide City districts, and would add another layer of
complexity to City election management.

Moreover, in discussing this with the School Board’s legal counsel, I understand that the School
Board has not taken a position on the potential of increasing the number of district seats, but that
the Superintendent believes the School Board’s general desire for greater diversity of
representation and for parity with the City Council means that the School Board would want to
increase the number of district seats accordingly.




{P1999664.1} PERKINS THOMPSON
 PAGE 2

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 Council Districts Proposal
 Sponsored by Commissioner Marpheen Chann (At-Large)
An issue that has been raised both during the Charter Commission election and deliberations has been that
of increasing the size of the City Council to ensure more representation on the Council. The proposal is
loosely based on Burlington’s (VT) model and Maine’s State Senate and State House districts (where
State Senate districts overlay numerous House districts).
In looking at the existing Council, another issue that arises is what to do with at-large seats. Currently, at-
large seats are held by councilors from diverse backgrounds: Councilor Pious Ali, Councilor April
Fournier, and Councilor Roberto Rodriguez. Research articles detailing the tradeoffs of at-large and
single-member districts are attached.
The original proposal taken up offered two avenues: Keep at-large seats or create larger districts that
overlay ward/precincts that preserve the “unifying effect.”
During a joint Governance and Elections Committee meeting, there was consensus that the number of
total districts should be thirteen (13). Commissioners disagreed on whether or not to keep at-large seats.
The Elections Committee at their February 15th, 2022, meeting agreed to forward the discussion on at-
large seats to the full commission along with a proposal of a thirteen (13) member council.


PROPOSAL:

  Thirteen (13) Member Council
 o Ten (10) Districts or Wards
 o Three (3) At-Large
  Redistricting
 o Use voting precincts as template for wards
  Mayor Role
 o Governance proposals have mayor separate from the Council




 Page 62
 Council Structure Analysis

 Population Size of District At-Large Is Mayor Pop/District Accountability Note
 Council Seats Seats on Council? Seat For how many
 members may a
10 Largest Maine Cities voter vote?***

Portland 66,215 9 5 3 yes 13,243 5 of 9
Lewiston 36,409 8 7 0 yes 5,201 2 of 8
Bangor 32,356 9 0 9 no mayor 9 of 9
South Portland 25,364 7 5 2 no mayor 5,073 7 of 7
Auburn 23,564 8 5 2 yes 4,713 4 of 8
Biddeford 21,526 10 7 2 yes 3,075 4 of 10
Sanford 21,387 7 0 6 yes 7 of 7
Saco 20,554 8 7 0 yes 2,936 2 of 8
Westbrook 19,266 7 5 2 no 3,853 3 of 7
Augusta 18,795 9 4 4 yes 4,699 6 of 9

average 8.2 4.5 3 4,279

***figure includes 1 district member, all at-large members, and elected mayor if mayor sits on council
 exception is South Portland where district seats must be occupied by a district resident but all voters may vote for all council positions

Cities similar in population to Portland in other states with 1-3 congressional districts

Bismarck, ND 74,100 5 0 4 yes 5 of 5
Missoula, MT 73,489 13 12 0 yes 12,248 3 of 13 all 6 districts elect 2 members
Rapid City, SD 75,258 11 10 0 yes 15,052 3 of 11 all 5 districts elect 2 members
Santa Fe, NM 84,683 9 8 0 yes 21,171 3 of 9 all 4 districts elect 2 members
Cheyenne, WY 64,618 9 9 0 no 21,539 3 of 9 all 3 districts elect 3 members
Idaho Falls, ID 64,618 7 0 6 yes 7 of 7
Charleston, WVA 48,864 27 20 6 yes 7 of 27
Grand Island, NE 51,267 11 10 0 yes 10,253 3 of 11 all 5 districts elect 2 members
Burlington, VT 44,743 13 8 4 yes 5,593 3 of 13 8 districts divided into 4 regions
 and each elects 1 at-large member
average 64,627 11.7 8.6 2.2 14,309




 Page 63
 City Council Make-Up
 November 2021

The Portland Charter Commission will examine two important changes regarding the make-up
of Portland’s City Council:
 1. Should the number of seats on the Council be expanded?
 2. Should Portland keep its hybrid structure (at-large + district seats) or opt for a
 council with a different structure?
Political debate over the make-up of legislative bodies (national, state, and local) in the US goes
back to colonial times with no conclusion as to what constitutes an optimal solution.1 This is
because any given council structure involves complex trade-offs between multiple and
oftentimes conflicting aspects of what constitutes “good government”. Municipal reform
advocates have posited several widely-shared core values or goals for evaluating council reform
efforts.2 Specifically, such efforts might be designed to:
 • increase the representativeness of council members
 • increase the responsiveness of the council to community needs
 • increase citizen engagement in council deliberations
 • increase the accountability of the council to voters
 • increase the council’s ability to make decisions for the public good
 • enhance the efficiency of council operations
Experience has shown that reforms which make improvements in one or more areas can have
negative effects in others. As a simple example, increasing the number of district councilors by
having smaller electoral districts may be expected to increase the representativeness and
responsiveness of a council but reduce its operational efficiency, its ability to reach consensual
decisions, and the ability of individual voters to hold the council responsible for its actions.
The attached chart shows the impact on each core value of three alternative proposals to
change the make-up of Portland’s current Council.3

What we know about Council size
The 2018 Municipal Form of Government Survey conducted by the International City/County
Management Association (ICMA) provides data on existing council sizes in the US. For cities
with 50-100,000 in population (n=184), council size ranged from 3-40 members with the mean,
median, and mode being 7.4 Small councils (4 members or less) and large ones (10 or more
members) are unusual. Small councils do not provide the level of human resources and variety
of views needed to run a city while large councils become unwieldy and make it difficult to


1
  “No political problem is less susceptible to a precise solution than that which relates to the number convenient
for a representative legislature…”, James Madison, The Federalist, #54.
2
  For example: Muzzio, D. and T. Tompkins (1989) On the Size of the City Council: Finding the Mean in Proceedings
of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 83-96 available at jstor and City Club of Portland
(Oregon,2020) New Government for Today's Portland: Rethinking How We Vote.
3
  Evaluation of impacts based on info in Muzzio and Tompkins, City Club of Portland, Naional League of Cities,
Cities 101: At-Large and District Elections, and ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.
4
  Numbers provided by Tad McGalliard, ICMA Director of Research, in email dated 9/20/21.

 Page 64
develop coherent policies. Five, seven, and nine member councils are most common with the
odd number of members favored to avoid tie votes.
There are few empirical analyses of the effects of city council size because it is difficult to
isolate size effects from the influence of other factors, leaving much of the available information
speculative and anecdotal. One size cannot be called better than others; rather, different sized
councils are conducive to different goals.5

What we know about Council composition and election methods
The 2018 ICMA survey found that exclusively at-large councils are most popular in cities of
Portland’s size (49% of respondents). A mix of at-large and district seats was found in 31% of
cities that responded to the survey; only 20% of respondents had district only seats.6
Conclusive research on how well the different approaches support particular values is scarce. In
general, at-large only councils tend to be less representative of a city's diversity than councils
with some or all district seats. Although at-large systems remain popular, the Supreme Court has
frequently found them discriminatory because they make it difficult for minority communities to
elect members to the council. An outlier is Cambridge MA which elects a diversified at-large
council all at one time using a proportional ranked-choice voting system.7
Exclusively district representation tends to produce more representative and responsive councils,
but only if gerrymandering is under control. On the downside, district only seats can lead to
councilors focusing on narrow district needs rather than what is best for the entire city.
Traditional single-member district systems are now being challenged by proponents of multi-
member districts. For example, if a single member district system had a council with 8 district
councilors, the multimember version might have 3 districts and 8 councilors, with 2 or 3 council
members elected per district, depending on size. Proponents argue that multimember districts
facilitate majority and minority representation from each district, increase voter choice,
encourage voters to diversify their votes, allow more candidates to enter each race, and allow
underrepresented groups to boost individual candidates.8 The larger the district and the number
of councilors per district, the more likely elections will yield a diverse council.
Portland's experience with a hybrid system has not been systematically studied in terms of the
values listed in our table. In terms of representativeness, however, it is interesting to note that in
the 110 council elections since 1984, women have won 35% (20 of 63) of district races and 30%
(14 of 47) of the at-large races. Minority candidates have won 3% (2 of 63) of district races and
19% (9 of 47) of the at-large races. Portland's experience runs counter to the conventional
wisdom that minorities do better in district races and women do better in at-large races.

Conclusion
The structure and size of the City Council are two among many interacting factors that affect city
politics, so any changes must be evaluated in the context of other changes that the Portland
Charter Commission may recommend. No single model is best for all situations, so
understanding the advantages and disadvantages of different options is a first step toward
identifying a path forward for Portland.

5
  Muzzio and Tompkins.
6
  Numbers provided by IMCA on 9/20/21. (n=183).
7
  FairVote, Spotlight: Cambridge, accessed 10/20/21.
8
  ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. Accessed 8/20/2021. Look for headings on Single-member districts:
Advantages and Disadvantages and Multimember districts: Advantages and Disadvantages.


 Page 65
Page 66
Cities 101 -- At-Large and District Elections
December 14, 2016Background


Background
The form of municipal elections varies from city to city, with three common variations:
some cities elect their local representatives by at-large elections, some by district, and
some using a mixed system.
The election system of a given city is determined by the nature of the council members'
constituency and by the presence or absence of party labels on the ballot. With regard
to the first feature, there are two types of constituencies for city council members: at-
large and district.
At-Large
All at-large members are elected to serve the same constituency, which is the
population of the city as a whole. At-large election proponents favor having council
members elected by the entire city because:

 • Council members in an at-large system can be more impartial, rise above
 the limited perspective of a single district and concern themselves with the
 problems of the whole community;
 • Vote trading between councilmembers may be minimized; and
 • The number of candidates available for election tends to be larger.
However, at-large elections can weaken the representation of particular groups, such as
people of color, especially if the group does not have a citywide base of operations or is
an ethnic or racial group concentrated in a specific ward.
At-large election systems are prevalent at the municipal level and a considerable
majority make use of at-large voting in some way. At-large elections tend to be more
practical in small cities and more homogeneous areas.
District
These elections select a single council member from a corresponding geographical
section of the city, called a district or ward. District election proponents favor having
council members elected to represent individual wards because:




 Page 67
 • District elections give all legitimate groups, especially those with a
 geographic base, a better chance of being represented on the city council,
 especially communities of color. Several court decisions have forced
 jurisdictions to switch from at-large elections to district elections, and in
 most cases the reason was to allow more representation by specific ethnic
 and racial groups acknowledging that the prior system was a denial of equal
 access to the city’s political process. (See: McNeil v. City of Springfield, IL,
 1987; and Williams v. City of Dallas, 1990; and Montes v. City of Yakima,
 2014);
 • District councilmembers are more attuned to the unique problems of their
 constituents, such as crime levels, small lot development, trash pick-up,
 potholes, and recreation programs; and
 • District elections may improve citizen participation because
 councilmembers who represent a specific district may be more responsive
 to their constituency.
However, councils elected by district elections may experience more infighting and be
less likely to prioritize the good of the city over the good of their district. Larger
municipalities tend to use district elections (Chicago and Philadelphia are examples).


Mixed-System
More than twenty percent of municipalities combine these two methods by electing
some council members at-large and some from districts. Mixed systems which provide
more district seats than at-large seats are more likely to stand Constitutional scrutiny.


Sources
Morgan, David and Robert England. Managing Urban America, 5th Edition. New York,
NY: Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 1999.
Moulder, Evelina. "Municipal Form of Government: Trends in Structure, Responsibility,
and Composition." In The Municipal Year Book, 2008. Washington, DC: International
City/County Management Association, 2008.
Renner, Tari and Victor S. DeSantis. "Municipal Form of Government: Issues and
Trends." In The Municipal Year Book, 1998. Washington, DC: International City/County
Management Association, 1998.
Svara, James H. Two Decades of Continuity and Change in American City Councils.
Washington, DC: National League of Cities, 2003.




 Page 68
 No. 14


The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts




 Scott Hofer
 Hobby School of Public Affairs
 Department of Political Science
 University of Houston
 sjhofer@uh.edu


 Cong Huang
 Hobby School of Public Affairs
 University of Houston
 chuang23@central.uh.edu


 Richard Murray
 Hobby School of Public Affairs
 Department of Political Science
 University of Houston
 rmurray@central.uh.edu




 October 2018




 Page 69
Hobby School of Public Affairs White Paper Series___________________________________________________



The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts

Scott Hofer, University of Houston
Cong Huang, University of Houston
Richard Murray, University of Houston


 This report provides a review of the existing literature about the trade-offs between at-
 large and single-member districts at the local offices in the United States. Overall, at-
 large districts were the most common form of representation in most local offices until
 the 1960s and the passage of Voting Rights Act in 1965. Since the 1960s single-member
 districts have been the method of choice for most local elections because they enable
 smaller, geographically situated communities to send their own representatives to larger
 legislative assemblies. The history behind these two electoral systems corresponds with
 their respective pros and cons. In general, at-large elections are found to improve
 diversity in gender representation on city councils with more female councilors being
 elected. On the other hand, single-member districts benefit the representation of some
 racial minority groups, including African Americans and Latinos. But the positive
 potential depends on context: (1) the concentration, (2) the size, and (3) the polarization
 of the vote. Specifically, the advantages of single-member districts are minimal in a
 largely homogenous community or in a community where underrepresented groups are
 not concentrated geographically. African Americans are found to be overrepresented on
 school boards with at-large elections when African Americans occupy a smaller part of
 the population.

Keywords: at-large districts, single-member districts, gender representation, racial
representation.


Background

 The literature on structures of elections focuses on local levels in the United States because
there is little variation in representation structures in higher offices (Davidson 1979; Meier and
Stewart 1991; Rocha 2007; Zax 1990). The United States does have single member (hereafter:
SM) districts in the 43 states that have two or more members in the House of Representatives,
while U.S. senators are elected at-large (hereafter AL) in all 50 states, as are almost all executive
officers at the state level. That being the case, the best opportunity to study the effects on of
electoral systems are in the thousands of local offices in the U.S., specifically school districts,
county commissions and city councils. Overall, at-large districts were the most common form of
representation in most local offices until the 1960s and the passage of Voting Rights Act (VRA)
in 1965 (Davidson 1992).
 The history behind SM and AL districts systems correspond with their respective pros and
cons. While context is key, the following section is a broad overview of the existing literature
about the trade-offs in both systems. Then we move to the discussion of more nuanced findings
pertaining to gender and racial representation in these two systems.

