# Analysis of e-Commerce Characteristics Based on Edge Algorithm and COX Model

Authors: Jinzhong Zuo
Journal: Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
 (2021)

---

## Abstract

With the rapid development of C2C (consumer to consumer) e-commerce transactions in China, the problem of information asymmetry in C2C e-commerce transactions is becoming more and more obvious. This paper analyzes the specific performance and influence of information asymmetry in C2C e-commerce transactions and then proposes a strategy to eliminate information asymmetry in C2C e-commerce transactions. Based on the perspective of information asymmetry, C2C e-commerce is taken as the research object, and the research methods such as literature analysis method, qualitative analysis method, and case analysis method are comprehensively used to explore the C2C e-commerce supervision problem in China under the information asymmetry environment. The reason and countermeasures. Secondly, it analyzes the e-commerce government supervision theory in detail and studies the definition, content, and principle of e-commerce government supervision, the necessity of e-commerce government supervision, and the main forms of e-commerce government supervision in China. The status of China’s e-commerce supervision is elaborated, including the question of “who is going to supervise,” “who is supervising,” and “how to supervise.” Aiming at the problems of imperfect legal system in China’s e-commerce supervision, lack of cross-departmental coordination mechanism, and difficulty in investigation and evidence collection of e-commerce illegal behavior, we put forward targeted and operational policy recommendations.


---

## Body

## 1. Introduction

With the development and progress of society, human beings have entered the era of e-commerce, which has changed the traditional business model and improved the level of information management, playing an irreplaceable positive role in China’s economic development. Based on this, it is very necessary to promote the progress of the e-commerce era. In-depth understanding of the actual situation of e-commerce operation found that information management and information systems have a greater impact on e-commerce. Therefore, in order to adapt to the development needs of the e-commerce era, it is very meaningful to strengthen the information management and information system construction.e-Commerce refers to various business activities carried out by means of servers and browsers in the context of the current network environment, so that merchants and consumers can realize online transactions and directly realize shopping and transactions through electronic payment and the like. Compared to traditional business, e-commerce is a new service that combines financial, transaction, and business activities.According to the transaction object of e-commerce, e-commerce can be divided into the following categories: The first category is enterprise-to-business e-commerce (business to business, referred to as “B2B”). It refers to the way in which enterprises conduct transactions through e-commerce, and the sales method relative to B2C is business to customer. For example, a factory that sells disposable tableware, if its main shipment target is a restaurant, this is the B2B model, where the restaurant provides disposable tableware to the user, and the restaurant-to-user model is focused on B2C/B2B [1]: the establishment of an interenterprise network and the stability of the supply chain system. B2C needs to rely on economies of scale to attract purchases and lower prices to increase profits. B2B does not rely on scale, but relies on the establishment of an interenterprise network to stabilize its sales. The second category is business to consumer e-commerce (business to customer, referred to as “B2C”). This form of e-commerce is generally based on the online retail industry, mainly through the network to carry out online sales activities, and is an electronic retail model. The B2C model is the earliest e-commerce model in China. The third category is consumer-to-consumer e-commerce (customer to customer, referred to as “C2C”). It means e-commerce behavior among consumers. For example, a consumer has a computer, trades through the network, and sells it to another consumer. This type of transaction is called C2C e-commerce. The fourth category is business to government (B2G). It is an e-commerce activity between enterprises and enterprises and government agencies. For example, some local governments in China are currently experimenting with online procurement. The government publishes the purchase list through the Internet and conducts bidding through online bidding. Enterprises and companies bid through electronic means and finally complete the government procurement task electronically [2].The rest of this paper is organized as follows. “Characteristics of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce” introduces the information asymmetry characteristics of C2C e-commerce, followed by the game analysis of e-commerce regulation designed in “Public Policy of e-Commerce Supervision in China,” the information asymmetry strategy analysis is discussed in “Eliminate the Strategy of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce Transactions,” and “Conclusion” concludes the paper with summary and future research directions.


## 2. Characteristics of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce

### 2.1. Information Asymmetry Performance

Although the state has relevant regulations, the opening of an electronic store must go to the industrial and commercial department for registration, but in practice, this provision is ineffective. No matter who you are, if you want to do online retail, you do not have to go to the industrial and commercial department to register. You can log in to any C2C e-commerce website and provide relevant information and documents for online application. You can open the store free of charge on the C2C e-commerce website. Operating, arrange the storefront as long as you choose the template provided by the website. The displayed products are all displayed by pictures. The sales of the products are managed automatically by the ready-made software. This means that you can open a C2C e-commerce website with a little time, an all-encompassing super department store. Since the cost of input is almost zero, the opening of the C2C electronic store is like a child’s play. When do you want to open it, and when do you want to turn it off? When the switch is completely closed, the switch does not need to be considered. Because of this, the credibility and business status of a C2C electronic store is only clear to the merchants themselves, and it is difficult for consumers to obtain relevant information. Consumers are at a serious information disadvantage compared to merchants [3]. e-Commerce construction has been transformed from an industry to include financial cooperation between governments, enterprises, and other industries and institutions, as shown in Figure 1.Figure 1
e-Commerce system structure.In C2C e-commerce transactions, consumers and merchants are engaged in real transactions in a virtual environment without encountering them. Consumers cannot see real merchandise, and the understanding of merchandise depends entirely on the images and text on the web. The pictures and texts of these related products are provided by the merchants themselves, the authenticity of the pictures and texts, and the closeness of the products [4].Of course, only the business itself knows the degree well, but consumers do not know. Obviously, in the C2C e-commerce transaction, for the quality of goods, the merchant has all the information of the goods and is in an absolute information advantage; the consumer has no knowledge of the situation of the goods and is in a complete information disadvantage. The information on the quality of goods between consumers and businesses is seriously asymmetrical. The characteristics of e-commerce market are summarized in Table1.Table 1
Market characteristics of e-commerce.
Complete competitionMonopolistic competitionOligopolyComplete monopolye-Commerce marketVendor numberMassMassFewOnlyA lot ofCompleteness of informationComplete informationIncomplete informationIncomplete informationIncomplete informationPrice information is variable, quality is relatively poorEnter conditionFree entryFree entryEntry barriers are high and barriers to entry are extremely highEntry barrierLow barrierProduct homogeneityHomogeneousDifferentiationHomogeneous or differentiatedNo similar alternativesDifferentiation


### 2.2. Impact of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce Transactions

#### 2.2.1. Damage to the Interests of Consumers

Since C2C e-commerce transactions are conducted under a virtual network environment, consumers and businesses do not meet each other. Consumers’ understanding of products depends entirely on the pictures and captions displayed by the merchants on the web page. Because the merchants open a C2C e-commerce store, there is almost no need to invest any cost. Therefore, in the case of severe information asymmetry, the merchant may publish false information on the web page for the purpose of maximizing profits, exaggerating the performance of the commodity, and inducing consumption. In the decision to make a purchase, although some C2C e-commerce websites have provisions for returning goods, because these businesses are the parents of C2C e-commerce websites, C2C e-commerce websites are mostly biased towards “parents” in order to not offend “parents” [5]. In one party, after the consumer finds that he has been defrauded, if he wants to return the goods, he must first negotiate with the merchant to see if the merchant is willing to return, how much money to return, and who will bear the logistics cost of returning the goods. Obviously, in the process of negotiating with the merchant, the consumer is in negotiation. In inferior position, if the negotiation fails, the consumer must complain to the C2C e-commerce website and must provide the identification certificate of the relevant institution, and the appraisal organization must pay the time and money for the appraisal of the goods. If consumers want to take the road of legal rights protection, due to the lack of supervision of online business and the gaps in e-commerce laws, and the litigation costs often far exceed the value of goods purchased by consumers, these issues make legal rights. It has become a kind of “expectation” [6].


#### 2.2.2. Increase Transaction Costs

Because the merchant will conceal the defect of the product and exaggerate the performance of the product, the consumer does not dare to easily believe the description of the product on the web page. In order to protect their legitimate rights and interests and avoid being deceived, consumers must learn more about the goods, which requires a lot of time, energy, and financial resources to collect information. In this way, regardless of whether the final transaction is successful or not, the consumer has already invested in the cost of the time, effort, and financial resources used to collect the product information before the transaction. The cost of unwarranted consumers due to information asymmetry seriously damages the interests of consumers and reduces the efficiency of transactions in the C2C e-commerce market [7].


#### 2.2.3. Initiating “Reverse Selection”

Because, in the C2C e-commerce transaction process, the information between the consumer and the merchant is seriously asymmetrical, the merchant knows the true quality of the product, and the consumer does not know the true quality of the product. Therefore, in the case where the quality of the product cannot be confirmed, consumers are only willing to buy goods at low prices for the purpose of protecting their own interests from loss, while high-quality goods are unattended because of higher prices than inferior goods. In order to obtain the corresponding profits, the merchants who manage high-quality goods will certainly cater to the low-cost choices of consumers and operate inferior commodities. In the end, the inferior goods will flood the C2C e-commerce market and form a situation of “inferior goods expelling good goods,” resulting in inefficient market. The interests of consumers and businesses are undermined [8].


## 2.1. Information Asymmetry Performance

Although the state has relevant regulations, the opening of an electronic store must go to the industrial and commercial department for registration, but in practice, this provision is ineffective. No matter who you are, if you want to do online retail, you do not have to go to the industrial and commercial department to register. You can log in to any C2C e-commerce website and provide relevant information and documents for online application. You can open the store free of charge on the C2C e-commerce website. Operating, arrange the storefront as long as you choose the template provided by the website. The displayed products are all displayed by pictures. The sales of the products are managed automatically by the ready-made software. This means that you can open a C2C e-commerce website with a little time, an all-encompassing super department store. Since the cost of input is almost zero, the opening of the C2C electronic store is like a child’s play. When do you want to open it, and when do you want to turn it off? When the switch is completely closed, the switch does not need to be considered. Because of this, the credibility and business status of a C2C electronic store is only clear to the merchants themselves, and it is difficult for consumers to obtain relevant information. Consumers are at a serious information disadvantage compared to merchants [3]. e-Commerce construction has been transformed from an industry to include financial cooperation between governments, enterprises, and other industries and institutions, as shown in Figure 1.Figure 1
e-Commerce system structure.In C2C e-commerce transactions, consumers and merchants are engaged in real transactions in a virtual environment without encountering them. Consumers cannot see real merchandise, and the understanding of merchandise depends entirely on the images and text on the web. The pictures and texts of these related products are provided by the merchants themselves, the authenticity of the pictures and texts, and the closeness of the products [4].Of course, only the business itself knows the degree well, but consumers do not know. Obviously, in the C2C e-commerce transaction, for the quality of goods, the merchant has all the information of the goods and is in an absolute information advantage; the consumer has no knowledge of the situation of the goods and is in a complete information disadvantage. The information on the quality of goods between consumers and businesses is seriously asymmetrical. The characteristics of e-commerce market are summarized in Table1.Table 1
Market characteristics of e-commerce.
Complete competitionMonopolistic competitionOligopolyComplete monopolye-Commerce marketVendor numberMassMassFewOnlyA lot ofCompleteness of informationComplete informationIncomplete informationIncomplete informationIncomplete informationPrice information is variable, quality is relatively poorEnter conditionFree entryFree entryEntry barriers are high and barriers to entry are extremely highEntry barrierLow barrierProduct homogeneityHomogeneousDifferentiationHomogeneous or differentiatedNo similar alternativesDifferentiation


