Newsgroup: it.politica
Titolo: Morto Ronald Reagan. Teheran: «Il più grande amico di Saddam»

Morto Ronald Reagan. Teheran: «Il più grande amico di Saddam»
di red
 È spirato sabato sera nella camera-ospedale dove vegetava dentro la
grande villa nel quartiere più lussuoso di Los Angeles, al numero 668 di
St Cloud Road, Bel Air. Già da un anno le sue funzioni vitali erano
ridotte al minimo. La figlia Patty nel dicembre scorso aveva rivelato che
non poteva più parlare e non riconosceva neppure i parenti più stretti. Le
funzioni neurologiche distrutte dal morbo di Alzheimer. 
Ronald Reagan è morto a 93 anni. Una lunga vita, sulla cresta dell'onda.
Il presidente-attore, divo di Hollywood, era stato eletto alla Casa Bianca
nel 1981 e ha battuto tutti i record di permanenza nella stanza ovale:
fino al 1989. La malattia lo aveva colpito dodici anni fa, sviluppandosi
progressivamente. Padre irlandese, cattolico e alcolista, venditore
ambulante di scarpe, madre puritana, era nato a Tampico (Illinois) nel
1911. 
Ha interpretato molti ruoli nella sua lunga vita: interprete del "sogno
americano" era sbarcato negli studios di Hollywood nel 1937, come attore
soprattutto di film Western di serie B. E nel '47 divenuto presidente del 
sindacato attori ebbe un ruolo di primo piano nella campagna
dell'anticomunismo più duro dell'epoca maccartista, approvando le liste
nere contro attori, sceneggiatori e registi accusati di intelligence con
il nemico sovietico. 
È stato questo il suo ruolo più riuscito: il persecutore del comunismo
sovietico. A lui è toccato essere l'ultimo presidente Usa della Guerra
Fredda. E a lui si deve la definizione della Russia come «Impero del
male». 
E per questo suo impegno anticomunista lo ricorda oggi l'anziano Lech
Walesa, ex operaio delle Officine di Danzica divenuto prima fondatore di
Solidarnosc e poi presidente della Polonia desovietizzata. 
Ma c'è anche chi commenta la sua morte in tutt'altra chiave. Radio
Teheran, la tv di Stato iraniana dando notizia della morte lo ha definito:
«il più grande amico di Saddam Hussein», con riferimento a quando, nel
1983, inviò Donald Rumsfeld a Baghdad «per promettere che gli Usa
sarebbero 
rimasti in silenzio a proposito dell'uso di armi chimiche contro gli
iraniani». 
Radio Teheran non ha invece voluto ricordare lo scandalo dell'«Irangate»,
il più grave dell'epoca Reagan, cioè l'affare della vendita di armi
all'Iran che serviva a finanziare la guerriglia antisandinista dei Contras
in Nicaragua. 
Fu anche interprete della linea ultraliberista in economia che
caratterizzò gli anni Ottanta su entrambe le sponde dell'Atlantico.
Personalmente era legato all'alta finanza di Wall Street, lui che aveva
dovuto lavorare per pagarsi gli studi fu avviato nella politica attiva nel
1954 dalla General Motors che lo invitò a compiere un giro di conferenze
nelle fabbriche. Nel 1966, dopo due anni di politica a tempo pieno nel
Partito repubblicano, divevve governatore della California, rieletto poi
nel 1970. Dieci anni dopo ottenne la nomination repubblicana nella corsa
alla Casa Bianca. La sua vittoria contro il presidente democratico Jimmy
Carter, massiccia, avvenne sullo sfondo della cattura degli ostaggi
all'ambasciata Usa a Teheran.
Grande amico del premier britannico Margaret Thatcher che infatto lo
ricorda come «uno dei grandi eroi americani». 
Può essere ricordato anche per aver ordinato i raid in Libia e a Grenada.
Ma soprattutto in America era il primo grande presidente mediatico, con
una grande capacità di arrivare al cuore della Nazione. 
L'ex cancelliere tedesco Helmut Kohl e il suo principale rivale,
sconfitto, Mikhail Gorbaciov lo ricordano invece per il suo impegno per la
pace. In effetti, sul finire della Guerra Fredda, cioè a partire dal 1985
fu costretto a iniziare il programma di disarmo nucleare concordato con
l'Unione Sovietica. E Giulio Andreotti ricorda che questo impegno non fu
proseguito dal suo successore repubblicano alla Casa Bianca, George Bush
padre, che invece il riarmo con il progetto dello "Scudo stellare".
Nel 1952 si sposò in seconde nozze con Nancy Davis, che gli sarà accanto
per il resto della vita e che oggi gli sopravvive a 82 anni. Da "Mommy",
come Ronald chiamava in privato la moglie, ha avuto due figli, Patty e
Ronald jr.
Solo 69 giorni dopo il suo insediamento alla Casa Bianca, il 30 marzo
1981, Reagan fu ferito in un attentato a Capitol Hill al torace da un
colpo di pistola. Il presidente guarì presto dall'attentato, ma la sua
salute 
durante gli anni alla Casa Bianca fu spesso segnata da malattie. Venne
operato a due riprese, per forme di cancro, nel 1985 e 1987. Soltanto la
sua fibra da atleta - football e golf le sue passioni - lo hanno mantenuto
in vita fino a sabato scorso. 
-- 
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 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 sarebbero
ROTFL e sentiti radio Teheran.......è peggio di Fede...

