# Tripartite Game Analysis of Military-Civilian Technology Transfer from the Perspective of Technology Characteristics

Authors: Ying Qu; Fei Guo
Journal: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
 (2022)

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## Abstract

Given the enterprise technology corporation technological learning problem of challenging to reduce the efficiency of technology transfer based on evolutionary game theory, from the nature of technical knowledge, military field, and civilian field of technology spillover, recessive and technical complexity, and other technical features, construction of bounded rationality under the condition of the private enterprise, the enterprise, and the government's three evolutionary game models, the influence of different technical characteristics on the three parties is analyzed by Matlab numerical simulation. The results show that intratechnological recessive only negatively inhibits the cooperative behavior of private enterprises. Both technology spillover and technology complexity promote the evolution of noncooperative behavior between military and civilians. The evolution speed of government support behavior is faster under high-intensity technology spillover. Finally, it is suggested that the technology transfer can be effectively promoted by strengthening the technology level of the private military enterprises, improving the technology transferability of the military enterprises, and perfecting the property right incentive mechanism of technological innovation.


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## Body

## 1. Introduction

Against the backdrop of an innovative strategy, civil-military integration has become a national development strategy and an important measure to ensure coordinated national defense development with economic and social development. Military-civilian technology transfer is the trend of The Times and an essential way of deep military-civilian integration. Military enterprises, as the primary support force of weapons and equipment scientific research and production, have superb scientific research and production technology and fully absorb military technology achievements with “strong reliability and high science and technology content” into civilian fundamental productive forces, which has become a meaningful way to promote military-civilian technology transfer. The core of technology transfer is knowledge transfer, including providing technological achievements by the provider and developing and using technology by the recipient. However, the relatively independent operation of military technology and civilian technology research and development production system implements military technology for civilians who face many problems. Military technology has served national defense construction for a long time. It is the embedded technology transformed by military enterprises for long-term coordination, processing, and run-in. It has the characteristics of situational dependence and confidentiality, which will aggravate the difficulties in the military and private technology expression and technology learning, thus reducing the efficiency of technology transfer. Therefore, it is of practical significance to analyze its influence on the main body of technology transfer from technical characteristics and put forward specific suggestions to promote military-civilian technology transfer.As a kind of knowledge, technology can be divided into three kinds of knowledge systems. One is a tangible knowledge system in products, equipment, components, and production. Second is intangible knowledge systems, such as proprietary technology, patents, etc. Third is tacit knowledge, such as technical principles and technical experience. From the perspective of knowledge management, the characteristics of technical knowledge can be divided into technical complexity, implicit technology, and overlapping technology. Technical characteristics affect the technology transfer [1, 2]. Zander et al. [3] believed that the more complex the technology, the lower the possibility of being transferred and imitated. Geng et al. [4] believe that technological uncertainty restricts technology transfer. Cai et al. [5] proposed that military-civilian technology characteristics such as technological complexity and implicit technology harm technology transfer. Xu et al. [6] believe that technology spillover is a crucial factor affecting the enthusiasm for technology transfer. Duan et al. [7] proposed that technology overlapping distance has an inhibitory effect on R&D cooperation based on the hypothesis testing method. The existing research mainly studies the influence of technology characteristics on technology transfer from the static perspective through hypothesis tests and only gets its positive and negative effects, ignoring the tolerance of technology transfer subjects to different degrees of technology characteristics and their possible behaviors.As a research hotspot [8], game theory has been widely applied in economics, management, and other fields [9–12]. In the traditional game theory, people are entirely rational, but in reality, the subject of the game is not entirely rational [13], so it cannot effectively solve the problems in reality. Evolutionary game theory is an improvement of the traditional game theory and can solve the shortcomings of traditional game theory. The evolutionary game theory combines evolutionary biology and rational economics, takes the group as the research object, and assumes that the expectation of the behavior of the game subject is correct [14]. It believes that game subjects are bounded rational and have the abilities of dynamic learning, imitation, and mutation [15]. These capabilities will change its strategy, make it pursue high returns, and finally reach the evolutionarily stable state of the system [16, 17]. In transferring military technology to civilian use, Chinese military enterprises, private enterprises, and government are all subjects with limited rationality. Each subject influences the other and changes according to the change of strategies of the other party to pursue the maximization of interests. Therefore, we can use evolutionary game theory to study military-civilian technology transfer.Existing literature on civil-military technology transfer focuses on development mode and realization path. Lavallee [18] proposed that national scientific and technological innovation cannot do without technology sharing. Yu et al. [19] studied the innovation mechanism of civil-military integration from the perspective of the innovation chain. Li et al. [20] studied the military-civilian coordination mechanism from the perspective of symbiosis. Zhou et al. [21] discussed the path evolution of civil-military technology transfer based on the civil-military technology transfer development process. Tian et al. [22] studied the integration mechanism of military-civilian scientific and technological collaborative innovation elements from three aspects of connotation, structure, and function realization.In addition, some scholars also pay attention to the influencing factors of military-civilian technology transfer. Fang et al. [23] believe that technology acceptance is critical in civil-military integration. Fang et al. [24] believed that product differentiation positively affected technology transfer efficiency. Han et al. [25] suggested that efficiency would affect technology transfer between military and civilians. Fang et al. [26] believed that government incentives would promote military-civilian technology transfer. Zhang et al. [27] believe that the government will eventually withdraw support. Huang et al. [28] believe that technology spillover impacts military-civilian technology transfer. Dong [29] believes that the similarity of technological basis is the basis of military-civilian technology spillover mode. Cao et al. [30] believe that barriers to technology integration are mainly reflected in communication, confidentiality, absorption and transformation capacity, standard differences, etc.To sum up, most existing studies have explored the realization path and analysis of influencing factors of civil-military technology transfer from a macroperspective. The analysis of obstacles to civil-military technology transfer mainly focuses on subjects’ abilities and technological differences. Few discuss the influencing factors of civil-military technology transfer from knowledge management. In addition, the analysis of technological characteristics mainly focuses on its role from the static perspective. It rarely analyzes the impact of technological characteristics on the transfer of civil-military technology from a dynamic perspective. This paper innovatively analyzes the influence of different degrees of technology characteristics on civil-military technology transfer based on evolutionary game theory. The purpose of this article is based on evolutionary game theory, based on the essence of technological knowledge, technical characteristics, in the process of extraction of military technology to civil construction corporation, army, and government tripartite game model of technology transfer of the main body, explores the characteristics of different technologies on the stability of the technology transfer, and uses the Matlab simulation directly showing the influence of related parameters. Finally, some suggestions are put forward. The contribution of this study mainly lies in the use of evolutionary game theory from the dynamic perspective to explore the evolution process of technology transfer of three parties with different degrees of technological characteristics, which has a particular reference significance to providing suggestions for promoting military-civilian technology transfer.The paper is structured as follows. Section2 introduces the concepts related to technical features. Section 3 constructs the evolution game model of military enterprises, private enterprises, and government in the process of the military to civilian. Section 4 analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the three parties in the game. Section 5 is related to numerical analysis. Section 6 is the main conclusion and enlightenment.


