Gul Rahman was killed in a secret CIA interrogation facility where he endured being doused with frigid water and shackled naked 
 
 It took almost 15 years for Gul Rahman’s family to receive a direct acknowledgment that he had been killed in a secret CIA interrogation facility in Afghanistan. 
 
 Now the family is pressing the United States to disclose what happened to his remains. 
 
 A Freedom of Information Act (Foia) request filed by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of the family seeks “information on what agents of the United States did with the body of Mr Gul Rahman, an Afghan citizen, following his death in CIA custody in November 2002”. 
 
 
 
 Rahman disappeared in October 2002, when the family was living in a refugee camp near Peshawar, Pakistan. He was delivered to a clandestine CIA prison near Kabul known as “the Salt Pit”, where he endured more than three weeks of interrogation that included being doused with frigid water and shackled naked or in a diaper for days in stress positions. 
 
 Inside the CIA’s black site torture room Read more 
 
 He was discovered dead in his cell on 20 November 2002, after being restrained overnight on the concrete floor on a night when the outside temperature dropped below freezing. 
 
 Gul Rahman’s family, represented by his nephew Obaid Ullah, filed a lawsuit in 2015 alongside two surviving former Salt Pit prisoners against James Mitchell and John “Bruce” Jessen, the two contract psychologists who designed the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation program”. A settlement reached in that lawsuit last year included a statement confirming that “Gul Rahman was subjected to abuses in the CIA program that resulted in his death and pain and suffering to his family”. 
 
 
 
 But the settlement left unresolved the mystery of what happened to Gul Rahman’s remains. Internal CIA investigations produced for the lawsuit recorded that the CIA ordered a freezer to preserve the body for an autopsy, and summarized an autopsy report that listed the likely cause of death as hypothermia. No records relating to the disposition of Rahman’s remains have been released. 
 
 
 
 The Geneva Conventions and other international treaties require that prisoners who die in custody in wartime be buried in marked graves, that the graves’ locations be recorded in a registry, and that their families be notified and allowed access to the gravesites when hostilities end. 
 
 
 
 In a deposition for the lawsuit against Mitchell and Jessen, Obaid Ullah pleaded for return of his uncle’s remains. “Where is his gravesite and what happened to him?” he said. “If they killed him I wish they would let us know: here is your dead body. At least present the dead body to us.” 
 
 
 
 Honoring this small but significant request will help bring his family long-needed closure Steven Watt, family attorney 
 
 Steven Watt, the ACLU attorney who filed the Foia request on behalf of the family, called the CIA’s continuing refusal to account for Rahman’s remains “a failure of basic human decency”. 
 
 
 
 “Honoring this small but significant request will help bring his family, including his mother, his wife, and three daughters, long-needed closure,” Watt said. “It will also shed further light on one of the most controversial and tragic aspects of the CIA’s now-defunct torture program,” he added. 
 
 
 
 Rahman’s death in November 2002, and the death of another prisoner the CIA delivered to an interrogation facility in Afghanistan two weeks later, convulsed the CIA’s fledgling Rendition, Detention and Interrogation program. 
 
 
 
 The deaths came as the CIA was debating what to do with videotapes of the torture of Abu Zubaydah, which included 83 sessions of waterboarding, and as a second CIA captive, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, was being subjected to similar treatment at the CIA’s black site in Thailand. Mitchell and Jessen led both those interrogations, and also participated in the interrogation of Gul Rahman in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
 This turbulent period is likely to receive renewed scrutiny during the forthcoming congressional confirmation hearings for Gina Haspel, Donald Trump’s nominee to direct the CIA. Haspel, currently deputy director of the CIA, reportedly oversaw the Thai black site during Nashiri’s interrogation, and had a central role in the eventual destruction of the videotapes, which prompted a lengthy justice department investigation that ended without charges. 
 
 
 
 The Foia request filed on Wednesday is directed to the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the state department. It specifically seeks information relating to the disposition of Gul Rahman’s body and its present location, and to protocols for family notification, investigations, and treatment of remains in the event of a death in CIA custody. 
 
 ||||| Related Documents: 
 
 The Detention and Interrogation Program Ended in 2009 and Will Not Be Renewed at CIA: 
 
 President Obama ended the detention and interrogation program nearly six years ago in 2009. 
 
