Newsgroup: it.politica
Titolo: sentite cosa dice il partito comunista iracheno alla festa dell' unitÓ di Genova

Festa dell' unità a Grnova 
da una parte Dalema e la Gruber, dall' altra Talabani (unione patriottica
curda) e Hammed Mousa (Partito Comunista iracheno)
"non condannano questa guerra e riconoscono che la fine del sanguinoso regime è
stata merito dell' invasione.Auspicano ritiro truppe solo dopo elezioni e dopo
la formazione del nuovo esercito iracheno. Hanno spiegato che la situazione non
è così drammatica come viene dipinta dai media occidentali e che sono alcuni
stati mediorientali a finanziare il terrorismo per trasformare l' irak in una
repubblica islamica. Che al nord non c'è attività terroristica
e il problema è su 4 distretti su tredici.
E che si tratta di terrorismo brutale che non potete chiamare resistenza.
Imbarazzo totale di Dalema e la Gruber la folla diessina presente ascolta
attonita.
&nbsp;
-----------------------------------------
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 &nbsp;
AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH

 attonita.
Non mi sorprende che i Curdi siano contenti di come stanno andando le cose:
al momento forse sono gli unici che ci stanno davvero guadagnado dall'at=
tuale stato delle cose.
Buon per loro, per carita': sono un popolo che ha subito tante e tali per=
secuzioni, che hanno tutta la mia simpatia. Pero', sono molto curioso di 
vedere come si metteranno le cose quando si trattera' di decidere lo status
del Kurdistan irakeno: non so come la Turchia veda la questione, e mi do=
mando se gli Stati Uniti, alla fin fine, siano disposti a "buttare a mare"
uno dei loro migliori e piu' fedeli alleati - la Turchia, appunto - per far
contenti i Curdi... Finora sono risusciti ad impedire che l'esercito turco
entrasse nel nord dell'Irak - e non e' poca cosa... -, ma ho molti dubbi 
sul fatto che siano davvero intenzionati ad inimicarsi la Turchia garan=
tendo un Kurdistan indipendente in Irak: voi come la vedete? Io penso che
Talabani potrebbe avere diversi motivi per non essere cosi' ottimista nel
prossimo futuro...
K.


 dall' altra Talabani (unione patriottica curda)
qualcuno gli ha chiesto se è disposto ad accettare
uno stato Iracheno che non preveda la completa autonomia
del territorio che lui controlla?
La risposta sarebbe interessante ed illuminante.

 attonita.
Che dire? Si tratta di una posizione che denota un certo senso della realtà;
cosa sarebbe infatti dell'Iraq se le truppe occupanti se ne andassero ORA,
come auspicato dalla sinistra italiana?
La sinistra che chiede un ritiro totale e, successivamente, una missione
sotto egida ONU, cui dovrebbero partecipare solo stati che non hanno preso
parte al conflitto. Quella stessa ONU che non osa mettere piede a Baghdad
per paura di altri attentati. Ma vi sembra una cosa fattibile?
Perché non appoggiare invece con tutte le forze la buona riuscita del piano
dell'ONU che porterà alle elezioni di gennaio, e puntare ad un ritiro dopo
quella data?
Certo vedere che pure i comunisti iracheni sono più avanti della nostra
sinistra non fa un bell'effetto ...