## 2. Related Concept Analysis

Military-civilian technology transfer strategy is influenced by policy environment, technological development level, and technological knowledge as a complex and dynamic process. Technology transfer is the transfer of technology from a high to a low level. Effective communication between participants and individuals in the organization is the key to technology transfer success [31]. The technology provider shall clearly express the transferred technology based on the demand and strength of the technology recipient, and the technology recipient shall accept, understand, absorb, and transform the technology. The essence of technology is knowledge. Starting from the attribute of knowledge, the essential characteristics of technology include complexity, implicit, and spillover.Technological complexity refers to the systematization and interdependence among technologies, which is an obstacle caused by the strong dependence on technology scenarios in technology transfer by technology providers. The complexity of technology means that technology contains more tacit knowledge, which is difficult to encode and express clearly [32]. The complexity of technology increases the fuzziness of technology. China’s military technology is a unique national defense technology that has been transformed through long-term running-in. The content transferred is mainly tacit knowledge such as national defense intelligence resources and scientific research achievements with solid situational dependence. Therefore, the more complex the technology is and the more the knowledge fields involved, the more difficult it is for military enterprises to express the essence and connotation of the technology.Implicitness in technology refers to the difficulty of explicit and literal transformation of technology, which is the obstacle of technology recipient due to technical reasons in technology transformation. The complexity of technology itself determines that the concept or theory of explicit and literal technology is not the whole of technology [33]. As tacit knowledge, technology exists more in people’s behaviors and beliefs. The more implicit the technology is, the more difficult it is to express the connotation of the technology, and the more difficult the technical knowledge is to be understood by the recipient [34]. Military technology has served national defense construction for a long time and has high confidentiality, so it is firmly implicit.Technology spillover refers to promoting other enterprises’ technological levels through voluntary or involuntary flow and diffusion of technology [35]. Technology transfer is a form of technology spillover. Based on absorbing and transforming new technologies, the technology recipient can consciously or unconsciously apply the experience and principles acquired from them to the original technologies, improving the recipient’s technological level and competitiveness. However, due to the mobility of technical knowledge, when the new technology or product flows to the recipient through personnel exchange and technical cooperation, the basic technical knowledge can be learned or imitated by other enterprises without cost, which will inevitably cause losses to the provider. The military industry is high-tech; technological innovation investment is significant and of high cost, and the nonconfidential technology spillover phenomenon will be more obvious.


## 3. Evolutionary Game Model

### 3.1. Model Hypothesis

Before constructing the game model of technology transfer, it is necessary to clarify the game subjects’ responsibilities, goals, and shared interests to determine the key influencing factors in military technology transfer to civilian use. For analysis, civil-military technology transfer is simplified into three parties: military enterprises, private enterprises, and government. The common goal of the three parties is to maximize their interests. The difference is that the military and the private enterprises maximize their interests while the government maximizes the comprehensive benefits of national defense and economic development. In transferring military technology to civilian use, military enterprises must comply with the basic standards of national security because of their high-level technology as the technology provider and because of their policy, professionalism, and confidentiality. As technology recipients, private enterprises can use military enterprises’ resources and technologies, break technological barriers, carry out technological innovation, improve competitive market advantages, and maximize benefits. As an essential participant in the technology transfer between military and civilians, the government plays a driving role. Military enterprises are mainly supported by government intervention and capital as a national strategic industry. Due to significant investment in military technology, high risk, and long capital recovery period, the state mainly supplies its capital. In addition, as a national development strategy, the government often issues a series of relevant policies, such as providing services or financial support, to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises, promote the deep integration of military and civilians, and pursue the maximization of comprehensive benefits of national defense construction and economical construction. The difference between the three central bodies leads to the different technical standards. At the same time, the fierce market competition environment and the particularity of technical knowledge make the players in the game in a state of information asymmetry. Therefore, to pursue their own development goals, the three parties in the game need to adjust their strategies through repeated experiments.Based on the above discussion, the following basic hypotheses are made.Hypothesis 1.
Based on bounded rationality, the three-party players of the game will adjust their strategies in time through constant trial and error until the optimal decision is made.Hypothesis 2.
The strategy set of private enterprises is {cooperation and noncooperation}, and their selection probabilities arex and 1 − x, respectively. The military enterprise strategy set is {cooperation, noncooperation}, and its selection probability is y, 1 − y, respectively. The government’s policy set is {supported, not supported}, and its selection probabilities are z, 1 − z, respectively, where x, y, and z∈0,1.Hypothesis 3.
When private enterprises and military enterprises do not carry out technical cooperation, the average income they can obtain depending on their capabilities is expressed asW1, W2, where W1<W2. In technical cooperation, information needs to be obtained through different channels. The cost of information is denoted as C1, C2 (not supported by the government), C3, and C4 (supported by the government). Since the government will encourage technology transfer between the military and the civilian through services and other means, C1 > C3, C2 > C4.Hypothesis 4.
When both the military and the civilian choose the technology cooperation strategy, the private enterprise as the technology recipient needs to payA certain transfer payment fee to the military enterprise to obtain the right to use the technology. New technologies need to be transformed again before they can be absorbed and utilized. Therefore, private enterprises need to pay technology transformation cost nB1, where n is the implicit coefficient of technology, acting on the technology transformation cost of private enterprises in the game process. Private enterprises can obtain knowledge and experience from the absorption and transformation of new technologies and apply them to existing technologies so that the benefits of existing technologies can be increased by m, where m is the technology spillover coefficient, acting on the benefits of existing technologies of private enterprises in the game process. The technology transferred by the military enterprises is successfully absorbed and transformed by the private enterprises, and the cooperation benefit is K. The transfer parties distribute the benefit according to the proportion, and the profit ratio of the military enterprises is a. The profit ratio of the private enterprises is 1 − a.Hypothesis 5.
In the process of technology transfer, military enterprises need to pay a specific technology transfer cost, qB2, where q is the technology complexity coefficient, acting on the technology transfer cost of military enterprises in the game process. Due to the technology spillover phenomenon, in the process of transfer, the basic technical knowledge may be unconditionally learned and imitated by other enterprises, reducing the original revenue by m, where m is the technology spillover coefficient, acting on the original technology revenue of military enterprises in the game process.Hypothesis 6.
In the process of military-civilian technology transfer, the government usually adopts the way of financial support and service support to promote the transfer behavior, among which the financial support is often reflected in the financial subsidy. The subsidies are generally based on the actual project settlement number of military enterprises and private enterprises. The subsidy coefficients are denoted aso and p, respectively, where o and p∈0,0.3. Service support is usually reflected in the establishment of technology sharing platforms or related facilities, and the government needs to invest resource cost C5. Civil-military cooperation will produce social benefits Q. If there is no practical cooperation and the government does not act, resources will be wasted, and the loss is F.
Based on the above hypotheses, the game payment matrix for the technology transfer of three parties is shown in Tables1–3.Table 1
Game payment matrix between military and private enterprises supported by the government.
Military enterpriseCooperationNoncooperationPrivate enterpriseCooperation1+mW1−1−pC3+A+nB1+1−aK,W2+A+aK−1−oC4+qB2−mW2W1−1−pC3,W2NoncooperationW1, W2−1−oC4W1,W2Table 2
The government does not support the game payment matrix between military and private enterprises.
Military enterpriseCooperationNoncooperationPrivate enterpriseCooperation1+mW1−C1−A−nB1+1−aK,1−mW2−C2+A−qB2+aKW1−C1,W2NoncooperationW1, W2−C2W1,W2Table 3
The government revenue matrix under different combinations of strategies.
GovernmentSupportedNot supportedMilitary enterprises/private enterprises(Cooperation, cooperation)(-, -),−pC3+A+nB1−oC4+qB2−C5+Q(-, -), Q(Cooperation, noncooperation)(-, -), -o(C4 +qB2)-C5(-, -), –F(Noncooperation, cooperation)(-, -),−pC3+A+nB1−C5(-, -), –F(Noncooperation, non-cooperation)(-, -), –C5(-, -), –F


