Newsgroup: italia.genova.discussioni
Titolo: Otto per mille

Ricevo e pubblico.
Per quanti fossero interessati ad una carità laica,
sperando di non urtare la sensibilità di nessuno.
Vi invito ad aderire ad una iniziativa di raccolta
firme affinchè un disegno di legge acconsenta che il
contribuente possa avere la possibilità di devolvere
l'otto per mille dell'irpef alla ricerca scientifica
(attualmente può essere devoluto solo a Chiese o
allo Stato).
Aderire alla raccolta firme è molto semplice, basta
collegarsi al sito 
www.clubfattinostri.it/8x1000/
 .
Ci vogliono solo un paio di minuti. Io l'ho appena
fatto, vi invito a fare altrettanto ed a proporre
l'iniziativa a tutti coloro che avete in elenco
nella vostra rubrica  (è necessario raggiungere un
milione di firme).


Già fatto, grazie! :-)
-- 
Ciao!
Giampietro
http://www.giampietrostocco.it
http://www.alternatehistory.co.uk
 

 milione di firme).
Pare che la finanziaria 2006 preveda la possibilita' di devolvere il 5 
per mille ad associazioni di volontariato o istituti di ricerca.
http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/05266l.htm
 (punto 337)
Alessandro.

test ha scritto:

Lo ha detto pure Tremonti ieri sera da Fazio (Fabio).
Oltretutto ha mostrato per l'ennesima volta (di fronte alle battute 
garbate di Fazio, con Luttazzi sarebbe morto dopo due secondi netti) di 
avere lo stesso senso dell'umorismo che ha il mio comodino.
Ah, dato che non dormo con nessuno all'interno di questo NG, è giusto 
che sappiate che io il comodino non ce l'ho.

 che sappiate che io il comodino non ce l'ho.
E il bicchiere per la dentiera allora dove lo tieni? ;-)
-- 
Per ogni problema esiste sempre una soluzione semplice ed elegante.
E sbajata.

 Lo ha detto pure Tremonti ieri sera da Fazio (Fabio).
Tremonti non saprei, io ricordavo che l'avesse detto Veronesi, sulla 
stessa poltrona, qualche minuto prima.
Alessandro.

 sappiate che io il comodino non ce l'ho.
Non hai il  " GHIRINDON " ?
Allora non sei genovese.
BIBI
www.sergiomarini.it
 

BIBI:

No di certo. E' colpa mia che ho crosspostato su ISA e IGD.


 Ricevo e pubblico.
Firmato.
-- 
Paolo Fasce
www.sudoku.sonda.it
www.fasce.it/paolo/sudoku/

 allo Stato).
E' ora che la scienza venga parificata alle altre religioni!

 E' ora che la scienza venga parificata alle altre religioni!
Beh, avresti ragione, non fosse per una sola piccolissima differenza.
Le religioni (cristiana, musulmana, comunista, ecc.) promettono un mondo
migliore. La scienza, invece, lo ha fatto e continua a farlo.


 
La mia dieta è composta solo di omogeneizzati e alcolici, quindi niente 
dentiera.

test ha scritto:

Beh, forse però inizio a stimare più Tremonti che Veronesi, anche perchè 
il primo ha venduto il culo a silvio (che è nano, e quindi va scritto in 
minuscolo) e lo ha fatto alla luce del sole, il secondo invece ha 
venduto il proprio deretano alla monsanto (minuscola anche questa, ma si 
tratta di altre bassezze) ma cerca ancora di darla a bere al mondo con 
la storia che lui è un ricercatore libero.
Il primo, nella sua disonestà, è onesto.

BIBI ha scritto:

No, infatti sono nato e cresciuto a sud di Genova (ma molto a sud).

 dentiera.
LOL!


 
Che ridi?
La prescrisse a mia madre il mio (ormai ex, per l'età, mica per 
l'altezza) pediatra.
Ce la tramandiamo di padre in figlio, è una cosa seria!!