 ROTFL e sentiti radio Teheran.......è peggio di Fede...
Evidentemente hai poca memoria.
Altrimenti ricorderesti che nel 1987 gli USA mandarono
la propria flotta nel Golfo in appoggio Saddam Hussein
nella guerra contro l'Iran.
Ricorderesti l'aereo di linea iraniano abbattuto nel
1988 (290 civili morti) da una portaerei USA di quella
flotta.
Ricorderesti quando con un'apposita votazione gli USA
cancellarono l'Iraq dalla lista delle nazioni che
sostengono il terrorismo e permisero il trasferimento
di armamenti americani per sostenere Saddam in quella
Guerra.
Ricorderesti come nel 1984 il mondo rimase attonito di
fronte all'uso delle armi chimiche da parte di Saddam
su kurdi ed iraniani e come - con una tempistica a
dir poco sconcertante - gli USA un paio di mesi dopo
ristabilirono i rapporti diplomatici con l'Iraq.
Ricorderesti come gli USA si opposero ad una risoluzione
ONU di condanna all'Iraq per l'invasione dell'Iran...
Ma se queste cose non le ricordi o non le sai, allora
perchè dai aria alla gola?

 
-- 
« C'è chi la fuma e chi se la spara in vena,
			a me basta un salto ! »
-----------------------------------------------
"We urge the organization of a coordinated, worldwide,
and systematic search for extraterrestrial intelligence"
"We wish to find the truth, no matter where it lies.
But to find the truth we need imagination and skepticism both.
We will not be afraid to speculate, but we will be careful
to distinguish speculation from fact." Carl Sagan
Truth is Out There
DonJuan

 democratico moderato e liberista eletto a maggioranza dal popolo 
Lo Scià di Persia fu eletto democraticamente ?
La dittatura dello shah
Nel 1975 tutti i partiti vengono messi fuori legge a eccezione di 
quello della Rinascita nazionale iraniana, legato allo scià. In 
politica estera vengono rafforzate le relazioni con i paesi comunisti, 
riallacciando anche i rapporti con il blocco dei paesi arabi, escluso 
l'Iraq. La Rivoluzione bianca si rivela un fallimento perché il tenore 
di vita aumenta solo per gli strati più alti della popolazione. 
Alè !
Saluti
Il GecKo
-- 
"che penserà la gente Mr. Kane" "Quello che dico Io " (Quarto potere)
Smettila di dire queste cazzate!! Le armi ci sono!!Mi vien voglia di 
andare in Iraq domani solo per trovarle e poterti così sputtanare! 
Saddam Hussein ha invaso un'altro paese in fragranze violazione del 
diritto internazionale occorreva intervenire.
(Guelfo su it.politica)

 di una lunga serie...
Guarda che lo scia' Mohammed Reza era un monarca assoluto, altro che
democrazia liberale...
L'attuale costituzione iraniana che ha istituito la teocrazia fu
sottoposta a voto popolare e votata a maggioranza dagli iraniani. Non per
altro, ma a dimostrazione che le elezioni non implicano democrazia ...



quando finirai di fare il pagliaccio sono sicuro che dirai al ng se quello
che è stato detto e' vero e falso.
Ma coglione come sei dubito che sarai in grado di rispondere seriamente.
--------------------------------
Inviato via 
http://arianna.libero.it/usenet/

Il 07 Giu 2004, 13:46, "Peppe Brescia" <Pe...@Peppe.Peppe> ha scritto:

quando finirai di fare il pagliaccio sono sicuro che dirai al ng se quello


 vedere tu stesso con i tuoi occhi.
sperando che tu non sia un utente cretino come peppe brescia, che e'
dimostrato in vari suoi post di essere un vero e proprio cretino, ti
invito a leggere i seguenti post che mandai su it.politica internazionale .
Ebbene in Iran prima di Khomeini non c'era nessun governo  democratico
moderato e liberista eletto a maggioranza dal popolo .
Lo Shah era stato messo al potere dalla CIA. Quello si con un golpe che
rovescio' un governo democratico moderato ed eletto a maggioranza dal
popolo, il governo di Mossadeq.
Leggiti i seguenti 5 post di cui ti do i link e ti riporto per intero solo
il primo.
http://groups.google.it/groups?q=cia,+iran,golpe+group:it.politica.internazionale.*&hl=it&lr=&ie=UTF-8&group=it.politica.internazionale.*&selm=9bc25d556421de59b125e881f31c1974.93441%40mygate.mailgate.org&rnum=1
http://groups.google.it/groups?q=cia,+iran,golpe+group:it.politica.internazionale.*&hl=it&lr=&ie=UTF-8&group=it.politica.internazionale.*&selm=0331a417b744fe1b47d9946419568aba.93441%40mygate.mailgate.org&rnum=3
 
