Newsgroup: it.cultura.militare
Titolo: Se vi siete mai domandati cosa si prova ad essere abbattuti da un AAM...

...eccovi accontentati (e senza spargimento di sangue):
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/04/video-russian-m.html
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    Luca Morandini
www.lucamorandini.it
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http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/04/video-russian-m.html
una serie di domande:
Prima di tutto, ammetto che in una situazione di tensione di confine, in 
cima alle RoE ci sta il riconoscimento visivo, ma in quel momento la 
camera 1) che ingrandimento aveva ? e da esso discende 2) a quanti FPS 
andava e a quanti FPS stava andando sul laptop di quell' ufficiale 
(presumo georgiano) ? Sinceramente, a me sembra troppo simile ad un 
ingaggio della I o inizio della II GM.
Riconosco che le mie conoscenze simulative del combattimento aereo 
moderno si sono concluse con Falcon 3.0 (gran simulatore, che rimase il 
migliore per molti anni, ma resta tecnologia dei primi '90) ma di sicuro 
non permettevo ai MiG di mostrare più di una quarantina di poligoni ;) 
ma di certo il filmato mi sembra falsato da ingrandimento e/o modifica 
di velocita'.
Ricordo a tutti la figuraccia che fece l' USAF quando cerco' di 
giustificare i "danni collaterali" causati quando nel 1999 in Serbia un 
F-15 prese un ponte mentre ci stava per passare un treno carico di 
civili, mostrando le riprese del FLIR dell' aereo, e vennero sbugiardati 
dal calcolo del movimento del treno da un frame all' altro, che era 
stato accelerato per dimostrare che il pilota "non aveva avuto il tempo 
di pensare", calcolo che mostrò che nel filmato il treno andava all' 
improbabile velocita' di  oltre 200 Km/h (e linea e motrice non erano 
capaci di più di 130/160 Km/h IIRC)
Saluti,
Dott. Piergiorgio.

