Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Per hamas, meglio il bastone o la carota?

Come da subject.
<:3)-
da:
http://www.repubblica.it/news/ired/ultimora/rep_nazionale_n_1118781.html
Gaza, 21:34
HAMAS ANNUNCIA TREGUA, SOSPESI TUTTI ATTACCHI DA GAZA
Hamas ha deciso di sospendere tutti gli attacchi dalla Striscia di Gaza
contro Israele. Lo ha detto il leader del movimento estremista
palestinese che si e' impegnato a mantenere la tregua. L'annuncio viene
dopo l'uccisione di uno dei capi della Jihad islamica, Mohammed
al-Sheikh Khalil, in un attacco aereo israeliano.

maisele wrote:


Questa notizia non mi č chiara: non capisco perché Hamas dovrebbe 
fermare gli attacchi dopo l'uccisione di un capo della Jihad islamica, 
visto che i due gruppi mi risulta siano concorrenziali.
La seconda cosa, che invece mi rattrista molto, č che sia di nuovo 
Israele a dover sparare su questa feccia, dopo aver ricevuto centinaia 
di attacchi missilistici sul territorio *non occupato*.
Che cazzo fanno i 26.000 poliziotti palestinesi?
Tb
-- 
TBLOG
http://www.tonibaruch.blogspot.com/
FALSO. E GLASSATO DI BLU:
http://tonibaruch.buzznet.com/user/?id=1653547
I CULOTASTIERATI:
http://tonibaruch.buzznet.com/user/?id=921717


e con questi altri?
da ultim'ora haaretz:
21:42 (GMT+3.00) Islamic Jihad says group will no longer honor
cease-fire (AP)
ps. ma un partito normale a gaza sara` mai possibile???

 Tb
Certo, dovrebbero sparare su Hamas approfittando della tregua tra un 
bombardamento e l'altro, quando il 90% dei territori e' ancora occupato.
C'hai proprio la logica stringente della dialettica servo-padrone...
Feccia dillo anche ai generali israeliani incolpati dal tribunale di 
Londra, i cui eccessi sono probabilmente la causa della crescita di 
Hamas...
Am.

 Hamas...
Certo, amalric.


 Certo, amalric.
"certo" tb, quelli sono innocenti come kahane non era razzista <g>
--------------------------------
Inviato via 
http://arianna.libero.it/usenet/

 Tb
E' stato scritto infinite volte che il rafforzamento delle 
organizzazioni militari e terroriste palestinesi non ci sarebbe stato, 
senza la repressione violenta della seconda intifada, e la 
pauperizzazione dei palestinesi di Gaza.
Se oggi Abu Mazen non  riesce ad impedire completamente le ositilita' 
di queste organizzazioni, non mi sembra  una buona politica di 
riprendere a bombardare Gaza, o fare eccesso di difesa.
Visto che ogni tanto parli dell'Irlanda, pensa se ad ogni attentato 
dell'Ira Londra avesse mandato degli aerei a bombardare i quartieri 
cattolici di Belfast.
Am.

 cattolici di Belfast.
L'Irlanda era territorio nazionale UK, dove l'UK era presente con 
intelligence, polizia, esercito, in pieno controllo del territorio.
Quindi non c'entra una sega.


 e a quelle che hanno occupato Gaza
Ti corrreggo: che hanno liberato gaza. Sei un arancione?
O devo dire pezzi di merda a chi ha occupato gaza nel corso di una 
legittimissima guerra difensiva (durante la quale gaza era occupata da 
altro stato ostile).
Non è che sei un po' antisionista?


 Quindi non c'entra una sega.
Il paragone me l'hai fatto tu per primo in altri post. Eppoi 
intelligence, polizia, esercito israeliani erano  presenti nei 
territori occupati, quando questi sono stati bombardati con aerei ed 
elicotterii. Quindi il paragone si puo' fare.
E questo eccesso di difesa e' stato confermato dalle defezioni di 
piloti israeliani.
Infine l'attacco di Hamas e' stato condannato anche dalla dirigenza 
palestinese.O no?
Am.

 O devo dire pezzi di merda a chi ha occupato gaza
esatto sondersalame, pezzo di merda lo devi dire ai cosiddetti "coloni" e a
chi del governo israeliano li ha istigati ad occupare territori che non
fanno parto di Israele scacciando i palestinesi. E che tuttora occupano
territori in Cisgiordania.


 domani Israele fosse piu' debole, sarei dalla parte di Israele.
Scusa se mi intrometto cosi', ma una posizione del genere non mi sembra
molto sostenibile. Nel senso che se entri nel merito della questione,
dovresti prendere le parti di chi secondo te ha  ragione,
indipendentemente dai rapporti di forza. Se invece non entri nel
merito, non ha senso decidere da che parte stare.
Discorso a parte per chi vende armi, che ha interesse a scambiare di
continuo i rapporti di forza per poter riarmare il piu' debole (in
questo caso, c'e' una logica nel sostenere il piu' debole senza entrare
nel merito)
Ciao
Riccardo

 esatto 
Che Re Faruk possa perdonarti.