## 2.2. Impact of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce Transactions

### 2.2.1. Damage to the Interests of Consumers

Since C2C e-commerce transactions are conducted under a virtual network environment, consumers and businesses do not meet each other. Consumers’ understanding of products depends entirely on the pictures and captions displayed by the merchants on the web page. Because the merchants open a C2C e-commerce store, there is almost no need to invest any cost. Therefore, in the case of severe information asymmetry, the merchant may publish false information on the web page for the purpose of maximizing profits, exaggerating the performance of the commodity, and inducing consumption. In the decision to make a purchase, although some C2C e-commerce websites have provisions for returning goods, because these businesses are the parents of C2C e-commerce websites, C2C e-commerce websites are mostly biased towards “parents” in order to not offend “parents” [5]. In one party, after the consumer finds that he has been defrauded, if he wants to return the goods, he must first negotiate with the merchant to see if the merchant is willing to return, how much money to return, and who will bear the logistics cost of returning the goods. Obviously, in the process of negotiating with the merchant, the consumer is in negotiation. In inferior position, if the negotiation fails, the consumer must complain to the C2C e-commerce website and must provide the identification certificate of the relevant institution, and the appraisal organization must pay the time and money for the appraisal of the goods. If consumers want to take the road of legal rights protection, due to the lack of supervision of online business and the gaps in e-commerce laws, and the litigation costs often far exceed the value of goods purchased by consumers, these issues make legal rights. It has become a kind of “expectation” [6].


### 2.2.2. Increase Transaction Costs

Because the merchant will conceal the defect of the product and exaggerate the performance of the product, the consumer does not dare to easily believe the description of the product on the web page. In order to protect their legitimate rights and interests and avoid being deceived, consumers must learn more about the goods, which requires a lot of time, energy, and financial resources to collect information. In this way, regardless of whether the final transaction is successful or not, the consumer has already invested in the cost of the time, effort, and financial resources used to collect the product information before the transaction. The cost of unwarranted consumers due to information asymmetry seriously damages the interests of consumers and reduces the efficiency of transactions in the C2C e-commerce market [7].


### 2.2.3. Initiating “Reverse Selection”

Because, in the C2C e-commerce transaction process, the information between the consumer and the merchant is seriously asymmetrical, the merchant knows the true quality of the product, and the consumer does not know the true quality of the product. Therefore, in the case where the quality of the product cannot be confirmed, consumers are only willing to buy goods at low prices for the purpose of protecting their own interests from loss, while high-quality goods are unattended because of higher prices than inferior goods. In order to obtain the corresponding profits, the merchants who manage high-quality goods will certainly cater to the low-cost choices of consumers and operate inferior commodities. In the end, the inferior goods will flood the C2C e-commerce market and form a situation of “inferior goods expelling good goods,” resulting in inefficient market. The interests of consumers and businesses are undermined [8].


## 2.2.1. Damage to the Interests of Consumers

Since C2C e-commerce transactions are conducted under a virtual network environment, consumers and businesses do not meet each other. Consumers’ understanding of products depends entirely on the pictures and captions displayed by the merchants on the web page. Because the merchants open a C2C e-commerce store, there is almost no need to invest any cost. Therefore, in the case of severe information asymmetry, the merchant may publish false information on the web page for the purpose of maximizing profits, exaggerating the performance of the commodity, and inducing consumption. In the decision to make a purchase, although some C2C e-commerce websites have provisions for returning goods, because these businesses are the parents of C2C e-commerce websites, C2C e-commerce websites are mostly biased towards “parents” in order to not offend “parents” [5]. In one party, after the consumer finds that he has been defrauded, if he wants to return the goods, he must first negotiate with the merchant to see if the merchant is willing to return, how much money to return, and who will bear the logistics cost of returning the goods. Obviously, in the process of negotiating with the merchant, the consumer is in negotiation. In inferior position, if the negotiation fails, the consumer must complain to the C2C e-commerce website and must provide the identification certificate of the relevant institution, and the appraisal organization must pay the time and money for the appraisal of the goods. If consumers want to take the road of legal rights protection, due to the lack of supervision of online business and the gaps in e-commerce laws, and the litigation costs often far exceed the value of goods purchased by consumers, these issues make legal rights. It has become a kind of “expectation” [6].


## 2.2.2. Increase Transaction Costs

Because the merchant will conceal the defect of the product and exaggerate the performance of the product, the consumer does not dare to easily believe the description of the product on the web page. In order to protect their legitimate rights and interests and avoid being deceived, consumers must learn more about the goods, which requires a lot of time, energy, and financial resources to collect information. In this way, regardless of whether the final transaction is successful or not, the consumer has already invested in the cost of the time, effort, and financial resources used to collect the product information before the transaction. The cost of unwarranted consumers due to information asymmetry seriously damages the interests of consumers and reduces the efficiency of transactions in the C2C e-commerce market [7].


## 2.2.3. Initiating “Reverse Selection”

Because, in the C2C e-commerce transaction process, the information between the consumer and the merchant is seriously asymmetrical, the merchant knows the true quality of the product, and the consumer does not know the true quality of the product. Therefore, in the case where the quality of the product cannot be confirmed, consumers are only willing to buy goods at low prices for the purpose of protecting their own interests from loss, while high-quality goods are unattended because of higher prices than inferior goods. In order to obtain the corresponding profits, the merchants who manage high-quality goods will certainly cater to the low-cost choices of consumers and operate inferior commodities. In the end, the inferior goods will flood the C2C e-commerce market and form a situation of “inferior goods expelling good goods,” resulting in inefficient market. The interests of consumers and businesses are undermined [8].


## 3. Public Policy of e-Commerce Supervision in China

According to the “China e-Commerce Report” published by the Ministry of Commerce, the amount of e-commerce transactions in the mainland in 2013 exceeded 10 trillion yuan (RMB, the same below), reaching 10.28 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 26.8%. The transaction volume of e-commerce enterprises is shown in Figures2 and 3.Figure 2
Changes in the total amount and trend of e-commerce transactions in China from 2004 to 2013.Figure 3
2005-2014 C2C network retail transaction amount map.


### 3.1. Difficulties in China’s C2C e-Commerce Tax Collection and Management

#### 3.1.1. The Scale of Collection and Management Is Huge and Lacks Legal Basis

C2C is actually a professional term for e-commerce, which refers to the e-commerce between individuals, where C refers to consumer, which is abbreviated to C because the English word for consumer is customer (consumer), and C to C is abbreviated to C2C because the pronunciation of 2 in English is the same as to. C2C is customer to customer. Since 2008, the individual merchants in China’s C2C e-commerce have shown a spurt of development, mainly in the scale and quantity of transactions, both of which have significantly improved. As of December 2015, according to relevant data, there are 418 million online payment users, and this growth momentum will not continue to grow. Although we have entered the era of big data and the efficiency of processing tax-related information has been significantly improved, the data is too large to avoid omissions, and the situation is relatively complicated in the actual tax collection and management, relying on the information in China’s current tax system. Management ability and resource status are difficult to monitor taxation one by one [9].


#### 3.1.2. The Elements of the Collection and Management Are Difficult to Determine

It is difficult to determine the object of collection and the taxpayer. C2C e-commerce transactions include all kinds of physical goods and labor services, which can be described as all-encompassing. The reason why C2C e-commerce levy objects are difficult to be divided into different categories is that both parties to the transaction are individuals, regardless of the transaction method, payment method, or transaction procedure, and its flexibility is far more than traditional business or B2B, B2C e-commerce, considering that the scope and scale of business between individual merchants are also very different, and the business content of C2C e-commerce is also different, so it is necessary to manage these C2C e-commerce businesses with different sizes and simple business scope. The main body sets the standard and then divides the object of collection into a huge project. The biggest characteristic of this business model is that the transaction information is transmitted through the network. Some individual merchants adopt electronic encryption technology in order to avoid the taxation department’s collection and management. The flexibility of the merchants in C2C e-commerce makes the taxation department difficult to determine the object of collection [10].


#### 3.1.3. Tax Location Is Difficult to Determine

Taxation locations are directly related to taxation issues. There are two main theories about the taxation supervision of C2C e-commerce. One is the theory of regional jurisdiction. This theory is mainly based on the registration place of the online store in real life, the place where the business activity takes place, the place where the buyer consumes the action, or the location of the server. In attributable tax department, however, this theoretical division is not rigorous enough. The scope of the online store’s business activities is very limited, and the place where the activity takes place can be changed frequently. To a large extent, there is a complete overlap with the tax jurisdiction of the industrial and commercial registration place. The other is the theory of unified jurisdiction. The central government uniformly uses electronic taxation to supervise all online store taxation in China’s internet trading platform and has set up a new electronic taxation department to monitor and manage the online stores of e-commerce platforms. Although the concept of this theory is relatively good, it can greatly reduce the probability of tax evasion and tax evasion. However, in China’s overlarge market, the establishment of a unified model consumes relatively large resources, and local taxes are incorporated into the central taxation. In line with China’s national conditions, it must be modified on the basis of this theory before it can be applied to practical operations. C2C e-commerce belongs to the new field. It is still necessary to think deeply about applying the current tax system to e-commerce and taxing it [11].


### 3.2. Performance of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce Tax Collection and Management

There is also information asymmetry in the traditional tax collection and management, but due to the characteristics of CZC e-commerce and the limitation of technological development level, it is more obvious in the C2C e-commerce tax collection and management. The performance of information asymmetry in C2C e-commerce can be refined to all aspects, between the government and the tax authorities, between the tax authorities, between tax collectors and taxpayers, etc., but the most important and most difficult to solve is the acquisition. The information is asymmetrical between the two parties.


