# Research on the Impact of the Cancellation of State Subsidies on Stakeholders of Offshore Wind Power

Authors: Daoxin Peng; Hongliang Wu
Journal: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
 (2022)

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## Abstract

Public subsidies for offshore wind power will be eliminated in 2022. At present, offshore wind power still depends on subsidies. In this new situation, it is necessary to study the influence on the stakeholders and how the offshore wind power industry achieves healthy and sustainable development. Firstly, this paper qualitatively analyzes the impact of the cancellation of state subsidies on offshore wind turbine manufacturers and developers and finds that if there is no subsidy to relay offshore wind power, the development of offshore wind power will stagnate, and the wind turbine manufacturers will face great challenges. Then, by constructing the subsidy demand calculation model and the transmission and distribution price cross subsidy calculation model according to China’s electricity price-related policies, the results show that the local subsidy is basically feasible to continue the national subsidy, and the burden is decreasing year by year, so the relay subsidy should be continued. Based on the cloud model, an evaluation model for the development of offshore wind power benefits from the cancellation of national subsidies is constructed to quantify the impact of the cancellation of overseas subsidies on local governments and power grid enterprises. According to the example analysis, under the background of the cancellation of national subsidies, Guangdong has the best development of offshore wind power benefits, which verifies the feasibility of the proposed model.


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## Body

## 1. Introduction

Although the cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind power in China is small, it has developed rapidly in recent years. Since 2010, the annual average growth rate of cumulative installed capacity has reached 50.4%. Under the background of the rapid development of offshore wind power and the high level of unit cost, policy is the main driving force for the development of offshore wind power. The state subsidies are declining year by year. From 2022, the subsidies for incremental offshore wind power projects will even be completely eliminated, and it is almost impossible for offshore wind power to have the ability to access the Internet at parity without subsidies in 2022. After the cancellation of the state subsidy, what profound impact will it have on the offshore wind power industry and various stakeholders? How should offshore wind power adapt to the adjustment in the future? And other issues are thought-provoking and urgent to be clarified.Much research has been done on the development and evolution of offshore wind power at home and abroad. Literature [1, 2] deeply analyzes the development process, policy evolution, and typical systems of offshore wind power in the UK, forecasts the development prospect of offshore wind power in the UK, and condenses the reference experience. The development and evolution of offshore wind power in the UK has a strong reference significance for the development of offshore wind power in China. Literature [3] summarizes the European offshore wind power standardization experience and its enlightenment to the development of offshore wind power in China. Literature [4] comprehensively combs the situation of offshore wind power resources, cost, utilization hours, and investment income of offshore wind power projects in typical provinces in China, which is the main basis for the selection of quantitative calculation parameters in this paper. Literature [5] summarizes the development of offshore wind power in Britain and Germany and concludes that the bidding mechanism is a powerful driving factor for the decline of offshore wind power price. Literature [6–12] studies and judges the current development status, subsidy status, and development trend of offshore wind power but lacks impact analysis on stakeholders and only discusses the development of offshore wind power industry.Under the new situation, the above literature conclusions are more basic raw materials for calculating the specific impact quantity after the cancellation of the national subsidy and putting forward suggestions on the future development strategy of offshore wind power. There is still a big gap between answering the impact on various stakeholders of offshore wind power after the cancellation of the national subsidy and how to accelerate the price adjustment and realize the sustainable development of offshore wind power industry.From the calculation model of transmission and distribution price and cross subsidy, literature [13] puts forward the pricing method of transmission and distribution price under incomplete data in view of the lack of data faced by peak load responsibility in the application of transmission and distribution price pricing. Aiming at the problem of information asymmetry between the government and power transmission and distribution enterprises, literature [14] established the regulatory pricing model of power transmission and distribution enterprises on the basis of incentive compatibility mechanism so as to maximize the profits of power transmission and distribution enterprises. Based on the reform of transmission and distribution electricity price in China, literature [15] studies the transmission and distribution electricity price transmission mechanism by voltage level and user category, puts forward the concepts of cost sharing based on virtual equipment capacity and income distribution based on electricity, and establishes the transmission mechanism of transmission and distribution cost in electricity price. Literature [16] takes the transmission and distribution price of large industrial users as the research object, uses Hansen threshold model to divide the load rate range for large industrial users, then establishes the long-term incremental cost allocation model of transmission and distribution grid, puts forward the transmission and distribution price pricing method based on load rate difference, and finally constructs the time-sharing transmission and distribution price coordination and optimization model based on load rate difference pricing with reference to the characteristics of time-sharing price. Literature [17] selects the price difference method to calculate the price subsidy of the Tianjin power market and calculates the amount and degree of cross subsidy enjoyed by residents and agricultural production at different voltage levels according to the price mechanism of transmission and distribution price. Based on the analysis of the market structure and pricing mechanism under the coexistence of regulated market and open market in China at the present stage, literature [18] constructs a calculation model of transfer cross subsidy under power market-oriented transaction, which includes the reduced value of power sales revenue of power grid enterprises and the increased value of revenue of power grid enterprises in the open market. Literature [19] studies the scale and influencing factors of price cross subsidy in China’s industrial sector by using the price difference method and logarithmic average Di’s index decomposition method, which provides a certain reference for the solution path and policy formulation of price cross subsidy in China under the background of power market reform.In 2020, China promulgated “the pricing method of transmission and distribution price of provincial power grid” and “the pricing method of transmission and distribution price of regional power grid.” However, the above documents did not propose the calculation model of transmission and distribution price for the new method, which brought some errors to the calculation of transmission and distribution price.From the perspective of wind power development and benefit evaluation model, literature [20] applies diamond model to identify and analyze the key factors affecting the development and competitiveness of the Indian wind power industry so as to put forward corresponding policies and suggestions to help market players maximize their interests. Literature [21] constructs the competitive value chain model of the Indian wind power industry, comprehensively analyzes the key influencing factors of the Indian wind power industry by using the five forces model, and provides wind power development suggestions for relevant government departments. Literature [22] first used the Delphi method to construct the evaluation index system of renewable energy power generation in Turkey, then used the fuzzy analytic hierarchy process to rank the indexes, and finally used fuzzy weighted aggregated sum product assessment to evaluate and rank five main renewable energy power generations. Literature [23] used the partial least square method to build the analysis model of key influencing factors of renewable energy power generation and ranked the factors affecting the development of renewable energy power generation. Literature [24] introduced perceived key factors into the comprehensive framework to evaluate the acceptance of renewable energy power generation technology. Literature [25] constructed a multilevel fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model to evaluate the competitiveness of wind power industry in Hebei Province, China, and analyzed an example to verify the feasibility of the model. Literature [26] first used the Bayesian weight correction method to determine the weight of wind power adaptability index and then constructed a comprehensive evaluation model of wind power adaptability based on the improved radar chart method. Literature [27] first uses the optimized day ahead complementary operation model to simulate the operation of the hybrid system of wind, light, and water power generation, then puts forward the corresponding objective functions and constraints according to the simulated operation, and comprehensively evaluates the benefits and risks of the complementary operation of the hybrid system of wind power, photovoltaic power generation, and hydropower.The above literature focuses more on determining the key influencing factors of the development of wind power industry and the relationship between the key influencing factors. Few scholars put forward the corresponding comprehensive evaluation model for the benefit development of wind power.Firstly, this paper sorts out the offshore wind power policy and obtains the current policy status and policy-making trend of offshore wind power. Then, based on the judgment of the current situation and trend of the policy, this paper qualitatively analyzes the impact of the cancellation of state subsidies on offshore wind turbine manufacturing enterprises and developers. According to China’s transmission and distribution pricing method, this paper constructs the subsidy demand calculation model and transmission and distribution price allocation model to quantify the impact of the cancellation of state subsidies on local governments and power grid enterprises. The results show that if there is no subsidy to relay offshore wind power, wind turbine manufacturing enterprises will face great challenges. Local subsidies are financially feasible to continue national subsidies, and the burden is decreasing year by year. On the whole, local subsidies should relay subsidies. Then, the cloud model is used to construct the benefit development evaluation model of offshore wind power after the cancellation of national subsidies, and eight provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Fujian are selected for example analysis to verify the feasibility of the model. Finally, from the two dimensions of tapping their own potential and external assistance, this paper gives specific development strategy suggestions for accelerating affordable Internet access to offshore wind power.