### 3.2. Establishing Dynamic Equations

Assume thatEji is the income of civil enterprise, military enterprise, and government choosing different strategies, and E¯j is the average income, where {i = 1 | cooperation/support}, {i = 2 | non-cooperation/non-support}; {j = 1 | civil enterprise}, {j = 2 | military enterprise}, {j = 3 | government}.The expected benefits of civil enterprises choosing different strategies are(1)E11=zy1+mW1−1−pC3+A+nB1+1−aK+1−yW1−1−pC3+1−zy1+mW1−C1−A−nB1+1−aK+1−yW1−C1,E12=zyW1+1−yW1+1−zyW1+1−yW1.The expected benefits of military enterprises choosing different strategies are(2)E21=zxW2+A+aK−1−oC4+qB2−mW2+1−xW2−1−oC4+1−zx1−mW2−C2+A−qB2+aK+1−xW2−C2,E22=zxW2+1−xW2+1−zxW2+1−xW2.The expected benefits of the government choosing different strategies are(3)E31=yx−pC3+A+nB1−oC4+qB2−C5+Q+1−x−oC4+qB2−C5+1−yx−pC3+A+nB1−C5+1−x−C5,E32=yxQ+1−x−F+1−yx−F+1−x−F.According to the dynamic repeated game evolution process, it can be known that the dynamic replication equation of civil enterprises, military enterprises, and governments is(4)U1x=dxdt=x1−xzypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3+ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK−C1,U2y=dydt=y1−yzxoqB2+C2−C4+oC4+xA−mW2−qB2+aK−C2,U3z=dzdt=z1−z−xpC3+pA+pnB1+yF−yoC4+oqB2−C5+F.


