Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia
Titolo: [CON] 4. Pipes e le interpretazioni creative su Lenin

CONTINUA DA :  [CON] 3. Pipes e le interpretazioni creative su Lenin
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Quella appena letta e' quindi una recensione che mostra come Pipes con le
sue manipolazioni sia davvero poco attendibile come storico...
Sullo stesso libro, e arrivando praticamente alle stesse conclusioni sulla
scarsa onesta' intellettuale di Pipes alla luce delle sue mistificazioni,
e' possibile leggere la seguente recensione di Henry Reichman che rispetto
alla precedente di Seigel segnala, oltre a quanto abbiamo gia' letto,
anche altre “perle” ad esempio come quella sull'accettazione dello sbarco
alleato a Murmansk da parte di Lenin o sulla politica estera sovietica
sulla Conferenza di Genova del 1922, o di una improbabile cercata alleanza
di Lenin con i nazisti arrivando, in piena paranoia anti-Lenin -  ad
addebitargli perfino quanto avvenne dal 1939 in poi eccetera eccetera. 
Quindi anche la lettura della seguente recensione e' sempre istruttiva
sulla totale parzialita' dello “storico” mr.Pipes, produttore di libri e
articoli in quantita’ industriale come ci ricordava sloamm ;)
==========================================================================
Richard Pipes´ one-sided example of how not to read documents
H-NET BOOK REVIEW, Published by 
H-Ru...@msu.edu
 (November 1997)
Reviewed by Henry Reichman
Richard Pipes, ed. The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996. xx + 204 pp. Series:
Annals of Communism. Appendix, notes, and index. (cloth), ISBN
0-300-06919-7.
The Unknown Lenin might better better be titled "the well-known Richard
Pipes." The book contains 113 previously unpublished documents
attributed to Lenin, mostly brief memoranda and telegrams, or on which
the Soviet leader penned marginal jottings, or, in a few cases (e.g.,
Lenin's 1886 Patent of Nobility), simply materials, largely ephemeral,
concerning Lenin. Nine additional documents, mostly telegrams to Lenin
by other Bolsheviks, are included in an appendix. Only a handful of the
materials, encompassing altogether perhaps thirty or thirty-five pages
of the text, can reasonably be considered substantive.
In a significant number of items Lenin's only contributions are often
cryptic marginalia, sometimes simply the notation "into the archive." A
few documents are merely trivial, including an order for medications
from the Kremlin pharmacy. With the major exception of one important
and revealing text of a speech on the 1920 Polish war, virtually the
entire substance of the book lies in editor Richard Pipes's tendentious
introduction and interpretive commentary and notes, which imply if not
argue that these newly released materials must alter previously
indulgent (if not favorable) views of Lenin. Since Pipes has spent
nearly half a century berating the Soviet founder as the evil genius of
our century, the book is hardly a surprise.
It is hard to imagine that much documentary material by or about Lenin
had not already been published by his Soviet successors, if not in the
five editions of his Collected Works, the last of which numbered 55
volumes and included more than 3,000 publications and documents, then
in the long run of Leninskii Sbornik, a pedantic and largely
inconsequential journal of Leniniana. Nonetheless, some Lenin materials
(although apparently no true "works") were withheld from publication
because either in tone or substance they tended to show the founding
Communist in a harsh light or, apparently, because they were deemed
too revealing of foreign policy formation. Whether these brief
materials, which in English translation here cover in toto just
slightly more than half the book's 204 pages, are adequate to prompt
even a minor reassessment is, at the least, problematic.
Pipes acknowledges that "it would be naive, of course, to expect [these
documents] to alter in some fundamental way our perception of Lenin's
personality or his politics." However, they do, he continues, "cast
fresh light on Lenin's motives, attitudes, and expectations" (6). Pipes
claims that these materials reveal Lenin to be "a heartless cynic, who
in many ways provided a model for Stalin" (1), and "a thoroughgoing
misanthrope" (11) with a "policeman's mentality" (12), who "for
humankind at large . . . had nothing but scorn" (10).
Taken as a whole, the documents show no such thing. The brutal rhetoric
found here, especially in some Civil War-era telegrams, certainly
reconfirms Lenin's ruthlessness, but this has hardly been hidden, even
by Soviet censors. Even when read in isolation the documents do not
prove, nor sometimes simply suggest, all that Pipes implies they do. A
few cases of inflated and bloodthirsty rhetoric in the midst of an
extraordinarily brutal civil war, some anti-clerical rantings by a
professed and passionate atheist, and pompous self-deluding
declarations of faith in world revolution do not prove that Lenin
pursued violence for its own sake, sought to annihilate believers, or,
in Pipes's most outrageous charge, plotted "the invasion of Germany and
England" (7).
Taken out of the context of Lenin's enormous ouevre and divorced from
his life and work, these materials do little more than provide
additional illustrations (and by no means the most interesting or
revealing ones) of the Soviet founder's distinctive and remarkable
combination of stubborn dogmatism with tactical flexibility verging on
