Newsgroup: it.cultura.militare
Titolo: Special Report: Why Hezbollah Fights

Sperando di fare cosa gradita, vi posto questo articolo di StratFor (è a 
sottoscrizione, per cui non vi posso postare il solo link), che cerca di 
spiegare le motivazioni che hanno spinto Hezbollah a precipitare la 
crisi in Libano.
Special Report: Why Hezbollah Fights
To understand Hezbollah, it is important to begin with this point: 
Almost all Muslim Arabs opposed the creation of the state of Israel. Not 
all of them supported, or support today, the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state or recognize the Palestinian people as a distinct 
nation. This is a vital and usually overlooked distinction that is the 
starting point in our thinking.
When Israel was founded, three distinct views emerged among Arabs. The 
first was that Israel was a part of the British mandate created after 
World War I and therefore should have been understood as part of an 
entity stretching from the Mediterranean to the other side of Jordan, 
from the border of the Sinai, north to Mount Hermon. Therefore, after 
1948, the West Bank became part of the other part of the mandate, Jordan.
There was a second view that argued that there was a single province of 
the Ottoman Empire called Syria and that all of this province -- what 
today is Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the country of Syria -- is 
legitimately part of it. This obviously was the view of Syria, whose 
policy was and in some ways continues to be that Syria province, divided 
by Britain and France after World War I, should be reunited under the 
rule of Damascus.
A third view emerged after the establishment of Israel, pioneered by 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. This view was that there is a single Arab 
nation that should be gathered together in a United Arab Republic. This 
republic would be socialist, more secular than religious and, above all, 
modernizing, joining the rest of the world in industrialization and 
development.
All of these three views rejected the existence of Israel, but each had 
very different ideas of what ought to succeed it. The many different 
Palestinian groups that existed after the founding of Israel and until 
1980 were not simply random entities. They were, in various ways, groups 
that straddled these three opinions, with a fourth added after 1967 and 
pioneered by Yasser Arafat. This view was that there should be an 
independent Palestinian state, that it should be in the territories 
occupied by Israel in 1967, extend to the original state of Israel and 
ultimately occupy Jordan as well. That is why, in September 1970, Arafat 
tried to overthrow King Hussein in Jordan. For Arafat, Amman, Jerusalem 
and Tel Aviv were all part of the Palestinian homeland.
After the Iranian revolution, a fifth strain emerged. This strain made a 
general argument that the real issue in the Islamic world was to restore 
religious-based government. This view opposed the pan-Arab vision of 
Nasser with the pan-Islamic vision of Khomeini. It regarded the 
particular nation-states as less important than the type of regime they 
had. This primarily Shiite view was later complemented by what was its 
Sunni counterpart. Rooted partly in Wahhabi Sunni religiosity and partly 
in the revolutionary spirit of Iran, its view was that the Islamic 
nation-states were the problem and that the only way to solve it was a 
transnational Islamic regime -- the caliphate -- that would restore the 
power of the Islamic world.
That pedantic lesson complete, we can now locate Hezbollah's ideology 
and intentions more carefully. Hezbollah is a Shiite radical group that 
grew out of the Iranian revolution. However, there is a tension in its 
views, because it also is close to Syria. As such, it is close to a much 
more secular partner, more in the Nasserite tradition domestically. But 
it also is close to a country that views Lebanon, Jordan and Israel as 
part of greater Syria, the Syria torn apart by the British and French.
There are deep contradictions ideologically between Iran and Syria, 
though they share a common interest. First, they both oppose the Sunnis. 
Remember that when Lebanon first underwent invasion in 1975, it was by 
Syria intervening on behalf of Christian friends and against the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Syria hated Arafat because 
Arafat insisted on an independent Palestinian state and Syria opposed 
it. This was apart from the fact that Syria had business interests in 
Lebanon that the PLO was interfering with. Iran also opposed the PLO 
because of its religious/ethnic orientation; moreso because it was 
secular and socialist.
Hezbollah emerged as a group representing Syrian and Iranian interests. 
These were:
     * Opposition to the state of Israel
     * An ambiguous position on an independent Palestine