 1	  


 Page 70
 At-Large and Single-Member Districts
	  

 At-large elections have been employed when ruling majorities attempt to emphasize the
corporate identity of particular jurisdictions and to suppress partisan or ethnic factionalism. The
basic idea being that those elected to AL districts will be more likely to work toward the best
result for the whole community rather than pander to the specific demands in parts of the
community. Work in political science broadly illustrates that substantive representation is most
common in AL systems for the wealthiest and most connected in the community (Enns and
Wlezien 2011; Gilens and Page 2014; Meier et al. 2005). Additionally, AL systems have the
benefit of increasing the diversity in gender representation with more women being elected in
these systems (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). However, people of color are less likely to be
elected in AL systems because the votes of racial minorities are diluted in elections that cover a
broader area (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). The importance of AL systems for diverse cities has
been the focus of lawsuits and VRA compliance. In more homogenous communities, the
difference between AL and SM districts are less pronounced in terms of racial representation,
while the overall trends of representation patterns along gender and economic lines remain.
 Since the 1960s SM districts have been the method of choice for most local elections because
they enable smaller, geographically situated communities to send their own representatives to
larger legislative assemblies. SM systems provide the benefits of localized democracy. In cases
of city councils and school boards, elected members in SM systems might only represent a small
neighborhood which allows legislators to be intimately aware of the issues of the local
community. This allows the elected member to focus on the needs of their localized constituency
rather than the interests of all. In diverse places, especially where diversity is in highly
segregated communities, the SM systems promote diversity with increasing minority
representation (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier et al. 2005; Trounstine and Valdini
2008; Zax 1990).
 Yet, this diversity in racial representation is likely to be contrasted with the loss of gender
representation and the tendency for fewer women to be elected in these systems. As noted, SM
systems have become more popular in the United States after passage of the VRA as a
mechanism to increase representation of racial minorities (Davidson 1992). In some cases, SM
systems were implemented due to lawsuits such as Thornburg v. Gingles in 1986 alleging the AL
systems in place unduly discriminated against cohesive groups of people of color to participate
equally in the process by electing disproportionately white officials (Kosterlitz 1986).
 Finally, a small, but growing number of communities have incorporated a mixed approach
that combines AL and SM systems. The Houston City Council is an example of these mixed
bodies. While there is variation in the impacts of mixed system (they should be thought of as a
continuum between AL and SM) the conclusion in the literature is that mixed systems typically
provide benefits similar to SM districts. These mixed systems and modified AL systems provide
descriptive representation similar to SM districts (Brockington et al. 1998; Karnig and Welch
1982; Welch 1990). Given the proportion of SM to AL districts (11 to 5) on the Houston City
Council,1 it is especially likely to produce representation outcome similar to purely SM district
systems.




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
 https://www.houstontx.gov/council/.

 2
	  

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Hobby School of Public Affairs White Paper Series___________________________________________________
	  

The Voting Rights Act and Electoral Structures

 In the United States, AL elections were popular for local elections; especially as a
mechanism to ensure that a bloc-voting white majority could deny black citizens the opportunity
to choose representatives of their choice in local governments. In 1965, mass politics changed
the landscape of racial diversity and racial representation through the VRA. Language allowing
judicial review of minority vote dilution efforts in places with a history of disenfranchising
minority voters initially helped push communities away from AL systems. However, court
rulings undermined this language in the late 1970s. By 1980, the courts had established that
racial minorities must prove that a challenged election structure was designed or maintained
intentionally to dilute their voting power. However, the passage of the VRA of 1982 changed
this standard was from racial intent to vote dilution in practice, making minority lawsuits more
likely to succeed. The 1986 Thornburg v. Gingle ruling created a quicker and easier process for
providing a remedy for vote dilution, resulting in widespread changes from AL elections to SM
elections, through both litigation and legislation (Davidson 1992; Kosterlitz 1986). Although the
courts would later reverse course on some aspects of the VRA, the legacy of the rulings in the
1980s has become the status quo.


Electoral Systems and Gender Representation

 One major focus in the relevant literature is on the role of gender representation in AL versus
SM structures. Table 1 summarizes the trade-offs between these two systems regarding gender
representation in particular. While SM districts are typically seen as a remedy to a lack of
diversity, AL districts are the most likely to produce female elected members (Trounstine and
Valdini 2008). Unlike racial diversity, gender diversity among the population is stable across
geography. The existing scholarship on gender representation overwhelmingly suggests that SM
districts either lead to fewer women being elected on city councils (Darcy, Welch, and Clark
1985; Hogan 2001; Matland 1995; Matland and Brown 1992; Rule 1994; Schwindt-Bayer and
Mishler 2005; Welch and Studlar 1990) or no effect (Alozie and Manganero 1993; Bullock and
MacManus 1991). This result may make more sense in terms of the non-exclusive relationship
between race and gender (Githens and Prestage 1977). For instance, nuanced analysis of
intersectionality found that black women tend to be advantaged by AL elections in cities while
black men are disadvantaged by this structure (Darcy, Hadley, and Kirksey 1993; Rule 1992).
However, there is no influence of SM versus AL districts for Mexican American women or men
(Karnig and Welch 1979). A more recent study (2008) by Trounstine and Valdini that focused on
more than 7,000 United States cities also found that the impact of either AL or SM district on
gender representation is much more significant regarding white female and black male
representation than was the case for Latinas or black women.




 3	  


 Page 72
 At-Large and Single-Member Districts
	  

 Table 1. The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts – Gender
 Representation
 Electoral Systems Effects Literature
 Single-member districts (1) Have positive effect on the  Karnig and Welch (1979)
 representation of African
 American men in city councils.
 (2) Have negative effect on the  Herrick and Welch (1992)
 representation of African
 American women in city
 councils.
 (3) Have no effect on the Karnig and Welch (1979)
 representation of Mexican
 American women or men in city
 councils.
 At-large districts (1) Promote diversity in gender Trounstine and Valdini
 representation on city councils. (2008)
 (2) Benefit African American Darcy, Hadley, and Kirksey
 female candidates. (1993)
 (3) African American male Rule (1992)
 candidates are disadvantaged by
 this structure.
 Note: Regarding mixed systems, they are considered to provide descriptive representation similar to single-
 member districts (see e.g., Brockington et al.). Same for Table 2.



Electoral Systems and Racial Representation

 The historical transformation at the local level from AL to SM has had the expected impact.
Majority-minority districts became very popular in the 1990s and the representation of
underrepresented groups began to improve (Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996). Table 2
lists the trade-offs on racial representation specifically. Numerous studies put forward that SM
districts have positive effect on the representation of some racial groups in city councils,
including African Americans and Latinos (Arrington and Watts 1991; Bullock and MacManus
1990; Davidson and Grofman 1994; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1991; Welch 1990). If
equity in representation is the goal, in a diverse community, then SM districts are
overwhelmingly cited as a better mechanism.




 4
	  

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Hobby School of Public Affairs White Paper Series___________________________________________________
	  

 Table 2. The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts – Racial
 Representation
 Electoral Systems Effects Literature
 Single-member districts (1) Improve diversity in racial  Cameron, Epstein, and
 representation on city councils. O’Halloran (1996)
 (2) Have positive effect on the Davidson and Grofman
 representation of African (1994)
 Americans and Latinos in city
 councils.
 (3) These effects are Trounstine and Valdini
 conditional on the context. The (2008)
 benefits are minimal in a
 largely homogenous
 community or in a community
 where underrepresented racial
 groups are not geographically
 concentrated.
 At-large districts (1) Lead to over-representation Arrington and Watts (1991)
 of minority voters where racial
 minority groups are
 geographically concentrated or
 where democratic voters make
 up a larger proportion of the
 population.
 (2) Lead to over-representation Meier and Rutherford
 of African Americans on (2014)
 school boards where African
 Americans make up a smaller
 proportion of the population.


 Despite the positive potential, the improved representation of historically underrepresented
groups depends on context (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). The concentration (Sass 2000), size
(Bullock and MacManus 1990; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004), and polarization (Brace
et al. 1988) of the vote are the key variables to consider. For instance, in a largely homogenous
community or in a community where underrepresented groups are not concentrated
geographically, the benefits of SM districts are minimal (Trounstine and Valdini 2008).
Conversely, AL districts lead to over-representation of minority voters under some
circumstances where Democratic voters make up a larger proportion of the population and racial
minority groups are concentrated in the area (Arrington and Watts 1991). Similarly, African
Americans are found to be overrepresented on school boards with AL elections when African
Americans occupy a smaller part of the population (Meier and Rutherford 2014).




 5	  


 Page 74
 At-Large and Single-Member Districts
	  

Houston Specific Outlook

 Given the trends found in scholarship on SM versus AL districts, we can make some
educated predictions about the impact of these districts specifically for the City of Houston.
Houston is a geographically large city with an incredibly diverse racial makeup; however, this
racial diversity is also highly segregated by neighborhood (Houston Chronicle 20152). These two
patterns make Houston an ideal location for a mix of AL and SM districts. The result of the
concentrated pockets of different ethnic and racial groups in these districts will allow greater
descriptive representation of the diverse communities within the city in the SM districts while the
AL members must appeal to the broader diverse electorate of the entire city.


References

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The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member versus At-Large Districts on City
Council Diversity
Author(s): Jessica Trounstine and Melody E. Valdini
Source: American Journal of Political Science , Jul., 2008, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 2008), pp.
554-569
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association

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  The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member
  versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity
  Jessica TtounStine Princeton University
  Melody E. Valdini Portland State University


 Scholars continue to debate the degree to which electoral institutions matter for representation. The literature predicts that
 minorities benefit from districts while women benefit from at-large elections. The mechanisms by which institutions affect the
 ability of traditionally underrepresented groups to win seats have been understudied. Using an analysis of over 7,000 cities
 and interviews with city councilors, we find that compared to at-large systems, district systems can increase diversity only
 when underrepresented groups are highly concentrated and compose a substantial portion of the population. In addition,
 we find that the electoral system has a significant effect on representation only for African American male and white female
 councilors; the proportion of African American women and Latina councilors is not affected by the use of either district or
 at-large systems.




Extensive research has been devoted to understand of the effect of different demographic contexts in varied
 ing the continuing under representation of women institutional environments.

 and people of color in legislatures. At the city level As the Supreme Court anticipated in the landmark
  scholars have found mixed results for the effect of single case Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), we demonstrate that
  member district elections in increasing descriptive repre compared to citywide elections, districts increase repre
  sentation. Particularly in places where citywide elections sentation when a group is geographically concentrated
  were implemented to dilute the vote strength of racial and moderately sized. Further, we find districts only ben
  groups, districts have been seen as a key factor in increas efit black men. That is, the positive effect of districts is
  ing racial and ethnic diversity. Alternatively for women, conditional on the context. Districts can increase oppor
  districts have been found to be detrimental to the election tunities for representation, but in some cases districts are
  of female councilors. Scholars have proposed numerous, not helpful. Only rarely do districts have a substantial im
  contradictory explanations for these findings. For minori pact. Taking advantage of variation among city institu
  ties the focus has been on residential segregation and size tional structures, council composition, and demograph
  of the group, while women are said to benefit from the ics, we use quantitative and qualitative methods to study
  multicandidate setting of at-large elections. For women these relationships. We analyze data from surveys of city
  of color these explanations are in direct conflict. This ar clerks and election results from more than 7,000 cities and

  ticle contributes to this large literature by exploring the connect this analysis to the experience of local legislators
  mechanisms by which institutions affect the representa through interviews with city councilors.
 tion of different groups, concurrently testing the segrega While the existing literature on underrepresentation
 tion and group size hypotheses and taking into account is vast, our article makes several contributions to the un

  the joint relationship between race and gender. Many of derstanding of the relationship between electoral institu
  our findings confirm conventional wisdom, but advance tions and representation. First, we offer a methodologi
  our knowledge in this area by offering empirical estimates cal contribution. While no model is perfect, our analyses



 Jessica Trounstine is assistant professor of politics and public affairs, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School, 303 Robertson Hall,
  Princeton, NJ 08544 (jessica@trounstine.com). Melody E. Valdini is assistant professor of political science, Portland State University,
  Division of Political Science, Hatfield School of Government, P.O. Box 751, Portland, OR 97207 (mev@pdx.edu).

  The authors would like to thank Zoltan Hajnal for the generous use of his data. They would also like to thank Chris Achen, Chuck Cameron,
  David Lewis, Doug Massey, Nolan McCarty, and Melody Rose for extremely helpful comments on drafts of the article, and Gretchen Kafoury
  for her very helpful advice on securing interviews with city council members. Benjamin Tagoe provided excellent research assistance.

  American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3, July 2008, Pp. 554-569
  ?2008, Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853

 554

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THE CONTEXT MATTERS 555


improve on previous research by taking into account the (see, for example, Arrington and Watts 1991; Bullock
large number of cities with no female or minority coun and MacManus 1990; Davidson and Grofman 1994; Poli
cilors, allowing us to make more precise predictions. We nard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1991; Welch 1990).3 Districts
use tobit models to predict, first, the likelihood that a city have also been found to be beneficial to Latinos (e.g.,
will elect any women or people of color and then, to esti Davidson and Korbel 1981; Heilig and Mundt 1983; Leal,
mate the proportion of female and minority councilors. Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Taebel 1978).4 These
Second, while existing research on electoral systems and statistical findings have been supported by extensive case
underrepresentation has tested the effects of either seg study and historical research as well (Bridges 1997; Rice
regation or group size, we are the first to include both 1977). In sum, the literature concludes that "the effect
variables in our analysis. Further, much of the work on of... districts is unequivocally... greater equity" (Mundt
the effect of districts studies councils at or before 1990 and Heilig 1982, 1035).
and/or is limited to a small sample of cities; we use re The literature on the representation of women finds
cent data on a large number of cities to analyze patterns precisely the opposite effect for single-member districts.
across time and place. Finally, most previous research as While there are some exceptions, the vast majority of the
well as the Thornburgv. Gingles (1986) decision assumes research has concluded that districts are either meaning
that the effect of electoral systems on the election of peo less (Alozie and Manganero 1993; Bullock and MacManus
ple of color is constant across gender. For example, the 1991) or disadvantageous for women candidates (see, for
justices refer to the effect of districts on the representa example, Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1987; Hogan 2001; King
tion of "minority groups" or "black citizens," but there 2002; Mailand 1995; Matland and Brown 1992; Norris
is no discussion of the possibility that electoral institu 1985; Rule 1994; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, Welch
tions work differently for men as opposed to women of and Studlar 1990).
color. The fourth contribution of our article is to question Because race and gender are not mutually exclu
this assumption, and, although we have limited data, we sive categories, a handful of scholars have also sought
present evidence that the effect of electoral institutions is to understand how electoral institutions affect women of
significantly different for men versus women of color. color given that they face a potential double disadvantage
 Even after decades of progress there remain sub (Githens and Prestage 1977) and conflicting institutional
stantial disparities in the representation of black/African effects. Existing research finds that black women are most
American, Latino/Hispanic, and women city council likely to be elected in state multimember districts (anal
members compared to their population proportions.1 ogous to at-large elections in cities) while black men are
The average city in our data set has a population that is 8% disadvantaged by this structure (Darcy, Hadley, and Kirk
African American, 7.6% Latino, and 52% female while the sey 1993; Rule 1992). Similarly, Herrick and Welch (1992)
average city council has a membership that is 4.8% African and Karnig and Welch ( 1979) find that black men, but not
American, 2.3% Latino, and 20.5% female. Yet, there is black women, are advantaged by districts. Further, Karnig
wide variation among municipalities and across time. A and Welch (1979) find no effect of districts for Mexican
clear question emerges: why do some cities do better than American men or women. This suggests that the effect of
others at electing women and people of color? districts should be conditional on the characteristics of
 the group as well as the candidate in question.
 In addition to academic work, the process of vote
 dilution and the effect of institutional structures on rep
 Single-Member Districts: An resentation have been the subject of intense legal analy
 Institutional Solution? sis. The United States Supreme Court held in Thornburg
 v. Gingles (1986) that in challenging at-large or multi
One of the most persistent findings by scholars of urban member districts minority plaintiffs must demonstrate
politics is that single-member district elections increase (among other things) that the group in question is suffi
descriptive representation of underrepresented racial and ciently large and compact enough to constitute a majority
ethnic groups on city councils.2 This effect has been of a single-member district. While these criteria are con
found to be particularly strong for African Americans sistently used in legal and scholarly work, there have been