#### 3.2.1. Asymmetry of Taxpayer Tax Information

In the substantive sense, tax collection and management are the management process for the collection, processing, processing, and application of tax information. The broad tax information refers to all kinds of information, data, news, and intelligence about tax economic behavior, status, and effects. In this paper, tax information refers to the narrowly defined tax information, that is, the information required by the tax authorities to implement tax collection and management, including taxpayer basic information and taxpayer business information. The basic information of the taxpayer refers to the taxpayer’s identity (type, identification number, and name), taxation location, bank account number, and contact telephone number, and the taxpayer’s business information refers to sales, fund collection and payment, procurement, inventory, expenses, and other information [12].The asymmetry of the taxpayer’s tax information means that the taxpayer does not disclose the private information he owns, which makes the tax authorities and taxpayers have a gap in understanding the taxation-related situation and form an information asymmetry. In fact, many tax information is generated in the specific transaction process of e-commerce, so it is possible to study the tax information in e-commerce tax collection and management by analyzing the e-commerce transaction process. The flow of e-commerce transactions and tax information transfer are shown in Figure4.Figure 4
e-Commerce transaction process and tax information transfer diagram.As can be seen from Figure4, the main body of e-commerce transactions includes buyers, sellers, banks, and network intermediaries. The taxes involved in e-commerce are mainly turnover tax and income tax, and taxpayers are usually sellers. The taxpayer has all the tax information; the buyer in the online retail generally realizes the transaction through the network intermediary, so the buyer knows the sales information but does not necessarily know the basic information of the taxpayer and the network intermediary (the third party trading platform, the third party payment platform, and the credit intermediary). As an indispensable chain in online retail e-commerce, it has basic information and business information of taxpayers, such as business flow, information flow, capital flow, and logistics, but the network platform is not an authority, and it is impossible to force users to pay taxes [13]. The tax information owned by the taxpayer is composed of information reported by the taxpayer and audit information.


#### 3.2.2. Information Asymmetry on Tax Regulations

On the one hand, some taxpayers lack the necessary understanding of relevant tax laws and regulations and procedures for fulfilling their tax obligations, and the tax authorities are in an information superior position. In recent years, the scale of online retail sales has expanded dramatically. The number of individual businesses in C2C e-commerce has greatly increased, and there are many taxpayers. Individuals often lack the habit of actively understanding tax laws. The taxpayer’s unclear knowledge and inadequate taxation by the tax authorities are likely to cause the taxpayer’s ignorant tax noncompliance, which leads to the state of taxation information asymmetry. On the other hand, some taxpayers who have studied the tax law in depth have used the tax law to blindly evade taxes, leaving the tax authorities at an information disadvantage [14]. e-Commerce is a new type of business operation. At present, the tax law legislature has not issued relevant tax policies, and the business level of tax law enforcement personnel is uneven. As a result, taxpayers who have thoroughly studied tax regulations can make full use of legal blind spots and hide true private information. Tax authorities are in a disadvantaged position when making tax returns or false declarations. The consequences of this situation are extremely serious. The taxpayer’s sense of honesty and taxation declines, and the tax noncompliance is also raised. The tax collection and management of this part of the taxpayer cannot be effectively implemented, and the seriousness of the tax law cannot be reflected [15].


### 3.3. Game Analysis

From the above, we can see that C2C e-commerce is not tax-free in China, but it has caused difficulties in the collection and management of tax authorities for various reasons. Through the use of information asymmetry and game theory, the C2C e-commerce tax collection and management model is established. C2C e-commerce tax collection and management are a category of incomplete information dynamic games. Tax authorities do not know taxpayers, and taxpayers know themselves. Through natural selection, the taxpayer acts first, and the tax authorities act accordingly. The tax authorities can observe the taxpayer’s actions and cannot observe the type, but the tax authorities can speculate on the types of taxpayers by observing their actions and then choose their own best actions. In addition, there are two inferences: there is information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities, and tax authorities are not perfect for tax audits [16].


#### 3.3.1. Model Premise Hypothesis

(1)
Taxpayers and tax authorities involved in the game are rational people, that is, they are seeking to maximize their own interests(2)
The information asymmetry between the two parties is collected, and the effectiveness of the tax authorities’ inspection is determined by the degree of information symmetry. Taxpayers have all their tax information, and the smaller the amount of information obtained by tax authorities, the higher the degree of information asymmetry, and the lower the probability of finding results. Record the degree of information asymmetry asJ,J (0, 1), and check the validity of the record e(3)
The taxable credit income isK, which is the additional income that the taxpayer can bring in the long-term legal tax payment, such as the cost brought by the tax authorities and the easier access to the bank from the bank to reduce the financing cost(4)
The taxation authority selects the audit record asα and does not check the record (1−α), the taxpayer evades the tax record as β, and pays tax according to law as 1−β; the taxpayer expects the payment level to be recorded as γ1, the tax authority expects the payment level is γ2, the taxpayer’s actual taxable income is recorded as E, the declared income is recorded as FE≥F, the tax rate is t, the penalty rate is set to m, and the taxpayer’s taxation cost increased by the tax authorities is H1, when the tax authorities inspect the time. The cost of collection and management is H2 [17].


#### 3.3.2. Game Process between Taxpayers and Tax Authorities

According to the characteristics of incomplete information dynamic game, we can summarize the game behavior of tax authorities and taxpayers as follows [18]:First, the taxpayer knows all the information about his/her income, and the taxpayer declares taxable income. The tax authorities are unaware of the taxpayer’s real income. When the tax authorities speculate that the taxpayer’s declared income is equal to the actual income, they will not choose to audit, because it can not only increase the income but also make the behavior pay more costs. When the tax authorities speculate that the income reported by the taxpayer may be lower than the actual income, it will be checked at a certain rate. In the end, the tax authorities can choose to reject or accept the amount declared by the taxpayer based on the results of the inspection [19].In this game process, the tax authorities have two decisions: the taxpayer’s report information that the tax authorities can observe and the tax authorities’ acceptance of the taxpayer’s declaration. In fact, the tax authorities are unable to monitor the actual taxable income of taxpayers, that is, each type of information is from different taxpayers. Under the condition of information asymmetry, the tax authorities are at an obvious information disadvantage [20].


#### 3.3.3. Model Solution

Taxpayer expected payment level:(1)γ1=1−βEt−K+βFt+αθt1+mE−F+αH1.The first item on the right side of the middle type indicates the tax payable by the taxpayer in the legal tax selection, the second item.The third item indicates that the taxpayer is required to pay the tax if the taxpayer evades the tax.The tax and fines, the fourth item, indicate the taxation costs incurred by the taxpayer during the inspection process by the tax authorities.Tax authorities expect the level of payment [21–23]:
(2)γ2=αH2−αβθt1+mE−F−Ft.The first item on the right side of the formula (2) indicates the cost incurred by the tax authorities for tax audits. The second item is the tax and fines that the taxpayer chooses to evade and is found to be paid. The third item is the tax paid by the taxpayer.By deriving partial biases for (1) and (2), respectively, the minimum level of expected tax payment for taxpayers and tax authorities can be obtained [24]:
(3)∂γ1∂β=K‐Et+Ft+αθt1+mE−F+αH1,∂γ2∂α=H2−βθt1+mE−F,which make ∂γ1/∂β=0,∂γ2/∂α=0.Solutions are as follows:(4)α∗=Et−Ft−Kθt1+mE−F+H1,β∗=H2θt1+mE−F.Through the above analysis, three kinds of equilibrium can be obtained.Equalization One. In order to ensure that the conditions α∗∈0,1,β∗∈0,1 need to be met
(5)βθt1+mE−F+H2≥Et−Ft−Kθt1+mE−F≥H2.Equilibrium Two. If it is available and if it can be satisfied at this time
(6)θt1+mE−F+H2≤Et−Ft−K,α∗=1;θt1+mE−F≥H2,β∗=1.Balance Three. If θt1+mE−F≥H2, θt1+mE−F+H2≤Et−Ft−K, and if you can meet it at this time, you can get α∗=0, β∗=1.


#### 3.3.4. Equilibrium Analysis of the Model

In the equilibrium one, the taxpayer evades taxes with a certain probability, and the tax authorities conduct audits from a certain probability. When the tax authorities’ inspection efficiency, fine rate, taxpayer and tax auditing costs, and taxable integrity gains are relatively high, and the tax authorities’ inspection costs are low, a balance can be achieved. At this time, the degree of information asymmetry is not high, the inspection efficiency of the tax authorities is relatively high at this time, the audit cost is relatively low, and the taxpayer’s cost of noncompliance and tax credit integrity are relatively high. This shows that the tax laws and regulations are relatively perfect in this case, the information of the two parties is relatively complete, the means of collection and management are more adequate, and the phenomenon of noncompliance with taxation is less. The traditional business model and the B2B collection and management situation are more consistent with this equilibrium. In these models, the degree of information asymmetry is relatively small. The perfect tax legal system and supervision system can effectively help the tax authorities to fully obtain taxpayer tax information and improve the tax authorities. Tax inspection and collection efficiency reduce taxpayers’ tax evasion and tax evasion. The simulation results of various models are shown in Table2.Table 2
Analysis of model results.
TaxpayerTaxation authorityInspection efficiencyFine rateTaxpayer and tax inspection costTax integrity income taxAuthority audit costResultEquilibrium oneTax evasion with a certain probabilityAuditing from a certain probabilityHighHighHighHighLow costLow degree of information asymmetryBalance 2Must choose tax evasionMust choose auditLowLowLowLowLow enoughInformation asymmetry is very highEquilibrium threeSelect a certain tax evasionChoose not to auditLowLowLowLowHighInformation asymmetry is extremely highIn the second phase of equilibrium, taxpayers must choose to evade taxes, and the tax authorities must choose to conduct audits. In this equilibrium, the taxation department’s fine rate, audit efficiency, taxpayer’s audited cost, and honest tax return are relatively low, and the tax auditing cost is also low enough. This shows that the information asymmetry is very high, the taxpayer’s noncompliance and tax credits are very low, the tax audit efficiency and cost are relatively low, taxpayers will see the risk of tax evasion is small, and the benefits are high. Taxpayers’ tax rates and tax authorities’ inspection rates are high. The situation of equilibrium two generally does not exist in real life, because the auditing costs of the tax authorities are not so low that they can benefit from auditing all taxpayers.In the third phase of equilibrium, taxpayers choose to evade taxes, and tax authorities choose not to conduct audits. In this equilibrium, the degree of information asymmetry is extremely high, and the cost of tax auditing is high. At the same time, the taxpayer’s fine rate, the cost of inspection by the tax authorities, and the integrity of tax payment are very low. At this point, the tax authorities are unable to obtain any taxpayer’s tax information, the inspection cost is very high, and the taxpayer’s tax evasion success rate is extremely high. This situation is in line with the C2C e-commerce model and is also the case of our research. Because the C2C e-commerce tax collection is seriously asymmetrical between the two parties, the tax authorities have almost no knowledge of the tax information of C2C individual businesses, and the auditing costs are relatively high. Therefore, the tax authorities often do not conduct tax collection, and the taxpayers know the tax. The authorities are unable to grasp the tax information, and the cost of tax evasion is very low. Therefore, taxpayers often choose to use online business to evade taxes, resulting in large tax noncompliance [25].In summary, information asymmetry is the main reason for the difficulty in tax collection and management of e-commerce models. The higher the degree of information asymmetry, the higher the taxpayer’s tax noncompliance, the greater the difficulty of tax collection and management, resulting in increased tax losses. Especially in China’s current C2C e-commerce, this phenomenon is very prominent. The characteristics of the C2C e-commerce model are doomed to a higher degree of information asymmetry than other models. C2C individual merchants have very low tax compliance, and tax authorities often choose to abandon the collection and management.


