mteb/BrightProPsychologyRetrieval huggingface dataset:
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Quining qualia  

Dennett offers philosophical thought experiments to argue that qualia do not
exist.  [62]  First he lists five properties of qualia:

1. They are "directly" or "immediately" graspable during our conscious experiences.  [62]
2. We are infallible about them.  [62]
3. They are "private": no one can directly access anyone else's qualia.  [62]
4. They are ineffable.  [62]
5. They are "intrinsic" and "simple" or "unanalyzable."  [62]
* The experiment of  Wilhelm Röntgen  (1888), to find whether a charged capacitor produces magnetic forces due to Earth's motion.  [E 15]
* The experiment of  Theodor des Coudres  (1889), to find whether the inductive effect of two wire rolls upon a third one is influenced by the direction of Earth's motion. Lorentz showed that this effect is cancelled to first order by the electrostatic charge (produced by Earth's motion) upon the conductors.  [E 16]
* The experiment of Königsberger (1905). The plates of a capacitor are located in the field of a strong electromagnet. Due to Earth's motion, the plates should have become charged. No such effect was observed.  [E 17]
* The experiment of  Frederick Thomas Trouton  (1902). A capacitor was brought parallel to Earth's motion, and it was assumed that momentum is produced when the capacitor is charged. The negative result can be explained by Lorentz's theory, according to which the electromagnetic momentum compensates the momentum due to Earth's motion. Lorentz could also show, that the sensitivity of the apparatus was much too low to observe such an effect.  [E 18]
Time dilation 
 Length contraction  |
Accept other people’s perspectives.
###  Primary sources
Other writings  |
Nevertheless, in 1920, Einstein gave an address at  Leiden University
 in which he commented "More
careful reflection teaches us however, that the special theory of relativity
does not compel us to deny ether. We may assume the existence of an ether;
only we must give up ascribing a definite state of motion to it, i.e. we must
by abstraction take from it the last mechanical characteristic which Lorentz
had still left it. We shall see later that this point of view, the
conceivability of which I shall at once endeavour to make more intelligible by
a somewhat halting comparison, is justified by the results of the general
theory of relativity". He concluded his address by saying that "according to
the general theory of relativity space is endowed with physical qualities; in
this sense, therefore, there exists an ether. According to the general theory
of relativity space without ether is unthinkable."  [15]
###  Experiments
Contemporary
"Quietism \(philosophy\)") .
Instead of looking into what a mental state is, in itself,  clinical
psychology  and  psychiatry
 determine a person's mental health through a
 mental status examination  .  [88]
Fizeau/Sagnac  |
In contrast to the modern understanding that heat radiation and light are both
 electromagnetic radiation  , Newton viewed heat and light as two different phenomena. He
believed heat vibrations to be excited "when a Ray of Light falls upon the
Surface of any pellucid Body".  [A 1]  : 348  He wrote, "I do not know what
this Aether is", but that if it consists of particles then they must be
Wikiquote has quotations related to _** Luminiferous aether
 ** _ .
Specific problems with folk psychology  

Much of folk psychology involves the attribution of  intentional states
 (or more specifically as a
subclass,  propositional attitudes  ). Eliminativists point out that these states are
generally ascribed syntactic and semantic properties. An example of this is
the  language of thought 
hypothesis, which attributes a discrete, combinatorial syntax and other
linguistic properties to these mental phenomena. Eliminativists argue that
such discrete, combinatorial characteristics have no place in neuroscience,
which speaks of  action potentials  , spiking  frequencies  , and
other continuous and distributed effects. Hence, the syntactic structures
assumed by folk psychology have no place in such a structure as the brain.
[22]  To this there have been two responses. On the one hand, some
philosophers deny that mental states are linguistic and see this as a  straw
man  argument.  [35]  [36]  The other view is
represented by those who subscribe to "a language of thought". They assert
that mental states can be  multiply realized  and that functional characterizations are just
higher-level characterizations of what happens at the physical level.  [37]
[38]

