5.7. A Checklist for Planning the PKI Q: How many security domains will be created, and what subsystem instances will be placed in each domain? Q: What ports should be assigned for each subsystem? Is it necessary to have a single SSL/TLS port, or is it better to have port separation for extra security? Q: What subsystems should be placed behind firewalls? What clients or other subsystems need to access those firewall-protected subsystems and how will access be granted? Is firewall access allowed for the LDAP database? Q: What subsystems need to be physically secured? How will access be granted, and who will be granted access? Q: What is the physical location of all agents and administrators? What is the physical location of the subsystems? How will administrators or agents access the subsystem services in a timely-manner? Is it necessary to have subsystems in each geographical location or time zone? Q: How many subsystems do you need to install? Q: Will any subsystems need to be cloned and, if so, what are the methods for securely storing their key materials? Q: Will the subsystem certificates and keys be stored on the internal software token in Certificate System or on an external hardware token? Q: What are the requirements for the CA signing certificate? Does the Certificate System need control over attributes like the validity period? How will the CA certificates be distributed? Q: What kinds of certificates will be issued? What characteristics do they need to have, and what profile settings are available for those characteristics? What restrictions need to be placed on the certificates? Q: What are the requirements for approving a certificate request? How does the requester authenticate himself, and what kind of process is required to approve the request? Q: Will many external clients need to validate certificate status? Can the internal OCSP in the Certificate Manager handle the load? Q: Will the PKI allow replacement keys? Will it require key archival and recovery? Q: Will the organization use smart cards? If so, will temporary smart cards be allowed if smart cards are mislaid, requiring key archival and recovery? Q: Where will certificates and CRLs be published? What configuration needs to be done on the receiving end for publishing to work? What kinds of certificates or CRLs need to be published and how frequently? Q: How many security domains will be created, and what subsystem instances will be placed in each domain? A: A subsystem can only communicate with another subsystem if they have a trusted relationship. Because the subsystems within a security domain have automatic trusted relationships with each other, it is important what domain a subsystem joins. Security domains can have different certificate issuing policies, different kinds of subsystems within them, or a different Directory Server database. Map out where (both on the physical machine and in relation to each other) each subsystem belongs, and assign it to the security domain accordingly. Q: What ports should be assigned for each subsystem? Is it necessary to have a single SSL/TLS port, or is it better to have port separation for extra security? A: The most secure solution is to use separate ports for each SSL/TLS interface. However, the feasibility of implementing multiple ports may depends on your network setup, firewall rules, and other network conditions. Q: What subsystems should be placed behind firewalls? What clients or other subsystems need to access those firewall-protected subsystems and how will access be granted? Is firewall access allowed for the LDAP database? A: The location to install a subsystem depends on the network design. The OCSP subsystem is specifically designed to operate outside a firewall for user convenience, while the CA, KRA, and TPS should all be secured behind a firewall for increased security. When deciding the location of the subsystems, it is critical to plan what other subsystems or services that server needs to access (including the internal database, a CA, or external users) and look at firewall, subnet, and VPN configuration. Q: What subsystems need to be physically secured? How will access be granted, and who will be granted access? A: The CA, TKS, and KRA all store extremely sensitive key and certificate information. For some deployments, it may be necessary to limit physical access to the machines these subsystems run on. In that case, both the subsystems and their host machines must be included in the larger infrastructure inventory and security design. Q: What is the physical location of all agents and administrators? What is the physical location of the subsystems? How will administrators or agents access the subsystem services in a timely-manner? Is it necessary to have subsystems in each geographical location or time zone? A: The physical location of Certificate System users may impact things like request approval and token enrollment, as well as system performance because of network lag time. The importance of response time for processing certificate operations should be taken into account when deciding where and how many subsystems to install. Q: How many subsystems do you need to install? A: The primary consideration is the expected load for each subsystem and then, secondarily, geographical or departmental divisions. Subsystems with fairly low loads (like the KRA or TKS) may only require a single instance for the entire PKI. Systems with high load (the CA) or which may benefit from local instances for local agents (like the TPS) may require multiple instances. Subsystems can be cloned, meaning they essentially are clustered, operating as a single unit, which is good for load balancing and high availability. Cloning is especially good for CAs and KRAs, where the same key and certificate data may need to be accessed by larger numbers of users or to have reliable failover. When planning for multiple subsystem instances, keep in mind how the subsystems fit within the established security domains. Security domains create trusted relationships between subsystems, allowing them to work together to find available subsystems to respond to immediate needs. Multiple security domains can be used in a single PKI, with multiple instances of any kind of subsystem, or a single security domain can be used for all subsystems. Q: Will any subsystems need to be cloned and, if so, what are the methods for securely storing their key materials? A: Cloned subsystems work together, essentially as a single instance. This can be good for high demand systems, failover, or load balancing, but it can become difficult to