#### 3.3.5. Analysis and Application of cox Model

Cox Model Structural Style. This model proposed by England statistician D.R.Cox in 1972 that is mainly used in studying each kind of factor (to be called covariate) regarding the lifetime length relations carries on the multifactor analysis. Instead of directly considering the relationship between the survival function and the covariance, the risk function is used as the dependent variable, and its structure form is
(7)ht=h0texpβ1X1+β2X2+⋯+βmXm.in which h0t is the base risk rate (nonparametric part) and B=−1.329 is the regression coefficient (estimated according to the observation value).The regression coefficientβj≥0, covariable value, the higher the risk function e−1.329=0.265 value indicate the individual risk of death.When regression coefficientβj=0 is expressed, the covariance has no effect on the risk function ht.When regression coefficientβ≤0, the covariate value is bigger, the risk function ht value is smaller, and the expression individual death risk is smaller.The Basic Characteristics of Cox Model. In the case of unknown, the β in the covariance can still be estimated, so the parameter estimation method of the Cox regression model is called the partial likelihood value method.In the Cox model,h0t is not modeled, so the Cox model is also called a semiparametric model.The Cox model of the basic assumes that regardless of the baseline risk, at any point in time, the presence of an exposed individual is not present in the exposed individual events in the risk which is constant. Also, namely two groups of crowds light in any time have the event risk proportion which is constant (or explanation expose for someone in all time to have event function all are same); therefore, the Cox model is called the proportion risk model, and the corresponding covariate parameter estimation must satisfy the proportion risk supposition. The Cox model does not have the intercept, because the intercept is a part, and is cancelled in the partial likelihood value law.Cox Model Assumptions. The ratio of the risk function of any two individuals, that is, the risk ratio (HR) to maintain a constant proportion, with independent time t is as follows:
(8)HR=hithjt=expβ1Xi1−Xj1+β2Xi2−Xj2+⋯+βpXim−Xjm.The efficiency of the covariates in the model does not change with time and change and inspects some covariates whether they satisfy the PH hypothesis; the simple method is observed according to this variable grouping survival curve overlapping, and prompts do not satisfy the PH hypothesis.Cox Model Parameter Estimation. The Cox model parameter estimation needs to construct the partial likelihood function, calculated by the maximum likelihood method, and estimates the parameters of bj, and general steps of maximum likelihood estimation method are as follows:Write likelihood functionL(9)Lθ1,θ2,⋯,θn=∏i=1npxi;θ1,θ2,⋯,θn∏i=1nfxi;θ1,θ2,⋯,θn.Take the logarithm and the derivation number, obtain the stationary point, the maximum point, and make the conclusion.


## 3.1. Difficulties in China’s C2C e-Commerce Tax Collection and Management

### 3.1.1. The Scale of Collection and Management Is Huge and Lacks Legal Basis

C2C is actually a professional term for e-commerce, which refers to the e-commerce between individuals, where C refers to consumer, which is abbreviated to C because the English word for consumer is customer (consumer), and C to C is abbreviated to C2C because the pronunciation of 2 in English is the same as to. C2C is customer to customer. Since 2008, the individual merchants in China’s C2C e-commerce have shown a spurt of development, mainly in the scale and quantity of transactions, both of which have significantly improved. As of December 2015, according to relevant data, there are 418 million online payment users, and this growth momentum will not continue to grow. Although we have entered the era of big data and the efficiency of processing tax-related information has been significantly improved, the data is too large to avoid omissions, and the situation is relatively complicated in the actual tax collection and management, relying on the information in China’s current tax system. Management ability and resource status are difficult to monitor taxation one by one [9].


### 3.1.2. The Elements of the Collection and Management Are Difficult to Determine

It is difficult to determine the object of collection and the taxpayer. C2C e-commerce transactions include all kinds of physical goods and labor services, which can be described as all-encompassing. The reason why C2C e-commerce levy objects are difficult to be divided into different categories is that both parties to the transaction are individuals, regardless of the transaction method, payment method, or transaction procedure, and its flexibility is far more than traditional business or B2B, B2C e-commerce, considering that the scope and scale of business between individual merchants are also very different, and the business content of C2C e-commerce is also different, so it is necessary to manage these C2C e-commerce businesses with different sizes and simple business scope. The main body sets the standard and then divides the object of collection into a huge project. The biggest characteristic of this business model is that the transaction information is transmitted through the network. Some individual merchants adopt electronic encryption technology in order to avoid the taxation department’s collection and management. The flexibility of the merchants in C2C e-commerce makes the taxation department difficult to determine the object of collection [10].


### 3.1.3. Tax Location Is Difficult to Determine

Taxation locations are directly related to taxation issues. There are two main theories about the taxation supervision of C2C e-commerce. One is the theory of regional jurisdiction. This theory is mainly based on the registration place of the online store in real life, the place where the business activity takes place, the place where the buyer consumes the action, or the location of the server. In attributable tax department, however, this theoretical division is not rigorous enough. The scope of the online store’s business activities is very limited, and the place where the activity takes place can be changed frequently. To a large extent, there is a complete overlap with the tax jurisdiction of the industrial and commercial registration place. The other is the theory of unified jurisdiction. The central government uniformly uses electronic taxation to supervise all online store taxation in China’s internet trading platform and has set up a new electronic taxation department to monitor and manage the online stores of e-commerce platforms. Although the concept of this theory is relatively good, it can greatly reduce the probability of tax evasion and tax evasion. However, in China’s overlarge market, the establishment of a unified model consumes relatively large resources, and local taxes are incorporated into the central taxation. In line with China’s national conditions, it must be modified on the basis of this theory before it can be applied to practical operations. C2C e-commerce belongs to the new field. It is still necessary to think deeply about applying the current tax system to e-commerce and taxing it [11].


## 3.1.1. The Scale of Collection and Management Is Huge and Lacks Legal Basis

C2C is actually a professional term for e-commerce, which refers to the e-commerce between individuals, where C refers to consumer, which is abbreviated to C because the English word for consumer is customer (consumer), and C to C is abbreviated to C2C because the pronunciation of 2 in English is the same as to. C2C is customer to customer. Since 2008, the individual merchants in China’s C2C e-commerce have shown a spurt of development, mainly in the scale and quantity of transactions, both of which have significantly improved. As of December 2015, according to relevant data, there are 418 million online payment users, and this growth momentum will not continue to grow. Although we have entered the era of big data and the efficiency of processing tax-related information has been significantly improved, the data is too large to avoid omissions, and the situation is relatively complicated in the actual tax collection and management, relying on the information in China’s current tax system. Management ability and resource status are difficult to monitor taxation one by one [9].


## 3.1.2. The Elements of the Collection and Management Are Difficult to Determine

It is difficult to determine the object of collection and the taxpayer. C2C e-commerce transactions include all kinds of physical goods and labor services, which can be described as all-encompassing. The reason why C2C e-commerce levy objects are difficult to be divided into different categories is that both parties to the transaction are individuals, regardless of the transaction method, payment method, or transaction procedure, and its flexibility is far more than traditional business or B2B, B2C e-commerce, considering that the scope and scale of business between individual merchants are also very different, and the business content of C2C e-commerce is also different, so it is necessary to manage these C2C e-commerce businesses with different sizes and simple business scope. The main body sets the standard and then divides the object of collection into a huge project. The biggest characteristic of this business model is that the transaction information is transmitted through the network. Some individual merchants adopt electronic encryption technology in order to avoid the taxation department’s collection and management. The flexibility of the merchants in C2C e-commerce makes the taxation department difficult to determine the object of collection [10].


## 3.1.3. Tax Location Is Difficult to Determine

Taxation locations are directly related to taxation issues. There are two main theories about the taxation supervision of C2C e-commerce. One is the theory of regional jurisdiction. This theory is mainly based on the registration place of the online store in real life, the place where the business activity takes place, the place where the buyer consumes the action, or the location of the server. In attributable tax department, however, this theoretical division is not rigorous enough. The scope of the online store’s business activities is very limited, and the place where the activity takes place can be changed frequently. To a large extent, there is a complete overlap with the tax jurisdiction of the industrial and commercial registration place. The other is the theory of unified jurisdiction. The central government uniformly uses electronic taxation to supervise all online store taxation in China’s internet trading platform and has set up a new electronic taxation department to monitor and manage the online stores of e-commerce platforms. Although the concept of this theory is relatively good, it can greatly reduce the probability of tax evasion and tax evasion. However, in China’s overlarge market, the establishment of a unified model consumes relatively large resources, and local taxes are incorporated into the central taxation. In line with China’s national conditions, it must be modified on the basis of this theory before it can be applied to practical operations. C2C e-commerce belongs to the new field. It is still necessary to think deeply about applying the current tax system to e-commerce and taxing it [11].


## 3.2. Performance of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce Tax Collection and Management

There is also information asymmetry in the traditional tax collection and management, but due to the characteristics of CZC e-commerce and the limitation of technological development level, it is more obvious in the C2C e-commerce tax collection and management. The performance of information asymmetry in C2C e-commerce can be refined to all aspects, between the government and the tax authorities, between the tax authorities, between tax collectors and taxpayers, etc., but the most important and most difficult to solve is the acquisition. The information is asymmetrical between the two parties.


### 3.2.1. Asymmetry of Taxpayer Tax Information

In the substantive sense, tax collection and management are the management process for the collection, processing, processing, and application of tax information. The broad tax information refers to all kinds of information, data, news, and intelligence about tax economic behavior, status, and effects. In this paper, tax information refers to the narrowly defined tax information, that is, the information required by the tax authorities to implement tax collection and management, including taxpayer basic information and taxpayer business information. The basic information of the taxpayer refers to the taxpayer’s identity (type, identification number, and name), taxation location, bank account number, and contact telephone number, and the taxpayer’s business information refers to sales, fund collection and payment, procurement, inventory, expenses, and other information [12].The asymmetry of the taxpayer’s tax information means that the taxpayer does not disclose the private information he owns, which makes the tax authorities and taxpayers have a gap in understanding the taxation-related situation and form an information asymmetry. In fact, many tax information is generated in the specific transaction process of e-commerce, so it is possible to study the tax information in e-commerce tax collection and management by analyzing the e-commerce transaction process. The flow of e-commerce transactions and tax information transfer are shown in Figure4.Figure 4
e-Commerce transaction process and tax information transfer diagram.As can be seen from Figure4, the main body of e-commerce transactions includes buyers, sellers, banks, and network intermediaries. The taxes involved in e-commerce are mainly turnover tax and income tax, and taxpayers are usually sellers. The taxpayer has all the tax information; the buyer in the online retail generally realizes the transaction through the network intermediary, so the buyer knows the sales information but does not necessarily know the basic information of the taxpayer and the network intermediary (the third party trading platform, the third party payment platform, and the credit intermediary). As an indispensable chain in online retail e-commerce, it has basic information and business information of taxpayers, such as business flow, information flow, capital flow, and logistics, but the network platform is not an authority, and it is impossible to force users to pay taxes [13]. The tax information owned by the taxpayer is composed of information reported by the taxpayer and audit information.


