Newsgroup: it.cultura.militare
Titolo: Strategia israeliana: contro ogni logica per il NYT

To Disarm Shadowy Guerrilla Army, Israeli Air Power May Not Be Enough
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By THOM SHANKER
Published: July 20, 2006
WASHINGTON, July 19 - With its bombardment of Lebanon, Israel aims to
accomplish the military goals of eliminating Hezbollah's ability to
fire missiles over the border, cutting its lines of resupply from Syria
or Iran and demonstrating - under pain of chaos - the cost to the
Lebanese government of allowing the militant group to operate freely
from its territory.
But recent combat history provides a chastening lesson that air power,
regardless of its accuracy and punch, cannot defeat even a conventional
adversary unless it is backed by ground forces. Thus, American military
analysts monitoring the conflict caution that Israel may be unable to
reach its goal of disarming a shadowy guerrilla army by missiles, bombs
and long-range artillery alone.
To that end, small numbers of Israeli commandos already have entered
Lebanon, senior Israeli officials acknowledged Wednesday, and more
ground forces may be sent in.
The Israeli Defense Forces are "right now doing pinpointed entries
into south Lebanon to deal with Hezbollah locations," said one senior
Israeli official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he
was discussing his nation's classified military planning.
Israel is wary of replicating its demoralizing, 18-year occupation of
southern Lebanon, and there are no plans for "clear and hold"
missions, these officials said. Instead, once their tactical objectives
are reached in missions aimed at clearing the rocky, cavernous,
bunker-laden terrain of militants and their arsenals, Israeli forces
would return home.
Then it would be up to Lebanese troops, perhaps with assistance from an
international force, to fill the security vacuum under the Israeli
plan, the Israeli official said.
Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East expert who served on the staff of the
National Security Council under President Reagan, said that while it
may not be possible for the Israelis to destroy Hezbollah completely,
especially through bombardment alone, "They can degrade that
guerrilla army's capacity to inflict unacceptable pain on Israeli
civilians and Israeli cities with rockets."
But even a successful conclusion of the current military effort in
southern Lebanon cannot resolve Israel's broader security problems,
he cautioned.
"The Palestinian suicide bombers were much more effective than these
rockets have ever been," said Mr. Kemp, who is now director of
regional strategic programs for the Nixon Center, a Washington policy
institute.
Over the past week of fighting, after Hezbollah forces captured two
Israeli soldiers, Israeli forces have carried out air and artillery
strikes to degrade Hezbollah military capabilities in southern Lebanon.
The attacks focused first on rockets and launchers.
"We are still working through our original targeting menus, but we
are chasing these strategic missiles as we find them," said the
Israeli official. "This is our first priority - and it will take
weeks, not days."
American military officers who study the missile threat noted that
Israel faced significant problems in countering Hezbollah's arsenal.
Even with perfect missile defenses - which do not exist - the
short-range weapons that have struck northern Israel follow such a
brief trajectory that they are nearly impossible to hit. For those
short-range rockets, and the longer-range missiles that have struck
Haifa, the Israeli tactic is not to defend by bringing them down in
flight, but to hit their launchers in hiding or immediately as they are
rolled into the open before firing, which requires persistent and
detailed surveillance.
More broadly, Israel also has sent its missiles and artillery shells
into Hezbollah outposts, weapons depots and command posts, aiming at
troops and ammunition buried in the rocky Lebanese terrain. The goal is
to create less a cordon sanitaire than an empty zone to be refilled by
forces, either Lebanese or international, capable of preventing
Hezbollah from returning within striking range of Israel.
To destroy Hezbollah's ability to plan and communicate, the
neighborhood in southern Beirut that served as the unofficial Hezbollah
capital has been pounded; Israeli officials acknowledge that this is
part of an attempt to strike directly at the organization's
leadership, as well as to disarm its fighters and dismantle its support
infrastructure.
In addition, to keep weapons from reaching Hezbollah, a number of road
links and bridges to Syria, and Beirut's airport, have been hit, as
Israeli warships impose a quarantine of the Lebanese coast. To the same
end, Israeli officials are demanding that a stringent monitoring regime
be put into place along all entry points to Lebanon.
But the Israeli military campaign is intertwined with another goal
aimed at the Lebanese government and civilian population, in the view
of some American experts. "That is to create enough pain on the
ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's
adventurism," said Edward P. Djerejian, who formerly was the American
ambassador to both Israel and Syria.
Mr. Djerejian, now director of Rice University's Baker Institute for
Public Policy, warned that, ultimately, there was no military solution
to reduce the security threats to Israel - and that the Israeli
leadership understood it had a limited time to achieve its current
military goals.
"There is only a certain window of time before the international
community truly weighs in," he said.
Until the United States and other nations decide to pressure Israel to
rein in its attacks, Israel itself must weigh the impact of bombarding
civilian infrastructure targets and even legitimate Hezbollah
operations centers within residential areas. These attacks could
quickly undermine any potential for the Lebanese government, and its
population, to support actions to constrain Hezbollah.
"Everybody understands the Israelis want to degrade Hezbollah's
ability as a military fighting force and as an organization capable of
launching missiles into Israel," said Theodore H. Kattouf, a former
American ambassador to Syria.
"I believe they want to turn the Lebanese people - those outside of
the true believers within the Shia community - against Hezbollah,"
he added. "I think they are quite misguided in the policy they are
following. These attacks are, if anything, making people feel somewhat
less hostile to Hezbollah and more convinced in their dislike of
Israel."

