# Image Watermark Based on Extended Shearlet and Insertion Using the Largest Information Entropy on Horizontal Cone

Authors: Zhao Jian; Sun Meiling; Jia Jian; Huang Luxi; Han Fan; Liu Shan
Journal: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
 (2015)

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## Abstract

Extended discrete shearlet provides a directional multiresolution decomposition. It has been mathematically shown that extended discrete shearlet is a more efficient representation for the signals containing distributed discontinuities such as edges, compared to discrete wavelet. Multiresolution analyses such as curvelet and ridgelet share similar properties, yet their directional representations are significantly different from that of extended discrete shearlet. Taking advantage of the unique properties of directional representation of extended discrete shearlet, we develop an image watermark algorithm based on the largest information entropy. In proposed algorithm, firstly, 1-level extended discrete shearlet transform decomposes the test image into directional components on horizontal cone; each directional component reflects directional features and textured features differently. Next, the directional component whose information entropy is the highest is selected to carry watermark. Compared with related algorithms based on DWT and DCT, the proposed algorithm tends to obtain preferable invisibility when it is robust against common attacks.


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## Body

## 1. Introduction

Image watermark is one of the most active and challenging subjects in the information hiding research because it is an efficient solution to protect the copyright of the digital media. Wavelets have been widely applied in image watermark owning to their perfect performance for piecewise smooth signals in one dimension [1, 2].However, wavelets are not actually optimal representation for signals in two dimensions or higher dimensions such as images [3–7]. In fact, wavelets not only fail to preserve the detailed features but they also fail to capture the directional features [3, 7]. With the development of multiresolution analysis, various multiresolution methods have been proposed to overcome this limitation of wavelets, and it has been experimentally proved that these multiresolution methods perform well in image watermark [4, 5, 8]. Among various multiresolution methods, discrete shearlet [6, 9] is a relatively new multiresolution method, which has drawn considerable attention and has been applied in some fields of image processing such as image denoising, image approximations, and image inpainting for its superior performance in dealing with signals in high dimensions [6, 9–11]. Extended discrete shearlet [9, 11] is derived from discrete shearlet transform. It is based on a simple but rigorous mathematical framework which is composed of directional orthonormal bases; each orthonormal base exhibits high directional sensitivity and is highly anisotropic. The extended discrete shearlet transform attempts to obtain a sparse image representation which contains more directional information and preserves more detailed information than discrete wavelet.Taking advantage of these unique properties of extended discrete shearlet, we develop an image watermark algorithm based on extended discrete shearlet transform and the largest information entropy [12, 13]. In proposed algorithm, by using extended discrete shearlet transform, an image is composed into directional components on the horizontal cone; each directional component is transformed into a set of shearlet coefficients. The watermark is embedded into the largest coefficients of the directional component whose information entropy is the highest. The proposed algorithm is compared with DCT-based algorithm and DWT-based algorithm.


## 2. Correlation with Basic Theory

### 2.1. Correlation with Shearlet Transform

A 2D affine system with composite dilations [6, 9, 14] is described by(1)SHψ=ψa,s,tx=a-3/4ψAa-1Bs-1x-t=a-3/4ψ1a-sa01ax-t,a>0,s∈R,t∈R2,where the parabolic scaling matrices Aa=(a,0;0,a)(a>0) are associated with scale transform and the shear matrices Bs=(1,s;0,1) are related to area-preserving geometrical transform. The generating function ψ is chosen like a tensor product by(2)ψ^ξ=ψ^ξ1,ξ2=ψ^1ξ1ψ^2ξ2ξ1,where ψ1 is continuous wavelet which is supported with supp⁡ψ^1⊂[-2,-1/2]∪[1/2,2] and ψ2 is a bump function with certain weak additional properties and is supported with supp⁡ψ^2⊂[-1,1].The associated continuous shearlet transform [6, 9–11, 14] is defined by(3)SHfa,s,t=f,ψa,s,t.The shearlet transform is a function associated with a, s, and t, whereas wavelet transform is a function which is merely associated with a and t. The main idea of the shear parameter s is to capture directional features, such as orientations of curves [6, 9, 11]. As a consequence, the shearlet is able to capture directional information. Figure 1 illustrates the ability of capturing directions of the shearlet transform.Figure 1
(a)ψa,s,t in the time domain for a=0.3, s=0, and t=0. (b) ψa,s,t in the frequency domain for a=0.3, s=0, and t=0. (c) ψa,s,t in the time domain for a=0.3, s=-0.5, and t=0. (d) ψa,s,t in frequency domain for a=0.3, s=-0.5, and t=0.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)


### 2.2. Correlation with Discrete Shearlet Transform

By samplingSH(ψ) on an appropriate discrete set of a, s, and t, a discrete shearlet transform is obtained [6, 9, 10, 14]. The discrete shearlet transform is described by(4)ψj,l,kdx=detAdj/2ψBdlAdjx-k:j≥0,-2j/2≤l≤2j/2,k∈Z2,d=0,1,where A0=(4,0;0,2), A1=(2,0;0,4), B0=(1,0;1,1), and B1=(1,1;0,1). If ψj,l,k(d) satisfy the property(5)∑j,l,kf,ψj,l,kd2=f2,the discrete shearlet transform forms a tight frame for L2(R).For anyξ=ξ1,ξ2∈R^2, ξ1≠0, suppose(6)∑j≥0ψ^12-2jω2=1forω≥18;∑l=-2j2jψ^22jω-l2=1forω≤1.Specifically, define (7)ψ^0ω=ψ^0ω1,ω2=ψ^1ω1ψ^2ω2ω1,ψ^1ω=ψ^1ω1,ω2=ψ^1ω2ψ^2ω1ω2,where ψ1 is a discrete wavelet function with supp⁡ψ^1⊂[-1/2,-1/16]∪[1/16,1/2] and ψ2 is a bump function with supp⁡ψ^2⊂[-1,1]. From the supporting condition of ψ^1 and ψ^2, ψj,l,k in frequency domain is supported with (8)supp⁡ψ^j,l,k0⊂ω1,ω2:ω1∈-22j-1,-22j-4∪22j-4,22j-1,l2-j+ω2ω1≤2-j.Equation (8) implies that each element ψ^j,l,k is supported on a pair of trapezoids, each of which is contained in a box of approximate size 22j×2j and oriented along line of slope -l2-j [6, 9, 10, 14].