### 3.2.2. Information Asymmetry on Tax Regulations

On the one hand, some taxpayers lack the necessary understanding of relevant tax laws and regulations and procedures for fulfilling their tax obligations, and the tax authorities are in an information superior position. In recent years, the scale of online retail sales has expanded dramatically. The number of individual businesses in C2C e-commerce has greatly increased, and there are many taxpayers. Individuals often lack the habit of actively understanding tax laws. The taxpayer’s unclear knowledge and inadequate taxation by the tax authorities are likely to cause the taxpayer’s ignorant tax noncompliance, which leads to the state of taxation information asymmetry. On the other hand, some taxpayers who have studied the tax law in depth have used the tax law to blindly evade taxes, leaving the tax authorities at an information disadvantage [14]. e-Commerce is a new type of business operation. At present, the tax law legislature has not issued relevant tax policies, and the business level of tax law enforcement personnel is uneven. As a result, taxpayers who have thoroughly studied tax regulations can make full use of legal blind spots and hide true private information. Tax authorities are in a disadvantaged position when making tax returns or false declarations. The consequences of this situation are extremely serious. The taxpayer’s sense of honesty and taxation declines, and the tax noncompliance is also raised. The tax collection and management of this part of the taxpayer cannot be effectively implemented, and the seriousness of the tax law cannot be reflected [15].


## 3.2.1. Asymmetry of Taxpayer Tax Information

In the substantive sense, tax collection and management are the management process for the collection, processing, processing, and application of tax information. The broad tax information refers to all kinds of information, data, news, and intelligence about tax economic behavior, status, and effects. In this paper, tax information refers to the narrowly defined tax information, that is, the information required by the tax authorities to implement tax collection and management, including taxpayer basic information and taxpayer business information. The basic information of the taxpayer refers to the taxpayer’s identity (type, identification number, and name), taxation location, bank account number, and contact telephone number, and the taxpayer’s business information refers to sales, fund collection and payment, procurement, inventory, expenses, and other information [12].The asymmetry of the taxpayer’s tax information means that the taxpayer does not disclose the private information he owns, which makes the tax authorities and taxpayers have a gap in understanding the taxation-related situation and form an information asymmetry. In fact, many tax information is generated in the specific transaction process of e-commerce, so it is possible to study the tax information in e-commerce tax collection and management by analyzing the e-commerce transaction process. The flow of e-commerce transactions and tax information transfer are shown in Figure4.Figure 4
e-Commerce transaction process and tax information transfer diagram.As can be seen from Figure4, the main body of e-commerce transactions includes buyers, sellers, banks, and network intermediaries. The taxes involved in e-commerce are mainly turnover tax and income tax, and taxpayers are usually sellers. The taxpayer has all the tax information; the buyer in the online retail generally realizes the transaction through the network intermediary, so the buyer knows the sales information but does not necessarily know the basic information of the taxpayer and the network intermediary (the third party trading platform, the third party payment platform, and the credit intermediary). As an indispensable chain in online retail e-commerce, it has basic information and business information of taxpayers, such as business flow, information flow, capital flow, and logistics, but the network platform is not an authority, and it is impossible to force users to pay taxes [13]. The tax information owned by the taxpayer is composed of information reported by the taxpayer and audit information.


## 3.2.2. Information Asymmetry on Tax Regulations

On the one hand, some taxpayers lack the necessary understanding of relevant tax laws and regulations and procedures for fulfilling their tax obligations, and the tax authorities are in an information superior position. In recent years, the scale of online retail sales has expanded dramatically. The number of individual businesses in C2C e-commerce has greatly increased, and there are many taxpayers. Individuals often lack the habit of actively understanding tax laws. The taxpayer’s unclear knowledge and inadequate taxation by the tax authorities are likely to cause the taxpayer’s ignorant tax noncompliance, which leads to the state of taxation information asymmetry. On the other hand, some taxpayers who have studied the tax law in depth have used the tax law to blindly evade taxes, leaving the tax authorities at an information disadvantage [14]. e-Commerce is a new type of business operation. At present, the tax law legislature has not issued relevant tax policies, and the business level of tax law enforcement personnel is uneven. As a result, taxpayers who have thoroughly studied tax regulations can make full use of legal blind spots and hide true private information. Tax authorities are in a disadvantaged position when making tax returns or false declarations. The consequences of this situation are extremely serious. The taxpayer’s sense of honesty and taxation declines, and the tax noncompliance is also raised. The tax collection and management of this part of the taxpayer cannot be effectively implemented, and the seriousness of the tax law cannot be reflected [15].


## 3.3. Game Analysis

From the above, we can see that C2C e-commerce is not tax-free in China, but it has caused difficulties in the collection and management of tax authorities for various reasons. Through the use of information asymmetry and game theory, the C2C e-commerce tax collection and management model is established. C2C e-commerce tax collection and management are a category of incomplete information dynamic games. Tax authorities do not know taxpayers, and taxpayers know themselves. Through natural selection, the taxpayer acts first, and the tax authorities act accordingly. The tax authorities can observe the taxpayer’s actions and cannot observe the type, but the tax authorities can speculate on the types of taxpayers by observing their actions and then choose their own best actions. In addition, there are two inferences: there is information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities, and tax authorities are not perfect for tax audits [16].


### 3.3.1. Model Premise Hypothesis

(1)
Taxpayers and tax authorities involved in the game are rational people, that is, they are seeking to maximize their own interests(2)
The information asymmetry between the two parties is collected, and the effectiveness of the tax authorities’ inspection is determined by the degree of information symmetry. Taxpayers have all their tax information, and the smaller the amount of information obtained by tax authorities, the higher the degree of information asymmetry, and the lower the probability of finding results. Record the degree of information asymmetry asJ,J (0, 1), and check the validity of the record e(3)
The taxable credit income isK, which is the additional income that the taxpayer can bring in the long-term legal tax payment, such as the cost brought by the tax authorities and the easier access to the bank from the bank to reduce the financing cost(4)
The taxation authority selects the audit record asα and does not check the record (1−α), the taxpayer evades the tax record as β, and pays tax according to law as 1−β; the taxpayer expects the payment level to be recorded as γ1, the tax authority expects the payment level is γ2, the taxpayer’s actual taxable income is recorded as E, the declared income is recorded as FE≥F, the tax rate is t, the penalty rate is set to m, and the taxpayer’s taxation cost increased by the tax authorities is H1, when the tax authorities inspect the time. The cost of collection and management is H2 [17].


### 3.3.2. Game Process between Taxpayers and Tax Authorities

According to the characteristics of incomplete information dynamic game, we can summarize the game behavior of tax authorities and taxpayers as follows [18]:First, the taxpayer knows all the information about his/her income, and the taxpayer declares taxable income. The tax authorities are unaware of the taxpayer’s real income. When the tax authorities speculate that the taxpayer’s declared income is equal to the actual income, they will not choose to audit, because it can not only increase the income but also make the behavior pay more costs. When the tax authorities speculate that the income reported by the taxpayer may be lower than the actual income, it will be checked at a certain rate. In the end, the tax authorities can choose to reject or accept the amount declared by the taxpayer based on the results of the inspection [19].In this game process, the tax authorities have two decisions: the taxpayer’s report information that the tax authorities can observe and the tax authorities’ acceptance of the taxpayer’s declaration. In fact, the tax authorities are unable to monitor the actual taxable income of taxpayers, that is, each type of information is from different taxpayers. Under the condition of information asymmetry, the tax authorities are at an obvious information disadvantage [20].


### 3.3.3. Model Solution

Taxpayer expected payment level:(1)γ1=1−βEt−K+βFt+αθt1+mE−F+αH1.The first item on the right side of the middle type indicates the tax payable by the taxpayer in the legal tax selection, the second item.The third item indicates that the taxpayer is required to pay the tax if the taxpayer evades the tax.The tax and fines, the fourth item, indicate the taxation costs incurred by the taxpayer during the inspection process by the tax authorities.Tax authorities expect the level of payment [21–23]:
(2)γ2=αH2−αβθt1+mE−F−Ft.The first item on the right side of the formula (2) indicates the cost incurred by the tax authorities for tax audits. The second item is the tax and fines that the taxpayer chooses to evade and is found to be paid. The third item is the tax paid by the taxpayer.By deriving partial biases for (1) and (2), respectively, the minimum level of expected tax payment for taxpayers and tax authorities can be obtained [24]:
(3)∂γ1∂β=K‐Et+Ft+αθt1+mE−F+αH1,∂γ2∂α=H2−βθt1+mE−F,which make ∂γ1/∂β=0,∂γ2/∂α=0.Solutions are as follows:(4)α∗=Et−Ft−Kθt1+mE−F+H1,β∗=H2θt1+mE−F.Through the above analysis, three kinds of equilibrium can be obtained.Equalization One. In order to ensure that the conditions α∗∈0,1,β∗∈0,1 need to be met
(5)βθt1+mE−F+H2≥Et−Ft−Kθt1+mE−F≥H2.Equilibrium Two. If it is available and if it can be satisfied at this time
(6)θt1+mE−F+H2≤Et−Ft−K,α∗=1;θt1+mE−F≥H2,β∗=1.Balance Three. If θt1+mE−F≥H2, θt1+mE−F+H2≤Et−Ft−K, and if you can meet it at this time, you can get α∗=0, β∗=1.