## 2. Impact Analysis of Various Stakeholders of Offshore Wind Power under the New Situation

### 2.1. Wind Turbine Manufacturers

The wind turbine manufacturers in this part mainly refer to wind turbine manufacturers and parts suppliers. 2022 will be a turning point for wind turbine manufacturers. The specific impact is as follows:(1)
There are shortcomings in the supply chain; the production capacity of wind turbine is tight. There is a possibility that wind power manufacturers will delay the delivery of wind turbines.On the one hand, the rush installation stimulated by the policy has caused a significant increase in the demand for wind turbines. On the other hand, the epidemic “black swan” has affected both domestic and foreign markets. China is facing the risk of insufficient supply of raw materials and parts. The opening of “scissors difference” between wind turbine supply and demand is becoming larger. There is a risk that the wind turbine manufacturers cannot fully fulfill the full orders in hand. It is expected that most of the following enterprises, except a few leading enterprises whole wind turbine manufacturers such as Jinfeng, Mingyang, and Yuanjing energy, will face the problem of failure to ship and deliver on time.(2)
The power generation group may voluntarily give up some prenode grid connection projects to avoid the risk of breach of contract faced by the whole machine manufacturer.Under the rational balance, the power generation group will probably take the initiative to give up some projects that are expected to be difficult to be connected to the power grid in front of the node. The power generation group can focus on resources by abandoning some projects to ensure the grid connection of key projects on schedule. For leading complete machine manufacturers with strong shipping capacity, they may face the risk of default, especially in 2021.(3)
Rush installation has a great negative effect on wind turbine manufacturers. Wind turbine orders will face greater variables in 2022 and beyond, and the industry will face great pressure of excess capacity.At present, there are problems of insufficient capacity from wind turbine production to offshore wind farm infrastructure, installation, and submarine cable laying. In order to honor the existing orders, as well as the influence of the high prices of wind turbines and infrastructure installations in the seller's market, enterprises in all links have the driving force to expand production capacity. However, due to the policy nature of this round of rush installation, the policy will undergo a huge adverse change in 2022, and the new capacity rate can only function for a maximum of one year and then become excess capacity. If local subsidies do not relay, the offshore wind power industry will face a major crisis.(4)
Starting from 2022, the bargaining power of wind turbine manufacturers will decline sharply, which will become the most direct object of unsubsidized parity pressure transmission of offshore wind power projects of power generation groups or the actual buyer in the parity era.Before the grid connection node (2022), the offshore wind power projects of various power generation groups rush to install, and the supply is in short supply. The wind turbine manufacturing enterprises have strong bargaining power. Moreover, due to the existence of high electricity price, including subsidies, the offshore wind power projects have price space to meet the income requirements of both parties. After the grid connection node (2022 and beyond), due to the clear withdrawal of national compensation and the uncertain prospect of local compensation, offshore wind power may step into the era of parity Internet access, and the rush for node grid connection and installation caused by policy changes is difficult to reappear. The power generation group gradually occupies an absolutely active position in the offshore wind power development market, and the transformation of the market from the seller’s market to the buyer’s market is completed instantaneously. Power generation groups can wait for the price to sell, develop projects that are profitable, and wait for changes when they are unprofitable. The absence of orders for wind turbine manufacturers means the demise of the enterprise. The minimum loss will become the criterion for supply decision-making. Supply below cost price is likely to become the norm or the actual buyer in the era of parity. Under the new normal, small enterprises have insufficient risk resistance and will face the reality of bankruptcy liquidation or merger and integration, which will accelerate the industry into the era of oligarchy.


### 2.2. Developers

At present, the main bodies of China’s offshore wind farm investment and construction mainly include five major power generation groups, China Resources Power Holdings Corporation Limited, and China Three Gorges Corporation Limited. The impact of the cancellation of national compensation is as follows:(1)
Driven by the policy, there will be a rush to install offshore wind power projects from 2020 to 2021.Driven by the policy, the offshore wind power sector will inevitably appear before the end of 2021 that developers rush to start construction, rush to install, and connect to the grid to rush the market, power prices, and revenue.(2)
Under rational decision-making, each developer will probably choose to give up some projects to avoid risks.Once the power grid connection fails to lock in the high price with subsidies before the node required by the policy, it may enter the era of parity. This will result in the price of power grid being at least 0.2-0.3 yuan/kWh lower than the current guide price. The price of grid is even difficult to make up for the kWh cost of offshore wind power development and construction, which will be an investment disaster for wind power development enterprises. At present, restricted by the supply capacity, wind power development enterprises generally have pessimistic expectations for the grid connection of the currently started and approved projects to be built as scheduled. Wind power development enterprises will take the initiative to give up some projects that are difficult to be connected to the grid on schedule to avoid risks.(3)
Rushing to install intensifies the gap in new energy subsidies. The tighter cash flow of developers will incur additional expenditures such as financial expenses.China’s new energy subsidy gap is widening year by year. The accounts receivable and notes data of the typical new energy listed companies subordinate to the China Three Gorges Corporation and five major power generation groups from 2017 to 2019 are shown in Table1. Most of the accounts receivable and bills of new energy company are new energy subsidy accounts receivable. It can be seen that the proportion of accounts receivable and bills in total operating revenue of all typical enterprises is increasing year by year, especially the new energy companies under China Datang Corporation and China Three Gorges Corporation. Their accounts receivable and notes even reached 1.1 times and 1.6 times of their total operating income in 2019. It is difficult to recover government subsidies in time, which will affect the cash flow of new energy enterprises and lead to additional financial costs.The rush to install offshore wind power for three consecutive years from 2019 to 2021 will further aggravate the subsidy gap and seriously affect the cash flow of enterprises. Developers rush to install, and eventually, developers will become actual pressure people. Some subsidies in the high electricity price locked by rush to install will still “lie” on the account.(4)
Under the tide of offshore wind power rush, there are hidden dangers in the development quality of the wind power industry.Table 1
Data related to accounts receivable and notes of typical enterprises (100 million yuan).
YearChina Longyuan Power Group Corporation LimitedHuaneng Renewables Corporation LimitedChina Datang Corporation Renewable Power Corporation LimitedChina Three Gorges Renewables (Group) Corporation LimitedAccounts receivable and notes201799.672.150.450.582018124.699.774.773.062019180.8—95.5104.1Total operating income2017246.4106.271.067.82018265.0116.783.273.82019276.1125.883.264.6Proportion of accounts receivable in total operating income201740.4%67.9%71.0%74.6%201847.0%85.4%89.8%99.0%201965.5%—114.8%161.1%In the context of rush installation, low-quality raw materials and key parts are likely to flow into the market, the quality of construction workers has decreased, and it is difficult to invest sufficient resources to ensure the construction quality. The following is that there are more hidden dangers in wind turbine quality and construction hoisting quality. There are more hidden dangers in the development quality of the wind power industry.