It has also been argued against folk psychology that the intentionality of
mental states like belief implies that they have semantic qualities.
Specifically, their meaning is determined by the things they are about in the
external world. This makes it difficult to explain how they can play the
causal roles they are supposed to in cognitive processes.  [39]

In recent years, this latter argument has been fortified by the theory of 
connectionism  . Many connectionist
models of the brain have been developed in which the processes of language
learning and other forms of representation are highly distributed and
parallel. This tends to indicate that such discrete and semantically endowed
entities as beliefs and desires are unnecessary.  [40]
*  Modern searches for Lorentz violation 
*  Hughes–Drever experiment 
*  Trouton–Noble experiment 
*  Experiments of Rayleigh and Brace 
*  Trouton–Rankine experiment 
*  Antimatter tests of Lorentz violation 
*  Lorentz-violating neutrino oscillations 
*  Lorentz-violating electrodynamics
Criticism  

The physical isomorphism approach faces indeterminacy problems. Any given
structure in the brain will be causally related to, and isomorphic in various
respects to, many different structures in external reality. But we cannot
discriminate the one it is intended to represent or that it is supposed to be
true "of". These locutions are heavy with just the intentionality that
eliminativism denies. Here is a problem of underdetermination or holism that
eliminativism shares with intentionality-dependent theories of mind. Here, we
can only invoke pragmatic criteria for discriminating successful structural
representations—the substitution of true ones for unsuccessful ones—the ones
we used to call false.  [41]

Dennett notes that it is possible that such indeterminacy problems remain only
hypothetical, not occurring in reality. He constructs a 4x4 "Quinian crossword
puzzle" with words that must satisfy both the across and down definitions.
Since there are multiple constraints on this puzzle, there is one solution.
Thus we can think of the brain and its relation to the external world as a
very large crossword puzzle that must satisfy exceedingly many constraints to
which there is only one possible solution. Therefore, in reality we may end up
with only one physical isomorphism between the brain and the external world.
[46]
*  Mental states 
*  Mental content
Contributions  |
Where should your focus be?
##  Epistemology
Subscribe
As seen on:
Relativistic energy  |
##  Classifications of mental states
See also:  Timeline of luminiferous aether
Besides those optical experiments, also electrodynamic first-order experiments
were conducted, which should have led to positive results according to
Fresnel. However,  Hendrik Antoon Lorentz  (1895) modified Fresnel's theory and showed that
those experiments can be explained by a stationary aether as well:  [A 6]
* _ Fluxions  _ (1671)
* _ De Motu  _ (1684)
* _ Principia  _ (1687)
* _ Opticks  _ (1704)
* _ Queries  _ (1704)
* _ Arithmetica  _ (1707)
* _ De Analysi  _ (1711)
Mental states are usually contrasted with physical or material aspects. For
(non-eliminative)  physicalists  , they are
a kind of high-level property that can be understood in terms of fine-grained
 neural  activity.  Property dualists
 , on the other hand, claim that
no such  reductive explanation  is
possible.  Eliminativists  may reject
the existence of mental properties, or at least of those corresponding to 
folk psychological  categories such
as thought and memory. Mental states play an important role in various fields,
including  philosophy of mind  ,  epistemology  and  cognitive
science  . In  psychology
 , the term is used not just to refer to the
individual mental states listed above but also to a more global assessment of
a person's mental health.  [1]
Overview  

Various arguments have been made for and against eliminative materialism over
the last 50 years. The view's history can be traced to  David Hume
 , who rejected the idea of the "self" on the
grounds that it was not based on any impression.  [11]  Most arguments for the
view are based on the assumption that people's commonsense view of the mind is
actually an implicit theory. It is to be compared and contrasted with other
scientific theories in its explanatory success, accuracy, and ability to
predict the future. Eliminativists argue that commonsense "folk" psychology
has failed and will eventually need to be replaced by explanations derived
from neuroscience. These philosophers therefore tend to emphasize the
importance of neuroscientific research as well as developments in  artificial
intelligence  .