## 3.1. Model Hypothesis

Before constructing the game model of technology transfer, it is necessary to clarify the game subjects’ responsibilities, goals, and shared interests to determine the key influencing factors in military technology transfer to civilian use. For analysis, civil-military technology transfer is simplified into three parties: military enterprises, private enterprises, and government. The common goal of the three parties is to maximize their interests. The difference is that the military and the private enterprises maximize their interests while the government maximizes the comprehensive benefits of national defense and economic development. In transferring military technology to civilian use, military enterprises must comply with the basic standards of national security because of their high-level technology as the technology provider and because of their policy, professionalism, and confidentiality. As technology recipients, private enterprises can use military enterprises’ resources and technologies, break technological barriers, carry out technological innovation, improve competitive market advantages, and maximize benefits. As an essential participant in the technology transfer between military and civilians, the government plays a driving role. Military enterprises are mainly supported by government intervention and capital as a national strategic industry. Due to significant investment in military technology, high risk, and long capital recovery period, the state mainly supplies its capital. In addition, as a national development strategy, the government often issues a series of relevant policies, such as providing services or financial support, to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises, promote the deep integration of military and civilians, and pursue the maximization of comprehensive benefits of national defense construction and economical construction. The difference between the three central bodies leads to the different technical standards. At the same time, the fierce market competition environment and the particularity of technical knowledge make the players in the game in a state of information asymmetry. Therefore, to pursue their own development goals, the three parties in the game need to adjust their strategies through repeated experiments.Based on the above discussion, the following basic hypotheses are made.Hypothesis 1.
Based on bounded rationality, the three-party players of the game will adjust their strategies in time through constant trial and error until the optimal decision is made.Hypothesis 2.
The strategy set of private enterprises is {cooperation and noncooperation}, and their selection probabilities arex and 1 − x, respectively. The military enterprise strategy set is {cooperation, noncooperation}, and its selection probability is y, 1 − y, respectively. The government’s policy set is {supported, not supported}, and its selection probabilities are z, 1 − z, respectively, where x, y, and z∈0,1.Hypothesis 3.
When private enterprises and military enterprises do not carry out technical cooperation, the average income they can obtain depending on their capabilities is expressed asW1, W2, where W1<W2. In technical cooperation, information needs to be obtained through different channels. The cost of information is denoted as C1, C2 (not supported by the government), C3, and C4 (supported by the government). Since the government will encourage technology transfer between the military and the civilian through services and other means, C1 > C3, C2 > C4.Hypothesis 4.
When both the military and the civilian choose the technology cooperation strategy, the private enterprise as the technology recipient needs to payA certain transfer payment fee to the military enterprise to obtain the right to use the technology. New technologies need to be transformed again before they can be absorbed and utilized. Therefore, private enterprises need to pay technology transformation cost nB1, where n is the implicit coefficient of technology, acting on the technology transformation cost of private enterprises in the game process. Private enterprises can obtain knowledge and experience from the absorption and transformation of new technologies and apply them to existing technologies so that the benefits of existing technologies can be increased by m, where m is the technology spillover coefficient, acting on the benefits of existing technologies of private enterprises in the game process. The technology transferred by the military enterprises is successfully absorbed and transformed by the private enterprises, and the cooperation benefit is K. The transfer parties distribute the benefit according to the proportion, and the profit ratio of the military enterprises is a. The profit ratio of the private enterprises is 1 − a.Hypothesis 5.
In the process of technology transfer, military enterprises need to pay a specific technology transfer cost, qB2, where q is the technology complexity coefficient, acting on the technology transfer cost of military enterprises in the game process. Due to the technology spillover phenomenon, in the process of transfer, the basic technical knowledge may be unconditionally learned and imitated by other enterprises, reducing the original revenue by m, where m is the technology spillover coefficient, acting on the original technology revenue of military enterprises in the game process.Hypothesis 6.
In the process of military-civilian technology transfer, the government usually adopts the way of financial support and service support to promote the transfer behavior, among which the financial support is often reflected in the financial subsidy. The subsidies are generally based on the actual project settlement number of military enterprises and private enterprises. The subsidy coefficients are denoted aso and p, respectively, where o and p∈0,0.3. Service support is usually reflected in the establishment of technology sharing platforms or related facilities, and the government needs to invest resource cost C5. Civil-military cooperation will produce social benefits Q. If there is no practical cooperation and the government does not act, resources will be wasted, and the loss is F.
Based on the above hypotheses, the game payment matrix for the technology transfer of three parties is shown in Tables1–3.Table 1
Game payment matrix between military and private enterprises supported by the government.
Military enterpriseCooperationNoncooperationPrivate enterpriseCooperation1+mW1−1−pC3+A+nB1+1−aK,W2+A+aK−1−oC4+qB2−mW2W1−1−pC3,W2NoncooperationW1, W2−1−oC4W1,W2Table 2
The government does not support the game payment matrix between military and private enterprises.
Military enterpriseCooperationNoncooperationPrivate enterpriseCooperation1+mW1−C1−A−nB1+1−aK,1−mW2−C2+A−qB2+aKW1−C1,W2NoncooperationW1, W2−C2W1,W2Table 3
The government revenue matrix under different combinations of strategies.
GovernmentSupportedNot supportedMilitary enterprises/private enterprises(Cooperation, cooperation)(-, -),−pC3+A+nB1−oC4+qB2−C5+Q(-, -), Q(Cooperation, noncooperation)(-, -), -o(C4 +qB2)-C5(-, -), –F(Noncooperation, cooperation)(-, -),−pC3+A+nB1−C5(-, -), –F(Noncooperation, non-cooperation)(-, -), –C5(-, -), –F


## 3.2. Establishing Dynamic Equations

Assume thatEji is the income of civil enterprise, military enterprise, and government choosing different strategies, and E¯j is the average income, where {i = 1 | cooperation/support}, {i = 2 | non-cooperation/non-support}; {j = 1 | civil enterprise}, {j = 2 | military enterprise}, {j = 3 | government}.The expected benefits of civil enterprises choosing different strategies are(1)E11=zy1+mW1−1−pC3+A+nB1+1−aK+1−yW1−1−pC3+1−zy1+mW1−C1−A−nB1+1−aK+1−yW1−C1,E12=zyW1+1−yW1+1−zyW1+1−yW1.The expected benefits of military enterprises choosing different strategies are(2)E21=zxW2+A+aK−1−oC4+qB2−mW2+1−xW2−1−oC4+1−zx1−mW2−C2+A−qB2+aK+1−xW2−C2,E22=zxW2+1−xW2+1−zxW2+1−xW2.The expected benefits of the government choosing different strategies are(3)E31=yx−pC3+A+nB1−oC4+qB2−C5+Q+1−x−oC4+qB2−C5+1−yx−pC3+A+nB1−C5+1−x−C5,E32=yxQ+1−x−F+1−yx−F+1−x−F.According to the dynamic repeated game evolution process, it can be known that the dynamic replication equation of civil enterprises, military enterprises, and governments is(4)U1x=dxdt=x1−xzypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3+ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK−C1,U2y=dydt=y1−yzxoqB2+C2−C4+oC4+xA−mW2−qB2+aK−C2,U3z=dzdt=z1−z−xpC3+pA+pnB1+yF−yoC4+oqB2−C5+F.


## 4. Analysis of the Evolutionary Stability Strategy of Model

In military-civilian technology transfer, different participants have different interest demands. When the three parties reach Nash equilibrium by adjusting strategies through trial and error, the game system reaches a stable state. To determine the equilibrium point of the game, the dynamic equations should meet the following equation:(5)U1x=U2y=U3z=0.Eight equilibrium points can be obtained by solving the duplicate dynamic equations, which areD1 (0, 0, 0), D2 (0, 0, 1), D3 (0, 1, 0), D4 (1, 0, 0), D5 (0, 1, 1), D6 (1, 1, 0), D7 (1, 0, 1), and D8 (1, 1, 1). These eight points are the boundaries of the solution domain of the game. According to the properties of stable equilibrium solution, we know that there is another equilibrium point in the solution domain. When U1′x<0,U2′y<0,U3′z<0, we can get the following equation:(6)U1'x=1−2xzypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3+ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK−C1,U2'y=1−2yzxoqB2+C2−C4+oC4+xA−mW2−qB2+aK−C2,U3'z=1−2z−xpC3+pA+pnB1+yF−yoC4+oqB2−C5+F..