opportunism, cemented, to be sure, by a certain cold-blooded
utilitarian idealism. Pipes, it seems, confronts these hitherto
secret materials like a Vichy policeman who finds gambling at Rick's
Place. He is "shocked!"
Here and there, of course, the documents do add to our knowledge of
Lenin's career and early Soviet history. Two documents suggest that
Allied landings in Murmansk in early 1918, which began over foreign
military involvement in the Russian Civil War, were approved by Lenin
and Stalin. That the Bolsheviks received German money even after 1917
is apparently confirmed in a note from August 1918: "The Berliners will
send some more money: if the scum delay, complain to me formally" (53).
Several documents shed additional light on Soviet intentions and plans
for the 1922 Genoa Conference, although it is by no means clear that
these show how "Lenin deliberately set himself to `wreck' Genoa even
before the conference had even convened" (6), as Pipes overconfidently
declares.
Additional materials add support to interpretations already held by most
historians on the basis of other, and often better, evidence. Transfer
of the legacy of the Bolshevik sympathizer N. P. Shmit through the
false marriages of his sisters to Bolshevik activists, which stirred a
ruckus with the Mensheviks and in the International, is documented,
although nothing new is added to our knowledge of this affair. Lenin's
intimate relationship with Inessa Armand is hinted at in four letters
from 1914 and four others from late 1916 and 1917.
His peculiar tolerance of the tsarist agent and Bolshevik Duma deputy
Roman Malinovsky is shown to have continued well into 1917.
Several notes, letters and telegrams to other Bolshevik leaders suggest
that Lenin did not hold many of his comrades in the highest regard,
although these are far from indicating even signals of the kind of
paranoiac megalomania associated with the behavior toward subordinates
of Stalin and Mao in their later years. Indeed, one genuinely
interesting revelation is how much Lenin concerned himself with the
health of his fellow revolutionaries, often ordering scrupulous
obedience to doctors' orders as well as rest stays in dachas and
spas. Other documents suggest that, as most historians have already
come to see, Stalin played a greater role and was closer politically to
Lenin than early historians and most contemporaries acknowledged.
Pipes's commentary occasionally misinterprets or often unjustifiably
infers too much from specific documents. Lenin begins a letter to
Armand in July 1914: "Best greetings for the commencing revolution in
Russia." According to Pipes, this "reveals that Lenin saw the outbreak
of the First World War as inevitably leading to a revolution in Russia"
(27).
Perhaps. It is equally if not more likely, however, that Lenin's
confidence stemmed from that month's general strike and street fighting
in St. Petersburg and accompanying Bolshevik gains in the trade union
movement, if it was not simply a formal declaration of standard
revolutionary optimism. Pipes produces a four-page memorandum by
Trotsky from October 1919 criticizing a Central Committee decision on
military operations against the White general Denikin.
Lenin's sole contribution to this document, one of the longer ones in
the book, is a brief appendage: "Received 1 October. Lenin: (nothing
but bad nerves; [the issue] was not raised at the plenum; it is strange
to raise it now."(73)
From this notation alone Pipes somehow concludes that "Lenin's cavalier
dismissal of his advice indicates that he did not hold Trotsky's
military abilities in high esteem" (70), a possibility, to be sure, but
certainly a highly exaggerated and unjustified inference from such
spare evidence.
And then there is the letter to foreign commissar Chicherin of August
1921 in which Lenin urges collaboration with "those Germans who want to
overturn the Versailles peace" (132). Here is Pipes's interpretation:
"The letter makes explicit Soviet Russia's policy of secretly
collaborating with those elements in Germany which wanted to `overturn
the Versailles treaty,' that is, the Nazis and other nationalists"
(131).
The document, of course, makes no mention at all of the Nazis, who were
then an infant sect probably unknown to Soviet diplomats, much less to
Lenin. Indeed, no mention is made of any extragovernmental nationalist
grouping, including not only the Nazis but the then far more numerous
and influential Freikorps. What is articulated here is an example of
Lenin's well-known strategy, given full implementation at Rapallo in
1922, of playing the imperialist blocs against each other. Elsewhere
Pipes writes that "the Soviet strategy of destroying the Versailles
treaty by forming an alliance with right-wing German elements . . . was
consummated two decades later in the Hitler-Stalin pact" (95). This
crude attempt to lay responsibility for 1939 on Lenin would be
laughable if it were not such a clear example of biased scholarship.
Perhaps the most egregious example of how Pipes reads into documents
conclusions that they do not necessarily support, is his contention
that Lenin denied requests to intervene against anti-Semitic pogroms
perpetrated by the Red Army on its retreat from Poland. On October 1,
1920, the Jewish Section,(Evsektsiia) of the Central Committee reported
such attacks by units of the First Cavalry Army.
The report, included by Pipes (116-17), was forwarded to the Central
Committee eighteen days later and to Lenin in mid-November. Lenin's only