Philosophers who argue against eliminativism may take several approaches.
Simulation theorists, like Robert Gordon  [12]  and  Alvin Goldman
 ,  [13]  argue that folk psychology is
not a theory, but depends on internal simulation of others, and therefore is
not subject to falsification in the same way that theories are.  Jerry Fodor
 , among others,  [14]  argues that folk
psychology is, in fact, a successful (even indispensable) theory. Another view
is that eliminativism assumes the existence of the beliefs and other entities
it seeks to "eliminate" and is thus self-refuting.  [15]

Schematic overview: Eliminativists suggest that some sciences can be  reduced
 (blue), but that theories that are in
principle irreducible will eventually be eliminated (orange).

Eliminativism maintains that the commonsense understanding of the mind is
mistaken, and that  neuroscience  will
one day reveal that mental states talked about in everyday discourse, using
words such as "intend", "believe", "desire", and "love", do not refer to
anything real. Because of the inadequacy of natural languages, people
mistakenly think that they have such beliefs and desires.  [2]  Some
eliminativists, such as  Frank Jackson  , claim that  consciousness  does not exist except as an  epiphenomenon
 of  brain 
function; others, such as Georges Rey, claim that the concept will eventually
be eliminated as neuroscience progresses.  [3]  [16]  Consciousness and folk
psychology are separate issues, and it is possible to take an eliminative
stance on one but not the other.  [4]  The roots of eliminativism go back to
the writings of  Wilfred Sellars  ,
 W.V.O. Quine  , 
Paul Feyerabend  , and  Richard
Rorty  .  [5]  [6]  [17]  The term
"eliminative materialism" was first introduced by  James Cornman
") in 1968 while describing a version of physicalism endorsed
by Rorty. The later  Ludwig Wittgenstein  was also an important inspiration for eliminativism,
particularly with his attack on "private objects" as "grammatical fictions".
[4]
The term "consciousness" is sometimes used not in the sense of _phenomenal
consciousness_ , as above, but in the sense of _ access consciousness
 _ . A mental
state is conscious in this sense if the information it carries is available
for reasoning and guiding behavior, even if it is not associated with any
subjective feel characterizing the concurrent phenomenal experience.  [3]
[61]  [62]  Being an access-conscious state is similar but not identical to
being an occurrent mental state, the topic of the next section.
* The experiment of  François Arago  (1810), to confirm whether refraction, and thus the aberration of light, is influenced by Earth's motion. Similar experiments were conducted by  George Biddell Airy  (1871) by means of a telescope filled with water, and  Éleuthère Mascart  (1872).  [E 3]  [E 4]  [E 5]
* The experiment of Fizeau (1860), to find whether the rotation of the polarization plane through glass columns is changed by Earth's motion. He obtained a positive result, but Lorentz could show that the results have been contradictory.  DeWitt Bristol Brace  (1905) and Strasser (1907) repeated the experiment with improved accuracy, and obtained negative results.  [E 6]  [E 7]  [E 8]
* The experiment of  Martin Hoek  (1868). This experiment is a more precise variation of the  Fizeau experiment  (1851). Two light rays were sent in opposite directions – one of them traverses a path filled with resting water, the other one follows a path through air. In agreement with Fresnel's dragging coefficient, he obtained a negative result.  [E 9]
* The experiment of  Wilhelm Klinkerfues  (1870) investigated whether an influence of Earth's motion on the absorption line of sodium exists. He obtained a positive result, but this was shown to be an experimental error, because a repetition of the experiment by  Haga  (1901) gave a negative result.  [E 10]  [E 11]
* The experiment of Ketteler (1872), in which two rays of an interferometer were sent in opposite directions through two mutually inclined tubes filled with water. No change of the interference fringes occurred. Later, Mascart (1872) showed that the interference fringes of polarized light in calcite remained uninfluenced as well.  [E 12]  [E 13]
* The experiment of  Éleuthère Mascart  (1872) to find a change of rotation of the polarization plane in quartz. No change of rotation was found when the light rays had the direction of Earth's motion and then the opposite direction.  Lord Rayleigh  conducted similar experiments with improved accuracy, and obtained a negative result as well.  [E 5]  [E 13]  [E 14]
That is, movement adds only a fraction of the medium's velocity to the light
(predicted by Fresnel in order to make  Snell's law  work in all frames of reference, consistent with stellar
aberration). This was initially interpreted to mean that the medium drags the
aether along, with a _portion_ of the medium's velocity, but that
understanding became very problematic after  Wilhelm Veltmann
") demonstrated that the index _n_ in Fresnel's formula
depended upon the  wavelength  of light, so
that the aether could not be moving at a wavelength-independent speed. This
implied that there must be a separate aether for each of the infinitely many
frequencies.
During the 1920s, the experiments pioneered by Michelson were repeated by 
Dayton Miller  , who publicly proclaimed
positive results on several occasions, although they were not large enough to
be consistent with any known aether theory. However, other researchers were
unable to duplicate Miller's claimed results. Over the years the experimental
accuracy of such measurements has been raised by many orders of magnitude, and
no trace of any violations of Lorentz invariance has been seen. (A later re-
analysis of Miller's results concluded that he had underestimated the
variations due to temperature.)
During these experiments, Bradley also discovered a related effect; the
apparent positions of the stars did change over the year, but not as expected.
Instead of the apparent angle being maximized when the Earth was at either end
of its orbit with respect to the star, the angle was maximized when the Earth
was at its fastest sideways velocity with respect to the star. This effect is
now known as  stellar aberration  .
*  Ives–Stilwell experiment 
*  Moessbauer rotor experiments 
*  Experimental testing of time dilation 
*  Hafele–Keating experiment 
*  Length contraction confirmations
In  cognitive psychology 
and the  philosophy of mind 
, a mental state is a kind of hypothetical state that corresponds to thinking
and feeling, and consists of a conglomeration of  mental representations
 and propositional
attitudes. Several theories in philosophy and psychology try to determine the
relationship between the agent's mental state and a proposition.  [84]  [85]
[86]  [87]
_Intentionality-based approaches_ see  intentionality  , i.e. that mental states refer to objects and represent how
the world is, as the mark of the mental.  [3]  [7]  [16]  [17]  [18]  This
circumvents various problems faced by consciousness-based approaches since we
ascribe representational contents both to conscious and to unconscious states.
[19]  Two main arguments have been raised against this approach: that some
representations, like maps, are not mental and that some mental states, like
pain, are not representational. Proponents of intentionality-based approaches
have responded to these arguments by giving a hierarchical explanation of how
non-mental representations depend on mental representations, akin to the
relation between unconscious and conscious states suggested in the last
paragraph, and by trying to show how apparently non-representational mental
states can be characterized as representational after all.  [20]  [19]  [21]
[22]  [23]
###  Wave-theory triumphs
With the development of the special theory of relativity, the need to account
for a single universal  frame of reference  had disappeared – and acceptance of the 19th-century theory of
a luminiferous aether disappeared with it. For Einstein, the Lorentz
transformation implied a conceptual change: that the concept of position in
space or time was not absolute, but could differ depending on the observer's
location and velocity.
See also  