     * Hostility to the United States for supporting Israel and later 
championing Yasser Arafat
Hezbollah had to straddle the deep division between Syrian secularity 
and Iranian religiosity. However the other three interests allowed them 
to postpone the issue.
This brings us to the current action. Three things happened to energize 
Hezbollah:
First, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon under pressure from the 
United States undermined an understanding between Israel and Syria. 
Israel would cede Lebanon to Syria. Syria would control Hezbollah. When 
Syria lost out in Lebanon, its motive for controlling Hezbollah 
disappeared. Syria, in fact, wanted the world to see what would happen 
if Syria left Lebanon. Chaos was exactly what Syria wanted.
Second, the election of a Hamas-controlled government in the Palestinian 
territories created massive fluidity in Palestinian politics. The 
Nasserite Fatah was in decline and a religious Sunni movement was on the 
rise. Both accepted the principle of Palestinian independence. None made 
room for either Syrian or Iranian interests. It was essential that 
Hezbollah, representing itself and the two nations, have a seat at the 
table that would define Palestinian politics for a generation. But 
Hezbollah was more a group of businessmen making money in Beirut than a 
revolutionary organization. It had to demonstrate its commitment to the 
destruction of Israel even if it was ambiguous on the nature of the 
follow-on regime. It had to do something.
Third, the Sunni-Shiite fault line had become venomous. Tensions not 
only in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan and Pakistan were creating a 
transnational civil war between these two movements. Iran was 
positioning itself to replace al Qaeda as the revolutionary force in the 
Islamic world and was again challenging Saudi Arabia as the center of 
gravity of Islamic religiosity. Israel was a burning issue. It had to be 
there. Moreover, in its dealings with the United States over Iraq, Iran 
needed as many levers as possible, and a front in Lebanon confronting 
Israel, particularly if it bogged down the Israelis, would do just that.
Hezbollah is enabled by both Syria and Iran. But precisely because of 
both national and ideological differences between those two countries, 
Hezbollah is not simply a tool for them. They each have influence over 
Hezbollah but this influence is sometimes contradictory. Syria's 
interests and Iran's are never quite the same. Nor are Hezbollah's 
interests quite the same as those of its patrons. Hezbollah has business 
interests in legal and illegal businesses around the world. It has 
interests within Lebanese politics and it has interests in Palestinian 
politics. As a Syrian client, it looks at the region as one entity. As 
an Iranian client, it looks to create a theocratic state in the region. 
As an entity in its own right, it must keep itself going.
Given all these forces, Hezbollah was in a position in which it had to 
take some significant action in Lebanon, Israel and the Islamic world or 
be bypassed by other, more effective, groups. Hezbollah chose to act. 
The decision it made was to go to war with Israel. It did not think it 
could win the war but it did think it could survive it. And if it fought 
and survived, it would have a seat at the Palestinian and Lebanese 
tables, and maintain and reconcile the patronage of Syria and Iran. The 
reasons were complex, the action was clear.
Hezbollah had prepared for war with Israel for years. It had received 
weapons and training from Iran and Syria. It had prepared systematic 
fortifications using these weapons in southern Lebanon after Israel's 
withdrawal, but also in the Bekaa Valley, where its main base of 
operations was and in the area south of Beirut, where its political 
center was. It had prepared for this war carefully, particularly 
studying the U.S. experience in Iraq.
In our view, Hezbollah has three military goals in this battle:
1. Fight the most effective defensive battle ever fought against Israel 
by an Arab army, surpassing the performance of Egypt and Syria in 1973.
2. Inflict direct and substantial damage on Israel proper using 
conventional weapons in order to demonstrate the limits of Israeli power.
3. Draw Israel into an invasion of Lebanon and, following resistance, 
move to an insurgency that does to the Israelis what the Sunnis in Iraq 
have done to the Americans.
In doing this, the U.S.-Israeli bloc would be fighting simultaneously on 
two fronts. This would place Jordan in a difficult position. It would 
radicalize Syria (Syria is too secular to be considered radical in this 
context). It would establish Hezbollah as the claimant to Arab and 
Islamic primacy along the Levant. It also would establish Shiite 
radicalism as equal to Sunni radicalism.