### 3.3.4. Equilibrium Analysis of the Model

In the equilibrium one, the taxpayer evades taxes with a certain probability, and the tax authorities conduct audits from a certain probability. When the tax authorities’ inspection efficiency, fine rate, taxpayer and tax auditing costs, and taxable integrity gains are relatively high, and the tax authorities’ inspection costs are low, a balance can be achieved. At this time, the degree of information asymmetry is not high, the inspection efficiency of the tax authorities is relatively high at this time, the audit cost is relatively low, and the taxpayer’s cost of noncompliance and tax credit integrity are relatively high. This shows that the tax laws and regulations are relatively perfect in this case, the information of the two parties is relatively complete, the means of collection and management are more adequate, and the phenomenon of noncompliance with taxation is less. The traditional business model and the B2B collection and management situation are more consistent with this equilibrium. In these models, the degree of information asymmetry is relatively small. The perfect tax legal system and supervision system can effectively help the tax authorities to fully obtain taxpayer tax information and improve the tax authorities. Tax inspection and collection efficiency reduce taxpayers’ tax evasion and tax evasion. The simulation results of various models are shown in Table2.Table 2
Analysis of model results.
TaxpayerTaxation authorityInspection efficiencyFine rateTaxpayer and tax inspection costTax integrity income taxAuthority audit costResultEquilibrium oneTax evasion with a certain probabilityAuditing from a certain probabilityHighHighHighHighLow costLow degree of information asymmetryBalance 2Must choose tax evasionMust choose auditLowLowLowLowLow enoughInformation asymmetry is very highEquilibrium threeSelect a certain tax evasionChoose not to auditLowLowLowLowHighInformation asymmetry is extremely highIn the second phase of equilibrium, taxpayers must choose to evade taxes, and the tax authorities must choose to conduct audits. In this equilibrium, the taxation department’s fine rate, audit efficiency, taxpayer’s audited cost, and honest tax return are relatively low, and the tax auditing cost is also low enough. This shows that the information asymmetry is very high, the taxpayer’s noncompliance and tax credits are very low, the tax audit efficiency and cost are relatively low, taxpayers will see the risk of tax evasion is small, and the benefits are high. Taxpayers’ tax rates and tax authorities’ inspection rates are high. The situation of equilibrium two generally does not exist in real life, because the auditing costs of the tax authorities are not so low that they can benefit from auditing all taxpayers.In the third phase of equilibrium, taxpayers choose to evade taxes, and tax authorities choose not to conduct audits. In this equilibrium, the degree of information asymmetry is extremely high, and the cost of tax auditing is high. At the same time, the taxpayer’s fine rate, the cost of inspection by the tax authorities, and the integrity of tax payment are very low. At this point, the tax authorities are unable to obtain any taxpayer’s tax information, the inspection cost is very high, and the taxpayer’s tax evasion success rate is extremely high. This situation is in line with the C2C e-commerce model and is also the case of our research. Because the C2C e-commerce tax collection is seriously asymmetrical between the two parties, the tax authorities have almost no knowledge of the tax information of C2C individual businesses, and the auditing costs are relatively high. Therefore, the tax authorities often do not conduct tax collection, and the taxpayers know the tax. The authorities are unable to grasp the tax information, and the cost of tax evasion is very low. Therefore, taxpayers often choose to use online business to evade taxes, resulting in large tax noncompliance [25].In summary, information asymmetry is the main reason for the difficulty in tax collection and management of e-commerce models. The higher the degree of information asymmetry, the higher the taxpayer’s tax noncompliance, the greater the difficulty of tax collection and management, resulting in increased tax losses. Especially in China’s current C2C e-commerce, this phenomenon is very prominent. The characteristics of the C2C e-commerce model are doomed to a higher degree of information asymmetry than other models. C2C individual merchants have very low tax compliance, and tax authorities often choose to abandon the collection and management.


### 3.3.5. Analysis and Application of cox Model

Cox Model Structural Style. This model proposed by England statistician D.R.Cox in 1972 that is mainly used in studying each kind of factor (to be called covariate) regarding the lifetime length relations carries on the multifactor analysis. Instead of directly considering the relationship between the survival function and the covariance, the risk function is used as the dependent variable, and its structure form is
(7)ht=h0texpβ1X1+β2X2+⋯+βmXm.in which h0t is the base risk rate (nonparametric part) and B=−1.329 is the regression coefficient (estimated according to the observation value).The regression coefficientβj≥0, covariable value, the higher the risk function e−1.329=0.265 value indicate the individual risk of death.When regression coefficientβj=0 is expressed, the covariance has no effect on the risk function ht.When regression coefficientβ≤0, the covariate value is bigger, the risk function ht value is smaller, and the expression individual death risk is smaller.The Basic Characteristics of Cox Model. In the case of unknown, the β in the covariance can still be estimated, so the parameter estimation method of the Cox regression model is called the partial likelihood value method.In the Cox model,h0t is not modeled, so the Cox model is also called a semiparametric model.The Cox model of the basic assumes that regardless of the baseline risk, at any point in time, the presence of an exposed individual is not present in the exposed individual events in the risk which is constant. Also, namely two groups of crowds light in any time have the event risk proportion which is constant (or explanation expose for someone in all time to have event function all are same); therefore, the Cox model is called the proportion risk model, and the corresponding covariate parameter estimation must satisfy the proportion risk supposition. The Cox model does not have the intercept, because the intercept is a part, and is cancelled in the partial likelihood value law.Cox Model Assumptions. The ratio of the risk function of any two individuals, that is, the risk ratio (HR) to maintain a constant proportion, with independent time t is as follows:
(8)HR=hithjt=expβ1Xi1−Xj1+β2Xi2−Xj2+⋯+βpXim−Xjm.The efficiency of the covariates in the model does not change with time and change and inspects some covariates whether they satisfy the PH hypothesis; the simple method is observed according to this variable grouping survival curve overlapping, and prompts do not satisfy the PH hypothesis.Cox Model Parameter Estimation. The Cox model parameter estimation needs to construct the partial likelihood function, calculated by the maximum likelihood method, and estimates the parameters of bj, and general steps of maximum likelihood estimation method are as follows:Write likelihood functionL(9)Lθ1,θ2,⋯,θn=∏i=1npxi;θ1,θ2,⋯,θn∏i=1nfxi;θ1,θ2,⋯,θn.Take the logarithm and the derivation number, obtain the stationary point, the maximum point, and make the conclusion.


## 3.3.1. Model Premise Hypothesis

(1)
Taxpayers and tax authorities involved in the game are rational people, that is, they are seeking to maximize their own interests(2)
The information asymmetry between the two parties is collected, and the effectiveness of the tax authorities’ inspection is determined by the degree of information symmetry. Taxpayers have all their tax information, and the smaller the amount of information obtained by tax authorities, the higher the degree of information asymmetry, and the lower the probability of finding results. Record the degree of information asymmetry asJ,J (0, 1), and check the validity of the record e(3)
The taxable credit income isK, which is the additional income that the taxpayer can bring in the long-term legal tax payment, such as the cost brought by the tax authorities and the easier access to the bank from the bank to reduce the financing cost(4)
The taxation authority selects the audit record asα and does not check the record (1−α), the taxpayer evades the tax record as β, and pays tax according to law as 1−β; the taxpayer expects the payment level to be recorded as γ1, the tax authority expects the payment level is γ2, the taxpayer’s actual taxable income is recorded as E, the declared income is recorded as FE≥F, the tax rate is t, the penalty rate is set to m, and the taxpayer’s taxation cost increased by the tax authorities is H1, when the tax authorities inspect the time. The cost of collection and management is H2 [17].


## 3.3.2. Game Process between Taxpayers and Tax Authorities

According to the characteristics of incomplete information dynamic game, we can summarize the game behavior of tax authorities and taxpayers as follows [18]:First, the taxpayer knows all the information about his/her income, and the taxpayer declares taxable income. The tax authorities are unaware of the taxpayer’s real income. When the tax authorities speculate that the taxpayer’s declared income is equal to the actual income, they will not choose to audit, because it can not only increase the income but also make the behavior pay more costs. When the tax authorities speculate that the income reported by the taxpayer may be lower than the actual income, it will be checked at a certain rate. In the end, the tax authorities can choose to reject or accept the amount declared by the taxpayer based on the results of the inspection [19].In this game process, the tax authorities have two decisions: the taxpayer’s report information that the tax authorities can observe and the tax authorities’ acceptance of the taxpayer’s declaration. In fact, the tax authorities are unable to monitor the actual taxable income of taxpayers, that is, each type of information is from different taxpayers. Under the condition of information asymmetry, the tax authorities are at an obvious information disadvantage [20].


## 3.3.3. Model Solution

Taxpayer expected payment level:(1)γ1=1−βEt−K+βFt+αθt1+mE−F+αH1.The first item on the right side of the middle type indicates the tax payable by the taxpayer in the legal tax selection, the second item.The third item indicates that the taxpayer is required to pay the tax if the taxpayer evades the tax.The tax and fines, the fourth item, indicate the taxation costs incurred by the taxpayer during the inspection process by the tax authorities.Tax authorities expect the level of payment [21–23]:
(2)γ2=αH2−αβθt1+mE−F−Ft.The first item on the right side of the formula (2) indicates the cost incurred by the tax authorities for tax audits. The second item is the tax and fines that the taxpayer chooses to evade and is found to be paid. The third item is the tax paid by the taxpayer.By deriving partial biases for (1) and (2), respectively, the minimum level of expected tax payment for taxpayers and tax authorities can be obtained [24]:
(3)∂γ1∂β=K‐Et+Ft+αθt1+mE−F+αH1,∂γ2∂α=H2−βθt1+mE−F,which make ∂γ1/∂β=0,∂γ2/∂α=0.Solutions are as follows:(4)α∗=Et−Ft−Kθt1+mE−F+H1,β∗=H2θt1+mE−F.Through the above analysis, three kinds of equilibrium can be obtained.Equalization One. In order to ensure that the conditions α∗∈0,1,β∗∈0,1 need to be met
(5)βθt1+mE−F+H2≥Et−Ft−Kθt1+mE−F≥H2.Equilibrium Two. If it is available and if it can be satisfied at this time
(6)θt1+mE−F+H2≤Et−Ft−K,α∗=1;θt1+mE−F≥H2,β∗=1.Balance Three. If θt1+mE−F≥H2, θt1+mE−F+H2≤Et−Ft−K, and if you can meet it at this time, you can get α∗=0, β∗=1.