 The use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) by CIA ended in December 2007, and was subsequently prohibited by an Executive Order issued by President Obama when he took office in January 2009. 
 
 The President also directed that CIA no longer operate detention facilities and banned the use of all interrogation techniques that are not in the Army Field Manual for those held in U.S. custody or under the effective control of the United States in any armed conflict. 
 
 It is Director Brennan’s resolute intention to ensure that Agency officers scrupulously adhere to these directives, which the Director fully supports. 
 
 History: 
 
 The detention and interrogation program was authorized by President George W. Bush six days after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, reviewed and determined to be lawful by the Justice Department, and implemented by the CIA. 
 
 The program was one part of a global counter-terrorism effort undertaken by CIA to dismantle al-Qa’ida and prevent another mass-casualty strike on American soil. 
 
 CIA’s Response Acknowledges Serious Mistakes: 
 
 CIA’s 2013 response (found at www.cia.gov) to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Study acknowledges that the program had shortcomings and the Agency made mistakes. The most serious problems occurred early on and stemmed from the fact that the Agency was unprepared and lacked the core competencies required to undertake an unprecedented program of detaining and interrogating suspected terrorists around the world. 
 
 In carrying out that program, CIA did not always live up to the high standards that we set for ourselves and that the American people expect of us. 
 
 CIA has owned up to these mistakes, learned from them, and taken numerous corrective actions over the years. Further improvements to CIA practices continue to be made today as a result of our review of the SSCI Study. 
 
 The Program Produced Valuable and Unique Intelligence: 
 
 The Agency takes no position on whether intelligence obtained from detainees who were subjected to EITs could have been obtained through other means or from other individuals. The answer to this question is, and will remain, unknowable. 
 
 However, CIA reviews indicate that the program, including interrogations of detainees on whom EITs were used, did produce valuable and unique intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists and save lives. Tab C of the Agency’s response addresses this issue in detail. 
 
 CIA’s position on the value of information derived from detainees is not an endorsement of the policy decision to use EITs or an “ends-justify-the-means” case for them, but merely a reflection of the historical record. 
 
 CIA assesses that most of the 20 case studies cited in the SSCI Study and the Agency’s representations about them remain valid examples of the program’s effectiveness, although CIA has acknowledged some flaws in its past representations. 
 
 Bin Ladin Example: 
 
 For instance, information that CIA obtained from detainees played a role, in combination with other streams of intelligence, in finding Usama Bin Ladin. 
 
 Information from detainees in CIA custody relating to the involvement of courier Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in delivering messages to and from Bin Ladin fundamentally changed our assessment of his potential importance to our hunt for Bin Ladin. 
 
 As an example, Ammar al-Baluchi, after undergoing EITs, was the first detainee to reveal that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti served as a courier for messages from Bin Ladin after Bin Laden had departed Afghanistan. Before that, CIA had only general information that Abu Ahmad had interacted with Bin Ladin before the group’s retreat from Tora Bora in late 2001, when Bin Ladin was relatively accessible to a number of al-Qa’ida figures. 
 
 This information prompted CIA to re-question other detainees on Abu Ahmad’s role, to review previous reporting in light of this information, and to increase the focus of Abu Ahmad’s role in our questioning. CIA then combined this information with reporting from other streams to build a profile of Abu Ahmad’s experiences, family, and characteristics that allowed us to eventually determine his true name and location. 
 
 CIA Representations to Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Public Regarding the Program: 
 
 CIA disagrees with the Study’s inference that the CIA systematically and intentionally misrepresented the program to Congress, others in the Executive Branch, and the media. 
 
 The Agency’s record is not perfect – there were instances where representations about the program that were used or approved by Agency officers were inaccurate, imprecise, or fell short of Agency tradecraft standards -- but the factual record does not support the inference in the Study that the Agency conspired to intentionally mislead the Congress or others regarding the effectiveness of the program. 
 
 Within the limits on access established by the White House, CIA made a good faith effort to keep Congressional oversight committee leaders fully briefed on the program. 
 