1 We use the terms black/African American and Hispanic/Latino in
terchangeably. Due to data limitations we are not able to study the 3Others find that districts are not superior (e.g., Bullock and Mac
effect of electoral institutions for Asian Americans.
 Manus 1993) or that the effect of districts has substantially weak
 ened over time (Welch 1990).
2 Descriptive representation and substantive representation are not
interchangeable. See Guinier (1992) and T?te (2003) for in-depth 4Others find that at-large systems offer better representation for
discussions. Latinos (e.g., Mladenka 1989)

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 556 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODY E. VALDINI


no studies that have determined whether or not districts cil. We predict that geographically concentrated, midsized
 serve to increase representation when these conditions are groups will benefit most from district elections.
met at the local level. We begin to do so here. Finally, these expectations rely on an assumption of
 Cities in the United States tend to elect their city coun polarized voting. The group must vote in a substantial
cils using two electoral system types: single-member dis bloc for candidates who are members of the group, and
tricts or at-large elections. When councilors are elected other groups must be substantially unwilling to vote for
by district, the city is divided into geographic areas of members of the group (Brace et al 1988; Davidson and
roughly equal population size that elect a single member Korbel 198 l;Engstrom and McDonald 1982). If either one
 to the city council in a plurality or majoritarian contest. of these does not hold, it is unclear whether the electoral
An at-large system is one in which members of the city system will have any direct effect on group representation.
council are selected by the entire city electorate. In most Polarized voting affects different racial and ethnic
cities this means that voters are offered a slate of candi minorities to different degrees. For instance, the more
dates and are allowed the same number of votes as there heterogeneous the group is, the less likely they may be to
are seats available. Cities often have majoritarian require vote as a bloc, which is particularly important for Latino
ments such that if a candidate does not receive 50% of communities (Pach?n 1999). For this reason we expect
 the vote she is forced into a run-off election. Some cities the effect of districts to be less pronounced for Latinos
designate seats or residency requirements for at-large po relative to African Americans. However, we still expect
 sitions turning the election into a series of single-member districts to have some impact. Research has found that
contests, while other cities vote for only one at-large mem Latinos share a significant number of characteristics that
ber in any given election. A small but growing number of encourage ethnically based voting, including discrimina
cities use mixed systems, electing some council members tion, immigrant experiences, Latin American heritage,
by district and others at-large. Scholars have found that and Spanish language (see Bar reto 2004 for a literature
 these mixed systems as well as modified at-large systems review). Further, due to the lack of partisan identifica
 that employ different vote count procedures lead to de tion in most city-level contests, candidate characteristics
 scriptive representation at levels closer to single-member like race, ethnicity, or gender may take on additional im
districts (Brockington et al. 1998; Karnig and Welch 1982; portance for voters looking for informational cues (Bobo
Welch 1990). The number of cities using pure at-large 1988; Kaufmann 2004; Popkin 1991; T?te 2003; Valdini
 systems has declined over the past 20 years, but at-large 2006).
 elections remain a common feature in city politics. The Nearly all of the research on racially polarized voting
majority of cities in our study elect their members at-large. has concentrated on state- and federal-level elections (see
 In order for district elections to increase the propor Hutchings and Valentino 2005 for a review). At the lo
 tion of councilors relative to the population size of an cal level, Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) found that blacks
 underrepresented group, previous literature has posited and Latinos tended to vote most cohesively for the same
 that three factors might come into play: concentration, candidate. Across 10 of the United States' largest cities,
 size, and polarization of the vote. First, the group must be 74% of blacks and 72% of Latinos voted for the group's
 geographically concentrated to take advantage of districts majority preferred candidate. This was compared to 67%
 (Sass 2000; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). If group members of whites voting for the group's first choice. Additionally
are spread throughout the city so that they do not com they find a significant racial/ethnic divide in votes for the
pose a simple majority of any one district, presumably winning candidate, with a 39 percentage point gap be
districts would not increase representation of the group tween whites and African Americans, and a 20 percentage
 compared to an at-large system. point gap between whites and Latinos. These figures bol
 The size of the group (of voting age citizens) should ster our prediction that districts will be most helpful for
 also impact the efficacy of districts (Brace et al. 1988; Bul
 African Americans.
 lock and MacManus 1990; Grofman and Handley 1989; The logic of concentration and group size also works
 Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004). At minimum, if to explain potential differential effects of districts for peo
 the group represents less than one-half of the population ple of color and women. Women are rarely (if ever) highly
 concentrated in a community. The same can be said for
 needed to elect a single council seat, districts are unlikely
 to ensure greater representation than at-large systems. Al group size and the representation of women. Because
 ternatively, if a group composes a majority of the city women are nearly always between 48% and 52% of a com
 population in a majoritarian, at-large system, the group munity's population, we cannot expect that they will be
maybe able to win all of the council seats. Districts might aided by districts. Furthermore, there is little evidence of
 even decrease the group's representation on the city coun gender-polarized voting. A number of studies have found


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 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 557


 that voters evaluate female candidates drawing on gen sented than white women (Darcy and Hadley 1988; Gar
dered stereotypes (e.g., Dolan 2004; Huddy and Terkild cia Bedolla, T?te, and Wong 2005; Montoya, Hardy-Fanta,
sen 1993; McDermott 1997; Valdini 2006) and that these and Garcia 2000). Garcia Bedolla, T?te, and Wong (2005)
 stereotypes can affect perceptions about candidates (Koch explain this finding as potentially resulting from block
 2000) and vote choice (Brown 1994; Brown, Heighberger, group voting. This would also be supported by Philpot
 and Shocket 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002). and Walton's (2007) finding that black men tend to be
 However, stereotyping only equates to polarized vot stronger supporters of black female candidates than white
ing when there are gendered differences in the judgments women or white men. Further, a number of studies have
of voters. Some research has determined that women are found that race trumps gender in determining voting be
more likely to prefer female candidates and men to prefer havior and attitudes (Gay and T?te 1998; Lien 1998) and
male candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2002). But, other scholars that the gender gap is essentially the same across racial and
 argue that there is little evidence of gender group con ethnic groups (Welch and Sigelman 1992). In sum, while
 sciousness (Conover 1988; Gurin 1985) and that women we expect white women to benefit from at-large elections,
 are equally if not more unlikely to vote for female can and black men to benefit from districts, there are no clear
didates as men (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Karnig and hypotheses that emerge for black women and Latinas with
Walter 1976). In the aggregate, the gender gap (while per regard to the effect of institutional structure.
 sistent) tends to be small with regard to support for parties
 and candidates (see Norrander 2003 for a review).
 So although it is likely that women are treated differ
 ently from men in elections, it is unclear how these differ
 Testing the Effects of the Electoral
 ences should interact with institutional variation. Accord System on Representation
 ing to the criteria specified in Thornburgv. Gingles (1986),
women are unlikely to benefit from districts. Scholars have To understand more about why single-member districts
suggested, among other reasons, that women might do help certain underrepresented groups and not others, we
better in multimember elections (such as at-large sys begin by testing the relationship between electoral struc
tems) because the competition is not zero-sum, mean ture and diversity in cities. Our data come from surveys
 ing that voters need not choose women at the expense of by the International City/County Manager's Association
men (Karnig and Welch 1979; Mailand and Brown 1992; (ICMA) conducted in 1986, 1992, 1996, and 2001. The
Mailand and Studlar 1996). On the other hand, scholars ICMA survey is mailed to city clerks in approximately
have not proposed that the zero-sum calculation applies 7,500 cities including all municipalities with more than
 to racial and ethnic minorities.5 This implies that the elec 2,500 residents. The average survey response rate for the
 toral structure is predicted to affect racial and ethnic mi years we analyze is 63%.6 The survey provides demo
norities in a different way and for different reasons than graphic information about council members and insti
women. So how should our expectation change when we tutional variables for the cities. To control for city-level
are talking about women of color; do the predictions for demographics we use 1990 census data for all 1986 obser
multimember elections only apply to white women? vations, 2000 census data for all 2001 observations, and
 There is some evidence that racial bloc group vot linearly interpolate values for 1992 and 1996. In total we
 ing does not apply to women of color, particularly when have 7,174 unique cities in the data set.
men of color are also running. McClain, Carter, and Brady
 (2005) find that black women have a harder time gain
 6Determining the effect of response rates to the ICMA is difficult
 ing the support of race-based organizations compared to because no other source contains institutional data for the same
black men, and Philpot and Walton (2007) find that black time period; but we can use data from the 1987 Census of Govern
women are the strongest supporters of black female can ments (COG) as a comparison for our main independent variable.
 The proportions of councilors elected in each type of system are
didates. Given that our concentration and size hypotheses similar in the two data sets. In the 1986 ICMA data 72.3% of cities
depend on polarized voting, we might not expect districts elected councilors at-large, 11.6% used districts, and 16.2% used a
to help black women. On the other hand, some scholars mixed system. The COG reports 74.2% of cities elected councilors
 at-large, 13.5% used districts, and 12.3% used a mixed system. It
have found that black women and Latinas are better repre
 does appear that western and southern cities are underrepresented
 in the ICMA compared to the census. The control variables included
5 Clearly more research should be done to determine the extent to in our analyses should mitigate the effect of this underrepresenta
which zero-sum calculations apply to different groups. It is possible tion; nonetheless we add the caveat that our findings are most di
that even in at-large settings such a calculation could be invoked, rectly applicable to the types of cities included in the ICMA sample.
particularly when cities use designated post systems or staggered Weighting by region does not change our conclusions. Summary
elections. statistics for all variables are available from the authors.


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 558 JESSICA TROUNSTINEAND MELODY E. VALDINI


 In addition to the statistical analysis, we present re sus council manager systems,9 the size of the city council,10
sponses from interviews of current city councilors from the presence of term limits, and a dummy variable noting
a sample of cities with mixed electoral systems.7 These whether city elections are held concurrently with national
interviews served a number of purposes in our investi elections.11 Because some city institutions are subject to
gation. First, they helped us to identify the contextual closer scrutiny as a result of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
factors that interact with institutions and affect the elec
 and our primary independent variable (elections by dis
tion of women and minority councilors. Secondly, they trict) may in fact be the result of challenges brought under
provide useful examples of our empirical findings. Fi the VRA, we include a dummy variable indicating juris
nally, they offer face validity of our findings from people dictions required to secure preclearance as per Section 5.
working in city politics. As we had hoped, all of the in We include citywide socioeconomic variables to account
terviewees in our sample were familiar with both types for the possibility that female or minority presence on the
of electoral systems and made a decision to run in one council is linked to wealthier or more educated commu
type rather than the other. Of the 174 councilors serv nities.12
ing in 2006, 98 (or 56%) were female and/or persons of We control for potential region effects and the racial
color. We randomly selected one-third of these members and ethnic makeup of the city population. Latinos have
for an interview. Eleven councilors chose to participate in lower citizenship rates and younger populations than
a phone interview in which we asked respondents open whites and African Americans, perhaps limiting their abil
ended questions regarding the effect of electoral institu ity to affect election outcomes (Jones-Correa 1998). To
tions for electing white women, women of color, and men control for this we include a measure of the total propor
of color.8 tion of the city population that are noncitizens and the
 In the quantitative analysis our dependent variables proportion that is 18 and older. To account for liberal lean
are the proportion of city councils that are black, Latino, ing communities that might be more likely to elect women
and female. Unfortunately, the ICMA survey data do not and minorities, we include a measure of the countywide
specify the race of women councilors or the gender (or vote for the Democratic presidential candidate in 1988
ethnic background) of those in the included racial cate and a dummy variable for central cities. To control for the
gories. While it would be ideal to augment our discussion likely relationship between time and our independent and
of women of color with ICMA data, we cannot. However, dependent variables, we include year fixed effects (with
using data from a different source for 1986 we are able 2001 as the base category). Finally, in all models we in
to perform a separate analysis of the effect of districts for clude the population proportions of African Americans,
black women versus black men and Latinas versus Latinos. Latinos, and Asians in each city.13 As was true with our
In all of the analyses our primary independent variable is dependent measure of racial and ethnic representation, we
the percentage of councilors elected by district in each city.
The majority of cities in our data set have a city council
that is either elected wholly by districts or at-large, but
 9 Using a more nuanced version of this variable allowing for mayor
some have mixed systems in which a portion of the coun
 council systems with a city manager makes no difference to the
cil is elected by district and a portion elected at-large. To results.
capture this variation we use a continuous version of the
 10 Scholars have argued that in smaller councils the value of each seat
variable.
 is greater and therefore less likely to be represented by minorities
 We add to these regressions a number of other insti or women (see Welch and Karnig 1979).
tutional variables that have been linked to minority coun 11 Ideally we would have also included controls for the city's vote
cil representation either directly or indirectly through count procedure, but these data are not collected by ICMA, and the
turnout and mobilization effects. These controls include large size of the data set precluded us from collecting it.

nonpartisan versus partisan elections, mayor council ver 12Unfortunately, group-specific versions of these demographic
 variables are not available from the 1990 census so we were unable
 to test the alternative argument that group resources determine
7The cities are the 10 largest mixed system cities: Houston, Philadel representation (see, for example, Cole 1974; Karnig 1979).
phia, Charlotte, lacksonville, Indianapolis, Boston, Washington
DC, Denver, Nashville, and New Orleans. 13 Ideally these proportions would be in reference to the population
 of citizens over the age of 18. However, the census did not provide
8 We interviewed six white women, two African American men, one data for citizens over the age of 18 by race/ethnicity for our en
African American woman, one Latino, and one Latina. Prior to tire time period. We tested alternative formulations of population
each interview we requested permission to record and quote each measures assuming in 2000 a constant citizenship rate across age
councilor. We received consent from all but one council member groups and in 1990 a constant citizenship rate across racial and
who is not quoted by name in this manuscript. Transcripts are ethnic groups. The alternative specification made little difference
available from the authors upon request. to the results and is available from the authors.