### 2.3. Correlation with Extended Discrete Shearlet

Extended discrete shearlet [6, 11] is obtained by directly extending discrete shearlet. Yet its framework is slightly different from that of the discrete shearlet. Framework of the extended discrete shearlet is composed of directional orthonormal bases; each orthonormal basis provides anisotropic window functions elongated along the direction determined by shear matrix. In addition, the extended discrete shearlet framework uses a MRA approach to compute shearlet coefficients and uses an iterative method to approximate the inverse. Based on this construction, a given image is explicitly decomposed into variously directional components for different cones when extended discrete shearlet is associated with different shear matrices and direction numbers; each directional component reflects directional features and textured features differently (see Figure 2); besides, a stable reconstruction of a given image is obtained.Figure 2
The extended discrete shearlet transform results corresponding to different directions and shear matrices.
(a)
(b)
(c)Actually, the extended discrete shearlet framework exhibits highly directional sensitivity; and, furthermore, the extended discrete shearlet framework is optimally sparse representation and is well localized in both the spatial and the frequency domains. Based on these properties, the extended discrete shearlet can be considered as an appropriate transform for image watermark.


## 2.1. Correlation with Shearlet Transform

A 2D affine system with composite dilations [6, 9, 14] is described by(1)SHψ=ψa,s,tx=a-3/4ψAa-1Bs-1x-t=a-3/4ψ1a-sa01ax-t,a>0,s∈R,t∈R2,where the parabolic scaling matrices Aa=(a,0;0,a)(a>0) are associated with scale transform and the shear matrices Bs=(1,s;0,1) are related to area-preserving geometrical transform. The generating function ψ is chosen like a tensor product by(2)ψ^ξ=ψ^ξ1,ξ2=ψ^1ξ1ψ^2ξ2ξ1,where ψ1 is continuous wavelet which is supported with supp⁡ψ^1⊂[-2,-1/2]∪[1/2,2] and ψ2 is a bump function with certain weak additional properties and is supported with supp⁡ψ^2⊂[-1,1].The associated continuous shearlet transform [6, 9–11, 14] is defined by(3)SHfa,s,t=f,ψa,s,t.The shearlet transform is a function associated with a, s, and t, whereas wavelet transform is a function which is merely associated with a and t. The main idea of the shear parameter s is to capture directional features, such as orientations of curves [6, 9, 11]. As a consequence, the shearlet is able to capture directional information. Figure 1 illustrates the ability of capturing directions of the shearlet transform.Figure 1
(a)ψa,s,t in the time domain for a=0.3, s=0, and t=0. (b) ψa,s,t in the frequency domain for a=0.3, s=0, and t=0. (c) ψa,s,t in the time domain for a=0.3, s=-0.5, and t=0. (d) ψa,s,t in frequency domain for a=0.3, s=-0.5, and t=0.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)


## 2.2. Correlation with Discrete Shearlet Transform

By samplingSH(ψ) on an appropriate discrete set of a, s, and t, a discrete shearlet transform is obtained [6, 9, 10, 14]. The discrete shearlet transform is described by(4)ψj,l,kdx=detAdj/2ψBdlAdjx-k:j≥0,-2j/2≤l≤2j/2,k∈Z2,d=0,1,where A0=(4,0;0,2), A1=(2,0;0,4), B0=(1,0;1,1), and B1=(1,1;0,1). If ψj,l,k(d) satisfy the property(5)∑j,l,kf,ψj,l,kd2=f2,the discrete shearlet transform forms a tight frame for L2(R).For anyξ=ξ1,ξ2∈R^2, ξ1≠0, suppose(6)∑j≥0ψ^12-2jω2=1forω≥18;∑l=-2j2jψ^22jω-l2=1forω≤1.Specifically, define (7)ψ^0ω=ψ^0ω1,ω2=ψ^1ω1ψ^2ω2ω1,ψ^1ω=ψ^1ω1,ω2=ψ^1ω2ψ^2ω1ω2,where ψ1 is a discrete wavelet function with supp⁡ψ^1⊂[-1/2,-1/16]∪[1/16,1/2] and ψ2 is a bump function with supp⁡ψ^2⊂[-1,1]. From the supporting condition of ψ^1 and ψ^2, ψj,l,k in frequency domain is supported with (8)supp⁡ψ^j,l,k0⊂ω1,ω2:ω1∈-22j-1,-22j-4∪22j-4,22j-1,l2-j+ω2ω1≤2-j.Equation (8) implies that each element ψ^j,l,k is supported on a pair of trapezoids, each of which is contained in a box of approximate size 22j×2j and oriented along line of slope -l2-j [6, 9, 10, 14].


## 2.3. Correlation with Extended Discrete Shearlet

Extended discrete shearlet [6, 11] is obtained by directly extending discrete shearlet. Yet its framework is slightly different from that of the discrete shearlet. Framework of the extended discrete shearlet is composed of directional orthonormal bases; each orthonormal basis provides anisotropic window functions elongated along the direction determined by shear matrix. In addition, the extended discrete shearlet framework uses a MRA approach to compute shearlet coefficients and uses an iterative method to approximate the inverse. Based on this construction, a given image is explicitly decomposed into variously directional components for different cones when extended discrete shearlet is associated with different shear matrices and direction numbers; each directional component reflects directional features and textured features differently (see Figure 2); besides, a stable reconstruction of a given image is obtained.Figure 2
The extended discrete shearlet transform results corresponding to different directions and shear matrices.
(a)
(b)
(c)Actually, the extended discrete shearlet framework exhibits highly directional sensitivity; and, furthermore, the extended discrete shearlet framework is optimally sparse representation and is well localized in both the spatial and the frequency domains. Based on these properties, the extended discrete shearlet can be considered as an appropriate transform for image watermark.


## 3. A Novel Watermark Algorithm Based on Extended Discrete Shearlet

The most important issue in extended discrete shearlet-based watermark algorithm is how to choose the watermark embedding location or the effective coefficients to be embedded, since the choice of watermark embedding location has an effect on both invisibility and robustness of watermark algorithm to some extent [1, 2, 4, 5, 8]. In this section, a novel algorithm for image watermark is proposed, which is based on combining the analysis of extended discrete shearlet coefficients [6, 11] and the basic theory of the largest information entropy to search the watermark embedding location for different images.