 sono un po' troppi però!!
Ti cito l'Economist, che certo non si può dire filo-berlusconiano.
Nel numero doppio di Natale, come sempre, ci sono articoli di "più ampio
respiro".  Nel 2004, tra questi c'era un articolo che descriveva i 10 colpi
finanziari più geniali della storia dell'umanità. L'ultimo, il più
brillante, era quello di cui parli tu. Se non vuoi leggertelo tutto (è
piuttosto complicato), salta direttamente all'ultimo capoverso, che traduco
qui per chi non sapesse l'inglese.
Pensate a tutti gli elementi dell'operazione. E stata coraggiosa e
rischiosa. Si affidava, per il successo, alla segretezza. E' stata
brillantemente concepita per risolvere uno specifico ed apparentemente
insormontabile problema. E' stata eseguita con grande abilità. E, pagando,
ha dato all'Italia l'opportunità di entrare nell'Euro, con i suoi
incacolabili vantaggi. Parte della sua bellezza sta nel fatto che i
profitti non sono derivati dalla controparte, ma dall'entrata nell?Euro.
Certamente tutto questo è stato estremamente scorretto - se fosse stato
fatto da un'azienda il management sarebbe probabilmente in galera per aver
falsificato i bilanci - anche se gli Italiani hanno sempre sostenuto che
sfruttava regole deboli, anziché infrangerne di robuste. Ma non stiamo a
fare gli schizzinnosi. E' stata, dopo tutto, la più grande operazione
finanziaria di tutti i tempi. Bravissimo! [in Italiano nell'originale]
Why didn't I think of that?
Dec 16th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Were these the best financial trades ever carried out?
[...]
Most great trades are done in secret by highly paid traders working for
investment banks, hedge funds and so on. Rarely does this institutional
activity cross paths with the world of retail finance. But for
inventiveness in linking the two activities, one trade clearly stands out.
It originated in 1992 when the Italian government changed its previously
lax rules on withholding tax for Eurobonds. At that time some specialist
teams in London and other big financial centres did nothing but seek out
tax arbitrages: by buying this bond here and moving it there, it was often
possible to avoid taxes at the point of purchase and thereby earn extra
returns. Exploiting Italy's rules had been one of the neatest such wheezes,
so when it was thwarted several of the tax teams found themselves wondering
what to do next.
Among them was Ludovico Filotti, who worked for Barings. In 1993 Mr Filotti
was on holiday in Italy. Reading the local newspaper, something caught his
eye. An advertisement was encouraging companies to buy bonds issued by
Italy's Post Office. These bonds were postal savings bonds, rather like
Britain's national savings certificates, and carried the guarantee of the
Italian state. Mr Filotti was curious: normally such bonds would only be
for retail investors, so he wondered on what terms companies could invest.
Back in Britain, he sent his Italian father the equivalent of £100 and
asked him to nip down to a post office to buy a bond certificate so that he
could study the small print on the bond.
What he found was encouraging. The postal bonds were “zero coupon”, that
is, unlike most bonds, which pay annual interest instalments, they would
pay nothing until they matured, so investors would have to wait a set
period before pocketing their returns and recovering their original
investment. The bonds promised a return of three times the initial
investment after 12 years—a rate equivalent to 9.6% a year.
Back at his bank, Mr Filotti explained his discovery to a colleague, John
Hunter, who realised that this highly attractive rate would be even more so
if the equally juicy rates on Italian-government bonds were to fall. That
would open a spread between Italy's ordinary borrowings and the postal
bonds, just the kind of “arbitrage” opportunity traders love. But the most
remarkable feature of the offer was that there was no upper limit on how
much could be invested. Nor were there disadvantageous tax obligations for
foreigners.
In fact, the arbitrage quickly disappeared when Italy's interest rates rose
rather than fell. The trading idea sat on a shelf. But, towards the end of
1995, Italy's economy began its path towards convergence with those of the
other countries hoping to join the euro. That meant its interest rates
began to fall. And, in the summer of 1996, they started to fall
dramatically. Suddenly, the Post Office trade was on. Mr Hunter persuaded
his new employer, a big Japanese bank, to buy $50m of the postal bonds.
At this stage, his trade became one of the greatest ever. It also became
amusing. Mr Filotti, who had also gone to work at the same Japanese bank,
flew to Italy and, escorted by police, carried a banker's draft for the
equivalent of $50m into a post office. Queuing up alongside pensioners
claiming their modest weekly infusion, he exchanged the draft for a savings
bond. Soon the certificate was safely lodged in London. With no limit on
the amounts that could be invested, a huge and profitable arbitrage was
there for the taking.
Readers who are not financial experts need not worry about exactly how
banks can exploit such trades, while the experts will understand that the
bonds offered both option and swap opportunities to lock in big profits.
Around the time of the trade, there was also large and unusual activity in
the market for swaptions (options on swaps).
Mr Hunter, however, was unable to persuade his conservative masters to go
further. No matter: he sold the idea for the trade, first to a single rival
bank, then to several others. This set off a mad rush to buy the bonds
before the opportunity disappeared. Bankers flew in droves to Italy,
jostling to be in front of each other in the queue. In double-quick time
UBS bought over $1 billion-worth of the bonds. CSFB bought the most, but,
according to International Financing Review, a trade magazine, later gave
back its profits when the Italian government threatened to withhold
lucrative mandates for privatisations. Nomura made the biggest single
purchase, plonking down $1.1 billion on the counter of a bemused clerk, who
duly filled out a certificate for more than a trillion lire.
Of course, it could not last. After $3.6 billion of the bonds had been
issued in the space of a few days, the Italian government suddenly put a
ceiling on the amount that could be bought and made threats to the banks'
future fee income. Too bad. Mr Hunter, however, is now the chief executive
of Brains, a specialist broker that tries to make money by selling clever
ideas to other traders.
Bubble, bubble, short and double
However, an even better contender for the title must be the trade conceived
by Sir John Templeton to profit from the 1990s internet bubble. A renowned
investor, Sir John will be remembered for many trades, not least the one in
1939 in which he bought shares in 104 almost worthless, and in some cases
already bankrupt, New York stockbrokers. Hitler had just invaded Poland,
and the young Mr Templeton correctly foresaw that abundant surpluses of
goods and commodities would soon become scarcities, leading to a strong
recovery of financial-asset prices. Within three years he had turned a
profit on 100 of the 104 purchases.
Sixty years later, long experience suggested to Sir John that technology
and internet shares were an especially inflated part of a huge bubble. The
problem was to construct an investment strategy that could exploit this.
His solution was ingenious, so much so that it wins the “Wish I'd thought
of that” prize by a mile.
Nomura made the biggest single purchase, plonking down $1.1 billion on the
counter of a bemused clerk, who duly filled out a certificate for more than
a trillion lire
For every flotation there is a “lock-up” period during which insiders at
the company are forbidden to sell any of their shares. Sir John reasoned
that, in a bubble market, these insiders would generally be keen to sell
once they could. After all, this was their only way of getting a lot of
money out of their venture if it was unlikely to mature into a profitable
long-term business and, as insiders, they ought to know better than anyone
that few of their companies were likely to stay the course. So he
systematically sold their shares short just before the end of the lock-up.
That meant he could buy the shares back more cheaply if they fell in price,
as he reckoned they would.
Sir John acted with great discipline. First, he decided to sell only those
shares that were trading at more than three times their original price.
Then he set precise points at which he would take profits if prices
fell—and he would ruthlessly cut his losses if a particular share held up
unexpectedly. In the end he made 84 separate transactions, each for $2.2m.
The results were spectacular. Sir John made a return of almost 50% on his
$185m bet. On some positions, he made profits of more than 90%.
Not bad, but still pretty piffling by Mr Soros's standards. To outdo his $1
billion coup, consider a scheme whose returns have been so great they are
unmeasurable. Fittingly, as the winner of the “greatest trade” title, it
requires only brief description. In 1996 and 1997 Italy (yes, again) was
desperate to reduce its public-sector deficit so that the country would
qualify for entry into the euro. One unintended boost came from the sale of
the postal bonds described above—bizarrely, because they matured after the
euro deadline, they were not counted as current debt. But the stroke of
genius by officials in Italy's finance ministry was to enter into a secret
trade that simultaneously brought in cash, took some debt off the books and
deferred the repayment of the cash and the debt until after the euro
deadline had been successfully reached.
Many economists were amazed when Italy defied expectations to qualify for
the euro. And its admission into the system has been worth an incalculable
fortune. It has brought huge savings via systematically lower interest
rates and greater economic efficiency. Had Italy not qualified, its economy
might have crumbled. Certainly, its public-sector finances would be in dire
straits.
The trade itself was fairly simple, though complicated enough to ensure
that it came to light only in late 2001, when Gustavo Piga, an economics
professor, stumbled across it while studying public-debt policies.
Essentially, Italy used a swap to defer interest payments on an issue of
$1.7 billion of yen-denominated bonds that it had made in 1995, at the same
time taking an up-front payment for the swap that was later repaid with
interest. Thus was Italy able to make it into the euro, merely at the price
of a big repayment on the swap in 1998.
Think of the various elements of the trade. It was bold and risky. It
relied on secrecy. It was brilliantly conceived to solve a specific, and
apparently insurmountable, problem. It was executed with great skill. And,
for a fee, it gave Italy the opportunity to be part of the euro system,
with its incalculable rewards. Part of its appeal is that the profits came
not from the counterparty on the trade itself, but from the economic
consequences of the trade.
Of course, it was also thoroughly dodgy—had it been done by a company, the
management would probably be in prison for cooking the books—though the
Italians have always maintained that it exploited weak rules, rather than
broke strong ones. But there is no need to be churlish. This was, after
all, the greatest trade ever. Bravissimo!