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 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 559


 cannot account for racial and ethnic group heterogeneity detriment to women. A variety of simulations help to clar
 in these models.14 ify the relationships between district elections and repre
 Like most research on this topic, we restrict our results sentation. We predict the marginal effect of the electoral
 to cities with substantial minority populations. Rather system on the proportion of women and minority council
 than select an arbitrary minimum for the size of groups, members when moving from a system in which a major
we allow the threshold to vary by city depending on the ity of the council is elected at-large to a system in which
 size of the city council. An observation is included if the a majority of the council is elected by district, holding
 group in question composes at least one-half of the per all other variables constant at their mean values. First,
 centage that a single council seat represents.15 Our analysis we predict the effect of districts on the probability of a
 assumes that black residents will be the strongest support city having any members of the underrepresented group
 ers of black candidates and Latino residents for Latino on the council. Then, we predict the effect of districts on
 candidates. The larger the city council the easier it should the expected proportion of female and minority council
be for any group to win representation. Using a varying members, weighted by the probability that this value is
threshold takes this into consideration. positive.17
 The mean number of council seats is six, so on av For African Americans, having a majority of coun
 erage a city is included if the underrepresented group is cil members elected by district increases the probability
 at least 8% of the city's total population. We apply this of electing any African Americans to the city council by
 selection criterion regardless of the electoral system em more than 10 percentage points, from 73% in at-large
ployed. When we test the hypothesis that the size of the cities to 84% in district cities.18 The expected propor
group matters for the effectiveness of the electoral system, tion of African American councilors increases by about
we relax this selection criterion and restrict the analysis to five percentage points under districts, from 13% to 18%.
 cities that have nonzero populations of the group in ques Because the average city in our data set has six council
 tion. This allows us to directly test the assumption that a members, in order for a group to gain an additional seat
 group will benefit most from districts when its population districts need to provide about a 16-point advantage. In
 is larger than one-half of the percentage of a single council our model, districts clearly fall short of this threshold for
 seat but less than a majority of the total population. African Americans.
 Due to the extremely large number of cities that have The key factor in increasing African American rep
no female or minority councilors, we use a random-effects resentation is the proportion of the city that is black. For
tobit model to estimate the effects of districts on council Latinos, districts have a weaker effect on representation.
representation [y* = *? + ??*, where y? = y* if y* > 0 For both at-large and district systems the probability of
&yti = 0 if y* < O].16 The model, a maximum-likelihood having any Latino councilors at all is low; 27% in at-large
 estimation censored at zero, combines the logic of probit systems and 33% in district systems. When this is taken
 and multiple regression to estimate both the probabil into consideration the relationship between district sys
 ity of a council having any female or minority members, tems and the expected proportion of the Latino councilors
 and given this, predicts the expected proportion of female is limited to about 1 \ percentage points, going from 4.1%
 councilors and councilors of color. in at-large systems to about 5.5% in district systems. The
 Do districts increase the proportion of African Amer Latino population in a city plays a key role in the election
 ican, Latino, and women councilors? The results displayed of Latino council members. Nearly equal in effect is the
 in Table 1 confirm that district elections continue to aid
 percentage of the city that has the rights of citizenship.
minority members in getting elected and are a nominal Echoing the results of our regression analyses, nearly
 every interviewee in our sample agreed that district sys
 14Scholars find that assuming ethnic or racial group homogeneity
 tems were better than at-large systems for electing peo
 severely biases estimates of representation (DeSipio 1996; Sass 2000;
Tarn 1995), but we have no fix for this problem. ple of color. For example, Councilman Jamie Isabel, an
 African American member on the Nashville City Coun
 15 We repeated the analyses using a 5% threshold of the group in
question instead of allowing the threshold to vary based on coun cil, explained, "It's happened again and again where
cil size (available upon request from the authors). The results are African Americans can't get enough votes to win at
extremely similar and our conclusions hold in all cases.
 large." Susan Burgess, a white woman serving in an
 16The likelihood function for each unit is computed using the at-large seat in the Charlotte City Council, echoed his
Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The estimates were stable in multiple
tests. Alternate specifications using a tobit model with Huber/White
 17 Effects on uncensored observations are also available from the
clustered standard errors are nearly identical. We further tested authors.
weighted models to correct for heteroskedasticity and got similarly
strong results. 18Predictions calculated using Stata/SE 9.2 mfx command.


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 5?0 JESSICA TROUNSTINEAND MELODY E. VALDINI


sentiments, stating that districts are "absolutely" better we have had a Hispanic member elected to the school
 than at-large seats for electing people of color. Coun board."
cilwoman Rosemary Rodriguez, a Latina serving on the
Denver City Council, believes so strongly in the posi
tive consequences of district elections for increasing the
representation of people of color that she worked for The Effect of Institutions for Women
electoral reform for other local offices in her city. She
explains: "I actually persuaded the legislature to adopt For women, the results in Table 1 suggest that the prob
single-member districts for Denver for a majority of the ability of a council having at least one female councilor
school board seats so that we could try to achieve His is high: about 83% in at-large systems and about 80% in
panic representation. And ever since that bill was passed, district systems, with the expected proportion of female




Table 1 Tobit Regression on the Percentage of Minority and Female Council Members
 % Black % Latino % Women

 Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err
 % District 0.06** 0.01 0.05** 0.02 -0.02** 0.01
Demographics
 % Latino 0.18** 0.07 1.68** 0.08 -0.00 0.03
 % Black 0.85** 0.03 0.17* 0.09 0.12** 0.02
 % Asian -0.41** 0.21 0.53** 0.16 0.08 0.07
 % Women 0.43** 0.16 -0.53* 0.32 -0.16 0.10
 Total Pop (mil) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05* 0.03
 % Poor 0.29** 0.10 -0.00 0.18 -0.07* 0.04
Med. Income (ths) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
% Coll. Grad 0.23** 0.07 0.26** 0.13 0.21** 0.03
% Noncitizens -0.05 0.15 -1.26** 0.14 0.00 0.07
 % Pop Over 18 0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.15 0.18** 0.05
 Democratic Vote -0.14** 0.05 0.15* 0.09 -0.01 0.02
Institutions
 Term Limits -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02** 0.01
Nonpartisan 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.01
Mayor Council -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.00
Council Size 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
Concurrent -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01* 0.01
 VRA 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03

Geography
 Central City 0.07** 0.01 0.08** 0.02 0.02* 0.01
 West 0.08** 0.03 0.05* 0.03 0.10* 0.01
 Northeast 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.02* 0.01
 Midwest -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04* 0.01
 1986 -0.07** 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.07* 0.01
 1992 -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02* 0.01
 1996 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.07* 0.01
Constant -0.37** 0.15 -0.46* 0.26 0.03 0.06
N 3042 2749 11537
 1670.83* 1258.24* 1668.51*
Waldx2
 *p < .10, **p< .05.
Source: International City/County Manager's Association (ICMA) surveys of 1986, 1992, 1996, and 2001.


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 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 561


 councilors going from 20% in at-large cities to 18% in Clearly, the variety of responses and opinions given
cities with district elections. None of the other variables on this subject is quite different from the nearly uniform
perform particularly well predicting women's represen responses given on the effects of district elections for the
 tation. The model suggests that increasing the propor election of people of color. The wide range of responses
 tion of women in a city negatively impacts the chance of regarding the effect of institutions on the representation
having women on the council. Women are also aided by of women is not too surprising given our statistical results.
 larger city councils. To test whether or not this finding We found that women are negatively affected by districts,
reflects the benefit of increased district magnitude that but the results were small, with the predicted proportion
other scholars identify, we interact this variable with a of women increasing only about 2% in at-large cities. In
dummy variable indicating whether the majority of the sum, after controlling for a variety of factors, it appears
 councilors are elected at-large or by district. Our findings that districts have a limited but distinctly positive effect
 reflect the conventional wisdom (e.g., Alozie and Man on increasing representation for underrepresented racial
ganaro 1993); women do better with larger city councils, and ethnic groups and a small negative effect for women
but in at-large cities this effect is much more pronounced. that appears to be driven by the multimember nature of
Once the interaction is included, the independent effect at-large elections.
of at-large elections actually disappears. This offers indi
rect support for the argument that women benefit from
a nonzero-sum setting.
 The opinions of our interviewees reflect these mud
 The Intersection of Race and Gender
dled findings of the effects of at-large versus district
elections for women. Councilperson Carol Boigon felt Given that racial and ethnic minority groups seem to ben
 strongly that at-large seats are better for electing women efit from districted systems while women seem to do bet
candidates. She explained that in her council, "the two ter in at-large systems, how do black women and Latinas
at-large seats run at the same time?no differentiation fare in these cities? Our main data set does not provide the
occurs?one race, two top vote getters get seated. So there racial and ethnic background by gender of city councilors;
 however, the United States Census of Governments col
were seven men and me. So you win by a plurality, which
really strengthens the hand of women." Council members lected these statistics in one year that matches our data?
 Jamie Isabel, Glorious Johnson, Susan Burgess, and Anna 1986. In this year about 16% of white and black councilors
Verna, on the other hand, all felt that districts are the bet and about 18% of Hispanic councilors were women. For
ter choice for increasing the number of women in office. the following analyses we use as dependent variables the
However, when asked why they felt that district elections proportion of the city council that is black women, black
are better for electing women, every respondent gave a men, Latinas, Latinos, and white (non-Hispanic) women.
different answer. We include all of the controls described above. As above
 Councilwoman Johnson explained districts were bet we only include cities with substantial minority and fe
ter because of the ability of women to be active and known male populations.19
within their districts, stating that the women currently The results in Table 2 suggest differential effects of
serving in district seats on her council "have... clout districts for black women and Latinas. Where district elec

when it comes to that district because they have been tions have no significant effect on increasing the propor
known since they were children." Councilwoman Burgess tion of councilors who are black women, black men get a
suggested that districts are better for women because they significant boost from this institutional structure. In fact
are less competitive. She explained, "Once you win a dis all of the predicted increase in representation found in Ta
trict election, many times the district representatives don't ble 1 is attributable to black men. The predicted probabil
even have competition in their subsequent elections. At ity of a council having any black women is about 13%, and
large is always competitive. Very tough races, to be truth the expected proportion of black women is about 1.6%
ful and we have only one woman and three men." Three regardless of the electoral system. The probability of a
other council members all argued, however, that it was a council having any black men is much higher, about 53%
toss-up and/or that the election of women depended on
factors specific to each electoral contest, not the electoral 19We chose not to select cities on the combined basis of race and
system. Councilwoman Sanders of Indianapolis stated, gender (e.g., only including cities with a substantial population of
"I don't know that there's really much difference [be black women) because previous scholarship has indicated that race
 is a more important predictor of vote choice than gender. Thus we
tween at-large versus district elections], at least not in my
 assume that the presence of black men and Latinos are important
experience." for the election of black women and Latinas.


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562 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODYE. VALDINI



Table 2 Tobit Regression on the Percentage of Council Members of Color by Gender
 % Black Women % Black Men > Latinas % Latinos % White Women

 Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er
 % District -0.00 0.03 0.08* 0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01
Demographics
 % Latino 0.29 0.28 0.08 0.15 0.97* 0.27 1.63** 0.15 -0.15** 0.05
 % Black 0.54* 0.1 0.58* 0.05 0.67* 0.33 0.27 0.19 -0.08** 0.04
 % Asian 1.36* 0.63 -0.03 0.36 0.43 0.6 0.21 0.36 -0.09 0.13
 % Women -0.19 0.57 0.49 0.31 -0.02 1.22 0.58 0.78 -0.36* 0.19
 Total Pop (mil) -0.06 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.13 -0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05
 % Poor 0.01 0.36 0.42* 0.19 0.67 0.6 0.25 0.36 -0.03 0.07
 Med. Income (ths) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00* 0.00
 % Coll. Grad 0.42* 0.23 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.54 0.13 0.32 0.19** 0.05
 % Noncitizens -0.61 0.64 -0.07 0.34 -0.7 0.46 -1.21** 0.26 0.00 0.14
 % Pop Over 18 -0.09 0.45 -0.07 0.24 0.25 0.79 0.17 0.47 0.32** 0.09
 Democratic Vote -0.03 0.15 -0.20* 0.08 -0.35 0.35 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.03
Institutions
 Term Limits 0.12* 0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04** 0.02
 Nonpartisan 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01
 Mayor Council -0.03 0.03 -0.03* 0.02 -0.13 0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.02* 0.01
 Council Size 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01** 0.00
 Concurrent 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01
 VRA -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.04 0.06

Geography
 Central City 0.12* 0.04 0.08* 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.10* 0.05 0.04* 0.01
 West -0.14 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.12* 0.01
 Northeast 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.12 0.19 -0.15 0.11 0.01 0.01
 Midwest 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.15 0.20 -0.02 0.10 0.04* 0.01
Constant -0.35 0.55 -0.38 0.3 -1.44 1.03 -1.45** 0.63 -0.13 0.12
N 893 893 698 698 3563
Waldx2 62.12* 303.92* 30.31 321.97* 430.62**

 *p<.10,**p<.05.
Source: United States Census of Governments 1986.



in at-large councils and nearly 70% for district councils. under districts to 67% in at-large cities, with the expected
The expected proportion goes from 8% in at-large cities proportion increasing from 12% to 13%.
to 14% in districted cities. In sum, black men and white women are the only
 For Hispanics the story is different. The electoral groups in our analysis that are substantively and signif
structure has no significant effect on the proportion of icantly affected by electoral institutions, and the biggest
the council that is Latino or Latina. However, Latinos are benefit of the system appears to be increasing the prob
much more likely to be represented on councils. The prob ability of having any black men or white women, rather
ability of having any Latinos on the council is about 21% than the proportion.
and the expected proportion about 3.5%, while the proba
bility of having Latinas on the council is about 4% and the
expected proportion less than 1%. Finally, in these results
 it appears that the positive effect of at-large elections is all
 Concentration of Population Matters
going toward white women, although the coefficient does
 The reason that the electoral system may have a relatively
not quite reach statistical significance. The probability of
 small overall effect for racial and ethnic minorities may
a council having any white women increases from 64%