 Riccardo
Ma il merito della questione e' sempre di trovare un equilibrio tra le 
parti che porti alla pace. E chi firmerebbe  un trattato con un partner 
troppo debole, che domani si ribellerebbe?
E chi ha ragione in quelle terre? Un accordo di pace prevede le 
frontiere del '67 come eque. Quelle dell'ONU.
Ovviamente non si tratta di fornire armi ai palestinesi, piuttosto di 
fare pressione sia su di essi che su Israele perche' le armi non 
vengano usate, ne' dai deboli ne' dai forti.
Rafforzare economicamente e amministrativamente  i palestinesi e' 
quello che stanno gia' facendo varie organizzazioni, e anche l'UK. 
Quindi non mi sembra che la mia sia una posizione cosi' strana.
Forse *conviene* avere una visione piu' etica che machiavellica della 
politica... 

 occupato senza nessuna ragione bellica.
Pure gli egiziani espropriavano le terre ?
-- 
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 palestinese.O no?
E quindi?
Le condanne che contano sono quelle in tribunale.
Quando l'anp arresterà e condannera i lanciatori di razzi, Israele non 
avrà nessuna necessità di rispondere ai lanci. Nemmeno con queste 
legittime, misurate e modeste contromisure.
tb


 legittime, misurate e modeste contromisure.
rotfl


 ci sono vittime civili in queste risposte?
Per ora no. Ma a rigor di convenzione di ginevra potrebbero anche 
essercene moltissime.
Secondo te Israele ha diritto di rispondere a chi spara centinaia di 
razzi da oltreconfine?
Tb


 essercene moltissime.
davvero? la convenzione di ginevra dice che puoi ammazzare civili come
rappresaglia? mi pare un po' strano.
Mi citi esattamente il passaggio in cui dice che puo' ammazzare i civili
tonibaruch.


 tonibaruch.
Capitolo V, articolo 59, paragrafo 7
7. A locality loses its status as a non-defended locality when its 
ceases to fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 2
[la località rimane soggetta alle norme generali, quindi non si può 
radere al suolo indiscriminatamente come Grozny, ma accorre limitarsi a 
sparare contro obiettivi che offrano vantaggio bellico]
E il paragrafo 2 dice
2. The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as 
a non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where 
armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse 
Party. Such a locality shall fulfil the following conditions: (a) all 
combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must 
have been evacuated; (b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military 
installations or establishments; (c) no acts of hostility shall be 
committed by the authorities or by the population; and (d) no activities 
in support of military operations shall be undertaken.
Quindi, le località da dove partono lanci di missili si possono 
attaccare, incluse chiese, moschee ed ospedali, qualora sia accertato 
che i lanci partono da lì.
Il fatto che Israele, anziché aprire fuoco di controbatteria contro i 
lanciatori, abbia finora eliminato 4 terroristi in automobile, è quindi 
da considerarsi un mirabile esempio di auto-contenimento nella risposta.
No?


 tonibaruch.
Ancora più pregnante, questo
ART VI
Art. 65. Cessation of protection
1. The protection to which civilian civil defence organizations, their 
personnel, buildings, shelters and matériel are entitled shall not cease 
unless they commit or are used to commit, outside their proper tasks, 
acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after a 
warning has been given setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable 
time-limit, and after such warning has remained unheeded.
----
L'avvertimento è stato dato.
I cannoni sono schierati.
Già da un pezzo, Israele avrebbe potuto rispondere con fuoco di 
controbatteria contro i lanciatori, anche se si trovano nel mezzo di un 
villaggio.
Ma la difesa israeliana, sfortunatamente per te, non prevede -nemmeno 
come effetto collaterale- l'uccisione di quantità di civili.
Ecco perché (immagino con grande soddisfazione dell'anp), è stato fatto 
saltare in aria seletivamente quel lurido pezzo di merda di Khalil e la 
sua scorta. Più auto-limitazione di così...


 ps. ma un partito normale a gaza sara` mai possibile???
Solo se è in grado di difendersi militarmente dagli altri tre.
Altrimenti fa la fine dei "collaborazionisti".
Mirco