http://groups.google.it/groups?q=cia,+iran,golpe+group:it.politica.internazionale.*&hl=it&lr=&ie=UTF-8&group=it.politica.internazionale.*&selm=716ce0c1e5b4948c16da20fbad57cb12.93441%40mygate.mailgate.org&rnum=4
http://groups.google.it/groups?q=cia,+iran,golpe+group:it.politica.internazionale.*&hl=it&lr=&ie=UTF-8&group=it.politica.internazionale.*&selm=18e2150431de55a81064d320576c8c4e.93441%40mygate.mailgate.org&rnum=2
http://groups.google.it/groups?q=cia,+iran,golpe+group:it.politica.internazionale.*&hl=it&lr=&ie=UTF-8&group=it.politica.internazionale.*&selm=3f7f4101d4d8fea2c214b801faadbec9.93441%40mygate.mailgate.org&rnum=5
28 August 2000: Link to original New York Times PDF files:
http://cryptome.org/iran-cia/cia-iran-pdf.htm
11 July 2000: Typographical errors corrected. See also: 
An informative commentary on July 6, 2000 about this report by Mark
Gasiorowski, a political science professor at Louisiana State
University: 
http://www.iranian.com/History/2000/July/Coup/index.html
.
A 1997 New York Times report on the CIA's claim that all coup records
were lost: 
http://www.iranian.com/History/June97/CIA/index.shtml
A 1978 coup account published by the British journal Lobster in 1998
which identified coup participants: 
http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-lob.htm
25 June 2000 
On June 16, 2000, the New York Times published on its Web site PDF files
of a secret CIA report: "CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY, OVERTHROW OF
PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN, November 1952-August 1953," an operation
planned and executed by the CIA and British SIS:
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html
 
The Times wrote in an introductory note that names of participants in
the overthrow were digitally edited from the report "after consultations
with historians who believed there might be serious risk that the
families of some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution
in Iran."
Cryptome has recovered the majority of the edited text of the files and
is publishing the report unedited except for unrecoverable redactions
(some sections were secured by a method which prevented recovery, as
noted at their beginning below) and those sections and appendices which
were not edited.
Restored text is shown in brackets below. 
More on the edited text recovery method at:
http://cryptome.org/cia-iran.htm
The New York Times is commended for publishing the report. It is a
disturbing document that should be widely read and pondered for the harm
it so vividly describes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    CS Historical Paper
                                    No.      208     
              CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY
         OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN
               November 1952-August 1953
                                      Date written  :  March 1954
                                      Date publsihed:  October 1969
                                      Written by    :  Dr. Donald N.
                                                         Wilber
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
                 HISTORIAN'S NOTE
     This paper, entitled Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq
of Iran, was written in March 1954 by Dr. Donald N. Wilber
who had played an active role in the operation.  The study
was written because it seemed desirable to have a record
of a major operation prepared while documents were readily
at hand and while the memories of the personnel involved
in the acitivity were still fresh.  In addition, it was
felt advisable to stress certain conclusions reach after
the operation had been completed and to embody some of
these in the form of recommendations applicable to future,
parallel operations.
     Documents pertaining to the operation described in
this paper are in the Project TPAJAX files which are held
by the Iran Branch of the Near East and South Asia Division.
     All proper names mentioned in this paper have been
checked for accuracy and completeness.  A serious effort
has been made to supply the first name and middle initial
of each individual.  The omission of any first names and
middle initials indicates that such information could not
be located.
                                   Dean L. Dodge
                                   NE Division
                                   Historical Officer
                                   March 1969
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[By the New York Times]
June 18, 2000
Editor's note:
The C.I.A.'s history of the 1953 coup in Iran is
made up of the following documents: a historian's
note, a summary introduction, a lengthy narrative
account written by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, and, as
appendices, five planning documents he attached.
On April 16, 2000, The New York Times on the Web
published the introduction and several of the
appendices.
The Times has now decided to publish the main body
of the text after removing certain name and
identifying descriptions. The editing was done after
consultations with historians who believed
there might be serious risk that the families of
some of those named as foreign agents would face
retribution in Iran.
The introduction summary and the main body
of the document are inconsistent on a few dates
and facts. In its reporting on the document, the
Times has relied upon details presented in the
main body of the text.
The table of contents provides navigation throughout
the document. Each entry is linked to the relevant
section of this file. The table of contents page
appears at the end of each chapter and appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           S E C R E T
                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                     Page
       HISTORIAN'S NOTE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    i
       SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  iii
   I.  PRELIMINARY STEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    1
  II.  DRAFTING THE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    5
 III.  CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN  . . . . . . . . .   12
  IV.  THE DECISIONS ARE MADE:  ACTIVITY BEGINS  . . . . . .   16
   V.  MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHAH  . . . . . . . . .   22
  VI.  THE FIRST TRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   39
 VII.  APPARENT FAILURE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   44
VIII.  "THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   65
  IX.  REPORT TO LONDON  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   78
   X.  WHAT WAS LEARNED IN THE OPERATION . . . . . . . . . .   85
       APPENDICES
       A  Initial Operation Plan for TPAJAX, as Cabled
          from Nicosia to Headquarters on 1 June 1953
       B  "London" Draft of the TPAJAX Operational Plan
       C  Foreign Office Memorandum of 23 July 1953 from
          British Ambassador Wakins to under Secretary
          of State Smith
       D  Report on Military Planning Aspect of TPAJAX
       E  Military Critique - Lessons Learned from TPAJAX
          re Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'Etat
                                ii
                           S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Redactions in this section could not be restored; shown by [  ].
 
