Vulnerability: Legitimate pools can be taken over and the penalty is not fair.
Severity: medium

Description:
In GoatV1Pair.takeOverPool(), a malicious user can take over pool from a legitimate user, because the mechanism for identifying is incorrect. And the penalty mechanism is not fair.\\nGoatV1Pair.takeOverPool() function exists to avoid grief, because only one pool can be created for each token. Doc says "They can then lower the amount of virtual Ether or Ether to be raised, but not make it higher." about GoatV1Pair.takeOverPool(). However, there is no checking for the amount of virtual Ether. This made it possible that legitimate pools can be taken over by malicious users.\\nL481 and L496 checks the amount of tokens, but there is no check for virtual Ether or Ether to be raised. So, a malicious user can take over a legitimate pool without any cost. He can remove his cost by increasing the amount of virtual Ether or reserved Ether. Paying +10 percent token can do nothing with it. Furthermore, the old liquidity provider should pay 5% penalty. This is very unfair. Generally, a malicious user have no Ether reserved. So, it is only harmful to legitimate users.\\n```\\n    function takeOverPool(GoatTypes.InitParams memory initParams) external {\\n        if (_vestingUntil != _MAX_UINT32) {\\n            revert GoatErrors.ActionNotAllowed();\\n        }\\n\\n        GoatTypes.InitialLPInfo memory initialLpInfo = _initialLPInfo;\\n\\n        GoatTypes.LocalVariables_TakeOverPool memory localVars;\\n        address to = msg.sender;\\n        localVars.virtualEthOld = _virtualEth;\\n        localVars.bootstrapEthOld = _bootstrapEth;\\n        localVars.initialTokenMatchOld = _initialTokenMatch;\\n\\n        (localVars.tokenAmountForPresaleOld, localVars.tokenAmountForAmmOld) = _tokenAmountsForLiquidityBootstrap(\\n            localVars.virtualEthOld,\\n            localVars.bootstrapEthOld,\\n            initialLpInfo.initialWethAdded,\\n            localVars.initialTokenMatchOld\\n        );\\n\\n        // new token amount for bootstrap if no swaps would have occured\\n        (localVars.tokenAmountForPresaleNew, localVars.tokenAmountForAmmNew) = _tokenAmountsForLiquidityBootstrap(\\n            initParams.virtualEth, initParams.bootstrapEth, initParams.initialEth, initParams.initialTokenMatch\\n        );\\n\\n        // team needs to add min 10% more tokens than the initial lp to take over\\n        localVars.minTokenNeeded =\\n            ((localVars.tokenAmountForPresaleOld + localVars.tokenAmountForAmmOld) * 11000) / 10000;\\n\\n481     if ((localVars.tokenAmountForAmmNew + localVars.tokenAmountForPresaleNew) < localVars.minTokenNeeded) {\\n            revert GoatErrors.InsufficientTakeoverTokenAmount();\\n        }\\n\\n        localVars.reserveEth = _reserveEth;\\n\\n        // Actual token amounts needed if the reserves have updated after initial lp mint\\n        (localVars.tokenAmountForPresaleNew, localVars.tokenAmountForAmmNew) = _tokenAmountsForLiquidityBootstrap(\\n            initParams.virtualEth, initParams.bootstrapEth, localVars.reserveEth, initParams.initialTokenMatch\\n        );\\n        localVars.reserveToken = _reserveToken;\\n\\n        // amount of tokens transferred by the new team\\n        uint256 tokenAmountIn = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(address(this)) - localVars.reserveToken;\\n\\n        if (\\n496          tokenAmountIn\\n497             < (\\n498                 localVars.tokenAmountForPresaleOld + localVars.tokenAmountForAmmOld - localVars.reserveToken\\n499                     + localVars.tokenAmountForPresaleNew + localVars.tokenAmountForAmmNew\\n500             )\\n        ) {\\n            revert GoatErrors.IncorrectTokenAmount();\\n        }\\n\\n        localVars.pendingLiquidityFees = _pendingLiquidityFees;\\n        localVars.pendingProtocolFees = _pendingProtocolFees;\\n\\n        // amount of weth transferred by the new team\\n        uint256 wethAmountIn = IERC20(_weth).balanceOf(address(this)) - localVars.reserveEth\\n            - localVars.pendingLiquidityFees - localVars.pendingProtocolFees;\\n\\n        if (wethAmountIn < localVars.reserveEth) {\\n            revert GoatErrors.IncorrectWethAmount();\\n        }\\n\\n        _handleTakeoverTransfers(\\n            IERC20(_weth), IERC20(_token), initialLpInfo.liquidityProvider, localVars.reserveEth, localVars.reserveToken\\n        );\\n\\n        uint256 lpBalance = balanceOf(initialLpInfo.liquidityProvider);\\n        _burn(initialLpInfo.liquidityProvider, lpBalance);\\n\\n        // new lp balance\\n        lpBalance = Math.sqrt(uint256(initParams.virtualEth) * initParams.initialTokenMatch) - MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY;\\n        _mint(to, lpBalance);\\n\\n        _updateStateAfterTakeover(\\n            initParams.virtualEth,\\n            initParams.bootstrapEth,\\n            initParams.initialTokenMatch,\\n            wethAmountIn,\\n            tokenAmountIn,\\n            lpBalance,\\n            to,\\n            initParams.initialEth\\n        );\\n    }\\n```\\n

Impact:
Legitimate pools can be taken over unfairly.

Recommended mitigation:
I think that the mechanism for identifying should be improved.