curda) e Hammed Mousa (Partito Comunista iracheno)
(cut)
Le posizioni del "Partito Comunista Irakeno" (Iraqi Communist Party
==> 
http://www.iraqcp.org
) sono note a tutti, da tempo; a tutti, ma
evidentemente non agli organizzatori della "festa dell'unità"
genovese. Eppure sarebbe bastata loro una ricerchina su Google...
In ogni caso, sull'argomento mi pregio di riportare un articolo
ripreso dal World Socialist Web Site (WSWS), che spiega oltremodo bene
la natura del "Partito Comunista Iraqeno" (o meglio, di uno dei
"partiti comunisti iraqeni", ve ne sono almeno due uno dei quali ha
scelto decisamente l'opposizione all'invasione del paese, anche
armata). Buona lettura a chi vuole.
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/iraq-j29.shtml
Iraqi Communist Party joins Washington’s puppet administration in
Baghdad
By Peter Symonds
29 July 2003
There is no shortage of wretched betrayals in the annals of Stalinism.
But the decision of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) to join the
Governing Council hand-picked by the Bush administration to provide a
façade for its neo-colonial subjugation of the country is without
precedent.
The very fact that Washington invited the ICP to join its puppet
administration in Baghdad testifies to the depth of the crisis that
the US confronts in Iraq. Three months after the invasion, US troops
are subject to daily guerrilla attacks and face growing opposition
from a hostile population that lacks basic essentials such as food,
clean water and electricity.
Yet as crowds of Iraqis take to the streets to demand an end to the US
occupation, the ICP has joined what is widely reviled as a quisling
administration. At its first meeting on July 13, ICP leader Hamid
Majid Mousa took his seat alongside the squalid assortment of Iraqi
exiles, businessmen, clerics, political charlatans and outright
criminals, such as convicted embezzler Ahmed Chalabi, that comprise
the Governing Council.
The ICP has attempted to justify its decision by arguing that the body
constitutes a step towards democracy and the independence of Iraq. In
doing so, the Stalinists are simply mouthing the pretexts offered by
the gangsters of the White House for their illegal invasion of Iraq.
Washington’s aims were never to “liberate” the Iraqi people but to
occupy the country in order to loot its resources and further its
ambitions throughout the Middle East.
By participating in the Governing Council, the ICP has legitimised an
illegitimate war and given its stamp of approval for ongoing US rule
over Iraq. It now bears full political responsibility for Washington’s
policies, including the savage repression of any resistance and the
plans of US corporations to take over and plunder the country’s
economy—above all, its vast reserves of oil.
The ICP has absurdly attempted to portray its inclusion in the
Governing Council as a triumph—a “concession” wrung from the US
occupying forces. Mousa personally met with Washington’s proconsul in
Baghdad, Paul Bremer III, who is closely aligned to the most
militaristic elements of the Bush administration, to press for the
party’s involvement. “There were also attempts to sideline our party
in the political process,” Mousa explained in an interview with an
Iranian newspaper, “but they failed miserably in the end.”
An editorial in the ICP’s Tareeq Al-Shaab newspaper makes much of the
fact that Bremer was forced to “retreat” and appoint a “Governing
Council” with limited powers, rather than a consultative “Political
Council”. But no amount of verbal juggling can hide the fact that the
ICP has been co-opted to a colonial-style body set up to contain and
suppress opposition to US rule. Bremer retains all the strings of
power, including the right of veto over the council’s decisions.
Moreover, having appointed the body, Washington can sack any or all of
its members if they fail to do its bidding or if their services are no
longer required.
The ICP’s decision required no great soul-searching. For years, the
Stalinists have been nothing more than an adjunct to various Iraqi
bourgeois groups patronised by Washington. While it may not have been
formally recognised as one of the six organisations eligible for
funding under the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, the ICP had the closest
relations with those groups that were—in particular, the two Kurdish
militia organisations, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Prior to the US invasion, the ICP expressed reservations, appealing to
the UN and the “international community” to stop the war. But after
the fall of Baghdad, it quickly dropped its muted opposition and
hailed the US military defeat of the Baathist regime as a victory.
Along with the KDP, PUK and other pro-US groups, it criticised aspects
of the occupation and called for a national conference to establish a
transitional administration with UN involvement. But when Washington
ruled out such a gathering and, with the backing of the UN, decided to
appoint a council instead, all these organisations rapidly fell into
line. Trailing behind in their wake, the ICP followed suit.
The Governing Council is yet to parcel out ministerial posts to its
members. Whatever the exact role assigned to Mousa, the ICP is
committed, along with other council members, to curbing opposition to