 CIA also facilitated multiple reviews by its own Inspector General (IG), whose reports allowed Agency leaders to address a number of the same shortcomings noted in the SSCI report. 
 
 Despite some flaws in CIA’s representations of effectiveness, the overall nature and value of the program, including the manner in which interrogations were carried out and the IG’s findings about the program’s shortcomings, were accurately portrayed to CIA’s Executive and Legislative Branch overseers, as well as the Justice Department. 
 
 CIA’s Response Included Recommendations Based on a Review of the Study: 
 
 While there are no specific recommendations for CIA improvement in the SSCI Study, CIA developed its own recommendations based on a review of the concerns raised in the Study. CIA has made substantial progress implementing these recommendations, including: To better plan and manage sensitive programs, CIA has codified a requirement to explicitly address at the outset lines of authority, resources, the implications of public disclosure, and an exit strategy. CIA is improving how it assesses the effectiveness of its sensitive programs and has instituted a process for determining which assignments entail particularly sensitive responsibilities requiring enhanced vetting of CIA officers being considered for those assignments. CIA has created a mechanism to ensure it regularly revalidates and, as necessary, updates the factual basis for the legal guidance on which it relies from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. CIA has established a requirement that internal accountability boards do not focus exclusively on individual misconduct, but look more broadly at any systemic problems. 
 
 
 
 CIA’s Response Takes an Introspective Look at the Past with an Eye towards the Future: 
 
 CIA has learned many lessons over the years from this chapter in its history, and the Agency is stronger as a result. The SSCI Study is no exception. 
 
 Nevertheless, CIA must ensure the SSCI Study doesn’t undermine the confidence of officers charged with executing current or future Presidential directives and hopes that, in the future, such reports can be the result of collaborative, bi-partisan investigations. 
 
 CIA sincerely hopes that, as a result of the Committee’s work and our subsequent review and response, we can move forward in our efforts to address successfully the many national security challenges facing our nation. By learning from the past while focusing on the future, we will be best able to meet our responsibility to protect the American people. 
 
 * Adobe® Reader® is needed to view Adobe PDF files. If you don't already have Adobe Reader installed, you may download the current version at www.adobe.com (opens in a new window). [external link disclaimer] ||||| BERKELEY, Calif. (CN) — Dror Ladin, the ACLU attorney who won a landmark settlement for terrorism detainees subjected to CIA tortures designed by two psychologists, warned Thursday that immunity laws may become more widely applied because of that case. 
 
 “This case faced an enormous uphill challenge,” Ladin said in a discussion at UC Berkeley School of Law. “We may see a follow-on case, but its outcome is not clear.” 
 
 The American Civil Liberties Union sued the psychologists in 2015 on behalf of Suleiman Abdullah Salim and Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud, who said they were tortured in CIA prisons in Afghanistan for information on terrorist groups, and on behalf of Gul Rahman, who died in custody. 
 
 The lawsuit accused James Mitchell and John “Bruce” Jessen of developing interrogation methods under a secret $160 million contract with the CIA based on experiments from the 1960s that applied electric shocks to dogs. 
 
 The research into “learned helplessness” found that dogs that could not escape the pain of being shocked eventually didn’t try to avoid it, even when they had the chance. 
 
 According to the ACLU, Mitchell and Jessen told the CIA that prisoners should be subjected to severe mental and physical pain and suffering, theorizing that inducing a state of learned helplessness would break their resistance to interrogation. The CIA paid Mitchell and Jessen $81 million over several years to oversee the program, in which they also tortured and experimented on prisoners, Ladin said. 
 
 The three detainees were slammed into walls, stuffed inside small boxes, shackled naked or in diapers for days in standing and stress positions, deprived of sleep, beaten, starved, forced to take cold showers, and waterboarded to simulate drowning, Ladin said. Techniques used on 116 other prisoners also included rectal force-feeding, designed to exert “total control over the detainee,” according to an investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee. 
 
 None of the three men was charged as an enemy combatant. Salim and Ben Soud were released without charges, and Rahman died of hypothermia after two weeks in custody. 
 
