Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: The Israeli solution

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304665367&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
Operation Cast Lead caused many people to reassess the viability of
the sacrosanct "two-state solution." A growing number of observers
have pointed out that Hamas's Iranian-sponsored jihadist regime in
Gaza is proof that Israel has no way to ensure that land it transfers
to the PLO-Fatah will remain under PLO-Fatah control.
This reassessment has also provoked a discussion of the PLO-Fatah's
own failures since it formed the Palestinian Authority in 1994.
Despite the billions of dollars it received from Israel and the West,
its Western trained armed forces numbering more than 75,000 and the
bottomless reserve of international political support it enjoys, the
PLO-Fatah regime did not build a state, but a kleptocratic thugocracy
where the rule of law was replaced by the rule of the jackboot.
Instead of teaching its people to embrace peace, freedom and
democracy, the PLO-Fatah-led PA indoctrinated them to wage jihad
against Israel in a never-ending war.
These reassessments have led three leading conservative thinkers -
former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton, Middle East Forum
president Daniel Pipes, and Efraim Inbar, director of Bar-Ilan
University's Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies - to all
publish articles over the past month rejecting the two-state solution.
Bolton, Pipes and Inbar not only agree that the two-state paradigm has
failed, they also agree on what must be done now to "solve" the
Palestinian conflict. In their view the failed "two-state solution"
should be replaced with what Bolton refers to as the "three-state
solution." All three analysts begin their analyses with the assertion
that Israel is uninterested in controlling Gaza, Judea and Samaria.
Since the Palestinians have shown they cannot be trusted with
sovereignty, the three argue that the best thing to do is to return
the situation to what it was from 1949 to 1967: Egypt should reassert
its control over Gaza and Jordan should reassert its control over
Judea and Samaria.
Bolton, Pipes and Inbar acknowledge that Egypt and Jordan have both
rejected the idea but argue that they should be pressured to
reconsider. They explain that Egypt fears that Hamas - a sister
organization of its own Muslim Brotherhood - will destabilize it.
Jordan for its part has two reasons for refusing their plan. The
Hashemite kingdom is a minority regime. A large majority of Jordanians
are ethnic Palestinians. Adding another 1.2 million from Judea and
Samaria could destabilize the kingdom. Then too, both the PLO and
Hamas are themselves threats to the regime. The Hashemites still
remember how with Syrian support, the PLO in 1970 attempted to
overthrow them.
As for Hamas, its popularity has grown in Jordan in tandem with its
empowerment in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. By integrating the west and
east banks of the Jordan River, the chance that Hamas would challenge
the regime increases dramatically. If we add to the mix Syrian
subversion and sponsorship of Hamas, and al-Qaida penetration of
Jordan through Iraq - particularly in the event of a US withdrawal -
the danger that merging the west and east bank populations would
manifest to the Hashemite regime becomes apparent.
IT IS OFTEN NOTED that Hamas's popularity among Palestinians owes in
part to the corruption of the PLO-Fatah-controlled PA. It has also
been noted that due to the PLO-Fatah-controlled PA's jihadist
indoctrination of Palestinian society, the population's transfer of
political loyalty from PLO-Fatah to Hamas was ideologically seamless.
What has been little noted is the strategic significance of the nature
of Hamas's relations with the PLO-Fatah from the establishment of the
PA in1994 until Hamas ousted it from Gaza in 2007. When the PA was
established in 1994, then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin argued that the
PLO-Fatah shared Israel's interest in fighting Hamas because Hamas
constituted a threat to its authority.
What Rabin failed to recognize was that Hamas's threat to PLO-Fatah
was and remains qualitatively different from the threat it poses to
Israel. PLO-Fatah never had a problem with Hamas attacks against
Israel, or with its annihilationist ideology as regards Israel. This
ideology is shared by PLO-Fatah and is widely popular among the
Palestinians. Consequently not only did the PLO-Fatah never prevent
Hamas from attacking Israel, it collaborated with Hamas in attacking
Israel and did so while disseminating Hamas's genocidal ideology
throughout the PA. PLO-Fatah did crack down on Hamas when it felt that
Hamas was threatening its grip on power, but in all other respects, it
supported Hamas - and continues to do so.
THE SAME UNFORTUNATELY is the situation in both Egypt and Jordan.
Hamas's Nazi-like Jew hatred is shared by the vast majority of
Jordanians and Egyptians. Islamist calls for the extermination of the
Jewish people and the destruction of Israel dominate the mosques,
seminaries, universities and media outlets in both countries. Popular
opposition to the peace treaties that Egypt and Jordan signed with
Israel stands consistently at more than 90 percent in both countries.
In spite of repeated Israeli demands for action, PLO-Fatah never ended
its support for jihadist anti-Semitism. The PLO-Fatah never believed -
as Israel hoped it would - that its best chance for remaining in power
was by teaching Palestinians to reject hatred, embrace freedom,
democracy and the blessings that peace would afford them. So too,
neither the Hashemites in Jordan nor President Hosni Mubarak's regime
in Egypt have ever believed that the best way to stabilize or
strengthen their own regimes is by preaching openness and peace and
rejecting jihadist anti-Semitism. To the contrary, in recent years,