the occupation. Asked his attitude recently to a US sell-off of the
oil industry, ICP Central Committee member Salam Ali dodged the issue.
He did not oppose privatisation as such, but insisted only that the
Iraqi people should have “the right to disposal over these resources”.
ICP members who participated in a rally on July 14 to commemorate the
overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 were not so coy about the
party’s policies. Faleh Kadhin, an electrical engineer, bluntly told
the New York Times: “We want a market economy.” There should be some
kind of social safety net, Kadhin said, but state ownership of
industries was clearly out of the question. Other party members
agreed. “We are working to empower the private sector,” Abu Salah
proudly told the newspaper.
A history of betrayal
There is no doubt that the ICP’s treachery will compound the
prevailing political confusion in Iraq and enable, in the short term
at least, reactionary Islamic fundamentalist trends to capitalise on
the growing opposition to the US occupation. For Iraqis seeking an end
to US rule and a progressive solution to the country’s deep political
and economic crisis, it is crucial to critically examine the history
of the ICP.
The ICP’s direct incorporation into the US occupation of Iraq is not
the product of Marxism but of its polar opposite—Stalinism. Despite
its false claims to be “socialist” and “communist”, the party was
never based on the struggle for the political independence of the
working class but, from the outset, sought to subordinate Iraqi
workers to one or other wing of the national bourgeoisie.
When the ICP was formed in 1934 and affiliated to the Communist
International, the Stalinist bureaucracy in Moscow had already
denounced the basic program of Marxism—socialist internationalism—as
“Trotskyism” and embraced instead the reactionary nationalist
perspective of “Socialism in One Country”. Over the next four years,
culminating in the notorious Moscow trials of 1936-38, Stalin and his
henchmen framed up and murdered the finest representatives of a whole
generation of revolutionary leaders, workers and intellectuals in the
Soviet Union and internationally, in a bid to suppress opposition to
their policies.
The corollary of “Socialism in One Country” in backward capitalist
countries was the so-called two-stage theory, which repudiated any
independent political role for the working class. Like the Mensheviks
that Lenin and Trotsky had opposed prior to the Russian Revolution,
the Stalinists insisted that, in countries with a belated capitalist
development, the tasks of the bourgeois revolution—national
independence, democratic rights and land reform—would be carried out
by the national bourgeoisie. With socialism relegated to the “second
stage” in the distant future, the working class could do no more than
provide support and assistance to the “progressive” wing of the
capitalist class.
In opposition to this perspective, the theory of Permanent Revolution
elaborated by Leon Trotsky made clear that in the epoch of
imperialism, the bourgeoisie was organically incapable of playing a
revolutionary role. The working class in economically backward
countries would be obliged to lead the struggle for national
independence and democracy, rallying the peasant masses and taking
power into its own hands in a struggle against both imperialism and
the national bourgeoisie. Once in power, the working class would of
necessity move more or less rapidly to the carrying through of
socialist tasks, such as the nationalization of finance and basic
industry under the democratic control of the working population.
The two-stage theory was to have catastrophic consequences in Iraq in
the events that followed the ousting of the monarchy in July 1958 by a
section of the military. Unlike previous palace coups, the Free
Officers group that led the overthrow was influenced by the growth of
anti-colonial sentiment throughout the Middle East and the emergence
of nationalist figures such as Nasser in Egypt. The monarchy was
widely despised as a tool for British domination over Iraq and had
been the target of broad protest movements in the 1940s and 1950s.
But the new government led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim was no more
capable of meeting the aspirations of the masses for democratic rights
and decent living standards than its counterparts elsewhere in the
Middle East. Such demands necessitate a revolutionary reorganisation
of society, which bourgeois leaders like Qasim and Nasser, tied in
countless ways to propertied interests, were organically incapable of
carrying out. While Qasim appealed at times to popular
anti-imperialist sentiment, he reacted ruthlessly to any threat to the
profit system.
The events in Iraq after 1958 bear a remarkable resemblance to the
tragedy that was to unfold in Indonesia, culminating in the bloody
1965-66 CIA-backed military coup. In both cases, the Stalinist parties
shackled the working class to so-called progressive bourgeois leaders,
bolstered their anti-imperialist credentials, curbed any independent
struggle by the masses and paved the way for the most reactionary
elements to reemerge and seize power.
The Qasim junta was heavily dependent on the ICP as the only political