 capaci di più di 130/160 Km/h IIRC)
Se non mi ricordo male non era la FLIR del velivolo, ma la 
telecamera/IIR del missile: hai riferimenti in merito ?
Saluti,
P.S.
Ecco il rapporto di Amnesty International sull'episodio:
<<5.1 Attack on Grdelica railroad bridge, hitting passenger train: 12 April
On 12 April, a civilian passenger train crossing a bridge in Grdelica, 
southern Serbia, was hit by two bombs. The attack took place in the 
middle of the day. At least 12 civilians reportedly died.(30) NATO 
admitted that its aircraft had bombed the bridge and hit the train, but 
said that the target had been the bridge itself and that the train had 
been hit accidentally. At a press conference on 13 April, General Clark, 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), explained that the pilot's 
mission had been to destroy the railroad bridge. He launched the weapon 
from a distance of several miles unaware that the train was heading 
towards the bridge:
             ''All of a sudden at the very last instant with less than a 
second to go he caught a flash of movement that came into the screen and 
it was the train coming in. Unfortunately he couldn't dump the bomb at 
that point, it was locked, it was going into the target and it was an 
unfortunate incident which he, and the crew, and all of us very much 
regret.''
General Clark then gave the following account of how the pilot returned 
to drop another bomb on the bridge, striking the train again, even 
though he had realized that he had hit the train instead of the bridge 
in the first attack.
             ''The mission was to take out the bridge.... He believed he 
still had to accomplish his mission. He put his aim point on the other 
end of the bridge from where the train had come, by the time the bomb 
got close the bridge was covered with smoke and clouds and at the last 
minute again in an uncanny accident, the train had slid forward from the 
original impact and parts of the train had moved across the bridge, and 
so that by striking the other end of the bridge he actually caused 
additional damage to the train.''
The video of the cockpit view of both attacks was shown at the press 
conference on 13 April. Several months later it was reported in 
Germany's Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper that this video was shown at 
three times speed, giving the impression to viewers that the civilian 
train was moving extremely fast.(31) According to press reports, the US 
air force attributed the speeded-up film to a technical fault, which 
they discovered months after the videotape was shown but they did not 
consider it useful to publicly disclose this information after it was 
uncovered. Jamie Shea, NATO spokesperson, told Amnesty International in 
Brussels that, due to the volume of videotape that analysts had to 
review each day during the campaign, the tapes were speeded up to 
facilitate viewing. He said that the press office was at fault for 
clearing the tape for public screening without slowing it down to the 
original speed.
NATO's explanation of the bombing -- particularly General Clark's 
account of the pilot's rationale for continuing the attack after he had 
hit the train -- suggests that the pilot had understood the mission was 
to destroy the bridge regardless of the cost in terms of civilian 
casualties. This would violate the rules of distinction and proportionality.
Also, NATO does not appear to have taken sufficient precautionary 
measures to ensure that there was no civilian traffic in the vicinity of 
the bridge before launching the first attack. The attacking aircraft -- 
or another aircraft -- could have overflown the area to ascertain that 
no trains were approaching the bridge. Had it done so, it might have 
been able to wait until the train had crossed before launching the attack.
Yet, even if the pilot was, for some reason, unable to ascertain that no 
train was travelling towards the bridge at the time of the first attack, 
he was fully aware that the train was on the bridge when he dropped the 
second bomb, whether smoke obscured its exact whereabouts or not. This 
decision to proceed with the second attack appears to have violated 
Article 57 of Protocol I which requires an attack to ''be cancelled or 
suspended if it becomes clear that the objective is a not a military one 
... or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life...which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated. '' Unless NATO is justified in 
believing that destroying the bridge at that particular moment was of 
such military importance as to justify the number of civilian casualties 
likely to be caused by continuing the attack -- an argument that NATO 
has not made -- the attack should have been stopped.
Further questions about this attack were raised in the New York Times on 
14 April, which reported that while NATO officials had refused to name 
the type of weapon or aircraft involved, officials in Washington had 
said that the plane had been an American F-15E, firing an AGM-130 bomb. 
General Clark had only referred to the aircraft pilot as being involved, 
but the F-15E carries a crew of two: the pilot and a weapons officer who 
controls the bombs. According to this report, the AGM-130 is at first 
guided by satellite, but as it nears its target, the pilot or weapons 
officer can guide it, using a video image. One reporter's account cited 
witnesses as identifying the attacking aircraft as a Harrier jet, which 
hovered within sight of the bridge before firing the second missile.(32) 
Other witnesses reported that two additional bombs were dropped on an 
adjacent highway bridge.(33) NATO has never mentioned that this attack 
struck the highway bridge.
On 15 April 1999 Amnesty International called on NATO to conduct an 
inquiry into this attack. NATO officials who met with Amnesty 
International delegates in Brussels said they were not aware of the 
second bomb being dropped by the pilot. Assistant Secretary General 
Buckley said that if General Clark's account is that the pilot fired a 
second time at the bridge, it must mean that there was an internal 
investigation and the pilot was cleared. >>
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700182000?open&of=ENG-366


 di velocita'.
inoltre ci sarebbe da chiedersi il perchè il pilota ha sprecato un 
missile costoso quando con una raffica di cannoncino se la sarebbe 
cavata tranquillamente

 hovered within sight of the bridge before firing the second missile.(32) 
Il che potrebbe spiegare non poche cose; anche se e' vero che questi 
testimoni (sicuramente civili) potrebbero aver confuso aerei, confusione 
  eventualmente rafforzata da un impressione di hovering (possibile in 
casi tipo un aereo in avvicinamento frontale a lento moto e il leggera 
cabrata/picchiata, cosa presumibile in un aereo il cui pilota e' 
intenzionato a vedere bene dove mette la bomba) pero' sappiamo bene che 
in quella guerra non solo l' USMC usava gli Harrier.... il che esponeva 
Brindisi a rappresaglie con inevitabile escalation (ricordo che il CSS-2 
ha una traiettoria midcourse tipo proietto di artiglieria [1], quindi 
disattivando il seeker lo si potrebbe usare come impromptu cruise contro 
citta' costiere)
[1] mi scuso per la singolare definizione, ma preferivo evitare 
confusione usando la parola "traiettoria balistica" che a un profano 
evoca i missili, appunto, balistici.
Saluti,
Dott. Piergiorgio.

 ....eccovi accontentati (e senza spargimento di sangue): 
allora potevi usare una demo di un simulatore...
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