Egypt has become the center for jihadist anti-Semitism in the Arab
world and Jordan has one of the highest rates of Jew hatred in the
world.
The situation on the ground in Jordan, Egypt, Gaza and Judea and
Samaria make two things clear. First, a Jordanian reassertion of
control over Judea and Samaria and an Egyptian reassertion of control
over Gaza would likely increase the chances that the moderate regimes
in both countries would be weakened and perhaps overthrown. Second,
like Fatah-PLO, neither Egypt nor Jordan would have any interest in
protecting Israel from Palestinian terrorists.
Bolton, Inbar and Pipes take for granted that Israel is uninterested
in asserting or retaining control over Gaza, Judea, and Samaria. This
is reasonable given the positions of recent governments on the issue.
However, the question is not whether Israel is interested or
uninterested in asserting control over the areas - and most Israelis
are uninterested in giving up control over Judea and Samaria in light
of what happened after Israel withdrew its forces and civilians from
Gaza.
THE SALIENT QUESTION is now that it is clear that the two-state
solution has failed, what is the best option for managing the
conflict? Not only would Israel be unable to trust that its security
situation would improve if the areas were to revert to Jordanian and
Egyptian control, Israel could trust that its security situation would
rapidly deteriorate as the prospect of regional war increased. With a
retrocession of Gaza, Judea and Samaria to Egyptian and Jordanian
rule, Israel would find itself situated within indefensible borders,
and facing the likely prospect that the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes
would be destabilized.
Today Israel has the ability to enter Gaza without concern that doing
so would provoke war with Egypt. It has minimized the terror threat
from Judea and Samaria by controlling the areas with the massive help
of the strong Israeli civilian presence in the areas which ensures
control over the roads and the heights. IDF forces can operate freely
within the areas without risking war with Jordan. The IDF controls the
long border with Jordan and can prevent terrorist infiltration from
the east.
If the current situation is preferable to the "three-state solution"
and if the current situation itself is unsustainable, the question
again arises, what should be done? What new policy paradigm should
replace the failed two-state solution?
The best way to move forward is to reject the calls for a solution and
concentrate instead on stabilization. With rockets and mortars
launched from Gaza continuing to pummel the South despite Operation
Cast Lead, and with the international community's refusal to enforce
UN Security Council resolutions barring Iran from exporting weapons,
it is clear that Gaza will remain an Iranian-sponsored, Hamas-
controlled area for as long as Hamas retains control over the
international border with Egypt.
So Israel must reassert control over the border.
It is also clear that Hamas and its terrorist partners in Fatah and
Islamic Jihad will continue to target the South for as long as they
can.
So Israel needs to establish a security zone inside of Gaza wide
enough to remove the South from rocket and mortar range.
From an economic perspective, it is clear that in the long run, Gaza's
only prospect for development is an economic union of sorts with the
largely depopulated northern Sinai. For years, Egypt has rejected
calls for economic integration with Gaza. Cairo should be pressured to
reassess its position as Israel stabilizes the security situation in
Gaza itself.
AS FOR JUDEA and Samaria, Israel should continue its military control
over the areas in order to ensure its national security. It should
also apply its law to the areas of Judea and Samaria that are within
the domestic consensus. These areas include the Etzion, Adumim, Adam,
Ofra and Ariel settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley.
Israel should end its support for the PLO-Fatah-led PA, and support
the empowerment of non-jihadist elements of Palestinian society to
lead a new autonomous authority in the areas. These new leaders, who
may be the traditional leaders of local clans, should be encouraged to
either integrate within Israel or seek civil confederation with
Jordan. Jordan could take a larger role in the civil affairs of the
Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, by for instance reinstating their
Jordanian citizenship which it illegally revoked in 1988. At the same
time, Israel should end its freeze on building for Israeli communities
in the areas.
It is obvious today that for the Palestinians to develop into a
society that may be capable of statehood in the long term, they
require a period of a generation or two to rebuild their society in a
peaceful way. They will not do this in environments where terrorists
are ideologically aligned with unpopular, repressive regimes.
The option of continued and enhanced Israeli control is unattractive
to many. But it is the only option that will provide an environment
conducive to such a long-term reorganization of Palestinian society
that will also safeguard Israel's own security and national well-
being.
While it is vital to recognize that the failed two-state solution must
be abandoned, it is equally important that it not be replaced with
another failed proposition. The best way to move forward is by
adopting a stabilization policy that enables Israel to secure itself
while providing an opportunity for Palestinians to integrate gradually
and peacefully with their Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian neighbors
Caroline Glick , THE JERUSALEM POST
----
"la sicurezza delle persone dovrebbe essere il valore più
importante"  (Luca Logi / rodewalder / Golda Meir, febbraio 2008)
http://raionim.blogspot.com/2009/01/certo-che-i-qassam-sono-pericolosi_05.html