                    S E C R E T
I.  PRELIMINARY STEPS
     Representatives of British Intelligence met with Near
East and Africa (NEA) Division representatives in Washing-
ton during November and December 1952 for the purpose of
discussing joint war and staybehind plans in Iran.  In
attendance for British Intelligence were Mr. Christopher
Montague Woodhouse, recently Chief of Station for British
Intelligence in Tehran; Mr. Samuel Falle of the British
Intelligence station in Tehran; and Mr. John Bruse
Lockhart, SIS Washington representative.  In attendance
for NEA Division were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of
Division, Mr. John H. Leavitt, Chief of Iran Branch;
Mr. John W. Pendleton, Deputy Chief of Division; and
Mr. James A. Darling, Chief of NEA Paramilitary Staff.
     Although it was not on the previously agreed agenda
of the meeting, British Intelligence representatives brought
up the proposition of a joint political action to remove
Prime Minister Mossadeq.  The NEA Division had not intended
to discuss this question at all and was unprepared to do so.
The meeting concluded without any decision being made and
with the NEA Division committing itself only to study in
more detail the political action proposals advanced by
British Intelligence.
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
     In March 1953 a telegram was received from the Tehran
Station which stated that General [ ] had
contacted the assistant military attache and had requested
Ambassador Henderson's views as to whether or nor the US
Government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian
military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq.  A meeting was
held in the Embassy at which Headquarters personnel, then
in the field, and station personnel were in attendance.
A cautiously worded reply was drafted at Headquarters and
its substance delivered to General [ ].  The reply
did not commit the United States in any way but was mildly
encouraging and revealed some US interest in the idea.
     On the basis of the [ ] overture and other
clear signs that determined opposition to Mossadeq was tak-
ing shape, and in view of the totally destructive and reck-
less attitude of the government of Prime Minister Mossadeq,
General Walter Bedell Smith, Undersecretary of State,
determined that the US Government could no longer approve
of the Mossadeq government and would prefer a successor
government in which there would be no National Frontists.
The change in policy was communicated to CIA, and the NEA
Division was informed that it was authorized to consider
operations which would contribute to the fall of the
Mossadeq government.  The Department of State and CIA
                         2
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
jointly informed Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of
Station, Roger Goiran, of the new policy and of the opera-
tional authorization.  The Director, on 4 April 1953,
approved a budget of $1,000,000 which could be used by
the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the
fall of Mossadeq.  Full authority was given to Ambassador
Henderson and the Chief of Station enabling any part or
all of the $1,000,000 to be used without further authority,
as long as the Ambassador and the station concurred.
     On 16 April 1953 a comprehensive study entitled:
"Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was 
completed.  The Study indicated that a Shah-General Zahedi
combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial
backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mossadeq,
particularly if this combination should be able to get the
largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable portion of
the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mossadeq's orders.
     Subsequent contact was made with General [ ].
Although his motives appeared serious, it soon became
apparent that he had no concrete plan and was in fact in
no position to take action against Mossadeq.
     General Zahedi, who at one time was a member of
Mossadeq's cabinet, stood out as the only major personality
in undisguised opposition to Mossadeq.  For this reason
                         3
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
he attacted to himself a considerable following.  The
Tehran Station, in April 1953, reestablished covert contact
with Zahedi through Commander Eric Pollard, the US Naval
Attache.  In order to make the covert liaison with Zahedi
more effective and reliable, and also for security reasons,
Zahedi's son, Ardeshir Zahedi, was selected as the means
of contact with General Zahedi in June 1953.  After 21 July
1953, contact with General Zahedi was made directly.
                          4
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Redactions in this section could not be restored, shown as [ ]; 
supposed redactions shown by [ ] are based on restored redactions
of other sections.
                    S E C R E T
II.  DRAFTING THE PLAN
     Near the end of April 1953 Dr. Donald N. Wilber, cov-
ert consultant to NEA, was selected by the Division to go
to Nicosia and, in close collaboration with SIS, draw up
a plan for the overthrow of Mossadeq.  The assumption by
Headquarters was that the planners would come up with a
project which they could conscientiously recommend.
     The discussions were begun at Nicosia on 13 May 1953
between Wilber and SIS Officer Norman Matthew Darbyshire.
Occasionally Mr. H. John Collins, Chief of SIS station at
Nicosia, was also present.  Mr. Darbyshire, who was in
charge of SIS's Iran branch, had been in Iran for several
years and was fluent in the language.  Discussions were
concluded on 30 May 1953, and the completed draft of a
recommended operational plan was cabled by Dr. Wilber to
Headquarters on 1 June.
     The opening meetins consisted of a review of all
the important personalities on the political scene in
Iran with a view toward determining whether General Zahedi,
the most prominent politician in opposition to Mossadeq,
was in fact the sole figure worthy of support and, if so,
what individuals and elements should be enlisted in his
support.  It soon became apparent that Dr. Wilber and
                         5
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
Mr. Darbyshire held quite similar views of Iranian person-
alities and had made very similar estimates of the factors
involved in the Iranian political scene.  There was no
friction or marked difference of opinion during the dis-
cussions.  It alsop quickely became apparent that the SIS
was perfectly content to follow whatever lead was taken
by the Agency.  It seemed obvious to Wilber that the Brit-
ish were very pleased at having obtained the active coop-
eration of the Agency and were determined to do nothing
which might jeopardize US participation.  At the same time
there was a faint note of envy expressed over the fact that
the Agency was better equipped in the way of funds, person-
nel, and facilities than was SIS.
     Wilber reported the preliminary conversations concern-
ing a three-way channel, set up for this occasion, which
was designed to insure immediate relay between Washington,
Nicosia, and Tehran.  That is, a message originating at any
one of these places would be sent by the most expeditious
route to the other two.  This route was the Middle East
Communications Authority (MECA) link, the relay station
a few miles outside of Nicosia.*
_____________________
*Unfortunately, communications between Nicosia and