 milione di firme).
Firmato con enorme piacere.

 Firmato con enorme piacere.
Ti sei toccata?


 management would probably be in prison for cooking the books?though the


 coglione come si diceva... <hahahahahaha>
Nessuno ha mai detto che Fazio sia coglione.
E' solo disonesto e rotto in culo. Con buona pace di Fletcher.
Ma che c'entra? Hai una vaga idea di cosa sia la Banca d'Italia?
Evidentemente, come sempre, non hai la piů vaga idea.
Perché il followup su ISA?
Fai il furbetto o ancora non sai come usare Knode?



ke kazzo ne so ? l'ho notato dopo che era un cross-post. Ormai avevo giá
spedito ! Mica siam tutti attenti e perfetti come te...:-)))
 

 spedito ! Mica siam tutti attenti e perfetti come te...:-)))
Non conosco Knode, ma c'ho la forte impressione che tu stia contando delle
gran musse. Vuoi dire che Knode si è preso la briga di impostare (leggo dai
tuoi header) il Followup-To: it.scienza.ambiente? Cambia newsreader.


 Cambia newsreader.
sto cercando di trovarne uno migliore. ma non lo trovo.
mozilla non mi piace. 

 eh...dì la verità... :-))))
Avendolo letto più di un anno fa, per scrupolo, l'ho riletto e ti confermo
che la Banca d'Italia non viene mai menzionata. Ma, così facendo, ho perso
un quarto d'ora, motivo per cui mi sento autorizzato a mandarti a fare in
culo.