 If the current situation is preferable to the "three-state solution"
and if the current situation itself is unsustainable, the question
again arises, what should be done? What new policy paradigm should
replace the failed two-state solution?
The best way to move forward is to reject the calls for a solution and
concentrate instead on stabilization. With rockets and mortars
launched from Gaza continuing to pummel the South despite Operation
Cast Lead, and with the international community's refusal to enforce
UN Security Council resolutions barring Iran from exporting weapons,
it is clear that Gaza will remain an Iranian-sponsored, Hamas-
controlled area for as long as Hamas retains control over the
international border with Egypt.
So Israel must reassert control over the border.
It is also clear that Hamas and its terrorist partners in Fatah and
Islamic Jihad will continue to target the South for as long as they
can.
So Israel needs to establish a security zone inside of Gaza wide
enough to remove the South from rocket and mortar range.
Interessante. E' la stessa proposta di cui si parla nel thread "Buongiorno 
con Grad", solo che la zona di sicurezza verrebbe ricavata a sud del 
confine, invece che a nord. Invece di spostare a nord Sderot, si tratterebbe 
di spostare a sud ogni insediamento palestinese a ridosso del confine. Così 
come lo spostamento di Sderot susciterebbe una certa opposizione 
nell'opinione pubblica israeliana, tale alternativa susciterebbe una certa 
opposizione in quella palestinese.
Naturalmente, affinchè la zona di sicurezza resti tale, occorrerebbe un 
pattugliamento, e di conseguenza uno stillicidio di perdite. Ma, certo, 
sarebbero perdite militari, non civili come avviene con i bombardamenti su 
centri abitati israeliani. Mi chiedo però se l'opinione pubblica israeliana 
sarebbe disposta a pagare questo prezzo.
Unita ad un modalità o l'altra di effettiva chiusura al traffico di armi del 
confine meridionale, e a sistemi sofisticati di difesa di punto contro 
eventuali missili a più lunga gittata, potrebbe efficacemente sterilizzare 
il problema, sia pure, appunto, ad un costo.
Ma solo dal punto di vista strettamente militare, direi.

 opposizione in quella palestinese.
Indubbiamente, ma la logica è piuttosto diversa.
Non si tratta di mettere una città fuoritiro, ma di ricavare una fascia 
di sicurezza che blindi il confine egiziano.
Operazione non così semplice come la si dipinge, visto che tunnel e 
contrabbando esistevano anche quando il confine era sotto controllo 
israeliano.
Certamente il controllo euroegiziano ha notevolmente peggiorato le cose.
Tb

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:gmbt3f$hg3$1...@reader.motzarella.org...

No. Se lo scopo è mettere il "South" (di Israele) fuori da "rocket & mortar 
range", allora la zona di sicurezza è a sud del confine settentrionale di 
Gaza, cioè si tratta del (principale) confine tra Gaza e Israele, non di 
quello tra Gaza ed Egitto.
Nel brano di articolo citato ci sono due "So", seguenti due separate 
considerazioni, e introducenti due separate misure proposte:
- ristabilire un controllo sul confine con l'Egitto,
- stabilire una fascia cuscinetto all'interno del territorio di Gaza. 

 - stabilire una fascia cuscinetto all'interno del territorio di Gaza. 
Ah sì, entrambe le cose.
Concordo che la fascia di sicurezza è insensata.
Tb