### 3.1. Analysis of Extended Discrete Shearlet Coefficients

After 1-level extended discrete shearlet decomposition associated with shear matrixB0 and direction numbers m, the test image of size N×N is decomposed into m directional components on horizontal cone (see Figure 2(b)); each of directional components is transformed into a set of shearlet coefficients.Each directional component reflects directional features and preserved textured features differently; therefore, the occurring probabilities of different pixel values in each directional component are different from those of all others and the probability distribution of each directional component’s information is different from that of all others in confusion degree. The higher information entropy [12, 13] of the directional component is, the more uncertain occurring probabilities of its different pixel values are, and probability distribution of its information is more disordered and more chaotic; that means it can hide more watermark bits. Based on this analysis, the directional component whose information entropy is the largest is selected to carry watermark. The information entropy of the lth directional component on horizontal cone is computed as follows:(1)
Mark pixel values of thelth directional component by (X1l,X2l,…,XN∗Nl).(2)
Count occurring probability(p1l,p2l,…,pjl,…,pKl) of different pixel values of the lth directional component; here K is the total number of different pixel values.(3)
Calculate the information entropy of thelth directional component by (9)Sl=-∑j=1Kpjllog2⁡pjl,wherel(l=1,…,m).Generally, watermark insertion is realized by modifying some special values of pixels or transforming domain coefficients [1, 2, 4, 5]. Here watermark insertion is realized by modifying the largest n×n coefficients of selected directional component in extended discrete shearlet domain.


### 3.2. Watermark Insertion Using the Largest Information Entropy

For an imagew used as watermark, in order to uniformly and randomly spread bits over the host image, it needs to be transformed into a binary image by (10)wwi,j=-1ifwi,j>Tr⁡1else,1≤i,j≤n.Here threshold Tr is selected byOSTA method. After processing the watermark image w, a binary image ww is obtained and then reshaped to binary sequence wm with length n×n.According to the above analysis in Section3.1, the directional component, whose information entropy is the highest, can hide more watermark bits and is selected to carry watermark. To obtain directional components on horizontal cone, a l-level extended discrete shearlet decomposition is applied to test image I with size N×N, which is associated with shear matrix B0 and direction numbers m. Then, to find out the directional component whose information entropy is the highest, information entropy of each directional component on horizontal cone is computed by (9).Here we suppose thepth (1≤p≤m) directional component’s information entropy is the highest. Then the binary sequence wm is embedded into the largest n×n coefficients of the pth directional component by(11)ypi,j=xpi,j1+a×bk,ifxpi,j≥Txpi,j,else,where 1≤k≤n×n, a is used to control embedding strength, and T is the threshold.Finally, the watermarked imageIw is obtained after 1-level extended inverse discrete shearlet transform by using these modified shearlet coefficients.


### 3.3. Watermark Extraction

The watermark can be extracted correctly from the watermarked image without original test image. The extracting process is as follows, which is mirroring embedding process.To extract embedded watermark bits from the watermarked image, 1-level extended discrete shearlet decomposition is firstly applied to the watermarked image, where the shear matrix is selected asB0 and the number of direction is n; then shearlet coefficients of every directional component on horizontal cone are obtained.Then, the watermarked coefficients are found out according to watermark size and the location key of embedding watermark. The extracted watermark bits are recovered into a sequencem→ by(12)mt=xij′p-xi,jpa×xi,jp,whenxijp≥T,where 1≤i, j≤N, 1≤t≤n×n, and T is the threshold.Finally, the extracted watermarkww′ is recovered by reshaping m→.


## 3.1. Analysis of Extended Discrete Shearlet Coefficients

After 1-level extended discrete shearlet decomposition associated with shear matrixB0 and direction numbers m, the test image of size N×N is decomposed into m directional components on horizontal cone (see Figure 2(b)); each of directional components is transformed into a set of shearlet coefficients.Each directional component reflects directional features and preserved textured features differently; therefore, the occurring probabilities of different pixel values in each directional component are different from those of all others and the probability distribution of each directional component’s information is different from that of all others in confusion degree. The higher information entropy [12, 13] of the directional component is, the more uncertain occurring probabilities of its different pixel values are, and probability distribution of its information is more disordered and more chaotic; that means it can hide more watermark bits. Based on this analysis, the directional component whose information entropy is the largest is selected to carry watermark. The information entropy of the lth directional component on horizontal cone is computed as follows:(1)
Mark pixel values of thelth directional component by (X1l,X2l,…,XN∗Nl).(2)
Count occurring probability(p1l,p2l,…,pjl,…,pKl) of different pixel values of the lth directional component; here K is the total number of different pixel values.(3)
Calculate the information entropy of thelth directional component by (9)Sl=-∑j=1Kpjllog2⁡pjl,wherel(l=1,…,m).Generally, watermark insertion is realized by modifying some special values of pixels or transforming domain coefficients [1, 2, 4, 5]. Here watermark insertion is realized by modifying the largest n×n coefficients of selected directional component in extended discrete shearlet domain.


## 3.2. Watermark Insertion Using the Largest Information Entropy

For an imagew used as watermark, in order to uniformly and randomly spread bits over the host image, it needs to be transformed into a binary image by (10)wwi,j=-1ifwi,j>Tr⁡1else,1≤i,j≤n.Here threshold Tr is selected byOSTA method. After processing the watermark image w, a binary image ww is obtained and then reshaped to binary sequence wm with length n×n.According to the above analysis in Section3.1, the directional component, whose information entropy is the highest, can hide more watermark bits and is selected to carry watermark. To obtain directional components on horizontal cone, a l-level extended discrete shearlet decomposition is applied to test image I with size N×N, which is associated with shear matrix B0 and direction numbers m. Then, to find out the directional component whose information entropy is the highest, information entropy of each directional component on horizontal cone is computed by (9).Here we suppose thepth (1≤p≤m) directional component’s information entropy is the highest. Then the binary sequence wm is embedded into the largest n×n coefficients of the pth directional component by(11)ypi,j=xpi,j1+a×bk,ifxpi,j≥Txpi,j,else,where 1≤k≤n×n, a is used to control embedding strength, and T is the threshold.Finally, the watermarked imageIw is obtained after 1-level extended inverse discrete shearlet transform by using these modified shearlet coefficients.


## 3.3. Watermark Extraction

The watermark can be extracted correctly from the watermarked image without original test image. The extracting process is as follows, which is mirroring embedding process.To extract embedded watermark bits from the watermarked image, 1-level extended discrete shearlet decomposition is firstly applied to the watermarked image, where the shear matrix is selected asB0 and the number of direction is n; then shearlet coefficients of every directional component on horizontal cone are obtained.Then, the watermarked coefficients are found out according to watermark size and the location key of embedding watermark. The extracted watermark bits are recovered into a sequencem→ by(12)mt=xij′p-xi,jpa×xi,jp,whenxijp≥T,where 1≤i, j≤N, 1≤t≤n×n, and T is the threshold.Finally, the extracted watermarkww′ is recovered by reshaping m→.