party that had substantial popular support. Having survived illegality
and repression under the monarchy, the ICP became a strong pole of
attraction, rapidly building trade unions and peasant organisations
that had hundreds of thousands of members. It was supported by
sections of the intelligentsia and the army, and had significant
influence in the People’s Resistance—a popular militia numbering over
10,000 members.
Qasim, on the other hand, faced splits even within the ranks of the
Free Officers. With the support of the ICP, he opposed a group of
officers around rival general Abd al-Salam Arif, who were pressing for
Iraq to join Nasser’s United Arab Republic (UAR)—the union of Egypt
and Syria formed in 1958. Arif was dismissed and became the focus for
opposition by various rightwing nationalist, pan-Arab and Islamicist
organisations, including the Baath Party, to Qasim and the ICP.
The ICP ruled out making any bid for power. At its May Day rally in
Baghdad in 1959, which attracted some 300,000 people, the party’s
central demand was for its representatives to be included in the
government. Qasim refused at the time, but just two months later, in a
bid to guarantee the ICP’s continuing support, he gave ministerial
posts to ICP member Naziha al-Dulaymi and two ICP sympathisers.
The ICP leadership did discuss taking power. But as one academic study
explained: “After heated arguments within the Politburo it was agreed
that while the party might well succeed in taking power, its original
analysis of the essentially bourgeois character of the revolution was
correct... Thus the party decided to moderate, or at least not to
press, its demands and generally began to pursue an accommodating line
towards Qasim. [Iraq Since 1958, Marion Farouk-Sluggett and Peter
Sluggett, p.69]”
The political processes that unfolded had an inexorable logic. The
refusal of the ICP to mobilise the masses for the seizure of power
only encouraged reactionary forces to press their demands. Qasim, who
had no independent social base of his own, accommodated to these
layers by cracking down on the ICP. But even as the government
restricted the ICP’s mass organisations, banned its paper and arrested
its activists throughout 1960, the party clung even more closely to
Qasim. Dulaymi remained in the cabinet, only to be dismissed in
November 1960.
Qasim himself, with only sections of the military under his command,
was left increasingly isolated and vulnerable. He survived an
assassination attempt in October 1959 by a Baath Party gang headed by
23-year-old Saddam Hussein. But in February 1963, a group of rightwing
officers, backed by the Baath Party, engineered a military coup. The
ICP’s alliance with Qasim left the working class completely
defenceless. Crowds gathered outside the Ministry of Defence begging
Qasim to give them weapons, but he refused.
What followed was a bloodbath as Baath Party thugs first seized and
executed Qasim and his close collaborators, then turned on the ICP. As
a number of separate sources testify, the CIA had developed close ties
with the Baath Party, supported the coup and, as in the case of
Indonesia three years later, supplied lists of ICP leaders for summary
execution. The results were horrific.
“Rank and file members and sympathisers were rounded up in their
homes, or shot in the streets in the first few days if they went out
to join the crowds in the streets in brave but futile attempts to
‘defend the revolution,’ which the party leaflets were actually
calling upon them to do. Husayn al-Radi, the first secretary of the
party, and many members of the Central Committee were arrested and
subsequently murdered. It is impossible to establish exactly how many
people were killed, but many thousands were arrested, and sports
grounds were turned into makeshift prisons to hold the flood of
detainees. People were killed in the streets, tortured to death in
prison, or executed after mock ‘trials’. Many of those who escaped
with their lives were condemned to long periods in prison under
atrocious conditions. [ibid, p.86]”
Estimates put the number dead at 3,000. The authors of Iraq Since 1958
express astonishment that the ICP had made no contingency plans, even
though it had been “well aware for some time that a coup was being
prepared”. In particular, they declare, it was “almost inexplicable”
that the party took no measures to protect its own leaders and
members. There is nothing mysterious, however, about this paralysis.
Having subordinated themselves unconditionally to Qasim, the ICP
leaders were not prepared to take any actions that the Iraqi leader
would deem hostile—even if their own necks were at stake.
Alliance with the Baathists
The ICP learnt nothing from the tragic events of 1963. In fact, the
pattern of events dictated by the ICP’s bankrupt two-stage perspective
were to be repeated in subsequent decades more than once.
Although the Baathists played a prominent role in the 1963 coup, they
could not hold onto power and were quickly pushed aside by Qasim’s
rival Arif. The Baath Party had only been formed in the early 1950s,
as an adjunct to the Baath Party in Syria, and its organisation had
been set back by the repression that followed the failed attempt on
Qasim’s life. Even by its own estimates, it had only 850 full members
and 15,000 sympathisers in 1963.
