# Cluster-Based Authentication Process in a Smart City

Authors: Md. Rafiqul Islam; Md. Nasim Adnan; Md. Ezazul Islam; A B M Shawkat Ali
Journal: Security and Communication Networks
 (2022)

---

## Abstract

The widespread deployment of the Internet of Things in any smart city provides a regular flow of huge amount of data in server(s) that poses challenges for effective and efficient management to improve the quality of citizens’ life. To maintain the privacy and security of these data, a proper and secured identification and authentication process is very essential. In this paper, we propose a cluster-based identification and authentication process for the users, edge servers, and service servers, which are engaged in storing, processing, and accessing data. The proposed identification and authentication process is secured due to some codes (values), which are not possible to compute except by the concerned entities. For the proposed trust evaluation method (which actually strengthens the proposed authentication process), we consider major components and their integration in the model very carefully so that the simulation results become credible. Hence, we hope that the simulation results will be useful for the readership. As a whole, the proposed approach has potentials of being implemented in real-time applications.


---

## Body

## 1. Introduction

World population has increased significantly in the last few decades, and most of the people are attracted to city “life” for job opportunities, improved health care, and education, to note a few. As a result, the number of city dwellers has increased at an unprecedented rate. According to statistics, the percentages of people living in cities were 29% and 50% in the years 1950 and 2008, respectively, which is predicted to reach 65% in 2040 [1]. With the rapid advancement and innovation of Information Technology (IT), the world is experiencing a paradigm shift in city infrastructures and services. The evolution of this new form of IT-based city is popularly known as “Smart City.” In a smart city, digital technologies translate into better public services for inhabitants and better use of resources while impacting the environment less.The smartness of a city depends on proper integration of numerous IoT devices with different service-oriented information systems. To make a city smart, sharing of information among the citizens and those service-oriented information systems is very important. For example, if a citizen suddenly becomes sick, s/he can ask for medical assistance through her/his smart phone. Then, an ambulance from the Emergency Medical Service will rush to her/his location to transfer her/him to a nearby hospital according to her/his need. Hence, interconnection among the citizens and service providers’ information systems to realize different services is a central issue of a smart city.We know that cloud computing involves the use of globally interconnected data centers. These data centers process a huge volume of IoT data from smart cities and respond as per user requirement. However, as the physical distance between the cloud and the end user is high, transmission latency and response time also increase accordingly [2]. Besides, IoT devices connected to distant data centers try to access sophisticated applications, which impose additional load on networks and contribute to higher latency [3]. Many IoT applications such as a Medical Assistance Management System need to send the location of a citizen, her/his current medical condition (e.g., a severe heart attack) with detailed medical records to the Medical Emergency Service of a smart city for assessment, so that an ambulance dedicated to her/his medical condition can reach to her/his location, provide paramedic service inside the ambulance, evaluate traffic conditions, and direct the ambulance in the best possible way to the nearest hospital of required specialty. However, the inherent limitations of cloud computing such as high latency, non-context-aware behavior, and no support for such mobility requirements pose serious limitations on the use of a real-time emergency service [4].A large-scale network of IoT with device and network-level heterogeneity along with the ultralarge volume of data and events generated by “things” of IoT will require prohibitively high network bandwidth in the case of “IoT + Cloud” scenario [3, 5]. Apart from these downsides, cloud computing will simply suffer from processing time inefficiency due to the large overhead of IoT data. Recent research efforts are investigating how to effectively exploit capabilities at the edge of networks to support the IoT in the context of the smart city [6]. In edge computing, massive data generated by different types of IoT devices of a smart city can be processed at the network edge instead of transmitting them to the distant cloud data centers owing to bandwidth and energy consumption concerns. Edge computing can provide services with faster response and greater quality, in comparison with cloud computing. Edge computing is more suitable to be integrated into the paradigm of a smart city to provide real-time services for a large number of end users.Figure1 depicts a smart city with dedicated servers for different city-oriented services. By using different IoT devices, users connect to those service servers through edge servers to obtain real-time services (cloud computing can also be used for providing non-real-time services). There can be millions of registered users for a particular server, and one user may be client(s) of multiple servers. Service to service and user to service communication are common scenarios in the context of a smart city. Most of the services can generally be accessed through IoT devices. In such a situation, user identification and authentication is a paramount security issue. It is important to note that edge computing can incorporate a hierarchy of servers with increasing computation capabilities for better service [7]. The hierarchy of servers can be organized into a cluster-based formation. The proposed cluster-based authentication process utilizes this capability of edge computing to manage the security challenges of a smart city more effectively. In a smart city, there will be thousands of users, who will access data, and it will be very difficult to observe every activity of a user. So, we consider cluster-based authentication to minimize the insider attacks, where a cluster member cannot access data of another cluster without going through her/his cluster master, who is a more trusted subject (user) than a cluster member. The clustering will decrease the processing overheads of authentication and authorization systems. The proposed authentication process is integrated with a trust evaluation method that helps to identify malicious activities of the user(s).Figure 1
A smart city with different computing service facilities.An increasing number of studies emphasize on the security, privacy, and risks within smart cities, highlighting the threats relating to information security and challenges for smart city infrastructure in view of management and processing of personal data [8–10]. Hence, privacy, data integrity, authenticity, and availability of information are major concerns for a smart city [11]. In this paper, we focus on to provide high availability of information and at the same time maintain privacy and data integrity. The contributions of the paper are as follows:(i)
We have shown a concept of data processing through edge servers and service servers controlled by the central server(s) in a smart city.(ii)
A robust trust evaluation process has been designed to evaluate the user trust before and after the registration to control the activities of the members as a first line of defense. This process is demonstrated using simulation results.(iii)
A secured cluster-based authentication process has been designed in the paradigm of edge computing. The secrecy of user information and authentication process is verified using AVISPA and Scyther.(iv)
A secured key management process has been verified using simulation results that ensure data confidentiality and integrity.In this way, the paper contributes to realize an efficient ecosystem of IoT devices, data, and applications along with stringent security requirements. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section2, we describe the proposed Trust Evaluation and Cluster-based Authentication Process. Section 3 presents comparison and discussion in detail. Finally, we render our concluding observations in Section 4.


## 2. Trust Evaluation and Cluster-Based Authentication Process

In the proposed cluster-based approach, we consider three types of servers such as edge server, which can ease the processing and storing overload of the other server; service server for each service (e.g., emergency healthcare service); and the central server for a smart city. Each user communicates with an edge server, which is located in the user’s locality. A user can get service from any service server through cluster-based communication. All users of a service server will be registered with the help of the edge servers. Users will perform registration through the respective edge server.