### 4.1. Evolution and Stability Strategy of Private Enterprises

According to (6), U1′x=1−2xzypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3+ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK−C1, we can see the following:(i)
Condition 1.z=C1−ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK/ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3, then any x∈0,1 satisfies U1x=0, and the stable strategy of private enterprises will not change with the change of x.(ii)
Condition 2.z≠C1−ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK/ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3; the U1x=0, where x∈0,1, can get x = 0, x = 1 two equilibriums. Let U1′x<0, that is, B=C1−ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK/ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3, then U1′x=1−2xz−BypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3, known as ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3>0, and then we have the following:(1)
① Ifz < B, that is, A > 1, then any x ∈ [0,1/2] satisfies U1′x<0, and x = 0 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises. This shows that when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards military-civilian technology transfer, private enterprises consider maximizing their interests. If the input cost of technical cooperation is higher than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the noncooperation strategy.(2)
② Ifz > B, that is, A < 0, then any x∈1/2,1 satisfies U1′x<0, and x = 1 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises. This shows that private enterprises consider maximizing their interests when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards technology transfer between military and civilians. If the input cost of technical cooperation is lower than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the cooperation strategy.(3)
③If 0 ≤B ≤ 1, we can know from ① and ② that when z < B, x = 0 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises; when z > B, x = 1 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises. Following the principle of maximum benefit, when the input cost of private enterprises’ technical cooperation is lower than the cooperation income and government subsidy, the stronger the willingness of military enterprises to cooperate with the government, the greater the probability of private enterprises choosing cooperation.


### 4.2. Evolution and Stability Strategy of Military Enterprises

According to (6), U2′y=1−2yzxoqB2+C2−C4+oC4+xA−mW2−qB2+aK−C2, we can see the following:(i)
Condition 1.z=C2−xA−mW2−qB2+aK/xoqB2+C2−C4+oC4, then any y∈0,1 satisfies U2y=0, and the stable strategy of military enterprises will not change with the change of y.(ii)
Condition 2.z≠C2−xA−mW2−qB2+aK/xoqB2+C2−C4+oC4; U2y=0, where y∈[0, 1], can get y = 0, y = 1 two equilibriums. Let U2′y<0, that is, C=C2−xA−mW2−qB2+aK/xoqB2+C2−C4+oC4, then, U2′y=1−2yz−CxoqB2+C2−C4+oC4, known as xoqB2 + C2 − C4 + oC4 > 0, and then we have the following:(1)
① Ifz < C, that is, C > 1, then any y∈0,1/2 can satisfy U2′y<0, and y = 0 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises. This shows that when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards military-civilian technology transfer, military enterprises consider maximizing their interests, and if the input cost of technical cooperation is higher than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the noncooperation strategy.(2)
② Ifz > C, that is, C < 0, then any y∈1/2,1 can satisfy U2′y<0, and y = 1 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises. This shows that military enterprises maximize their interests when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards military-civilian technology transfer. If the input cost of technical cooperation is lower than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the cooperation strategy.(3)
③If 0 ≤C ≤ 1, we can know from ① and ② that when z < C, y = 0 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises; when z > C, y = 1 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises. Following the principle of maximum benefit, when the input cost of military enterprise technical cooperation is lower than the cooperation income and government subsidy, the stronger the willingness of private enterprises to cooperate with the government, the greater the probability of military enterprise cooperation.


### 4.3. Evolution and Stability Strategy of Government

According to (6), U3′z=1−2z−xpC3+pA+pnB1+yF−yoC4+oqB2−C5+F, we can see the following:(i)
Condition 1.x=F−C5−yoC4+oqB2/yF+pC3+pA+pnB1, then any z∈[0,1] satisfies U3z=0, and the stable strategy of government will not change with the change of z.(ii)
Condition 2.x≠F−C5−yoC4+oqB2/yF+pC3+pA+pnB1; U3z=0, where z∈0,1, can get z = 0, z = 1 two equilibriums. Let U3′z<0, that is, D=F−C5−yoC4+oqB2/yF+pC3+pA+pnB1, then, U3′z=1−2zz−D−yF−pC3−pA−pnB1, known as −yF−pC3−pA−pnB1<0, and then we have the following:(1)
① Ifx < D, that is, D > 1, then any z∈1/2,1 can satisfy U3′z<0, and z = 1 is the equilibrium point of the government. This shows that when military enterprises maintain a negative attitude of noncooperation in technology transfer, the government considers maximizing its interests, and if the input cost and capital subsidy are lower than the resource loss, it will choose the support strategy.(2)
② Ifx > D, that is, D < 0, then any z∈0,1/2 can satisfy U3′z<0, and z = 0 is the equilibrium point of the government. This shows that when military enterprises maintain a negative attitude of noncooperation in technology transfer, the government maximizes its interests. If the input cost and capital subsidy are higher than the resource loss, it will not support the strategy. When military enterprises maintain a positive attitude towards cooperation in technology transfer, considering the maximization of self-interest, if the government input cost and capital subsidy are higher than the resource loss, choose not to support the strategy.(3)
③If 0 ≤D ≤  1, we can know from ① and ② that when x < D, z = 1 is the government equilibrium point; when x > D, z = 0 is the government equilibrium point. Following the principle of maximum benefit, the lower the willingness of military enterprises to transfer technology, the lower the input cost of the government, and the greater the probability of cooperation that the government chooses to support.


## 4.1. Evolution and Stability Strategy of Private Enterprises

According to (6), U1′x=1−2xzypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3+ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK−C1, we can see the following:(i)
Condition 1.z=C1−ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK/ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3, then any x∈0,1 satisfies U1x=0, and the stable strategy of private enterprises will not change with the change of x.(ii)
Condition 2.z≠C1−ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK/ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3; the U1x=0, where x∈0,1, can get x = 0, x = 1 two equilibriums. Let U1′x<0, that is, B=C1−ymW1−A−nB1+K−aK/ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3, then U1′x=1−2xz−BypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3, known as ypA+ypnB1+C1−C3+pC3>0, and then we have the following:(1)
① Ifz < B, that is, A > 1, then any x ∈ [0,1/2] satisfies U1′x<0, and x = 0 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises. This shows that when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards military-civilian technology transfer, private enterprises consider maximizing their interests. If the input cost of technical cooperation is higher than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the noncooperation strategy.(2)
② Ifz > B, that is, A < 0, then any x∈1/2,1 satisfies U1′x<0, and x = 1 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises. This shows that private enterprises consider maximizing their interests when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards technology transfer between military and civilians. If the input cost of technical cooperation is lower than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the cooperation strategy.(3)
③If 0 ≤B ≤ 1, we can know from ① and ② that when z < B, x = 0 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises; when z > B, x = 1 is the equilibrium point of private enterprises. Following the principle of maximum benefit, when the input cost of private enterprises’ technical cooperation is lower than the cooperation income and government subsidy, the stronger the willingness of military enterprises to cooperate with the government, the greater the probability of private enterprises choosing cooperation.