contribution to this document was to scrawl on it "into the archive,"
which Pipes construes to mean "that no action was to be taken" (10).
One wonders, however, what action Lenin could have taken six weeks
after the fact. Moreover, the significance of the notation "into the
archive" is hardly clear. Indeed, elsewhere Pipes reproduces a note
from Trotsky with Lenin's "into the archive" annotation (136) as
evidence of action that WAS taken by Lenin.
There are several other examples as well of documents marked "into the
archive" by Lenin which Pipes uses to illustrate how Lenin concerned
himself with the issues they addressed. [Lenin's November 1919 draft
theses concerning policy in the Ukraine, however, are another matter.
Here Lenin proposes to "treat the Jews and urban inhabitants in the
Ukraine with an iron rod, transferring them to the front, not letting
them into government agencies. . ." (77). This certainly evidences at
least a pandering to the presumed anti-Semitism of the Ukraininian
masses, although not necessarily blatant anti-Semitism of Lenin's own.]
One document in the collection surely does highlight the calculating
brutality that emerged in Lenin, especially in the wake of the Civil
War. In a March 1922 letter to Molotov on policy toward the church,
Lenin writes:
"It is precisely now and only now, when in the starving regions people
are eating human flesh, and hundreds if not thousands of corpses are
littering the roads, that we can (and therefore must) carry out the
confiscation of church valuables with the most savage and merciless
energy, not stoping [short of] crushing any resistance.
It is precisely now and only now that the enorous majority of the
peasant mass will be for us or at any rate will not be in a condition
to support in any decisive way that handful of Black Hundred clergy and
reactionary urban petty bourgeoisie who can and want to attempt a
policy of violent resistance to the Soviet clergy.
We must, come what may, carry out the confiscation of church valuables
in the most decisive and rapid manner, so as to secure for ourselves a
fund of several hundred million gold rubles (one must recall the
gigantic wealth of some of the monasteries and abbeys). Without this
fund, no government work in general, no economic construction in
particular, and no defense of our position in Genoa especially is even
conceivable. . . .. All considerations indicate that later we will be
unable to do this, because no other moment except that of desperate
hunger will give us a mood among the broad peasant masses that will
guarantee us the sympathy of these masses or at least their
neutrality." (152-53)
This document, with its chilling rhetoric, is not new, however. As Pipes
acknowledges, it was smuggled out of the Central Party Archive in the
late 1960s and published in 1970 in Paris. Its republication in the
official Izvestiia TsK in 1990, however, dispelled skepticism about its
authenticity.
More important, it cannot stand on its own as evidence of Bolshevik
policy toward the church or even of Lenin's own views. These were much
more complex than this collection or Pipes's explanatory material will
admit. Moreover, it certainly cannot be said to evidence a POLICY of
callous disregard for famine victims, since it is contemporaneous with
Soviet efforts to involve both Russians and foreigners in relief
efforts.
Surely the most useful materials concern the 1920 war with Poland,
although Pipes's contention that some documents indicate that the
Soviets planned an invasion even before they were attacked by
Pilsudski's forces cannot be supported by the extremely thin and murky
references offered as evidence. In particular, the stenographic record
of a speech delivered by Lenin to the Ninth Conference of the Communist
Party in September 1920, which as the longest document in the
collection occupies twenty pages, is of special interest.
It provides crucial insights into Soviet foreign policy and the
attitudes toward world revolution of the Bolshevik leadership; both
diplomatic historians and students of Leninism will find it
indispensable. Again, however, Pipes draws unfounded and extreme
conclusions.
To be sure, several documents show that Lenin's optimism about the
potential for revolution in the West was stronger and lasted longer
than many have believed. But Pipes's contention that Lenin's speech
"indicates that the invasion of Poland had as its objective not only
the sovietization of that country but also an immediate advance on
Germany and possibly England" (94) is totally unsupported by the text.
Certainly Lenin tells his listeners that the advance on Warsaw was
linked to rising hopes of proletarian upheaval in Europe, including
Germany and England as, well as Poland, but that is quite a different
matter from planning an invasion, and certainly not of England, to
which there is absolutely no conceivabe reference.
Lenin was undoubtedly a fanatic, but there is no evidence here or
elsewhere that he was a madman. Indeed, he was very much the realist;
the thrust of the speech was to acknowledge "the main and dismal
point," which was "that a mistake has undoubtedly been committed"
(106).
The speech also includes a valuable discussion of the Communist attitude
toward the Versailles system. As previously noted, Pipes emphasizes
Lenin's recognition that German nationalists and Soviet Communists
could make common cause against the peace treaty, and he contends that
this portended future developments in Soviet policy, not simply Rapallo