## 3.3.4. Equilibrium Analysis of the Model

In the equilibrium one, the taxpayer evades taxes with a certain probability, and the tax authorities conduct audits from a certain probability. When the tax authorities’ inspection efficiency, fine rate, taxpayer and tax auditing costs, and taxable integrity gains are relatively high, and the tax authorities’ inspection costs are low, a balance can be achieved. At this time, the degree of information asymmetry is not high, the inspection efficiency of the tax authorities is relatively high at this time, the audit cost is relatively low, and the taxpayer’s cost of noncompliance and tax credit integrity are relatively high. This shows that the tax laws and regulations are relatively perfect in this case, the information of the two parties is relatively complete, the means of collection and management are more adequate, and the phenomenon of noncompliance with taxation is less. The traditional business model and the B2B collection and management situation are more consistent with this equilibrium. In these models, the degree of information asymmetry is relatively small. The perfect tax legal system and supervision system can effectively help the tax authorities to fully obtain taxpayer tax information and improve the tax authorities. Tax inspection and collection efficiency reduce taxpayers’ tax evasion and tax evasion. The simulation results of various models are shown in Table2.Table 2
Analysis of model results.
TaxpayerTaxation authorityInspection efficiencyFine rateTaxpayer and tax inspection costTax integrity income taxAuthority audit costResultEquilibrium oneTax evasion with a certain probabilityAuditing from a certain probabilityHighHighHighHighLow costLow degree of information asymmetryBalance 2Must choose tax evasionMust choose auditLowLowLowLowLow enoughInformation asymmetry is very highEquilibrium threeSelect a certain tax evasionChoose not to auditLowLowLowLowHighInformation asymmetry is extremely highIn the second phase of equilibrium, taxpayers must choose to evade taxes, and the tax authorities must choose to conduct audits. In this equilibrium, the taxation department’s fine rate, audit efficiency, taxpayer’s audited cost, and honest tax return are relatively low, and the tax auditing cost is also low enough. This shows that the information asymmetry is very high, the taxpayer’s noncompliance and tax credits are very low, the tax audit efficiency and cost are relatively low, taxpayers will see the risk of tax evasion is small, and the benefits are high. Taxpayers’ tax rates and tax authorities’ inspection rates are high. The situation of equilibrium two generally does not exist in real life, because the auditing costs of the tax authorities are not so low that they can benefit from auditing all taxpayers.In the third phase of equilibrium, taxpayers choose to evade taxes, and tax authorities choose not to conduct audits. In this equilibrium, the degree of information asymmetry is extremely high, and the cost of tax auditing is high. At the same time, the taxpayer’s fine rate, the cost of inspection by the tax authorities, and the integrity of tax payment are very low. At this point, the tax authorities are unable to obtain any taxpayer’s tax information, the inspection cost is very high, and the taxpayer’s tax evasion success rate is extremely high. This situation is in line with the C2C e-commerce model and is also the case of our research. Because the C2C e-commerce tax collection is seriously asymmetrical between the two parties, the tax authorities have almost no knowledge of the tax information of C2C individual businesses, and the auditing costs are relatively high. Therefore, the tax authorities often do not conduct tax collection, and the taxpayers know the tax. The authorities are unable to grasp the tax information, and the cost of tax evasion is very low. Therefore, taxpayers often choose to use online business to evade taxes, resulting in large tax noncompliance [25].In summary, information asymmetry is the main reason for the difficulty in tax collection and management of e-commerce models. The higher the degree of information asymmetry, the higher the taxpayer’s tax noncompliance, the greater the difficulty of tax collection and management, resulting in increased tax losses. Especially in China’s current C2C e-commerce, this phenomenon is very prominent. The characteristics of the C2C e-commerce model are doomed to a higher degree of information asymmetry than other models. C2C individual merchants have very low tax compliance, and tax authorities often choose to abandon the collection and management.


## 3.3.5. Analysis and Application of cox Model

Cox Model Structural Style. This model proposed by England statistician D.R.Cox in 1972 that is mainly used in studying each kind of factor (to be called covariate) regarding the lifetime length relations carries on the multifactor analysis. Instead of directly considering the relationship between the survival function and the covariance, the risk function is used as the dependent variable, and its structure form is
(7)ht=h0texpβ1X1+β2X2+⋯+βmXm.in which h0t is the base risk rate (nonparametric part) and B=−1.329 is the regression coefficient (estimated according to the observation value).The regression coefficientβj≥0, covariable value, the higher the risk function e−1.329=0.265 value indicate the individual risk of death.When regression coefficientβj=0 is expressed, the covariance has no effect on the risk function ht.When regression coefficientβ≤0, the covariate value is bigger, the risk function ht value is smaller, and the expression individual death risk is smaller.The Basic Characteristics of Cox Model. In the case of unknown, the β in the covariance can still be estimated, so the parameter estimation method of the Cox regression model is called the partial likelihood value method.In the Cox model,h0t is not modeled, so the Cox model is also called a semiparametric model.The Cox model of the basic assumes that regardless of the baseline risk, at any point in time, the presence of an exposed individual is not present in the exposed individual events in the risk which is constant. Also, namely two groups of crowds light in any time have the event risk proportion which is constant (or explanation expose for someone in all time to have event function all are same); therefore, the Cox model is called the proportion risk model, and the corresponding covariate parameter estimation must satisfy the proportion risk supposition. The Cox model does not have the intercept, because the intercept is a part, and is cancelled in the partial likelihood value law.Cox Model Assumptions. The ratio of the risk function of any two individuals, that is, the risk ratio (HR) to maintain a constant proportion, with independent time t is as follows:
(8)HR=hithjt=expβ1Xi1−Xj1+β2Xi2−Xj2+⋯+βpXim−Xjm.The efficiency of the covariates in the model does not change with time and change and inspects some covariates whether they satisfy the PH hypothesis; the simple method is observed according to this variable grouping survival curve overlapping, and prompts do not satisfy the PH hypothesis.Cox Model Parameter Estimation. The Cox model parameter estimation needs to construct the partial likelihood function, calculated by the maximum likelihood method, and estimates the parameters of bj, and general steps of maximum likelihood estimation method are as follows:Write likelihood functionL(9)Lθ1,θ2,⋯,θn=∏i=1npxi;θ1,θ2,⋯,θn∏i=1nfxi;θ1,θ2,⋯,θn.Take the logarithm and the derivation number, obtain the stationary point, the maximum point, and make the conclusion.


## 4. Eliminate the Strategy of Information Asymmetry in C2C e-Commerce Transactions

### 4.1. Improve the Seller’s Credit Evaluation Mechanism

At present, the C2C e-commerce website basically provides a seller credit evaluation mechanism, that is, after the consumer receives the purchased product and uses it, the seller evaluates the merchant according to the actual situation of the product and the service status obtained. Generally, the evaluation content includes the quality of the product, whether the performance of the product is consistent with the description of the merchant on the webpage, whether the service attitude of the merchant is good, and whether the delivery of the commodity is timely. Therefore, the consumer’s evaluation forms the credit of the merchant. If the consumer is satisfied with the service and product quality of the merchant, there are many good evaluations, and the credit degree of the merchant is high. On the contrary, if the consumer is not satisfied with the service and product quality of the merchant, the poor evaluation is more, and the credit degree of the merchant is low. In this way, when consumers make purchases, they can understand the past consumers’ evaluation of the services and quality of the merchants according to the creditworthiness of the merchants, thereby changing the information disadvantage status of the consumers and minimizing the lack of integrity of the merchants. The framework of e-commerce information system is shown in Figure5.Figure 5
The strategy of improving the e-commerce information system.


### 4.2. Broaden Consumer Communication Channels

For the quality of goods, consumers have the most say. Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the communication channels of consumers so that consumers can more fully understand the relevant information of products before purchasing goods and maximize the change between consumers and businesses. In information asymmetry, to this end, the C2C e-commerce website not only needs to establish a “community” layout but also provides the necessary space for consumers to discuss the quality of a certain merchant service or a certain product more actively and to effectively classify the content of the community. To facilitate consumer information exchange. At the same time, a search engine should be established, and consumers can quickly find out all the evaluations of a certain product sold by a certain merchant through a search engine.


### 4.3. Introduce Information Intermediaries

In order to reduce the cost of collecting information by consumers themselves and avoid “reverse selection” resulting in “inferior goods expelling good goods,” information brokers can be introduced in C2C e-commerce websites to improve the transaction efficiency of C2C e-commerce market. Intermediaries are required to conduct long-term tracking of the quality of goods operated by merchants on the C2C e-commerce website and conduct fair evaluation and screening. The information intermediary can combine the needs of the consumer with the goods provided by the merchant according to the specific needs of the consumer and facilitate the transaction between the buyer and the seller or provide a good information consultation service for the consumer. The information intermediary obtains certain services through the standardized service. In commission, this will not only reduce the blindness of consumers when shopping and reduce the risk of trading but also encourage businesses that manage high-quality goods to continue to provide quality goods, so that the survival opportunities of inferior goods are getting smaller and smaller.


### 4.4. Strengthen the Construction of the Legal System

The government must not only strictly enforce the legislation but also strictly enforce the law. The complaints against consumers must be dealt with in a timely manner, and the businesses that provide inferior goods should be punished, and the opportunity cost of the reverse selection behavior of the merchants who operate the inferior commodities should be increased to curb the behavior of the species. In occurrence, for those who manage high-quality goods, according to the level of their credibility evaluation, they can subsidize taxation and establish an incentive mechanism for integrity. The C2C e-commerce tax collection and management system based on network intermediary information as shown in Figure6.Figure 6
C2C e-commerce tax collection and management system based on network intermediary information.


### 4.5. Establish a C2C e-Commerce Merchant Industry Association

The binding force of the merchants increases the degree of consumer trust in the merchants and the products or services they operate, reduces information asymmetry, and reduces the efficiency losses caused by market failures. It is necessary to give full play to the industry supervision function of C2C e-commerce merchants, strengthen the communication and communication between C2C e-commerce merchants, and use the online instant chat mode and the information publishing function of the network platform to supervise and manage similar businesses. The industry credit evaluation content can be increased in the existing credit evaluation mechanism. The industry credit evaluation is mainly evaluated by the C2C e-commerce merchant industry association based on the credit evaluation of the merchants and the complaints of the consumers over a period of time, so as to convey the correct information of the high-quality goods to the consumers and reduce the price distortion.


