Newsgroup: it.politica
Titolo: Calipari tradito dallo stato

"Calipari, rapporto costruito per evitare altre inchieste"Il rapporto 
italiano sulla morte di Nicola Calipari in Iraq, almeno nella parte che 
definiva l'uccisione del funzionario dei servizi da parte di un posto di 
blocco americano come "non intenzionale", era costruito allo scopo di 
evitare ulteriori inchieste della magistratura italiana. Lo si legge in un 
cable siglato dall'ambasciatore Usa a Roma, Mel Sembler, nel maggio 2005
      CODICE DATA CLASSIFICAZIONE FONTE
      05ROME1506 03/05/2005 SECRET Embassy Rome
      Intestazione non disponibile
      Tuesday, 03 May 2005, 15:18 S E C R E T ROME 001506 SIPDIS BAGHDAD 
PLEASE PASS TO BG">BG VANGJEL; JUSTICE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
CRIMINAL DIVISION EO 12958 DECL: 05/02/2015 TAGS PREL, MOPS, KJUS, IT, IZ, 
IRAQI FREEDOM SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: BERLUSCONI TRYING TO PUT CALIPARI 
INCIDENT BEHIND US - ITALIAN REPORT FINDS NO INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Classified By: Ambassador Mel Sembler, reasons 1.4 b and d.
      Classified By: Ambassador Spogli, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d).
      1. (S) Summary and Recommendation:
      Just prior to the May 2 release of
      the Italian report on the March 4 killing of intelligence officer 
Nicola Calipari at a U.S.
      checkpoint in Baghdad, Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to 
PM Berlusconi's
      office to receive an advance copy of the report and to hear from 
senior GOI officials
      their view of the way forward. The Italians stressed that the GOI 
wanted
      to put the incident behind us, that it would not damage our strong 
friendship
      and alliance, and that it would not affect the Italian commitment in 
Iraq.
      The Italians said that while U.S. cooperation with Italy in the joint 
investigation
      had been total and thoroughly professional, Italy had to stand by the 
Italian reconstruction
      of the March 4 incident. The Italian report, they said, concluded that 
the shooting was not intentional
      and that no individual responsibility could be assigned for the 
shooting, thus making
      the magistrate's criminal investigation less likely to develop into a 
full criminal case.
      2. (S) Recommendation (see also Para 9): While the Italian report 
quibbles with many
      findings and much of the methodology of the US AR 15-6 report on the 
incident, we will be best
      served by resisting the temptation to attack the Italian version 
point-by-point, and should
      instead continue to let our report speak for itself. While our 
instinct at Post is to defend the U.S.
      report and criticize the Italian one, we realize the consequences of 
doing so could be asymmetrical:
      while the criticism in the Italian report is unlikely to have serious 
negative consequences
      for the USG, if the GOI appears to be disloyal to its public 
servants - or to be rolling
      over to please the USG in this matter, the consequences for 
Berlusconi's government
      and Italy's commitment in Iraq could be severe. Therefore, we strongly 
recommend all USG
      spokespeople stand by the 15-6 report while refraining from detailed 
criticism of the Italian draft.
      End Summary and Recommendation.
      3. (S) Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to the PM's office 
late May 2 to receive
      an advance copy of the Italian report on the March 4 Calipari 
incident, based on the joint
      investigation carried out with the U.S., and to hear from senior GOI 
officials their views
      on the matter. Present on the Italian side were FM Fini, U/S Letta, PM 
Dip Advisor
      (NSA equivalent and Ambassador-designate to the US) Castellaneta, 
SISMI Chief Pollari,
      a few of their senior aides, and the two Italian investigators BG">BG 
Campregher and MFA
      official Ragaglini. (Berlusconi himself was not at the meeting and, we 
believe, was out of Rome until the next morning.)
      4. (S) The Italians made the following main points:
      -- The intent of Italian Government is that this incident should have 
no negative effect
      on our excellent bilateral relations.
      -- Specifically, there should be no effect on the Italian commitment 
in Iraq.
      -- The Italian government wants to put the incident behind us and 
hopes this report will
      contribute to that end (see below for explanation as to how it will 
serve that purpose).
      -- An unclassified version of report would be posted on a GOI web site 
May 2, with classified
      sections redacted. The full, classified report would be given only to 
PM Berlusconi, but the
      USG could have a copy on request after Berlusconi sees it.
      -- Berlusconi would discuss the report in Parliament on Thursday, May 
5.
      -- It would be useful for President Bush to call Berlusconi Wednesday, 
so that he could
      say before Parliament the next day that he had spoken with the 
President about the matter.
      5. (S) As to the report itself, the Italians generally described it as 
supporting the "tragic accident"
      thesis, and highlighted the following:
      -- The report says it is impossible to attribute individual 
responsibility for the killing.
      -- It also says Italian investigators found no evidence that killing 
was intentional.
      -- This last point was designed specifically to discourage further 
investigation by the
      prosecuting magistrates, since under Italian law they apparently can 
investigate cases
      of intentional homicide against Italian citizens outside of Italy, but 
not cases of unintentional homicide.
      (NOTE: Our contacts warn that Italian magistrates are infamous for 
bending such laws to suit their purposes,
      so it remains to be seen whether the GOI tactic will work in this 