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 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 563


 lie in population size and residential concentration of the The results in Table 3 are clear. Only when a group
 groups. We now look to see whether districts have a larger is concentrated will districts promote increased descrip
 effect if these factors are taken into consideration. As op tive representation on the council. For African Ameri
posed to women, African American and Latino voters cans, the effect of districts goes from being negative at
can be heavily concentrated. The theory that concentra very low levels of concentration to significantly positive
 tion drives the relationship between district elections and at high levels. Districts have the largest effect for cities
 representation of racial and ethnic minorities has a sub in the third quartile, where moving from an at-large sys
 stantial number of subscribers (Brace et al. 1988; David tem to a district system increases the estimated probabil
 son and Korbel 1981; Engstrom and McDonald 1982; ity of electing an African American council member by
Mladenka 1989; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). Yet there about 10 percentage points, from 14% to 24%. This is a
have been few attempts to actually test this claim directly powerful effect compared to the first quartile, where dis
 (Sass 2000 is an exception). We use 1990 and 2000 census tricts decreased both the probability of having any African
data on concentration in 331 metropolitan areas to do so American councilors (from 7% to 3%) and the expected
here.20 proportion from .9% to .3%. When the isolation index
 Demographers rely on a variety of different measures is very high for African Americans the effect of districts
of racial and ethnic concentration and segregation calcu becomes insignificant. This could indicate the decreased
 lated using demographic data collected at the census-tract importance of the electoral system when a group makes
 level (Massey and Dent?n 1988). One measure is the iso up a majority of the electorate. The size of the black pop
 lation index, which ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the ulation is most dominant in the first and fourth models,
probability that group members will meet members of suggesting that African American council representation
their own group in their census tract. A score of .6 for in cities at the two ends of the isolation spectrum is best
African Americans means that the average African Amer predicted by the size of the minority group itself.
 ican lives in a census tract that is 60% black. This mea We repeated this analysis with the 1986 census data
 sure has the benefit of being sensitive to a group's size in using the proportion of black men and the proportion of
addition to the distribution of the group throughout a black women as dependent variables. As expected the re
community. It would be impossible to have a high isola sults hold systematically for the election of black men, but
tion score unless a group composes a substantial portion not black women. For black men districts have a negative
of the total community. Both factors are likely impor effect in the first quartile and an increasingly powerful
tant for a group to transform membership into voting effect in the second through fourth quartiles. For black
 strength. women the electoral institution has no effect in the first
 In order to analyze the effect of concentration, we split through third quartiles, but districts are extremely pow
our data into four samples based on the isolation index erful and positive in the fourth quartile. When blacks
for each group and run the same tobit models presented compose a majority of a city's population, districts?not
above for each quartile.21 We hypothesize that the benefits at-large elections?help black women.
of district elections should be most likely if a group can As shown in the bottom half of Table 3, for Latinos,
reasonably generate a voting majority in some neighbor the effect of the interaction between districts and con
hoods. In other words we predict increasingly significant centration is even more striking. The effect of districts
effects as the isolation index increases. The following anal is small and highly insignificant in the first and second
yses are restricted to cities with nonzero populations of quartiles. The effect in the third quartile is substantial but
African Americans and Latinos. We present only the vari not quite statistically significant. Unless Latinos are ex
ables of interest, but the models include all of the controls tremely concentrated, districts make little difference for
 listed in Table 1. The full models are available from the representation. In the fourth quartile, the impact is large.
authors.
 Districts increase the probability of electing Latinos to the
 council to 98% from 75% under at-large systems.22 The
20The census did not produce concentration data at the municipal
 predicted proportion of Latinos on the council increases
ity level until 2000, and then only for large cities. To show the effects by more than 25 percentage points from 19% in at-large
of concentration across time for as many cases as we can, we rely cities to 48% in district systems.23
on the MSA-level statistics, but because of the potential mismatch
between MSA- and city-level concentration, we rerun the analysis
using 2000 data at the city level for 596 cases. 22We could not run these models on Latinos and Latinas separately
 because of a lack of data.
21 We elected not to present an interaction model because the effect
is nonlinear. We had enough data to estimate the effect in a split 23 Using city-level isolation measures from 2000 for large cities, the
sample allowing the coefficients to vary. results are extremely similar though not exactly the same. For blacks


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564 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODY E. VALDINI



Table 3 Tobit Regression on Proportion of African American Council Members, Controlling for
 Concentration
 0 < isolation < .25 .25 < isolation < .50 .50 < isolation < .75 .75 < isolation < 1

 Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err
% District -0.13* 0.05 0.04* 0.02 0.08* 0.02 0.06 0.04
% Black 3.15* 0.48 1.29* 0.08 1.22* 0.06 1.31* 0.10
VRA 0.14* 0.06 -0.03* 0.02 0.06* 0.03 -0.90 73.3
Constant -0.92 0.60 -0.05 0.22 0.13 0.26 1.44 0.68
N 1373 2247 2735 908
Waldx2 94.15* 680.00* 902.92* 383.65*


 Tobit Regression on Proportion of Latino Council Members, Controlling for Concentration
 0 < isolation < .25 .25 < isolation < .50 .50 < isolation < .75 .75 < isolation < 1

 Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err
% District 0.03 0.11 -0.00 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.32** 0.16
% Latino 4.63** 0.94 1.53** 0.17 1.53** 0.15 2.14** 0.40
% Noncitizens -4.98** 1.67 -1.22** 0.35 -0.97** 0.23 -0.64 0.67
Constant -2.80 1.73 -0.35 0.48 -0.53 0.46 1.61 1.19
N 4542 1966 968 133
Waldx2 163.28* 241.99* 427.35* 198.88*

 *p< .10,**p<.05.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 1990 & 2000; International City/County Manager's Association (ICMA) surveys of 1986,1992,1996, and 2001.




 There are at least two reasons that the effect of districts This is precisely the conclusion drawn by one of our
occurs only at the highest levels of isolation for Latinos. interviewees, Councilman Felix Arroyo, the first Latino
First, Latinos have lower levels of turnout compared to elected to the Boston City Council. Councilman Arroyo
their population proportions than African Americans or stated that he chose to run for an at-large seat rather than
whites. This may indicate that Latinos need to be a larger the district seats also available because "it is very difficult
 share of the population before they can affect electoral to win if you are a person of color by district except for
outcomes as a group. Secondly, these results may indicate two districts which are actually communities of colors."
a lower level of polarized voting and bloc group voting Further, he explained that because of the demographics of
until Latinos are highly concentrated and a large portion the city, the at-large seat was better for electing Latinos in
of the population. It is plausible that ethnic group identity Boston, "because most of the Latino community is spread
would be associated with a higher degree of segregation across the city, as well as the immigrant community and
and a larger minority group presence. In general though, the progressive groups." For Arroyo, the lack of concen
 these data provide strong support for our hypothesis that tration of his primary constituency means that districts
 the benefit of single-member district elections for minor do not offer him the best opportunity for election.
 ity groups operates through patterns of concentration. Councilor Carol Boigon, a white woman serving on
Furthermore, the negative results for African Americans the Denver City Council, also emphasized the power of
 in the first quartile of isolation suggest that underrepre district elections when groups are concentrated. She ex
 sented groups may fare better in at-large elections when plains:
 they are highly dispersed throughout the community.
 ... in a district seat... some of the ethnic con
 the effect of districts is negative in the first quartile, small and centrations have an opportunity to be repre
 insignificant in the second quartile, and increasingly positive in the sented _That's the advantage I see. We have two
third and fourth quartiles. For Latinos the effect is negative in the
first quartile, nearly zero in the second and fourth quartiles, and
 seats that could reliably elect a black council per
very powerful in the third quartile. son, the 8th and 11th. And those of us who feel


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 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 565


 that it's important to have diverse voices at the In no case does the electoral system bring a group to
 table and who are not black, you would say "Why representational parity, but in cities where there are very
 would you run from one of those seats then?" I large populations of African Americans and Latinos, there
 wouldn't. is virtually 100% probability of at least a single council
 member being African American or Latino. This suggests
Councilwoman Boigon's point is clear: African American that African Americans and Latinos are breaking into the
council members benefit electorally in areas of the city political system when they command a substantial voting
 that have large concentrations of black voters. bloc.
 In our interviews a number of councilors emphasized
 group size in combination with concentration in their dis
 cussion of the superiority of district for electing people
 Size of the Group Interacts of color. Councilman Jamie Isabel, an African American
 with Districts member on the Nashville City Council, explained that dis
 tricts are better because at-large systems "dilute the votes."
We hypothesized that the effect of districts should inter Similarly, Councilor Susan Burgess, a white woman on the
 act with group size, being most effective when groups Charlotte City Council, stated that
 are moderately sized. Our use of the isolation variable in
 the previous section tested this indirectly, but because the
 ... the reason is because we have drawn our dis
 index combines concentration with group size, in this sec
 tricts to make sure we have minority represen
 tion we test this hypothesis directly by splitting our sample
 tation. Three [out of seven] of our districts are
by the size of the underrepresented group.24 We divided
 majority-minority. And there's always a minor
our data into three subsamples for African Americans and
 ity elected there. We have had difficulty electing
Latinos. The first sample includes cities that have minority
 minorities at-large, even when they are extremely
populations greater than zero, but less than the one-half
 qualified... We've had awesome African Ameri
 of the percentage that a council seat represents. The sec
 can candidates who have tried to go from districts
ond sample includes cities with minority groups equal to
 to at-large and lost citywide.
or larger than one-half of the percentage the council seat
 represents, but less than a majority of the population. The
 third sample includes cities where the group in question Councilperson Joanne Sanders, a white woman serving
 composes a majority of the population. in the Indianapolis council (which is consolidated with
 The results confirm our expectations. Districts mat the county), nearly repeated the sentiments of Council
 ter most for groups that are a moderate proportion of woman Burgess, stating that
 the population. For very small and very large groups the
 electoral system has no significant effect on representa
 tion in the models. Rather than present these as regres
 because of the demographics of the county, I
 think that the district level was better for peo
 sion results, we have included a graph of the benefit of
districts compared to at-large systems for African Amer
 ple of color... we still have heavily black areas,
 in our communities, where it's easily a seventy
 icans and Latinos depending on the size of the black or
Latino population. thirty Democrat district. So for people of color
 The results in Figure 1 suggest that districts have a that's much easier than trying to run county-wide
much stronger effect for African Americans than Latinos, where some of the outlying areas are predomi
as would be expected given the differences in concentra nantly white. Although, the black people who have
 run on the at-large ticket have been successful but
 tion and bloc voting between the groups. For both groups
the only statistically significant differences between elec again you can tell by the numbers unfortunately
 they don't always glean the most amount of votes.
 toral systems occur when the group is moderately sized.


24 A single model including the interactions between districts, group Councilor Sanders's response hints at the presence of
size, and dummy variables for subsamples also generated signifi racially polarized voting in Indianapolis. Other interview
cant results. There is no significant difference between at-large and ees expressed similar sentiments. When asked why
district systems when a group is very small; increasing the group
population increases the proportion of minority group members black candidates had been unsuccessful in winning at
and districts enhance this result. We present the split sample analysis large seats, Councilman Isabel ascribed the outcome to
because the results are easier to interpret. polarization:

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566 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODY E. VALDINI



 Figure 1 Estimated Benefit of Districts Compared to At-Large Elections by Group
 Population Size, 1986-2001

 Probability of Having Any Black or Latino Councilors




 Predicted Proportion of Black and Latino Councilors




 African American Latino


 Tiny Population 1 Moderate Population I Majority Population


 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 1990 & 2000; International City/County Manager's Association (ICMA) surveys of 1986,1992,
 1996, and 2001.



 I think whites have a reluctance to vote for African Latinos tended to divide their votes among a slate of can
 Americans. We're in the south, I think up north or didates and so "every time a Hispanic candidate would
 back where you are out west, there may be some run, they would be defeated." According to these coun
 differences. But I think here in the south whites re cil members, racially polarized voting continues to be a
 ally haven't come to the reality that African Amer significant factor in city council elections, and different
 icans can represent them well. groups are affected in different ways by these types of vote
 patterns.

Similarly, Councilor Burgess suggested that "subtle
racism" kept African Americans from winning citywide
elections. A number of our interviewees also insinuated Conclusions
that some groups formed more cohesive voting blocs than
others. Councilor Rodriguez from Denver highlighted the One final possibility in explaining the benefit of districts
benefits of districts for Latino candidates because of the for female and minority council membership is the at
strategy of "single-shot[ting]" where voters pool votes traction of running in a district versus citywide election.
in a multicandidate, at-large race for a single candidate. Districts might aid racial and ethnic minorities because
She told us that the African American community used more traditionally underrepresented candidates choose
this approach successfully to elect representatives whereas to run in district races. If the organizing, fundraising,



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THE CONTEXT MATTERS 5^7


and campaign costs are substantially different between Brown, Clyde, Neil Heighberger, and Peter Shocket. 1993.
districts and citywide races, this may well be a factor. Fur "Gender-Based Differences in Perceptions of Male and Fe
 male City Council Candidates." Women & Politics 13(1): 1?
 thermore, it remains to be explained why some cities elect 17.
more women than others: it does not appear to make a Bullock, Charles, and Susan MacManus. 1990. "Structural Fea
 substantial difference whether women run in district or
 tures of Municipalities and the Incidence of Hispanic Coun
at-large electoral systems. Nonetheless, we believe that we cilmembers." Social Science Quarterly 71(4): 665-81.
have taken a step forward in explaining the effect of elec Bullock, Charles S., Ill, and Susan A. MacManus. 1991. "Munic
 toral systems on underrepresented groups. ipal Electoral Structure and the Election of Councilwomen."
 Journal of Politics 53(1): 75-89.
 By taking advantage of the institutional variation
 Bullock, Charles S., Ill, and Susan A. MacManus. 1993. "Testing
across cities in the United States, we have gained a more
 Assumptions of the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test: An
nuanced understanding of the representation of women Analysis of the Impact of Structures on Black Descriptive
and racial and ethnic minorities. Single-member district Representation." American Politics Quarterly 21(3): 290-306.
systems can increase diversity only when underrepre Cole, Leonard. 1974. "Electing Blacks to Municipal Office:
 sented groups are highly concentrated and compose mod Structural and Social Determinants." Urban Affairs Quar
 terly 10(1): 17-39.
erate portions of the population. These factors are most
 Conover, Pamela. 1988. "The Role of Social Groups in Political
important in an arena where polarized voting predomi
 Thinking." British Journal of Political Science 18(1): 51-96.
nates and where groups leverage their population size to
 Darcy, Robert, and Charles Hadley. 1988. "Black Women in
achieve descriptive representation. In addition, the effect Politics?The Puzzle of Success." Social Science Quarterly
of the electoral system is not constant across all people 69(3): 629-45.
of color, nor is it constant across both genders; race and Darcy, Robert, Charles D. Hadley, and Jason F. Kirksey. 1993.
gender interact to produce different results. Our findings "Election Systems and the Representation of Black Women in
demonstrate the need for caution when making declara American State Legislatures." Women and Politics 13: 73-89.
 Darcy, Robert, and Sarah Schramm. 1977. "When Women Run
 tions of the benefit or detriment of institutional settings;
 Against Men." Public Opinion Quarterly 41(1): 1-12.
while the electoral rules certainly have an effect, the con
 Darcy, Robert, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. 1985. "Women
 text in which they are employed is also crucial to gain a
 Candidates in Single-Member and Multimember Districts:
 complete understanding. American State Legislative Races." Social Science Quarterly
 66(4): 945-53.
 Davidson, Chandler, and Bernard Grofman, eds. 1994. Quiet
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 MEMORANDUM

To: Portland Charter Commission

From: Jim Katsiaficas

Date: March 22, 2022

Re: Legal Issues – Charter Revision Question(s); Districting Questions

At a recent Charter Commission Meeting, Commissioner O’Brien asked who decides whether
and how to organize charter commission revisions into one or more ballot questions. The answer
is that the Charter Commission determines this by majority vote. Title 30-A M.R.S. §2105(1)(A)
provides “A. If the charter commission, in its final report under section 2103, subsection 5,
recommends that the present charter continue in force with only minor modifications, those
modifications may be submitted to the voters in as many separate questions as the commission
finds practicable. The determination to submit the charter revision in separate questions under
this paragraph and the number and content of these questions must be made by a majority of the
charter commission.”