 > 
http://www.ict.org.il/arab_isr/arab-isr_frame.htm
http://www.ict.org.il/
Board of Directors
Shabtai Shavit  Chairman, Board of Directors, former director of the
Israeli Intelligence Agency (Mossad)
Aharon Scherf  Former director of Israel's Foreign Affairs Division
and senior official in Prime Minister's Office
E il centro studi antiterrorista dell'AVO cosa diceva, a proposito dei
"combattenti" uccisi dai Sovietici nel 1956?
GT

 Board of Directors
[cut]
Sei caduto di nuovo in una delle più infantili fallacie logiche: 
discutere l'autore, non l'argomentazione
Ciao ciao torrieri, torna pure quando ti sarai graduato all'asilo della 
dialettica.
Tb
-----
allego modi e glossario dello studio ICT
Data Gathering
The greatest care and effort in carrying out this project has been spent 
in gathering and evaluating enough information on each fatal incident to 
enable accurate classification of each claimed fatality. Reliable and 
detailed data on Israeli casualties of the al-Aqsa conflict has been 
relatively easy to find, as this information is extensively reported in 
Israeli and foreign newspapers, as well as various official and 
unofficial websites. Palestinian Arab fatalities present much greater 
difficulty, for several reasons:
     * Arab names are often long and complex; in many cases different 
sources give different casualty names for the same incident, and it is 
difficult to ascertain whether the different names in fact refer to the 
same person.
     * Detailed reports of Palestinian casualties are generally provided 
by Palestinian organizations and individuals; in some cases these 
reports are “slanted” or even fraudulent, due to pressures to paint 
Israel in as negative a light as possible.
     * The Israel Defense Forces do not keep a precise record (or at 
least have not so far provided such a record to us) of every time, 
place, and circumstance where weapons have been used; thus, certain 
Palestinian reports of fatalities due to Israeli fire cannot be 
confirmed or refuted. In many cases, we have given the Palestinian 
account of events the benefit of the doubt, even though the casualties 
may have resulted from Palestinian actions, rather than Israeli actions. 
In cases where the cause of death as reported by Palestinian sources is 
very much open to question, we have assigned a Low confidence Level to 
that particular casualty.
We have made extensive use of mainstream media outlets, both in Israel 
and abroad, for the details of al-Aqsa conflict incidents. Information 
on Palestinian casualties has been gathered from Arabic-language 
newspapers, cross-correlated with reports from human-rights 
organizations in Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Unfortunately, 
these sources generally disagree on many significant details, including 
the name, age, and circumstances of death of victims. It should be noted 
that, since no Israeli official body has been keeping records of Israeli 
actions and their results, the information reported by the Western media 
has come almost exclusively from Palestinian sources.
Categorization
In order to provide a better understanding of the nature and 
significance of al-Aqsa conflict incidents and casualties, we have 
classified them according to several criteria. This classification 
system is a reflection of our desire to improve upon the usual 
reportage, which – to give an extreme example – treats the death of a 
suicide bomber as equivalent to the death of one of his victims. A good 
system of classification, combined with carefully-gathered data, 
provides rich opportunities for analysis.
As the conclusions reached in this study are strongly influenced by the 
categories we have chosen for our analysis, it is important to 
understand these categories in some detail.
Incident Organization 	
This category is used to classify incidents, such as terror attacks, 
which can be attributed to a particular terrorist organization; it is 
used as well to identify the groups targeted by Israeli “targeted killings”.
Incident Type 	
This category provides a broad description of the type of incident that 
occurred; examples include “Terror Attack”, “Roadblock Confrontation”, 
and so on.
Attack Type 	
This is a more specific category, identifying the particular form of 
violence which led to injury or loss of life. Examples include “Car 
Bomb”, “Suicide Bomb”, and “Lynching”.
Incident Target 	
The Incident Target represents the immediate goal of an attack, as 
opposed to any broader political aims. Examples include “Civilian”, 
“Vehicle”, “Hotel”, and “Militant”.
Incident Confidence Level 	
This category reflects our considered opinion as to the reliability of a 
report. Confidence Level as applied to incidents represents the degree 
of certitude that the incident itself took place; applied to individual 
casualties, it represents the level of certainty that a particular 
individual was injured or killed in the incident. It is possible that an 
incident itself may have a high Confidence Level while some of the 
casualties attributed to the incident have a lower Confidence Level. 
This is the case where the incident itself was well attested, but some 
of the reports of casualties attributed to the incident were less reliable.
Confidence levels are as follows:
     * Extremely Low
     * Low
     * Questionable