### 2.1. Trust Evaluation

For user registration, at first, the “trust” of a user is evaluated. Trust has been treated as a soft security mechanism for protection or a means for security in many fields, ranging from economics, psychology, sociology, medicine, and technology [12]. Hence, it is nearly impossible to generalize the concept of trust. Even for a specific field, trust is very complicated as it can be influenced by many measurable and nonmeasurable attributes [13]. Trust can be classified into two types: one is direct trust and another is indirect trust [14, 15].For registration in a service server, a direct trust can be gained if a user can present her/his National Identification Number (NID) or passport number or an equivalent authentic document issued by the government. On the other hand, if a user cannot present her/his NID/passport, for registration s/he must be endorsed by one or more existing user(s) having direct trust or a representative (such as a commissioner) from the user’s locality. In this way, a user can gain indirect trust and be eligible for registration. Once a user is registered into one or more service server(s), her/his trust will be evaluated continuously according to her/his activities over time. Hence, in the process of trust evaluation, it is required to automatically collect information concerning trust decision attributes, evaluate the level of trust based on the values of trust decision attributes, and at times evaluate the entire trust evaluation process to make the proposed trust evaluation process more effective and updated [13].The proposed trust evaluation process works as follows. At first, we define the levels of trust (LT) and their associated value ranges according to Table1. When a user performs registration through direct trust, s/he is assigned “mid (M)” as the LT. Hence, s/he obtains a random value in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] as the initial trust value. Similarly, when a user performs registration through indirect trust, s/he is assigned “low (L)” as the LT. As a result, s/he obtains a random value in the interval of [0.31, 0.40] as the initial trust value. After a user obtains the initial trust value, her/his trust value is continuously updated based on a reward-penalty method. We use the following recurrence to assign ITV (Initial Trust Value) to a user Ui who is registered to the system.(1)ITV=0.41,0.50,through direct trust,0.31,0.40,through indirect trust.Table 1
Levels of trust and their associated value ranges.
Levels of trust (LT)Revocation list (RL)Warning (W)Low (L)Mid (M)High (H)Very high (VH)Value ranges[0.00, 0.15][0.16, 0.30][0.31, 0.40][0.41, 0.50][0.51, 0.80][0.81, 1.00]For each unwanted or malicious activity by the user, her/his trust value will be decreased (as a penalty). Malicious activities for which the trust value is penalized or rewarded is called trust decision attributes (TDAs). Malicious activities such as unauthorized read, write, update, or delete of data are examples of some TDAs for which trust value can be decreased. According to the proposed trust evaluation process, TDAs for which the trust value is decreased are grouped into the following two broad categories:(i)
Data-level TDAs(ii)
Application-level TDAsTDAs of the abovementioned groups and their penalty points are defined in Tables2 and 3.Table 2
Penalties for data-level TDAs.
Data-level attributesUnauthorized readUnauthorized writeUnauthorized updateUnauthorized deleteUnauthorized uploadUnauthorized downloadPenalties0.10.20.20.30.20.2Table 3
Penalties for application-level TDAs.
Application-level attributesInappropriate shareInappropriate useUnauthorized installationUnauthorized executionUnauthorized uploadUnauthorized downloadPenalties0.10.20.20.30.20.2On the other hand, for a day-long authorized activity, the user’s trust value will be increased (as a reward). For LTs ranging from low (L) to high (H), the user’s trust value will be increased by 0.01 for each day-long authorized activity. However, for both warning (W) and very high (VH) LTs, the trust value will be increased by 0.001 for each day-long authorized activity. Trust value will not be gone beyond 1.00.We now explain how the trust value of a user can be changed over time according to her/his activities and, as a result, how it impacts the LT. We suppose that a user is registered in a service server (the Emergency Medical Service Server) through direct trust; hence, the user’s LT will be “mid” and a random number in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] will be assigned as the trust value. Let us assume that the initial trust value (ITV) is 0.45. Now if s/he asks for medical assistance through an application deployed in the emergency medical service server, the emergency medical service will act accordingly. However, if it is identified that the service was called without any purpose, according to Table3, the user’s trust value will be reduced by 0.20 for “inappropriate use” of the application. The user’s current trust value (CTV) will be 0.25, and as a result, the user’s LT will change from “mid” to “warning” and an appropriate text warning will be sent to the user. After receiving the warning, if the user starts committing authorized activities, then for each day-long authorized activity the trust value will be increased by 0.001. In this way, the user can increase her/his LT. However, if the user does the same malicious activity with CTV 0.25, her/his CTV will again be reduced by 0.20 (changes of values for CTV can be formulated using equation (1)). As the user’s CTV will be 0.05, the user’s LT will be “revocation list” and her/his information will be put into the “revocation list” database so that s/he will be barred from not only using the Emergency Medical Service Server but also other sensitive service servers. Even if the user tries to obtain a new registration through indirect trust, s/he will be detected from the “revocation list” database and will be barred from obtaining a new registration. However, the user can again be assigned to the “warning” LT only if it is advised by an appropriate regulatory body. The proposed trust evaluation process can be further explained in Figure 2. In Figure 2, DTF (Database for Trust Evaluation) consists of tables of trust decision attributes, LTs and associated value ranges, and the revocation list, and DRU stands for Database for Registered Users.(2)CTV=ITV−∑i=1TDApenTDAi+∑j=1Dinc.Figure 2
The process of trust evaluation.Here, in (2) TDA is the number of trust decision attributes. penTDAi indicates the penalty associated with the i-th TDA. D is the number of day-long authorized activity; inc is the increment (as a reward) of CTV for each day-long authorized activity based on CTV. We define inc as follows:(3)inc=0.01,if CTV∈0.31,0.40,0.001,if CTV≤0.30or CTV≥0.81.It is worth to mention that the whole process of trust evaluation is flexible. For example, penalties of TDAs can be reviewed regularly and can be updated as per relevancy to the trust decision process. Accordingly, if any TDA such as “unauthorized download” from the category of application-level attributes (Table3) becomes irrelevant in the future, then its penalty will be set to a very small value or zero. If a new TDA appears to be relevant, it can be incorporated with an appropriate penalty. Even if a new category of TDAs evolves, they can be incorporated into the process of trust evaluation. Different data mining algorithms [16, 17] can be applied in the evolution of the trust evaluation process.We now identify how effective is the proposed trust evaluation process in terms of protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attack and resistance to insider attack. In doing so, we simulate some scenarios as described in the following. The simulation program is developed using Python 3.8. For simulation, we consider three types of scenarios.(i)
Scenario 1: user first commits malicious activity and then plans to do day-long authorized activity(ii)
Scenario 2: user first does day-long authorized activity and then plan to commit malicious activity(iii)
Scenario 3: user starts at random whether to commit a malicious activity or do the day-long authorized activityIn Scenario 1, a user with direct trust obtains a random value in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] as ITV (initial trust value) according to equation (1). Then, s/he starts activities by first committing a malicious activity. The malicious activity is selected randomly from the set of data-level TDAs and application-level TDAs. As a result, the user’s CTV (current trust value) will be reduced. To compensate the reduction, the user starts doing day-long authorized activity so that again user’s CTV can be increased and again s/he can get an opportunity do some malicious activities. However, if the user goes into the “revocation list” in the database, her/his CTV will never be increased unless s/he is again assigned to the “warning” LT (level of trust) by an appropriate regulatory body.From the simulation, we see that if a user with direct trust first commits a malicious activity and then plans to do day-long authorized activity (any number of days from 1 to 30), s/he will be able to commit only another malicious activity before going into the “revocation list” in the database. Here, in total two (02) malicious activities are committed, however, at the cost of nine (09) day-long authorized activities (see columns 2 and 3 of the first data row of Table4). In this paper, we define maximum possible malicious activities (MPMA) as the number of malicious activities before going into the “revocation list.” We also define the number of day-long authorized activities before going into the “revocation list” as the cost in days (CD). Here, MPMA = 2 and CD = 9. If the same user first does a day-long authorized activity (any number of days from 1 to 30) to increase CTV and then plan to commit malicious activity, s/he will be able to commit 4 malicious activities (MPMA), however, at the cost of 68 day-long activities (CD) (see columns 6 and 7 of the first data row of Table 4). If the same user starts by random (whether to commit a malicious activity or do day-long authorized activity), then MPMA = 4 and CD = 65 (see columns 10 and 11 of the first data row of Table 4).Table 4
Simulation of the proposed trust evaluation process.
Scenario 1Scenario 2Scenario 31 to 301 to 601 to 301 to 601 to 301 to 60Type of usersMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDUser with direct trust29242468287897746537954User with indirect trust101035344136844412326An example of how MPMA and CD are calculated for simulation is described in the following. At first, a user with direct trust obtains a random value of 0.49 in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] as ITV. Then, for the case of “Scenario 1,” malicious activity is selected randomly from the set of data-level TDAs and application-level TDAs. If “unauthorized download” gets selected from data-level TDAs, the associated penalty of 0.2 is deducted from the CTV of the user. As a result, CTV of the user reduces to 0.49–0.2 = 0.29 according to equation (2). At this point, MPMA = 1 (as one malicious activity has just been committed). The reduction of CTV also affects the user’s LT (level of trust). With a CTV of 0.29, the user’s LT will change from “mid” to “warning” and an appropriate text warning will be sent to the user. Now, if the user starts committing authorized activity, then for each day-long authorized activity the trust value will be increased by 0.001 (this increment value is assigned with the “warning” LT). For simulation, the number of day-long authorized activity is randomly selected either from 1 to 30 or from 1 to 60. Even if 60 is selected (meaning two month-long uninterrupted authorized activities), CTV is only increased to 0.29+0.001×60=0.29+0.06≡0.30. At this point, CD = 60. However, when the user commits the next random malicious activity (suppose with 0.2 penalties), CTV is reduced to 0.30–0.20 = 0.10. At this point, MPMA will be 2 (as two malicious activities have been committed in total). However, with CTV = 0.10, the user is placed into the “revocation list” database and will be barred from not only using the Emergency Service Servers but also other sensitive service servers. The user’s CTV will never be increased unless s/he is again assigned to the “warning” LT, however, only if recommended by an appropriate regulatory body. In the same way, the simulation result also shows that in Scenario 1, the most likely value of MPMA is 2 (see Table 4). In Table 4, we interpret “any number of day-long authorized activities from 1 to 30” as “1 to 30” and “any number of day-long authorized activities from 1 to 60” as “1 to 60” for convenience.From Table4, we see that even for users with direct trust, and planning intelligently and patiently (user first do day-long authorized activity for any number from 1 to 60 and then plan to commit malicious activities), CD/MPMA is 31.28. This implies that even when the user(s) plan meticulously for committing malicious activities, they will not be able to repeat that within a month. Such a low frequency of malicious activities can occur even by mistake. Hence, it is easily understandable that the proposed trust evaluation process provides formidable protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attack and insider attack.The calculation of CTV, which in turn determines the LT of a user, is performed in such a way that it is independent of the nature of applications or sensors (or any IoT devices). As detailed above, the calculation of CTV is directly dependent on data-level TDAs, application-level TDAs, and the current LT of a user. Therefore, the CTV of a user is directly dependent on the usage pattern of that particular user. This is why, in the scenario of a concurrent attack on an application, the CTVs of all participating users are reduced in the same manner.


