mteb/CovidQA huggingface dataset:
According to the situation report published by the WHO on 28 January 2020 [3], a total of 2798 confirmed 2019-nCoV cases have been reported globally; of these, 2761 cases were from China, including Hong Kong (8 cases), Macau (5) and Taipei (4). Thirty-seven confirmed cases have been reported outside of China in eleven countries in Europe, North America, Australia and Asia; of these 37 exported cases, 36 had a travel history from China or an epidemiological link to a case from China. Of the confirmed cases in China, 461 have been reported as severely ill, with 80 deaths to date.
This outbreak and the response to it illustrate some key issues about how global preparedness and response capacity for outbreaks have evolved over almost two decades since the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2002/3 and what lessons have, or have not, been learned. It also raises questions about the impact these lessons have had on the way agencies and governments respond to these events and about the role of the WHO and the International Health Regulations (IHR).
One of the critical lessons from the SARS experience was the absolute necessity to be able to coordinate the international resources that are available in an outbreak and to get them focussed on identifying priorities and solving problems. The WHO established the means to do this for SARS and it has since been further developed and integrated into global preparedness, especially after the West Africa Ebola epidemic. Organisations such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), the Global Research Collaboration For Infectious Disease Preparedness (GloPID-R) and the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) have been supported by the WHO Research Blueprint and its Global Coordinating Mechanism to provide a forum where those with the expertise and capacity to contribute to managing new threats can come together both between and during outbreaks to develop innovative solutions to emerging problems.
This global coordination has been active in the novel coronavirus outbreak. WHO's response system includes three virtual groups based on those developed for SARS to collate real time information to inform real time guidelines, and a first candidate vaccine is ready for laboratory testing within 4 weeks of the virus being identified.
Another key factor in successfully preventing and managing emerging threats is the rapid and transparent sharing of information between countries and agencies. There was extensive criticism of China for its perceived failure to share information about the emerging SARS infection early enough in the outbreak to allow countries to prepare and respond. There were similar concerns about information sharing as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) emerged and evolved in the Middle East in 2012, particularly in Saudi Arabia, and about the emergence of Ebola in West Africa in 2014.
On this occasion information sharing seems to have been rapid and effective (while recognising that the information available in the early stages of an outbreak is always less than the global community would like). The WHO was notified of the original clustering within days and the full genomic sequence of the new virus was published less than 2 weeks after the cluster was first detected. The WHO has expressed its satisfaction with the actions of the Chinese authorities in sharing information with the WHO.

Working with journalists and the media to help them understand the science and epidemiology, particularly in a fast moving event, will improve risk communication to the public and reduce inappropriate concerns and panic.
While reporting of this outbreak shows signs of the efforts of epidemiologists, infectious disease experts, national and international public health agencies and others engaging with journalists, there are also signs that this is not yet achieving it's goal. For example, the public perception is that the increase in case numbers reported daily by the Chinese authorities represents a daily escalation in the epidemic while the reality is that these numbers are also the result of active, aggressive, case finding in China and some of these cases are 'old' cases newly recognised as being due to the novel coronavirus. Similarly the virus is usually described by the media as 'deadly' and although this is true in the sense that it has caused deaths, the nuances of uncertain case fatality rates in the early stages of an outbreak are not being communicated. The current estimated case fatality rate seems to be around 3% which is significant but not comparable to the 10% rate for SARS or 34%
reported for MERS. These misperceptions are still driving public anxiety.
To supplement formal reporting mechanisms between countries and with WHO (including the IHR), the use of informal mechanisms such as media and social media reports was advocated in the light of the SARS experience. There are now globally several systems that provide collated information from informal reporting including networks of experts and scanning of media and social media. These contribute to, and amplify, epidemic intelligence and are being integrated with national and international surveillance systems.
The value, and the challenges, of this additional source of information has been evident in the current outbreak. The value comes from ensuring that early indications of cases beyond the initial outbreak city have been detected and can supplement the global risk assessment and monitoring of the evolution of the outbreak. The challenges lie in the volume and diversity of the information available and the relative lack of verification mechanisms, such that one of these systems (ProMed) has commented that it was becoming increasingly difficult to assimilate the information being supplied [4] and to make meaningful interpretations.
Early in the outbreak it was reported that health workers had not been infected. This was reassuring because it is health workers who many times, and inadvertently, amplify transmission. Failure to wash hands between patients, for example, can result not only in autoinfection, but also in infection of patients hospitalised for other causes when they provide care. Autoinfection is not only a risk for the health worker, but also for their families and the communities in which they live, depending on the transmissibility and means of transmission. More recently infection, and at least one death, in health workers has been confirmed. Although not unexpected this does add to the epidemiological risk.
A characteristic of the SARS outbreak was the variability of transmissibility between cases and the occurrence of 'superspreading events' where a case infected significantly more contacts than the average. This was also seen with MERS in the outbreak in the Republic of Korea (RoK). In this current novel coronavirus outbreak, such superspreading events have not been documented but the epidemiology is still not clear. Confirming whether or not this is happening must be an urgent task for the Chinese investigation. Modellers have suggested reproductive rates (R 0 ) of 3.8 (95% confidence interval, 3.6-4.0) [5] and 2.6 (1.5-3.5) [6] ; R 0 for SARS was estimated at around 3 in the absence of control measures [7] .
The economic impact of major outbreaks can be substantial for the affected country. This was seen clearly in SARS, MERS in RoK and Ebola in West Africa. One analyst estimates that the current coronavirus outbreak's likely impact will range from a 0.8% cut to real GDP if the epidemic is controlled within 3 months, to a 1.9% cost to GDP if the epidemic lasts 9 months [8] . This may increase substantially in the light of the extended restrictions on movement, and therefore trade and commerce, within China.