     * High
     * Extremely High
Side Responsible for Incident 	
This category assigns responsibility for initiating an incident – for 
example, “Israel,” “Palestinians,” “Probably Israel,” “Probably 
Palestinians,” or “Unclear.” In the case of a terrorist attack on 
Israeli civilians by Palestinians, the Side Responsible is listed as 
“Palestinians”. The same is true of “work accidents.” In the case of a 
targeted killing of a Palestinian militant carried out by Israel, the 
Side Responsible is listed as “Israel.” In the majority of 
incidents—Roadblock Confrontations, Violent Clashes, etc—the Side 
Responsible is listed as “Unclear.”
Note that Side Responsible in this study refers to physical 
responsibility only, and does not indicate a moral judgement.
Side Responsible for Casualty 	
In the majority of incidents, assigning responsibility for an incident 
to one side or another is insufficient for purposes of analysis. An 
incident may be initiated by Palestinians—for instance, an armed attack 
by Hamas militants on an Israeli bus—but end with the militants being 
killed by Israelis. In such a case, the Side Responsible for Incident 
would be “Palestinians”, while the Side Responsible for Casualty would 
be “Israel” in the case of each militant, and “Palestinians” in the case 
of each Israeli casualty. There are also cases in which Palestinians 
killed Palestinians and Israelis killed Israelis.
As with Side Responsible for Incident, Side Responsible for Casualty 
represents only the physical responsibility for causing death or injury, 
and expresses no judgement as to the appropriateness of that action.
Combatant Level 	
This is one of our most significant ways of classifying casualties, and 
represents the degree to which someone killed or injured during the 
course of the al-Aqsa conflict can be considered an “innocent victim”. 
Our decisions in defining the Combatant Level categories and assigning 
casualties to these categories are made with reference to ICT’s 
published definition of terrorism, explained in Boaz Ganor’s article, 
“Terrorism: No Prohibition Without Definition”.
     * Non-Combatant
A non-combatant is an innocent bystander – a person whose death or 
injury has no justification other than nationality or ethnicity.
     * Health Related
A “health related” fatality is someone who died from a cause only 
indirectly related to violence – for example, due to a heart attack 
following an incident, tear-gas inhalation, or a roadblock delay that 
prevented an ilperson from receiving medical treatment in a timely manner.
     * Probable Combatant
A “probable combatant” is someone killed at a location and at a time 
during which an armed confrontation was going on, who appears most 
likely – but not certain – to have been an active participant in the 
fighting. For example, in many cases where an incident has resulted in a 
large number of Palestinian casualties, the only information available 
is that an individual was killed when Israeli soldiers returned fire in 
response to shots fired from a particular location. While it is possible 
that the person killed had not been active in the fighting and just 
happened to be in the vicinity of people who were, it is reasonable to 
assume that the number of such coincidental deaths is not particularly 
high. Where the accounts of an incident appear to support such a 
coincidence, the individual casualty has been given the benefit of the 
doubt, and assigned a non-combatant status.
     * Uniformed Non-Combatant
A “uniformed non-combatant” is a non-civilian, but is not actively 
involved in the conflict. This category can include civil police as well 
as soldiers in uniform but not at their post.
     * Violent Protester
A “violent protester” may be a civilian, but has chosen to take an 
active and violent part in the conflict – such as rioting or vigilante 
activity.
     * Protestor Unknown
A “protestor unknown” is anyone who was killed during a protest, for 
whom information as to violent behavior is unavailable.
     * Full Combatant
A “full combatant” is a soldier on active duty, an active member of a 
terrorist group, or a civilian independently choosing to perpetrate an 
armed attack on the opposing side. In general, rock-throwers are not 
considered to be combatants; an exception to this generalization would 
be, for example, someone dropping large rocks from a bridge onto 
fast-moving traffic. A rioter throwing "Molotov cocktails", grenades, or 
the like can be considered a full combatant.
Mere possession of a weapon does not imply combatant status. A civilian 
driving with a weapon in his/her car, or a pedestrian with a holstered 
pistol, is normally considered a noncombatant. However, a civilian who 
encounters a terror attack in progress and draws his/her weapon in an 
attempt to stop or prevent the attack is a combatant once the weapon is 
out of its holster.
     * Suspected Collaborator
This is a special category for Palestinian or Israeli Arabs targeted by 
militants who suspect them of aiding Israel.
     * Unknown
In a large number of cases, the information at hand has been 
insufficient to decide the circumstances of death for a given 
Palestinian casualty. As the project continues and additional 
information is accumulated, we believe that the number of “unknowns” 
will steadily decrease.


