Newsgroup: it.politica
Titolo: Sorpresa (?): l'immigrazione NON è un costo

http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/editorial.pdf
 
 
The current situation of high and persistent unemployment in many OECD countries,
combined with ageing populations and workforces, has brought back the debate over
immigration policy. One prominent issue is the extent to which immigrants may rely on
social benefits and public services. Beliefs about this net fiscal contribution of immigrants
- how much they pay in taxes in comparison to what they receive in support - are among
the main elements shaping public opinion on migration.
According to recent opinion polls, about 50% of citizens in European countries and in
Canada believe that immigrants contribute less in taxes than they receive in health and
welfare services and that they are a big burden on the public purse and are supported by
higher taxes paid by native-born citizens. Similar surveys for the United States show an even
higher figure. What accounts for this? One reason is that past immigration was often of
low-educated workers, who were not always able to find or maintain their place in the labour
market as jobs changed and economies modernised. Although this is much less the case
today, old beliefs tend to linger, reinforced in part by the difficulties some children of
immigrants have had in schools and the labour market. A second reason is that maintaining
stereotypes is the objective of certain groups whose interest is more in making political hay
than in proposing concrete solutions for real economic problems. A third reason is that
people often forget that a significant part of public expenditure is for public goods such as
national defence, whose cost does not increase with the number of immigrants.
Still, in quite a few OECD countries, there is ongoing debate about immigration and the
welfare state. There are fears that immigration may put further pressure on the public
purse at a time when fiscal consolidation is at the forefront of policy agendas. These fears
go well beyond anti-immigrant parties and risk jeopardising efforts to adapt migration
policies to the new economic and demographic challenges that many OECD countries will
have to face over the coming decades. In this context, it is critical to get a better
understanding of the fiscal impact of migration and to confront public perceptions with
hard facts.
The OECD has undertaken the first comparative international study of the net fiscal
impact of migration, covering a broad range of OECD countries. One benefit of international
comparisons is that if the results are all telling more or less the same story, the story is likely
to be a true one. The evidence compiled in this publication addresses a number of
preconceived ideas. Overall, it shows that the fiscal impact of immigration is close to zero on
average over the OECD. It tends to be more negative in countries where the immigrant share
of the population receiving pensions is large but is generally proportional to the share of
immigrants in the total population. The current impact of the cumulative waves of migration
that arrived over the past fifty years is just not that large, whether on the positive or the
negative side. In other words, migration represents neither a significant gain nor drain for
the public purse. Immigrants are pretty much like the rest of the population in this respect.
 
But there is more. One can be confident that, with the growing focus on skilled labour
migration during the past two decades, recent immigrants are more likely to be net fiscal
contributors than preceding waves of immigrants. It is the policies of the past that have
contributed to produce less favourable results in certain countries and for certain groups, not
necessarily policies today. And certainly not those policies that aim to bring in labour
migrants with the needed skills for jobs for which there are not enough domestic candidates.
What else do the results show?
Firstly, although tertiary educated immigrants make a larger net fiscal contribution
than low-skilled immigrants, the latter tend to fare better compared with the native-born
of the same skill level. This is an important point. Most OECD countries have facilitated
migration of highly skilled individuals, but continue to maintain restrictions on
recruitments into jobs requiring lower skills, notably because of concerns over possible
adverse effects on demand for social services. Our results, however, show that these fears
are mainly unfounded, especially as candidates for recruitment for these jobs will be better
educated than those of the past and their performance can be expected to compare more
favourably with that of resident persons.
Secondly, the age profile of immigrants is one of the main factors explaining
cross-country differences in immigrants' net fiscal position. The younger adult immigrants
arrive, the more positive their direct fiscal contribution. Why is this the case? Essentially
because those who come sooner, all things being equal, have longer working lives during
which their net fiscal contribution is usually positive, and also because younger migrants
have a greater incentive to invest in education and training, in particular in the host-country
language. This implies giving more weight to younger ages in selecting labour migrants. It
also means encouraging immigrants to come with their families, so that their children do not
fall too far behind in joining educational systems that are often more demanding than the
ones they left behind.
Thirdly, it appears that, when immigrants have a less favorable net fiscal position than
the native-born, this is not driven by a greater dependence on social benefits, but rather by
the fact that with lower wages on average, immigrants tend to contribute less. Most
immigrants do not come for social benefits, they come to find work and to improve their
lives and those of their families. Employment is a better way to do this than the dole.
Indeed, and lastly, employment appears as the single most important determinant of
migrants' net fiscal contribution, especially in generous welfare states. Raising immigrants'
employment rate to that of the native-born would result in substantial fiscal gains, notably
in European OECD countries. Integration and anti-discrimination policies, to the extent that
they can contribute to closing the employment gap between natives and immigrants, can be
highly cost effective.
International migration is part of the trends that will continue to shape not only global
realities but also national strategies. If the results described above tell us anything, they tell
us that more immigration does not necessarily mean more public debt. If the policies of the
past fifty years have managed to produce a net fiscal impact that is almost neutral, a world
of labour migration that is better managed in accordance with labour market needs, with
due attention to integration, can only bring benefits.