### 2.2. Cluster-Based Authentication

Now, the proposed cluster-based authentication process comes into action. According to the proposed cluster-based authentication process, each service server gets a number generated by the central server and it is unique for each service server. Similarly, each edge server gets a number generated by the respective service server and each user of an edge server is assigned a number generated by the edge server. These numbers are called authentication numbers, which are used for generating keys and authentication token for each entity (user, edge server, and service server). Here, we have considered two types of cryptosystems such as symmetric (secret key) and asymmetric (public key) cryptosystems. In a secret key cryptosystem, a secret key is used for both encryption and decryption. In an asymmetric cryptosystem, private and public keys are used. Figure3 shows an edge server with its registered users. The respective server generates the authentication number using a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-512 or any other strong hash function. The authentication number generation process is given below.(1)
For the central server, ANcs = H (IDcs‖ RN ‖ TScs-an) generated by itself(2)
For a service server, ANss = H (IDss‖ ANcs ‖ TSss-an) generated by the central server(3)
For an edge server, ANes = H (IDes‖ ANss ‖ TSes-an) generated by the respective service server(4).
For a user, ANu = H (IDu‖ Pwd ‖ ANes ‖ TSu-an) generated by the respective edge serverFigure 3
An edge server with its registered users.The authentication numbers of all registered users are stored in the respective edge servers. All the symbolic notations used in this article are defined in Table5. All the authentication numbers are stored in the server, which generates them and the respective entity obtains her/his/its authentication number from her/his/its controlling server. Here, an authentication number is much secured since it is generated using a one-way hash function such as SHA-512. Hence, it is not possible to compute an authentication number of a user without knowing the authentication number of the respective edge server and the authentication number of an edge server cannot be computed without knowing the authentication number of the respective service server. A user can get access to the respective edge server using her/his IDu, Pwd, and ANu. For secured communication, each entity will have a secret key. The secret key generation process is as follows:(1)
For a user, Ksec-u = H (IDu‖ ANu ‖ ESsec ‖ TSu-k) generated by the respective edge server(2)
For an edge server, Ksec-es = H (IDes‖ ANes ‖ SSsec ‖ TSes-k) generated and stored by the respective service server(3)
For a service server, Ksec-ss = H (IDss‖ ANss ‖ CSsec ‖ TSss-k) generated and stored by the central server(4)
For the central server, Ksec-cs = H (IDcs‖ ANcs ‖ CSsec ‖ TScs-k)Table 5
Symbols with their definitions.
SymbolDefinition‖ConcatenationES, SS, CSEdge server, service server, and central serverIDu, IDes, IDss, IDcsID of a user, edge server, service server, and central server, respectivelyPwdPassword of a userATu, ATes, ATssAuthentication Token for a user, edge server, and service server, respectivelyRNcsRandom number of the central serverANu, ANes, ANss, ANcsAuthentication number of user, edge server, service server, and the central server, respectivelyESsec, SSsec, CSsecSecret key of edge server, service server, and central server, respectivelyTSu, TSes, TSss, TScsTime stamp for the user, edge server, service, and central server, respectively. Times tamp means date and time. In a time stamp an, k and AT represent authentication number, key, and authentication token, respectively. For example, TSu-an is the time stamp for generating the authentication number of a userKsec-u, Ksec-es, Ksec-ssPrivate key of the user, edge server, and service server, respectivelyFor the security of the secret key of each entity (user, edge server, service server, and central server), secrecy of the respective generating entity plays an important role. For example, in case of the secret key of a user (Ksec-u), even if ANu (authentication number of the user) is compromised no one can compute Ksec-u without knowing the ESsec (secret key of the edge server). Similarly, other secret or private keys cannot be computed without knowing the secret key of the respective generating entity. Dialogues of the different entities in process of secret key generation are shown in Table 6.Table 6
Dialogues of different entities.
UserEdge serverService serverCentral server1. Requests ANu1.1 Sends requested ANu2. Requests with (IDu + ANu) for Ksec-u2.1 Generates Ksec-u3. Requests ANes3.1 Sends ANes4. Requests with (IDes + ANes) for Ksec-es4.1 Generates Ksec-es5. Requests ANss5.1 Sends ANss6. Requests with (IDss + ANss) for Ksec-ss6.1 Generates Ksec-ss7. Generates Ksec-csIn the proposed approach, each service server and its related edge server constitute a cluster. Each edge server is a cluster member, and the respective service server is a cluster master in the cluster. The secret key of a cluster member is used for secured communication between a member of a cluster and its master (service server). Member to member communication is performed using public key cryptography [18]. However, the user to user communication can be done through the help of the respective edge server. For cluster-based communication, each entity will use token for authentication purposes. The generation process of authentication token is as follows:(1)
For a user, ATu = H (IDu‖ Ksec-u ‖ ESsec ‖ TSu-at) generated by the respective edge server(2)
For an edge server, ATes = H (Ides‖ Ksec-es ‖ SSsec ‖ TSes-at) generated by the respective service server(3)
For a service server, ATss = H (IDss‖ Ksec-ss ‖ CSsec ‖ TSss-at) generated by the central serverFigure4 shows a cluster where all edge servers are members of the cluster and the respective service server is the cluster master. A cluster member can be authenticated by the cluster master whenever it is necessary. If there are r (more than one) service servers in a smart city, there will be r clusters for secured communication.Figure 4
A cluster of edge servers and the respective service server.Here, a user gets services directly from the edge server where s/he has done her/his registration. At first, a user logs in to the edge server using her/his ID, Pwd, and authentication token (AT). For a strong authentication process, AT is used here. A user can get service from another edge server where s/he has not registered. This process will be performed in the following way. Suppose a userUi has performed registration in an edge server ESi where her/his credential is stored. If s/he wants to get service from an edge server ESj (where the user Ui has not performed her/his registration), in such case, in the log-in process the edge server asks the user to enter her/his ID, Pwd, and the ID of the edge server ESi. The server ESj sends an encrypted message (where plain text is ID, Pwd of the user, and the ID of ESj with a nonce which is used to authenticate the message) to ESi to authenticate the user Ui. Next, ESi authenticates the user and sends an encrypted response to ESj. Here, all the edge servers in a cluster use public key cryptosystem such as RSA or elliptical curve cryptography for secret messaging. The above scenario is depicted in Figure 5. In Figure 5, CTes denotes ciphertext, which is generated using the private key of ESj where plain text is ID and Pwd of the user, ID of ESj, and a nonce (n1). ESi decrypts the message using the public key of ESj and finds the authentication request to authenticate the user Ui. ESi sends an authentication message (AMes) with n1 to ESj. In this way, ESj authenticates the user Ui.Figure 5