### 2.3. Local Government

With the rapid development of offshore wind power, the biggest problem faced by local governments is whether to use land to make up for the national compensation. This is also the question that the whole offshore wind power industry is most looking forward to getting the answer. If the local government continues to subsidize, the amount of subsidies in each province will be huge, and the financial pressure will be huge. It is estimated that local subsidy will continue until 2025. Except for a few provinces with low benchmark coal price, offshore wind power projects in all provinces can basically have the ability to access the Internet at parity. With local subsidies, the difficulties faced by offshore wind turbine manufacturers and developers mentioned above will be greatly improved.In the provinces that need to focus on the development of offshore wind power, local subsidies will relay, and the intensity of subsidies depends on the financial strength of local governments. There are four supporting reasons.First, the current unit cost of offshore wind power is more than twice that of onshore wind power, and it is too early to cancel the state subsidy.Second, the weight of nonaqueous renewable energy consumption responsibility required by the national development and reform commission and the energy administration makes more coastal provinces “inseparable” from offshore wind power and “have to” place high hopes on offshore wind power and relay subsidies. Taking Guangdong as an example, the endowment of photovoltaic and onshore wind power resources in nonaqueous renewable energy is poor. Guangdong’s considerable resources are offshore wind power, so they must support the development of offshore wind power.Third, offshore wind power will have multiple long-term benefits after overcoming short-term difficulties, and local subsidies will be an investment with high input and output. Once offshore wind power breaks through the cost constraint, it will be a cheap, environmentally friendly, and sustainable energy supply in the future. At the same time, cultivating a group of local competitive upstream and downstream enterprises of offshore wind power, at present, many provinces have the practice of exchanging resources for investment, which is of great benefit to promote local economic development and improve local taxes. In addition, offshore wind power can also greatly improve the guarantee ability of safe and reliable energy supply in coastal areas.Fourth, although there are difficulties in raising financial funds, as long as there is determination at the local level, it does not constitute a hard constraint.


### 2.4. Power Grid Enterprise

A large amount of offshore wind power access will increase the operation risk of the power grid, and the space for the transmission and distribution price to accommodate the investment in the offshore wind power transmission facility section is relatively limited. If the power grid is needed to support the development of offshore wind power, it is more reasonable for the power grid enterprise and the developer to jointly undertake the investment in the power transmission section.(1)
A large amount of wind power is concentrated in grid connection from 2020 to 2021, which makes it difficult to absorb offshore wind power and increases the risk of power grid operation.The overall output characteristics of offshore wind power generally show the characteristics of being large in winter and small in summer, high output at night, and low output during the day. Offshore wind power has strong reverse peak shaving characteristics. The reverse peak shaving characteristics of a typical province are shown in Figure1. If a large amount of offshore wind power is connected, especially a large amount of centralized access in a short time caused by rush loading, it will greatly increase the difficulty of offshore wind power consumption and put forward higher requirements for the peak shaving and frequency modulation capacity of the power grid.(2)
The grid enterprise takes over the investment in offshore wind power transmission facilities, which will occupy the already very limited space for pricing. Based on the calculation of transmission and distribution electricity price, it is appropriate to provide policy support for the additional increase of power grid scale and electricity price.Figure 1
Characteristics of reverse peak shaving in a typical province.If the grid takes over the offshore wind power and invests in the grid section, it will squeeze out some projects that should be invested but cannot be invested again within the limited electricity price space and nuclear price investment scale. At a time when the scale of nuclear price investment is extremely tight, the investment plan has been pressed again and again, which may greatly affect the safe and stable operation of the power grid. If the state level requires the grid company to undertake the investment in offshore wind power transmission facilities, the investment scale should be approved additionally. Moreover, the corresponding electricity price shall be added on the basis of the approved transmission and distribution electricity price.


## 2.1. Wind Turbine Manufacturers

The wind turbine manufacturers in this part mainly refer to wind turbine manufacturers and parts suppliers. 2022 will be a turning point for wind turbine manufacturers. The specific impact is as follows:(1)
There are shortcomings in the supply chain; the production capacity of wind turbine is tight. There is a possibility that wind power manufacturers will delay the delivery of wind turbines.On the one hand, the rush installation stimulated by the policy has caused a significant increase in the demand for wind turbines. On the other hand, the epidemic “black swan” has affected both domestic and foreign markets. China is facing the risk of insufficient supply of raw materials and parts. The opening of “scissors difference” between wind turbine supply and demand is becoming larger. There is a risk that the wind turbine manufacturers cannot fully fulfill the full orders in hand. It is expected that most of the following enterprises, except a few leading enterprises whole wind turbine manufacturers such as Jinfeng, Mingyang, and Yuanjing energy, will face the problem of failure to ship and deliver on time.(2)
The power generation group may voluntarily give up some prenode grid connection projects to avoid the risk of breach of contract faced by the whole machine manufacturer.Under the rational balance, the power generation group will probably take the initiative to give up some projects that are expected to be difficult to be connected to the power grid in front of the node. The power generation group can focus on resources by abandoning some projects to ensure the grid connection of key projects on schedule. For leading complete machine manufacturers with strong shipping capacity, they may face the risk of default, especially in 2021.(3)
Rush installation has a great negative effect on wind turbine manufacturers. Wind turbine orders will face greater variables in 2022 and beyond, and the industry will face great pressure of excess capacity.At present, there are problems of insufficient capacity from wind turbine production to offshore wind farm infrastructure, installation, and submarine cable laying. In order to honor the existing orders, as well as the influence of the high prices of wind turbines and infrastructure installations in the seller's market, enterprises in all links have the driving force to expand production capacity. However, due to the policy nature of this round of rush installation, the policy will undergo a huge adverse change in 2022, and the new capacity rate can only function for a maximum of one year and then become excess capacity. If local subsidies do not relay, the offshore wind power industry will face a major crisis.(4)
Starting from 2022, the bargaining power of wind turbine manufacturers will decline sharply, which will become the most direct object of unsubsidized parity pressure transmission of offshore wind power projects of power generation groups or the actual buyer in the parity era.Before the grid connection node (2022), the offshore wind power projects of various power generation groups rush to install, and the supply is in short supply. The wind turbine manufacturing enterprises have strong bargaining power. Moreover, due to the existence of high electricity price, including subsidies, the offshore wind power projects have price space to meet the income requirements of both parties. After the grid connection node (2022 and beyond), due to the clear withdrawal of national compensation and the uncertain prospect of local compensation, offshore wind power may step into the era of parity Internet access, and the rush for node grid connection and installation caused by policy changes is difficult to reappear. The power generation group gradually occupies an absolutely active position in the offshore wind power development market, and the transformation of the market from the seller’s market to the buyer’s market is completed instantaneously. Power generation groups can wait for the price to sell, develop projects that are profitable, and wait for changes when they are unprofitable. The absence of orders for wind turbine manufacturers means the demise of the enterprise. The minimum loss will become the criterion for supply decision-making. Supply below cost price is likely to become the norm or the actual buyer in the era of parity. Under the new normal, small enterprises have insufficient risk resistance and will face the reality of bankruptcy liquidation or merger and integration, which will accelerate the industry into the era of oligarchy.