## 4. Experimental Results

### 4.1. Invisibility of Watermark

Invisibility is an evaluative measure of perceptual quality of the watermarked image. In a satisfactory image watermark algorithm, watermark should not cause much degradation of perceptual quality of the watermarked image. In the proposed algorithm, a64×64 watermark image is embedded into different test images (“Lena,” “Boat,” and “Barbara” with 512×512) to test invisibility, where the number of directions is 9 and the embedding strength is 0.1.As shown in Table1, there are not much visual differences between original test images and their corresponding watermarked images. In addition, the PSNR value of each watermarked image is above 53 dB, and NC value of corresponding extracted watermark image is above 0.98. The extracted watermarks are all easily distinguishable. Whether from a subjective view or from the objective view, the proposed algorithm has preferable invisibility.Table 1
The experimental results of invisibility.
Lena
Boat
Barbara
The test images
The watermarked images
PSNR/MSE
53.1768/0.3129
53.5148/0.2895
53.6411/0.2812
The absolute difference between original images and their corresponding watermarked image
The extracted watermark
NC
0.9849
0.9848
0.9850Furthermore, by analyzing the absolute difference between the test image and the watermarked image, it is not difficult to find that the watermark tends to spread on these regions with strong edges and extreme brightness. In particular, it is noted that the watermarked image is magnified a hundred times.


### 4.2. Robustness of the Proposed Algorithm

Robustness is a default measure which is used to evaluate the watermarked image’s resistance against attacks. In a satisfactory algorithm for image watermark, the watermark would not be easily removed from the watermarked image after common and deliberate attacks. In this paper, we simulate the real situation of disguised attacks and check out robustness for the proposed algorithm, where the number of orientations is 9 and the embedding strength is 0.1.


#### 4.2.1. Robustness to Scaling Attack

For the “Lena” image and “Barbara” image, when scaling parameters are 1/2, 3/4, 3/2, 2, and 4, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and NC values are all above 0.90. For the “Boat” image, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and NC values are all above 0.90 when scaling parameters are 3/4, 3/2, 2, and 4. With the increase of scaling attack parameter, PSNR values are increasing; MSE values are decreasing. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can resist scaling attack.


#### 4.2.2. Robustness to JPEG Compression Attack

JPEG lossy compression is the most common attack during the transformation of the watermarked image. In order to evaluate robustness of proposed algorithm, every watermarked image is compressed using JPEG with different quality factors. From extracted watermarks in Table3, it is not hard for anyone to observe that extracted watermark is still distinguishable until the quality factor is set to 30. In addition, for all test images, PSNR values are all above 30 dB; NC values are all above 0.8. Therefore, the proposed algorithm is very robust against JPEG compression.


#### 4.2.3. Robustness to Filtering Attack

As shown in Table4, whether Gaussian low-pass filtering, average filtering, or median filtering, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable for the “Lena” image and the “Barbara” image. In addition, NC values are all above 0.855 for the “Lena” image, 0.77 for the “Boat” image, and 0.86 for the “Barbara” image. However, the extracted watermarks are imperfect for the “Boat” image.


#### 4.2.4. Robustness under Various Noises Attack

The watermarked image is easily disturbed by various noises. In the test, we add “Salt and Pepper” (Table5) noise and “Gaussian” white noise (Table 6) to the watermarked images.For the watermarked image with “Salt and Pepper” noise, with the increase of noise attack strength, more and more noise points appear in the extracted watermark, but the extracted watermark is still distinguishable and complete until the attack strength is set to 0.05. When the attack strength is set to 0.05, the extracted watermark is not perfect but distinguishable; the NC value is 0.8262 for the Lena image, 0.7866 for the Boat image, and 0.7861 for the Barbara image, respectively.Similarly, for the watermarked image under the attack of “Gaussian” white noise, when the noise mean is set to zero, noise points increasingly appear in extracted watermark with the increase of noise variance. The extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and perfect for all test images until the noise variance is set to 0.0005. When the noise variance is set to 0.0005 and 0.001, the extracted watermark is incomplete but distinguishable for all test images; the NC values are all above 0.8. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can resist noise attack to some extent.