*  Attention schema theory 
*  Blindsight 
*  Constructivist epistemology 
*  Cotard delusion 
*  Deconstructivism 
*  Epiphenomenalism 
*  Functionalism  "Functionalism \(philosophy of mind\)")
*  Mind–body problem 
*  Monism 
*  Nihilism 
*  Phenomenology  "Phenomenology \(philosophy\)")
*  Physicalism 
*  Principle of locality 
*  Property dualism 
*  Reductionism 
*  Scientism 
*  Substance dualism 
*  Vertiginous question
*  Webarchive template wayback links 
*  Wikipedia articles incorporating a citation from EB9 
*  CS1 maint: archived copy as title 
*  CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown 
*  CS1 maint: unfit URL 
*  CS1: long volume value 
*  Articles with short description 
*  Short description is different from Wikidata 
*  All pages needing factual verification 
*  Wikipedia articles needing factual verification from June 2011 
*  Commons category link is on Wikidata 
*  Articles with BNF identifiers 
*  Articles with BNFdata identifiers 
*  Articles with GND identifiers 
*  Articles with J9U identifiers 
*  Articles with LCCN identifiers
###  Rational, irrational and arational
Consciousness-based approaches hold that all mental states are either
conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious states. There
is controversy concerning how this relation is to be characterized.  [3]  [8]
[11]  One prominent early version, due to  John Searle  , states that non-conscious states are mental if they
constitute dispositions to bring about conscious states.  [12]  [13]  This
usually leads to a hierarchical model of the mind seeing only conscious states
as independent mental phenomena, which is often a point of dispute for
opponents to consciousness-based approaches. According to this line of
thought, some unconscious mental states exist independently of their conscious
counterparts. They have been referred to as the "deep unconscious" and figures
in the cognitive sciences and psychoanalysis.  [14]  [15]  But whether this
counterargument is successful depends both on allowing that the deep
unconscious is actually mental and on how the dependency-relation denied by
the deep unconscious is to be conceived.  [11]  [15]
1. ** ^  ** Young ascribed aether to  caloric theory  , pairing light and heat, and cited passages from Newton such as: "A luminiferous ether pervades the Universe, rare and elastic in a high degree," and:
Categories  |
The only similarity of this relativistic aether concept with the  classical
aether  "Aether \(classical element\)")
models lies in the presence of physical properties in space, which can be
identified through  geodesics  . As historians such as  John Stachel
 argue, Einstein's views on the "new
aether" are not in conflict with his abandonment of the aether in 1905. As
Einstein himself pointed out, no "substance" and no state of motion can be
attributed to that new aether. Einstein's use of the word "aether" found
little support in the scientific community, and played no role in the
continuing development of modern physics.  [B 11]  [B 12]  [B 13]
Although the aether is almost stationary according to Fresnel, his theory
predicts a positive outcome of aether drift experiments only to _second_ order
in  v  /  c  ,  {\displaystyle v/c,}  
because Fresnel's dragging coefficient would cause a negative outcome of all
optical experiments capable of measuring effects to _first_ order in  v  /  c
{\displaystyle v/c}  
. This was confirmed by the following first-order experiments, which all gave
negative results. The following list is based on the description of  Wilhelm
Wien  (1898), with changes and additional
experiments according to the descriptions of  Edmund Taylor Whittaker
 (1910) and  Jakob
Laub  (1910):  [B 5]  [B 1]  [B 6]
Pragmatic theory of truth  