## 2.2. Developers

At present, the main bodies of China’s offshore wind farm investment and construction mainly include five major power generation groups, China Resources Power Holdings Corporation Limited, and China Three Gorges Corporation Limited. The impact of the cancellation of national compensation is as follows:(1)
Driven by the policy, there will be a rush to install offshore wind power projects from 2020 to 2021.Driven by the policy, the offshore wind power sector will inevitably appear before the end of 2021 that developers rush to start construction, rush to install, and connect to the grid to rush the market, power prices, and revenue.(2)
Under rational decision-making, each developer will probably choose to give up some projects to avoid risks.Once the power grid connection fails to lock in the high price with subsidies before the node required by the policy, it may enter the era of parity. This will result in the price of power grid being at least 0.2-0.3 yuan/kWh lower than the current guide price. The price of grid is even difficult to make up for the kWh cost of offshore wind power development and construction, which will be an investment disaster for wind power development enterprises. At present, restricted by the supply capacity, wind power development enterprises generally have pessimistic expectations for the grid connection of the currently started and approved projects to be built as scheduled. Wind power development enterprises will take the initiative to give up some projects that are difficult to be connected to the grid on schedule to avoid risks.(3)
Rushing to install intensifies the gap in new energy subsidies. The tighter cash flow of developers will incur additional expenditures such as financial expenses.China’s new energy subsidy gap is widening year by year. The accounts receivable and notes data of the typical new energy listed companies subordinate to the China Three Gorges Corporation and five major power generation groups from 2017 to 2019 are shown in Table1. Most of the accounts receivable and bills of new energy company are new energy subsidy accounts receivable. It can be seen that the proportion of accounts receivable and bills in total operating revenue of all typical enterprises is increasing year by year, especially the new energy companies under China Datang Corporation and China Three Gorges Corporation. Their accounts receivable and notes even reached 1.1 times and 1.6 times of their total operating income in 2019. It is difficult to recover government subsidies in time, which will affect the cash flow of new energy enterprises and lead to additional financial costs.The rush to install offshore wind power for three consecutive years from 2019 to 2021 will further aggravate the subsidy gap and seriously affect the cash flow of enterprises. Developers rush to install, and eventually, developers will become actual pressure people. Some subsidies in the high electricity price locked by rush to install will still “lie” on the account.(4)
Under the tide of offshore wind power rush, there are hidden dangers in the development quality of the wind power industry.Table 1
Data related to accounts receivable and notes of typical enterprises (100 million yuan).
YearChina Longyuan Power Group Corporation LimitedHuaneng Renewables Corporation LimitedChina Datang Corporation Renewable Power Corporation LimitedChina Three Gorges Renewables (Group) Corporation LimitedAccounts receivable and notes201799.672.150.450.582018124.699.774.773.062019180.8—95.5104.1Total operating income2017246.4106.271.067.82018265.0116.783.273.82019276.1125.883.264.6Proportion of accounts receivable in total operating income201740.4%67.9%71.0%74.6%201847.0%85.4%89.8%99.0%201965.5%—114.8%161.1%In the context of rush installation, low-quality raw materials and key parts are likely to flow into the market, the quality of construction workers has decreased, and it is difficult to invest sufficient resources to ensure the construction quality. The following is that there are more hidden dangers in wind turbine quality and construction hoisting quality. There are more hidden dangers in the development quality of the wind power industry.


## 2.3. Local Government

With the rapid development of offshore wind power, the biggest problem faced by local governments is whether to use land to make up for the national compensation. This is also the question that the whole offshore wind power industry is most looking forward to getting the answer. If the local government continues to subsidize, the amount of subsidies in each province will be huge, and the financial pressure will be huge. It is estimated that local subsidy will continue until 2025. Except for a few provinces with low benchmark coal price, offshore wind power projects in all provinces can basically have the ability to access the Internet at parity. With local subsidies, the difficulties faced by offshore wind turbine manufacturers and developers mentioned above will be greatly improved.In the provinces that need to focus on the development of offshore wind power, local subsidies will relay, and the intensity of subsidies depends on the financial strength of local governments. There are four supporting reasons.First, the current unit cost of offshore wind power is more than twice that of onshore wind power, and it is too early to cancel the state subsidy.Second, the weight of nonaqueous renewable energy consumption responsibility required by the national development and reform commission and the energy administration makes more coastal provinces “inseparable” from offshore wind power and “have to” place high hopes on offshore wind power and relay subsidies. Taking Guangdong as an example, the endowment of photovoltaic and onshore wind power resources in nonaqueous renewable energy is poor. Guangdong’s considerable resources are offshore wind power, so they must support the development of offshore wind power.Third, offshore wind power will have multiple long-term benefits after overcoming short-term difficulties, and local subsidies will be an investment with high input and output. Once offshore wind power breaks through the cost constraint, it will be a cheap, environmentally friendly, and sustainable energy supply in the future. At the same time, cultivating a group of local competitive upstream and downstream enterprises of offshore wind power, at present, many provinces have the practice of exchanging resources for investment, which is of great benefit to promote local economic development and improve local taxes. In addition, offshore wind power can also greatly improve the guarantee ability of safe and reliable energy supply in coastal areas.Fourth, although there are difficulties in raising financial funds, as long as there is determination at the local level, it does not constitute a hard constraint.


## 2.4. Power Grid Enterprise

A large amount of offshore wind power access will increase the operation risk of the power grid, and the space for the transmission and distribution price to accommodate the investment in the offshore wind power transmission facility section is relatively limited. If the power grid is needed to support the development of offshore wind power, it is more reasonable for the power grid enterprise and the developer to jointly undertake the investment in the power transmission section.(1)
A large amount of wind power is concentrated in grid connection from 2020 to 2021, which makes it difficult to absorb offshore wind power and increases the risk of power grid operation.The overall output characteristics of offshore wind power generally show the characteristics of being large in winter and small in summer, high output at night, and low output during the day. Offshore wind power has strong reverse peak shaving characteristics. The reverse peak shaving characteristics of a typical province are shown in Figure1. If a large amount of offshore wind power is connected, especially a large amount of centralized access in a short time caused by rush loading, it will greatly increase the difficulty of offshore wind power consumption and put forward higher requirements for the peak shaving and frequency modulation capacity of the power grid.(2)
The grid enterprise takes over the investment in offshore wind power transmission facilities, which will occupy the already very limited space for pricing. Based on the calculation of transmission and distribution electricity price, it is appropriate to provide policy support for the additional increase of power grid scale and electricity price.Figure 1
Characteristics of reverse peak shaving in a typical province.If the grid takes over the offshore wind power and invests in the grid section, it will squeeze out some projects that should be invested but cannot be invested again within the limited electricity price space and nuclear price investment scale. At a time when the scale of nuclear price investment is extremely tight, the investment plan has been pressed again and again, which may greatly affect the safe and stable operation of the power grid. If the state level requires the grid company to undertake the investment in offshore wind power transmission facilities, the investment scale should be approved additionally. Moreover, the corresponding electricity price shall be added on the basis of the approved transmission and distribution electricity price.


## 3. Model Construction

### 3.1. Calculation Model of Reasonable Transmission and Distribution Price under Transmission and Distribution Price Reform

