دادگاه‌ها به هر سرنخی که در مقدمه در مورد معنای قانون اساسی می‌توانند بیابند، علاقه نشان داده‌اند."Legal Tender Cases", 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531–32 (1871) ("[I]t [cannot] be questioned that, when investigating the nature and extent of the powers, conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which those powers were granted. This is a universal rule of construction applied alike to statutes, wills, contracts, and constitutions. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, the language of its provisions must be construed with reference to that purpose and so as to subserve it. In no other way can the intent of the framers of the instrument be discovered. And there are more urgent reasons for looking to the ultimate purpose in examining the powers conferred by a constitution than there are in construing a statute, a will, or a contract. We do not expect to find in a constitution minute details. It is necessarily brief and comprehensive. It prescribes outlines, leaving the filling up to be deduced from the outlines."), "abrogated on other grounds by Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon", 260 U.S. 393 (1922), "as recognized in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council", 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). دادگاه‌ها تکنیک‌های متعددی را برای تفسیر معنای قوانین ایجاد کرده‌اند و از آنها برای تفسیر قانون اساسی نیز استفاده می‌شود."Cf. Badger v. Hoidale", 88 F.2d 208, 211 (8th Cir. 1937) ("Rules applicable to the construction of a statute are equally applicable to the construction of a Constitution." (citing "Taylor v. Taylor", 10 Minn. 107 (1865))). در نتیجه دادگاه‌ها گفته‌اند که در تفسیر مفهوم قانون اساسی باید از فنون تفسیری که بر متن دقیق سندExamples include the "plain meaning rule," "Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.", 158 U.S. 601, 619 (1895) ("The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction."), "superseded on other grounds by" U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, "as recognized in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R.", 240 U.S. 1 (1916); "McPherson v. Blacker", 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) ("The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text ..."), and "noscitur a sociis", "Virginia v. Tennessee", 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) ("It is a familiar rule in the construction of terms to apply to them the meaning naturally attaching to them from their context. Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments. Where any particular word is obscure or of doubtful meaning, taken by itself, its obscurity or doubt may be removed by reference to associated words. And the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used."). تمرکز دارد استفاده شود. در مقابل این تکنیک‌ها، تکنیک‌هایی متوازن هستند که توجه بیشتری را بر تلاش‌های گسترده‌تر برای تشخیص معنای سند از چیزی بیش از فقط عبارت متمرکز می‌کنند."See, e.g.", "Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt", 324 U.S. 652, 663 (1945) ("[I]n determining the meaning and application of [a] constitutional provision, we are concerned with matters of substance, not of form."), "overruled on other grounds by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co.", 466 U.S. 353 (1984); "South Carolina v. United States", 199 U.S. 437, 451 (1905) ("[I]t is undoubtedly true that that which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which is expressed."), "overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.", 469 U.S. 528 (1985); "Ex parte Yarbrough", 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) ("[I]n construing the Constitution of the United States, [courts use] the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put into words all derivative powers ..."); "Packet Co. v. Keokuk", 95 U.S. 80, 87 (1877) ("A mere adherence to the letter [of the Constitution], without reference to the spirit and purpose, may [sometimes] mislead."). مقدمه برای این تلاش‌ها برای شناسایی «روح» قانون اساسی نیز مفید است.