### 4.6. Case Analysis

The test data of total trade amount of e-commerce enterprises in a city are as follows. Three different models analyze and compare the data, the results are shown in Table3, and the graph is shown in Figure 7.Table 3
Special data test based on large data statistical model.
Import and export trade20002002200420062008201020153.2+0.6-0.3+0.4+0.7-0.1-0.8Large data statistical model5.06.43.52.94.52.54.1Polynomial kernel model0.50.70.10.40.50.30.4Figure 7
Special data validation of statistical models.It is clearly evident from the Figure7 that our proposed big data statistical model in the application process is of the superiority. In the course of this test, we found that the results of e-commerce business statistics were inaccurate. Data is similar to the traditional model existed in the system’s computing process. Therefore, this paper introduces the middleware, first of all to identify the composition of the traditional model code, and then it is classified according to the code, one by one test. Through the test results, it can be found that the existing code features are obvious. Therefore, only the middle plug-in needs to be added to screen the elements of the enterprise e-commerce statistical errors so as to obtain the accurate detection data of the traditional model. The middle plug-in can be used to optimize the system during use and constantly adjust according to the amount of electricity supplier with the exchange. Therefore, during the control process of the program, through constant testing, random e-commerce business statistics are used to carry out practical research, constantly filling it and using the self-improvement and repair functions of big data statistical model to continuously improve accuracy of the data statistics model. The use of this big data statistical model can accurately improve this study and increase the number of tests before it is put into use, so as to increase the guarantee on the original basis. A special data test diagram based on a large data statistics model is shown in Figure 8.Figure 8
Special data test icons based on large-data statistical models.From the HDFS perspective, Hadoop nodes in a big data statistical model are stored by the system and provide a data node serving the positioning block and a distributed file system. The system’s name space consists of named nodes. The architecture of the HDFS master-slave architecture greatly simplifies the distributed system architecture. Compared with the traditional model, the design features the big data statistical model system: centralized management of meta data, decentralized storage of data blocks (64 MB) to ensure data security, data replication (at least 3 backups per data), and high fault tolerance. Traditional database systems should be capable of real-time, but for big data sets, at the terabyte or petabyte level. However, the retrieval speed of data mining decreases sharply. However, the comparison of various models can provide more favorable data analysis results for the C2C e-commerce model. The comparison between special data test and traditional model based on big data statistical model is shown in Figure9.Figure 9
Comparison of special data test and traditional model based on large-data statistical model.Through the above experimental results, it can be observed that the parallel computing of big data sets on a cluster is a typical example of nonrelational data management and analysis techniques. Map reduce abstracts a series of map operations and reduces operations from the data processing tasks to complete data filtering and aggregation, respectively, and manage them through a simple interface. In simple terms, the calculation process and the basic principle are to decompose a big data set into hundreds of small data sets. Each data set is processed by a node in the cluster and generates intermediate results. These intermediate results in turn by a large number of nodes merge to form the final result. On the premise of ensuring the accuracy of the big data statistical model, the computer system can also process the bivariate model according to the analysis. Making corresponding judgments on the statistical errors and making secondary statistics through the automatic rectification of the system ensure that the output of the final output can ensure its objectivity. Thus, the e-commerce statistical theory analysis model can reach the objective statistical results regardless of the single variable or multivariate cases and provide accurate guidance for the development of the enterprise. On the basis of ensuring the national economic stability, the majority of participants seek to maximize the benefits.


## 4.1. Improve the Seller’s Credit Evaluation Mechanism

At present, the C2C e-commerce website basically provides a seller credit evaluation mechanism, that is, after the consumer receives the purchased product and uses it, the seller evaluates the merchant according to the actual situation of the product and the service status obtained. Generally, the evaluation content includes the quality of the product, whether the performance of the product is consistent with the description of the merchant on the webpage, whether the service attitude of the merchant is good, and whether the delivery of the commodity is timely. Therefore, the consumer’s evaluation forms the credit of the merchant. If the consumer is satisfied with the service and product quality of the merchant, there are many good evaluations, and the credit degree of the merchant is high. On the contrary, if the consumer is not satisfied with the service and product quality of the merchant, the poor evaluation is more, and the credit degree of the merchant is low. In this way, when consumers make purchases, they can understand the past consumers’ evaluation of the services and quality of the merchants according to the creditworthiness of the merchants, thereby changing the information disadvantage status of the consumers and minimizing the lack of integrity of the merchants. The framework of e-commerce information system is shown in Figure5.Figure 5
The strategy of improving the e-commerce information system.


## 4.2. Broaden Consumer Communication Channels

For the quality of goods, consumers have the most say. Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the communication channels of consumers so that consumers can more fully understand the relevant information of products before purchasing goods and maximize the change between consumers and businesses. In information asymmetry, to this end, the C2C e-commerce website not only needs to establish a “community” layout but also provides the necessary space for consumers to discuss the quality of a certain merchant service or a certain product more actively and to effectively classify the content of the community. To facilitate consumer information exchange. At the same time, a search engine should be established, and consumers can quickly find out all the evaluations of a certain product sold by a certain merchant through a search engine.


## 4.3. Introduce Information Intermediaries

In order to reduce the cost of collecting information by consumers themselves and avoid “reverse selection” resulting in “inferior goods expelling good goods,” information brokers can be introduced in C2C e-commerce websites to improve the transaction efficiency of C2C e-commerce market. Intermediaries are required to conduct long-term tracking of the quality of goods operated by merchants on the C2C e-commerce website and conduct fair evaluation and screening. The information intermediary can combine the needs of the consumer with the goods provided by the merchant according to the specific needs of the consumer and facilitate the transaction between the buyer and the seller or provide a good information consultation service for the consumer. The information intermediary obtains certain services through the standardized service. In commission, this will not only reduce the blindness of consumers when shopping and reduce the risk of trading but also encourage businesses that manage high-quality goods to continue to provide quality goods, so that the survival opportunities of inferior goods are getting smaller and smaller.


## 4.4. Strengthen the Construction of the Legal System

The government must not only strictly enforce the legislation but also strictly enforce the law. The complaints against consumers must be dealt with in a timely manner, and the businesses that provide inferior goods should be punished, and the opportunity cost of the reverse selection behavior of the merchants who operate the inferior commodities should be increased to curb the behavior of the species. In occurrence, for those who manage high-quality goods, according to the level of their credibility evaluation, they can subsidize taxation and establish an incentive mechanism for integrity. The C2C e-commerce tax collection and management system based on network intermediary information as shown in Figure6.Figure 6
C2C e-commerce tax collection and management system based on network intermediary information.


## 4.5. Establish a C2C e-Commerce Merchant Industry Association

The binding force of the merchants increases the degree of consumer trust in the merchants and the products or services they operate, reduces information asymmetry, and reduces the efficiency losses caused by market failures. It is necessary to give full play to the industry supervision function of C2C e-commerce merchants, strengthen the communication and communication between C2C e-commerce merchants, and use the online instant chat mode and the information publishing function of the network platform to supervise and manage similar businesses. The industry credit evaluation content can be increased in the existing credit evaluation mechanism. The industry credit evaluation is mainly evaluated by the C2C e-commerce merchant industry association based on the credit evaluation of the merchants and the complaints of the consumers over a period of time, so as to convey the correct information of the high-quality goods to the consumers and reduce the price distortion.


## 4.6. Case Analysis

The test data of total trade amount of e-commerce enterprises in a city are as follows. Three different models analyze and compare the data, the results are shown in Table3, and the graph is shown in Figure 7.Table 3
Special data test based on large data statistical model.
Import and export trade20002002200420062008201020153.2+0.6-0.3+0.4+0.7-0.1-0.8Large data statistical model5.06.43.52.94.52.54.1Polynomial kernel model0.50.70.10.40.50.30.4Figure 7
Special data validation of statistical models.It is clearly evident from the Figure7 that our proposed big data statistical model in the application process is of the superiority. In the course of this test, we found that the results of e-commerce business statistics were inaccurate. Data is similar to the traditional model existed in the system’s computing process. Therefore, this paper introduces the middleware, first of all to identify the composition of the traditional model code, and then it is classified according to the code, one by one test. Through the test results, it can be found that the existing code features are obvious. Therefore, only the middle plug-in needs to be added to screen the elements of the enterprise e-commerce statistical errors so as to obtain the accurate detection data of the traditional model. The middle plug-in can be used to optimize the system during use and constantly adjust according to the amount of electricity supplier with the exchange. Therefore, during the control process of the program, through constant testing, random e-commerce business statistics are used to carry out practical research, constantly filling it and using the self-improvement and repair functions of big data statistical model to continuously improve accuracy of the data statistics model. The use of this big data statistical model can accurately improve this study and increase the number of tests before it is put into use, so as to increase the guarantee on the original basis. A special data test diagram based on a large data statistics model is shown in Figure 8.Figure 8
Special data test icons based on large-data statistical models.From the HDFS perspective, Hadoop nodes in a big data statistical model are stored by the system and provide a data node serving the positioning block and a distributed file system. The system’s name space consists of named nodes. The architecture of the HDFS master-slave architecture greatly simplifies the distributed system architecture. Compared with the traditional model, the design features the big data statistical model system: centralized management of meta data, decentralized storage of data blocks (64 MB) to ensure data security, data replication (at least 3 backups per data), and high fault tolerance. Traditional database systems should be capable of real-time, but for big data sets, at the terabyte or petabyte level. However, the retrieval speed of data mining decreases sharply. However, the comparison of various models can provide more favorable data analysis results for the C2C e-commerce model. The comparison between special data test and traditional model based on big data statistical model is shown in Figure9.Figure 9
Comparison of special data test and traditional model based on large-data statistical model.Through the above experimental results, it can be observed that the parallel computing of big data sets on a cluster is a typical example of nonrelational data management and analysis techniques. Map reduce abstracts a series of map operations and reduces operations from the data processing tasks to complete data filtering and aggregation, respectively, and manage them through a simple interface. In simple terms, the calculation process and the basic principle are to decompose a big data set into hundreds of small data sets. Each data set is processed by a node in the cluster and generates intermediate results. These intermediate results in turn by a large number of nodes merge to form the final result. On the premise of ensuring the accuracy of the big data statistical model, the computer system can also process the bivariate model according to the analysis. Making corresponding judgments on the statistical errors and making secondary statistics through the automatic rectification of the system ensure that the output of the final output can ensure its objectivity. Thus, the e-commerce statistical theory analysis model can reach the objective statistical results regardless of the single variable or multivariate cases and provide accurate guidance for the development of the enterprise. On the basis of ensuring the national economic stability, the majority of participants seek to maximize the benefits.


## 5. Conclusion

On the basis of summarizing the hotspots of C2C e-commerce tax research, this paper combines relevant basic concepts and theoretical analysis and inserts case analysis to discuss the current situation of tax collection and management in China. Finally, based on network intermediary information, C2C e-commerce tax collection and management means, related improvement measures, and a brief analysis are established. Although, at present, the tax policy of e-commerce in China is not yet mature, e-commerce tax payment will become an inevitable trend in the future development. In order to ensure the effective implementation of taxation policies, we must not only reduce taxation costs but also vigorously popularize e-commerce taxation policies, cultivate taxpayers’ awareness of taxation, improve the professional ethics and quality of taxpayers, implement real-name taxation policies, and raise taxpayers. The professional ethics and quality meet the era requirements of e-commerce taxation under the C2C model. Through the establishment of the game theory model, the analysis of information asymmetry is the main reason for the difficulty in tax collection and management of C2C e-commerce in China. From the information asymmetry in China’s C2C e-commerce performance, the reasons for the formation of information asymmetry and its impact and effects are analyzed. In the era of modernization, our government and tax authorities should fulfill the power of taxation according to law to ensure the smooth progress of modernization. In addition, because the level of e-commerce supervision and construction is relatively abstract and complex, involving laws, systems, and technologies, this paper analyzes the issue of e-commerce tax collection and management from the perspective of information asymmetry of tax collection and has certain limitations, in terms of countermeasures, mainly from the improvement of the legal system, tax collection, and management. The improvement of information technology and the updating of the management methods of tax authorities propose the proposal of the construction of e-commerce tax collection and management system. It is worthwhile to further study in order to propose a comprehensive and multiangle construction plan.



---

*Source: 6628068-2021-03-09.xml*