 irachena, ma gli israeliani ai kamikaze sanno come parlare.
Hanno molti meno mezzi degli usa e hezbollah ha mezzi molto sofisticati
(se hanno i missili antinave di aspetterei centinaia di manpads e atgm)


Ah no? Io ho sentito parlare di roba arrivata dalla Russia come gli
sa-18 roba che anche per le "ferrerie iraniane" è molto avanzata non
li usano solo perchè gli aerei volano troppo alti visto che devono
colpire solo obbiettivi strategici e i carri non ci sono ancora, ma se
devi fare il cas far volare elicotteri ecc per coprire un'assalto
terrestre stai sicuro che li useranno. Gli hezbollah sono maestri delle
imboscate e delle IED e cosa sta dando maggiori rogne agli usa in Iraq?

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_STJPJVN
segnalato da lluca logi su ipi, richiede l'abbonamento, ma già il
titolo mi sembra chiaro
NB l'economist era a strafavore dell'invavione dell'iraq ai tempi.

From its strategic outpost in Iraq, the United States was to have
hemmed in Iran and Syria. Instead, Iran is enjoying an unprecedented
bout of muscularity, its Shiite allies now having gained the upper hand
in neighboring Iraq. Syria continues to turn a blind eye as militants
transit its territory to join the fight in Iraq. And Damascus has now
teamed up with Tehran to aid and abet the alliance between Hamas and
Hezbollah.
Far from taming the region's politics, Washington's policies have
succeeding in putting a truculent Iran in command of the Islamic
street. In Tehran, a dogmatic leadership imbued with messianic aims is
both behind Hezbollah's forays and capitalizing on them to establish
itself as the vanguard of political Islam. A defiant Iran is leading
the Shiite masses once more abandoned by their corrupt and illegitimate
leaders.
Again, it did not have to come to this. The reformists formerly in
power in Tehran sought moderation at home and peace abroad, but were
ignored by Washington. Had the Bush administration been more
forthcoming, and taken advantage of the bilateral cooperation that
emerged amid the war in Afghanistan, it could have empowered the
reformers.
The Bush administration has done no better on the Palestinian-Israeli
front. Preoccupied with Iraq, Washington has effectively disengaged
from the peace process. The Bush team not only abandoned Bill Clinton's
diplomatic efforts, but also derided them as naïve and ineffectual.
But for all its faults, Clinton's diplomacy sustained a process of
reconciliation that kept an uneasy peace. Since the inception of Israel
in 1948, every decade has been plagued by an Arab-Israeli war - except
the 1990s.
In contrast, Bush's disengagement has only led to the radicalization of
Palestinian politics. Even major Israeli concessions, such as
withdrawal from Gaza, are unable to quell the extremist fervor when
they take place absent the cover of consensual diplomacy.
In the aftermath of the Sept. 11th tragedies, the guardians of the
American imperium perceived it all to be so easy. A political culture
that had sanctified suicide bombings and militant ideologies was to be
remolded by America's power. The war in Iraq was to be the key to
solving the Arab predicament.
The Bush administration may well be seeking the right end in the Middle
East - the pacification of the region through economic and political
liberalization.
But we already have ample proof that it has chosen the wrong means. Its
errant attempt to impose democracy through force has backfired, only
stirring up a hornet's nest and risking a region-wide crisis.
Iraq lies in ruins, Islamist forces are strengthening, and the
Palestine-Israel conflict threatens to become a full-scale war. Even
more ominously, the Middle East is being polarized along sectarian
lines, empowering an Iran with nuclear ambitions. The mistakes of the
Bush administration are coming home to roost.
Charles A. Kupchan, a professor of international affairs at Georgetown
University, is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Ray Takeyh is a
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden
Iran: Power and Paradox in the Islamic Republic."

