Newsgroup: it.politica
Titolo: report completo su Calipari

Salve,
ho appena sentito in TV che su Internet sarebbe disponibile il rapporto 
senza omissis del Pentagono sull'uccisione di Calipari. Ho provato a 
cercare, ma evidentemente le mie capacita' sono limitate. Quindi non 
sono riuscito a trovare niente.
Qualcuno ha notizie sull'indirizzo in cui e' disponibile tale rapporto?
Grazie.
Massimo Peca

"Massimo Peca" wrote in message:

Lo ha ******* Il Corriere della ****, nelle due (***) ver**oni,
con****** e senza ******.
http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2005/05_Maggio/01/pop_omissis.shtml
-- 
Stardust®
"La nostra sarà una ***** spirituale, siamo alternativi in ****
ai com****i. Usiamo il libro **** del com***** quando facciamo
i ******, è efficacissimo!" (Silvio ******** - 26 gennaio 2005)

Massimo Peca ha scritto:

sul corriere credo sia già in doc.

Massimo Peca ha scritto:

Per assicurarti della veridicità puoi estrarlo direttamente con pdftotext,
scarica il documento con omissis dal sito della forza multinazionale in
Iraq:
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/media-information/15-6.pdf
e usa pdftotext per estrarre il testo:
http://www.snapfiles.com/get/pdftotext.html
Buon divertimento...


http://www.mnf-iraq.com/media-information/15-6.pdf
Hanno già provveduto a togliere il documento! Già che c'erano potevano
lasciarlo sti coglioni...



www.repubblica.it

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:a1q971l2tds05cfgn...@4ax.com...

mah... o sono davvero troppo stupidi (o magari troppa fretta di far 
uscire il rapporto visto le demenziali esternazioni del nano) o fa parte 
del gioco per rendere credibile la montatura dell'"errore" nel censurare 
il documento
lasciarlo li' dopo lo "scoop" poteva far dubitare 

"Federico Zenith" wrote in message:

Ancora piu' semplice. Basta settare sfondo nero e carattere bianco nel
pdf.
-- 
Stardust®
"La nostra sarà una campagna spirituale, siamo alternativi in tutto
ai comunisti. Usiamo il libro nero del comunismo quando facciamo
i comizi, è efficacissimo!" (Silvio Berlusconi - 26 gennaio 2005)

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:Hq4de.93719$zZ1.2...@twister1.libero.it...

Sta ancora sulla home page di Repubblica. Meglio che ti salvi i file come ho 
fatto io, sia Word che Acrobat, non li posso spedire sul NG perchè ho 
scoperto che il news-server di 
tin.it
 sega i msg con file allegati per 
paura, IMHO, che io sia un buontempone che vuole infettare la rete :-D Cmq 
ecco la cappella che ha fatto chi lo ha compilato. Io non ho mai creato un 
file pdf e non saprei dove cominciare, ma se tu avessi il file incriminato 
occorre che vai sulla barra dei comandi in alto a sinistra e selezioni una 
grossa "T" che non sta per grosse "TETTE" me per "TESTO" e che trovi dopo la 
manina e la lente di ingradimento. Poi fai "seleziona tutto" e quindi 
"copia", a questo punto usi un qualunque editor di testi, sia se stai in 
windows che in altro ambiente, fai "incolla" e vedrai che le cancellature 
scompaiono 


rotfl
----
Sviti

pdf.
Ancora meglio: mettere il carattere in bianco e lo sfondo diverso dal
nero, ad es. verde scuro, così si vedranno le parti censurate
evidenziate in nero.
----
Sviti

 wrote:

----------
UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. (U) BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. (U) Administrative Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. (U) Appointing Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. (U) Brief Description of the Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. (U) Constraints and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
C. (U) Format of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. (U) ATMOSPHERICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. (U) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. (U) Local Security Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. (U) Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. (U) Baghdad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. (U) Route Irish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 5
1. (U) Methods of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. (U) Insurgent TTPs for IEDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 8
1. (U) Third Infantry Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. (U) Second Brigade, 10th Mountain Division . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. (U) 1-69 Infantry Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. (U) 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
F. (U) Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
III. (U) TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS,
AND TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
i
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UNCLASSIFIED
A. (U) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005 . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 12
1. (U) Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 13
2. (U) 3ID TCP SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. (U) 2/10 MTN TCP SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. (U) 1-69 IN TCP SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. (U) Rhino Bus Run TTP Background Information . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 17
D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
E. (U) Rules of Engagement Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers . . .
. . . . . . . 19
F. (U) Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
G. (U) Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
IV. (U) THE INCIDENT AT BP 541 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A. (U) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. (U) Site Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C. (U) Personnel Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
D. (U) The Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. (U) Receipt of the Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. (U) Establishing the Blocking Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3. (U) The Duties of the Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4. (U) Communications Regarding the Mission Duration . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 28
E. (U) The Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
F. (U) Post-Incident Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
G. (U) Forensic Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. (U) 5 March 2005 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2. (U) 11 March 2005 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3. (U) 14 March 2005 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4. (U) BP 541 Traffic Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
ii
UNCLASSIFIED
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5. (U) Number of Rounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
H. (U) Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
I. (U) Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
V. (U) COORDINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A. (U) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B. (U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
C. (U) Captain Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
D. (U) Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
iii
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
I. BACKGROUND
A. (U) Administrative Matters
1. (U) Appointing Authority
(U) I was appointed by LTG John R. Vines, Commander, Multi-National
Corps-Iraq
(MNC-I) on 8 March 2005 to investigate, per U.S. Army Regulation 15-6
(Annex 1B), all
the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident at a Traffic
Control Point (TCP) in
Baghdad, Iraq on 4 March 2005 that resulted in the death of Mr. Nicola
Calipari and the
wounding of Ms. Giuliana Sgrena and Mr. Andrea Carpani. Lieutenant
Colonel Richard
Thelin, USMC was appointed as my legal advisor for this investigation.
I was directed to
thoroughly review (1) the actions of the Soldiers manning the TCP, (2)
the training of the
Soldiers manning the TCP, (3) TCP procedures, (4) the local security
situation, (5) enemy
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), (6) the Rules of
Engagement (ROE)
employed during the incident, and (7) any coordination effected with
the Soldiers at the
TCP or their higher levels of command on the transport of Ms. Sgrena
from Baghdad to
Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). (Annex 1A).
(U) The appointing letter (Annex 1A) refers to the location of the
incident as being a
Traffic Control Point (TCP). As will be further explained in this
report, the Soldiers
involved were actually manning a former Traffic Control Point, but
executing a blocking
mission. This mission took place at a southbound on-ramp from Route
Vernon (also
known as Route Force on MNF-I graphics) onto westbound Route Irish,
the road to
BIAP. The intersection of these two routes has been designated as
Checkpoint 541. For
purposes of this report, the position will be referred to as Blocking
Position 541 (BP
541).
2. (U) Brief Description of the Incident
(U) On the evening of 4 March 2005, personnel of A Company of 1-69
Infantry
(attached to 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division), were
patrolling Route
Irish, the road linking downtown Baghdad with BIAP. Seven of those
Soldiers were then
assigned the mission of establishing and manning a Blocking Position
(BP) on the
southbound on-ramp off Route Vernon to westbound Route Irish. They
were to man the
BP until relieved, which was anticipated to be after a convoy
transporting the U.S.
Ambassador to Camp Victory had passed and arrived at its destination.
(U) The Soldiers established the BP by approximately 1930 hours and
began
executing their mission. At approximately 2050 hours, the car carrying
Mr. Calipari, Mr.
Carpani, and Ms. Sgrena, traveling southbound on Route Vernon,
approached the onramp
to enter westbound Route Irish. For reasons that are examined later in
this report,
the car came under fire. The shooting resulted in the wounding of the
driver (Mr. Andrea
Carpani), and Ms. Sgrena, and the death of Mr. Nicola Calipari. The
Commanding
1
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
General, Third Infantry Division directed a commander's
inquiry/preliminary
investigation be conducted that night.
B. (U) Constraints and Limitations
(U) Ideally, the scene of the incident would have been preserved as it
existed
immediately after the shooting was over and the car had stopped. Doing
so would have
allowed the initial investigators to get precise measurements on the
distances and
locations of the significant objects involved in the event. An initial
on-site investigation
was conducted, but a number of circumstances that occurred on the site
prevented the
incident site from being treated as a sterile site. Both HMMWVs
involved in the
blocking position were moved to transport Ms. Sgrena to the Combat
Support Hospital in
the International Zone. Further, the scene was not deemed to be a
crime scene, and
efforts were made to clear the roadway. As a result, the car was moved
from its position,
per the unit's Standing Operating Procedure on Consequence Management,
before a
location using a global positioning system could be obtained. At the
direction of the
Commander, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division the car was placed back
in the position
that was thought to be its actual stopping point based on eyewitness
testimony and digital
photographs taken of the car before its initial removal from the
scene.
(U) A further constraint was the inability to reconstruct the event so
as to provide
accurate data for forensic analysis of bullet trajectory, speed of the
vehicle, and stopping
distance due to the inherent danger in the vicinity of the incident
location. This was
made evident during a site visit by the Joint Investigation Team when
a hand grenade was
thrown (from the Route Vernon overpass) at the Team's vehicles as
members were
boarding, injuring one Soldier.
(U) These factors limited the forensic team's ability to conduct an
on-site, in-depth
analysis, although extensive tests were performed on Camp Victory. As
a result, the
forensic studies of the car could not be as conclusive as they
normally would be.
(U) Other limitations include the removal and disposal of the shell
casings to allow
free operation of the turret in the blocking vehicle. Additionally,
the cell phones involved
in the incident were returned to Mr. Carpani before he left the scene.
(Annex 4M). More
importantly, while sworn statements were provided by all the key U.S.
personnel
involved in the incident, the Italian personnel provided only unsworn
statements as they
are not required under Italian law to swear to statements until
appearing before a judge.
C. (U) Format of the Report
(U) This report is divided into five sections; (1) Background, (2)
Atmospherics,
including a historical overview of attacks along Route Irish and
prevailing enemy
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), (3) Discussion of TCP and
BP tactical
2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
missions and training received by BP 541 personnel, (4) Events and
actions at BP 541 on
the evening of 4 March 2005, and (5) Coordination effected pertaining
to the hostage
recovery. Each section will review the pertinent facts, set forth
findings, and, as
appropriate, provide recommendations for future action. Additionally,
documentary
evidence used in preparing this report is included in annexes.
3
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
II. ATMOSPHERICS
A. (U) Introduction
(U) This section examines the local security situation as of 4 March
2005, known
insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and recent
events occurring in the
vicinity of Checkpoint 541. The previous experience of the Soldiers
manning the BP that
night, their parent unit, and their higher headquarters units in the
Baghdad Area of
Responsibility (AOR), is also examined. The purpose of this section is
to present a full
picture of the conditions facing the Soldiers manning BP 541 that
night.
B. (U) Local Security Situation
1. (U) Iraq. From July 2004 to late March 2005, there were 15,257
attacks against
Coalition Forces throughout Iraq. The U.S. considers all of Iraq a
combat zone. (Annex
8E).
2. (U) Baghdad. Baghdad is a city of six million people and is home to
a large number
of suspected insurgents and terrorists operating both in the city and
its environs.
(S//NF) From 1 November 2004 to 12 March 2005 there were a total of
3306 attacks
in the Baghdad area. Of these, 2400 were directed against Coalition
Forces. (Annex 8E)
3. (U) Route Irish. Route Irish is an East-West road along south
Baghdad. It is
approximately 12 kilometers long and runs from the International Zone
in downtown
Baghdad to BIAP. The highway is a four-lane road with a 50 meter wide
median.
(Annexes 8E, 144K).
(U) Route Irish has six major intersections. Each of these has been
assigned a
corresponding checkpoint number by Coalition Forces to facilitate
command and control.
Entry Control Point 1 (ECP 1) is located at one end of the highway
near BIAP.
Checkpoints 539-543 follow the road east going into downtown. (Annex
141K).
(U) Checkpoint 541 refers to the intersection of Route Irish with
Route Vernon (also
known as Route Force), which runs North-South. (Annex 142K).
(U) Route Irish is commonly referred to as "the deadliest road in
Iraq" by journalists,
Soldiers, and commanders. There is no corresponding alternative route
from downtown
Baghdad (and the International Zone) to BIAP, which gives the route a
heavy traffic flow
and causes Coalition convoy movement to become more predictable. These
conditions
make Route Irish a lucrative target area for insurgents to employ
improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) of varying types and to achieve effects in terms of
casualties. Soldiers in
1st Cavalry Division and 3d Infantry Division have come to refer to
Route Irish as "IED
Alley." (Annex 8E).
4
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(S//NF) Between 1 November 2004 and 12 March 2005, there were 135
attacks or
hostile incidents that occurred along Route Irish. These included 9
complex attacks (i.e.,
a combination of more than one type of attack, e.g., an IED followed
by small arms fire
or mortars), 19 explosive devices found, 3 hand grenades, 7 indirect
fire attacks, 19
roadside explosions, 14 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 15 vehicle
borne explosive
devices, and 4 other types of attacks. (Annexes 1E, 8E).
(S//NF) The attack density for the period 1 November 2004 to 12 March
2005 is
11.25 attacks per mile, or a minimum of one attack per day along Route
Irish since
November. (Annex 8E).
(S//NF) The highest concentration of IED attacks occurs at 1000 hours,
with the
second highest concentration of attacks occurring at 1600 hours. These
times correspond
to convoys departing from or arriving at the Victory Base complex, the
largest Coalition
military facility in Baghdad. (Annex 5E).
(S//NF) Approximately 66 percent of all night time attacks along Route
Irish occur
between the hours of 1900 and 2100. (Annex 8E). The incident at BP 541
occurred
between 2030 and 2100 hours on 4 March 2005.
(U) The majority of IED and VBIED attacks occur in and around three
overpasses
(CP 540, CP 541, and CP 543) and the turnoff to the International
Zone. As mentioned
earlier, CP 541 is the location where the incident occurred on 4 March
2005. (Annex
3E).
C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
1. (U) Methods of Attack
(U) Insurgent attacks throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operation fall
into one of several
categories, all of which have occurred along Route Irish in the past
year. They include:
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Unexploded IEDs, Hand Grenades,
Indirect Fire
(mortars, rockets, and unidentified indirect fire), Rocket-Propelled
Grenades (RPGs),
Small Arms Fire (SAF), Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIEDs), and
Complex Attacks. The most common attacks along Route Irish are IEDs,
VBIEDs, and
SAF. (Annex 8E).
2. (U) Insurgent TTPs for IEDs
(U) A large number of evolving techniques have been adopted by the
insurgents in
placing IEDs along Route Irish. Examples of currently used techniques