 Tehran were not as rapid as was hoped during this
 period in which more than 45 cables were exchanged.
                         6
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
     Discussions at Nicosia moved on to a disclosure of
assets by both parties.  Those by SIS were centered upon
the contacts of the Rashidian brothers in such fields as
the armed forces, the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), reli-
gious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and
other influential figures.  When this material was relayed
from Nicosia, the Tehran Station commented that it was
their belief that these assets had been far overstated
and oversold.  In reply it was pointed out that SIS was
as aware as we of the weaknesses of the Rashidians, but
that one of the strongest points in their favor was their
avowed willingness to risk their possessions and their
lives in an attempt against Mossadeq.  In the critical
days of August 1953 the Rashidians did display such a
willingness.  SIS disclosures were followed by those of
Dr. Wilber for CIA.  Prior to Wilber's departure a dis-
cussion was held at Headquarters to determine which of the
station assets should be disclosed to the SIS in return for
promised disclosures by the SIS of the assets which they
were prepared to put into an operational plan.  It was
agreed at Headquarters that the identities of the vitally
important principal agents of the Tehran Station, [Djalili]
[and Keyvani]
[ ] would not be disclosed.  Since the SIS had been
                         7
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
informed during the November 1952 meetings referred to
above that CIA had two major principal agents in Iran, it
was necessary to offer two such in place of [Djalili and]
[Keyvani].  This was done, naming a station agent and a
sub-agent** of [ ] to these important posts.
To the best of our knowledge [Djalili and Keyvani] were not
uncovered by the Rashidian brothers or any other SIS agents
during the course of this operation.
     The continuing conversations at Nicosia were reflected
by outgoing cables requesting, principally from the Tehran
Station, information which would be helpful in drafting the
operational plan.
     Discussions now narrowed down to a series of basic
assumptions which were stressed both in the draft plan and
in its final form.  It was determined that the details of
the operational plan should be included within a framework
of such basic assumptions as these:  that Zahedi alone of
potential candidates had the vigor and courage to make him
worthy of support; that the Shah must be brought into the
operation; that the Shah would act only with great reluc-
tance but that he could be forced to do so; that if the
______________________
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
                         8
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
issue was clear-cut the armed forces would follow the
Shah rather than Mossadeq; that the operation must, if
possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-legal instead
of an outright coup; that public opinion must be fanned
to fever pitch against Mossadeq in the period just preceding
the execution of the overthrow operation; that the military
aspect would be successful only if the station were able
to review the plan with the Iranians chosen by Zahedi to
execute it; that immediate precautions must be taken by
the new government to meet a strong reaction by the Tudeh
Party.  Some of these assumptions were presented in cables
sent off before the draft plan was completed.  The reactions
from the Tehran Station and Headquarters did not always
express agreement with the ideas of the planners.  The
station expressed its feeling that the Shah would not act
decisively against Mossadeq, while Headquarters wondered
whether we should not support some other individual and
whether the Persians themselves might not take the lead in
action designed to overthrow Mossadeq.  It was, however,
agreed that the station should begin at once with its new
policy of attacking the government of Mossadeq through grey
propaganda.  The station relayed this line to its own agents
and passed it on to the Rashidian brothers of SIS.  The CIA
Art Group, a section of the PP Staff Advisory Panel, was
                         9
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
asked to prepare a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq
cartoons.
     The meetings were interrupted for several days when
one of the Rashidian brothers managed to get permission to
leave Iran*--not at all an easy matter during the Mossadeq
period--and went to Geneva where he was met by SIS Officer
Norman Darbyshire.  He not only briefed Darbyshire on the
current situation but was able to give comprehensive answers
to a number of specific questions.  It should be noted that
the SIS station at Nicosia had been in tri-weekly wireless
contact with the Rashidian brothers at Tehran, employing
the best of the Britishtrained staybehind operators.  This
contact, in Persian, was naturally limited in time, and
even more limited after we passed word to Darbyshire on his
return from Geneva that the Iranian armed forces were now
in possession of directional finders supplied under MAAG.
     Mr. George A. Carroll (FI Deputy Tehran, Designate)
arrived at Nicosia on 29 May, in time to pass along reactions
____________________
*It is interesting to note that Rashidian obtained his
 exit visa to leave Iran and his reentry permit from
 no less a supporter of Mossadeq than Foreign Minister
 Hoseyn Fatemi.  This lends some evidence to long held
 CIA views that Fatemi was from time to time susceptible
 to British overtures and was trying to keep a hand in
 with the opposition and British in the event Mossadeq
 fell.  He was certainly aware of Rashidian's agent
 status with the British.
                        10
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                    S E C R E T
and suggestions from Headquarters, prior to the completion of
the draft plan.  As stated, this draft was cabled to Head-
wuarters on 1 June 1953.  (See Appendix A for a typed
transcript of the cable.)
     While Nicosia proved to be a hand point of contact with
the British and a fairly good communications intersection
point, it did have certain disadvantages.  It was remote
from the headquarters of either agency, and, even worse, the
SIS station files were extremely inadequate so that any in-
formation on personalities, especially members of the Iranian
armed forces, had to be obtained by querying the Tehran
Station and Headquarters.
     Once the draft paln had been cabled, it was agreed with
SIS that their copy would be hand-carried to London where
the viewpoint of the SIS headquarters would be incorporated
prior to 15 June.  In the meantime, as had been agreed with
Headquarteers, the Agency would conduct a searching scrutiny
of the plan at Beirut, and then bring these results to Lon-
don for amalgamation with the draft as reworked by SIS at
London.  Carroll remained a few days after the completion of
the draft to begin work on the military aspect of the plan.
He also returned to Nicosia for a few additional days after
the close of the Beirut meetings for this purpose.  It must
be noted that Miss Helen E. Morgan, CIA representative at
Nicosia, gave strong support to the CIA personnel who worked
at Nicosia.
                        11
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were no redactions in this section.
 