 ambassador to both Israel and Syria.
Dal quale una persona di intelligenza media e dotata dei rudimenti della
lingua inglese potrebbe dedurre che l'"Air Power" applicato direttamente
alle capacità missilistiche nemiche non rappresenta _l'intera_ "strategia
israeliana".

 tempo.
Questo è da vedere prima sentivo su radiotre l'inviato del corriere in
medio oriente dire che ciò che più preoccupa la comunità
internazionale non è tanto la violenza di israele quanto la mancanza
di una strategia definita, in definitiva dopo le debacle subite dai
militari (missile antinave ed il non riuscire ad intaccare più di
tanto hezbollah con attacchi aerei piuttosto distruggendo quasi tutte
le infrastrutture libanesi almeno a detta dell'inviato) la palla è
passata in mano ad Olmert che sostanzialmente  non sa che fare, ora
stanno ammassando truppe e credo che invaderanno in compenso in libano
ormai ci sono 1 milione tra profughi e sfollati (su 4 milioni di
popolazione totale) e l'economia è devastata (senza il turismo il
libano fa poco ed è pieno di debiti) economicamente sono stati colpiti
i ceti antisiriani (quelli più ricchi). Insomma un bel disastro
francamente non so come andrà a finire.

 israeliana".
Ecco.
I punti chiave.
Intelligenza media.
Rudimenti d'inglese.
Secondo te il barone ha anche solo uno di questi punti?
-- 
"This unusual and highly successful species spends a great deal of time 
examining his higher motives and an equal amount of time ignoring his 
fundamental ones. He is proud that he has the biggest brain of all the 
primates, but tries to conceal the fact that he also has the biggest 
penis." Desmond Morris

 Secondo te il barone ha anche solo uno di questi punti?
D'altronde se uno legge correntemente coreano, cinese, russo e
assirobabilonese che bisogno ha di leggere e comprendere l'inglese?
Che cazzaro...
-- 
K.F.H.

 
da altro thread, si apprende che il barone è anche esperto di 
psicopedagogia infantile, essendo ampiamente edotto riguardo alla 
condizione di "stronzetti cresciuti nella bambagia" relativamente alle 
giovani generazioni dei kibbutz israeliani.

 qualsiasi momento.
E questo dovrebbe bloccare le linee di rifornimento di una
guerriglia... Leggiti qualche libro di storia va.
- Tu invece faresti bene a documentarti sulla lunghezza degli Zelzal (tutte
le versioni). Se tu lo facessi, scopriresti che sono ingombrantucci per
essere trasportati a dorso di mulo. Gli Hezbollah in quanto guerriglieri con
capacità di ingaggio di bersagli entro i 5 km possono essere riforniti lungo
mulattiere, ma di questo, chi se ne frega. Gli Hezbollah in quanto milizia
in grado di colpire Haifa, no; hanno bisogno di strade e ponti e camion
lunghetti. Studia e ripassa.

Michele Armellini ha scritto:

ma infatti lo so benissimo.

 > adventurism," said Edward P. Djerejian, 
 
dici che gli israeliani stanno riuscendo a raggiungere questo goal?  
-- 
visitate 
http://www.comunisti-italiani.it/frames/index.htm
http://cubainforma.interfree.it/
il film sul 9/11 : 
http://www.loosechange911.com/
http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/Berlin.jpg
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 dici che gli israeliani stanno riuscendo a raggiungere questo goal?
Per ora non direi. Da qui a dire che è una strategia contro ogni logica, ce
ne passa.