but 1939 as well. Lenin's discussion of the "unnatural characteristic
bloc" (102) between right-wing German patriots (he calls them German
Kornilovites) and Bolsheviks emphasized, however, the temporary and
strictly informal nature of the alliance, warning clearly: "If you form
a bloc with the German Kornilovites, they will dupe you" (103).
One could cite numerous additional examples of largely irrelevant
documents and tendentious editing, but I have already spilled too much
(cyber)ink on a book about which one wonders why it needed to be
published. Those few documents, such as the speech to the Ninth
Conference, that genuinely reveal new information could well have
appeared in journals, since they will mainly be of use to scholars. The
remaining materials simply reinforce common interpretations and
impressions of Lenin's politics and character. Clearly, the book's
editor had a purpose of his own.
In an acknowledgement at the opening of the volume, Yury A. Buranov of
the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of
Recent History, which furnished Pipes with the documents, emphasizes: "The
interpretation of the materials is a matter of the creative and scholarly
assessment on the part of the American editor."
It is this interpretation that in the end holds the book together --
and it is this interpretation that makes the book a one-sided example
of how NOT to read documents.
Reviewed by Henry Reichman, California State University, Hayward, for
H-Russia
Copyright (c) 1997 by H-Net, all rights reserved. This work may be
copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit is given to the
author and the list. For other permission, please contact
H-...@h-net.msu.edu
.
===============================================
Tutto cio’ non basta ancora? Leggetevi il brano finale di una recensione
di W. Lacquer ad un altro libro sempre del "creativo" Pipes, Russia under
the Bolshevik Regime, libro in cui secondo quanto scrive Lacquer si
addebita, sorpassando a destra perfino le teorie di Nolte, ai bolscevichi
nientemeno che la responsabilita'  dell'Olocausto... 
Russia under the Bolshevik Regime
by Richard Pipes
(Knopf, 587 pp., $35)
di W. lacquer
(...)
Pipes makes these and other useful points, but he tends to overshoot the
target. We all know that Mussolini was once a revolutionary Socialist, and
that he made some favorable comments about Lenin in the early 1920s; but it
is an exaggeration to say that Mussolini "never concealed his sympathy and
admiration for communism." After he came to power he was no longer
interested in the subject, and the Communists ended up in the Lipari
Islands. 
Affinities between Berlin and Moscow did exist, but they were not all
important. It is true that the Nazis, for all their feverish propaganda
slogans, did not regard the Communists as a mortal threat to the German
nation; but it is not true that relations between the two parties were
"friendly." On a few occasions, some of them in wartime, Hitler expressed a
grudging admiration for Stalin, which he never did for Churchill or
Roosevelt; but Pipes makes too much of such asides. One of Pipes's main
sources for
Hitler's "learning a great deal from Marxism" is Hermann Rauschning, a
former Nazi leader; but Rauschning's testimony, however entertaining and
stimulating, is now read by most German experts with great reservations
because its
authenticity is not above suspicion.
Did Hitler and Mussolini really "learn a great deal from Bolshevik
techniques"? They were in no need of an inspiration from abroad, and they
made no effort at all to learn. They understood the appeal of nationalism
well
before Stalin did. True, being a native of the Caucasus, Stalin understood
nationalism a little better than other Communist leaders, and he wrote a
long essay about it early in his career. But like all other Marxists (and
liberals and nearly everyone else), he still thought that with a little
pressure from
above nationalism would become less and less important and ultimately
vanish
altogether.
Pipes concludes that "the Jewish Holocaust thus turned out to be one of the
many unanticipated and unintended consequences of the Russian revolution."
This is true, but only in the sense that all history is a seamless web. In
this light, Kerensky, and Tsar Nikolai ii, too, are partly responsible for
the Bolshevik takeover, and thus partly responsible also for the Holocaust.
Pipes does not quite endorse the views of the German nationalist school of
historiography inspired by Ernst Nolte, according to which Hitler learned
what he knew about mass murder from the Gulag; but some of Pipes's
statements
come oddly close.
Pipes makes the perfectly valid point that while communism derived its
inspiration from the Enlightenment, fascism is rooted in the Counter-
Enlightenment. And he points out that in practice the distinction was
blurred.
So far so good. But he then continues putting the blame for communism's
failure on "the Enlightenment's most pernicious idea," that man was merely
a
material being, devoid of soul or innate ideas. This is a misreading of the
eighteenth-century philosophers; La Mettrie did espouse such a die-hard
materialism, but Locke and Hume, Kant and the French Encyclopedists, did
not.
More important, such intellectual genealogies are unconvincing. Nietzsche
has been made responsible for Eichmann, and Mazzini for Mussolini; but
this does
not really help us to understand Eichmann and Mussolini. Voltaire as the
spiritual godfather of Stalin does not make much sense either.
 