#### 4.2.5. The Comparison Experiments of Related Algorithm

To verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, the proposed algorithm is compared with related algorithms based on DWT and DCT. DCT-based watermark algorithm is performed by embedding watermark in the largestn×n coefficients of the first-level DCT subband. Watermarking based on DWT is performed by embedding watermark in the largest n×n coefficients of the first-level subband, where a one-level DWT decomposition is performed using “Haar” wavelet.To be fair, both the watermark image and the test images are the same to all algorithms. Table7 shows the results of comparison on “Lena” image. As shown in Table 7, the proposed algorithm outperforms other algorithms in invisibility. Meanwhile, in robustness against these attacks, such as scaling attack and cropping attack, the proposed algorithm gets advantage over other algorithms.In Table2, although the NC values of proposed algorithm are not higher than other algorithms except no attack and scaling attack, it is noted that PSNR values of proposed algorithm are higher than other algorithms except cropping middle (50%). In other words, watermark which is embedded in host image cause much degradation of perceptual quality of the watermarked image, yet the quality of the watermarked image for proposed algorithm is better.Table 2
Experimental results under the scaling attack.
Scaling parameter
1/4
1/2
3/4
3/2
2
4
Lena
PSNR
28.9888
34.6526
40.2526
45.8866
45.7492
45.9472
MSE
82.0732
22.2750
6.1350
1.6766
1.7304
1.6533
NC
0.7778
0.9302
0.9731
0.9824
0.9819
0.9819
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
26.3117
31.1662
35.9492
42.4460
42.2792
42.5013
MSE
152.0217
49.7120
16.5257
3.7024
3.8473
3.6540
NC
0.6982
0.8154
0.9009
0.9771
0.9692
0.9712
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
23.6562
25.4999
29.1969
35.8845
35.6902
35.9257
MSE
280.1925
183.2677
78.2331
16.7738
17.5412
16.6155
NC
0.7671
0.9009
0.9658
0.9756
0.9751
0.9751
The extracted watermarkTable 3
Experimental results under the attack of JPEG lossy Compression.
Quality factor
30
40
50
60
75
90
Lena
PSNR
35.1718
36.0294
36.4005
42.2603
53.2168
48.0330
MSE
19.7649
16.0294
14.8947
6.1242
0.3100
0.8313
NC
0.8252
0.8506
0.9004
0.9160
0.9453
0.9849
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
33.3926
34.3324
34.6845
38.6331
53.5308
47.9809
MSE
29.7727
23.9794
22.1121
8.9077
0.2884
1.0351
NC
0.8101
0.8423
0.8955
0.9077
0.9233
0.9834
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
30.6849
31.9392
32.2378
36.1950
53.8219
46.1332
MSE
55.5383
41.6065
38.8416
15.6165
0.2697
1.5840
NC
0.8257
0.8457
0.8706
0.9146
0.9438
0.9834
The extracted watermarkTable 4
Experimental results under filtering attack.
Filter
Gaussian low-pass filtering(13∗13)
Average filtering(4∗4)
Average filtering(8∗8)
Median filtering(3∗3)
Windows median filtering(2∗3)
Windows median filtering(3∗4)
Lena
PSNR
41.2527
33.8154
31.2694
36.0472
33.0632
30.7585
MSE
4.8731
27.0112
48.5448
16.1570
33.5627
54.7312
NC
0.9619
0.9058
0.8560
0.8955
0.8652
0.8608
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
38.8456
31.3718
28.6105
32.1768
29.8478
28.7947
MSE
8.4824
47.4128
89.5425
39.3914
67.3442
85.8246
NC
0.8677
0.7930
0.7710
0.8193
0.7891
0.7764
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
33.7961
25.9565
24.0378
25.3074
24.8688
23.6426
MSE
27.1314
164.9810
256.6278
191.5741
211.9325
281.0734
NC
0.9580
0.8960
0.8604
0.9038
0.8652
0.8901
The extracted watermarkTable 5
Experimental results under the attack of “Salt and Pepper” noise.
Attack strength
d = 0.001
d = 0.005
d = 0.01
d = 0.02
d = 0.05
Lena
PSNR
34.8891
28.3823
25.3281
22.3135
18.4735
MSE
21.0945
94.3727
195.0891
381.7102
924.1257
NC
0.9814
0.9741
0.9741
0.9268
0.8262
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
35.5080
28.3722
25.3806
22.4128
18.3500
MSE
18.2927
94.5926
188.3749
373.0794
950.7809
NC
0.9834
0.9712
0.9482
0.9331
0.7866
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
35.3764
28.0243
25.2388
22.5369
18.4612
MSE
18.8555
102.4817
194.6269
362.5728
926.4612
NC
0.9814
0.9717
0.9727
0.9316
0.7861
The extracted watermarkTable 6
Experimental results under the attack of “Gaussian” white noise (mean = 0).
Variance
v = 0.00001
v = 0.00005
v = 0.0001
v = 0.0005
v = 0.001
Lena
PSNR
47.9293
42.5216
39.7561
32.9411
29.9570
MSE
1.0475
3.6585
6.8782
33.0349
65.6718
NC
0.9849
0.9766
0.9575
0.8721
0.8345
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
48.0248
42.5474
39.7670
32.9706
29.9739
MSE
1.0247
3.6169
6.8608
32.8114
65.4169
NC
0.9854
0.9697
0.9565
0.8643
0.8179
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
48.0677
42.5511
39.7595
32.9428
29.9936
MSE
1.0146
3.6138
6.8727
33.0220
65.1206
NC
0.9844
0.9663
0.9443
0.8701
0.8301
The extracted watermarkTable 7
Comparison on “Lena” image (NC/PSNR).
DCT
DWT
DST
No attack
0.9849/34.7284 dB
0.9849/33.7641 dB
0.9849/53.1768 dB
Scaling (25%)
0.7699/27.8846 dB
0.7686/28.0819 dB
0.7778/29.9888 dB
Scaling (50%)
0.9243/31.6796 dB
0.9261/31.6349 dB
0.9302/34.6526 dB
Scaling (4)
0.9809/34.7284 dB
0.9749/33.8214 dB
0.9819/45.9472 dB
JPEG (10)
0.8428/29.2431 dB
0.9824/29.0396 dB
0.7056/30.6196 dB
JPEG (30)
0.9429/31.9655 dB
0.9844/31.5159 dB
0.8252/35.1718 dB
JPEG (50)
0.9819/32.5494 dB
0.9849/32.0032 dB
0.9004/36.4005 dB
Cropping right (50%)
0.7222/9.6540 dB
0.9790/9.6459 dB
0.9712/9.6617 dB
Cropping right (75%)
0.7280/7.0743 dB
0.8530/7.0719 dB
0.8579/7.0764 dB
Cropping middle (50%)
0.7100/11.6153 dB
0.8750/27.3320 dB
0.8901/11.6305 dB
Salt & Pepper noise (0.1)
0.6934/15.4339 dB
0.6331/15.3887 dB
0.6729/15.4918 dB


## 4.1. Invisibility of Watermark

Invisibility is an evaluative measure of perceptual quality of the watermarked image. In a satisfactory image watermark algorithm, watermark should not cause much degradation of perceptual quality of the watermarked image. In the proposed algorithm, a64×64 watermark image is embedded into different test images (“Lena,” “Boat,” and “Barbara” with 512×512) to test invisibility, where the number of directions is 9 and the embedding strength is 0.1.As shown in Table1, there are not much visual differences between original test images and their corresponding watermarked images. In addition, the PSNR value of each watermarked image is above 53 dB, and NC value of corresponding extracted watermark image is above 0.98. The extracted watermarks are all easily distinguishable. Whether from a subjective view or from the objective view, the proposed algorithm has preferable invisibility.Table 1
The experimental results of invisibility.
Lena
Boat
Barbara
The test images
The watermarked images
PSNR/MSE
53.1768/0.3129
53.5148/0.2895
53.6411/0.2812
The absolute difference between original images and their corresponding watermarked image
The extracted watermark
NC
0.9849
0.9848
0.9850Furthermore, by analyzing the absolute difference between the test image and the watermarked image, it is not difficult to find that the watermark tends to spread on these regions with strong edges and extreme brightness. In particular, it is noted that the watermarked image is magnified a hundred times.


## 4.2. Robustness of the Proposed Algorithm

Robustness is a default measure which is used to evaluate the watermarked image’s resistance against attacks. In a satisfactory algorithm for image watermark, the watermark would not be easily removed from the watermarked image after common and deliberate attacks. In this paper, we simulate the real situation of disguised attacks and check out robustness for the proposed algorithm, where the number of orientations is 9 and the embedding strength is 0.1.