The emergence of a significant respiratory illness linked to a novel coronavirus represents a test of the global capacity to detect and mange emerging disease threats. Its emergence in China adds an additional dimension in the light of previous experience with SARS. The timing of the outbreak immediately before the Chinese Lunar New Year with its attendant population movements adds extra risk and urgency to the response.
The rapid sharing of information in this outbreak and the speed of the coordinated response both in the country and internationally suggest that lessons have been learned from SARS that improve global capacity. The international networks and forums that now exist have facilitated the bringing together of expertise from around the world to focus research and development efforts and maximise the impact.

At this early stage in the outbreak information remains incomplete and key clinical and epidemiological questions have not yet been answered, but the deficit seems to be due more to the constraints of investigating an emerging disease than to any unwillingness to engage and share information with partners.
There are some indications of areas where further improvement is necessary. The global media response to the unfolding events has been relatively balanced and informed but the nuances of the evolving situation have not been critically examined in partnership with the media and as a result the public perception of the risk may be exaggeratedalthough it of course remains possible that the outbreak will develop in a way that matches up to the perceived risk. The lack of appreciation of the uncertainties in determining a meaningful case fatality rate and the significance of ascertainment bias at the beginning of an outbreak, along with the impact of aggressive case finding on case numbers, are examples of where understanding could be improved. This is always a challenging process when balancing the resources focussed on analysing the situation on the ground with resources directed at interpreting the information for journalists but in SARS, the R 0 was seen to decrease in response to
information reaching the public and the public then adopting risk reduction actions [6] ; so accurate public risk communication is critical to success. It would be helpful to find a forum where this can be explored with the media community after the event.
The increase in access to early information from diverse sources including media and social media adds an important dimension to identifying and tracking new events globally and is a key part of the overall epidemic intelligence system. However, it is also a potential source of disinformation. When, as has been seen in this outbreak, the volume of information coming in exceeds any capacity to collate and analyse it and to attempt to cross-reference and verify separate items, there is a risk that the information fuels speculation and media and public concern. Again there is a fine balance between information that encourages appropriate risk avoidance actions and information that encourages inappropriate actions; however the public health is usually better served by more information rather than less.
The role of a declaration of a PHEIC in managing a serious outbreak has been questioned in the light of Ebola in West Africa and in the Democratic Republic of Congo [9] and has been challenged again with this outbreak. The binary nature of a PHEIC declaration (either an event is a PHEIC or it isn'tthere are no intermediate options) and the specificity of the three defined criteria for a PHEIC have caused difficulty for Emergency Committees in considering whether a given event should be a PHEIC. The lack of a clear understanding of what a PHEIC declaration is meant to achieve adds to the Emergency Committee's difficulties, as does the relative paucity of clinical and epidemiological answers at this stage of the investigation. In this instance the Emergency Committee were divided in coming to a conclusion but decided on balance that the current situation, although an emergency, should not as yet be declared a PHEIC [2]. As with Ebola in the DRC, there has been criticism of the WHO for
this decision but, as with Ebola, it is not immediately clear what would be different in the response if a PHEIC was declared.
The WHO is working on improving the way in which Emergency Committees develop their advice for the Director General but, as recommended by this Emergency Committee and the post-Ebola IHR Review Committee in 2015, the development of an intermediate alert alongside WHO's risk assessment process may be helpful.