According to the pricing method of transmission and distribution price of provincial power grid issued in 2020, this paper calculates the reasonable average transmission-distribution price of each voltage level so as to obtain the reasonable transmission-distribution price calculation model of various users [28](1)
The permitted income of shared network shall be determined according to the pricing method of transmission and distribution price of provincial power grid:(1)Permittedincome=Permittedcost+permittedreturn+TaxesPermittedcost=permittedcostinbaseperiod+estimatednewreducedpermittedcostinsupervisionperiodPermittedincome=effectiveassetswithaccruedincome×PermittedrateofreturnEffectiveassetswithaccruedincome=effectiveassetswithaccruedincomeinthebaseperiod±effectiveassetswithexpectednewreducedaccruedincomeintheregulatorycyclePermittedrateofreturn=returnonequitycapital×1−assetliabilityratio+returnondebtcapital×Assetliabilityratio.(2)
Voltage level allocation allowed income. The permitted income of each voltage level shall be apportioned according to the principle of the proportion of the asset value of each voltage level:(2)Allowableincomeofeachvoltagelevel=allowableincomeofsharednetwork×Proportionofassetvalueofthisvoltagelevel.(3)
Total permitted revenue for this voltage class: assume that the total delivered power of voltage leveli is Qi, qij is the amount of electricity transmitted from the voltage level i to the voltage level j, qi is the power transmitted from the voltage level i to users of this voltage level, and the total allowable revenue Ri of voltage level i is(3)Ri=rk×qkiQk×qiQi,whererk is the apportioned allowable income of the previous (multiple) voltage level K of the voltage level i; qki is the electric quantity transmitted from the voltage level K to the voltage level i; Qk is the total transmitted power of voltage level K.(4)
Reasonable average transmission-distribution price of each voltage level: the reasonable average transmission and distribution price of voltage leveli is(4)Pi=Riqi.Considering the influence of different load characteristics of various users on power supply cost, the price comparison relationship between reasonable transmission-distribution prices of various users is calculated based on the annual load rate of various users, and then the reasonable transmission-distribution prices of various users at various voltage levels can be obtained. Assuming that the unit transmission-distribution cost of a voltage level isC, the fixed cost of unit transmission and distribution (i.e., the fixed cost of transmission and distribution per unit maximum load) is F. The average load rate is f, and the unit power transmission and distribution cost that can be changed is yb. The unit transmission and distribution cost of class m users under this voltage level is Cm. The fixed cost per unit of transmission-distribution is Fm, and electricity consumption is qm. The annual load rate is fm. The annual load rate of users is the wallpaper of the average load and maximum load of such users within one year (8760 h). The relationship between the fixed cost of transmission and distribution per unit electricity is y (i.e., the fixed cost of transmission-distribution per kWh) and the average load rate f within one year is(5)y=fixedcostofavoltagelevelmaximumload×f×8760=F8760f,where the fixed cost of unit transmission-distribution F = fixed cost of a voltage level/maximum load of a voltage level.The unit power transmission-distribution cost is divided into fixed cost and variable cost, and then the unit power transmission-distribution cost of class 1 users is(6)c1=F1f1h+yb.The unit power transmission-distribution cost of class 2 users is(7)c2=F2f2h+yb,(8)yb=C1−efh,where e is the proportion of fixed assets of power transmission and distribution of a certain voltage level and h is the duration of power supply.In practice, the cost of power transmission-distribution is mainly user service cost, which is related to the number of users [29, 30]. However, the accurate number of users is difficult to obtain, so the allocation and substitution are carried out according to the user’s electricity; that is, the variable cost of transmission-distribution is calculated according to (8). Comprehensive formulas (10)–(12) can be obtained:(9)c1=F1f1h+C1−efh,c2=F2f2h+C1−efh.The price comparison relationship between the reasonable transmission-distribution electricity pricesj1,j2 of the two types of users can be expressed by the price comparison of variable costs c1,c2. For the fixed cost of transmission-distribution, the fixed cost of transmission-distribution per unit power that is inversely proportional to the load rate [31, 32] can be obtained:(10)CF1=f1f,CF2=f2f,j1j2=f/f12+1−e/ff/f22+1−e/f.The reasonable transmission-distribution price level of reference user 1 is calculated as equation (11), and the reasonable transmission-distribution price of other types of users is(11)pi1=pi×∑l=1nQil∑l−1njl×Qil,(12)pil=pi1×jl,where pi1 and pil are the reasonable transmission and distribution price of class i reference user 1 and class l user, respectively, and Qil is the power consumption of class l power user of class i voltage level.The actual transmission-distribution price of various users at each voltage level is the difference between the actual sales price of each user and the on-grid price.(13)pil′=pils−pilb,where pil′ is the actual transmission and distribution price of class 1 users of voltage level m; pils and pilb are the actual sales price and on-grid price of class 1 users of voltage level m, respectively.


### 3.2. Calculation of Electricity Price Cross Subsidy under Transmission and Distribution Electricity Price Reform

The electricity price cross subsidy of each user’s unit electricity under each voltage level is equal to the difference between its reasonable transmission and distribution electricity price and the actual transmission and distribution electricity price.(14)csil=pil−pil′.The total amount of cross subsidies for various users of each voltage level is(15)CSil=csil×qil,where qil is the power consumption of class 1 users of voltage level m.


### 3.3. Evaluation Model for the Benefit Development of Offshore Wind Power with the Cancellation of National Subsidies

Based on AHP and the basic principles of the cloud model, an interest balance evaluation model is constructed. The specific steps of AHP are shown in reference [33].Step 1: use AHP to calculate the index weight to obtain the weight results of indicators at all levels.Step 2: determine benefit development evaluation indicators.Step 3: five experts are invited to score six three-level indicators of eight provinces according to relevant policiesS=EX,En,He; equations (16)–(18) can calculate the digital characteristics of three cloud models of secondary indicators: Exi′, Eni′, and Hei′;Step 4: the cloud model digital characteristics of secondary indicators can be obtained by the following formula [34]:(16)Exj=∑i=1nλi′Exi′∑i=1nλi′,(17)Enj=∑i=1nλi′2Eni′∑i=1nλi′2,(18)Hej=∑i=1nλi′2ei′∑i=1nλi′2,where λi′ is the weight of each index, i=1,2…,19, j=1,2,….The cloud model digital characteristics of secondary indicators are obtained through calculation, and finally, the final digital characteristics of offshore wind power benefit development after the cancellation of state subsidies in eight provinces are obtained. The cloud map is drawn in combination with MATLAB software in order to obtain more intuitive evaluation and comparison results. The specific process is shown in Figure2.Figure 2
Flowchart of benefit development evaluation of offshore wind power.


## 3.1. Calculation Model of Reasonable Transmission and Distribution Price under Transmission and Distribution Price Reform