                    S E C R E T
III.  CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN
      On the afternoon of 9 June all those who were to take
part in the discussions arrived in Beirut:  Mr. Kermit
Roosevelt, Chief NEA and project chief throughout the
operation, came in by plane from London; Carroll came
from Cyprus by plane; Roger Goiran, Chief of Station at
Tehran, drove on from Damascus by car; and Wilber came in
from Cairo by air.
     On the morning of 10 June the talks got underway and
continued for four days.  The usual schedule was to start
quite early, carry through until about two o'clock, and
then assemble again in the late afternoon.  The first order
of business was a reexamination of all the factors and ele-
ments of the political scene in Iran in the light of the
current and comprehensive information supplied by the
Tehran chief of station.  After all the basic principles
of the draft paln had been accepted, the attention of the
conferees turned to a section by section consideration of
the plan.  The object of the meetings was to determine how
each section could be given the maximum structure and im-
pact.  One switch in general outlook was made that was most
salutary for all later thinking.  The draft plan had implied
that definite counteraction would have to be taken against
some of the strongest elements supporting Mossadeq, such as
                        12
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
the Qashqai tribal leaders; but it was now decided that
every effort should be devoted to increasing the size and
effectiveness of the anti-Mossadeq forces, the assumption
being that Mossadeq's supporting elements would not react
once their leader was out of the picture.
     The Tehran chief of station suggested that an alter-
native plan to provide for the overthrow of Mossadeq be
developed.  This was to become the Amini/Qashqai plan
which the station kept alive as a possible alternative
until the successful conclusion of TPAJAX.
     Saturday afternoon the group held its final meeting
and on the next morning, 14 June, departed by plane for
its several destinations.
     Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London on 15 June and
reported to the main offices of the SIS at 54 Broadway.
They turned over the Beirut revision of the plan.  No copy
of the original Beirut draft exists, since it was reworked
to form the final "London" draft.
     The London meetings were held in one of the conference
rooms at 54 Broadway, notable only for a large sign with
the legend in red, "Curb Your Guests."  For the SIS,
Commander Maurice M. Firth and Norman Darbyshire, who had
come on from Nicosia by way of Geneva (where he had seen
Asadollah Rashidian a second time before the latter went
                        13
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
back to Iran) were always present. Upon occasion Major
P.(Paddy) J. Keen, whose post seemed to be that of desk
officer for several Middle East countries, also participated.
Montague Woodhouse, clearly one of their most highly esteemed
officers, attended a single meeting but had little to con-
tribute.
     From the moment the discussion began, it was clear that
the SIS had no major comments of their own on the draft plan.
Nor did they have much to say on the Beirut version beyond a
certain close attention to phraseology.  As at Nicosia it was
apparent that the Americans were to be placated and allowed
to run things as they pleased.  They did, however, seem to
have abundant confidence in the plan and in the successful
outcome of the operation, and said that the Rashidians would
be ordered to follow completely the orders of CIA's Tehran
Station.
     At the final meeting those present reviewed the future
conduct of affairs.  The SIS officers stated that they
thought it would take some time to obtain a firm decision
from their government as to the approval or non-approval
of the plan.
     Roosevelt and Wilber left London on 17 June, and
Roosevelt was back in his office by noon of the 18th.
                        14
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
There the plan was immediately reconstructed and typed
up.  (It is given as Appendix B and it should be read
at this point in the chronological account of the 
operation.)
                        15
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were no redactions in this section.
 