--------------------
Infine sempre per dare un quadro completo del personaggio Pipes, ecco una
porzione di una intervista al nostro caro professore produttore di libri
in quantita' industriale, come ci ricordava sloamm, articolo comparso sul
quotidiano conservatore Il Tempo,  e in cui si legge :
-------------
"Secondo lo storico Stèphane Courtois, curatore del «Libro nero del
comunismo», il numero totale delle vittime del comunismo nel mondo si
aggira
intorno ai cento milioni di persone, vale a dire il 50 per cento in più
rispetto alle morti causate dalle due guerre mondiali. Un tale gigantesco
fallimento induce a credere che, al di là del ruolo svolto da alcuni grandi
leader, qualcosa di profondamente sbagliato fosse già presente nelle
premesse ideologiche del movimento comunista. Giriamo la domanda al nostro
interlocutore. «Il seme della distruzione si trova nel pensiero di Karl
Marx - risponde Pipes. I precetti di Marx ed Engels, seguiti dai comunisti,
prevedono l'abolizione della proprietà privata in nome dell'eguaglianza e
della libertà. Quel che Marx non considera è che la proprietà privata è una
caratteristica permanente della vita sociale e che gli esseri umani sono,
per natura, avidi e poco disponibili a spogliarsi di ciò che possiedono.
Infatti i bolscevichi, per costringere la gente a rinunciare ai propri
beni,
debbono puntare tutto sull'autorità pubblica, attribuendo ad essa un potere
illimitato. Il che, in poco tempo, porta all'affermazione di una vera e
propria casta d'intoccabili, la famosa nomenklatura, senza la quale il
regime sovietico non sarebbe stato possibile.
--------------------
Insomma Pipes non si accontenta piu' di demonizzare Lenin equiparandolo a
Stalin,  falsificando e/o ignorando alla grande diversi documenti e fatti
storici che lo smentiscono (come ad esempio chi fece eliminare Stalin sia
nella fase di ascesa che nelle famose purghe della meta’ degli anni ’30
per consolidare il suo potere) e  arrivando anche ad interpretare
creativamente il pensiero di Lenin  come abbiamo visto in precedenza.
Ora all’apice della sua isteria anticomunista mr. Pipes se la prende con
Marx ed Engels, indicandoli come la radice di ogni male dell'Umanita', "il
seme della distruzione" come afferma lui stesso ai giornalisti
assolutamente non compiacenti de Il Tempo. <g>
Affermazione, questa di Pipes, che sarebbe da ROTFLare alla grande perche'
allora applicando la sua stessa logica, anche Gesu' Cristo con il suo
messaggio sarebbe da ritenere un seme della distruzione se si pensa a
tante cose belle come le crociate, con tutte le sue stragi,
l'Inquisizione, la corruzione dei papi, l'ambiguita' e la complicita'
verso il nazifascismo eccetera eccetera. 
Con questo concludiamo questo lungo thread sulle mistificazioni a scopo
politico commesse da alcuni storici come Pipes.
saluti
sergio
-- 
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 authenticity is not above suspicion.
[cut]
Laqueur è troppo prudente: "Non ho citato neanche una volta gli Hitler
Speaks di Hermann Rauschning, opera oggi considerata talmente poco
attendibile che è preferibile trascurarla del tutto" (I. Kershaw, Hitler I,
Milano, 1999, pag. XVI).
Saluti,
Arturo