According to the pricing method of transmission and distribution price of provincial power grid issued in 2020, this paper calculates the reasonable average transmission-distribution price of each voltage level so as to obtain the reasonable transmission-distribution price calculation model of various users [28](1)
The permitted income of shared network shall be determined according to the pricing method of transmission and distribution price of provincial power grid:(1)Permittedincome=Permittedcost+permittedreturn+TaxesPermittedcost=permittedcostinbaseperiod+estimatednewreducedpermittedcostinsupervisionperiodPermittedincome=effectiveassetswithaccruedincome×PermittedrateofreturnEffectiveassetswithaccruedincome=effectiveassetswithaccruedincomeinthebaseperiod±effectiveassetswithexpectednewreducedaccruedincomeintheregulatorycyclePermittedrateofreturn=returnonequitycapital×1−assetliabilityratio+returnondebtcapital×Assetliabilityratio.(2)
Voltage level allocation allowed income. The permitted income of each voltage level shall be apportioned according to the principle of the proportion of the asset value of each voltage level:(2)Allowableincomeofeachvoltagelevel=allowableincomeofsharednetwork×Proportionofassetvalueofthisvoltagelevel.(3)
Total permitted revenue for this voltage class: assume that the total delivered power of voltage leveli is Qi, qij is the amount of electricity transmitted from the voltage level i to the voltage level j, qi is the power transmitted from the voltage level i to users of this voltage level, and the total allowable revenue Ri of voltage level i is(3)Ri=rk×qkiQk×qiQi,whererk is the apportioned allowable income of the previous (multiple) voltage level K of the voltage level i; qki is the electric quantity transmitted from the voltage level K to the voltage level i; Qk is the total transmitted power of voltage level K.(4)
Reasonable average transmission-distribution price of each voltage level: the reasonable average transmission and distribution price of voltage leveli is(4)Pi=Riqi.Considering the influence of different load characteristics of various users on power supply cost, the price comparison relationship between reasonable transmission-distribution prices of various users is calculated based on the annual load rate of various users, and then the reasonable transmission-distribution prices of various users at various voltage levels can be obtained. Assuming that the unit transmission-distribution cost of a voltage level isC, the fixed cost of unit transmission and distribution (i.e., the fixed cost of transmission and distribution per unit maximum load) is F. The average load rate is f, and the unit power transmission and distribution cost that can be changed is yb. The unit transmission and distribution cost of class m users under this voltage level is Cm. The fixed cost per unit of transmission-distribution is Fm, and electricity consumption is qm. The annual load rate is fm. The annual load rate of users is the wallpaper of the average load and maximum load of such users within one year (8760 h). The relationship between the fixed cost of transmission and distribution per unit electricity is y (i.e., the fixed cost of transmission-distribution per kWh) and the average load rate f within one year is(5)y=fixedcostofavoltagelevelmaximumload×f×8760=F8760f,where the fixed cost of unit transmission-distribution F = fixed cost of a voltage level/maximum load of a voltage level.The unit power transmission-distribution cost is divided into fixed cost and variable cost, and then the unit power transmission-distribution cost of class 1 users is(6)c1=F1f1h+yb.The unit power transmission-distribution cost of class 2 users is(7)c2=F2f2h+yb,(8)yb=C1−efh,where e is the proportion of fixed assets of power transmission and distribution of a certain voltage level and h is the duration of power supply.In practice, the cost of power transmission-distribution is mainly user service cost, which is related to the number of users [29, 30]. However, the accurate number of users is difficult to obtain, so the allocation and substitution are carried out according to the user’s electricity; that is, the variable cost of transmission-distribution is calculated according to (8). Comprehensive formulas (10)–(12) can be obtained:(9)c1=F1f1h+C1−efh,c2=F2f2h+C1−efh.The price comparison relationship between the reasonable transmission-distribution electricity pricesj1,j2 of the two types of users can be expressed by the price comparison of variable costs c1,c2. For the fixed cost of transmission-distribution, the fixed cost of transmission-distribution per unit power that is inversely proportional to the load rate [31, 32] can be obtained:(10)CF1=f1f,CF2=f2f,j1j2=f/f12+1−e/ff/f22+1−e/f.The reasonable transmission-distribution price level of reference user 1 is calculated as equation (11), and the reasonable transmission-distribution price of other types of users is(11)pi1=pi×∑l=1nQil∑l−1njl×Qil,(12)pil=pi1×jl,where pi1 and pil are the reasonable transmission and distribution price of class i reference user 1 and class l user, respectively, and Qil is the power consumption of class l power user of class i voltage level.The actual transmission-distribution price of various users at each voltage level is the difference between the actual sales price of each user and the on-grid price.(13)pil′=pils−pilb,where pil′ is the actual transmission and distribution price of class 1 users of voltage level m; pils and pilb are the actual sales price and on-grid price of class 1 users of voltage level m, respectively.


## 3.2. Calculation of Electricity Price Cross Subsidy under Transmission and Distribution Electricity Price Reform

The electricity price cross subsidy of each user’s unit electricity under each voltage level is equal to the difference between its reasonable transmission and distribution electricity price and the actual transmission and distribution electricity price.(14)csil=pil−pil′.The total amount of cross subsidies for various users of each voltage level is(15)CSil=csil×qil,where qil is the power consumption of class 1 users of voltage level m.


## 3.3. Evaluation Model for the Benefit Development of Offshore Wind Power with the Cancellation of National Subsidies

Based on AHP and the basic principles of the cloud model, an interest balance evaluation model is constructed. The specific steps of AHP are shown in reference [33].Step 1: use AHP to calculate the index weight to obtain the weight results of indicators at all levels.Step 2: determine benefit development evaluation indicators.Step 3: five experts are invited to score six three-level indicators of eight provinces according to relevant policiesS=EX,En,He; equations (16)–(18) can calculate the digital characteristics of three cloud models of secondary indicators: Exi′, Eni′, and Hei′;Step 4: the cloud model digital characteristics of secondary indicators can be obtained by the following formula [34]:(16)Exj=∑i=1nλi′Exi′∑i=1nλi′,(17)Enj=∑i=1nλi′2Eni′∑i=1nλi′2,(18)Hej=∑i=1nλi′2ei′∑i=1nλi′2,where λi′ is the weight of each index, i=1,2…,19, j=1,2,….The cloud model digital characteristics of secondary indicators are obtained through calculation, and finally, the final digital characteristics of offshore wind power benefit development after the cancellation of state subsidies in eight provinces are obtained. The cloud map is drawn in combination with MATLAB software in order to obtain more intuitive evaluation and comparison results. The specific process is shown in Figure2.Figure 2
Flowchart of benefit development evaluation of offshore wind power.


## 4. Example Analysis

### 4.1. Accounting for Transmission and Distribution Prices

The offshore wind power transmission facilities section refers to the offshore booster station as the boundary, and the offshore booster station, transmission cable, and onshore centralized control station are constructed by the power grid enterprise, excluding the offshore cables [35].The cost of offshore wind power transmission facility section accounts for about 8%–12% of the total cost of offshore wind power, calculated as 10%. The unit cost level of new installed capacity in a typical province from 2020 to 2025 and the sales power from 2021 to 2025 are shown in Table2. The rate of return on investment of offshore wind power project is calculated as 6.5%.Table 2
Some input parameters for calculating the impact of investment in offshore wind power transmission section on transmission and distribution price. Unit: ten thousand kilowatts, yuan/kilowatt, one hundred million yuan, and one hundred million kilowatts.
Particular year202020212022202320242025Annual new scale478.8478.8478.8478.8478.8478.8Unit cost level180001600014000120001100010000Investment in power transmission facilities86.276.667.057.552.747.9Annual electricity sales642567447080743278028190It is estimated that taking over the investment in offshore wind power transmission facilities will increase the transmission-distribution price in Guangdong Province by about 4.89 li/kWh (after tax). Referring to the current transmission and distribution electricity price of 0.23 yuan/kWh in Guangdong (the general industrial and commercial electricity price of less than 1 kV in the five cities of the Pearl River Delta), the specific weight of the increase is up to 2.1%, almost half of the 5% reduction in industrial and commercial electricity price by policy in 2020.If all else remains the same and the investment in the power transmission section is split half and half between the power grid and the offshore wind power developers, this will increase the transmission-distribution price in Guangdong Province by around 2.45 li/kWh (after tax), reducing the proportion to 1.1%.