### 4.2.1. Robustness to Scaling Attack

For the “Lena” image and “Barbara” image, when scaling parameters are 1/2, 3/4, 3/2, 2, and 4, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and NC values are all above 0.90. For the “Boat” image, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and NC values are all above 0.90 when scaling parameters are 3/4, 3/2, 2, and 4. With the increase of scaling attack parameter, PSNR values are increasing; MSE values are decreasing. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can resist scaling attack.


### 4.2.2. Robustness to JPEG Compression Attack

JPEG lossy compression is the most common attack during the transformation of the watermarked image. In order to evaluate robustness of proposed algorithm, every watermarked image is compressed using JPEG with different quality factors. From extracted watermarks in Table3, it is not hard for anyone to observe that extracted watermark is still distinguishable until the quality factor is set to 30. In addition, for all test images, PSNR values are all above 30 dB; NC values are all above 0.8. Therefore, the proposed algorithm is very robust against JPEG compression.


### 4.2.3. Robustness to Filtering Attack

As shown in Table4, whether Gaussian low-pass filtering, average filtering, or median filtering, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable for the “Lena” image and the “Barbara” image. In addition, NC values are all above 0.855 for the “Lena” image, 0.77 for the “Boat” image, and 0.86 for the “Barbara” image. However, the extracted watermarks are imperfect for the “Boat” image.


### 4.2.4. Robustness under Various Noises Attack

The watermarked image is easily disturbed by various noises. In the test, we add “Salt and Pepper” (Table5) noise and “Gaussian” white noise (Table 6) to the watermarked images.For the watermarked image with “Salt and Pepper” noise, with the increase of noise attack strength, more and more noise points appear in the extracted watermark, but the extracted watermark is still distinguishable and complete until the attack strength is set to 0.05. When the attack strength is set to 0.05, the extracted watermark is not perfect but distinguishable; the NC value is 0.8262 for the Lena image, 0.7866 for the Boat image, and 0.7861 for the Barbara image, respectively.Similarly, for the watermarked image under the attack of “Gaussian” white noise, when the noise mean is set to zero, noise points increasingly appear in extracted watermark with the increase of noise variance. The extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and perfect for all test images until the noise variance is set to 0.0005. When the noise variance is set to 0.0005 and 0.001, the extracted watermark is incomplete but distinguishable for all test images; the NC values are all above 0.8. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can resist noise attack to some extent.


### 4.2.5. The Comparison Experiments of Related Algorithm

To verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, the proposed algorithm is compared with related algorithms based on DWT and DCT. DCT-based watermark algorithm is performed by embedding watermark in the largestn×n coefficients of the first-level DCT subband. Watermarking based on DWT is performed by embedding watermark in the largest n×n coefficients of the first-level subband, where a one-level DWT decomposition is performed using “Haar” wavelet.To be fair, both the watermark image and the test images are the same to all algorithms. Table7 shows the results of comparison on “Lena” image. As shown in Table 7, the proposed algorithm outperforms other algorithms in invisibility. Meanwhile, in robustness against these attacks, such as scaling attack and cropping attack, the proposed algorithm gets advantage over other algorithms.In Table2, although the NC values of proposed algorithm are not higher than other algorithms except no attack and scaling attack, it is noted that PSNR values of proposed algorithm are higher than other algorithms except cropping middle (50%). In other words, watermark which is embedded in host image cause much degradation of perceptual quality of the watermarked image, yet the quality of the watermarked image for proposed algorithm is better.Table 2
Experimental results under the scaling attack.
Scaling parameter
1/4
1/2
3/4
3/2
2
4
Lena
PSNR
28.9888
34.6526
40.2526
45.8866
45.7492
45.9472
MSE
82.0732
22.2750
6.1350
1.6766
1.7304
1.6533
NC
0.7778
0.9302
0.9731
0.9824
0.9819
0.9819
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
26.3117
31.1662
35.9492
42.4460
42.2792
42.5013
MSE
152.0217
49.7120
16.5257
3.7024
3.8473
3.6540
NC
0.6982
0.8154
0.9009
0.9771
0.9692
0.9712
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
23.6562
25.4999
29.1969
35.8845
35.6902
35.9257
MSE
280.1925
183.2677
78.2331
16.7738
17.5412
16.6155
NC
0.7671
0.9009
0.9658
0.9756
0.9751
0.9751
The extracted watermarkTable 3
Experimental results under the attack of JPEG lossy Compression.
Quality factor
30
40
50
60
75
90
Lena
PSNR
35.1718
36.0294
36.4005
42.2603
53.2168
48.0330
MSE
19.7649
16.0294
14.8947
6.1242
0.3100
0.8313
NC
0.8252
0.8506
0.9004
0.9160
0.9453
0.9849
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
33.3926
34.3324
34.6845
38.6331
53.5308
47.9809
MSE
29.7727
23.9794
22.1121
8.9077
0.2884
1.0351
NC
0.8101
0.8423
0.8955
0.9077
0.9233
0.9834
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
30.6849
31.9392
32.2378
36.1950
53.8219
46.1332
MSE
55.5383
41.6065
38.8416
15.6165
0.2697
1.5840
NC
0.8257
0.8457
0.8706
0.9146
0.9438
0.9834
The extracted watermarkTable 4
Experimental results under filtering attack.
Filter
Gaussian low-pass filtering(13∗13)
Average filtering(4∗4)
Average filtering(8∗8)
Median filtering(3∗3)
Windows median filtering(2∗3)
Windows median filtering(3∗4)
Lena
PSNR
41.2527
33.8154
31.2694
36.0472
33.0632
30.7585
MSE
4.8731
27.0112
48.5448
16.1570
33.5627
54.7312
NC
0.9619
0.9058
0.8560
0.8955
0.8652
0.8608
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
38.8456
31.3718
28.6105
32.1768
29.8478
28.7947
MSE
8.4824
47.4128
89.5425
39.3914
67.3442
85.8246
NC
0.8677
0.7930
0.7710
0.8193
0.7891
0.7764
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
33.7961
25.9565
24.0378
25.3074
24.8688
23.6426
MSE
27.1314
164.9810
256.6278
191.5741
211.9325
281.0734
NC
0.9580
0.8960
0.8604
0.9038
0.8652
0.8901
The extracted watermarkTable 5
Experimental results under the attack of “Salt and Pepper” noise.
Attack strength
d = 0.001
d = 0.005
d = 0.01
d = 0.02
d = 0.05
Lena
PSNR
34.8891
28.3823
25.3281
22.3135
18.4735
MSE
21.0945
94.3727
195.0891
381.7102
924.1257
NC
0.9814
0.9741
0.9741
0.9268
0.8262
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
35.5080
28.3722
25.3806
22.4128
18.3500
MSE
18.2927
94.5926
188.3749
373.0794
950.7809
NC
0.9834
0.9712
0.9482
0.9331
0.7866
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
35.3764
28.0243
25.2388
22.5369
18.4612
MSE
18.8555
102.4817
194.6269
362.5728
926.4612
NC
0.9814
0.9717
0.9727
0.9316
0.7861
The extracted watermarkTable 6
Experimental results under the attack of “Gaussian” white noise (mean = 0).
Variance
v = 0.00001
v = 0.00005
v = 0.0001
v = 0.0005
v = 0.001
Lena
PSNR
47.9293
42.5216
39.7561
32.9411
29.9570
MSE
1.0475
3.6585
6.8782
33.0349
65.6718
NC
0.9849
0.9766
0.9575
0.8721
0.8345
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
48.0248
42.5474
39.7670
32.9706
29.9739
MSE
1.0247
3.6169
6.8608
32.8114
65.4169
NC
0.9854
0.9697
0.9565
0.8643
0.8179
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
48.0677
42.5511
39.7595
32.9428
29.9936
MSE
1.0146
3.6138
6.8727
33.0220
65.1206
NC
0.9844
0.9663
0.9443
0.8701
0.8301
The extracted watermarkTable 7
Comparison on “Lena” image (NC/PSNR).
DCT
DWT
DST
No attack
0.9849/34.7284 dB
0.9849/33.7641 dB
0.9849/53.1768 dB
Scaling (25%)
0.7699/27.8846 dB
0.7686/28.0819 dB
0.7778/29.9888 dB
Scaling (50%)
0.9243/31.6796 dB
0.9261/31.6349 dB
0.9302/34.6526 dB
Scaling (4)
0.9809/34.7284 dB
0.9749/33.8214 dB
0.9819/45.9472 dB
JPEG (10)
0.8428/29.2431 dB
0.9824/29.0396 dB
0.7056/30.6196 dB
JPEG (30)
0.9429/31.9655 dB
0.9844/31.5159 dB
0.8252/35.1718 dB
JPEG (50)
0.9819/32.5494 dB
0.9849/32.0032 dB
0.9004/36.4005 dB
Cropping right (50%)
0.7222/9.6540 dB
0.9790/9.6459 dB
0.9712/9.6617 dB
Cropping right (75%)
0.7280/7.0743 dB
0.8530/7.0719 dB
0.8579/7.0764 dB
Cropping middle (50%)
0.7100/11.6153 dB
0.8750/27.3320 dB
0.8901/11.6305 dB
Salt & Pepper noise (0.1)
0.6934/15.4339 dB
0.6331/15.3887 dB
0.6729/15.4918 dB