A key function of a PHEIC declaration is that it is the (only) gateway to the WHO Temporary Recommendations on possible travel and trade restrictions to limit international spread of a disease. In this case several countries globally had already implemented entry screening at airports and China had begun closing down international travel from Wuhan before the Emergency Committee had finished their deliberations. While the WHO would not, and could not, interfere with the sovereign decisions of member states, the lack of influence on travel and trade decisions could prove problematic.
Alongside the speed of the response in this outbreak, we have seen dramatic changes in the scale of the response. The imposition of very extensive quarantine measures on millions of people as an attempt to break the transmission of the virus is unprecedented. We do not know whether they will be effective; indeed we do not know how we will determine if they have been effectivewhat end point can we measure that will provide an answer to that question? If recent suggestions that people infected with this coronavirus may be infectious while incubating or asymptomatic, and the reports that up to 5 m people left Wuhan before the travel restrictions were imposed, are confirmed, the efficacy of these control measures will be more challenged.

Given the likely impact on at least the Chinese economy and probably the global economy, it will be important to understand the role and the effectiveness of public health measures on this scale for the future.
However, the imposition of these dramatic measures does also raise a wider question: if there is an impact from these measures, what other countries would (or could) implement such measures? Would other countries accept the self-imposed economic damage that China has accepted to try and contain this outbreak? Is it reasonable to consider that national governments would close down public transport into and out of London, New York or Paris in the week before Christmas even if it were shown to be an effective control measure?

These decisions and questions cross the interface between public health, science and politics. The response to this outbreak in

China was inevitably influenced by the historical reaction to the country's response to SARS and the world's suspicion of China's lack of cooperation at that time. The current response is therefore framed within a context of not wanting to be seen to be behaving in the same way with this event.
This may indicate another impact of the SARS (and MERS and Ebola) experience on the response to subsequent outbreaksa tendency to look at worst case scenarios and respond accordingly and a fear of 'getting it wrong'. This can deter leaders at all levels, from outbreak teams to national governments, from making judgements when all the information they would like is not available in case those judgments turn out to be wrong when the full information becomes available.
In emergency response it is generally better to over-react and then scale back if necessary rather than under-react and then act too late. Response should be on a 'no regrets' basismake the best decisions possible on the basis of the best information and science available at the time but do not judge or criticise if later information suggests a different course of action. The early response must recognise what is known and what is not known and look at what of the unknowns can reasonably be estimated by reference to previous outbreaks, similar pathogens, early reporting and modelling, etc. The risk assessment and response can then be modified and refined as information on the unknowns evolves.
Key to that approach, however, is confidence that decisions will not be criticised based on information that was not available at the time. It is also important to be ready to change decisions when the available information changessomething that both scientists and politicians can find difficult.

In that context, China should not be judged for implementing what might appear to be extreme measures but China should also be prepared to discontinue the measures quickly if evidence suggests they are not the best way to solve the problem. By closing airports the international spread from Wuhan may be decreased, but success will depend on how effective the measures really are at stopping people moving out of the affected area as well as on the behaviour of the virus. As always, only time will tellbut time is scarce.
Safe patient transport for COVID-19

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7079436/

SHA: 3ec1eb120d6bcca31ddc69832be05988c0952e60

Authors: Liew, Mei Fong; Siow, Wen Ting; Yau, Ying Wei; See, Kay Choong
Date: 2020-03-18
DOI: 10.1186/s13054-020-2828-4
License: cc-by