maintain. For example, cloned CAs have serial number ranges for the certificates they issue, and a clone could hit the end of its range. Q: Will the subsystem certificates and keys be stored on the internal software token in Certificate System or on an external hardware token? A: Certificate System supports two hardware security modules (HSM): nCipher nShield Connect XC and Thales Luna HSM. Using a hardware token can require additional setup and configuration before installing the subsystems, but it also adds another layer of security. Q: What are the requirements for the CA signing certificate? Does the Certificate System need control over attributes like the validity period? How will the CA certificates be distributed? A: The real question here is, will the CA bee a root CA which sets its own rules on issuing certificates or will it be a subordinate CA where another CA (another CA in your PKI or even an external CA) sets restrictions on what kind of certificates it can issue. A Certificate Manager can be configured as either a root CA or a subordinate CA. The difference between a root CA and a subordinate CA is who signs the CA signing certificate. A root CA signs its own certificate. A subordinate CA has another CA (either internal or external) sign its certificate. A self-signing root CA issues and signs its own CA signing certificate. This allows the CA to set its own configuration rules, like validity periods and the number of allowed subordinate CAs. A subordinate CA has its certificates issued by a public CA or another Certificate System root CA. This CA is subordinate to the other CA's rules about its certificate settings and how the certificate can be used, such as the kinds of certificates that it can issue, the extensions that it is allowed to include in certificates, and the levels of subordinate CAs the subordinate CA can create. One option is to have the Certificate manager subordinate to a public CA. This can be very restrictive, since it introduces the restrictions that public CAs place on the kinds of certificates the subordinate CA can issue and the nature of the certificate chain. On the other hand, one benefit of chaining to a public CA is that the third party is responsible for submitting the root CA certificate to a web browser or other client software, which is a major advantage for certificates that are accessed by different companies with browsers that cannot be controlled by the administrator. The other option is make the CA subordinate to a Certificate System CA. Setting up a Certificate System CA as the root CA means that the Certificate System administrator has control over all subordinate CAs by setting policies that control the contents of the CA signing certificates issued. It is easiest to make the first CA installed a self-signed root, so that it is not necessary to apply to a third party and wait for the certificate to be issued. Make sure that you determine how many root CAs to have and where both root and subordinate CAs will be located. Q: What kinds of certificates will be issued? What characteristics do they need to have, and what profile settings are available for those characteristics? What restrictions need to be placed on the certificates? A: As touched on in Section 5.4.6, "Using and Customizing Certificate Profiles" , the profiles (the forms which configure each type of certificate issued by a CA) can be customized. This means that the subject DN, the validity period, the type of SSL/TLS client, and other elements can be defined by an administrator for a specific purpose. For security, profiles should provide only the functionality that is required by the PKI. Any unnecessary profiles should be disabled. Q: What are the requirements for approving a certificate request? How does the requester authenticate himself, and what kind of process is required to approve the request? A: The request approval process directly impacts the security of the certificate. Automated processes are much faster but are less secure since the identity of the requester is only superficially verified. Likewise, agent-approved enrollments are more secure (since, in the most secure scenario they can require an in-person verification and supporting identification) but they can also be the most time-consuming. First determine how secure the identity verification process needs to be, then determine what authentication (approval) mechanism is required to validate that identity. Q: Will many external clients need to validate certificate status? Can the internal OCSP in the Certificate Manager handle the load? A: Publishing CRLs and validating certificates is critical. Determine what kinds of clients will be checking the certificate status (will it mainly be internal clients? external clients? will they be validating user certificates or server certificates?) and also try to determine how many OCSP checks will be run. The CA has an internal OCSP which can be used for internal checks or infrequent checks, but a large number of OCSP checks could slow down the CA performance. For a larger number of OCSP checks and especially for large CRLs, consider using a separate OCSP Manager to take the load off the CA. Q: Will the PKI allow replacement keys? Will it require key archival and recovery? A: If lost certificates or tokens are simply revoked and replaced, then there does not need to be a mechanism to recover them. However, when certificates are used to sign or encrypt data such as emails, files, or harddrives, then the key must always be available so that the data can be recovered. In that case, use a KRA to archive the keys so the data can always be accessed. Q: Will the organization use smart cards? If so, will temporary smart cards be allowed if smart cards are mislaid, requiring key archival and recovery? A: If no smart cards are used, then it is never necessary to configure the TPS or TKS, since those subsystems are only used for token management. However, if smart cards are used, then the TPS and TKS are required. If tokens can be lost and replaced, then it is also necessary to have a KRA to archive the keys so that the token's certificates can be regenerated. Q: Where will certificates and CRLs be published? What configuration needs to be done on the receiving end for publishing to work? What kinds of certificates or CRLs need to be published and how frequently? A: The important thing to determine is what clients need to be able to access the certificate or CRL information and how that access is allowed. From there, you cna define the publishing policy.

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