When indeterminacy problems arose because the brain is physically isomorphic
to multiple structures of the external world, it was urged that a pragmatic
approach be used to resolve the problem. Another approach argues that the 
pragmatic theory of truth  should be used from the start to decide whether certain neural
circuits store true information about the external world.  Pragmatism
 was founded by  Charles Sanders Peirce
 and  William James
 , and later refined by our
understanding of the  philosophy of science  . According to pragmatism, to say that  general
relativity  is true is to say
that it makes more accurate predictions than other theories (  Newtonian
mechanics  ,  Aristotle's
physics  "Physics \(Aristotle\)") , etc.). If
computer circuits lack intentionality and do not store information using
propositions, then in what sense can computer A have true information about
the world while computer B lacks it? If the computers were instantiated in 
autonomous cars  , we could test
whether A or B successfully complete a cross-country road trip. If A succeeds
while B fails, the pragmatist can say that A holds true information about the
world, because A's information allows it to make more accurate predictions
(relative to B) about the world and to move around its environment more
successfully. Similarly, if brain A has information that enables the
biological organism to make more accurate predictions about the world and
helps the organism successfully move around in the environment, then A has
true information about the world. Although not advocates of eliminativism,
John Shook and Tibor Solymosi argue that pragmatism is a promising program for
understanding advancements in neuroscience and integrating them into a
philosophical picture of the world.  [55]
---
Publications  |