                    S E C R E T
IV.  THE DECISIONS ARE MADE:  ACTIVITY BEGINS
     Since the meetings at Beirut and London had taken
such a relatively short time, there was not too much that
Headquarters could do in the interval from the time of
Roosevelt's departure until his return.  Progress had,
however, been made in setting up a specific and close
liaison with the State Department.  The fact that an oper-
ational plan was being prepared was already known to a very
restricted number of individuals in the State Department,*
and it should be noted that the security there seems to
have been excellent up to the time of the event.
     The Greece-Turkey-Iran (GTI) office of the Department
of State presented its informed opinion in two papers:  one
was a top secret paper of 6 June 1953 entitled, "Proposal
to Bring about a Change of Government in Iran" and the
other a top secret undated GTI memorandum on the subject,
"Measues which the United States Government might take
in support of a successor government to Mossadeq."
_______________________
*
 Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
 Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith
 Deputy Under Secretary of State, Harrison Freeman Matthews
 Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, Mr. Henry A. Byroade
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, mr. John Durnford
     Jernagan
 Liaison, Mr. James Lampton Berry
                        16
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
     It was not the task of officers of the State Department
to obtain high level decisions on the plan.  However, the
State Department did assert that, prior to acceptance of
the plan, assurance must be forthcoming from the British
that they would be flexible in their approach to the govern-
ment that succeeded Mossadeq as far as the oil question was
concerned.
     Mr. Leslie Herbert Mitchell, UK Embassy officer (SIS
representative) charged with liaison with the Agency, con-
cerned himself with this point and did expedite the required
assurances from the British Government.  These assurances
took the form of a foreign office memorandum presented by
British Ambassador to the United Staes, Roger Mellor Makins,
to Under Secretary of State Smith on 23 July 1953.  (Copy
attached as Appendix C.)  Also the Department of State wanted
to satisfy itself that an adequate amount of interim economic
aid would be forthcoming to the successor government before
it would finally approve decisive action.
     During this same period discussions between Agency
officers and Ambassador Henderson (in Washington, having
arrived on consultation 3 June) began 8 June.  (This is
recorded in a memorandum of conversation contained in
TPAJAX files.)  The Ambassador appeared to backtrack some-
what from his earlier opinion that the premise of the plan
                        17
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
that the Shah would cooperate was fallacious, and that
the Shah would not issue a firman naming Zahedi unless
in response to a vote of inclination by the Majlis.  The
Ambassador, who was always thoroughly cooperative, was
absorbed in a search for constructive suggestions and
willingly agreed to delay his return to Tehran by arrang-
ing a prolonged visit in Europe.  From the standpoint of
the plan it was not considered advisable to have the
Ambassador in Tehran when the final operation was under-
taken.  In addition, his continued absence was thought to
be an importan factor in the war of nerves which was to
be conducted against Mossadeq.
     The following approvals of the operational plan were
obtained on the dates indicated:
          Director CIA             - 11 July 1953
          Director SIS             -  1 July 1953
          Foreign Secretary        -  1 July 1953
          Secretary of State       - 11 July 1953
          Prime Minister           -  1 July 1953
          President                - 11 July 1953
     Pending final approval or disapproval of the opera-
tional plan, the station was carrying forward activities
already authroized toward the achievement of the goal.
In addition to the general authorization of April enabling
the Tehran Station to spend up to $1,000,000 in covert
activity in support of Zahedi, the station on 20 May was
                        18
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
specifically authorized to spend one million rials a week
(rate of 90 rials to the US dollar) in purchasing the
cooperation of members of the Iranian Majlis.
     On or about the end of June the station had established
direct contact with the Rashidian brothers and was prepared
to instruct them as their role and those of their con-
tacts in the development of the operation.
     At Headquarters two groups were organized within the
NE/4 Branch on 22 June in support of Tehran Station opera-
tional preparations.  One group, headed by Carroll who had
returned from Nicosia in mid-June, was to make an exhaustive
study of the military aspects of the overthrow operation.
(Carrol's final report on the military aspect of TPAJAX
planning is attached as Appendix D.)  The intent was to
present Zahedi and his chosen military secretariat with a
concrete plan for their modification or improvement.  It
was felt that every effort should be made to bring the
rather long-winded and often illogical Persians into a
position where each one knew exactly what specific action
was required of him.  The soundness of this feeling was
demonstrated when the failure of the Persians to maintain
security resulted in the initial breakdown.  The other
group, headed by Wilber, assumed responsibility for the
psychological warfare phases of the plan.  Overall direction
                        19
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
of these groups and of relations with the field station
were in the hands of Mr. John Henry Waller, head of NE/4
Branch.
     Carroll left for Tehran in mid-July.  He stopped over
at London to discuss his military plan with SIS Officer
Norman Darbyshire and finally reached Tehran on 21 July.
Wilber's group sent guidance cables and dispatches to the
station, all intended to flesh up the skeleton of psycho-
logical operations as presented in the plan itself.  In
the meantime a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq articles
were written or outlined by the group while the CIA Art
Group was given constant guidance in its preparation of a
large number of anti-Mossadeq cartoons and broadsheets.  In
addition, these artists did an effective drawing for a wall
poster showing Zahedi being presented to the Iranian people
by the Shah.  Written and illustrative material piled up
rapidly, and on 19 July a special courier took it all to
Tehran.  On 22 July the station began to distribute the
material to several agents.  What happened to this mate-
rial will be described in later pages.
     By the time that the go-ahead had been received from
all parties involved, the NEA Division had picked out
qualified individuals for special assignments connected
with the project:  Mr. Roosevelt, Chief, NEA, was to be
                        20
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
field commander in Tehran; John H. Leavitt, NEA/CPP, was
to go to Nicosia to be in contact and liaison with the SIS
station and to maintain the three-way wireless contact estab-
lished earlier; while Colonel Stephen Johnson Meads drew
the job of representing the Agency in meetings in Paris with
Princess Ashraf, energetic twin sister of the Shah.  Mr.
Joseph C. Goodwin, Chief of Station in Tehran, was to act
for purposes of TPAJAX as chief of staff to the field com-
mander, Mr. Roosevelt.  Mr. George Carroll, Chief FI Tehran,
was given the military planning responsibility first in
Washington, then in Tehran.  Dr. Donald Wilber was charged
throughout the operation with the propaganda aspects of the
plan and worked closely with the CIA Art Group in the prepa-
ration of propaganda material.  Mr. John Waller, just having
returned from service as Chief FI, Tehran, was charged with
the Headquarters support responsibilities during TPAJAX and
maintained the required liaison with the Departments of
State and Defense.  Although not present in Tehran for the
final implementation of TPAJAX, Mr. Roger Goiran, previous
Chief of Station Tehran, directed the early stages and
preliminaries of the operation in Tehran.  It should be here
noted that Mr. Goiran, more than any other officer, was
responsible for having developed, over a five-year period,
station assets which proved valuable and necessary to the
operation.
                        21
                    S E C R E T
continua 