are listed below:
o (S//NF) Explosives positioned alongside guard rails. The large
number of
guard rails on the road make these devices difficult to detect and
relatively
5
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
easy to emplace by staging equipment in vehicles or near overpasses,
and, in a
matter of minutes, having the IED armed and in the desired location.
o (S//NF) Explosives wrapped in a brown paper bag or a plastic trash
bag. This
is a particularly easy method of concealment, easy to emplace, and has
been
used effectively against Coalition Forces and civilians along Route
Irish.
o (S//NF) Explosives set on a timer. This technique is new to the
Route Irish
area, but is being seen more frequently.
o (S//NF) Use of the median. The 50 meter wide median of Route Irish
provides a large area for emplacing IEDs. These can be dug in, hidden,
and/or
placed in an animal carcass or other deceptive container.
o (S//NF) Surface laid explosives. The enemy will drop a bag
containing the
explosive onto the highway and exit the area on an off-ramp with the
detonation occurring seconds or minutes later depending on the desired
time
for the explosion.
o (S//NF) Explosives on opposite sides of the median. Devices have
been found
along both sides of the median that were apparently designed to work
in
tandem, to counter Coalition Force tactics to avoid the right side of
the
highway while traveling Route Irish.
o (S//NF) Explosives hidden under the asphalt. Insurgents pretend to
do work
on the pavement, plant the explosives, and repair the surface. These
are
usually remote-detonated devices.
(Annex 11E).
3. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs
(U) There are two basic types of car bombs, i.e., suicide (where the
car is moving) and
stationary (where the car is parked). Both can be either command or
remote-detonated.
(Annex 8E).
(S//NF) The enemy is very skillful at inconspicuously packing large
amounts of
explosives into a vehicle. The most commonly used detonation materials
are plastic
explosives and 155mm artillery shells. When moving, these VBIEDs are
practically
impossible to identify until it is too late. (Annex 8E).
(U) The techniques for employing VBIEDs continue to evolve. Some of
the more
commonly used techniques include:
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o (S//NF) Multiple suicide vehicles. The first vehicle either creates
an opening
for a second, more powerful vehicle, or acts as bait to draw other
personnel,
such as medics and other first responders, into the kill zone of the
first vehicle.
As people respond, the second VBIED engages the responders.
o (S//NF) Suicide VBIEDs are typically used against convoys, Coalition
Force
patrols, or Coalition checkpoints where they can achieve maximum
damage.
Such vehicles will rapidly approach the convoy from the rear and
attempt to
get in between convoy vehicles before detonating.
o (S//NF) Stationary VBIEDs are typically parked along main supply
routes,
like Route Irish, and often have been found near known checkpoints.
These
are usually remotely operated and may be employed in conjunction with
a
suicide VBIED.
o (S//NF) A particularly devious technique is for a driver to approach
a
checkpoint and claim that he has injured people in his vehicle. The
VBIED is
then detonated when Coalition Soldiers approach.
(Annex 8E).
4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks
(U) The number of IED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March
2005 (the
date of the incident), has steadily increased. Although the
effectiveness of those
detonations has decreased over that timeframe, the overall average
number of casualties
during that period is nearly one per IED detonation. (Annex 4E).
(S//NF) The week of the incident saw 166 IED incidents, with 131
detonations and 35
IEDs rendered safe. There were 82 casualties from those incidents.
(Annex 4E).
(U) The number of VBIED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March
2005 has
also seen a relatively steady increase. Similar to the decrease in the
effectiveness of
IEDs, the effectiveness of VBIEDs has also decreased over that period,
but there have
been spikes for particular VBIED events that have produced large
numbers of casualties.
(Annex 4E).
(S//NF) There were 17 VBIEDs detonated during the week of the incident
with five
rendered safe. The average casualty per VBIED detonation that week was
23 due to the
large number of casualties that resulted from a VBIED detonation in Al
Hillah. The Al
Hillah attack was widely publicized and caused all Coalition Forces
concern as they
patrolled Baghdad and its environs. Any intelligence gained on
potential VBIEDs was
passed in the form of a BOLO (Be On the Look Out) message to units on
patrol via FM
radio. (Annex 4E).
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D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541
(U) Overpasses like Checkpoint 541 are particularly susceptible to
attacks. Such sites
provide excellent early observation in all directions, easy escape
routes, and high speed
access to Route Irish. The latter factor is particularly evident at
Checkpoint 541 where
there is a long (380 meter) exit lane coming off of southbound Route
Vernon leading to
the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 5E).
(S//NF) Checkpoint 541 has been the site of 13 attacks between 1
November 2004 and
early March 2005. Two of those attacks involved VBIEDs. Other attacks
included
mortars, small arms fire, and IEDs. (Annex 1E).
(U) On the evening of the incident, there were at least two cases of
small arms fire in
the immediate vicinity, one before and one after the incident. Also,
as mentioned earlier,
while the Joint Investigation Team was examining the site, a hand
grenade was tossed at
the personnel from the Route Vernon overpass. This site is under the
observation of
insurgents in the adjoining housing complex and local neighborhoods
anytime a position
is established at Checkpoint 541. (Annex 1E).
(S//NF) The two adjoining Route Irish checkpoints, numbers 540 and
542, were also
the target of attacks during the 1 November 2004 to early March 2005
period.
Checkpoint 540 had 15 attacks, with three of those attacks being
VBIEDs. Similarly,
Checkpoint 542 had 12 attacks during that period, with two of those
attacks being
VBIEDs. (Annex 1E).
(U) Furthermore, two days before the incident, two Soldiers from the
same unit (1-69
IN) were killed by an IED at Checkpoint 543. The Commander, A Company,
1-69 IN
lost a very close friend in that attack. (Annexes 1E, 74C).
E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility
1. (U) Third Infantry Division (3ID)
(U) The Division returned to Iraq in early February 2005. It conducted
a formal
Transfer of Authority with the 1st Cavalry Division and assumed
responsibility for MNDBaghdad
on 27 February 2005. (Annex 15E).
(S//NF) The Division consists of seven U.S. Brigades and one Iraqi
Brigade. Since
their arrival, units of 3ID have conducted 14,463 patrols throughout
the Baghdad area, to
include 33 Rhino Bus escort missions (See Section III.C.5. of this
report for background
information on the Rhino Bus), through 25 March 2005. (Annex 15E).
(S//NF) In its first month since TOA, 3ID has received 422 attacks
from insurgents
resulting in 13 killed and 60 wounded. (Annex 15E).
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2. (U) Second Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (2/10 MTN)
(U) The Second Brigade has been in Iraq for nearly eight months.
(Annex 65C).
(U) From 12 August 2004 to 11 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers conducted
approximately 50,000 patrols. The Soldiers also conducted 5,237
Traffic Control Points
(TCPs) during that period. (Annex 4E).
(U) Between 15 December 2004 and 13 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers
conducted
712 TCPs in support of Rhino Bus operations. There were usually eight
such TCPs
conducted per night in support of Rhino Bus movements. (Annex 4E).
(U) The "TCPs" that were conducted for the Rhino Bus movements are
more properly
called hasty Blocking Positions (BPs). (See Section III.B. of this
report for a discussion
of the difference between TCPs and BPs).
3. (U) 1-69 Infantry Battalion (1-69 IN)
(U) 1-69 IN arrived in the Iraqi Theater of Operations on 4 November
2004. The unit
first served in Taji, north of Baghdad where they spent approximately
three months.
While in Taji, the primary mission of 1-69 IN was to conduct patrols
in search of
insurgents responsible for firing rockets and mortars at Coalition
bases. (Annex 10E).
(U) In February 2005, 1-69 IN relocated to Baghdad under the command
and control
of 2/10 MTN. The Commander, 1st Cavalry Division assigned the unit the
mission of
patrolling and securing Route Irish as of 15 February 2005. (Annex
65C).
(U) Through early April 2005, 1-69 IN had conducted over 2000 patrols
in Iraq.
About two-thirds of those patrols were dismounted patrols requiring
the Soldiers to leave
their vehicles. About one-third of the patrols were conducted at
night. (Annex 10E).
(U) The unit has conducted over 1000 Traffic Control Points (TCPs)
since arriving in
Iraq. Most of those occurred along Route Irish. Other than the subject
incident, there
was only one incident involving civilians (one wounded civilian in
Taji). (Annex 10E).
(S//NF) Since arriving in Iraq, 1-69 IN has experienced 19 roadside
explosive devices,
38 incidents of small arms fire, 4 RPGs, 3 VBIEDs, 3 hand grenades, 16
indirect fire
attacks, and 2 complex attacks. (Annex 10E).
(S//NF) Five attacks against 1-69 IN in November resulted in two
fatalities and three
wounded. Five detonations in December resulted in one fatality and
three wounded. In
January 2005, 1-69 IN received six detonations that resulted in seven
fatalities and three
wounded. The seven fatalities all came in one attack involving 10
buried 155mm
artillery rounds. After relocating to Baghdad in February, the unit
received one attack
9
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with no fatalities or wounded. Through early March, 1-69 IN has
received four
detonations resulting in three fatalities and three wounded. (Annex
10E).
(S//NF) Overall, 1-69 IN suffered 10 fatalities and 9 wounded while in
Taji, followed
by 3 fatalities and 3 wounded while conducting security operations on
Route Irish. All
13 of the unit's combat related fatalities in theater have come as a
result of IEDs. (Annex
10E).
4. (U) 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion (1-76 FA)
(U) 1-76 FA was new to the Baghdad AOR, having arrived on 21 February
2005.
Their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program began on 22 February 2005.
1-76 FA personnel
were in the last night of their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program with
2-82 FA and in
charge of VIP security operations on the evening of 4 March 2005. The
Transfer of
Authority occurred the next day, 5 March 2005. (Annexes 59C, 63C).
(U) 1-76 FA is responsible for security inside the International Zone
as well as U.S.
Embassy VIP movement security along Route Irish. (Annex 58C).
(U) 1-76 FA has Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) to coordinate
directly with
1-69 IN for security along Route Irish. This is the same level of
coordination previously
authorized by 1st Cavalry Division to 2-82 FA. When executing
DIRLAUTH, 1-76 FA
directly coordinates an action with units internal or external to its
command and keeps the
3ID commander informed. The 1-76 FA TOC passes all coordination
efforts through the
4th Brigade TOC to 3ID JOC. (Annex 58C).
F. (U) Findings
(U) Route Irish and its checkpoints, particularly the ones at the
three overpasses (CP
540, CP 541, and CP 543), are continually subject to attacks from
IEDs, VBIEDs, SAF,
and other methods of attack. It is a road filled with dangers that can
kill, maim, and
injure Soldiers and civilians. (Annexes 3E, 5E, 8E).
(U) The insurgents are continually adjusting their methods of attack
along the Route
Irish corridor. (Annex 11E).
(U) The long straightaway off southbound Route Vernon leading to the
on-ramp to
westbound Route Irish provides an excellent opportunity for a suicide
VBIED to build up
speed and threaten Soldiers in their positions. (Annex 5E).
(U) The Soldiers of 1-69 IN had suffered a significant number of
deaths in the four
months that they had been in Iraq as of 4 March 2005, including two
Soldiers that were
killed by an IED at Checkpoint 543 two days before the incident.
(Annexes 1E, 10E).
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(U) 1-69 IN Soldiers were experienced in patrolling, providing route
security, and
conducting TCPs. (Annex 10E).
(U) Due to it being their first full day on shift, 1-76 FA Soldiers
lacked experience in
issuing operational orders and in battle tracking security forces
during execution of
blocking missions. (Annexes 59C, 63C).
11
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III. TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING
A. (U) Introduction
(U) This section examines TCPs, BPs, and training matters. It first
discusses the
difference between a TCP and a BP. Standing Operating Procedures
(SOPs) for the
various units involved regarding TCPs and BPs are assessed, and the
Rhino Bus TTP is
outlined. This is followed by a review of the training on TCPs, BPs,
weapons, and Rules
of Engagement (ROE) that the Soldiers manning BP 541 had received
before 4 March
2005. The ROE that were in effect that night are explained. The
section concludes with
findings and recommendations.
B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions
(U) Task Force 1-69 IN had received missions to establish TCPs and
blocking
positions numerous times in the past. Although the terms are used
interchangeably
(Annex 65C), there are subtle, but distinct, differences in approach
to establishing the two
positions. (Annex 96C).
(S//NF) A traffic control point involves (1) the stopping of a
vehicle, (2) a search of
that vehicle, and (3) the authorized passage of the vehicle through
the control point.
(Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C, 72C). TCPs can be of limited or extended
duration. (Annex
97C).
(S//NF) A blocking position, in contrast, does not involve the search
of a vehicle.
Ideally, the underlying intent of a blocking position involves no
contact with a vehicle.
In Iraq, the purpose of a BP is twofold: (1) to prevent vehicles from
gaining access to the
protected location, and (2) to prevent VBIEDs from getting close
enough to kill or injure
Soldiers or civilians. Blocking positions are neither intended nor
designed to allow
traffic to pass. The intent is to achieve maximum standoff from
approaching vehicles and
force them to turn around. (Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C). Blocking positions
can be
temporary or for longer durations. (Annex 97C). As indicated to 1-69
IN during Relief
in Place operations, patrols must be prepared to execute hasty BPs
when required.
C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005
(U) SOPs are designed to serve as guidelines for specific operations
and are not
prescriptive in nature. They provide a baseline for acceptable