### 4.2. Subsidy Calculation

If local subsidies take over from national subsidies, what is the exact amount of subsidies in each province? How much pressure will the subsidies put on local finances? After calculations, we know that in 2025 the total amount of local subsidies is basically below 1 billion yuan; at this time, the provinces basically have the grid parity ability of offshore wind power. Specific calculations are as follows.First, calculate the amount of kWh subsidies of each province from 2022 to 2025. Considering the law that the wind power price has decreased by 0.05 yuan/kWh every year over the years and that there is still a large room for the decline of the price in 2021, based on the offshore wind power kWh price of 0.75 yuan in 2020, it is expected that the offshore wind power guide price will be 0.70 yuan, 0.65 yuan, 0.60 yuan, 0.55 yuan, and 0.50 yuan per kWh from 2021 to 2025. Meanwhile, the on-grid price of future offshore wind power projects will be determined through competition. Combined with the statistical law that the declared price of competitive configuration in Shandong, Liaoning, Zhejiang, and Shanghai in 2019 is generally lower than the guide price by 0.01–0.02 yuan and comprehensively considering factors such as accelerated technological progress, it is estimated that the bid winning price of offshore wind power in all provinces in 2021–2025 will be 0.69 yuan, 0.63 yuan, 0.57 yuan, 0.51 yuan, and 0.45 yuan per kWh. The annual power subsidies for offshore wind power in all provinces from 2022 to 2025 are shown in Table3.Table 3
Estimation of subsidy amount of offshore wind power per kilowatt-hour of each province from 2022 to 2025 (yuan/kWh).
ProvinceGuide price/average bid priceBenchmark electricity price (benchmark coal electricity price)kWh subsidyParticular year202220232024202520202022202320242025Guangdong0.630.570.510.450.4530.160.100.050.00Jiangsu0.630.570.510.450.3910.210.160.110.05Fujian0.630.570.510.450.39320.210.160.100.05Shanghai0.630.570.510.450.41550.190.140.080.03Zhejiang0.630.570.510.450.38530.220.160.110.06Shandong0.630.570.510.450.39490.210.150.100.05Liaoning0.630.570.510.450.37490.230.170.120.07Hebei0.630.570.510.450.3720.230.180.120.07The second is to calculate the subsidized electricity demand of each province from 2022 to 2025. The subsidized electricity demand of each province from 2022 to 2025 is shown in Table4.Table 4
On-grid power to be subsidized for offshore wind power in all provinces from 2022 to 2025. Unit: million kilowatts, hours, and billion kilowatt-hours.
ProvinceCumulative installed capacityEquivalent utilization hoursCumulative on-grid power to be subsidized20222023202420252022–20252022202320242025Guangdong14681947242629052550374497619741Jiangsu11851441169719532650314382450517Fujian300396491587310093123152182Shanghai54586266250013141516Zhejiang2162793424062500547086101Shandong7296120144255018243137Liaoning102126150174257526323945Hebei7296120144232517222833Total3468443854086378—910116414191673The third is to calculate the total amount of local financial subsidies required by each province from 2022 to 2025 and its proportion in the general public budget revenue of each province, as shown in Table5. The general public budget revenue of each province is calculated based on the data of 2019 and the average annual growth of 5%. The calculation results show that, except for Jiangsu and Fujian, the financial burden of local subsidies and national subsidies is not heavy, and they are decreasing year by year, and the proportion of subsidies in Jiangsu and Fujian can also be accepted. The high proportion of subsidies in Jiangsu and Fujian is mainly due to the large base of cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind power, considerable new scale in the future, and low local coal-fired benchmark electricity price. Guangdong will no longer need subsidies in 2025.Table 5
Weight of index system.
Grid connection benefits0.4786Electricity sales0.3482Electricity sales price0.3553Line loss rate0.2965Economic performance0.5214Asset liability ratio0.4336Return on net assets0.3595Increased sales of electricity per unit investment0.2069


### 4.3. Benefit Development Evaluation of Offshore Wind Power after the Cancellation of Public Subsidies

Through literature reference and other means, the development evaluation index of the benefits of cancelling the national subsidy for offshore wind power is determined, as shown in Figure3.Figure 3
Benefit development evaluation index of offshore wind power.The comprehensive weight of each index is determined according to the method of AHP inviting experts to score the index system. The weight results are shown in Table5.Five experts were invited to prejudge and evaluate the development of offshore wind power benefits in the eight provinces after the cancellation of national subsidies and conduct a comprehensive analysis based on the model in Figure3 to obtain the final scores of the eight provinces. The scoring results are shown in Table 6. The comprehensive score cloud chart is shown in Figure 4.Table 6
Comprehensive score of benefit development of offshore wind power.
ProvinceGuangdongJiangsuFujianShanghaiZhejiangShandongLiaoningHebeiComprehensive score(86.5351, 2.5996, 0.9891)(68.2923, 3.0081, 1.1923)(71.6293, 2.3061, 0.6913)(84.8991, 2.0891, 0.8466)(74.433, 2.5066, 0.6725)(80.2532, 3.008, 1.5621)(78.2995, 2.5612, 1.0223)(79.8996, 1.8928, 0.9881)Figure 4
Comprehensive score cloud chart of offshore wind power benefit development.It can be seen from Figure4 that, in the future, under the background of the cancellation of public subsidies, Guangdong’s offshore wind power benefits will develop best, which is consistent with the calculation results that Guangdong will no longer need subsidies in 2025. The development of Shanghai and Shandong provinces is good. However, due to the high proportion of offshore wind power in Fujian and Jiangsu provinces, the cancellation of subsidies has a great impact on the development of offshore wind power. The benefit development of offshore wind power in Zhejiang, Liaoning, and Hebei provinces is at a medium level, and the cancellation of public subsidies has little impact on it.


## 4.1. Accounting for Transmission and Distribution Prices

The offshore wind power transmission facilities section refers to the offshore booster station as the boundary, and the offshore booster station, transmission cable, and onshore centralized control station are constructed by the power grid enterprise, excluding the offshore cables [35].The cost of offshore wind power transmission facility section accounts for about 8%–12% of the total cost of offshore wind power, calculated as 10%. The unit cost level of new installed capacity in a typical province from 2020 to 2025 and the sales power from 2021 to 2025 are shown in Table2. The rate of return on investment of offshore wind power project is calculated as 6.5%.Table 2
Some input parameters for calculating the impact of investment in offshore wind power transmission section on transmission and distribution price. Unit: ten thousand kilowatts, yuan/kilowatt, one hundred million yuan, and one hundred million kilowatts.
Particular year202020212022202320242025Annual new scale478.8478.8478.8478.8478.8478.8Unit cost level180001600014000120001100010000Investment in power transmission facilities86.276.667.057.552.747.9Annual electricity sales642567447080743278028190It is estimated that taking over the investment in offshore wind power transmission facilities will increase the transmission-distribution price in Guangdong Province by about 4.89 li/kWh (after tax). Referring to the current transmission and distribution electricity price of 0.23 yuan/kWh in Guangdong (the general industrial and commercial electricity price of less than 1 kV in the five cities of the Pearl River Delta), the specific weight of the increase is up to 2.1%, almost half of the 5% reduction in industrial and commercial electricity price by policy in 2020.If all else remains the same and the investment in the power transmission section is split half and half between the power grid and the offshore wind power developers, this will increase the transmission-distribution price in Guangdong Province by around 2.45 li/kWh (after tax), reducing the proportion to 1.1%.


