Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Iran Might Be the Biggest Loser in the Arab Spring

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/24/supremely_irrelevant
 
 
One year ago today, Egyptians took to the streets to demand the
removal of Hosni Mubarak's three-decade-old dictatorship. As they
waved flags and chanted for the fall of the regime, another ruler
1,200 miles to the east was calculating how to use their act of
courage for his own profit. On Feb. 4, at the height of the protests
in Tahrir Square, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took
the stage in Tehran to deliver his assessment of the revolutionary
moment unfolding in Cairo.
 
Speaking partly in Arabic, Khamenei described events in Egypt as an
"Islamic awakening" inspired by Iran's own 1979 revolution. The speech
was blasted out to thousands of Egyptians via text message, and
Khamenei even claimed on his webpage to have personally inspired the
pro-democracy demonstrations, comparing them to "the yell that the
Iranian nation let out against America and against global arrogance
and tyranny."
 
Khamenei was not alone in predicting that the Arab Spring would
provide Iran an opportunity to expand its influence across the Middle
East. Early on, some Washington commentators fretted that he may be
right. Writing in Foreign Affairs, for example, Michael Scott Doran, a
former official in President George W. Bush's administration,
cautioned that the "resistance bloc" led by Tehran was "poised to
pounce, jackal-like, on the wounded states of the region." And, in
Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Knesset as recently
as October that he doubted the "high hopes that blossomed in the Arab
Spring" would be realized, arguing that Iran would manipulate events
to expand its influence.
 
But even at the time, Khamenei's assertions fell on deaf ears among
the hundreds of thousands risking their lives in Tahrir Square. When
asked about Khamenei's boastful claims, one Tahrir protester mocked:
"Egyptians were not inspired by Iran. Rather, the Egyptian people are
inspiring the world." This proved a much more astute observation than
the supreme leader's. As Foreign Policy's own Marc Lynch documents in
his compelling new book, The Arab Uprising, the 2011 revolts in Egypt
and elsewhere were inspired by decades-old grievances against corrupt
regimes and the mutually reinforcing demonstration effects of
simultaneous movements rising up across the Arab world. Iran had
nothing to do with it.
 
The reaction in Tahrir Square represented a sign of things to come.
Iran has tried to exploit events, but the winds of political change
have not blown in Tehran's favor.
 
When Mubarak fell, Iran's leaders moved out with swagger. They saw one
pivotal U.S. ally gone, and perceived an opportunity to exploit unrest
to undermine other pro-Western regimes, especially Saudi Arabia. They
sought to develop contacts with Islamists in Egypt and Libya, expand
ties to opposition movements in Yemen, and capitalize on the
indigenous Shiite protests in Bahrain. And Iran's leaders seemed
confident that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, Tehran's
state ally in the Middle East, was immune from the populist wave
because of its militant stance toward Israel and the United States.
 
One year later, however, it is hard to find evidence that Iran has
benefited from the Arab uprisings. In fact, Iran's regional position
has taken a big hit. With the partial exception of Yemen, Tehran has
struggled to build new networks of influence with emerging Islamist
actors. Meanwhile, Assad's regime has been thoroughly delegitimized,
expelled from the Arab League, and is wobbling in the face of
nationwide protests. This, in turn, has created considerable anxiety
for Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia that constitutes Iran's chief non-
state ally.
 
The perception of Iranian meddling has also decimated Tehran's "soft
power" appeal across the Arab world. Surveys conducted in Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
by Zogby International show Iran's reputation in free fall since the
Arab Spring began. Just a few years ago, Iran enjoyed a strong
majority of support among the populations of all these countries; as
of July 2011, Iran had a net unfavorable rating in every country but
Lebanon.
 
This is not just a temporary setback for Iran, but a sea change that
could deeply undermine its regional ambitions. To be sure, the
trajectory of the Arab Spring remains uncertain, and rising sectarian
tensions and political backsliding in some countries may provide
opportunities for Tehran to cause mischief. But several underlying
dynamics suggest that Iran's struggles will continue.
 
As Arab publics increasingly look to their own governments to
represent their interests, Iran's ability to leverage regional
discontent to influence the Arab street will continue to wane.
Moreover, emerging political actors vying for influence and votes in
an increasingly populist landscape, including both secular parties and
Sunni Arab Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, will be
keen to brandish their Arab nationalist credentials and will be
reluctant to forge close associations with Tehran. Within hours of
Mubarak's fall, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood's spokesman was
already taking pains to emphasize that "Egypt is not Iran. Egypt can
build its own model of democracy according to its culture and Islamic
preference."
 
The Iranian regime's brutal response to its own 2009 protest movement
puts further limits on its influence over the Arab Spring. The
regime's refusal to respect universal rights, while claiming to back
democratic movements across the Middle East, is irrefutable evidence
of hypocrisy. And Iran's continued support for the Syrian regime's
bloody tactics -- at the very moment that Assad faces growing pressure
from fellow Arab states and Turkey to end the violence and step aside
-- only magnifies this double standard.
 
Classic balance of power dynamics have also triggered extensive
pushback from Tehran's regional rivals. Iran's nuclear ambitions,
combined with widespread concerns of Iranian-backed subversion, have
motivated unprecedented arms purchases and security cooperation among
the Arab Gulf states. Exaggerated perceptions of Iranian meddling also
produced the ill-advised Saudi intervention into Bahrain last March.
In the face of perceived Iranian threats, Saudi Arabia and its allies
are likely to continue to circle the wagons.
 
Lastly, as the prospects of Assad's political survival in Syria
continue to dim, so do Iran's hopes for regional supremacy. For years,
Iran's close alliance with Syria has provided it with a platform to
exert influence in the Arab world, and a base from which to funnel
support to militant Lebanese and Palestinian organizations threatening
Israel. But with the pro-democracy movement in Syria persisting in the
face of severe repression and Assad's regime facing international
estrangement, Iran's most critical alliance is increasingly tenuous.
 
If Assad falls, Iran may attempt to compensate by doubling down in
Iraq. But the susceptibility of Iraq's Shiite-led government to
Iranian hegemony is widely exaggerated and Iraq cannot replace Syria
as a gateway to the Levant. Iraqi nationalism is profound and local
distrust of Iran, a country Iraq waged the bloodiest war of the late
twentieth century against, runs deep. Iraq also desires a long-term
partnership with the United States and improved relations with its
Arab neighbors -- goals that are incompatible with Iranian domination.
 
One year after the Egyptian revolution began, Khamenei's hopes -- and
Western analysts' fears -- have not materialized, and are not likely
to. Although it has been fashionable to describe Iran's growing power
in the Middle East, actual events suggest the opposite. Iran's economy
is reeling under sanctions, and the regime's nuclear activities and
saber-rattling increasingly mark it as a pariah state. And as the Arab
Spring marches on, Iran will find itself falling further behind.

 
 
]...]
 
sono perfettamente d'accordo.
La primavera araba, più che la democrazia, aveva tra le sue concrete
possibilità  lo sbocciare del potere iraniano.
È andata completamente alla rovescia, e potrebbe andare ancora molto peggio
per gli asciugamani neri.
 
La democrazia continua a essere un miraggio. Ma i conti geopolitici
tornano.
 
 
-- 
“Those who expect to reap the blessings of  freedom, must, like men,
undergo the  fatigues of supporting it.”  - North Idaho 21st Batallion of
Light Foot