operations from which
commanders can derive principles and techniques and adapt them to
their current
mission. (Annexes 44C, 65C, 72C, 96C, 98C).
12
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1. (U) Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks (Army Field Manual
3-21.9,
Chapter 7)
(U) Construction and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks are high
frequency
tasks for an infantry company and subordinate elements when they must
establish area
security during stabilization operations. (Annex 5F).
(U) A checkpoint is a predetermined point used as a means of
controlling movement,
such as a place where military police check vehicular and pedestrian
traffic, to enforce
circulation measures and other law, order, and regulations. (Annex
5F).
(U) A roadblock is used to limit the movement of vehicles along a
route or to close
access to certain areas or roads. Checkpoints and roadblocks can be
either deliberate or
hasty. The primary difference is the extent of planning and
preparation conducted by the
establishing force. (Annex 5F).
(U) Checkpoints and roadblocks may be established to:
o (U) Check and/or inspect and register all personnel and vehicles in
and out of
the controlled area.
o (U) Deter illegal movement.
o (U) Create an instant roadblock.
o (U) Control movement into the area of operations or on a specific
route.
o (U) Prevent smuggling and contraband.
(Annex 5F).
(U) The layout, construction, and manning of checkpoints and
roadblocks should
reflect the considerations of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops
Available - Time,
Civilians (METT-TC), especially the time available for emplacing them.
(Annex 5F).
The following factors should be considered in establishing a
checkpoint or roadblock:
o (U) Position the checkpoint or roadblock where it is visible and
where traffic
cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass without being observed.
o (U) Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the
search area.
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o (U) Position a combat vehicle off the road, but within sight, to
deter resistance
to Soldiers manning the checkpoint. It must be able to engage vehicles
attempting to break through or bypass a checkpoint.
(Annex 5F).
(U) Many items are used to reinforce a roadblock or a checkpoint.
These include:
barrels filled with sand, water, or heavy concrete blocks (emplaced to
slow and canalize
vehicles), concertina wire (emplaced to control movement around the
checkpoint), and
signs stating the speed limit into and out of the checkpoint (in both
English and the local
language.) (Annex 5F).
2. (U) 3ID TCP SOP
(S//NF) In 3ID's published Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP),
there is a
section directly addressing traffic control points. A TCP is defined
as a "Structured
Engagement Area." The 3ID FSOP does not include guidelines for
positions with a
blocking mission (i.e., blocking positions). (Annex 1F).
(S//NF) The TCP SOP calls for an Alert Line, a Warning Line, a Stop
line, a Search
Area, and an Overwatch Area. (Annex 1F).
(S//NF) The Search Area should be a well-lit checkpoint, provide
standoff from
neighborhood structures, allow a sufficient area to accommodate more
than one search
team, the establishment of warning signs with sufficient distance for
drivers to react, the
use of physical barriers to force vehicles to slow down, and other
barriers like tire
poppers, to block movement of vehicles attempting to continue through
the search area.
(Annex 1F).
(S//NF) The Warning Line and Alert Line should provide maximum
standoff for
oncoming traffic. (Annex 1F).
(S//NF) Soldiers should fire into engine blocks before engaging the
driver. (Annex
1F).
(S//NF) The equipment for a TCP includes warning signs, triangles,
sawhorses, traffic
cones, and/or tire poppers. (Annex 1F).
(S//NF) Minimum leader requirements for executing a TCP are listed as
(1) map
reconnaissance, (2) mission briefing, (3) safety briefing, and (4)
back brief to the
commander or designated representative. Position selection
considerations are not
specifically addressed. (Annex 1F).
14
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3. (U) 2/10 MTN TCP SOP
(S//NF) The 2/10 MTN's published Tactical Standing Operating
Procedures
(TACSOP) addresses checkpoint operations. The TACSOP does not provide
guidance
on blocking positions. (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) A unit establishes checkpoints to control its area of
responsibility, deny the
enemy freedom of movement, and contribute to security of military
units as well as the
populace. They must be established to ensure that the position cannot
be bypassed.
(Annex 2F).
(S//NF) The 2/10 MTN TACSOP distinguishes between vehicle checkpoints
(VCPs)
and personnel checkpoints (PCPs). These are further divided into three
types: deliberate,
hasty, and flying. (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) Deliberate checkpoints are permanent or semi-permanent. They
are used
near operating bases or along Main Supply Routes (MSRs). (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) Hasty checkpoints are planned in advance and will be
maintained for a set
period of time of short duration. Hasty checkpoints are frequently
employed during the
conduct of vehicle or foot patrols. (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) Flying, or immediate, checkpoints are conducted when specific
intelligence
indicates that a checkpoint will hinder the enemy's freedom of
movement at a specific
time and place. They are conducted immediately and often with little
or no planning.
(Annex 2F). Although not a TCP mission, the mission given to 1-69 IN
to block Route
Irish on 4 March 2005 fell into this category.
(S//NF) Vehicle checkpoints should consist of four zones: canalization
zone, turning
or deceleration zone, search zone, and safe zone. (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) The canalization zone uses natural obstacles and/or artificial
obstacles to
canalize the vehicles into the checkpoint. It usually consists of
disrupting or turning
obstacles, such as serpentines and other barrier systems. Warning
signs should be placed
at least 100 meters in front of the checkpoint. (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) The turning or deceleration zone forces vehicles to make a
rapid decision, i.e.,
decelerate, make slow hard turns, or maintain speed and crash into
obstacles. (Annex
2F).
(S//NF) The search zone is a relatively secure area where personnel
and vehicles are
positively identified. (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) The safe zone is the assembly area for the checkpoint that
allows personnel to
eat, sleep, and recover in relative security. (Annex 2F).
15
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(S//NF) The use of radios or cell phones should be limited to
essential
communications and/or entirely prohibited as their transmissions may
detonate any IEDs
present. (Annex 2F).
(S//NF) The SOPs used by 2/10 MTN originated with the 1st Armored
Division, and
then were adopted by the 1st Cavalry Division, and in turn by 3ID.
(Annexes 66C, 67C).
It is noted that the SOP is not prescriptive, i.e., there is no
requirement for signs, only a
suggestion. (Annex 2F). Soldiers and leaders alike acknowledged using
this SOP as a
reference for establishing blocking positions, adopting certain
procedures and equipment
as required. (Annexes 65C, 66C, 98C).
4. (U) 1-69 IN TCP SOP
(S//NF) The 1-69 IN has its own Tactical Standard Operating Procedures
(TACSOP).
It is a modified version of the 256th Brigade TACSOP. (Annexes 72C,
98C, 3F). It
addresses checkpoint operations, but not blocking positions. (Annexes
72C, 96C, 3F). In
addition, there are checklists for equipment to be used at TCPs.
(Annex 3F).
(S//NF) The TCPs described in the 1-69 TACSOP are of a more enduring
nature than
those described in 2/10 MTN's TACSOP. Even hasty checkpoints are more
like 2/10
MTN's deliberate checkpoints. There is no similar position as the
flying or immediate
TCP described by the 2/10 MTN SOP. (Annex 3F).
(S//NF) The Battle Drill for TCP occupation described in the 1-69 IN
TACSOP is the
same as that found in 3ID's FSOP. (Annexes 1F, 3F).
(S//NF) The Battalion considers barriers as mandatory equipment for
blocking
positions (Annexes 96C, 97C, 98C). These can be existing barriers on
site or other
obstacles such as concertina wire. (Annexes 96C, 98C). The team at BP
541 considered
the on-site Jersey barriers as meeting this requirement. (Annexes 74C,
77C).
(S//NF) Signs are required for TCPs. (Annex 96C). Signs were not used
at BPs by 4-
5 Air Defense Artillery (ADA), 1-69 IN's predecessor. Based on their
experience, the
opinion of the BP 541 Soldiers was that signs had been marginally
effective for TCPs
conducted in the daytime in Taji. They were less effective at night.
During both day and
night operations, the signs were easily bypassed. (Annexes 79C, 87C).
(S//NF) The Soldiers have found concertina wire to be effective at
TCPs in the
daytime. Wire becomes quite ineffective at night as motorists cannot
see it, even when
chemlights are attached to it. Furthermore, the BP 541 Soldiers
believed that the
emplacement of concertina wire exposes them to additional risk.
(Annexes 79C, 87C).
(S//NF) The signs that A Company, 1-69 IN Soldiers had used in Taji
had not been
available since their move to Baghdad on 5 February 2005. (Annexes
81C, 112C). On or
about 12 February 2005, the signs were unloaded and stored next to a
conex. There were
16
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UNCLASSIFIED
approximately 25 signs in this shipment. These were TCP signs that
said "Stop and Wait
to be called forward." Other signs that had been for the rear of
vehicles said "Stay back
100 meters or you will be shot." The last part of that phrase "or you
will be shot" was to
be covered with tape. (Annex 112C). The signs had not been modified,
and, therefore,
not reissued as of 4 March 2005. (Annex 95C).
5. (U) Rhino Bus Run TTP Background Information
(U) Since October 2004, there had been significant insurgent contact
on Route Irish.
Most of the contacts were RPGs, SAF, IEDs, and VBIEDs. These attacks
prompted a reassessment
of the Coalition's responses for operations along Route Irish.
(S//NF) Route Irish is the primary route to BIAP for U.S. Embassy
personnel, and
there was routinely at least one convoy each day. Rhino buses (armored
buses) were
procured to provide better protection for passengers. Additionally, a
series of briefings
and plans were developed to address the insurgent situation along
Route Irish. The result
was the Rhino Bus Run Program. (Annex 65C).
(S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run Program, 1-76 FA escorts two or three
Rhino
armored buses and one or two baggage trucks to and from the Embassy
staging area in
the International Zone and the BIAP passenger terminal twice nightly,
seven days a
week. Each run consists of up to 65 escorted passengers. This is the
standard TTP 1-76
FA learned during the Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program conducted by
2-82 FA as part
of Relief in Place operations. 1-76 FA's higher headquarters, Fourth
Brigade,
coordinates attack helicopter support to conduct route reconnaissance
ahead of the
convoy and Close Air Support in the event of an attack. (Annex 59C).
(S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run TTP, 1-76 FA identifies the escort
platoon. Once
the escort platoon leader receives the number of passengers for
transport at the staging
area, and has established communications with the attack helicopters,
the 1-76 FA TOC
requests clearance from the 3ID TOC (the battlespace owner) through
4th Brigade TOC to
move the convoy. Once 4th Brigade receives clearance from 3ID TOC, the
1-76 FA
Battle Captain contacts 1-69 IN Battle Captain and requests that they
establish blocking
positions along Route Irish. Once the 1-69 IN Battle Captain notifies
the 1-76 FA Battle
Captain that the units are set in position, the convoys depart from
the staging area. Once
the convoy has passed ECP 1, the 1-76 FA Battle Captain contacts the
1-69 IN Battle
Captain and clears the units to open their blocking positions. The
same process is
followed for the reverse trip. (Annex 59C).
(U) There is no written SOP that covers Rhino Bus operations. The TTPs
that 1-76
FA used on 4 March 2005 are the same TTPs employed by 2-82 FA. (Annex
59C).
17
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D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers
(U) The Soldiers manning BP 541 on 4 March 2005 received SOP training
on TCPs at
Fort Hood and the National Training Center (NTC). (Annexes 72C, 96C,
97C, 98C).
The training at Fort Hood was part of mobilization training, and was
conducted by the
Battalion leadership and the Mobilization Assistance Team, while the
training at NTC
occurred as part of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. (Annex 96C).
(S//NF) The Soldiers were trained to the following standards for TCPs:
(1) 360 degree
security, (2) one element controls traffic entry to the TCP, and (3)
one element conducts
searches and operates the detainee holding area. Soldiers are to
control traffic effectively
and efficiently, keep Soldiers safe, and accomplish the mission.
(Annex 96C).
(S//NF) The Battalion Commander gave verbal guidance at Fort Hood on
using M4s
as the primary weapon for firing warning shots. This was intended for
mounted mobile
operations as a TTP for clearing overhead passes instead of static
blocking positions due
to difficulty in traversing the gunner's turret. (Annex 73C).
(S//NF) There is no evidence to indicate that the Soldiers were
trained to execute
blocking positions before arriving in theater. TTPs for blocking
positions and other
operations were learned and practiced during the Right Seat/Left Seat
Ride exercises as
part of the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority process with the
Soldiers of 4-5 ADA
from 5 to 15 February 2005. Gunners and leaders were able to watch
tasks being
performed before they had to perform these tasks themselves under the
supervision of 4-5
ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C, 9G). These TTPs were accepted by the
1-69 IN
Battalion Commander as approved higher headquarters sanctioned
guidance. (Annex
72C).
(S//NF) The 4-5 ADA blocking position TTP called for one vehicle,
either a
HMMWV or a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, to pull up next to the last
Jersey barrier (closest
to Route Irish). The Soldiers at the BP would then use a hand-held
spotlight and laser
pointer to get drivers' attention, and make them stop and turn around.
Normally, these
blocking positions, which were hasty in nature, would be held for
10-15 minutes before
the TOC would order the road opened. Signs were not used by 4-5 ADA.
(Annexes 74C,
83C).
(S//NF) As demonstrated by 4-5 ADA previously, the standard practice
by Alpha
Company, 1-69 IN personnel at blocking positions is for the gunner to
use the spotlight,
while the HMMWV commander or Truck Commander operates the laser
pointer. If the