 iraniano
Ma se non sapete di cosa parlate perchč non state zitti?
E' incredibile come non perdiate occasioni per fare figure di
merda.
Che fai, passi ogni tanto per scrivere cazzate?
Reza Pahlevi eletto democraticamente ?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?
Quello di Reza Pahlevi un "governo democratico moderato
e liberista eletto a maggioranza dal popolo" ?!?!?!?!?!
Lo shah si insediň nel 1953 grazie a un colpo di stato
organizzato e appoggiato dalla CIA (e questo č storia,
visto che i documenti di quegli anni sono stati de-
segretati).
Il governo abbattuto fu quello di Mossadeq, leader del
partito nazionalista (il Fronte Nazionale, un partito
di DESTRA) lui sě eletto democraticamente, ma reo di
aver nazionalizzato le compagnie petrolifere.
Lo shah e mise fuori legge tutti i partiti (ad eccezione
del proprio). Governň per piů di un ventennio come
monarca assoluto e la sua polizia politica, "istruita"
dal Schwartzcop Senior, fece piazza pulita di qualunque
ipotesi di opposizione democratica.
Il suo regime fu abbattuto dalla "Rivoluzione Islamica" di
Kohmeini e - pare incredibile solo perchč non se ne parla -
l'attuale costituzione dell'Iran č stata votata a maggioranza
dal popolo iraniano.

 sperando che tu non sia un utente cretino come peppe brescia
E' peggio.
E' uno che parla di "300.000 morti" nel triangolo
rosso (davvero!) e cita Pisanň come fonte...

altro, ma a dimostrazione che le elezioni non implicano democrazia ...
Teheran per colpa di reagan s'è baccata una guerra e una milionata d
morti: certo non possono avere lka stessa opinione di reagn che ha
Bush!
Dare le armi chimiche a Saddam affinchè ammazzasse gli iraniani è o no
un crimine di guerra?
€
Mai, nessun Stato moderno, ha ricevuto un affronto tanto grave quanto è stata l'esclusione
dell'Italia dalle celebzioni del D-Day. Paghiamo la colpa grave di avere eletto un delinquente,
un corruttore piduista di magistrati, un ladrone craxiano emerso dai soldi sporchi d sangue
di Cosa Nostra.

 altro, ma a dimostrazione che le elezioni non implicano democrazia ...
mi sa che DonJuan e' della sQuola di Stefano De Cesari...
Aspetto ancora un suo commento sul post che ho mandato sull'Iran.
ciao
s.