It was not until 1968 that the Baath Party seized power, taking
advantage of the infighting and unpopularity of the previous
military-backed regimes. Conscious of his government’s political
isolation, Baath leader Hasan al-Bakr turned for support to the ICP,
offering it three ministerial positions in the cabinet. The overture
was also aimed at cementing a relationship with the Stalinist
bureaucracy in Moscow, which was the country’s main military supplier
and a potential source of aid.
Although the ICP declined the offer, it had no fundamental opposition
to the proposal. Under pressure from Moscow, the ICP leadership had
already begun to accommodate to “progressive Nasserist elements” in
the previous military regimes. As the Baath government increasingly
turned to the Soviet Union for support, it was not a huge political
leap for the ICP, at Moscow’s insistence, to join with the party that
had slaughtered its members just years before, and declare it to be
progressive.
The impetus was provided by the Baath regime’s decision to nationalise
the oil industry. The move, aimed at capitalising on higher oil prices
in the early 1970s, required close cooperation with the Soviet Union,
which provided markets and technical expertise. Moscow, in turn, was
keen to exploit the relationship and pressed the ICP to openly support
the government. In April 1972, the ICP issued a statement declaring
that recent developments had “marked a turning point in the people’s
struggle” and indicated its willingness to join the Baath-dominated
National Progressive Front. In May, two senior ICP leaders were
appointed to the Baath cabinet and, two weeks later, the oil industry
was nationalised.
The ICP remained in the National Progressive Front for seven years. It
bears political responsibility for all of the Baath regime’s crimes
against the working class as well as its repression of the Kurds and
Shiites. The Baath Party used its predominance not only to insist that
the ICP uncritically accept its policies but to extend its influence
into areas where it had never had support, such as the trade unions.
The ICP clung to the Baath Party right to the bitter end, even after
the regime launched a fresh wave of repression against the party in
April 1978. It only quit the front in 1979.
In light of this wretched history, the ICP’s decision to enter
Washington’s puppet body in Baghdad, while seemingly at odds with its
past rhetoric, is entirely explicable. Throughout its existence, the
ICP has sought to attach itself to one or other section of the Iraqi
bourgeoisie. The ability of these layers to posture as
“anti-imperialist” rested on their ability to manoeuvre during the
Cold War between Washington and Moscow. But that evaporated with the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Throughout the 1990s, even the
most radical of the national liberation movements—from the PLO in the
Middle East to the ANC in South Africa—abandoned any opposition to the
dictates of the major powers.
Deeply compromised in the eyes of the masses by its support for the
Baathist dictatorship, and subject to constant repression, the ICP has
over the past two decades been reduced to a pathetic rump. It led a
marginal political existence in the 1990s, in the so-called northern
no-fly zone—the military exclusion zone declared by Washington in the
aftermath of the 1990-91 Gulf War and patrolled by US and British
warplanes. With the permission of the Kurdish militia, the ICP set up
an office in the Kurdish area and promoted various Kurdish leaders as
the latest incarnation of the “progressive bourgeoisie”.
The northern no-fly zone was a hotbed of imperialist intrigue. It
served as a base of operations for Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress
(INC) and the Iraq National Accord (INA), both of which were formed
with the backing of the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies.
The ICP maintained relations with all these organisations and held its
own discussions with US officials. When these thoroughly venal groups
agreed to join the Governing Council in Baghdad, the ICP, true to
form, tagged along.
Workers, intellectuals and young people in Iraq and throughout the
Middle East seeking to fight the eruption of imperialist war and
neo-colonial oppression must draw the necessary political lessons. The
collapse of the Soviet Union did not spell the end of socialism but
was the sharpest expression of a more universal process: the demise of
all national-based parties and programs under the impact of the
globalisation of production. Above all, what is required in Iraq and
the Middle East is the building of parties based on the program and
perspective of the International Committee of the Fourth
International, the world Trotskyist party, which alone has defended
the principles of socialist internationalism against the betrayals of
Stalinism.
Salut,
--
*Riccardo Venturi* <vent...@SPAMMACECCHIGORIspl.at>
*Er muoz gelîchesame die leiter abewerfen
So er an îr ufgestigen ist (Vogelweide & Wittgenstein)*
*CH-1700 Fribourg/Freiburg (Confoederatio Helvetica)
*0041 78 623 99 86
____________________________________________________
http://utenti.lycos.it/Guctrad/alamanno.html
http://utenti.lycos.it/Balladven/index.html
http://www.obiezione.it
 ==> Canzoni contro la guerra

AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH
Documentati, invece di ridere come un idiota.
Salut,
--
*Riccardo Venturi* <vent...@SPAMMACECCHIGORIspl.at>
*Er muoz gelīchesame die leiter abewerfen
So er an īr ufgestigen ist (Vogelweide & Wittgenstein)*




sei in malafede, perchè parli solo di Talabaniche ha senzaltro interessi
autonomisti e non di Hameed Mousa rappresentante del PARTITO COMUNISTA IRACHENO
CHE HA  IN LINEA DI MASSIMA AVVALLATO QUANTO DETTO DAL CURDO


 QUANTO DETTO DAL CURDO 
Si...ma fammi capire: che l'abbia o meno detto, a me che mi frega ?
Non č mica perche l'ha detto quello, che io debbo cambiare opinione (o 
farmela)
Mica sono uno di Forza Italia, che ha una opinione solo se essa č 
calata dall'alto come verbo dell'Unto del SIgnore...
Mha...
Saluti
Il GecKo
-- 
"che penserŕ la gente Mr. Kane" "Quello che dico Io " (Quarto potere)
Te lo ripeto, parla della grammatica ai tempi del Boccaccio.Grammatica 
arbitraria ed irregolare sono sempre sinonimo di scarsacircolazione 
del libro, di una modesta alfabetizzazione della popolazione -come era 
appunto nel '300. (Class, detto anche "El Barbaro del Ritmo" su 
it.politica)
Smettila di dire queste cazzate!! Le armi ci sono!!Mi vien voglia di 
andare in Iraq domani solo per trovarle e poterti cosě sputtanare! 
(Guelfo su it.politica) 