gunner must fire his weapon, M4 or M240B, he drops the hand-held light
to engage the
threat with well-aimed fire using both hands. (Annexes 74C, 79C).
There is no specific
training for operating the spotlight and the M240B simultaneously.
(Annex 66C).
(U) Based upon the fact that two 1-69 IN Soldiers were killed by an
IED two nights
before at Checkpoint 543, his experience, training, and risk
assessment, the Alpha
18
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Company Commander chose to augment the 4-5 ADA TTP on 4 March 2005 by
placing
two HMMWVs at BP 541 for additional force protection. Force protection
was
paramount in his mind because of the threat of IEDs and VBIEDs. (Annex
74C). As a
result, Second Lieutenant Acosta tasked the overwatch vehicle gunner
to operate the
green laser pointer rather than have Staff Sergeant Brown, the Truck
Commander do so.
(Annexes 77C, 87C).
E. (U) Rules Of Engagement (ROE) Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers
(U) The Soldiers were trained on ROE as part of their deployment
preparation at Fort
Hood and the National Training Center (NTC), as well as in Kuwait and
Iraq. (Annexes
111C, 128C, 134C). The training at Fort Hood and NTC centered on basic
ROE concepts
of the escalation of force, hostile intent, hostile act, and positive
identification.
Specifically, Soldiers were briefed on the right of self defense,
which allows them to
defend themselves and Coalition Forces with all necessary force to
negate the potential
threat. Soldiers also received training in graduated force, which is
designed to allow
them to employ escalating measures of non-lethal force to properly
discern hostile intent
and prevent accidental civilian injury. Soldiers were briefed on
positive identification
(PID), which requires Soldiers to have a reasonable certainty that the
object of attack is a
proper military target. Soldiers were also briefed on the protections
afforded detainees
and civilians, their duty to care for the wounded and sick, military
necessity,
proportionality, discrimination, and collateral damage1. (Annexes
111C, 1G, 3G).
(U) While at NTC, judge advocates from the Center for Law and Military
Operations
(CLAMO) conducted impromptu interviews with the Soldiers, including
Soldiers from 1-
69 IN, where they were questioned about basic ROE principles. ROE is a
key aspect of
training at NTC and Soldiers are challenged with difficult, real world
scenarios that
emphasize ROE issues, such as, the use of force and properly
identifying hostile intent.
(Annexes 111C, 1G).
(U) The Soldiers of the BP 541 team had received formal refresher ROE
training
approximately one month before the incident. (Annexes 129C, 132C,
133C, 137C). This
training included vignettes on TCP operations, fixed site security,
and patrols, and
emphasized the use of graduated force and how and when to use
non-lethal measures of
force. Specifically, the vignettes highlighted how to discern hostile
act and hostile intent
from innocuous civilian activity. (Annexes 111C, 1G).
19
(S//NF) 1 Military necessity requires that all targets are proper
military targets, i.e., they possess a military
attribute, the destruction of which provides a military advantage.
Proportionality refers to whether any
expected collateral damage is excessive in comparison to the overall
military value of the target.
Discrimination requires Soldiers to employ force in a manner that
properly distinguishes between lawful
targets and unlawful targets. Collateral damage encompasses any death
or injury to civilians and damage
or destruction of civilian property.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) The entire battalion, including every member of the BP 541 team,
received an indepth
review of a recent AR 15-6 investigation involving a shooting incident
that further
reinforced proper execution of ROE. (Annex 133C). The investigation
involved the
wounding of a civilian at a TCP, in which the vehicle was driving at a
high rate of speed
and the Soldiers at the TCP engaged the vehicle. The brief discussed
the use of signs,
chemical lights, spotlights, and graduated force as it applies to
fixed position operations.
Failure to follow the SOP was discussed and how proper use of the SOP
can help a
Soldier to discern hostile intent. Escalation of force to discern
hostile intent was
emphasized. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 2G, 3G).
(U) Furthermore, the Soldiers were briefed on ROE before going out on
patrol each
day. They were so briefed on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 83C, 129C, 130C,
132C, 134C,
135C).
(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines a Hostile Act as "a use of
force against
1-69 IN or friendly forces, or persons or property under the
protection of 1-69 IN forces
that is likely to cause serious permanent injury or death or
significant property damage."
(Annex 3F).
(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines Hostile Intent as "a threat of
imminent
use of force against 1-69 IN or friendly forces, or persons or
property under the
protection of MNC-I forces that is likely to cause serious permanent
injury or death or
significant property damage. Hostile intent may be judged by the
threatening force or
individual's capability and preparedness to inflict damage, or by
evidence, particularly
intelligence, that clearly indicates that a surprise strike is
imminent." (Annex 3F).
(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE allows the use of deadly force if a
Soldier, his
unit, other U.S. forces, or designated friendly forces are attacked or
threatened with
imminent attack. (Annex 3F).
(S//NF) The ROE taught to the Soldiers was shout, show, shove, shoot.
(Annexes
129C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C). The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE also provides
for shout,
show, shove, shoot. (Annex 3F). For the night of 4 March 2005 at BP
541, the Soldiers
were told the ROE was: Shout, i.e., use the spotlight on an
approaching vehicle as far in
advance of the Alert Line as possible; Show, i.e., use the green laser
light, aimed at the
driver, at the Alert Line; Shove, i.e., fire warning shots; and Shoot,
i.e., disabling shots
first, then, if necessary, shoot to kill. (Annexes 77C, 81C).
F. (U) Findings
(U) The leaders and Soldiers understood their mission to block vehicle
access to
Route Irish on the evening of 4 March 2005. They were knowledgeable of
the Rules of
Engagement to be employed in that mission. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C).
20
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) The Soldiers at BP 541 had been trained, and routinely refreshed
on, the Rules of
Engagement since their arrival in theater. (Annexes 77C, 81C, 111C).
(U) There is no written SOP or TTP in 3ID, 2/10 MTN, or 1-69 IN for
the execution
of the blocking mission and establishing a blocking position. (Annexes
1F, 2F, 3F). The
procedure was passed on from the departing unit (4-5 ADA) to the
incoming unit (1-69
IN) during the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority, where leaders
observed the
execution of the mission one week, and executed the mission the
following week under
the supervision of the outgoing unit (Right Seat/Left Side Ride). The
only training
received by 1-69 IN Soldiers on blocking positions was that employed
along Route Irish
during after-curfew Rhino Bus Runs, and occurred during the Left Seat
Right Seat Ride
process with 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C, 9G). It is clear
that these BPs
were not established as TCPs.
(U) There is no clear guidance in these units on what equipment is
required for
establishing a blocking position (e.g., different road signs).
(Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F).
(U) Requiring the gunner in a blocking position to operate the
hand-held spotlight as
well as his crew-served weapon is an accepted practice in 1-69 IN.
(Annexes 72C, 74C).
G. (U) Recommendations
(U) Recommend that all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) review the
inherent
differences between the blocking mission and any other mission
involving TCPs. Given
the nature of the environment in Iraq, recommend that blocking
positions be addressed
separately in unit SOPs.
o (S//NF) Soldiers and leaders must understand that in a BP, the goal
is to
achieve standoff as far away and as quickly as possible, with no
vehicle
passage.
(U) Recommend a comprehensive review of TCP and blocking position
procedures,
to include risk assessment, required equipment, considerations for
site selection, and the
establishment of clearly visible warnings or indicators, both day and
night, for Soldier
and civilian recognition. The Soldiers and leaders must look at the
position holistically,
i.e., from the perspective of Iraqi drivers and what they might see.
Units must enforce a
quality control program to maintain established standards.
(U) As of this writing, MNC-I has already embarked on a comprehensive
analysis of
Entry Control Points (ECPs), TCPs, and BPs.
o (S//NF) This analysis will produce standard practices and guidelines
for the
selection and establishment of ECPs, TCPs, and BPs.
21
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Recommend that permanent Coalition participation be included in
the Force
Protection Working Group to solicit lessons learned from other
nations' experiences in
operating ECPs, TCPs, and BPs in an insurgency environment.
(U) Recommend the development and publication of a written SOP for
Rhino Bus
Runs.
22
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
IV. THE INCIDENT AT BP 541
A. (U) Introduction
(U) This section examines the shooting incident at BP 541 on the night
of 4 March
2005. The section begins with a description of the site and then a
brief look at the
individuals involved. The mission assigned to the 1-69 IN Soldiers is
detailed. The
incident itself is then described. The events immediately following
the shooting are
addressed next. Following this is a look at the forensic evidence. The
section concludes
with findings and recommendations.
B. (U) Site Description
(U) BP 541 was located on the on-ramp from southbound Route Vernon
onto
westbound Route Irish approximately six miles west of the
International Zone in
Baghdad. Specifically, BP 541 (Grid 38S MB3571 8371) was located at
the intersection
of Route Vernon and Route Irish, which is the second intersection on
Route Irish east of
Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The road leading to the on-ramp
begins where the
westernmost lane of Route Vernon separates from the highway. The
on-ramp itself
begins near a side street that borders the edge of a housing area on
the west side of the
road. This point is approximately 640 meters south of the nearby
underpass on Route
Vernon, and approximately 380 meters from where the road to the
on-ramp splits from
Route Vernon. (Annexes 141K, 144K).
(U) At the interchange of the on-ramp and Route Vernon, the highway
becomes an
overpass extending over Route Irish. Three separate concrete Jersey
barriers are located
in the on-ramp to Route Irish. The barriers are arranged with the
first two barriers on the
right hand side of the on-ramp and the third one on the left hand side
of the on-ramp, but
not in a serpentine configuration, as one approaches from the north.
The first barrier is
approximately 75 meters from the concrete abutment of the Route Vernon
overpass near
the beginning of the on-ramp. The second barrier is approximately 37
meters beyond the
first barrier (112 meters from the concrete abutment). The third
barrier is approximately
31 meters beyond the second barrier (143 meters from the abutment).
This third, or
southernmost, barrier is approximately 80 meters from where the
on-ramp merges with
westbound Route Irish. The total length of the on-ramp is
approximately 223 meters.
(Annexes 142K, 144K).
(U) From the vantage point of the southernmost barrier, Route Irish is
directly south of
the position with a 50-meter median separating the eastbound and
westbound lanes. To
the north and northwest of the position, there is a large open area
that is littered with
garbage and debris. The field extends from the bottom of the on-ramp
to the side street
and west. Immediately beyond the side street, approximately 150 meters
from the
southernmost barrier, is a large housing community with windows and
porches that
overlook the on-ramp. There is a clear line of sight from the houses
to the on-ramp. The
23
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Route Vernon overpass stands several stories higher than the on-ramp
and runs parallel to
the on-ramp until the on-ramp curves to the southwest, approximately
50 meters from the
beginning of the on-ramp. The overpass is supported by large cylinder
concrete supports.
The ground under the overpass is also littered with garbage and
debris. (Annexes 16K,
143K).
(U) The road itself is concrete. There is a slight elevation gain
between the beginning
of the on-ramp and its merger with Route Irish. The curve is banked
slightly. The onramp,
but for the Jersey barriers, is wide enough to accommodate two
vehicles abreast of
each other, i.e., it is two-lanes wide. (Annexes 16K, 19K).
C. (U) Personnel Involved
1. (U) Captain Michael Drew, New York Army National Guard, a New York
City Police
Department Sergeant was the Commander, A Company, 1-69 IN, in charge
of patrolling
Route Irish and establishing blocking positions at four checkpoints on
the night of 4
March 2005. (Annex 1J).
2. (U) First Lieutenant Robert Daniels, New York Army National Guard,
was the
Executive Officer for A Company, 1-69 IN on 4 March 2005 and was
initially present at
BP 541. (Annex 2J).
3. (U) Second Lieutenant Nicolas Acosta, Louisiana National Guard, was
the platoon
leader in charge of BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 6J).
4. (U) Sergeant Sean O'Hara, Louisiana National Guard, was in the
overwatch vehicle at
BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 8J).
5. (U) Sergeant Luis Domangue, Louisiana National Guard, was the
secondary gunner in
the overwatch vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 5J).
6. (U) Specialist Kenneth Mejia, Louisiana National Guard, was the
driver of the
overwatch vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005, and a trained combat life
saver. (Annex
4J).
7. (U) Staff Sergeant Michael Brown, New York Army National Guard, a
New York
City Police Department officer was the acting Platoon Sergeant at BP
541 and the Truck
Commander of the blocking vehicle on 4 March 2005. (Annex 7J).
8. (U) Specialist Mario Lozano, New York Army National Guard, was the
gunner on the
blocking vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005. He had been an M240B and
M249 gunner
in previous assignments. (Annex 10J).
24
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
9. (U) Specialist Brian Peck, New York Army National Guard, was the
driver of the
blocking vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 9J).
10. (U) Sergeant First Class Edwin Feliciano, New York Army National
Guard, was
with the Company Commander's vehicle on 4 March 2005. (Annex 3J).
11. (U) Mr. Nicola Calipari was an Italian military intelligence