## 4.2. Evolution and Stability Strategy of Military Enterprises

According to (6), U2′y=1−2yzxoqB2+C2−C4+oC4+xA−mW2−qB2+aK−C2, we can see the following:(i)
Condition 1.z=C2−xA−mW2−qB2+aK/xoqB2+C2−C4+oC4, then any y∈0,1 satisfies U2y=0, and the stable strategy of military enterprises will not change with the change of y.(ii)
Condition 2.z≠C2−xA−mW2−qB2+aK/xoqB2+C2−C4+oC4; U2y=0, where y∈[0, 1], can get y = 0, y = 1 two equilibriums. Let U2′y<0, that is, C=C2−xA−mW2−qB2+aK/xoqB2+C2−C4+oC4, then, U2′y=1−2yz−CxoqB2+C2−C4+oC4, known as xoqB2 + C2 − C4 + oC4 > 0, and then we have the following:(1)
① Ifz < C, that is, C > 1, then any y∈0,1/2 can satisfy U2′y<0, and y = 0 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises. This shows that when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards military-civilian technology transfer, military enterprises consider maximizing their interests, and if the input cost of technical cooperation is higher than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the noncooperation strategy.(2)
② Ifz > C, that is, C < 0, then any y∈1/2,1 can satisfy U2′y<0, and y = 1 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises. This shows that military enterprises maximize their interests when the government maintains a supportive attitude towards military-civilian technology transfer. If the input cost of technical cooperation is lower than the benefits and government subsidies, they choose the cooperation strategy.(3)
③If 0 ≤C ≤ 1, we can know from ① and ② that when z < C, y = 0 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises; when z > C, y = 1 is the equilibrium point of military enterprises. Following the principle of maximum benefit, when the input cost of military enterprise technical cooperation is lower than the cooperation income and government subsidy, the stronger the willingness of private enterprises to cooperate with the government, the greater the probability of military enterprise cooperation.


## 4.3. Evolution and Stability Strategy of Government

According to (6), U3′z=1−2z−xpC3+pA+pnB1+yF−yoC4+oqB2−C5+F, we can see the following:(i)
Condition 1.x=F−C5−yoC4+oqB2/yF+pC3+pA+pnB1, then any z∈[0,1] satisfies U3z=0, and the stable strategy of government will not change with the change of z.(ii)
Condition 2.x≠F−C5−yoC4+oqB2/yF+pC3+pA+pnB1; U3z=0, where z∈0,1, can get z = 0, z = 1 two equilibriums. Let U3′z<0, that is, D=F−C5−yoC4+oqB2/yF+pC3+pA+pnB1, then, U3′z=1−2zz−D−yF−pC3−pA−pnB1, known as −yF−pC3−pA−pnB1<0, and then we have the following:(1)
① Ifx < D, that is, D > 1, then any z∈1/2,1 can satisfy U3′z<0, and z = 1 is the equilibrium point of the government. This shows that when military enterprises maintain a negative attitude of noncooperation in technology transfer, the government considers maximizing its interests, and if the input cost and capital subsidy are lower than the resource loss, it will choose the support strategy.(2)
② Ifx > D, that is, D < 0, then any z∈0,1/2 can satisfy U3′z<0, and z = 0 is the equilibrium point of the government. This shows that when military enterprises maintain a negative attitude of noncooperation in technology transfer, the government maximizes its interests. If the input cost and capital subsidy are higher than the resource loss, it will not support the strategy. When military enterprises maintain a positive attitude towards cooperation in technology transfer, considering the maximization of self-interest, if the government input cost and capital subsidy are higher than the resource loss, choose not to support the strategy.(3)
③If 0 ≤D ≤  1, we can know from ① and ② that when x < D, z = 1 is the government equilibrium point; when x > D, z = 0 is the government equilibrium point. Following the principle of maximum benefit, the lower the willingness of military enterprises to transfer technology, the lower the input cost of the government, and the greater the probability of cooperation that the government chooses to support.


## 5. Numerical Analysis

In order to reflect the technology characteristics more clearly and intuitively, the evolution behavior of technology transfer among military enterprises, private enterprises, and the government is simulated by Matlab.When considering parameters, distribution should consider the following basic conditions: based on the military enterprise of scientific research funds, scientific research personnel, and technology advantage, the normal income of military enterprises is higher than that of private enterprises, which can be set to 18 and 15, respectively, while the transfer cost of military enterprises is lower than that of private enterprises, so it can be set to 2 and 3. Due to the weak informatization awareness of private enterprises and the dominant position of military enterprises in the process of military technology transfer to civilian use, it is necessary to seek suitable private enterprises actively. Therefore, the information acquisition cost of military enterprises is higher than that of private enterprises, which can be divided into 2 and 1.5. The information cost with government support is lower than without government support, which can be set as 1.5 and 1. After technology transfer between the military and the civilian, the enterprise can gain profits by absorbing and transforming new technology, set to 8. In order to promote the active participation of private enterprises in military-civilian technology transfer, the profit distribution coefficient of military enterprises is slightly lower than that of private enterprises, which is set at 0.4 and 0.6, respectively. After selecting technology transfer, the income obtained by enterprises should be higher than the cost paid. That is, the net profit should be greater than 0. Therefore, according to the distribution of other parameters, the transfer payment cost of private enterprises can be set as 0.5. In order to ensure the fair state of government subsidies, the government’s subsidy coefficient is the same, set at 0.3. Under the impetus of national policies, the government should actively promote the technology transfer between the military and civilians. Considering the necessity of building the platform, the cost of the platform should be less than the sum of the cost of obtaining information between the military and the civilian. Therefore, the cost of the platform can be set as 2. In order to ensure the appropriate state of the effective utilization of resources, the resource loss caused by the government’s ineffective support is the same as the cooperation benefit, and the resource loss can be set to 8. Therefore, the initial allocation of each parameter is as follows:C1 = 1.5, C2 = 2, C3 = 1, C4 = 1.5, W1=15, W2=18, K = 8, a = 0.4, B1 = 3, n = 0.2, A = 0.5, m = 0.2, B2 = 2, q = 0.2, o = 0.3, p=0.3, C5 = 2, F = 8.In the process of technology transfer, game players have different cooperative intentions, and the time step is set as △t, and the probability of each participant choosing different behaviors is 0.5. Based on this, the influence of parametersm, n, p, and other technical characteristics on the evolution results of the three players are discussed.