Authentication of a user from a different edge server.Now, when an edge server itself wants to get service from the service server of the same cluster (cluster master), the edge server is authenticated by the service server. The edge server sends an encrypted message using the secret key of the edge server where plain text is ID and AT of the edge server. After receiving the message, the service server will authenticate the edge server and accept the request for the service if the requesting edge server is an authentic one.When an edge server wants to get service from a service server (cluster master) of a different cluster, the edge server sends the request to the cluster master of its cluster with its ID and AT and the ID of the server from which it wants to get service. Suppose an edge serverESe (cluster member of cluster e) wants to get service from SSg (cluster master of cluster g). Let the cluster master of cluster e is SSe. In this case, ESe encrypts its ID and AT and sends a request message to SSe to get the service from SSg. Then, SSe opens the message and finds ID and AT, and authenticates ESe. If ESe is an authentic member, then SSe sends an encrypted message using its private key and a nonce. SSg receives the message and opens it using the public key of SSe. In this way, ESe can reach out SSg for the desired service. This scenario is depicted in Figure 6.Figure 6
Communication between an edge server and a service server of a different cluster.In the cluster-based authentication process, there exists another cluster where members are all the service servers and cluster master is the central server or an authentication server connected with the central server (see Figure7). This cluster is mainly used to authenticate the service server when interservice server communication is needed. Suppose a service server SSb wants to get service from the service server SSc. In this situation, the SSc uses its private key and sends an encrypted message to the central server to authenticate SSb. The central server will then send a message to SSb to send his ID and AT. Then, SSb sends its ID and AT as a ciphertext using its secret key. The central server opens it and authenticates SSb if its AT is in the central server.Figure 7
A cluster of service servers and the central server.Secured communication between two service servers can be performed using public cryptography such as RSA [19] or elliptical curve cryptography. According to Chatzigiannakis et al. [20], elliptical curve cryptography is a better alternative to RSA as elliptical curve cryptography requires less computational resources. In the paradigm of the proposed approach, the majority of devices will have enough resources required. Suppose an edge server ESp is a member where the cluster master is SSc and ESp wants to get service from another service server SSg. In this case, ESp sends a request message to SSg with the ID of SSc. Then, SSg sends the encrypted request message of ESp using the public key of SSc. SSc opens it and finds the ID and AT of the edge server ESp and proceeds accordingly.Verification of phases 3, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 from Table7 is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther separately. For the phases mentioned, the secrecy of messages is verified using both AVISPA and Scyther. In addition, AVISPA also checks the authentication of messages. We achieve the following goals when the protocol from mentioned table is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther.(1)
Secrecy of ID, Pwd, andAMes using AVISPA and Scyther when ESj and ESi pass messages between them(2)
Authentication of the sender using AVISPA when ID and Pwd of user sent fromESj from ESi(3)
No attack by an intruder when checking authentication using AVISPA when (ID + Pwd) of user are sent byESjTable 7
Dialogue for user authentication.
User (Ui)Edge serverESiEdge serverESj1. Login toESi with (ID, Pwd, AT)1.1 Finds AT and authenticatesUi2. Sends log-in request toESj2.1 Asks (ID + Pwd) ofUi and ID of ESi2.2. Sends (ID + Pwd) ofUi and ID of ESi2.3 Received necessary information3. Encrypts (ID + Pwd) of user and ID ofESj with a nonce using the public key of ESi and private key of ESj and sends PEes to ESi to authenticate Ui3.1 Decrypts PE the public key ofESj and private key of ESi and finds an authentication request3.2 AuthenticatesUi, encrypts AMes by symmetric key (ESi, ESj), and sends encrypted message AMes to ESj3.3AMes is received and decrypts by symmetric key (ESi, ESj) and authenticate UiWhenESj sends PEes to ESi, it is encrypted using the public key of ESi and the private key of ESj. The target is to ensure the authenticity of the sender and maintain the secrecy of the messages within the cipher. Figures 8 and 9 show that AVISPA and Scyther verify the secrecy of plain texts (ID and Pwd), respectively, inside PEes cipher. At this phase, the receiver receives the cipher and decrypts using the public key of the sender and the private key of the receiver. Authentication of the sender at the same phase is maintained, which is verified by AVISPA, and Figure 8 shows the result. In the same figure, AVISPA also verifies that due to this authentication process no intruder can attack. On the other hand, when ESi sends AMes to ESj, the secrecy of AMes is maintained in both sender and receiver ends. At this phase, the sender encrypts the message using a symmetric key shared by the sender and receiver. AVISPA and Scyther both verify this result in Figures 8 and 9.Figure 8
Simulation result of the protocol in Table7 using AVISPA verifies secrecy and authentication.Figure 9
Simulation result of the protocol in Table7 using Scyther verifies secrecy.Verification of phases 1, 1.1, 2, and 2.1 in Table8 is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther separately. For all the phases mentioned, the secrecy of messages is verified using both AVISPA and Scyther. In addition, AVISPA also checks the authentication of messages. We achieve the following goals when the protocol from the mentioned table is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther.(1)
Secrecy ofATes and PEss using AVISPA and Scyther when ESe, SSe, and SSg pass messages among them(2)
Authentication of the sender using AVISPA whenPEss is sent from ESe to SSg(3)
No attack by intruder occurs when checking authentication using AVISPA whenPEss is sent by ESeTable 8
Dialogue for getting service from the different cluster master.
Cluster memberESeCluster masterSSeCluster masterSSg1. Sends encrypted service request using E ((IDes‖ ATes), ID of SSg) by symmetric key (ESe, SSe)1.1 Decrypts the encrypted request and finds IDes, ATes, and authenticateESe2. Creates an encrypted message (PEss) using the private key ofSSe and a nonce2.1 Receives encrypted message and decrypts using the public key ofSSe2.2 Accepts service requestWhenESe sends a service request to SSe, the secrecy of the message checked from sender and receiver sides, both AVISPA and Scyther in Figures 10 and 11, respectively, show that secrecy of ATes is maintained. At this phase, the message is encrypted using a symmetric key shared between sender and receiver. On the other hand, the secrecy of PEss is maintained when ESe sends an encrypted message to SSg. At this phase, the sender encrypts the message using the private key of ESe and SSg decrypts the cipher using the public key of SSe. This result of secrecy is verified by AVISPA and Scyther, which are shown in above mentioned figures. In addition, authentication of the sender of PEss also verified by AVISPA, which is depicted in Figure 11.Figure 10
Simulation result of the protocol in Table8 using AVISPA verifies secrecy and authentication.Figure 11
Simulation result of the protocol in Table8 using Scyther verifies secrecy.