Commissioners have asked how City Council districts currently are determined and what legal
standards apply, and asked if increases in City Council district seats necessarily require an
increase in School Board seats.

Article II, Section 1 of the current Charter provides for the division of the City into five districts
for purposes of all City elections:

 For the purpose of all elections the city, including its islands, shall be divided into
 five (5) districts to establish compact and contiguous districts of approximately
 equal population.

 The city council for voting purposes may by ordinance divide the election districts
 into voting districts.

The number of both City Council and School Board district seats are based on this
provision. Article II, Section 2 provides for election of one City councilor to “be elected
from each of the five (5) districts heretofore provided for [in Article II, Section 1].”
Article III, Section 1 provides for five School Board members to be elected from each of
the five districts established under Article II, Section 1.


ONE CANAL PLAZA, PO BOX 426
PORTLAND, ME 04112-0426
207.774.2635
FAX 207.871.8026
www.perkinsthompson.com
{P1999664.1}



 Page 107
March 22, 2022


State law (30-A M.R.S. §2503) requires municipalities that have districts to reapportion their
districts through enactment of a reapportionment ordinance by the municipal legislative body
within one year after the Maine Legislature completes its reapportionment, which follows each
decennial national census. In that reapportionment, “Each district must contain as nearly as
possible the same number of inhabitants as determined according to the latest Federal Decennial
Census, but districts may not differ in number of inhabitants by more than 10% of the inhabitants
in the smallest district created.” This is the result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring
equal weighting of votes. The City Council, as Portland’s municipal legislative body, establishes
district reapportionment by ordinance. The City currently is conducting its reapportionment,
which must be completed by August 10, 2022, 90 days before the November election.

As noted above, the City Charter establishes five districts for purposes of all City elections, and
so this sets out the number of districts and district seats for both Council and School Board
elections. Except for the current Charter, I know of no other legal requirement that the number
of School Board district seats equal the number of City Council district seats.

However, there is the practical issue of conducting City elections if there were differing numbers
of Council and School Board districts, since there would be two different sets of districts with
different boundaries. Election workers at polling places would have to offer multiple district
ballots since Council and School Board district lines would not be the same. This already
happens where State legislative district lines divide City districts, and would add another layer of
complexity to City election management.

Moreover, in discussing this with the School Board’s legal counsel, I understand that the School
Board has not taken a position on the potential of increasing the number of district seats, but that
the Superintendent believes the School Board’s general desire for greater diversity of
representation and for parity with the City Council means that the School Board would want to
increase the number of district seats accordingly.




{P1999664.1} PERKINS THOMPSON
 PAGE 2

 Page 108
 CITY OF PORTLAND ETHICS COMMISSION & CODE OF ETHICS

1. The proper operation of the City of Portland requires that all City officials, whether elected,
appointed, or city employees be impartial, equitable, and responsive to the needs of the people
and each other in the performance of their respective functions and duties; that proper conduct
by City officials will promote public confidence in the integrity of government and will be
maintained by all City officials; that public office not be used for personal or financial gain or
advantage; and that the structure of City government be used properly in decision and policy-
making. In recognition of these goals and the importance of protecting public interest and City
officials, a Ethics Commission shall hereby be established for all by the City Council.

1.1 PURPOSE: To provide impartial oversight as to ensure that standards of conduct are
defined and upheld; and to make public the sources of income as well as other areas of
personal and pecuniary interests to city officials, their family members, and major supporters for
purposes of recusal.

Section 1.2 Ordinance required.
The City Council shall maintain an ordinance defining the code
of ethical conduct of elected and appointed City officials, as
well as all employees of the City in accordance with all applicable labor laws,
contracts, and confidentiality requirements. The ordinance shall be developed
and recommended by the Ethics Commission, as provided in Section
2, and be approved and later amended with the approval of 2/3 of
City Councilors present and voting. The ordinance shall
establish the process for filing complaints and soliciting
advisory opinions by residents of Portland and city employees.

1.3 The code shall include and encompass but not be limited to the following:

 Standards of Conduct
 Disclosure of Confidential Information
 Conflicts of Interest
 Disclosure of Conflict
 Determination of Conflict

1.3.1 Whereby the disclosures as provided in Sec. 1.3 wherein prior to being sworn into office,
all elected city officials and executive and senior city staff shall complete a disclosure form. The
form shall disclose all sources of income, as well as those of close family members, in
accordance with common and accepted practices consistent with state and community
standards. Applicable forms shall be public documents and may be referenced by the public for
purposes of recusal. The form shall be updated on an annual basis or upon change of
employment or situation. These disclosures shall be made publically accessible and posted




 Page 109
together on the city’s website and on the page of that city official as applicable and in
accordance with all applicable labor laws, contracts, and confidentiality requirements.




1.4 The Board shall devise, with the assistance from city staff and/or outside counsel, a code of
ethics for Portland City officials and employees which shall include but be not limited to:
 - Councilors
 - School Board
 - All other elected officials
 - All appointments including but not limited to boards, commissions, and task forces
 - All city employees

1.5 Anyone, whether they be a city official or member of the public, may bring a complaint to the
attention of city officials for the purposes of consideration of a conflict of interest or the
appearance of a conflict of interest, or for any violation of the code of ethical conduct.

Section 2. Formation of Ethics Commission.
The ordinance shall direct the formation of an Ethics
Commission, consisting of seven (7) members who are residents of
the City, to review the code ordinance not less than once every
three (3) years. The commission shall be appointed by the City
Council. Elected officials, candidates for any elected office,
and their immediate family members shall not be permitted to be
members of the commission. The commission shall meet as needed,
but no less than once every three (3) months.

Section 2.1. Independence.
The Commission shall remain an independent body, free from
interference from any City employees or elected officials. The
Commission may request funding from the City Council for an
independent investigation as needed.

Section 2.2. Term.
Commissioners shall serve for a term of three (3) years.

Section 2.3 Duties.
The Commission shall develop the Code of Ethics. The Commission
shall provide a report to the City Council no less than
annually. The Commission shall consider questions and render
advisory opinions.




 Page 110
Section 2.3.1. Advisory Opinions.
The Ethics Commission or quorum of at least five (5) members,
shall be convened on request for an advisory opinion by no less
than two (2) members of the City Council, the Mayor, or the
Chief Executive of the City. The Commission may issue, at its
discretion, advisory opinions upon request of any city officer,
official, employee, or resident of the City of Portland at any
time.

The names of complainants shall be protected by confidentiality,
unless they elect to waive it. No complainant shall be
retaliated against for filing a complaint.

Section 2.3.2. Advisory Interpretation of the City Charter
The Ethics Commission may, at its discretion, also render non-
binding, advisory opinions on City compliance with The City
Charter. The Commission shall provide its written interpretation of
the Charter on the written request of any resident or official of the
City. The Commission’s interpretation is advisory only and for
educational purposes and shall not be the basis for any legal action.
A copy of the request and the proposed response shall be provided to
the City Council, Mayor and City Manager for review prior to being
issued.

Section 2.3.3. The Ethics Commission shall deliver all advisory
opinions including but not limited to ethics violations,
conflicts of interest, and charter opinions, to the City
Attorney, Chief Executive/Administrator, Mayor and City Council
in compliance with applicable law, no less than 14 days after a
decision is made. AND PUBLIC REVIEW??


Section 3. Violations of Ethics Code.
Violations apply to both elected and appointed officials and any
member of city staff. If the Commission finds violations of the
ethics code, the Commission may recommend, by a simple majority
vote, advisory opinions to the applicable hiring authority any
appropriate disciplinary or removal proceedings and notify the
city attorney that further action should be taken in accordance
with state law. Opinions rendered by the Commission are not
legally binding and purely advisory in nature and shall be




 Page 111
rendered in accordance with all applicable labor laws, contracts, and confidentiality
requirements..

In no circumstances shall the ethics commission have access to
any personal information protected by state law.

Any City Councilor or Mayor found in violation of the ethics
code may be reprimanded by the City Council. The Council may
decide to do nothing, censure a member, remove a member, or set
a recall election. Whichever option is selected, requires a
2/3rds majority vote of the City Council.

Suspected criminal conduct shall be reported immediately to the
Portland police department.

The complainant shall receive a response to the complaint
regarding the outcome.


Section 3.1 Conflict of Interest of Elected Officials, Boards, and ad hoc Committees

3.1.1 Determination of Conflict

If the subject is a member of an elected or appointed body, including but not limited to council,
board, committee, or task force, the complaint shall be brought to the attention of the chair (or
equivalent) of that body. Once the complaint of conflict of interest has been initiated against a
member of a body as provided above, the body shall deliberate the matter themselves or refer
deliberation to an appropriate office or entity.


If the complaint is against the chair, then the complaint shall be brought to the attention of the
next most senior member who is not subject of the complaint or who is not the complainant
themself.

Once a complaint has been made, the subject shall be notified of the complaint and shall have
the option to recuse themself or to request deliberation. Public notice shall be given of the
complaint unless confidentiality requirements prohibit it.

Complaints determined by the chair of the relevant body (or the next most senior member, to
whom the complaint is not against) to be frivolous, scurrilous, libelous, baseless, unfounded, of
nuisance, or otherwise without account need not be deliberated or referred if the complaint is
publicly designated as such.




 Page 112
Members of the public may bring their complaint to the entire body or to other city officials
including the Ethics Commission. The Commission may refer complaints to the appropriate
office or body for consideration. Except as described in the preceding paragraph, all complaints
shall be considered or deliberated in as timely manner as possible and in any case shall be
considered in advance of deliberation on the relevant proposal or law.

Section 3.2 Acknowledgement of Complaint
The complainant shall receive a response to the complaint regarding the outcome.


Section 3.3 Failure to Disclose or Comply with Code of Ethics
Failure to disclose or comply with the code of ethics shall result in disciplinary action that may
include termination of the individual from their position with the city.



Examples of Ethics Boards/Commissions/Ordinances/Charter Amendments:
Bangor, ME: Population: 31,753
 ● Ordinance: https://ecode360.com/6889057
 ● Charter Amendment (establishes board & requires creation of code):
 https://ecode360.com/14956369

Waterville, ME: Population: 15,828
 ● Ordinance:http://www.waterville-me.gov/ordinances/wp-
 content/uploads/sites/25/2018/02/Ethics-Ordinance-Revised-010518.pdf
 ● Charter Amendment: Article VI (establishes board & requires creation of code)
 http://www.waterville-me.gov/clerk/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2017/08/2020-Charter-
 with-Revision-Markups.pdf

Windham, ME: Population: 18,434
 ● Ordinance (establishes both the Ethics Board & code):
 https://www.windhammaine.us/DocumentCenter/View/1017/Ethics-Policy---Board-of-
 Ethics?bidId=

York, ME: Population 13,723
 ● Ordinance (no board established - up to chairs & department heads to regulate conduct):
 https://www.yorkmaine.org/DocumentCenter/View/1348/a-Code-of-Ethics-2021-06-
 14?bidId=

Bristol, ME: Population 2,834
 ● Ordinance (no board established but complaints are brought straight to the selectmen to
 decide).




 Page 113
 https://www.bristolmaine.org/sites/g/files/vyhlif4191/f/uploads/code_of_ethics_and_cond
 uct.pdf

Lisbon, ME: Population 9,711
 ● Ordinance (establishes an ethics panel of three voters and issues advisory opinions on
 conflicts of interests)
 https://library.municode.com/me/lisbon/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICOOR_C
 H12ETCOIN_S12-3ETPA

Ogunquit, ME: Population 1,577
 ● Ordinance (no board, ethics violations are determined internally on boards and
 committees) https://www.townofogunquit.org/vertical/Sites/%7B2524508A-BBA7-
 433A-9EAA-
 E74D93FCB25D%7D/uploads/CODE_OF_ETHICS_FOR_BOARDS_AND_COMMIT
 TEES.pdf

Madison, ME: Population 2,433
  ● Ordinance (includes ethics board with advisory opinions provided to select board)
 https://ecode360.com/9856843

Kennebunk, ME: Population 11,536
 ● Internal procedures governing rules for the council.
 https://www.kennebunkmaine.us/DocumentCenter/View/218/Select-Board-Code-of-
 Ethics?bidId=

Bridgton, ME: Population 5,418
 ● Ordinance (establishes penalty for violation and applies to all elected officials and
 employees) https://bridgtonmaine.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Code-of-Ethics.pdf

New York, NY: Population: 8.5 Million
 ● Charter Chapter 68 (establishes the Conflicts of Interest Board, defines its powers and
 obligations, defines prohibited interests and conduct, establishes reporting requirements,
 establishes the Board’s power to impose penalties, authorizes the Board to investigate
 and adjudicate gifts by lobbyists):
 https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCcharter/0-0-0-5995
 ● The Rules of the City of New York
 https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCrules/0-0-0-86448

El Paso, TX: Population: 679,813




 Page 114
 ● Charter Title 2, Chapter 2.92 (establishes board, Standard of Conduct, duties, jurisdiction,
 and procedures)
 https://library.municode.com/tx/el_paso/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT2ADPE_
 CH2.92ET_ARTIIIETRECO_2.92.150ADOP
 ● Ordinance
 https://library.municode.com/tx/el_paso/ordinances/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=107821
 4

Philadelphia, PA: Population 1.58 Million
 ● Charter Chapter 11 (establishes Board, powers and duties)
 https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-182492
 ● Code (defines duties, standards, prohibited conduct, penalties, establishes standard of
 conduct and financial disclosure requirements)
 https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-217009


Examples of Charter Compliance Commissions:

Provincetown, MA: Population: 2,994 - Charter Compliance Commission
 ● Charter Amendment: https://www.provincetown-ma.gov/125/Charter-Compliance-
 Commission
 ● https://www.provincetown-ma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/202/Charter-PDF?bidId=
 (page 6)

Bourne, MA: Population: 19,872 - Charter Compliance Commission
 ● Charter Amendment:
 https://www.townofbourne.com/sites/g/files/vyhlif7346/f/uploads/town_charter_2016.pdf
 ● https://www.townofbourne.com/charter-compliance

Milton, VT: Population 2,507 - Charter Compliance Commission
 ● Charter Amendment:
 https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/24appendix/129/00702




Reasoning:
1. Protect whistleblowers.
2. Fight and discourage corruption, waste, fraud, abuse, and favoritism from both elected and
unelected individuals.
3. Increase transparency and accountability in municipal government.




