Correspondence theory of truth  

Several philosophers, such as the Churchlands and  Alex Rosenberg
 ,  [41]  [53]  have
developed a theory of structural resemblance or physical isomorphism that
could explain how neural states can instantiate truth within the 
correspondence theory of truth  . Neuroscientists use the word
"representation" to identify the neural circuits' encoding of inputs from the
peripheral nervous system in, for example, the visual cortex. But they use the
word without according it any commitment to intentional content. In fact,
there is an explicit commitment to describing neural representations in terms
of structures of neural axonal discharges that are physically isomorphic to
the inputs that cause them. Suppose that this way of understanding
representation in the brain is preserved in the long-term course of research
providing an understanding of how the brain processes and stores information.
Then there will be considerable evidence that the brain is a neural network
whose physical structure is identical to the aspects of its environment it
tracks and whose representations of these features consist in this physical
isomorphism.  [42]

Experiments in the 1980s with  macaques  isolated
the structural resemblance between input vibrations the finger feels, measured
in cycles per second, and representations of them in neural circuits, measured
in action-potential spikes per second. This resemblance between two easily
measured variables makes it unsurprising that they would be among the first
such structural resemblances to be discovered. Macaques and humans have the
same peripheral nervous system sensitivities and can make the same tactile
discriminations. Subsequent research into neural processing has increasingly
vindicated a structural resemblance or physical isomorphism approach to how
information enters the brain and is stored and deployed.  [41]  [54]

This isomorphism between brain and world is not a matter of some relationship
between reality and a map of reality stored in the brain. Maps require
interpretation if they are to be about what they map, and eliminativism and
neuroscience share a commitment to explaining the appearance of aboutness by
purely physical relationships between informational states in the brain and
what they "represent". The brain-to-world relationship must be a matter of
physical isomorphism—sameness of form, outline, structure—that does not
require interpretation.  [42]

This machinery can be applied to make "sense" of eliminativism in terms of the
sentences eliminativists say or write. When we say that eliminativism is true,
that the brain does not store information in the form of unique sentences,
statements, expressing propositions or anything like them, there is a set of
neural circuits that has no trouble coherently carrying this information.
There is a possible translation manual that will guide us back from the
vocalization or inscription eliminativists express to these circuits. These
neural structures will differ from the neural circuits of those who explicitly
reject eliminativism in ways that our translation manual will presumably shed
some light on, giving us a neurological handle on disagreement and on the
structural differences in neural circuitry, if any, between asserting p and
asserting not-p when p expresses the eliminativist thesis.  [41]