## 4.2.1. Robustness to Scaling Attack

For the “Lena” image and “Barbara” image, when scaling parameters are 1/2, 3/4, 3/2, 2, and 4, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and NC values are all above 0.90. For the “Boat” image, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and NC values are all above 0.90 when scaling parameters are 3/4, 3/2, 2, and 4. With the increase of scaling attack parameter, PSNR values are increasing; MSE values are decreasing. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can resist scaling attack.


## 4.2.2. Robustness to JPEG Compression Attack

JPEG lossy compression is the most common attack during the transformation of the watermarked image. In order to evaluate robustness of proposed algorithm, every watermarked image is compressed using JPEG with different quality factors. From extracted watermarks in Table3, it is not hard for anyone to observe that extracted watermark is still distinguishable until the quality factor is set to 30. In addition, for all test images, PSNR values are all above 30 dB; NC values are all above 0.8. Therefore, the proposed algorithm is very robust against JPEG compression.


## 4.2.3. Robustness to Filtering Attack

As shown in Table4, whether Gaussian low-pass filtering, average filtering, or median filtering, the extracted watermarks are still distinguishable for the “Lena” image and the “Barbara” image. In addition, NC values are all above 0.855 for the “Lena” image, 0.77 for the “Boat” image, and 0.86 for the “Barbara” image. However, the extracted watermarks are imperfect for the “Boat” image.


## 4.2.4. Robustness under Various Noises Attack

The watermarked image is easily disturbed by various noises. In the test, we add “Salt and Pepper” (Table5) noise and “Gaussian” white noise (Table 6) to the watermarked images.For the watermarked image with “Salt and Pepper” noise, with the increase of noise attack strength, more and more noise points appear in the extracted watermark, but the extracted watermark is still distinguishable and complete until the attack strength is set to 0.05. When the attack strength is set to 0.05, the extracted watermark is not perfect but distinguishable; the NC value is 0.8262 for the Lena image, 0.7866 for the Boat image, and 0.7861 for the Barbara image, respectively.Similarly, for the watermarked image under the attack of “Gaussian” white noise, when the noise mean is set to zero, noise points increasingly appear in extracted watermark with the increase of noise variance. The extracted watermarks are still distinguishable and perfect for all test images until the noise variance is set to 0.0005. When the noise variance is set to 0.0005 and 0.001, the extracted watermark is incomplete but distinguishable for all test images; the NC values are all above 0.8. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can resist noise attack to some extent.