 Page 115
4. Be a safe, independent place to send complaints and concerns regarding ethical conduct.
5. Creates an ethics mission and code for the City of Portland.
6. Cost effective, productive ethical conduct oversight.
7. To bring more voices at the table and the community oriented decisions on what ethical
conduct is, rather than one individual.
8. Build public trust in municipal government
9. No associated costs chartered in.




 Page 116
Procedures Committee Proposal on Participatory Budgeting

"The City Council shall develop and implement a participatory budgeting system wherein a portion of the
municipal budget and/or the Capital Improvement program is allocated based on a process that involves the
input of as many residents of Portland as possible. The City Council may establish a subcommittee, a task force,
or any other structure that is necessary and proper for the design, implementation, and management of
a participatory budgeting system."




 Page 117
Page 118
SCHOOL BUDGET

Section 5. School budget.



Prior to the submission of a school budget, the school board and
city council shall establish a Joint Committee on Budget
Guidance, consisting of with four city councilors and four
school board members, appointed by the Mayor and school board
chair, respectively. The purpose of the joint committee is to
develop guidance for the city and school district on budget
priorities and constraints, covering a two-year period and
updated annually. The joint committee shall obtain public
comment on the guidance prior to submitting the guidance as a
proposed non-binding joint resolution to the city council and
school board for their approval.

Not later than three and one-half (3.5) months before the end of
the fiscal year, the superintendent shall submit to the school
board budget estimates of the various sums required for the
support of public schools for the ensuing fiscal year and shall
thereafter provide the school board with such information
relating to such estimates as the school board shall require.

During the thirty (30) days fFollowing submission of the
superintendent’s proposed budget to the school board and the
city budget to the city council, the school board and the city
council, or their designated subcommittees, a Joint Budget
Committee, consisting of four city councilors and four school
board members, appointed by the Mayor and school board chair,
respectively, shall meet jointly at least twice to review the
proposed school budget, focusing on its underlying assumptions
and supporting data and the ability of the city to raise the
necessary funds for the support of such proposed budget develop
guidance for the city and school district on budget priorities
and constraints for the upcoming fiscal year. The joint
committee shall obtain public comment on the guidance prior to
submitting the guidance to the city council and school board for
their consideration. The superintendent and the city manager
shall provide budget information regarding such proposed budget
as reasonably requested by the Joint Budget Committeeschool
board and the city council, or their designated subcommittees.




 Page 119
The budget submitted by the superintendent to be reviewed
jointly by the school board and the city council shall provide a
complete financial plan of all school funds and activities for
the ensuing fiscal year. In organizing the school budget for
joint review by the school board, the superintendent shall
utilize the most feasible combination of expenditure
classification by fund, organization, unit, program, purpose or
activity, and object. The budget shall begin with a clear
general summary of its contents; shall show in detail all
estimated income and all proposed expenditures, including debt
service for the ensuing fiscal year; and shall be so arranged as
to show comparative figures for actual and estimated income and
expenditures of the current fiscal year and actual income and
expenditures of the preceding fiscal year. The total of proposed
expenditures shall not exceed the total of proposed income.

Not later than the last Monday in April of each fiscal year, the
school board shall submit to the city councilprepare a budget of
the various sums required for the support of the public schools
for the ensuing fiscal year in the format provided above, and
shall thereafter provide the city council with such information
relating to such budget as the city council shall require.

The school board shall hold aA budget hearing on such budget
estimates shall be held at least seven (7) days prior to
determining the total amount of the school budgetfinal action by
the city council. The city council shall thereafter submit the
school budget determined by the school board to a budget
validation referendum. If the voters discontinue use of the
budget validation referendum process, the city council shall
instead submit the school budget to a municipal school budget
referendum. The warrant calling the budget validation referendum
or the school budget referendum shall include voter information
containing the amount of locally raised funds and the amounts
for each cost center summary budget category proposed by the
school board.

The city council in its appropriation resolve for the ensuing
year shall, in addition to amounts appropriated for other
general city purposes, appropriate one gross amount for the




 Page 120
support of the public schools, which amount shall equal the
greater of (i) the amount adopted by the voters at the school
budget referendum and ratified at the budget validation
referendum, as necessary, or (ii)not be less than the sum
required to be appropriated for such purposes by the general
laws of the state. Such gross amount shall not be less than the
sum requested by the school board except by a vote of at least
six (6) members of the city council. Such appropriation shall be
expended under the direction and control of the school board but
no such appropriation shall be exceeded except by consent of the
voters city council. (Referendum 6/13/78; 11/2/10)




 Page 121
At the appropriate location(s) in the Charter, specify that the city manager and superintendent
must jointly prepare and submit to a joint meeting of the council and school board a multi-year
capital improvement CIP before submission of the budget, and must publish a general summary
of the CIP. The CIP must be revised and extended each year with regard to capital
improvements pending or in process of construction or acquisition.

The Education Committee recognizes that changes in the city’s governance structure may affect
the roles of city officials in the CIP process. If no changes are made to the governance structure,
the following amendments to the Charter appear to capture the intent of this proposal:

 ARTICLE VI. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
 …
 Section 5. Appointment; qualifications; powers and duties
 of the city manager.
 …
 The city manager's powers and duties shall be as follows:
 …
 (i) To jointly prepare with the Portland Public
 Schools superintendent a five (5) year rolling capital
 improvement plan for annual presentation to a joint
 meeting of the city council and school board, which plan
 includes the following:
 1. A one (1) year plan of specific projects and their
 cost;
 2. A two (2) through five (5) year plan of specific
 projects and general categories, and amounts of proposed
 spending and funding sources; and
 3. A discussion of the basis for the plan and the
 factors which went into its development or amendments.




 Page 122
 GOVERNANCE COMPROMISE
 (AMENDMENT)
 Co-Sponsors: Commissioners CHANN and O’BRIEN amended by BUXTON, KEBEDE, SHEIKH-
 YOUSEF, and WASHBURN
MAYOR AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE
   The mayor shall be the chief executive officer of the City of Portland, overseeing and supervising
 the city administrator and implementing policies passed by the City Council.
   The mayor is no longer a member of the Council and does not have a council vote.

COUNCIL AS LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
   Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, which appoints members to committees
 and elects a 2-year council president.
   The council president develops and proposes council rules of procedure for adoption by the
 council.
   The council president serves as the official channel for Council to communicate with
 constitutional officers about policies, priorities, and agendas for Council meetings.
   The mayor may propose legislation to be taken up by council. Individual council members
 may sponsor legislation. All city staff and members of the public may petition a councilor to
 sponsor legislation to be taken up on their behalf.


PUBLIC FIGUREHEAD
   The mayor shall serve as the official representative of the city in Augusta and Washington, D.C.
   The mayor shall serve as the official spokesperson for the city.
   The mayor may form public task forces with staffing support for any issue not taken up by the
 council.
BUDGETARY POWERS
   The mayor, with the assistance of department heads and the city administrator, drafts and presents
 the annual city budget to the council for adoption.
   The mayor, with the assistance of the city administrator, works with department heads to develop
 their departmental budgets.
REMOVAL OF MAYOR
   If the mayor is convicted of a felony materially related to their official duties, the City Council
 may, upon a vote of ¾ of its members, remove the mayor from their office.

   If the mayor engages in official misconduct or neglect of duty, the council may schedule a recall
 election by a 3/4ths vote. (from Westbrook)
APPOINTMENTS AND STAFFING
   The mayor may not unilaterally hire and fire city staff, including the city administrator, city
 attorney, city clerk, and department heads.
   The mayor nominates department heads and the city administrator, and presents nominations to
 the City Council for confirmation.




 Page 123
   Only department heads may fire and hire city staff.
   The council cannot unilaterally fire or hire officers, including the city administrator or department
 heads. The mayor shall recommend removal of an officer, and the council can approve with
 simple majority. If council seeks to discharge an officer, they should seek approval of the mayor,
 who will make the recommendation for removal to be approved by a majority of the council.
 Should the council seek to remove an officer without mayoral approval, they may only do so with
 a ¾ majority vote.

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND DAY-TO-DAY
OPERATIONS
   The mayor oversees the implementation of policies passed by the council and shall meet regularly
 with the Council Executive Committee to develop implementation plans and report on results and
 measure accountability.
   The mayor shall direct the city administrator and department heads to implement council policies.
   The mayor shall lead an economic development task force.
   The mayor shall chair the city administrator’s annual performance review and may call, at any
 time, an executive session of the council to discuss performance.




 Page 124
 [CHANGES TRACKED]
 GOVERNANCE COMPROMISE
 Co-Sponsors: Commissioners CHANN and O’BRIEN amended by KEBEDE, BUXTON, SHEIKH-
 YUSUF, and WASHBURN
MAYOR AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE
  ● The mayor shall be the chief executive officer of the City of Portland, overseeing and supervising
 the City Manager city administrator and implementing policies passed by the City Council.
  ● The mayor is no longer a member of the Council and does not have a vote.
  ● The mayor signs or vetos all legislation enacted by the Council. Commented [1]: Veto power was not in
  ● The mayor shall preside as chair of a twelve (12) member council. original document Michael sent. I think the
 veto powers significantly alters the powers of
  ● The mayor shall cast a vote only in the event of a tie. the mayor and makes this **much** less of a
  ● The mayor and At-Large Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, who will compromise proposal than Michael's original
 appoint Council members to committees. text. I'm still not sure where I land on veto
 power, but I think if the goal is still to
  ● The Executive Committee will develop and propose Council rules of procedure for adoption by encourage some council-mayor
 the City Council. collaboration, it might be better to allow
 Mayor to sponsor legislation (and spell this
  ● The Executive Committee will serve as the official channel for the mayor and Council to out in detail in this proposal) and form
 communicate with Constitutional Officers about policies, priorities, and to set agendas for legislative tasks force, rather than give mayor
 Council meetings. veto power. If the mayor doesn't have veto
 power and instead needs to collaborate w/
COUNCIL AS LEGISLATIVE BRANCH councilors to push their agenda, is that more
 collaborative? I don't think their lack of a veto
  ● Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, which appoints members to committees
 makes them any less "accountable" to voters,
 and elects a 2-year council president. we've just seen veto power abused pretty
  ● The council president develops and proposes council rules of procedure for adoption by the extensively in Maine, especially with such a
 council. split electorate.

  ● The council president serves as the official channel for Council to communicate with Either way-- I think veto power is up for
 constitutional officers about policies, priorities, and agendas for Council meetings. debate and I think we should hash it out as
 commission. I don't know if i can sign on to
  ● CB added: The mayor may propose legislation to be taken up by council. Individual council something with veto power for the mayor.
 members may sponsor legislation. All city staff and members of the public may petition a Commented [2]: Is this a Committee of the
 councilor to sponsor legislation to be taken up on their behalf. Whole or do councilors elect a few of their
 members as executives?
 Commented [3R3]: Similar question: I think the
PUBLIC FIGUREHEAD WHOLE council should elect the whole of
 their executive committee-- so they all vote
  ● The mayor shall serve as the official representative of the city in Augusta and Washington, D.C.
 on their president and 2(?) other committee
  ● The mayor shall serve as the official spokesperson for the city. members to serve on Exec.

  ● The mayor may form public task forces by right with staffing support for any issue not taken up broader q is do they need an exec committee
 by the council. or is it better just to have 1 CP?
BUDGETARY POWERS Commented [4]: this was a common thread
 b/tw Gov Committee and NSY proposal.
  ● The mayor, with the assistance of department heads and the city administrator, drafts and presents
 the annual city budget to the council for adoption.




 Page 125
  ● The mayor, with the assistance of the shall direct the drafting of the City Budget by the City
 Manager, who will work withand city administrator, shall works with department heads to
 develop their departmental budgets.
REMOVAL OF MAYOR
  ● If the mayor is convicted of a felony materially related to their the performance of the Mayor’s
 official duties, the City Council may, upon a vote of ¾ of its members, remove the mayor from
 their office.
  ● If the mayor engages in official misconduct or neglect of duty, the council may schedule a recall
 election by a 3/4ths vote. (from Westbrook)
APPOINTMENTS AND STAFFING
  ● The mayor may not unilaterally hire and fire city staff, including the City Managercity
 administrator, city attorney, city clerk, and department heads.
  ● The mayor advises and consents to City Manager’s shall nominatesions department heads and the
 city administrator, and presents nominations to the City Council for confirmation.
  ● Only department heads may fire and hire city staff.
  ● The city council may not unilaterally discharge department heads or the city administrator. These Commented [5]: I'm not sure I'm 100% behind
 individuals Department heads/City Administrator may only be fired if the Mayor recommends this addition, I think it makes sense for the
 council to not be able to fire a mayor's staff
 such action and a majority of the council approves. The council cannot unilaterally fire or hire out from under them, but at the same
 officers, including city administrator or department heads. The mayor shall recommend to remove time...what if a mayor hires someone who
 an officer, council can approve with simple majority. If council seeks to discharge an officer, they turns out to be a real dumpster fire of a
 person, but they won't fire them because
 should seek approval of mayor, who will make the recommendation for removal to be approved they're a personal friend, you'd want a check
 by majority of council. Should the council seek to remove an officer without mayoral approval, on that thru the council, right?)
 they may only do so with a ¾ majority vote.
 Does it make more sense that the mayor can
 ● nom, hire, fire w/ a vote of 2/3rds of council,
 and council likewise can by 2/3 or even
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND DAY-TO-DAY
 larger majority opt to remove a high level
OPERATIONS staffer? It offers a balance on power and
  ● The mayor oversees the implementation of policies passed by the council and shall meet regularly addresses sone folks concerns about
 with the Council Executive Committee to develop a plan for implementation plans and report on cronyism better.
 results. to help ensure and measure accountability. Commented [6]: This section feels a little
 convoluted. Does it make sense to say more
  ● The mayor shall direct the city administrator and department heads City Manager to implement simply:
 council policies. "Mayor may hire and fire department heads
 and the city administrator with nomination
  ● The mayor shall lead an economic development task force. and approval for any new hires or discharges
  ● The mayor shall chair the City Managercity administrator’s annual performance review and may with a 2/3 council vote? Department heads
 call, at any time, an executive session of the council to discuss performance. are responsible for hiring and firing of their
 own staffers."