## 2.1. Trust Evaluation

For user registration, at first, the “trust” of a user is evaluated. Trust has been treated as a soft security mechanism for protection or a means for security in many fields, ranging from economics, psychology, sociology, medicine, and technology [12]. Hence, it is nearly impossible to generalize the concept of trust. Even for a specific field, trust is very complicated as it can be influenced by many measurable and nonmeasurable attributes [13]. Trust can be classified into two types: one is direct trust and another is indirect trust [14, 15].For registration in a service server, a direct trust can be gained if a user can present her/his National Identification Number (NID) or passport number or an equivalent authentic document issued by the government. On the other hand, if a user cannot present her/his NID/passport, for registration s/he must be endorsed by one or more existing user(s) having direct trust or a representative (such as a commissioner) from the user’s locality. In this way, a user can gain indirect trust and be eligible for registration. Once a user is registered into one or more service server(s), her/his trust will be evaluated continuously according to her/his activities over time. Hence, in the process of trust evaluation, it is required to automatically collect information concerning trust decision attributes, evaluate the level of trust based on the values of trust decision attributes, and at times evaluate the entire trust evaluation process to make the proposed trust evaluation process more effective and updated [13].The proposed trust evaluation process works as follows. At first, we define the levels of trust (LT) and their associated value ranges according to Table1. When a user performs registration through direct trust, s/he is assigned “mid (M)” as the LT. Hence, s/he obtains a random value in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] as the initial trust value. Similarly, when a user performs registration through indirect trust, s/he is assigned “low (L)” as the LT. As a result, s/he obtains a random value in the interval of [0.31, 0.40] as the initial trust value. After a user obtains the initial trust value, her/his trust value is continuously updated based on a reward-penalty method. We use the following recurrence to assign ITV (Initial Trust Value) to a user Ui who is registered to the system.(1)ITV=0.41,0.50,through direct trust,0.31,0.40,through indirect trust.Table 1
Levels of trust and their associated value ranges.
Levels of trust (LT)Revocation list (RL)Warning (W)Low (L)Mid (M)High (H)Very high (VH)Value ranges[0.00, 0.15][0.16, 0.30][0.31, 0.40][0.41, 0.50][0.51, 0.80][0.81, 1.00]For each unwanted or malicious activity by the user, her/his trust value will be decreased (as a penalty). Malicious activities for which the trust value is penalized or rewarded is called trust decision attributes (TDAs). Malicious activities such as unauthorized read, write, update, or delete of data are examples of some TDAs for which trust value can be decreased. According to the proposed trust evaluation process, TDAs for which the trust value is decreased are grouped into the following two broad categories:(i)
Data-level TDAs(ii)
Application-level TDAsTDAs of the abovementioned groups and their penalty points are defined in Tables2 and 3.Table 2
Penalties for data-level TDAs.
Data-level attributesUnauthorized readUnauthorized writeUnauthorized updateUnauthorized deleteUnauthorized uploadUnauthorized downloadPenalties0.10.20.20.30.20.2Table 3
Penalties for application-level TDAs.
Application-level attributesInappropriate shareInappropriate useUnauthorized installationUnauthorized executionUnauthorized uploadUnauthorized downloadPenalties0.10.20.20.30.20.2On the other hand, for a day-long authorized activity, the user’s trust value will be increased (as a reward). For LTs ranging from low (L) to high (H), the user’s trust value will be increased by 0.01 for each day-long authorized activity. However, for both warning (W) and very high (VH) LTs, the trust value will be increased by 0.001 for each day-long authorized activity. Trust value will not be gone beyond 1.00.We now explain how the trust value of a user can be changed over time according to her/his activities and, as a result, how it impacts the LT. We suppose that a user is registered in a service server (the Emergency Medical Service Server) through direct trust; hence, the user’s LT will be “mid” and a random number in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] will be assigned as the trust value. Let us assume that the initial trust value (ITV) is 0.45. Now if s/he asks for medical assistance through an application deployed in the emergency medical service server, the emergency medical service will act accordingly. However, if it is identified that the service was called without any purpose, according to Table3, the user’s trust value will be reduced by 0.20 for “inappropriate use” of the application. The user’s current trust value (CTV) will be 0.25, and as a result, the user’s LT will change from “mid” to “warning” and an appropriate text warning will be sent to the user. After receiving the warning, if the user starts committing authorized activities, then for each day-long authorized activity the trust value will be increased by 0.001. In this way, the user can increase her/his LT. However, if the user does the same malicious activity with CTV 0.25, her/his CTV will again be reduced by 0.20 (changes of values for CTV can be formulated using equation (1)). As the user’s CTV will be 0.05, the user’s LT will be “revocation list” and her/his information will be put into the “revocation list” database so that s/he will be barred from not only using the Emergency Medical Service Server but also other sensitive service servers. Even if the user tries to obtain a new registration through indirect trust, s/he will be detected from the “revocation list” database and will be barred from obtaining a new registration. However, the user can again be assigned to the “warning” LT only if it is advised by an appropriate regulatory body. The proposed trust evaluation process can be further explained in Figure 2. In Figure 2, DTF (Database for Trust Evaluation) consists of tables of trust decision attributes, LTs and associated value ranges, and the revocation list, and DRU stands for Database for Registered Users.(2)CTV=ITV−∑i=1TDApenTDAi+∑j=1Dinc.Figure 2
The process of trust evaluation.Here, in (2) TDA is the number of trust decision attributes. penTDAi indicates the penalty associated with the i-th TDA. D is the number of day-long authorized activity; inc is the increment (as a reward) of CTV for each day-long authorized activity based on CTV. We define inc as follows:(3)inc=0.01,if CTV∈0.31,0.40,0.001,if CTV≤0.30or CTV≥0.81.It is worth to mention that the whole process of trust evaluation is flexible. For example, penalties of TDAs can be reviewed regularly and can be updated as per relevancy to the trust decision process. Accordingly, if any TDA such as “unauthorized download” from the category of application-level attributes (Table3) becomes irrelevant in the future, then its penalty will be set to a very small value or zero. If a new TDA appears to be relevant, it can be incorporated with an appropriate penalty. Even if a new category of TDAs evolves, they can be incorporated into the process of trust evaluation. Different data mining algorithms [16, 17] can be applied in the evolution of the trust evaluation process.We now identify how effective is the proposed trust evaluation process in terms of protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attack and resistance to insider attack. In doing so, we simulate some scenarios as described in the following. The simulation program is developed using Python 3.8. For simulation, we consider three types of scenarios.(i)
Scenario 1: user first commits malicious activity and then plans to do day-long authorized activity(ii)
Scenario 2: user first does day-long authorized activity and then plan to commit malicious activity(iii)
Scenario 3: user starts at random whether to commit a malicious activity or do the day-long authorized activityIn Scenario 1, a user with direct trust obtains a random value in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] as ITV (initial trust value) according to equation (1). Then, s/he starts activities by first committing a malicious activity. The malicious activity is selected randomly from the set of data-level TDAs and application-level TDAs. As a result, the user’s CTV (current trust value) will be reduced. To compensate the reduction, the user starts doing day-long authorized activity so that again user’s CTV can be increased and again s/he can get an opportunity do some malicious activities. However, if the user goes into the “revocation list” in the database, her/his CTV will never be increased unless s/he is again assigned to the “warning” LT (level of trust) by an appropriate regulatory body.From the simulation, we see that if a user with direct trust first commits a malicious activity and then plans to do day-long authorized activity (any number of days from 1 to 30), s/he will be able to commit only another malicious activity before going into the “revocation list” in the database. Here, in total two (02) malicious activities are committed, however, at the cost of nine (09) day-long authorized activities (see columns 2 and 3 of the first data row of Table4). In this paper, we define maximum possible malicious activities (MPMA) as the number of malicious activities before going into the “revocation list.” We also define the number of day-long authorized activities before going into the “revocation list” as the cost in days (CD). Here, MPMA = 2 and CD = 9. If the same user first does a day-long authorized activity (any number of days from 1 to 30) to increase CTV and then plan to commit malicious activity, s/he will be able to commit 4 malicious activities (MPMA), however, at the cost of 68 day-long activities (CD) (see columns 6 and 7 of the first data row of Table 4). If the same user starts by random (whether to commit a malicious activity or do day-long authorized activity), then MPMA = 4 and CD = 65 (see columns 10 and 11 of the first data row of Table 4).Table 4
Simulation of the proposed trust evaluation process.
Scenario 1Scenario 2Scenario 31 to 301 to 601 to 301 to 601 to 301 to 60Type of usersMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDMPMACDUser with direct trust29242468287897746537954User with indirect trust101035344136844412326An example of how MPMA and CD are calculated for simulation is described in the following. At first, a user with direct trust obtains a random value of 0.49 in the interval of [0.41, 0.50] as ITV. Then, for the case of “Scenario 1,” malicious activity is selected randomly from the set of data-level TDAs and application-level TDAs. If “unauthorized download” gets selected from data-level TDAs, the associated penalty of 0.2 is deducted from the CTV of the user. As a result, CTV of the user reduces to 0.49–0.2 = 0.29 according to equation (2). At this point, MPMA = 1 (as one malicious activity has just been committed). The reduction of CTV also affects the user’s LT (level of trust). With a CTV of 0.29, the user’s LT will change from “mid” to “warning” and an appropriate text warning will be sent to the user. Now, if the user starts committing authorized activity, then for each day-long authorized activity the trust value will be increased by 0.001 (this increment value is assigned with the “warning” LT). For simulation, the number of day-long authorized activity is randomly selected either from 1 to 30 or from 1 to 60. Even if 60 is selected (meaning two month-long uninterrupted authorized activities), CTV is only increased to 0.29+0.001×60=0.29+0.06≡0.30. At this point, CD = 60. However, when the user commits the next random malicious activity (suppose with 0.2 penalties), CTV is reduced to 0.30–0.20 = 0.10. At this point, MPMA will be 2 (as two malicious activities have been committed in total). However, with CTV = 0.10, the user is placed into the “revocation list” database and will be barred from not only using the Emergency Service Servers but also other sensitive service servers. The user’s CTV will never be increased unless s/he is again assigned to the “warning” LT, however, only if recommended by an appropriate regulatory body. In the same way, the simulation result also shows that in Scenario 1, the most likely value of MPMA is 2 (see Table 4). In Table 4, we interpret “any number of day-long authorized activities from 1 to 30” as “1 to 30” and “any number of day-long authorized activities from 1 to 60” as “1 to 60” for convenience.From Table4, we see that even for users with direct trust, and planning intelligently and patiently (user first do day-long authorized activity for any number from 1 to 60 and then plan to commit malicious activities), CD/MPMA is 31.28. This implies that even when the user(s) plan meticulously for committing malicious activities, they will not be able to repeat that within a month. Such a low frequency of malicious activities can occur even by mistake. Hence, it is easily understandable that the proposed trust evaluation process provides formidable protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attack and insider attack.The calculation of CTV, which in turn determines the LT of a user, is performed in such a way that it is independent of the nature of applications or sensors (or any IoT devices). As detailed above, the calculation of CTV is directly dependent on data-level TDAs, application-level TDAs, and the current LT of a user. Therefore, the CTV of a user is directly dependent on the usage pattern of that particular user. This is why, in the scenario of a concurrent attack on an application, the CTVs of all participating users are reduced in the same manner.