 
http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/editorial.pdf
 
 
 
 
Stronzate. 
 
 

 Stronzate.
 
Il sommario della tua vita.
 


Crepa. 
 
 

 Crêpe.
 
Suzette?

 
 
"Namib"  ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:e751ad36-9c42-4c35...@googlegroups.com...
 
http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/editorial.pdf
 
 
***
 
A TE TI FANNO COMODO TANTI NERI IN CONCORRENZA TRA DI LORO COSI SI ABBASSANO 
I PREZZI DEL GIGOLO' NERO CHE TI AFFITTI. QUESTO E IL PUNTO 
 

 Suzette?
 
 
 
 
No, crepa, schiatta. 
 
 

, schiatta.
 
Nobile?
 

 Nobile?
 
 
 
 
Non la tua, plebeo. 
 
 


A dirla schietta, chiedevo se schiattasse il nobile, non la sua schiatta. Ma se schiatta la schiatta del nobile, da plebeo, fischietto.
 

 The current situation of high and persistent unemployment in many OECD countries,
 
 
 
Aggiungo che il rapporto tra la spesa pubblica per
l'immigrazione, da una parte, e i contributi previdenziali e 
le tasse pagate dagli immigrati, dall'altra, mostra che, anche
nell'ipotesi meno favorevole di calcolo (quella della spesa 
ro-capite), nel 2011 gli introiti dello Stato riconducibili 
agli immigrati sono stati pari a 13,3 miliardi di euro,
mentre le uscite sostenute per loro sono state di 11,9 miliardi,
con una differenza in positivo per il sistema paese di 1,4 miliardi.
 
Altro discorso da fare e' quello relativo all'ondata di migranti che si 
stanno riversando dall'Africa in Italia e in Europa.
Se non si interviene sulle cause, e non con le elemosine degli interventi
dei paesi ricchi verso i PVS, aspettiamoci volumi ben piu' elevati di quelli attuali. 
Si tratta di adottare nei paesi PVS una serie di politiche che abbiano come obiettivo a) la creazione di infrastrutture e servizi (strade e comunicazione
in genere, diffusione dell'elettricità, gas, scuole, politiche di 
urbanizzazione basata sui centri medi, organizzazione di una pubblica amministrazione efficiente, sanità, ecc.); b) sviluppo dell'apparato industriale, soprattutto nei settori in cui dispongono di materie prime ed a tecnologia stabilizzata, o comunque gestibile e padroneggiabile, possibilmente con forte impiego di mano d'opera; c) aumento della produttività agricola, migliorando la zootecnia, le sementi, le tecniche di coltivazione ed il controllo dell'acqua; d) sfruttamento razionale delle fonti di energia potenziali o sottoutilizzate, problema sempre più rilevante dato il prezzo del petrolio e le crescenti quantità di energia necessarie allo sviluppo economico e sociale; e) politiche sanitarie e di controllo delle nascite che frenino il boom demografico, riequilibrando anche in questo senso il rapporto risorse-popolazione.
http://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=668&lang=it
 
 
 
Ma il ricco nord del mondo che sfrutta con il neocolonialismo delle multinazionali i PVS, non portera' mai avanti tali politiche che metterebbero
in difficolta' il sistema basato sul profitto ad ogni costo.
 
E allora, non lamentiamoci se le migrazioni assumono una portata di migrazione biblica.
 
brif