officer with the rank of
Major General who was in charge of the recovery of Ms. Sgrena on 4
March 2005.
(Annex 104C).
12. (U) Mr. Andrea Carpani is an Italian military intelligence officer
with the rank of
Major in the Carabinieri with years of experience working and driving
in Baghdad. He
was driving the car involved in the incident on 4 March 2005. (Annex
104C).
13. (U) Ms. Giuliana Sgrena is an Italian journalist for Il Manifesto.
She had been
kidnapped and held hostage in Baghdad for one month at the time of her
release on the
night of 4 March 2005. (Annex 103C).
D. (U) The Mission
1. (U) Receipt of the Mission
(U) The mission of A Company, 1-69 IN on 4 March 2005 was their
standard mission,
i.e., to provide security along Route Irish. The mission entailed
looking for IEDs and
VBIEDs and ensuring Coalition convoys could safely transit between the
International
Zone and BIAP. A Company, 1-69 IN had been performing this mission
since 15
February 2005. Their normal patrol shift was 1500 to 2300 daily.
(Annex 137C).
(U) While on patrol, Captain Drew received two VBIED BOLO reports via
radio, one
for a black car, another for a white car. (Annexes 74C, 13E, 14E). He
passed that
information via radio to his subordinate leaders, including Second
Lieutenant Acosta,
who passed it on to his troops. (Annexes 74C, 77C).
(U) At 1843 hours, the 1-69 IN Battle Captain received a call from the
1-76 FA Battle
Captain asking how quickly they could establish blocking positions
along Route Irish.
(Annexes 60C, 61C, 3L).
(S//NF) Adverse weather had mandated that the VIP travel by ground
rather than by
helicopter, and the Embassy requested that access to Route Irish be
blocked for the
movement. (Annexes 60C, 61C, 3L).
(S//NF) At approximately 1900 hours, A Company, 1-69 IN received a
mission from
its Battalion TOC. A Company was directed to establish blocking
positions on the four
westbound on-ramps along Route Irish to support the movement of a VIP
from the
25
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
International Zone as they would for a Rhino Bus Run mission. (Annexes
58C, 133C,
137C).
(U) At 1916 hours the 1-76 FA Battle Captain called the 1-69 IN Battle
Captain to
order all elements to report to their blocking positions for the VIP
transit. (Annex 3L).
(S//NF) Captain Drew considered the current enemy situation, and
decided to place an
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle at both Checkpoint 542 and Checkpoint 543,
and two
HMMWVs each at Checkpoint 540 and Checkpoint 541. He assigned
Checkpoint 541 to
a team led by Second Lieutenant Acosta. (Annex 137C).
(U) At approximately 1930 hours, Second Lieutenant Acosta arrived at
Checkpoint
541 with three HMMWVs. He found First Lieutenant Daniels in position
at the on-ramp.
Second Lieutenant Acosta relieved First Lieutenant Daniels. A short
time later, Captain
Drew pulled up in his HMMWV, took one of Second Lieutenant Acosta's
HMMWVs for
placement at Checkpoint 540, and then left with First Lieutenant
Daniels accompanying
him. (Annex 133C).
(U) At 1938 hours, the 1-69 IN Battle Captain reported to the 2/10 MTN
Battle
Captain that all blocking positions had been established. The 1-76 FA
Battle Captain
reported to the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain that the VIP would depart in
approximately five
to ten minutes. (Annex 2L).
(U) At 1945 hours, the VIP security convoy NCOIC reported to the 1-76
FA Battle
Captain that the convoy with the VIP departed the International Zone
with a destination
of Camp Victory. The 2/10 MTN Battle Captain requested the VIP's
convoy departure
time and composition from the 3ID JOC Battle Captain, as they were not
in direct contact
with 1-76 FA. Meanwhile, the 1-76 FA Battle Captain directed 1-69 IN
Battle Captain to
initiate the Route Irish closure plan. (Annexes 59C, 64C, 2L).
2. (U) Establishing the Blocking Position
(U) The instructions given to Second Lieutenant Acosta by Captain Drew
were to set
up a blocking position to facilitate the movement of a VIP down Route
Irish. (Annex
77C). Captain Drew also issued guidance on the importance of force
protection. (Annex
74C). He expected to maintain the blocking position no more than 15
minutes. (Annexes
74C, 77C).
(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta emplaced his two vehicles to establish
the blocking
position. He positioned the blocking vehicle commanded by Staff
Sergeant Brown on the
road, near the outer curb, positioned in conjunction with the second
barrier of three Jersey
barriers already on-site on the on-ramp. Second Lieutenant Acosta
placed the overwatch
vehicle by the third Jersey barrier, closest to Route Irish. (Annexes
142K, 143K). In
their final positions, both vehicles were facing toward Route Irish.
(Annex 77C).
26
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta, using the factors of METT-TC, positioned
the vehicles
to provide standoff from the overpass (a common hand grenade throwing
location), a
clear line of sight to on-coming traffic, overwatch field of view (to
watch for threats from
nearby buildings), and to allow adequate room for on-coming vehicles
to stop and turn
around. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
(U) Staff Sergeant Brown's vehicle was positioned to block traffic
from using the onramp
to enter Route Irish. The other vehicle was positioned to provide
overwatch of the
area as well as to block traffic entering the on-ramp the wrong way
from Route Irish.
(Annexes 77C, 83C).
(U) After consulting with Staff Sergeant Brown, Second Lieutenant
Acosta
established the Alert Line at the concrete abutment of the Route
Vernon overpass. The
Warning Line was established as the second light pole on the overpass
up the on-ramp
from the Alert Line. (Annexes 77C, 83C, 16K).
(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta and Staff Sergeant Brown informed the
gunners of the
Alert Line and Warning Line locations, and reviewed when to shine the
spotlight, and
when to fire warning shots. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
3. (U) The duties of the Soldiers
(U) Specialist Peck was the driver of the blocking vehicle and was to
remain in the
driver's seat, facing west down Route Irish. (Annexes 85C, 130C).
(U) Specialist Lozano was the gunner in the blocking vehicle. He was
to remain in
the turret, facing north up the on-ramp toward on-coming traffic. From
there, he was to
operate a three million candlepower hand-held spotlight that he was to
shine on
approaching vehicles as soon as possible, even before the Alert Line
(he was able to see
at least 20 meters beyond the Alert Line). (Annexes 77C, 79C, 83C,
134C).
(U) Staff Sergeant Brown, the Truck Commander of the blocking vehicle
and acting
Platoon Sergeant, was to be dismounted so he could execute local
security around his
vehicle. (Annexes 83C, 131C).
(U) Specialist Mejia was the driver of the overwatch vehicle and was
to remain in the
driver's seat, facing west down Route Irish. (Annexes 89C, 128C).
(U) Sergeant Domangue was to be in the turret of the overwatch vehicle
where he
would operate a green laser pointer. He was to shine the laser pointer
on a vehicle as
soon as he saw it, but no later than at the Alert Line, focusing it on
the driver's side of the
windshield. He was also to keep watch on the area between Route Irish
and the on-ramp.
(Annexes 87C, 129C).
27
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Sergeant O'Hara was to be dismounted from the overwatch vehicle so
as to
provide local security for his vehicle. (Annexes 81C, 132C).
(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta was to be dismounted so he could
supervise the
operation of the BP. (Annexes 77C, 133C).
4. (U) Communications Regarding the Mission Duration
(U) Captain Drew, Second Lieutenant Acosta, and Staff Sergeant Brown
were all
concerned about the length of time that the Soldiers had been manning
their blocking
positions. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C). Captain Drew was concerned that
leaving his
Soldiers in a static position for more than 15 minutes left them open
to attack. He was
also concerned that he was not adequately performing his patrolling
mission because his
Soldiers were tied down to the blocking positions. (Annex 74C).
(U) Captain Drew checked with the 1-69 IN TOC at least two times
seeking to
collapse the blocking positions and return his Soldiers to their
patrolling mission. The 1-
69 IN TOC, after checking with 2/10 MTN TOC, informed him that the
convoy had not
passed and to stay in position. (Annexes 74C, 2L).
(U) At 2010 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain requested permission
from the 3ID
TOC to remove blocking positions until 15 minutes before VIP movement.
(Annex 2L).
(U) At 2014 hours, the 3ID TOC Battle Captain informed the 2/10 MTN
Battle
Captain that A Company, 1-69 IN could reduce their blocking positions
until 2018 hours.
(Annex 2L).
(U) At 2015 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain reported to the 3ID TOC
Battle
Captain that A Company, 1-69 IN blocking positions would remain in
place. (Annex
2L).
(U) At 2020 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain notified 1-69 IN to
keep blocking
positions in place. (Annex 2L).
(U) At 2030 hours, Captain Drew asked again about collapsing the
blocking positions.
He was told that the word from 3ID was not to move off the blocking
positions, that the
convoy would be coming down Route Irish in approximately 20 minutes,
and that the
convoy would consist of four HMMWVs and an up-armored Suburban.
(Annexes 97C,
3L).
(S//NF) 1-76 FA was able to communicate the requirement for blocking
positions
along Route Irish for a VIP movement from the International Zone to
BIAP. (Annexes
58C, 59C, 62C, 63C). The security escort platoon with the VIP was able
to, and did,
relay departure and arrival times to the 1-76 FA Battle Captain.
(Annexes 59C, 64C).
28
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The VIP convoy departed the International Zone in four HMMWVs (and no
Suburban) at
approximately 1945 hours. It arrived at the Camp Victory gate at 2010
hours (Annex
59C). The convoy reached its destination on Camp Victory at 2020 hours
(Annex 59C).
The VIP returned to the International Zone by helicopter at
approximately 2205 hours.
The determination to fly by helicopter back to the International Zone
was not made until
shortly before the VIP departed as a result of clearing weather
conditions. (Annexes 59C,
64C).
(S//NF) The 1-76 TOC had two means of communicating with 4th Brigade,
its higher
headquarters: Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP)2 and FM. The 1-76 FA
Battle
Captain was using only VOIP to communicate with 1-69 IN, but
experienced problems
with VOIP, therefore losing its only communication link with 1-69 IN,
other than going
through 4th Brigade. (Annex 97C). As a result, the Battle Captain was
unable to pass
updated information about the blocking mission either directly to 1-69
IN, or to 4th
Brigade. He did not attempt to contact 4th Brigade via FM
communications. (Annex
63C). Fourth Brigade, in turn, could not pass updated information to
its major command,
3ID. (Annex 57C). Likewise, 3ID had no new information to pass to its
subordinate
command, 2/10 MTN. Finally, 2/10 MTN was thus unable to pass updated
information
to its subordinate command, 1-69 IN. (Annexes 51C, 52C).
(U) There is no evidence to indicate that 1-76 FA passed on the
information about the
VIP departure and arrival times to any unit. (Annexes 59C, 63C). As a
result, A
Company, 1-69 IN's Soldiers were directed to remain in their blocking
positions.
(U) Other than the duty logs, there are no other written records of
communications or
tape recordings among involved units relating to the coordination to
block Route Irish on
the evening of 4 March 2005. (Annex 6M).
E. (U) The Incident
(U) After arriving at BIAP from Italy in the late afternoon of 4 March
2005, and
taking care of some administrative matters, Mr. Carpani and Mr.
Calipari went to some
undisclosed location in the Mansour District of Baghdad. (Annexes
104C, 105C). At
approximately 2030 hours they recovered Ms. Sgrena and headed back
toward BIAP.
(Annexes 103C, 104C, 109C). Both agents made a number of phone calls
to various
officials during the drive. (Annex 104C). Mr. Carpani was mostly
talking to his
colleague, Mr. Castilletti, who was waiting for them outside of BIAP
near Checkpoint
539. He updated Mr. Castilletti on his location and discussed
arrangements at the airport.
(Annex 105C). Mr. Carpani, who was driving, had to slow down at one
point due to a
flooded underpass on Route Vernon. (Annexes 103C, 104C). Mr. Carpani,
who had
experience driving in Baghdad, did not have an alternate route to the
airport planned.
2 (S//NF) 2 VOIP is a technology that allows telephone calls to be
made using a broadband internet
connection instead of a regular (analog) phone line.
29
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(Annexes 104C, 105C). He was taking what he considered to be the most
logical route to
BIAP, but was not checking his speedometer. (Annex 105C). Neither he,
nor Mr.
Calipari, knew the on-ramp to Route Irish was blocked. (Annex 104C).
Indeed, Mr.
Carpani believed the road to the airport was open. (Annex 105C).
(U) At approximately 2045 hours the Soldiers at BP 541 were in the
positions that
they had been occupying since 1930 hours. They had successfully turned
around 15-30
vehicles, with none getting more than a few meters beyond the Alert
Line. (Annexes
77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 132C). Specialist Lozano was in his turret,
his M240B (on
which he had last qualified just five days before (Annex 6G)) pointed
down and to his left
at a grassy area with Specialist Peck in the driver's seat in the
blocking vehicle.
Specialist Mejia was in the driver's seat of the overwatch vehicle
with Sergeant
Domangue in the turret. Sergeant O'Hara was sitting in the rear
passenger's seat of the
overwatch vehicle, cleaning his protective glasses. Staff Sergeant
Brown, the acting
Platoon Sergeant, was seeking to determine how much longer they were
to remain in
position. As such, he was standing with Second Lieutenant Acosta near
the overwatch
vehicle, their backs to the on-ramp. (Annexes 79C, 83C, 128C, 129C,
130C, 131C,
132C, 133C, 134C). None of the Soldiers knew that the Italians were
coming. (Annexes
116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C).
(U) As the car approached the on-ramp to Route Irish, Mr. Carpani was
on the cell
phone updating Mr. Castilletti on their position and reporting that
everything was going
fine. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Though not in the habit of checking his
speedometer, Mr.
Carpani estimated his speed at 70-80 kph as he exited off of Route
Vernon, heading
toward the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 105C). The courtesy light in
the car was on
and had been since picking up Ms. Sgrena in the Mansour District of
Baghdad. (Annex
104C). Additionally, Mr. Carpani had his side window halfway open to
listen for
possible threats. (Annex 105C). Ms. Sgrena and Mr. Calipari were in
the rear of the car