## 2.2. Cluster-Based Authentication

Now, the proposed cluster-based authentication process comes into action. According to the proposed cluster-based authentication process, each service server gets a number generated by the central server and it is unique for each service server. Similarly, each edge server gets a number generated by the respective service server and each user of an edge server is assigned a number generated by the edge server. These numbers are called authentication numbers, which are used for generating keys and authentication token for each entity (user, edge server, and service server). Here, we have considered two types of cryptosystems such as symmetric (secret key) and asymmetric (public key) cryptosystems. In a secret key cryptosystem, a secret key is used for both encryption and decryption. In an asymmetric cryptosystem, private and public keys are used. Figure3 shows an edge server with its registered users. The respective server generates the authentication number using a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-512 or any other strong hash function. The authentication number generation process is given below.(1)
For the central server, ANcs = H (IDcs‖ RN ‖ TScs-an) generated by itself(2)
For a service server, ANss = H (IDss‖ ANcs ‖ TSss-an) generated by the central server(3)
For an edge server, ANes = H (IDes‖ ANss ‖ TSes-an) generated by the respective service server(4).
For a user, ANu = H (IDu‖ Pwd ‖ ANes ‖ TSu-an) generated by the respective edge serverFigure 3
An edge server with its registered users.The authentication numbers of all registered users are stored in the respective edge servers. All the symbolic notations used in this article are defined in Table5. All the authentication numbers are stored in the server, which generates them and the respective entity obtains her/his/its authentication number from her/his/its controlling server. Here, an authentication number is much secured since it is generated using a one-way hash function such as SHA-512. Hence, it is not possible to compute an authentication number of a user without knowing the authentication number of the respective edge server and the authentication number of an edge server cannot be computed without knowing the authentication number of the respective service server. A user can get access to the respective edge server using her/his IDu, Pwd, and ANu. For secured communication, each entity will have a secret key. The secret key generation process is as follows:(1)
For a user, Ksec-u = H (IDu‖ ANu ‖ ESsec ‖ TSu-k) generated by the respective edge server(2)
For an edge server, Ksec-es = H (IDes‖ ANes ‖ SSsec ‖ TSes-k) generated and stored by the respective service server(3)
For a service server, Ksec-ss = H (IDss‖ ANss ‖ CSsec ‖ TSss-k) generated and stored by the central server(4)
For the central server, Ksec-cs = H (IDcs‖ ANcs ‖ CSsec ‖ TScs-k)Table 5
Symbols with their definitions.
SymbolDefinition‖ConcatenationES, SS, CSEdge server, service server, and central serverIDu, IDes, IDss, IDcsID of a user, edge server, service server, and central server, respectivelyPwdPassword of a userATu, ATes, ATssAuthentication Token for a user, edge server, and service server, respectivelyRNcsRandom number of the central serverANu, ANes, ANss, ANcsAuthentication number of user, edge server, service server, and the central server, respectivelyESsec, SSsec, CSsecSecret key of edge server, service server, and central server, respectivelyTSu, TSes, TSss, TScsTime stamp for the user, edge server, service, and central server, respectively. Times tamp means date and time. In a time stamp an, k and AT represent authentication number, key, and authentication token, respectively. For example, TSu-an is the time stamp for generating the authentication number of a userKsec-u, Ksec-es, Ksec-ssPrivate key of the user, edge server, and service server, respectivelyFor the security of the secret key of each entity (user, edge server, service server, and central server), secrecy of the respective generating entity plays an important role. For example, in case of the secret key of a user (Ksec-u), even if ANu (authentication number of the user) is compromised no one can compute Ksec-u without knowing the ESsec (secret key of the edge server). Similarly, other secret or private keys cannot be computed without knowing the secret key of the respective generating entity. Dialogues of the different entities in process of secret key generation are shown in Table 6.Table 6
Dialogues of different entities.
UserEdge serverService serverCentral server1. Requests ANu1.1 Sends requested ANu2. Requests with (IDu + ANu) for Ksec-u2.1 Generates Ksec-u3. Requests ANes3.1 Sends ANes4. Requests with (IDes + ANes) for Ksec-es4.1 Generates Ksec-es5. Requests ANss5.1 Sends ANss6. Requests with (IDss + ANss) for Ksec-ss6.1 Generates Ksec-ss7. Generates Ksec-csIn the proposed approach, each service server and its related edge server constitute a cluster. Each edge server is a cluster member, and the respective service server is a cluster master in the cluster. The secret key of a cluster member is used for secured communication between a member of a cluster and its master (service server). Member to member communication is performed using public key cryptography [18]. However, the user to user communication can be done through the help of the respective edge server. For cluster-based communication, each entity will use token for authentication purposes. The generation process of authentication token is as follows:(1)
For a user, ATu = H (IDu‖ Ksec-u ‖ ESsec ‖ TSu-at) generated by the respective edge server(2)
For an edge server, ATes = H (Ides‖ Ksec-es ‖ SSsec ‖ TSes-at) generated by the respective service server(3)
For a service server, ATss = H (IDss‖ Ksec-ss ‖ CSsec ‖ TSss-at) generated by the central serverFigure4 shows a cluster where all edge servers are members of the cluster and the respective service server is the cluster master. A cluster member can be authenticated by the cluster master whenever it is necessary. If there are r (more than one) service servers in a smart city, there will be r clusters for secured communication.Figure 4
A cluster of edge servers and the respective service server.Here, a user gets services directly from the edge server where s/he has done her/his registration. At first, a user logs in to the edge server using her/his ID, Pwd, and authentication token (AT). For a strong authentication process, AT is used here. A user can get service from another edge server where s/he has not registered. This process will be performed in the following way. Suppose a userUi has performed registration in an edge server ESi where her/his credential is stored. If s/he wants to get service from an edge server ESj (where the user Ui has not performed her/his registration), in such case, in the log-in process the edge server asks the user to enter her/his ID, Pwd, and the ID of the edge server ESi. The server ESj sends an encrypted message (where plain text is ID, Pwd of the user, and the ID of ESj with a nonce which is used to authenticate the message) to ESi to authenticate the user Ui. Next, ESi authenticates the user and sends an encrypted response to ESj. Here, all the edge servers in a cluster use public key cryptosystem such as RSA or elliptical curve cryptography for secret messaging. The above scenario is depicted in Figure 5. In Figure 5, CTes denotes ciphertext, which is generated using the private key of ESj where plain text is ID and Pwd of the user, ID of ESj, and a nonce (n1). ESi decrypts the message using the public key of ESj and finds the authentication request to authenticate the user Ui. ESi sends an authentication message (AMes) with n1 to ESj. In this way, ESj authenticates the user Ui.Figure 5