## 4.2. Subsidy Calculation

If local subsidies take over from national subsidies, what is the exact amount of subsidies in each province? How much pressure will the subsidies put on local finances? After calculations, we know that in 2025 the total amount of local subsidies is basically below 1 billion yuan; at this time, the provinces basically have the grid parity ability of offshore wind power. Specific calculations are as follows.First, calculate the amount of kWh subsidies of each province from 2022 to 2025. Considering the law that the wind power price has decreased by 0.05 yuan/kWh every year over the years and that there is still a large room for the decline of the price in 2021, based on the offshore wind power kWh price of 0.75 yuan in 2020, it is expected that the offshore wind power guide price will be 0.70 yuan, 0.65 yuan, 0.60 yuan, 0.55 yuan, and 0.50 yuan per kWh from 2021 to 2025. Meanwhile, the on-grid price of future offshore wind power projects will be determined through competition. Combined with the statistical law that the declared price of competitive configuration in Shandong, Liaoning, Zhejiang, and Shanghai in 2019 is generally lower than the guide price by 0.01–0.02 yuan and comprehensively considering factors such as accelerated technological progress, it is estimated that the bid winning price of offshore wind power in all provinces in 2021–2025 will be 0.69 yuan, 0.63 yuan, 0.57 yuan, 0.51 yuan, and 0.45 yuan per kWh. The annual power subsidies for offshore wind power in all provinces from 2022 to 2025 are shown in Table3.Table 3
Estimation of subsidy amount of offshore wind power per kilowatt-hour of each province from 2022 to 2025 (yuan/kWh).
ProvinceGuide price/average bid priceBenchmark electricity price (benchmark coal electricity price)kWh subsidyParticular year202220232024202520202022202320242025Guangdong0.630.570.510.450.4530.160.100.050.00Jiangsu0.630.570.510.450.3910.210.160.110.05Fujian0.630.570.510.450.39320.210.160.100.05Shanghai0.630.570.510.450.41550.190.140.080.03Zhejiang0.630.570.510.450.38530.220.160.110.06Shandong0.630.570.510.450.39490.210.150.100.05Liaoning0.630.570.510.450.37490.230.170.120.07Hebei0.630.570.510.450.3720.230.180.120.07The second is to calculate the subsidized electricity demand of each province from 2022 to 2025. The subsidized electricity demand of each province from 2022 to 2025 is shown in Table4.Table 4
On-grid power to be subsidized for offshore wind power in all provinces from 2022 to 2025. Unit: million kilowatts, hours, and billion kilowatt-hours.
ProvinceCumulative installed capacityEquivalent utilization hoursCumulative on-grid power to be subsidized20222023202420252022–20252022202320242025Guangdong14681947242629052550374497619741Jiangsu11851441169719532650314382450517Fujian300396491587310093123152182Shanghai54586266250013141516Zhejiang2162793424062500547086101Shandong7296120144255018243137Liaoning102126150174257526323945Hebei7296120144232517222833Total3468443854086378—910116414191673The third is to calculate the total amount of local financial subsidies required by each province from 2022 to 2025 and its proportion in the general public budget revenue of each province, as shown in Table5. The general public budget revenue of each province is calculated based on the data of 2019 and the average annual growth of 5%. The calculation results show that, except for Jiangsu and Fujian, the financial burden of local subsidies and national subsidies is not heavy, and they are decreasing year by year, and the proportion of subsidies in Jiangsu and Fujian can also be accepted. The high proportion of subsidies in Jiangsu and Fujian is mainly due to the large base of cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind power, considerable new scale in the future, and low local coal-fired benchmark electricity price. Guangdong will no longer need subsidies in 2025.Table 5
Weight of index system.
Grid connection benefits0.4786Electricity sales0.3482Electricity sales price0.3553Line loss rate0.2965Economic performance0.5214Asset liability ratio0.4336Return on net assets0.3595Increased sales of electricity per unit investment0.2069


## 4.3. Benefit Development Evaluation of Offshore Wind Power after the Cancellation of Public Subsidies

Through literature reference and other means, the development evaluation index of the benefits of cancelling the national subsidy for offshore wind power is determined, as shown in Figure3.Figure 3
Benefit development evaluation index of offshore wind power.The comprehensive weight of each index is determined according to the method of AHP inviting experts to score the index system. The weight results are shown in Table5.Five experts were invited to prejudge and evaluate the development of offshore wind power benefits in the eight provinces after the cancellation of national subsidies and conduct a comprehensive analysis based on the model in Figure3 to obtain the final scores of the eight provinces. The scoring results are shown in Table 6. The comprehensive score cloud chart is shown in Figure 4.Table 6
Comprehensive score of benefit development of offshore wind power.
ProvinceGuangdongJiangsuFujianShanghaiZhejiangShandongLiaoningHebeiComprehensive score(86.5351, 2.5996, 0.9891)(68.2923, 3.0081, 1.1923)(71.6293, 2.3061, 0.6913)(84.8991, 2.0891, 0.8466)(74.433, 2.5066, 0.6725)(80.2532, 3.008, 1.5621)(78.2995, 2.5612, 1.0223)(79.8996, 1.8928, 0.9881)Figure 4
Comprehensive score cloud chart of offshore wind power benefit development.It can be seen from Figure4 that, in the future, under the background of the cancellation of public subsidies, Guangdong’s offshore wind power benefits will develop best, which is consistent with the calculation results that Guangdong will no longer need subsidies in 2025. The development of Shanghai and Shandong provinces is good. However, due to the high proportion of offshore wind power in Fujian and Jiangsu provinces, the cancellation of subsidies has a great impact on the development of offshore wind power. The benefit development of offshore wind power in Zhejiang, Liaoning, and Hebei provinces is at a medium level, and the cancellation of public subsidies has little impact on it.


## 5. Research on Development Strategy of Offshore Wind Power

The following four aspects will help offshore wind power to accelerate the realization of subsidy-free and sustainable development:(1)
The main participants guide and implement the large-scale development and construction of offshore wind power.The experience of onshore wind power development shows that large-scale centralized development is an important way to reduce the unit cost of offshore wind power and realize subsidized and affordable access to the Internet. In order to improve the large-scale effect of offshore wind power, the government should encourage, support, and guide the large-scale development of offshore wind power, such as leading and promoting the development and management of large-scale continuous resources. Offshore wind power developers, wind turbine manufacturers, and construction enterprises should integrate resources and reduce construction costs by means of sharing and joint development, just like the construction and hoisting among different wind power developers in the same wind power base.(2)
The government takes multiple measures to reduce nontechnical costs and help accelerate the parity of offshore wind power.The land subsidy will continue until 2025. The offshore wind power projects in all provinces can basically have the ability to access the Internet at parity, and the subsidy pressure is decreasing every year. At the same time, the government formulated a more reasonable “14th five-year plan” for offshore wind power development, strengthened the hard binding force of scale in the plan, and reasonably controlled the timing and rhythm of offshore wind power development. In addition, we should properly solve the problem of underpayment of new energy enterprises. Finally, before the grid connection node, the transmission line construction of offshore wind power projects connected to the grid in 2020–2021 shall be given priority, and a green channel shall be established for rapid approval and priority construction.(3)
Wind turbine manufacturing enterprises should improve the life cycle management capability of offshore wind power and pay close attention to breaking through the bottleneck technology.Wind turbine manufacturing enterprises should continue to consolidate the foundation, establish a full life cycle management concept for wind turbines, focus on improving the independent manufacturing capabilities of wind turbines, complete wind turbine operation and maintenance systems, and strengthen wind turbine decommissioning capabilities.(4)
Power grid enterprises need policy support to participate in investment.Power grid enterprises can give play to their main business advantages and reasonably share the investment in offshore wind power transmission facilities, but they need to separately approve the investment scale and increase the transmission and distribution price. Moreover, it is more reasonable for grid companies and developers to jointly undertake the investment in the power transmission section, which can minimize the impact of supporting policies on the price increase of transmission and distribution.


## 6. Conclusion

This paper summarizes the core policies related to offshore wind power and analyzes the impact of the cancellation of state subsidies on wind turbine manufacturers, developers, local governments, and power grid enterprises. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward targeted strategies on how to accelerate the realization of offshore wind power to get rid of subsidies and sustainable development. The details are as follows:(1)
At present, wind turbine manufacturing enterprises are facing great uncertainty; there is a two-way default risk, and they will face the problem of overcapacity after the rush installation. At the same time, it may become the actual buyer in the era of offshore wind power parity, and the development environment is getting worse. Developers will have higher construction costs before the end of the rush installation time, but they are guaranteed to be able to accept high electricity prices. After the end of the rush to install, the market’s bargaining power has improved, with the ability to pass on risks, and the overall operating pressure is lower than that of wind turbine manufacturers.(2)
It is basically feasible for local subsidies to continue the state subsidies, and the burden is decreasing year by year, so the subsidies should be relayed.(3)
It is more reasonable for the grid company and the developer to jointly undertake the investment in the power transmission section.(4)
The analysis shows that wind power on the sea should try its best to reduce the cost in order to accelerate the realization of getting rid of subsidies and sustainable development. At the same time, it can gradually improve the life cycle management ability of offshore wind turbine and reasonably control the timing and rhythm of offshore wind power investment. In addition, measures such as appropriately relaxing grid connection nodes, relaying local subsidies to national subsidies, and properly solving the gradually heavy subsidy arrears burden of new energy development enterprises also contribute to the sustainable development of offshore wind power.



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*Source: 6804943-2022-04-26.xml*