regard.) Also, Castellaneta told
      us later that the GOI was hoping the prosecutors would find that, 
because the killing was unintentional,
      there would not be grounds for a case of "excessive legitimate 
defense."
      -- The Italian report was written with prosecuting magistrates in 
mind. The Italians stressed
      that USA 15-6 regulations permitted some things to be covered in the 
joint investigation but not
      others, while Italian magistrates had broader scope that had to be 
satisfied.
      -- The government will block attempts by parliamentary committees to 
open their own investigations
      (there are already several calls for this from the opposition), on the 
grounds that this report answers questions sufficiently.
      -- The report stands behind the accounts given by Sgrena, the driver, 
and SISMI's
      Baghdad Station Chief; i.e., the "Italian reconstruction" of the 
incident.
      6. (S) The copy of 67-page Italian report that they handed to us was a 
draft that was
      still being proofread in another room (in fact, they said it was the 
only hard copy in existence,
      and they swapped out a couple pages during the meeting as typos were 
corrected).
      We have translated and e-mailed to State EUR/WE high points (see para 
10) and faxed the complete
      text in Italian to State EUR/WE. Our quick scan indicates that there 
are several pages in which
      the Italian investigators take issue with specific facts and findings 
in the USA 15-6 report,
      generally on the grounds that the accounts of the Italian witnesses 
differed significantly
      from those of the American soldiers. There is also an extensive 
critique of the inadequacy
      of SOPs for Traffic control Points and Blocking Positions. It argues 
that more complete notification
      to US authorities would not have changed the outcome. In a subsequent 
meeting with the DCM,
      Castellaneta said the main difference in the reports was that the US 
report focused on
      communications while the Italian report focused on preparation of the 
soldiers and the
      stress under which they were operating. The final conclusions, though, 
are as stated
      by the Italians in our meeting: no individual responsibility, no 
deliberate intent.
      7. (S) Ambassador Sembler told the Italians that the USG shared the 
Italian desire
      to put this incident behind us and not let it affect overall bilateral 
relations.
      In that regard, it was important for the Italian government not to 
point accusing fingers
      at the U.S. or complain about lack of cooperation, and we would 
endeavor to continue doing so ourselves
      . Fini said Italy could not complain about cooperation from U.S.; the 
Italian report clarified
      that the Italian investigators had full access and he would ask 
Berlusconi to stress that fact
      in parliament on May 5. Ragaglini and BG">BG Campregher were effusive 
about the "total and complete"
      cooperation they received from the USA investigators, including access 
to all evidence.
      The one caveat was that for five days before they arrived in Baghdad 
BG">BG Vangjel
      had been conducting interviews within the USA chain of command re 
communications and U.S. knowledge
      of the rescue operation. The Italians, however, were given copies of 
everything done prior to their arrival.
      8. (S) The Italians were clearly not happy about the classified 
portions of the USA 15-6 posted on
      the web being "unredacted" so easily and asked the Ambassador for an 
explanation.
      They did not push the issue after he explained it was solely a 
technical mistake.
      The Italians said they had pulled from Baghdad the SISMI Station Chief 
whose name was
      revealed in the "unredacted" version of the 15-6; he will not go back.
      9. (S) Embassy recommendations for immediate next steps:
      -- The NSC should try to schedule a POTUS-Berlusconi call on 
Wednesday.
      -- The USG public reaction for now should be limited to "We've just 
received Italian
      report and are studying it." (Italian press will be furiously 
nit-picking, and it will not serve
      a useful purpose for us to get into point-by-point refutation at this 
stage, although we might
      want to do backgrounders later in Baghdad, Washington, or Rome.)
      -- The Department should consider a SecState-Fini call in the next few 
days to confirm
      that we share Italy's desire to put incident behind us.
      10. (U) Informal Embassy Translation of Italian Report's Conclusions:
      "The Italian representatives - based on the evidence they were able to 
obtain - did not
      find elements that would allege that the facts indicate deliberate 
murder.
      It is realistic that tension felt by the soldiers and some 
inexperience and stress may
      have made them react instinctively and with little control.
      The lack of formal references to clear rules that should have been 
observed makes it
      problematic to assign specific individual responsibilities.
      The facts asserted by Ms. Sgrena, the car's driver and the SISMI Chief 
of Station in
      Baghdad can be considered realistic. Based on the overall analysis, 
their reconstruction
      is coherent and plausible."
      End Informal Embassy Translation of Conclusions.
      11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
      SEMBLER
      NNNN 2005ROME01506 - Classification: SECRET

 cable siglato dall'ambasciatore Usa a Roma, Mel Sembler, nel maggio 2005
Si sapeva, ma, come sempre, vederlo nero su bianco, fa male...
Potenza di WikiLeaks.
P.

 P.
"massivan"
Calipari e Russo (giornalista free lance)
sapevano troppo e dovevano morire. 


Spero che la moglie abbia tutto l'appoggio e il rilievo che merita
questa notizia.
Vedremo se l'informazione avrà il coraggio di aprire uno spiraglio
decisivo per illuminare tutta questa situazione.