Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia
Titolo: OLTRE IL MITO DI STALINGRADO

 migliaia di uomini, fucilandoli sul posto se arretravano o si arrendevano.
ecco che il vice-artamano si lancia in deliri : ma tu hai idea dei
sistemi usati dall'esercito a te tanto caro (quello nazista,
ovviamente) ? No?
Allora informati : Hitler's Army di Omer Bartov. C'e un intero
capitolo sulla disciplina nella Wehrmacht. E dati con fonti, non le
chiacchiere come quelle che riportate tu e il tuo artamanuzzo
(CUT Del rest)
 
Il kameraden di artamano troppo preso nei suoi deliri estivi non deve
mai aver letto ad esempio il libro di Glantz sulla battaglia di Kursk
"(The Battle of Kursk (Modern War Studies)"
Giusto un parere di un lettore (che e' stato anche utente di questo
ng), L. Signorelli :
David Glantz writing the definitive assessment of the Battle for
Kursk? Sounded like a dream come true. After all, colonel Glantz is
the leading authority (along with the now much less active John
Erickson) on the Eastern Front topic. After all, he wrote such amazing
in-depth analysis on several EF campaign (from a much needed Soviet
perspective) like "From Don To Donets" or "When Titans Clashed" - this
one probably the best one-volume general history of the Russia's war.
After all, Glantz did a wonderful job on demolishing (hard numbers at
hand) a lot of Cold War fabricated myths on how good (and unlucky)
were Nazi Generals, and how dumb (and lucky and faceless) where the
Soviets. So, when "The Battle of Kursk" landed in my hands, I felt a
comprehensible shiver of anticipation. The first thing I must say
consider is that - probably following many complaints for the very dry
style (someone called it a "syntactical slog") of his previous work -
col. Glantz finally decided to team with someone providing him with a
much needed editing work. Not to say that Mr. House's collaboration
solved all the problems: we're treated here and there with repetitions
and convoluted passages, and, yes, the style is still a bit on the dry
side. For instance, nearly every quote from a primary source
describing the actual firefight is preceded by the same "A quote for a
(German/Soviet) account vividly depict the intensity of the battle",
or a variation of the same. And the maps - ok, a bit more time spent
on polishing and editing them would have helped immensely. But these
are really minor issues. As far as the content goes, "The Battle Of
Kursk" is (nearly) the definitive thing. Glantz manages to put order
in the former chaos, and gives us a perspective that, if not new as
the dust jacket's notes would make us believe, is possibily the
current state-of-art on the subject. Ten years ago, the battle for the
Kursk salient (fought between July 5th and 16th 1943) was, thank to
the then mandatory uncritical reading of German literature on the
subject and a complete disregard for Soviet sources, alternatively
known as a footnote at the Stalingrad campaign, as the last
significant German offensive effort in the East, as the largest tank
battle ever fought, as another evidence of Hitler's strategical
ineptitude, the demonstration that if Germany's military brains had
free hands they could have won., an Herculean effort almost doomed
from the beginning by Soviet espionage, bad timing and many other
things. So, Kursk became another lost opportunity for the ubermenshen
to revert the Stalingrad disaster and win the war. Also, the whole
battle ended up focused on the Prokorovkha maelstrom, giving to that
single episode a bigger importance of what was in reality. Not really
a battle, but rather a confused collation of events that historians
seemed uneasy to define as the turning point of WWII or just another
"big" battle.. "The Battle Of Kursk" convincingly demonstrates that
Kursk was a Soviet victory AND a German defeat - because Soviet
strategy was more sound (even if their execution of the same was often
flawed) and German strategy was wrong - based on a very rigid
framework of incorrect assumptions, and leading to some big
operational mistakes. It shows also that, if the southern portion of
the German assault pushed deep in the Soviet defensive belt, its
management was faulty at least, especially after the crucial 10th July
decision to shift the axis of the attack from North (towards Oboyan)
to NE (towards Prokorovkha), a huge mistake that was NOT a pre-planned
move (as German memoirs made us believe in the past), but the result
of an incorrect assessment of Soviet forces position and conditions.
Also, it somehow manages to de-emphasizes the importance of
Prokorovkha itself: if the 12th July battle was indecisive (Soviet
Guards 5th Tank Army failed its mission to destroy the II SS Pzkrp,
but made any further German dream of "operational freedom"
unrealistic), continuous combat on the 13th, 14th and 15th show us
that Manstein was 1) overestimating the real effect the 12th July
battle had on the Soviets and 2) continuing operations in spite of
Hitler (correct) belief that Citadel had failed. So - here goes the
big deal - Hitler DIDN'T called off Citadel prematurely against
Manstein's will (another much discussed myth), but the 16th July ends
of the southern offensive was inevitable, facing mounting losses,
Soviet pressure on the flanks and Soviet operations in the north. Just
a couple of days more, and 4th Pz Army would have been crushed beyond
recovery. The bottom line is that German generals lost Kursk most in
their own - and not because of Hitler's meddling. It must be said
that, beyond this, Glantz simply confirm what was known in the past by
anyone serious in the subject, and there's no shocking revelation
based on some untapped primary source. Even the "numbers" issue it's a
bit of an anticlimax: Glantz chooses a conservative approach taking
for granted archival numbers for both sides. But, if we're now
confident about Soviet initial numbers and losses, the same cannot be
said for the Germany's, especially as far as the SS corps is
concerned. In my humble opinion, the numbers here should be
drastically increased, but, as they said, who am I to contradict
colonel Glantz? Also, a bit more courage underlining German troubles
at the command level would have been welcome..
 
Sergio


Credo non morirà mai il mito dell'"intelligenza" della Wehrmacht in
confronto alla "stupidità" dell'Armata Rossa.
Come se fosse possibile ad una massa di incompetenti anche soltanto
coordinare una massa tale di uomini e mezzi.
Per non parlare della incontrovertibile adeguatezza dele manovre operative
sovietiche, Operazione Uranus, Piccolo Saturno, Bagration ecc. ecc.
Credo cmq che questo non sia altro che l'ennesimo tentativo di scatenare una
flame-war.
H.N.