Authentication of a user from a different edge server.Now, when an edge server itself wants to get service from the service server of the same cluster (cluster master), the edge server is authenticated by the service server. The edge server sends an encrypted message using the secret key of the edge server where plain text is ID and AT of the edge server. After receiving the message, the service server will authenticate the edge server and accept the request for the service if the requesting edge server is an authentic one.When an edge server wants to get service from a service server (cluster master) of a different cluster, the edge server sends the request to the cluster master of its cluster with its ID and AT and the ID of the server from which it wants to get service. Suppose an edge serverESe (cluster member of cluster e) wants to get service from SSg (cluster master of cluster g). Let the cluster master of cluster e is SSe. In this case, ESe encrypts its ID and AT and sends a request message to SSe to get the service from SSg. Then, SSe opens the message and finds ID and AT, and authenticates ESe. If ESe is an authentic member, then SSe sends an encrypted message using its private key and a nonce. SSg receives the message and opens it using the public key of SSe. In this way, ESe can reach out SSg for the desired service. This scenario is depicted in Figure 6.Figure 6
Communication between an edge server and a service server of a different cluster.In the cluster-based authentication process, there exists another cluster where members are all the service servers and cluster master is the central server or an authentication server connected with the central server (see Figure7). This cluster is mainly used to authenticate the service server when interservice server communication is needed. Suppose a service server SSb wants to get service from the service server SSc. In this situation, the SSc uses its private key and sends an encrypted message to the central server to authenticate SSb. The central server will then send a message to SSb to send his ID and AT. Then, SSb sends its ID and AT as a ciphertext using its secret key. The central server opens it and authenticates SSb if its AT is in the central server.Figure 7
A cluster of service servers and the central server.Secured communication between two service servers can be performed using public cryptography such as RSA [19] or elliptical curve cryptography. According to Chatzigiannakis et al. [20], elliptical curve cryptography is a better alternative to RSA as elliptical curve cryptography requires less computational resources. In the paradigm of the proposed approach, the majority of devices will have enough resources required. Suppose an edge server ESp is a member where the cluster master is SSc and ESp wants to get service from another service server SSg. In this case, ESp sends a request message to SSg with the ID of SSc. Then, SSg sends the encrypted request message of ESp using the public key of SSc. SSc opens it and finds the ID and AT of the edge server ESp and proceeds accordingly.Verification of phases 3, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 from Table7 is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther separately. For the phases mentioned, the secrecy of messages is verified using both AVISPA and Scyther. In addition, AVISPA also checks the authentication of messages. We achieve the following goals when the protocol from mentioned table is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther.(1)
Secrecy of ID, Pwd, andAMes using AVISPA and Scyther when ESj and ESi pass messages between them(2)
Authentication of the sender using AVISPA when ID and Pwd of user sent fromESj from ESi(3)
No attack by an intruder when checking authentication using AVISPA when (ID + Pwd) of user are sent byESjTable 7
Dialogue for user authentication.
User (Ui)Edge serverESiEdge serverESj1. Login toESi with (ID, Pwd, AT)1.1 Finds AT and authenticatesUi2. Sends log-in request toESj2.1 Asks (ID + Pwd) ofUi and ID of ESi2.2. Sends (ID + Pwd) ofUi and ID of ESi2.3 Received necessary information3. Encrypts (ID + Pwd) of user and ID ofESj with a nonce using the public key of ESi and private key of ESj and sends PEes to ESi to authenticate Ui3.1 Decrypts PE the public key ofESj and private key of ESi and finds an authentication request3.2 AuthenticatesUi, encrypts AMes by symmetric key (ESi, ESj), and sends encrypted message AMes to ESj3.3AMes is received and decrypts by symmetric key (ESi, ESj) and authenticate UiWhenESj sends PEes to ESi, it is encrypted using the public key of ESi and the private key of ESj. The target is to ensure the authenticity of the sender and maintain the secrecy of the messages within the cipher. Figures 8 and 9 show that AVISPA and Scyther verify the secrecy of plain texts (ID and Pwd), respectively, inside PEes cipher. At this phase, the receiver receives the cipher and decrypts using the public key of the sender and the private key of the receiver. Authentication of the sender at the same phase is maintained, which is verified by AVISPA, and Figure 8 shows the result. In the same figure, AVISPA also verifies that due to this authentication process no intruder can attack. On the other hand, when ESi sends AMes to ESj, the secrecy of AMes is maintained in both sender and receiver ends. At this phase, the sender encrypts the message using a symmetric key shared by the sender and receiver. AVISPA and Scyther both verify this result in Figures 8 and 9.Figure 8
Simulation result of the protocol in Table7 using AVISPA verifies secrecy and authentication.Figure 9
Simulation result of the protocol in Table7 using Scyther verifies secrecy.Verification of phases 1, 1.1, 2, and 2.1 in Table8 is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther separately. For all the phases mentioned, the secrecy of messages is verified using both AVISPA and Scyther. In addition, AVISPA also checks the authentication of messages. We achieve the following goals when the protocol from the mentioned table is simulated using AVISPA and Scyther.(1)
Secrecy ofATes and PEss using AVISPA and Scyther when ESe, SSe, and SSg pass messages among them(2)
Authentication of the sender using AVISPA whenPEss is sent from ESe to SSg(3)
No attack by intruder occurs when checking authentication using AVISPA whenPEss is sent by ESeTable 8
Dialogue for getting service from the different cluster master.
Cluster memberESeCluster masterSSeCluster masterSSg1. Sends encrypted service request using E ((IDes‖ ATes), ID of SSg) by symmetric key (ESe, SSe)1.1 Decrypts the encrypted request and finds IDes, ATes, and authenticateESe2. Creates an encrypted message (PEss) using the private key ofSSe and a nonce2.1 Receives encrypted message and decrypts using the public key ofSSe2.2 Accepts service requestWhenESe sends a service request to SSe, the secrecy of the message checked from sender and receiver sides, both AVISPA and Scyther in Figures 10 and 11, respectively, show that secrecy of ATes is maintained. At this phase, the message is encrypted using a symmetric key shared between sender and receiver. On the other hand, the secrecy of PEss is maintained when ESe sends an encrypted message to SSg. At this phase, the sender encrypts the message using the private key of ESe and SSg decrypts the cipher using the public key of SSe. This result of secrecy is verified by AVISPA and Scyther, which are shown in above mentioned figures. In addition, authentication of the sender of PEss also verified by AVISPA, which is depicted in Figure 11.Figure 10
Simulation result of the protocol in Table8 using AVISPA verifies secrecy and authentication.Figure 11
Simulation result of the protocol in Table8 using Scyther verifies secrecy.