The capture of two Israeli soldiers was the first provocation, 
triggering Israeli attacks. But neither the capture nor the retaliation 
represented a break point. That happened when Hezbollah rockets hit 
Haifa, several times, presenting Israel with a problem that forced it to 
take military steps -- steps for which Hezbollah thought it was ready 
and which it thought it could survive, and exploit. Hezbollah had to 
have known that attacking the third largest city in Israel would force a 
response. That is exactly what it wanted.
Hezbollah's strategy will be to tie down the Israelis as long as 
possible first in the area south of the Litani River and then north in 
the Bekaa. It can, and will, continue to rocket Haifa from further 
north. It will inflict casualties and draw the Israelis further north. 
At a certain point Hezbollah will do what the Taliban and Saddam Hussein 
did: It will suddenly abandon the conventional fight, going to ground, 
and then re-emerge as a guerrilla group, inflicting casualties on the 
Israelis as the Sunnis do on the Americans, wearing them down.
Israel's strategy, as we have seen, will be to destroy Hezbollah's 
infrastructure but not occupy any territory. In other words, invade, 
smash and leave, carrying out follow-on attacks as needed. Hezbollah's 
goal will be to create military problems that force Israel to maintain a 
presence for an extended period of time, so that its follow-on strategy 
can be made to work. This will be what determines the outcome of the 
war. Hezbollah will try to keep Israel from disengaging. Israel will try 
to disengage.
Hezbollah sees the war in these stages:
1. Rocket attacks to force and Israeli response.
2. An extended period of conventional combat to impose substantial 
losses on the Israelis, and establish Hezbollah capabilities to both 
Israel and the Arab and Islamic worlds. This will involve using fairly 
sophisticated weaponry and will go on as long as Hezbollah can extend it.
3. Hezbollah's abandonment of conventional warfare for a prepared 
insurgency program.
What Hezbollah wants is political power in Lebanon and among the 
Palestinians, and freedom for action within the context of 
Syrian-Iranian relations. This war will cost it dearly, but it has been 
preparing for this for a generation. Some of the old guard may not have 
the stomach for this, but it was either this or be pushed aside by the 
younger bloods. Syria wanted to see this happen. Iran wanted to see this 
happen. Iran risks nothing. Syria risks little since Israel is terrified 
of the successor regime to the Assads. So long as Syria limits resupply 
and does not intervene, Israel must leave Damascus out.
Looked at from Hezbollah's point of view, taking the fight to the 
Israelis is something that has not happened in quite a while. 
Hezbollah's hitting of Haifa gives it the position it has sought for a 
generation. If it can avoid utter calamity, it will have won -- if not 
by defeating Israel, then by putting itself first among the anti-Israeli 
forces. What Hezbollah wants in Israel is much less clear and important 
than what it opposes. It opposes Israel and is the most effective force 
fighting it.
Fatah and Hamas are now bystanders in the battle for Israel. They have 
no love for or trust in Hezbollah, but Hezbollah is doing what they have 
only talked about. Israel's mission is to crush Hezbollah quickly. 
Hezbollah's job is to survive and hurt Israel and the IDF as long as 
possible. That is what this war is about for Hezbollah.
Send questions or comments on this article to 
anal...@stratfor.com
.
--------------------
    Luca Morandini
www.lucamorandini.it
--------------------

 Sperando di fare cosa gradita,
Visto lo stato penoso del mio inglese mi avresti fatto cosa gradita
anche traducendomelo...;-)
comunque, dopo tutto questo bailamme strategico, mi piacerebbe capire
cosa cazzo avrebbe dovuto fare Israele davanti ad un gruppo, presente
oltretutto nella colaizione di governo libanese, che la attacca da un
confine internazionalmente riconosciuto, e ne uccide e rapisce dei
soldati.
Grazie per gli eventuali chiarimenti

 anche traducendomelo...;-)
Il mio masochismo non arriva a tanto ;)
Saluti,


 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:1153731090.8...@m79g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...

Aggiungi alla domanda che il gruppo in questione non può essere accontentato
in alcun modo da Israele, finchè quest'ultimo continua ad esistere. Lo
scambio di prigionieri sarebbe fine a se stesso, non al raggiungimento di
una soluzione definitiva. Le fattorie di Sheba hanno qualche importanza
tattica locale, ma nel quadro generale delle cose sono una stupidaggine.


Io ci metterei anche l'arsenale di razzi a media e lunga gittata in 
possesso degli Hezbollah, razzi che sono adatti solo a colpire bersagli 
areali strategici non protetti.
Saluti,