 Page 126
 GOVERNANCE COMPROMISE

 Co-Sponsors: Commissioners CHANN and O’BRIEN

MAYOR AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE

 ● The Mayor shall be the chief executive officer of the City of Portland with supervision of the City Manager
 and the implementation of policies passed by the City Council.

 ● The Mayor shall preside as chair of the City Council.

 ● The Mayor shall cast a vote only in the event of a tie.

 ● The Mayor and At-Large Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, who will appoint
 Council members to committees.

 ● The Executive Committee will develop and propose Council rules of procedure for adoption by the City
 Council.

 ● The Executive Committee will serve as the official channel for the Mayor and Council to communicate
 with Constitutional Officers about policies, priorities, and to set agendas for Council meetings.

PUBLIC FIGUREHEAD

 ● Mayor shall serve as the official representative of the City in Augusta and Washington, D.C.

 ● Mayor shall serve as the official spokesperson for the City.

 ● May form public task force by right with reasonable staffing support for any issue not taken up by Council.

BUDGETARY POWERS

 ● The Mayor shall present the City Budget to the Council for adoption.

 ● The Mayor shall communicate their and City Council’s priorities for the drafting of the City Budget by the
 City Manager, who will work with Department Heads to develop their departmental budgets.

 ● The Mayor may veto the City Budget and the Council can override with a 2/3 majority vote.

HIRING & FIRING OF CITY STAFF

 ● The City Manager, Corporation Counsel, and City Clerk shall be hired following a search process that
 includes the Mayor and City Council and a majority vote of the City Council.

 ● The Mayor shall chair the City Manager, Corporation Counsel, and City Clerk’s annual performance
 review and may call, at any time, an executive session of the Council to discuss performance. These
 officers may be removed following a majority vote of the City Council.

 ● The Mayor shall not have the power to unilaterally hire and fire city staff, including the City Manager, City
 Attorney, City Clerk, Department Heads.

 ● The Mayor advises and consents to City Manager’s nominations of Department Heads and presents to City
 Council for confirmation.

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, ECONOMIC DEV & DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS

 ● The Mayor shall ensure that policies passed by the Council are implemented by the City Manager and city
 staff and shall meet regularly with the Executive Committee and the City Manager to develop a plan for
 implementation to help ensure and measure accountability.

 ● The Mayor shall lead an economic development task force.




 Page 127

City of Portland Charter Commission
 Meeting Minutes
 March 23, 2022 (Remote via Zoom)

1. Zoom Information

 The meeting was conducted as a remote meeting by Zoom videoconference in accordance
 with the Commission’s Remote Participation Policy and State law (1 M.R.S. §403-B).

2. Call to Order

 Chair Kebede called the meeting to order at 6:03 p.m.
 Commissioners present were Barowitz, Buxton, Chann, Eglinton, Houston, Kebede,
 Lizanecz (joined 6:10 p.m.), O’Brien, Sheikh-Yousef, Stewart-Bouley, Washburn, and
 Waxman. (Quorum established)

3. Review and Approval of Minutes

 On motion by Commissioner Waxman, seconded by Commissioner Eglinton, the
 Commission voted to approve the draft meeting minutes of March 16, 2022 by roll-call vote
 of 11-0.

4. Deliberation on Governance Models

 Commissioners deliberated on reforms to the basic structure of Portland’s government.

 Commissioner Chann made a motion to move the Chann/O’Brien Governance Compromise
 and the Amended Chann/O’Brien Governance Compromise up on the agenda to receive a
 first reading and clarifying questions so that these could be included in further deliberation
 on this topic. The Commission voted 10-2 (Washburn, Sheikh-Yousef opposed) to approve
 the motion.

 A discussion followed as to how to proceed: conduct a first reading and then postpone the
 discussion to next week, or first reading and then discuss governance components while the
 facilitators are present.



{P2001564.1} 1
 Commissioner Chann began presenting the Governance Compromise. It incorporates the
 mayor as chief executive officer as favored in the straw poll. The mayor also would chair the
 city council but would only vote in event of a tie; he likened this to the role of the Vice
 President with regard to the US Senate. The mayor would have a more significant role in
 development of the City budget, and would hire the “constitutional officers” subject to
 council confirmation. The city manager would be responsible for day-to-day administration.

 Commissioner O’Brien added that the mayor and at-large councilors would serve as the
 executive committee to would provide the channel for official communications, and that the
 mayor would be at the table for economic development discussions.

 Commissioner Eglinton questioned what the mayor’s “supervision” over the city manager
 entailed, and the response was oversight, not micromanagement. Commissioner Barowitz
 asked what oversight or checks and balances there would be over each branch, and the
 response was that each branch – legislative and executive – would serve as a check on the
 other. The proposal is silent on the ombudsman/public advocate concept for now.
 Commissioner Barowitz also asked about the use of “city manager” rather than “city
 administrator”; Commissioner O’Brien responded that whatever the title, the position is the
 City’s chief operating officer.

 Chair Kebede presented the Amended Chann/O’Brien Governance Compromise. The mayor
 no longer would be a council member or have a council vote, but would be the chief
 executive officer as in Westbrook, ME and in Burlington, VT. A professional administrator
 would be supervised by the mayor. The mayor would be to the City as the Governor is to the
 State of Maine. As to whether additional oversight is needed, the Chair noted that the
 executive and legislative branches in the cities cited oversee each other successfully. The
 mayor would be the City’s official representative with regard to other entities, including the
 Governor and Legislature.

 The commissioners agreed to act at the next meeting on issues not addressed by the
 proposals, to move expediently by consensus rather than by formal motion through a list of
 issues to be assembled by Commissioner Washburn. The Commission then would begin to
 promptly prepare and review the text for the Charter revision to effect the changes.

5. Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Clean Elections proposal from Elections
 Committee

 Commissioner Buxton presented the Clean Elections proposal.

 The Commission’s legal advisor recommended an amendment to remove Section 13.a. to
 avoid constitutionality concerns.

 The Commission conducted a public hearing. Among the comments received was a rebuttal
 by John Brautigam, Esq. to the legal advice provided to the Commission. The Commission’s
 legal advisor said he would review the authorities cited by Atty. Brautigam, and the
 Commission proceeded subject to this issue’s later resolution.


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 Commissioner O’Brien moved to adopt the proposal, seconded by Commissioner Washburn.
 Following deliberation, the Commission considered several amendments offered by
 Commissioner O’Brien.
 1) to strike or be silent on whether a candidate participating in clean election program
 must participate in a city-sponsored debate, seconded by Commissioner Eglinton;
 amendment failed on a tie vote of 5 yes (O’Brien, Eglinton, Chann, Washburn,
 Waxman), 5 no (Kebede, Huston, Sheikh-Yousef, Lizanecz, Buxton), 1 abstention
 (Barowitz)
 2) to amend language regarding the database for contributions so that it would be
 determined by the city council; the amendment was seconded by Commissioner
 Washburn and then withdrawn.
 3) to add a concept to section 13(a) to prevent for-profit and non-profit corporations
 from achieving financial gain through pending or future contracts and business when
 make contributions. Commissioner Washburn stated that the ethics code may be a
 better place for this prohibition. The amendment passed on a vote of 10 yes (O’Brien,
 Eglinton, Chann, Kebede, Huston, Sheikh-Yousef, Lizanecz, Buxton, Barowitz,
 Waxman), 1 no (Washburn)

 Following a general discussion the Commissioners voted 11-0 to approve the motion as
 amended (Commissioner Stewart-Bouley absent).

6. Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Redistricting proposal from Elections
 Committee

 Commissioner Chann presented the Elections Committee proposal to increase the number of
 district councilors from 5 to 10, with 3 at-large seats, for a total of 13 councilors. District
 lines would be drawn by the council and adjusted as now happens under a State law requiring
 a reapportionment ordinance after each decennial census.

 Commissioner Waxman recognized that smaller districts would make it easier to conduct
 participatory budgeting, but was not sure the voters would support 13 councilors and 10
 districts.

 Commissioner Washburn favored an odd number of councilors, and expressed that increasing
 the number of councilors increases the connection between council members and those they
 represent.

 The Commission conducted a public hearing.

 In deliberation, Commissioner O’Brien explained that a larger council would have more
 mechanisms to allow more councilors to introduce legislation and would reduce the
 overburdening of councilors with committee assignments and work that now occurs. He
 added that tie votes can be addressed by allowing the mayor to vote, and that a 12-member
 council would allow an even number of councilors to be on the ballot each year.
 Commissioner Washburn suggested corresponding increases in the number of school board


{P2001564.1} 3
 members for the same reason. The Commission’s legal advisor noted that the number of
 districts is set by the existing Charter at five, and that the number of city councilors and of
 school board members is based on electing one from each of those districts. He explained
 that he had consulted with the school board’s legal counsel, who had spoken with the
 Superintendent about increasing the number of school board district seats in step with
 increases in city council district seats; while the school board had not considered the
 question, the Superintendent though it would agree to an increase for increased
 representation and parity. The Commission’s legal advisor also heard from the city clerk who
 thought it would be a “nightmare” to administer municipal elections with different school
 and council districts.

 Commissioner Waxman asked where the proposal came from, and several Commissioners
 responded that they saw there was a lot of interest among voters to broaden representation
 and diversity and to make the council more directly representative. Commissioner Barowitz
 said that he heard the same from voters, but was concerned it would create single-issue
 candidates.

 A friendly amendment to reduce the numbers to 6 district and 3 at-large councilors was
 declined.

 Commissioner Chann moved to adopt the proposal, seconded by Commissioners Washburn.

 Commissioner O’Brien moved to amend the motion to 12 councilors, with 9 district and 3-at
 large, with a chair who only votes to break a tie. Commissioner Chann seconded the
 amendment, which passed by a vote of 6 (O’Brien, Houston, Lizanecz, Eglinton, Waxman,
 Chann) to 5 (Kebede, Barowitz, Buxton, Washburn, Sheikh-Yousef).

 The Commission clarified that this vote is only about the city council, and approved the
 motion as amended by vote of 8 (O’Brien, Buxton, Lizanecz, Chann, Kebede, Barowitz,
 Houston, Washburn) to 3 (Waxman, Sheikh-Yousef, Eglinton).

7. Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Code of Ethics proposal from Procedures
 Committee

 Because additions discussed at the last meeting did not make it into the version of the Code
 of Ethics proposal for this evening’s meeting, this item was tabled to the next meeting by
 consensus.

8. Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Participatory Budgeting Proposal from
 Procedures Committee

 Commissioner Waxman introduced this proposal, explaining that after reviewing several
 participatory budgeting programs, the Procedures Committee though it best to prepare a brief
 outline of the measure in the Charter and to leave development of the details of the actual
 participatory budgeting process to the city council. Through clarifying questions,
 Commissioners established that this proposal is limited to the City budget but Commissioner


{P2001564.1} 4
 O’Brien noted that nothing would stop the school board from similarly adopting participatory
 budgeting.

 On motion by Commissioner Waxman, seconded by Commissioner Washburn, the
 Commission approved the proposal by vote of 10-0 (Commissioners Stewart-Bouley and
 Lizanecz absent).

9. First Read of School Budget Process Proposal from Education Committee

 Commissioner Houston presented the first reading of this proposal. The purposes of the
 proposal are to make it easier for the public to understand and to participate in the school
 budget process, and to increase or achieve parity of the school board with the city council,
 which adopts its own budget. In this proposal, the city council is removed from the budget
 process except to send the school budget to a budget validation referendum; if at some time
 the voters decide to cease the budget validation referendum, then the City would instead hold
 a municipal school budget referendum. The proposal establishes an 8-member Joint
 Committee on Budget Guidance, with four councilors and four school board members
 appointed by the mayor and school board chair, respectively, to develop guidance for the
 City and school budget over the next two years prior to submission of a school budget.
 Asked by Commissioner Waxman how this proposal came to be, Commissioner Houston
 noted that he’s seen much budget back-and-forth recently, and that he also heard concerns
 from voters. Commissioner Eglinton added that the Joint Committee portion of the proposal
 came out of his experience on the school board and with the school district as well as his
 concern with parity.

 The Commission’s legal advisor pointed out that unlike the three-part school budget process
 under State law (school board proposes budget, legislative body votes on budget, voters vote
 at budget validation referendum), this proposal bypasses the legislative body entirely and
 goes directly to the budget validation referendum. This could lead to budget invalidation,
 and the issue would be locked into the Charter. Chair Kebede asked the Education
 Committee to work with legal counsel to see if the concerns could be addressed.

10. First Read of Capital Improvement Program Process Proposal from Education
 Committee

 Commissioner Eglinton presented the first reading of this proposal. Under the current
 Charter, the city manager’s duties include preparation of a rolling 5-year capital
 improvement program (CIP) plan that includes both short-term and longer-term projects and
 presentation of that CIP to the city council. This proposal expands that obligation by
 directing the city manager and the superintendent to jointly prepare that CIP and to present it
 to a joint meeting of the city council and school board to provide a comprehensive view of
 proposed public capital improvement projects in Portland.




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11. New Business

 Commissioner Barowitz suggested the creation of a constitutional officer position to serve as
 an auditor overseeing City finances to avoid fraud and waste. This person might be a new
 hire or might be additional responsibility for an existing City staff person, and that resulting
 savings and revenue otherwise achieved might pay for new measures under the Charter
 revisions.

 Chair Kebede reminded Commissioners that time is growing short to complete the
 Commission’s work and asked Committees to prepare narratives explain the purpose and
 process for each proposal.

12. Adjourn

 On motion by Commissioner Washburn, seconded by Commissioner O’Brien, the
 Commission voted to adjourn by roll-call vote of 9-0. The meeting adjourned at 11:00 p.m.




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