### 5.1. The Coefficient of Technology Spilloverm

According to Figure1(a), assuming that the technology spillover coefficient m is 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively, the final evolutionary equilibrium point of the behaviors of military enterprises, civil enterprises, and the government is (0, 0, 1). With the increase of the m value, the speed of convergence to the equilibrium point becomes faster, indicating that the technology spillover coefficient has a negative inhibition effect on military-civilian technological cooperation behavior. According to Figure 1(b), the cooperative behavior of private enterprises shows a trend of strengthening first and then weakening over time. In the initial stage of private enterprises’ technological cooperation, low technology spillover is beneficial for private enterprises to maintain a positive, cooperative attitude. However, private enterprises will eventually choose the technology noncooperation behavior. The larger the technology spillover coefficient is, the faster the evolution of the noncooperation behavior of private enterprises will be. This phenomenon is because the more significant the technology spillover coefficient is, the greater the technology spillover cost of military enterprises. Therefore, private enterprises will choose noncooperation behavior because of the noncooperation of military enterprises. According to Figure 1(c), the technology spillover coefficient negatively influences military enterprise technological cooperation choice. The larger the technology spillover coefficient is, the faster the military enterprise noncooperation behavior evolves. According to Figure 1(d), the technology spillover coefficient has a positive promoting effect on government support behavior. The larger the technology spillover coefficient is, the faster the government support behavior evolves.Figure 1
(a) Simulation results of differentm evolution, (b) influence of parameter m on private enterprise, (c) influence of parameter m on military enterprises, and (d) influence of parameter m on the government.
(a)(b)(c)(d)


### 5.2. The Coefficient of Technical Implicitn

According to Figure2(a), the implicit technology coefficient will inhibit the military-civilian choice of technology cooperation behavior so that the final evolutionary equilibrium point of the three parties is (0, 0, 1). The higher the implicit technological coefficient is, the more the government support accelerates with the acceleration of the military and civilians choosing technological noncooperation. According to Figure 2(b), the implicit technology coefficient has a negative inhibitory effect on the cooperative behavior of private enterprises. The cooperative behavior of private enterprises shows a trend of strengthening first and then weakening over time. At the initial stage, the low intensity of the implicit technological coefficient urges private enterprises to maintain a positive, cooperative attitude. As time goes by, private enterprises will eventually choose technological noncooperation behavior. The larger the implicit technological coefficient is, the faster the evolution trend of noncooperative behavior of private enterprises is. The more significant the technology implicit coefficient is, the more the cost the private enterprises need to spend to understand, absorb, and transform the new technology, so private enterprises will choose not to cooperate because of the increase in cost. According to Figures 2(c) and 2(d), military enterprises and private enterprises have similar evolutionary paths under different technological implicit coefficients, indicating that implicit technological coefficients have little influence on military enterprises and government.Figure 2
(a) Simulation results of differentn evolution, (b) influence of parameter n on private enterprises, (c) influence of parameter n on military enterprises, and (d) influence of parameter n on the government.
(a)(b)(c)(d)


### 5.3. The Coefficient of Technical Complexityq

According to Figure3(a), the coefficient of technological complexity inhibits the military-civilian choice of technological cooperation. The higher the technical complexity coefficient is, the faster the system evolves to the equilibrium point of (0, 0, 1). According to Figure 3(b), the technical complexity coefficient negatively inhibits private enterprises’ cooperative choice behavior. The cooperative behavior of private enterprises shows a trend of strengthening first and then weakening over time. In the initial stage, the evolution path of private enterprises with different technological complexity coefficients is similar, indicating that the technological complexity coefficient has little influence on private enterprises. Over time, the larger the coefficient of technological complexity is, the more the evolution trend of noncooperative behavior of private enterprises accelerates. This phenomenon occurs because a significant coefficient of technological complexity will increase the technology transfer cost of large enterprises, so private enterprises choose noncooperative behavior with the noncooperative behavior of military enterprises. According to Figure 3(c), the technological complexity coefficient has a negative inhibiting effect on military enterprise cooperation behavior. The larger the technological complexity coefficient is, the faster the evolution trend of noncooperation behavior is. According to Figure 3(d), the evolution paths of government are close under different technological complexity coefficients, indicating that technological complexity coefficients have little influence on government.Figure 3
(a) Simulation results of differentq evolution, (b) influence of parameter q on private enterprises, (c) influence of parameter q on military enterprises, and (d) influence of parameter q on the government.
(a)(b)(c)(d)


## 5.1. The Coefficient of Technology Spilloverm

According to Figure1(a), assuming that the technology spillover coefficient m is 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively, the final evolutionary equilibrium point of the behaviors of military enterprises, civil enterprises, and the government is (0, 0, 1). With the increase of the m value, the speed of convergence to the equilibrium point becomes faster, indicating that the technology spillover coefficient has a negative inhibition effect on military-civilian technological cooperation behavior. According to Figure 1(b), the cooperative behavior of private enterprises shows a trend of strengthening first and then weakening over time. In the initial stage of private enterprises’ technological cooperation, low technology spillover is beneficial for private enterprises to maintain a positive, cooperative attitude. However, private enterprises will eventually choose the technology noncooperation behavior. The larger the technology spillover coefficient is, the faster the evolution of the noncooperation behavior of private enterprises will be. This phenomenon is because the more significant the technology spillover coefficient is, the greater the technology spillover cost of military enterprises. Therefore, private enterprises will choose noncooperation behavior because of the noncooperation of military enterprises. According to Figure 1(c), the technology spillover coefficient negatively influences military enterprise technological cooperation choice. The larger the technology spillover coefficient is, the faster the military enterprise noncooperation behavior evolves. According to Figure 1(d), the technology spillover coefficient has a positive promoting effect on government support behavior. The larger the technology spillover coefficient is, the faster the government support behavior evolves.Figure 1
(a) Simulation results of differentm evolution, (b) influence of parameter m on private enterprise, (c) influence of parameter m on military enterprises, and (d) influence of parameter m on the government.
(a)(b)(c)(d)