talking to each other. (Annexes 103C, 105C). The atmosphere in the car
was a mix of
excitement over the recovery of Ms. Sgrena, and tension from the tasks
yet to be
completed. (Annex 140C).
(U) At approximately 2050 hours, Specialist Lozano saw a car
approaching the onramp,
approximately 140 meters from his position. (Annexes 79C, 134C, 144K).
Specialist Lozano, holding the spotlight in his left hand, shined his
spotlight onto the car
before it arrived at the Alert Line. (Annexes 79C, 85C). At this time,
Sergeant
Domangue acquired the vehicle's headlights and saw the spotlight
shining on it. He then
focused his green laser pointer onto the windshield of the car as it
reached the Alert Line.
(Annexes 87C, 129C). Both Specialist Lozano and Sergeant Domangue
perceived the car
to be traveling in excess of 50 mph (and faster than any other
vehicles that evening).
(Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C, 134C).
(U) The car crossed the Alert Line still heading towards the Soldiers'
position without
slowing down. Specialist Lozano continued to shine the spotlight, and
shouted at the
vehicle to stop, a fruitless effort, but an instantaneous reaction
based on his training.
30
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(Annexes 85C, 130C). Without slowing down, the car continued toward
the Warning
Line with the spotlight and laser still on it. (Annexes 79C, 87C,
129C).
(U) The car continued to approach at a high rate of speed, coming
closer to the
Soldiers than any other vehicle that evening. (Annexes 79C, 87C,
129C). When the car
got to the Warning Line, Specialist Lozano, while still holding the
spotlight in his left
hand, used his right hand to quickly fire a two to four round burst
into a grassy area to the
on-coming vehicle's right (the pre-set aiming point) as a warning
shot. (Annexes 79C,
87C, 125C, 129C, 134C).
(U) The vehicle maintained its speed as it went beyond the Warning
Line. (Annexes
77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C). Staff Sergeant Brown, a
New York City
Police Officer trained in vehicle speed estimation, estimated the car
was traveling at 50
mph and believed that it would not be able to stay on the road around
the curve at that
speed. (Annex 83C). Specialist Lozano dropped the spotlight and
immediately traversed
his weapon from his left to his right, without having to move the
turret, to orient on the
front of the car. With both hands on the weapon, he fired another
burst, walking the
rounds from the ground on the passenger's side of the vehicle and
towards the car's
engine block in an attempt to disable it. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C,
87C, 129C,
131C, 132C, 133C). The rounds hit the right and front sides of the
vehicle, deflated the
left front tire, and blew out the side windows. (Annexes 104C, 105C,
132C, 1I).
(U) Mr. Carpani reacted by saying into the phone, "they are attacking
us," not
knowing who was shooting at him. (Annexes 103C, 104C, 105C). He
stepped on the
brakes, curled up on the left side of the car, and dropped the phone.
(Annexes 104C,
105C). Specialist Lozano stopped firing as he saw the car slow down
and roll to a stop.
Approximately four seconds had elapsed between the firing of the first
round and the last
round, and no more than seven seconds from the time the car crossed
the Alert Line until
it came to a stop. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 129C, 131C, 132C,
133C, 134C).
The car came to a stop near the middle of the on-ramp, such that the
first Jersey barrier
was aligned with the vehicle between the front and back doors.
(Annexes 79C, 83C,
105C).
F. (U) Post-Incident Events
(U) Once the car came to a stop, Mr. Carpani got out of the car with
his hands raised,
cell phone in one hand, and told the Soldiers that he was from the
Italian Embassy.
(Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 104C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C).
Second
Lieutenant Acosta, Staff Sergeant Brown, Sergeant O'Hara, and
Specialist Peck
approached the car with weapons raised and secured the driver.
(Annexes 130C, 131C,
132C, 133C). Staff Sergeant Brown patted him down and asked him if
there were others
in the car. Mr. Carpani said there were two others and that there was
one weapon on the
front seat and another on the male passenger in the back seat. He
warned Staff Sergeant
Brown that both weapons had a round in the chamber. Staff Sergeant
Brown then moved
31
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Mr. Carpani about 10 meters away from the car and off to the side of
the road to question
him and examine him. After initially taking control of the cell phones
as well as Mr.
Carpani's and Mr. Calipari's identification and badges, Staff Sergeant
Brown returned
those items to Mr. Carpani. At some point, Staff Sergeant Brown
directed the car be
placed in park since the car continued to roll. (Annexes 83C, 105C).
(U) Sergeant O'Hara and Second Lieutenant Acosta searched the vehicle.
(Annexes
77C, 81C). Second Lieutenant Acosta ordered Sergeant Domangue to
inform Captain
Drew and to send Specialist Mejia over with his medical kit.
Specialist Mejia arrived at
the car and found Mr. Calipari gravely injured. Specialist Mejia was
able to bandage Mr.
Calipari's wound, but Mr. Calipari died a few minutes later.
Specialist Peck also tried to
assist with Mr. Calipari. He then returned to the blocking vehicle and
relieved Specialist
Lozano in the turret to allow him to collect himself. (Annex 85C,
130C). Specialist
Mejia then turned his attention to Ms. Sgrena's wounds. (Annex 89C,
128C). He tried to
administer an IV, but his needles were too large. Meanwhile, Sergeant
O'Hara bandaged
Ms. Sgrena's shoulder wound. (Annexes 128C, 132C).
(U) Captain Drew then arrived on the scene along with Specialist
Silberstein, who
was a qualified medic. (Annexes 127C, 128C, 133C, 134C). Specialist
Silberstein
assessed Ms. Sgrena and treated her for shock. He then confirmed that
Mr. Calipari was
dead. (Annex 127C). Captain Drew assessed the situation, passed all
available
information to his command, and ordered the casualties to be evacuated
to the Combat
Support Hospital (CSH) in the International Zone for treatment of
their wounds. He also
requested an ambulance for Mr. Calipari's body. (Annexes 74C, 133C,
137C). Ms.
Sgrena was loaded into the blocking vehicle and proceeded to the CSH
with the
overwatch vehicle following as U.S. military vehicles do not travel
alone. (Annexes
127C, 128C, 129C, 130C, 132C, 133C). Mr. Carpani was transported later
by a separate
vehicle from another element of Captain Drew's patrol. (Annex 136C).
All equipment in
the vehicle before the shooting was later returned to Mr. Carpani.
(Annex 4M).
(U) Before Mr. Carpani was transported to the CSH, he made at least
seven phone
calls on his cell phone. He tried asking how his companions were but
was unable to get
an answer. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Sergeant First Class Feliciano
arrived with Captain
Drew and found that Mr. Carpani spoke Spanish, as did Sergeant First
Class Feliciano.
He was able to tell Mr. Carpani about the condition of his companions.
(Annex 91C)
(U) Mr. Carpani told Sergeant First Class Feliciano who Ms. Sgrena was
and that he
was trying to get to the airport. He told Sergeant First Class
Feliciano that he heard shots
from somewhere, and that he panicked and started speeding, trying to
get to the airport as
quickly as possible. Mr. Carpani further told Sergeant First Class
Feliciano that he
continued to speed down the ramp, and that he was in a hurry to get to
the airport.
(Annexes 91C, 136C).
32
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Mr. Carpani became a little dizzy, so Sergeant First Class
Feliciano got some
water for him. Mr. Carpani kept making phone calls. He contacted Mr.
Castilletti who
put Captain Green on the phone. Mr. Carpani then had Captain Drew talk
to Captain
Green. Mr. Carpani kept on insisting that he wanted to go to the
airport. After one of the
phone calls, though, he said he needed to go to the hospital where Ms.
Sgrena had been
taken. (Annex 91C).
(U) The incident was reported through command channels, and the
Commanding
General, 3ID ordered an immediate commander's inquiry/preliminary
investigation into
the incident. Before the investigator had arrived on the scene, the
HMMWVs involved in
the incident had departed to the CSH and the car had been moved in an
effort to clean up
the site so that the on-ramp could be re-opened. The Commander, 2/10
MTN arrived
about two hours after the incident and ordered the car be put back in
its stopped position
to support the commander's inquiry as much as possible. (Annex 65C).
G. (U) Forensic Evidence
1. (U) 5 March 2005 Report
(U) Photographs of the incident scene were taken in the hours after
the incident by
Combat Camera personnel, as advised by CID personnel. (Annexes 32K -
69K). The
exact locations of the three incident vehicles could not be determined
since the two
HMMWVs had been moved upon transporting Ms. Sgrena to the Combat
Support
Hospital, and the car had been moved during cleanup efforts at the
site. (Annex 5I).
2. (U) 11 March 2005 Report
(U) The forensic investigation of the incident scene conducted on the
morning of 11
March 2005 provided the following distances between relevant points
based on GPS
measurements3:
o (U) Blocking vehicle to Alert Line - 389 feet, 7 inches (118.8
meters)
o (U) Blocking vehicle to Warning Line - 272 feet (82.9 meters)
o (U) Blocking vehicle to disabled vehicle stop point - 125 feet (38.1
meters)
o (U) Disabled vehicle stop point to Warning Line - 147 feet (44.8
meters)
33
(U) 3 The position of the Toyota was determined from photographs taken
before it was moved during
cleanup efforts. The blocking vehicle location comes from GPS readings
provided by the Preliminary
Investigating Officer based on witness statements regarding its
position at the time of the incident.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
o (U) Disabled vehicle stop point to Alert Line - 264 feet, 7 inches
(80.7
meters)
o (U) Alert Line to Warning Line - 117 feet, 7 inches (35.9 meters)
(Annexes 5I, 143K).
3. (U) 14 March 2005 Report
(U) A forensic examination of the car was performed after its removal
from the scene.
This analysis disclosed 11 entrance bullet holes. They are consistent
with 7.62 mm
bullets. Three bullets perforated the front section of the car at the
bumper, right head
light, and right fender. Two bullets perforated the windshield. Six
bullets perforated the
right side, right door, right front and rear passenger windows. No
bullet holes or ricochet
damage was noted on the car's undercarriage. (Annex 1I).
(U) The trajectory analysis demonstrated that all 11 bullets came from
one point of
origin. The actual distance from the car to the machine gun could not
be conclusively
determined because of several variables: the grade of the curve and
curvature of the
roadway; depressions or elevations of the terrain; the lateral
movement of the car; human
reaction time, modulation of speed and braking by the driver; a flat
tire; and lateral and
vertical movement of the machine gun. The security situation at the
incident site
prevented examiners from visiting the scene. (Annex 1I).
4. (U) BP 541 Traffic Samples
(U) On Friday, 25 March 2005, a certified radar operator conducted two
traffic
samples at BP 541. From 1809 hours to 1824 hours, 27 vehicles were
clocked. The
average speed at the Alert Line was 44 mph. The average speed at the
beginning of the
on-ramp's curve was 24 mph. From 1956 hours to 2015 hours, 30 vehicles
were clocked.
The average speed at the Alert Line was 46 mph. The average speed at
the beginning of
the curve was 26 mph. Unlike the night of the incident, which was also
a Friday, the road
was dry during these samples. (Annex 1M).
5. (U) Number of Rounds
(U) The ammunition box in the blocking vehicle originally contained
200 rounds.
There were 142 rounds remaining in the M240B ammunition box. No
casings were
collected. Eleven rounds hit the vehicle. The weapon had been fired on
seven previous
occasions using the same ammunition box. As such, there were no more
than 40
additional rounds that could have been fired. (Annexes 85C, 99C).
34
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
H. (U) Findings
(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta was under a time constraint to establish
the BP quickly
and expected to be in position for a very limited time, i.e., no more
than 15-20 minutes.
Further, the position was on a tight curve that caused Second
Lieutenant Acosta to make
less than optimal choices in positioning his vehicles. Still, Second
Lieutenant Acosta
properly considered and employed the factors of METT-TC in deciding
where to emplace
his two vehicles so as to provide vehicle stand-off, force protection,
overwatch field of
view, and clear line of sight for the spotlight operator. From 15-30
vehicles were turned
around without incident based upon how the position was established.
(Annexes 77C,
79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 1F, 2F, 3F).
(U) At the time of the incident, there were only two HMMWVs, and seven
U.S.
military personnel, at BP 541. Both the blocking vehicle and the
overwatch vehicle were
positioned on the on-ramp, facing Route Irish. There were no other
vehicles, or Soldiers
in the immediate vicinity of BP 541, and the BP could not be seen by
any other BPs on
Route Irish. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 87C, 89C, 117C, 118C,
119C, 120C,
121C, 122C, 123C, 124C).
(U) The Soldiers had a heightened sense of awareness because of the
two VBIED
BOLOs, one for a black car, another for a white car. (Annexes 74C,
77C, 13E, 14E).
Given the number of vehicles that had been stopped and turned around,
and this
awareness of VBIEDs, it is highly unlikely that Specialist Lozano was
not paying
attention. Further, Specialist Lozano had recently rotated into the
position, replacing
Specialist Peck, to ensure that there was a fresh set of eyes in the
turret. (Annexes 79C,
85C). Rotating qualified personnel in and out of the turret to
maintain alertness was a
wise decision by the BP 541 leadership.
(U) Ineffective battle tracking procedures (communications, log
posting, and
information sharing) at the 1-76 FA TOC caused A Company, 1-69 IN to
be left in their
blocking positions longer than expected. The night of 4 March 2005 was
the last night of
the Left Seat Ride for 1-76 FA, and 4-5 March 2005 was the first full
duty day for the
unit. (Annexes 59C, 63C, 97C).
(U) The spotlight and green laser pointer had proven effective in
stopping and turning
around vehicles before the car with the Italians arrived at the
on-ramp. Many of the
vehicles, though, screeched their tires when stopping. While effective
for accomplishing
the mission, the spotlight and laser pointer may not be the best
system from a civilian
point of view. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 132C)
(U) Specialist Lozano did not drop the spotlight until after he fired
the warning shots,
then immediately transitioned to two hands on his weapon as he fired
the disabling shots.
(Annexes 79C, 83C, 85C, 87C).
35