 Milano, 1999, pag. XVI).
Ti ringrazio per la interessantissima segnalazione che effettivamente mi e'
sfuggita e che rafforza quanto ho scritto su la scarsa serieta' di Richard
Pipes come storico.
Eh la memoria... ricordi il discorso avviato su ICS Mod sul come segnarsi le
cose interessanti di un libro? se si prende l'opera di Kershaw , di
segnalazioni ne uscirebbe un volumetto :)
Mi e' piaciuto molto quel libro, tanto e' che vorrei rileggerne alcuni
capitoli prima o poi.. meno male che ogni capitolo ha il primo paragrafo che
riassume per grandi linee quanto viene scritto in seguito.
ciao
Sergio
--------------------------------
Inviato via 
http://arianna.libero.it/usenet/

Non ci posso credere....
Tu hai passato due mesi e mezzo a redigere questa accozzaglia di porcherie
e hai pure il coraggio di postarla su un NG???
Guarda, ho le lacrime agli occhi, è un'ora che sghignazzo davanti al pc....
Senti spero nei prossimi giorni, ferie permettendo, di riprendere qualche
punto perchè ne vale la pena...
Adesso pesco a caso tra le varie perle....
1) L'articolo di Mieli
Ora si capisce cosa intendevi quando continuavi a dire che il libro di
Pipes io non lo possedevo.
Ma scusa non ti sei neppure accorto che Mieli in quella risposta cita
testualmente Pipes?  :))
E che quindi la mia e sua versione devono coincidere per forza dato che la
fonte è la stessa?
Non è che io ho scopiazzato Mieli, bensì entrambi abbiamo scopiazzato
(citato) Pipes.
E' questa la grande scoperta che avevi fatto sulle mie presunte
mistificazioni?
Certo che come Sergiok Holmes lasci un pochetto a desiderare.
ROTFL!!!!
2) Allora, hai usato i motori di ricerca come un pattumiera andando alla
ricerca di qualsiasi cosa potesse servirti a dare addosso a Pipes, ma
questa è davvero fenomenale, ti scongiuro, fammi ridere ancora di più:
Ma chi sarebbe PAUL N. SEIGEL che scrive recensioni su SOCIALIST ACTION?
E' un amico di KELIX KREISEL, vero?
Ovviamente questo articolo-patacca lo hai beccato solo spulciando i
newsgroup: lo troviamo infatti su alt.politics.socialism.trotsky  con il
titolo "Cold Warriors Never Die!" del 28/11/1999, postato da un certo
PRIANIKOFF!!!    :))
Ma non ti vergogni nemmeno un po? 
Eddai per una volta un pochino rosso anche di vergogna, non solo di
ideologia....
ROTFL!!!!!
3) Hai sbrodolato pagine e pagine di fregnacce apologetiche del
bolscevismo (bellissima la tua teoria secono cui i campi di concentramento
sovietici sono giustificati perchè gli inglesi li hanno usati in Africa
nella guerra boera, mi ha fatto andare il succo di frutta di traverso dal
ridere) ma non hai commentato gli ordini scritti di Lenin di impiccare i
kulaki a centinaia.
Ma no!! Che sbadato che sono, la colpa non era sua, infatti...
4) Eccezionale pure tutto il "quadro storico" che hai dipinto. Non è altro
che la solita litania trita e ritrita che il PCI ci sbrodola da
cinquant'anni.... insomma Lenin fu costretto ad ordinare massacri su
massacri per colpa dei bianchi cattivi e delle nazioni capitalistiche che
volevano soffocare la rivoluzione, eccetera eccetera.
Senti, appena ho un po' di tempo per trascriverle ti posto un po' di
cosette, che Boffa avrà sicuramente dimenticato di riportare, sugli anni
d'oro del comunismo di guerra che tu tanto rimpiangi, così continuiamo a
farci un bel po' di altre grasse risate.
sergio, sei veramente un mito, a raccontarle queste cose non ci crederebbe
nessuno!!!