## 5.2. The Coefficient of Technical Implicitn

According to Figure2(a), the implicit technology coefficient will inhibit the military-civilian choice of technology cooperation behavior so that the final evolutionary equilibrium point of the three parties is (0, 0, 1). The higher the implicit technological coefficient is, the more the government support accelerates with the acceleration of the military and civilians choosing technological noncooperation. According to Figure 2(b), the implicit technology coefficient has a negative inhibitory effect on the cooperative behavior of private enterprises. The cooperative behavior of private enterprises shows a trend of strengthening first and then weakening over time. At the initial stage, the low intensity of the implicit technological coefficient urges private enterprises to maintain a positive, cooperative attitude. As time goes by, private enterprises will eventually choose technological noncooperation behavior. The larger the implicit technological coefficient is, the faster the evolution trend of noncooperative behavior of private enterprises is. The more significant the technology implicit coefficient is, the more the cost the private enterprises need to spend to understand, absorb, and transform the new technology, so private enterprises will choose not to cooperate because of the increase in cost. According to Figures 2(c) and 2(d), military enterprises and private enterprises have similar evolutionary paths under different technological implicit coefficients, indicating that implicit technological coefficients have little influence on military enterprises and government.Figure 2
(a) Simulation results of differentn evolution, (b) influence of parameter n on private enterprises, (c) influence of parameter n on military enterprises, and (d) influence of parameter n on the government.
(a)(b)(c)(d)


## 5.3. The Coefficient of Technical Complexityq

According to Figure3(a), the coefficient of technological complexity inhibits the military-civilian choice of technological cooperation. The higher the technical complexity coefficient is, the faster the system evolves to the equilibrium point of (0, 0, 1). According to Figure 3(b), the technical complexity coefficient negatively inhibits private enterprises’ cooperative choice behavior. The cooperative behavior of private enterprises shows a trend of strengthening first and then weakening over time. In the initial stage, the evolution path of private enterprises with different technological complexity coefficients is similar, indicating that the technological complexity coefficient has little influence on private enterprises. Over time, the larger the coefficient of technological complexity is, the more the evolution trend of noncooperative behavior of private enterprises accelerates. This phenomenon occurs because a significant coefficient of technological complexity will increase the technology transfer cost of large enterprises, so private enterprises choose noncooperative behavior with the noncooperative behavior of military enterprises. According to Figure 3(c), the technological complexity coefficient has a negative inhibiting effect on military enterprise cooperation behavior. The larger the technological complexity coefficient is, the faster the evolution trend of noncooperation behavior is. According to Figure 3(d), the evolution paths of government are close under different technological complexity coefficients, indicating that technological complexity coefficients have little influence on government.Figure 3
(a) Simulation results of differentq evolution, (b) influence of parameter q on private enterprises, (c) influence of parameter q on military enterprises, and (d) influence of parameter q on the government.
(a)(b)(c)(d)


## 6. Conclusions

Based on the game theory, this study constructs a three-party game model of private enterprises, military enterprises, and government from the perspective of technical characteristics in the military-civilian field. It analyzes the influence of different technology characteristics on the dynamic evolution of military-civilian technology transfer. The results show that conversion and sex are the main influencing factors of technology spillover. As a provider of military technology, overflow loss is more significant than as a receiver of technology spillover benefits; even the people will improve. Eventually, people will tend not to cooperate; this time, the government promotes a military and civilian technology transfer that supports the strategy. Therefore, the game evolution results of the three parties will converge (0,0,1), i.e., (noncooperation, noncooperation, support). For civil enterprises, whether it is technology spillover, technology implicit, or technical complexity, private enterprises tend not to cooperate and eventually maintain stability. However, there are differences in the evolution speed and evolution stability time of private enterprises under different technical characteristics. Compared with other technical characteristics, the evolution of private enterprises under technology spillover is faster. Although the evolution trend of private enterprises under technological recessive and technological complexity is close, the evolution speed of private enterprises under low intensity technological recessive is faster. For the military enterprise, the impact of technology within the recessive is not significant. However, the technology spillover and technical complexity of the military enterprise’s cooperative behavior produce adverse effects, leading to the enterprise’s evolution of cooperative behavior. Its evolution speed and stability time are different—under the background of high intensity technology spillover, the evolution speed of military enterprises is relatively faster. For the government, the influence of technology is implicit, and technology complexity is slight. Technology spillover has a positive promoting effect on government support behavior, and the evolution speed of government is faster under the high intensity of technology spillover.Based on the above research results, the following suggestions are put forward to promote civil-military technology transfer.The enlisted private enterprises should improve their own technical level. We will accelerate the spread and application of new technologies, processes, and equipment, increase investment in technological research and development, open up new areas, and improve our capacity for innovation. We should strengthen the construction of talents, pay attention to the introduction of technical and research talents, train scientific and technologically innovative talents in practice, and overcome the negative effect of implicit technology on military-civilian technology transfer.Military enterprises should pay attention to the promotion of technology transfer capacity, formulate and improve the technology evaluation mechanism and the capability evaluation mechanism of the military and private enterprises, and formulate different transfer schemes for different transfer technologies, strengthen exchanges with the military and private enterprises, establish good cooperative relations, expand the depth of technology transfer on the basis of paying attention to the intellectual protection of patent property rights, and weaken the negative effect of technology complexity on military and civilian technology transfer.The state and government should create a good environment for military and civilian technology transfer, formulate and improve supporting policies and systems for military-civilian technology transfer, establish information exchange platforms for military and civilian enterprises to break through information communication barriers between the military and the civilian to the maximum extent, and promote information docking and resource sharing between the military and the civilian. We will improve the property rights incentive mechanism for technological innovation and strengthen property rights protection, determine the ownership relationship between technology innovator and achievement, and overcome the negative effect of technology spillover on military-civilian technology transfer.Although this paper studies the game of technology transfer among private enterprises, military enterprises, and government from the perspective of technical characteristics, it has gained some enlightenment. However, as there are many participants in the civil-military technology transfer network, third-party intermediaries or financing institutions and research institutions may be considered for follow-up research. Although the numerical simulation results in this paper show the dynamic evolution process of technology transfer among three parties, in order to make the conclusion more scientific and accurate, the subsequent research can consider replacing simulation data with real data through field investigation.



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*Source: 4888360-2022-04-30.xml*