 “One of the things that is most painful to some of the clients is even when they were finally released and went home and tried to tell people what happened to them, no one believed them,” Ladin said, because they didn’t believe the United States would use such techniques. 
 
 The ensuing case, Salim v. Mitchell, hinged on whether Mitchell and Jessen acted as independent contractors or as agents of the federal government, which could have conferred immunity. 
 
 Ladin said they failed to show they were agents of the state because they chose to work as contractors, setting up Spokane, Washington-based Mitchell, Jessen & Associates in 2005 to run the interrogation program under the CIA contract. 
 
 Mitchell and Jessen argued that torture is a political decision outside the jurisdiction of the courts. Ladin warned Thursday that with federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court being reshaped under President Donald Trump, immunity laws could become more strict and jurisdiction more circumscribed, throwing the outcome of future torture litigation into question. 
 
 Salim v. Mitchell was settled in August 2017 for an undisclosed amount. But previous suits were thrown out of court on secrecy grounds, never making it past the motion to dismiss, Ladin said. 
 
 The case succeeded, he said, because of the Senate investigation. A resulting 524-page summary report included a declassified list of survivors of the CIA program, which meant that the government couldn’t rely as expansively on the state secrets doctrine to dismiss lawsuits, Ladin said. 
 
 “We were faced with this one-note depressing litany of courts refusing to let cases move forward,” he said. “The report changed the calculus.” 
 
 Ladin also discussed the documents unearthed during discovery, revealing that although official accounts portray top CIA brass and their lawyers as ethical actors under tremendous pressure to combat a “superpowered” terrorism, they never made a good-faith legal inquiry into what they could and could not do in the interrogation program. 
 
 In one CIA cable, Mitchell, Jessen and interrogation personnel in Afghanistan discussed with the CIA a request that the Justice Department not prosecute if they were found to have violated any laws. 
 
 In another, the interrogation team wrote to CIA headquarters demanding assurances that if they did not kill a detainee, he would not be allowed for the rest of his life to speak to another person not involved in his interrogation. The team also made arrangements to cremate the detainee’s body if he died in custody to hide evidence of torture. 
 
 During a deposition, Ladin asked Jose Rodriguez, a former director of the CIA interrogation program, about the due diligence he did on Mitchell and Jessen before hiring them. 
 
 Rodriguez replied he did “nothing” to vet them. “I just took it for granted that they knew what they were doing,” he said in the videotaped testimony. 
 
 The CIA did not return a phone call seeking comment. 
 
 “There were 119 people who the CIA detained based on nothing,” Ladin said. “It’s incredible.” 
 
 News reports indicate that many of the people sent to CIA prisons in Afghanistan and elsewhere were turned in by personal enemies, or for rewards. 
 
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– He died "starved, sleepless, and freezing" more than 15 years ago in an Afghan prison cell, and now his family wants to know where his body is. In what an ACLU attorney calls a "failure of basic human decency," the CIA is being accused by relatives of Gul Rahman—who died in November 2002 in the prison known as the "Salt Pit"—of concealing from them where his remains are, keeping his family from "long-needed closure," per the Guardian. The FOIA request filed Wednesday seeks the exact location of Rahman's body, as well as details on how it was handled after his death. The only known info so far came out of a 2015 lawsuit brought by Rahman's family and two survivors of the Salt Pit, which spurred a probe that revealed a CIA autopsy report noting that Rahman likely died of hypothermia and that a freezer had been ordered for his remains. What happened to his body after that remains unclear. The complaint on behalf of Rahman and the other two terrorism detainees was brought against John Mitchell and James "Bruce" Jessen, for-hire psychologists who were responsible for coming up with the interrogation methods used by the CIA until the program was officially discontinued in 2009 by President Obama. Per Courthouse News, techniques used on Rahman, Suleiman Abdullah Salim, and Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud included depriving them of sleep, hurling them into walls, making them endure icy-cold showers and waterboarding, and keeping them shackled in a standing or "stress" position for days naked or while wearing diapers. "Where is his gravesite and what happened to him?," Rahman's nephew said in a deposition for the suit. "At least present the dead body to us."