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Specialist Lozano spotlighted the car before it reached the Alert
Line, fired
warning shots as it reached the Warning Line, and fired on the vehicle
in an attempt to
disable it immediately after it crossed the Warning Line. (Annexes
79C, 87C, 129C,
134C).
(U) Specialist Lozano was the only one to fire his weapon. (Annexes
77C, 79C, 81C,
83C, 85C, 87C, 89C).
(U) The car was traveling at approximately 50 mph as it crossed the
Warning Line.
(Annex 83C).
(U) Mr. Carpani did not apply his brakes until after the rounds began
striking the car.
(Annexes 104C, 105C).
(U) Given the cyclic rate of fire of the M240B, Specialist Lozano's
expertise with the
weapon, and that only 11 rounds struck the vehicle with only five of
those impacting the
front of the car, it is highly unlikely that any shots were fired
after the car came to a stop.
(Annexes 79C, 6G, 1I, 3M).
(U) Both the blocking and overwatch vehicles were moved after the
incident as
directed by Captain Drew to transport Ms. Sgrena to the Combat Support
Hospital. Both
vehicles were needed to provide security for the move to the hospital.
(Annexes 74C,
77C).
(U) The gunner complied with the Rules of Engagement. After operating
the
spotlight, and perceiving the on-coming vehicle as a threat, he fired
to disable it and did
not intend to harm anyone in the vehicle. (Annexes 79C, 83C).
(U) There were a number of unrelated events that had a role in the
incident. These
were: (1) bad weather forcing a VIP to convoy on Route Irish that
evening vice the
preferred method of traveling by helicopter; (2) communications
problems involving a
unit new to the AOR that caused the Soldiers to be left in position
longer than expected;
(3) the recovery of Ms. Sgrena being pushed back daily, for several
days, to 4 March
2005; (4) the Italians did not know the Soldiers were at the on-ramp,
and were not
expecting any such roadblocks; and (5) the Soldiers did not know the
Italians were
traveling to BIAP. (Annexes 51C, 52C, 57C, 59C, 60C, 61C, 63C, 97C,
104C, 105C,
107C, 109C, 116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C).
(U) Mr. Carpani was driving faster than any other vehicle observed by
the Soldiers
that evening. He failed to stop for the spotlight since he was not
expecting a roadblock.
Additionally, he was dealing with multiple distractions including
talking on the phone
while driving, the conversation in the back seat, trying to listen for
threats, driving on a
wet road, focusing on tasks to be accomplished, the need to get to the
airport, and the
excited and tense atmosphere in the car. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 125C,
140C). Any one
of these would have affected his reaction time.
36
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
I. (U) Recommendations
(S//NF) Recommend the Force Protection Working Group consider the use
of
additional non-lethal measures (e.g., spike strips, temporary speed
bumps, and wire) be
emplaced to slow down or stop vehicles before the use of disabling
shots. The intent is to
provide as many non-lethal options as possible before asking a Soldier
to focus on firing
the weapon.
(U) Recommend that the Force Protection Working Group, in conjunction
with MNCI
Information Operations, propagate a Public Awareness/Public Service
Campaign to
inform all drivers of their responsibilities for behavior when
approaching and while at
Coalition Checkpoints. This information could be posted on panels or
boards at airports
and other major transportation centers, as well as in pamphlets to be
distributed from
various locations, to include rental car agencies and border control
points. This public
awareness campaign should enhance safe operations by promoting mutual
trust,
cooperation, and confidence for Coalition Forces and Iraqi citizens as
well as formally
outlining expected driver behavior throughout the AOR.
(U) Recommend the Force Protection Working Group consider the
following points as
they develop the MNC-I SOP for TCP operations:
o (S//NF) Different signs for ECPs, TCPs, and BPs. For example:
o (S//NF) Road Closed - Do Not Enter (for BPs).
o (S//NF) Coalition Checkpoint Ahead - Proceed Slowly and Follow
Directions (for TCPs).
(U) Signs written in Arabic and English should, where possible, also
incorporate
international symbols to accommodate foreign nationals as they begin
operating in Iraq.
o (S//NF) Highly visible and quickly deployable checkpoint and
roadblock warning
signs for Soldiers on patrol.
o (S//NF) Standards for when and how to use spotlights and lasers.
o (S//NF) The use of hand-held signs as an alternative to hand-and-arm
signals.
(U) Recommend a review of frequently established TCP locations to
consider the use
of existing permanent highway overpass signs that warn drivers that
checkpoints may be
upcoming (e.g., "Possible Checkpoint Ahead - Next Exit").
(S//NF) Recommend an assessment of the current technique of requiring
the gunner to
operate both the spotlight and the weapon in the turret of the
vehicle. This will allow
more reaction time and simplify duties and responsibilities of the
gunner.
37
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Further recommend a transition to a more driver friendly alert
signal by
substituting devices such as rotating warning lights and sirens to
replace spotlights as
early warning tools.
(U) Recommend periodic reviews of Right Seat/Left Seat Ride Relief in
Place
procedures based on:
o (S//NF) Transfer of Authority between units (before and after).
o (S//NF) Changes in MTOE equipment.
o (S//NF) Significant changes in the operational environment.
(S//NF) These reviews will ensure there is rigor in enforcing
standards and essential tasks
in accordance with existing SOPs. Further recommend MSC enforcement of
"Right
Seat/Left Seat Ride" certification programs where outgoing commanders
certify
incoming units' ability to perform required tasks before TOA. This
will ensure Soldiers
and leaders can properly execute tasks to standard and understand the
reasons for tasks
that deviate from established procedures as a result of any recent
changes.
(S//NF) Recommend the MSC Commanders review MNF FRAGO 1269/5 2005 Dec
04 with subordinate commands to ensure thorough fratricide reporting
and investigation
of fratricide incidents. The use of Rapid Response Teams (SJA, PAO,
PMO, CID,
Safety, etc.) to provide support to the on-site commander is highly
recommended.
(U) Recommend development of a casualty post-incident procedure
reference guide to
assist junior leaders in accurately preserving incident scenes as much
as time and the
tactical situation allow.
(S//NF) Some key pieces of information could include:
o (S//NF) Diagram of the scene to include exact grid of locations of
personnel/equipment included.
o (S//NF) Amount of ammunition expended.
o (S//NF) Digital photos.
o (S//NF) Chronology of events.
o (S//NF) Personnel involved with the incident.
38
o (S//NF) Personnel on-site at the time of the incident.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
o (S//NF) Permission to stand down or remove any equipment.
(U) Recommend that no disciplinary action be taken against any Soldier
involved in
the incident.
(U) Recommend that this report be circulated to all MNC-I Major
Subordinate
Commanders for use as an After Action Review tool.
39
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
V. COORDINATION
A. (U) Introduction
(U) This section addresses the status of coordination with MNF-I,
MNC-I, and their
subordinate units regarding the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena
on 4 March 2005.
Further, it examines the role that Captain Green played in this
incident.
B. (U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement
(U) When moving through another unit's battlespace in a combat zone,
coordination
with forces in the area is required for situational awareness, and,
more importantly, for
deconfliction of unit movements, positioning, and operations. For
example, 2/10 MTN
has successfully coordinated and executed previous movements and
operations of units
and forces not assigned to their AOR. The unit had coordinated,
sometimes on relatively
short notice, with numerous Joint Special Operations Units, Special
Missions Units, and
Special Tactics Units before 4 March 2005, with no incidents. (Annex
65C).
(U) To determine who or what organizations were aware of the Sgrena
recovery and
transport operation, sworn statements were taken from key military
officials within MNFI,
MNC-I, and their subordinate units that, by their function, would have
had access to
information about such an operation. A statement was also provided by
the Political
Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy Baghdad. The results are listed
below:
o (U) No one at the U.S. Embassy, including the Political Military
Counselor, knew
about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had
occurred. (Annex
114C).
o (U) No one within the MNF-I leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until
after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 1C to 27C).
o (U) No one, with one exception to be addressed below, within the
MNC-I
leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting
incident had
occurred. (Annexes 28C to 43C).
o (U) No one within the 3ID leadership knew about the Sgrena operation
until after
the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 44C to 56C).
o (U) No one within 4 BCT knew about the Sgrena operation until after
the
shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 5M).
o (U) No one within the 1-76 FA leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until
after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 58C to 63C).
40
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
o (U) No one within the 2/10 MTN leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation
until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 65C to 71C).
o (U) No one within the 1-69 IN leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until
after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 72C, 96C to 99C).
o (U) No one at the BIAP Command Post knew about the Sgrena operation
until
after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 110C).
o (U) No one at the Hostage Working Group knew about the Sgrena
operation until
after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 126C).
o (U) No one with A Company, 1-69 IN knew about the Sgrena operation
until after
the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C,
86C,
88C, 90C, 92C).
(U) Thus, it can be positively stated that the U.S. military was
totally unaware of the
recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005 until after the
shooting incident
had occurred.
C. (U) Captain Green
(U) Captain Green (USA) is the Aide-de-Camp to Major General Mario
Marioli
(ITAR), DCG, MNC-I. (Annex 107C). As early as 28 February 2005,
Captain Green
was aware that a number of Italian VIPs would be coming into BIAP. The
date for their
arrival kept getting pushed back. He was aware that the VIPs would be
involved in
working the Sgrena hostage situation. Captain Green knew no specifics
beyond that.
(Annexes 107C, 109C).
(U) At approximately 1330 hours on 4 March 2005, Captain Green,
Lieutenant
Colonel Zarcone (ITAR), and one PSD departed for BIAP, arriving at
about 1350 hours.
Major General Marioli and another PSD arrived shortly thereafter.
(Annex 107C). The
plane finally arrived at 1626. (Annex 1H). Eleven passengers deplaned
and were
immediately taken to the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory. There,
security badges were
obtained for five of the VIPs. (Annexes 106C, 107C).
(U) Captain Green accompanied three Italian VIPs, Major General
Marioli, and two
PSDs in three cars to a location about one kilometer beyond Checkpoint
539 on Route
Irish. Two Italians left, heading into Baghdad. The rest of the group
waited at the site
for a short while, returned to Camp Victory, then went back to the
spot past Checkpoint
539. Major General Marioli did not want Captain Green to go back out
to Checkpoint
539, but Captain Green, as his aide, insisted since his presence would
be necessary to
interface with the U.S. security forces in the area. (Annexes 100C,
106C, 107C).
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) At approximately 2030 hours, Major General Marioli approached
Captain Green
and asked him how he was doing and if Lieutenant Colonel Zarcone had
told him what
was going on. Captain Green said no, but that he suspected it had
something to do with
the Italian journalist. Major General Marioli said "Yes, but it is
best if no one knows."
Captain Green took this as an order from a General Officer not to pass
that information
on to anyone. (Annex 109C). Moreover, Major General Marioli did not
intend for
Captain Green to take any action whatsoever on that information. He
only told Captain
Green so that he would not be surprised when Ms. Sgrena arrived.
(Annex 100C).
(U) Approximately 20 minutes later, a phone call came in to the third
Italian VIP at
the site near Checkpoint 539. The call brought news of the shooting.
Captain Green
made contact with U.S. personnel in a nearby Bradley Fighting Vehicle
and confirmed
the shooting. Captain Green subsequently was able to speak with
Captain Drew at BP
541. Captain Green discussed the matter with Captain Drew and relayed
to Major
General Marioli that it was best for them to return to Camp Victory as
the wounded were
being transported to the Combat Support Hospital in the International
Zone. (Annex
107C). Major General Marioli was very appreciative of Captain Green's
coordination
efforts following the shooting. (Annex 100C).
(U) Captain Green was not informed of the recovery and transport of
Ms. Sgrena until
a short time before the incident at BP 541 occurred. (Annex 109C). He
was not expected
to take any action in the matter as it was an Italian national issue,
nor was he in a position
of any authority to do so. (Annex 100C). He was obeying an order from
Major General
Marioli. (Annex 109C).
D. (U) Findings
(U) No U.S. military personnel within MNF-I, MNC-I (to include Captain
Green), or
subordinate units were informed by the Government of Italy of the
hostage rescue
mission that occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 1C to 56C, 58C to 63C,
65C to 72C,
76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C, 96C to 99C, 110C, 114C,
126C, 7M).
(U) Not coordinating with U.S. personnel was a conscious decision on
the part of the
Italians as they considered the hostage recovery an Intelligence
mission and a national
issue. (Annex 100C).
(U) Based upon previous successful coordination efforts by 3ID and
2/10 MTN
working with organizations from various agencies outside their chain
of command, it is
clear that, while the hostage recovery operation may have otherwise
been a success, prior
coordination might have prevented this tragedy. Iraq is still a
hostile environment, i.e, a
combat zone, and the more coordination that can be done to increase
situational
awareness of those operating within the battlespace, the better it is
for all involved.
(Annex 65C).
42
UNCLASSIFIED
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