Abstract: nan

Text: Mei Fong Liew 1,2* , Wen Ting Siow 1,2 , Ying Wei Yau 3 and Kay Choong See 1
Dear Editor, Although COVID-19 has not been officially labelled as a pandemic yet, the global burden of disease is significant and continues to rise. The virus has a high humanto-human transmissibility via airborne, droplet and contact routes [1] . Patient numbers can surge, and hospitals should be ready not just with the infrastructure, but also staff to be familiar with workflows. Kain and Fowler [2] have eloquently detailed influenza pandemic preparations for hospitals and intensive care units, and we feel the principles described in the article are relevant to COVID-19. Staff must consider patient transfers in between wards, as COVID-19 patients are admitted in isolation facilities to contain infected cases and to avoid nosocomial spread [1] .
Infectious cases may be intentionally brought out of isolation rooms for various reasons. Intra-hospital transfer may be required from emergency departments to the wards, from the general floor to the intensive care unit and from the wards to radiology suites. Inter-hospital transfer may be required for extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) if patients with COVID-19 develop severe acute respiratory distress syndrome within hospitals with only basic ventilation facilities. During episodes of patient transport outside of isolation, potential breaches of infection control can occur. At the same time, when COVID-19 patients turn ill during transport, their management is exceptionally challenging as accompanying staff would be wearing cumbersome personal protective equipment (PPE) [3] .
Mitigating the spread of COVID-19 is a national priority in Singapore [4] , and part of this effort involves planning and conducting safe patient transport for suspected or confirmed cases. HCWs who handle the transport of COVID-19 patients must consider the following principles (see Table 1 ): firstly, early recognition of the deteriorating patient; secondly, HCW safety; thirdly, bystander safety; fourthly, contingency plans for medical emergencies during transport; fifthly, post-transport decontamination. Specific action steps require designated zones for transport [5] , sufficient supplies of PPE, staff training and support personnel like security officers and cleaning crews. Powered air-purifying respirators add a layer of safety on top of N95 respirators [3] and should be used if possible for high-risk cases, such as those requiring ambulance transport to ECMO centres.
Given the continued global spread of COVID-19, we expect that more hospitals will need to deal with this disease. Haphazard transport of infected cases leading to nosocomial spread can stymie efforts to break the chains of transmission. We hope that our suggestions can aid others in ensuring safe patient transport for COVID-19 and reduce nosocomial spread. 

Not applicable.

Availability of data and materials Not applicable.

Ethics approval and consent to participate Not applicable.

Not applicable.
The authors declare that they have no competing interests. prior to embarking on the same ambulance • Staff to doff PPE in the nearest clinical area, for example ambulance bay, upon arrival • Terminal cleaning of ambulance upon arrival when back at primary hospital BVM bag-valve-mask, CO2 carbon dioxide, ECMO extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, EMD emergency, GW general ward, HEPA high-efficiency particulate air, ICU intensive care unit, PAPR powered air-purifying respirator, PPE personal protective equipment
Viruses Causing Gastroenteritis: The Known, The New and Those Beyond

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4776197/

SHA: f7b30ee89775bc82607cc6bc87feb5934b47625f

Authors: Oude Munnink, Bas B.; van der Hoek, Lia
Date: 2016-02-19
DOI: 10.3390/v8020042
License: cc-by

Abstract: The list of recently discovered gastrointestinal viruses is expanding rapidly. Whether these agents are actually involved in a disease such as diarrhea is the essential question, yet difficult to answer. In this review a summary of all viruses found in diarrhea is presented, together with the current knowledge about their connection to disease.
Text: The gastrointestinal tract is a vulnerable organ for infections as there is constant contact with the outside, mainly via the oral route. Inflammation of the stomach and the intestines (gastroenteritis) can cause nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Gastroenteritis is responsible for two to three million deaths each year, making it one of the most common causes of mortality [1] . Mainly children in developing countries, but also immuno-compromised individuals in developed countries, suffer from diarrhea. While bacterial and parasitic gastrointestinal infections are declining as a result of proper disposal of sewage and safe drinking water, viral gastroenteritis is not declining in developing countries [2] . In the developed world, viruses are already the most common pathogens causing diarrhea [3] .
Although viruses infecting humans had already been described since 1901 [4] and viruses were suspected to play a role in diarrhea, it lasted until 1972, when the first virus causing gastroenteritis (norovirus) was identified in an outbreak of diarrhea in Norwalk (California, United States) [5] . Shortly after the discovery of norovirus several other viruses causing gastroenteritis were discovered: rotavirus in epithelial cells of children with gastroenteritis [6] , astrovirus in infantile diarrhea cases [7] , enteric adenoviruses in the feces of children with acute diarrhea [8] , and sapovirus during an outbreak of gastroenteritis in an orphanage in Sapporo, Japan [9] . All these viruses spread via the fecal-oral route through person-to-person transmission and are described in more detail below.
Noroviruses are part of the family Caliciviridae and outbreaks of norovirus gastroenteritis have been reported in cruise ships, health care settings, schools, and in the military, but norovirus is also responsible for around 60% of all sporadic diarrhea cases (diarrhea cases where an enteropathogen could be found), reviewed in the literature [10, 11] . The pathogenesis of norovirus infection has been tested in vivo. Filtrated norovirus was given to healthy volunteers after which most of them developed diarrhea [12] . Culturing of the virus, however, has been a problem since its discovery, yet one study has recently described the cultivation of norovirus in B cells, and has revealed that co-factors, such as histo-blood antigen expressing enteric bacteria, are probably needed before enteric viruses can be cultured in vitro [13] . Sapoviruses are also members of the Caliciviridae. There are five human genogroups of sapovirus described [14] which account for 2.2%-12.7% of all