## 4.2.5. The Comparison Experiments of Related Algorithm

To verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, the proposed algorithm is compared with related algorithms based on DWT and DCT. DCT-based watermark algorithm is performed by embedding watermark in the largestn×n coefficients of the first-level DCT subband. Watermarking based on DWT is performed by embedding watermark in the largest n×n coefficients of the first-level subband, where a one-level DWT decomposition is performed using “Haar” wavelet.To be fair, both the watermark image and the test images are the same to all algorithms. Table7 shows the results of comparison on “Lena” image. As shown in Table 7, the proposed algorithm outperforms other algorithms in invisibility. Meanwhile, in robustness against these attacks, such as scaling attack and cropping attack, the proposed algorithm gets advantage over other algorithms.In Table2, although the NC values of proposed algorithm are not higher than other algorithms except no attack and scaling attack, it is noted that PSNR values of proposed algorithm are higher than other algorithms except cropping middle (50%). In other words, watermark which is embedded in host image cause much degradation of perceptual quality of the watermarked image, yet the quality of the watermarked image for proposed algorithm is better.Table 2
Experimental results under the scaling attack.
Scaling parameter
1/4
1/2
3/4
3/2
2
4
Lena
PSNR
28.9888
34.6526
40.2526
45.8866
45.7492
45.9472
MSE
82.0732
22.2750
6.1350
1.6766
1.7304
1.6533
NC
0.7778
0.9302
0.9731
0.9824
0.9819
0.9819
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
26.3117
31.1662
35.9492
42.4460
42.2792
42.5013
MSE
152.0217
49.7120
16.5257
3.7024
3.8473
3.6540
NC
0.6982
0.8154
0.9009
0.9771
0.9692
0.9712
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
23.6562
25.4999
29.1969
35.8845
35.6902
35.9257
MSE
280.1925
183.2677
78.2331
16.7738
17.5412
16.6155
NC
0.7671
0.9009
0.9658
0.9756
0.9751
0.9751
The extracted watermarkTable 3
Experimental results under the attack of JPEG lossy Compression.
Quality factor
30
40
50
60
75
90
Lena
PSNR
35.1718
36.0294
36.4005
42.2603
53.2168
48.0330
MSE
19.7649
16.0294
14.8947
6.1242
0.3100
0.8313
NC
0.8252
0.8506
0.9004
0.9160
0.9453
0.9849
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
33.3926
34.3324
34.6845
38.6331
53.5308
47.9809
MSE
29.7727
23.9794
22.1121
8.9077
0.2884
1.0351
NC
0.8101
0.8423
0.8955
0.9077
0.9233
0.9834
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
30.6849
31.9392
32.2378
36.1950
53.8219
46.1332
MSE
55.5383
41.6065
38.8416
15.6165
0.2697
1.5840
NC
0.8257
0.8457
0.8706
0.9146
0.9438
0.9834
The extracted watermarkTable 4
Experimental results under filtering attack.
Filter
Gaussian low-pass filtering(13∗13)
Average filtering(4∗4)
Average filtering(8∗8)
Median filtering(3∗3)
Windows median filtering(2∗3)
Windows median filtering(3∗4)
Lena
PSNR
41.2527
33.8154
31.2694
36.0472
33.0632
30.7585
MSE
4.8731
27.0112
48.5448
16.1570
33.5627
54.7312
NC
0.9619
0.9058
0.8560
0.8955
0.8652
0.8608
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
38.8456
31.3718
28.6105
32.1768
29.8478
28.7947
MSE
8.4824
47.4128
89.5425
39.3914
67.3442
85.8246
NC
0.8677
0.7930
0.7710
0.8193
0.7891
0.7764
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
33.7961
25.9565
24.0378
25.3074
24.8688
23.6426
MSE
27.1314
164.9810
256.6278
191.5741
211.9325
281.0734
NC
0.9580
0.8960
0.8604
0.9038
0.8652
0.8901
The extracted watermarkTable 5
Experimental results under the attack of “Salt and Pepper” noise.
Attack strength
d = 0.001
d = 0.005
d = 0.01
d = 0.02
d = 0.05
Lena
PSNR
34.8891
28.3823
25.3281
22.3135
18.4735
MSE
21.0945
94.3727
195.0891
381.7102
924.1257
NC
0.9814
0.9741
0.9741
0.9268
0.8262
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
35.5080
28.3722
25.3806
22.4128
18.3500
MSE
18.2927
94.5926
188.3749
373.0794
950.7809
NC
0.9834
0.9712
0.9482
0.9331
0.7866
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
35.3764
28.0243
25.2388
22.5369
18.4612
MSE
18.8555
102.4817
194.6269
362.5728
926.4612
NC
0.9814
0.9717
0.9727
0.9316
0.7861
The extracted watermarkTable 6
Experimental results under the attack of “Gaussian” white noise (mean = 0).
Variance
v = 0.00001
v = 0.00005
v = 0.0001
v = 0.0005
v = 0.001
Lena
PSNR
47.9293
42.5216
39.7561
32.9411
29.9570
MSE
1.0475
3.6585
6.8782
33.0349
65.6718
NC
0.9849
0.9766
0.9575
0.8721
0.8345
The extracted watermark
Boat
PSNR
48.0248
42.5474
39.7670
32.9706
29.9739
MSE
1.0247
3.6169
6.8608
32.8114
65.4169
NC
0.9854
0.9697
0.9565
0.8643
0.8179
The extracted watermark
Barbara
PSNR
48.0677
42.5511
39.7595
32.9428
29.9936
MSE
1.0146
3.6138
6.8727
33.0220
65.1206
NC
0.9844
0.9663
0.9443
0.8701
0.8301
The extracted watermarkTable 7
Comparison on “Lena” image (NC/PSNR).
DCT
DWT
DST
No attack
0.9849/34.7284 dB
0.9849/33.7641 dB
0.9849/53.1768 dB
Scaling (25%)
0.7699/27.8846 dB
0.7686/28.0819 dB
0.7778/29.9888 dB
Scaling (50%)
0.9243/31.6796 dB
0.9261/31.6349 dB
0.9302/34.6526 dB
Scaling (4)
0.9809/34.7284 dB
0.9749/33.8214 dB
0.9819/45.9472 dB
JPEG (10)
0.8428/29.2431 dB
0.9824/29.0396 dB
0.7056/30.6196 dB
JPEG (30)
0.9429/31.9655 dB
0.9844/31.5159 dB
0.8252/35.1718 dB
JPEG (50)
0.9819/32.5494 dB
0.9849/32.0032 dB
0.9004/36.4005 dB
Cropping right (50%)
0.7222/9.6540 dB
0.9790/9.6459 dB
0.9712/9.6617 dB
Cropping right (75%)
0.7280/7.0743 dB
0.8530/7.0719 dB
0.8579/7.0764 dB
Cropping middle (50%)
0.7100/11.6153 dB
0.8750/27.3320 dB
0.8901/11.6305 dB
Salt & Pepper noise (0.1)
0.6934/15.4339 dB
0.6331/15.3887 dB
0.6729/15.4918 dB


## 5. Conclusion

This paper tries to implement an image watermark by taking advantage of the unique advantages of extended discrete shearlet and selecting watermark embedding location based on the highest information entropy. The unique advantages of extended discrete shearlet made the watermark system more invisible. Experimental results demonstrate that visual performance of the watermarked images is preferable to that of related algorithms based on DWT and DCT; meanwhile, the proposed watermark algorithm can resist common attack. Therefore, the extended discrete shearlet can be considered as an appropriate transform for digital watermark.



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*Source: 450819-2015-10-04.xml*