## 3. Comparison and Discussion

In this paper, based on some predefined comparison criteria, we present a qualitative comparison between the proposed cluster-based authentication process and some other similar processes that involves authentication. We consider the following contenders in the comparison spectrum.(i)
Contender 1: secure remote user authenticated key establishment protocol for smart home environment [21](ii)
Contender 2: effective authentication for restricting unauthorized user [22](iii)
Contender 3: a secure remote user authentication scheme for smart cities e-governance applications [23](iv)
Contender 4: a secure IoT architecture for smart cities [24]From Table9, we see that the proposed cluster-based authentication process uses more secured public key encryption system with a framework of key hierarchy. Besides, together with trust evaluation, the proposed cluster-based authentication process can provide a shield against DoS and Insider Attack.Table 9
Comparison between the proposed cluster-based authentication process and some other similar processes.
Comparison CriteriaContender 1Contender 2Contender 3Contender 4The proposed cluster-based authentication process1. Applicability in smart city paradigmYesYesYesYesYes2. Applicability in edge computing paradigmNoNoNoNoYes3. Applicability in device levelNoYesNoNoNo4. Use of authentication tokenNoNoNoNoYes5. Use of one time passwordNoYesNoNoNo6. Hierarchical key managementNoNoNoYesYes7. Type of encryptionSymmetric keySymmetric keySymmetric keySymmetric keyPublic key8. Algorithm detailAES-CBCAES-512AES-512 or AES-128AES-512 or AES-128RSA or Elliptical Curve Cryptography9. Protection against denial of service (DoS) attackYesNoYesNoYes10. Resistance to insider attackNoNoYesNoYes11. Trust evaluation on user activityNoNoNoNoYes12. Low latency with high availabilityNoNot applicableNoNoYesWe now evaluate the proposed cluster-based authentication process in terms of execution time(s). Table10 shows the mean execution times of generating authentication numbers (ANcs, ANss, ANes, and ANu), secret keys (Ksec-u, Ksec-es, Ksec-ss, and Ksec-cs) and authentication tokens (ATu, ATes, and ATss) using PHP as a scripting language. We conduct five rounds of executions for each of the authentication numbers, secret keys, and authentication tokens, and then calculate the mean of execution times, where values of IDs (e.g., IDcs, IDss, IDes and IDu) and password are assumed to be six characters long for the abovementioned generation processes. For the same generation processes, Apache server time is used for time stamp (e.g., TSu, TSes, TSss, and TScs) values as we use PHP for above experiment. PHP script generates the abovementioned time stamp values within in Apache server using an Intel Core i5 CPU with 2.30 GHz processor and 8 GB RAM. We use PHP benchmark tool to record the execution times in microseconds. Among the first set that shows authentication number generation times; generation of ANss takes the highest time, where the fastest one is ANcs. In the second set, which shows secret key generation times, close competitors are Ksec-u and Ksec-cs with almost equal time. In the same set, the slowest time is taken by Ksec-es to be generated. In the third set, ATss takes the slowest time among three where ATes is the fastest to be generated. All these keys mentioned in Table 10 are used in variety of dialogues, next paragraphs show detailed comparisons.Table 10
Mean execution time.
Numbers, keys, and tokensMean execution timeANcs1.46×10−5ANss3.24×10−6ANes2.34×10−6ANu3.00×10−6Ksec-u2.96×10−6Ksec-es2.72×10−6Ksec-ss2.81×10−6Ksec-cs2.96×10−6ATu2.77×10−6ATes2.57×10−6ATss2.96×10−6Next, we compare the secret key generation times using variety of hashing algorithms required for “dialogues of different entities,” which is shown in Figure10. We use MD5, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, and Snefru as hashing algorithms to generate secret keys (Ksec-u, Ksec-es, and Ksec-ss) as shown in Table 6. We calculate the total time required to generate secret keys (shown in Table 6) using each of the hashing algorithms (see Figure 12). Our experiment shows that SHA384 and SHA512 perform the best (takes less time) among all the algorithms used, whereas SHA256 and Snefru take more time in execution, and MD5 takes moderate time compared to all others.Figure 12
Total secret key generation times using variety of hashing algorithms for “dialogues of different entities.”Figure13 shows the comparison of total time taken for both encryption and decryption using variety of key length of RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We use these two asymmetric algorithms for “dialogue for user authentication.” We execute all encryption and decryption shown in Table 7 with 1024-, 2048-, and 3072-bit keys separately for RSA, and for the same operations using ECC, we use 160-, 224-, and 256-bit keys. These are the comparable key sizes of these two asymmetric algorithms considering security strengths [25]. For example, 256-bit ECC key will provide same level of security as 3072-bit key of RSA. The figure shows total time required for encryption and decryption with RSA always faster than ECC in all the test cases above. It is shown in [25] that key generation time of ECC is faster than RSA as ECC uses shorter keys to provide same level of security strength. Hence, if encryption and decryption take place more frequently than the key generation process, then use of RSA is a good choice. However, when the situation is opposite, the use of ECC is a better choice.Figure 13
Secret key generation times using variety of key length (1024, 2048, and 3072 bits) in RSA for asymmetric encryption measured for “dialogue for user authentication.”Figure14 shows the comparative result of total execution times for encryption and decryption required for the steps shown in Table 8. These encryption and decryption processes require combination of asymmetric and symmetric keys both. We calculate the total time for two combinations asymmetric and symmetric keys: one set contains RSA and AES with variety of key length and another set contains ECC and AES, where RSA and ECC are asymmetric algorithms and AES is a symmetric one. We use variety of key lengths for each of the sets. RSA with 512-bit key and AES with 128-bit key combination is the fastest in terms of execution time than all other pairs of RSA and AES combination, whereas the combination of RSA (2048) and AES (256) is the slowest in terms of execution time among all the combinations. On the other hand, combination of ECC and AES with variety of key lengths encrypts and decrypts even faster than all the combinations of RSA and AES. The combination of ECC and AES has a decreasing trend in total encryption and decryption time as the key length increases for each execution. For example, ECC with 256-bit key and AES with 256-bit key show the fastest total of encryption and decryption time.Figure 14
Total encryption and decryption times using variety of key lengths of RSA (asymmetric), ECC (asymmetric), and AES (symmetric) for “dialogue for getting service from the different cluster master.”


## 4. Conclusion

In this paper, we have proposed a cluster-based authentication process for the users, edge servers, and service servers, which are engaged in storing, processing, and accessing data. All the necessary processes have been presented using necessary figures and tables. A trust evaluation process is used to evaluate the user trusts before and after the registration to control the activities of the members in the system. The proposed trust evaluation process can be further augmented through fusion of soft information with already existing hard information. Soft information for the proposed trust evaluation process can be collected from three different kinds of platforms such as authority’s complaint platform, users’ review platform, and social media platform. Moreover, simulation of the proposed trust evaluation process has not been conducted for time-advance mechanism using a large number of alternative system configurations. In the future, we intend to extend our work by exploiting the aforementioned scopes. Also, we shall extend our work by comparing with some similar ones such as [26,27].The proposed authentication process is secured enough in the context of a smart city. As such, the authentication token of a user is simulated using the secret key and secret of the generating entity (edge server). Even if the secret key is compromised, authentication token cannot be generated without the secret of the edge server. Similarly, authentication tokens of other entities are secured according to the proposed method. We have done simulations of the protocol using AVISPA and Scyther. The simulation results have shown that the sessions in the process are safe.



---

*Source: 5186376-2022-06-14.xml*