  
Beh, mi pare che stessimo parlando di cio' che ha detto Talabani, no?
Personalmente non so cosa abbia detto Hameed Mousa e, peraltro, mi pare
che tu non lo citassi nel tuo post iniziale, ma anche a me interesserebbe
capire come andranno le cose, quando gli americani dovranno fare i conti
con le pressanti richieste della Turchia, che di certo non vedrebbe di 
buon occhio uno stato curdo indipendente. 
Secondo te Talabani la vedra' ancora cosi' bene la situazione?
K.


 Salut,
PROOOOOOOOOOOOOOTTTTTTTTT


Sai mica a cosa è dovuta la tua permanenza in vita?

 come auspicato dalla sinistra italiana?
Stanno già cambiando opinione. Contrordine per la nostra allegra sinistra,
adesso bisogna restare in iraq. Un fulgido esempio di unità nella
confusione.
-- 
Mangiafuoco

PROOOOOOOOOOOOOOTTTTTTTTT
Stai forse inneggiando al compagno Igor Protti?...


Sai mica a cosa č dovuta la tua permanenza in vita?
Zitto, senno' questo e' talmente scemo da staccare la presa della
cella frigorifera dove lo hanno messo...


 Sai mica a cosa è dovuta la tua permanenza in vita?
Accanimento terapeutico?
-- 
There are two sides to every divorce: yours and the shithead's.

 Documentati, invece di ridere come un idiota.
Il 95% dei post del soggetto in questione sono
di una sola riga e spesso non vanno oltre il
monosillabo.
Tu non solo pretendi che legga il papiro che
hai postato ma addirittura che lo capisca.
Riccardo: la tua fiducia nel genere umano ha
del commovente. 

 &nbsp;
semplicemente perchè Mousa nello scenario iracheno non conta un cazzo,
perchè Mousa non ha parecchie migliaia di guerriglieri
perfettamente armati ed addestrati,
perchè Mousa non controlla tutta la parte nord dell'Irak, con importati
pozzi petroliferi,
perchè Mousa non ha richiesto l'autonomia del territorio che controlla,
anche perchè non ne controlla nessuno,
perchè le pretese di Mousa non contrastano con un Irak unitario e
non creano gravi problemi ad un paese come la Turchia che ha l'esercito
più potente della regione, dopo Israele, è alleato degli americani
e che non ha intenzione di avere al suo confine nessuno stato curdo
più o meno autonomo.


L'articolo è molto interessante, perché racconta la storia del Partito
Comunista Iraqeno. E' interessante anche il punto di vista particolare
dell'International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), anche se
leggendolo sono giunto a conclusioni assai diverse di quelle degli estensori
dell'articolo.
In particolare mi ha colpito la definizione del Partito Comunista Iraqeno
come stalinista; visto comunque che il sito ha sollevato la mia curiosità mi
sono andato a leggere un articolo sulla situazione italiana e sui rapporti
tra RC e l'Ulivo
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jun2003/ital-j21.shtml
in sintesi vi si accusa RC di opportunismo e di abbandonare le autentiche
lotte marxiste nel cercare l'alleanza con l'Ulivo.
La cosa più curiosa (anche se storicamente in parte giustificata) è che la
definizione stalinista compare due volte:
"former leader of the Stalinist labour federation CGIL, Sergio Cofferati"
"the largest ex-Stalinist party, known as "Left Democrats".
Arturo

attonita.
Credo che la differenza fra ciò che questi rappresentanti iracheni
hanno detto rispetto a ciò che si aspettava il pubblico della festa
dell'Unità sia tanto grande che non li hanno capiti. Probabilmente,
molti sono ancora dietro a pensarci. Alla fine diranno che quei tizi
si sono sbagliati.
Labirinti
gioca...@libero.it
Remove A B C

 ha scritto nel messaggio
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E infatti!
Il Manifesto parla dei "deliri" di Talabani", mentre il WSWC citato sopra
vuole fare passare il PCI iraqeno storicamente stalinista come un partito di
traditori venduti per un un minimo di potere.
La cosa strana secondo me è il fatto che gli organizzatori della tavola
rotonda abbiano invitato proprio quei due esponenti. Me lo riesco a spiegare
solo in un modo, che metto in relazione alle dichiarazioni di Fassino e
Barlenghi sulla presenza delle truppe: a sinistra c'è che vuole cambiare
posizione sull'Iraq, la cosa più difficile però è farsi capire dal proprio
elettorato, e questo è stato un tentativo di fare sentire voci favorevoli a
questa linea.

curda) e Hammed Mousa (Partito Comunista iracheno)
Prova a salire sul palco della "Convenscion" di Forza Italia a dire
qualcosa che non piace al pelato. 
Una lezione di libertà dalla sinistra, l'ennesima.
Non c'è da stupirsi se un curdo e un comunista sono relativamente
soddisfatti, visto che entrambi hanno subito le persecuzioni di
Saddam, la loro situazione è notevolmente migliorata. E' peggiorata
senz'altro la situazione dei sunniti, ed è peggiorata la situazione
degli sciiti (per colpa loro però, se durante l'invasione avessero
preso una parte più attiva oggi potrebbero accampare più diritti,
invece sono rimasti a guardare).
                       Roberto
La Locomotiva
http://media.supereva.it/bacheca5.freemail/rg.htm