 farci un bel po' di altre grasse risate.
Accomodati pure del resto pure sulla questione della carestia tu e il tuo
pipes avete fatto la figura del fregnacciaro dato che tutta la storiella si
basava , come e' indicato in quel libro americano che ho citato, sulla
accusa di un avversario politico di Lenin! LOL! ma si puo' essere cosi'
cialtroni?
 
 Io tuttavia dopo questo tuo ennesimo intervento "altamente culturale"
(LOL!!!) , ringrazio nuovamente chi ha gia' espresso un pubblico
apprezzamento per quanto ho scritto nei miei 4 post. :)
sergio


 segnalazioni ne uscirebbe un volumetto :)
[cut]
E' indiscutibilmente un ottimo studio. Io per il momento ho solo il primo
volume e mi cullo nella pia speranza che il secondo esca in edizione
economica...
Saluti,
Arturo

apprezzamento per quanto ho scritto nei miei 4 post. :)
Ci credo che ringrazi, dopo la sputtanata clamorosa che hai copincollato dai
newsgroup dei fans di Trockji ti sono rimasti giusto gli applausi dei tuoi
amichetti per sollevarti il morale. Adesso arriverà puntuale anche il
conforto di Pomero, così potrai andare a nanna tranquillo.
ROTFL!!!

 ROTFL!!!
Ogniuno ha i suoi amichetti. Io posso contare sugli "applausi" (LOL!) di 
persone molto intelligenti e preparate che hai letto, tu hai geniacci 
noti per la loro credibilita' in tutta usenet come i camerati artamano e 
arduino et simili...
Ti devi accontentare sloammuccio purtroppo di quel che hai.. :)

solita figura di cacca davanti al ng . :)
Chiamala risposta, io la chiamo uno sterile esercizio di spurgo fognario
:))

 Ma ha smentito che cosa, le balle dei cocomerai  :))
lo sapevo che hai difficolta a leggere e comprendere, ed effettivamente
mentre compilavo la risposta devo ricordarmi che gia' un post di media
lunghezza ti surriscalda fino al punto di fusione l'unico neutrone in
dotazione al radicale di destra che sei (LOL!!! per non ammettere che sei
un nazistucolo... pensa quanto sei meschino :) ) FIGURIAMOCI 4 post lunghi
contenenti perfino brani in inglese... <g>
Per il resto che scrivi o scriverai OT (come stai facendo in questo thread
invece di confutare seriamente - ma sei incapace proprio a farlo? - quanto
e' stato scritto) rispetto all'argomento su cui ti ho risposto con i miei
4 msg sia qui che su ICS Moderato (facendoti fare una degna figura da
pirl.. ehm da "radicale di destra" dopo i tuoi ripetuti sproloqui su miei
fugoni eccetera) non staro' a perdere tempo a ribattere ai tuoi ridicoli
grugniti da nazistello ignorante. 
Quindi se hai da rispondere con argomenti interessanti a livello storico
anche per il ng  rispondi su ICS Moderato.  Altrimenti non fai che
riconfermare - come hai fatto in precedenza quando ti sei limitato solo a
ridicolizzare la professione di uno che ha scritto un articolo in cui
mostra le "perle" dei tuoi idoli - che sei il classico vigliacchetto anche
a livello intellettuale, ma del resto questo e' una caratteristica
standard tra camerati.
sergio


 economica... 
Prima o poi... Io pero' al posto tuo farei quel piccolo necessario
risparmio a prendere il volume non in edizione economica visto che ne vale
la pena. :)
ciao


 sergio
Ho già iniziato a risponderti su un nuovo thread, caro il mio trollone
stalinista. 
Leggi, leggi, chissà che non ti entri qualcosa in quella zucca bolscevica.



meno male... sono riuscito a farti aprire un libro e probabilmente un
discorso senza i soliti ragli e grugniti da neonazistucolo.


 per quello che scrive.
[cut]
E' comunque un autore con cui secondo me è utile confrontarsi.
Saluti,
Arturo