 discutere l'autore, non l'argomentazione
Si.  Se l'istituto che produce lo studio e' diretto dal capo di
un'organizzazione colpevole di terrorismo, tortura e uccisione
indiscriminata di civili, con lo studio e la sua metodologia mi ci
pulisco il culo.
Sono "contento" di sapere che tu non lo fai.
GT

 Si. 
Capisci l'errore, ma lo ripeti di continuo.
Eppoi fai un gulyash che fa cagare.
Come mai?
Tb



mi sono perso per caso la tua risposta su questi dati?
s.


 and senior official in Prime Minister's Office
a parte questo dettaglio su cui ho preferito sorvolare, i conti non tornano
e quelli fatti da tb - a meno che non ha usato altre fonti - ancora di meno.
Poi i dati sono fermi all'aprile 2004. C'e' una fonte che non sia israeliana
o palestinese sul conteggio delle vittime di questa guerra ?


>palestinesi uccisi?
Semplice, mi sono confuso.
I combattenti uccisi sono il 55%. Come da tabella.
70% è il numero dei civili israeliani ammazzati.


 politica...
Forse la giusta concezione e' un po' una mescolanza di questi due
estremi
Ciao
Riccardo

 o palestinese
B'tselem.  Un'organizzazione Israeliana ma indipendente dal governo e
dai servizi segreti (di QUALUNQUE stato).
http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Index.asp

 
http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Index.asp
Interessante.
Secondo te l'eliminazione di Khalil e dei tre "attivisti" che 
viaggiavano sulla sua auto come sarà classificata nelle statistiche di 
Betsalem? Un target e tre vittime collaterali, oppure quattro target?


Tb
vai sergio, scrivi sul calepino giallo limone delle cose da imparare:
quando dico una cazzata non mi devo arrampicare sugli specchi ma
ammettere che ho detto una cazzata... ;)
comunque, Tb, troppo buono. Mettendo da parte la tristezza di questi
calcoli, a me risulta 78% vittime civili israeliane causate da terr.
pal. : 715/920 = 0.777 e 35% di vittime civili palestinesi causate da
isr.: 972/2770 = 0.351. Se proprio si deve farlo, e` meglio
confrontare le pere con le pere, e le mele con le mele...
ciao

 Betsalem? Un target e tre vittime collaterali, oppure quattro target?
Non so.  Tu che dici?  Secondo la tua organizzazione imparziale diretta
dal Mossad, i tizi di cui si parla qua' sotto erano Targets o no?
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article314940.ece
 The Hebron confessions
As ex-soldiers speak out about seeing Palestinian civilians being
killed, Donald Macintyre talks to the victims' families
Published: 25 September 2005
Still dressed in the loose sharwal trousers that he wears for his work
as a gardener, the 22-year-old ex-soldier sits across the café table
in a central Tel Aviv shopping mall, and says that when he joined the
Israeli army he just "wanted to kill Arabs".
Like most of the other 300 ex-soldiers who have so far testified about
their experiences to Breaking the Silence, an organisation formed a
year ago by a group of young men who had done their military service in
Hebron, the soldier doesn't want to give his real name. But he tells
how his attitude gradually changed when he came into contact with
Palestinians and Bedouin for the first time and saw the long delays,
and sometimes harassment, faced by them at the checkpoints he manned in
the Jordan valley.
The ex-soldier, who joined the religious Nahal brigade despite having
already shed his own ultra-orthodox background, talks about "initiated
action" he saw when serving at the military base at the Psagot
settlement on the edge of Ramallah in early 2002, and to which he says
officers sometimes turned a blind eye.
Instead of carrying out the instructions to use their machine guns and
M16s only when fired at by Palestinians militants, he suggests, "a
soldier would say: 'Why let them decide when the shooting takes place?
Let's show them who's boss.'"
With time, he says, "the soldiers got the feeling that they were at a
firing range, and for every shot fired ... they'd fire hundreds of
bullets in return. There's no need to add that they hit innocent
people, and sometimes afterwards we saw ... ambulances arriving there.
Nobody cared that they were liable to hit innocent people, they found
the whole thing funny."
So far the testimonies gathered by Breaking the Silence have triggered
17 official Israel Defence Force investigations and one internal
disciplinary process. Three of the accounts (see panels) have also been
followed up by The Independent on Sunday with the families of the
victims.
They have also helped to fuel a growing debate within parts of Israeli
society and the media about many military operations during the present
conflict, which was ignited exactly five years ago this Friday.
Central to the rapid escalation of that conflict were attacks by
Palestinian suicide bombers which since October 2000 have claimed the
lives of 745 Israeli civilians, and wounded over 5,100. But the Israeli
human rights agency B'tselem estimates that some 1,700 Palestinian
civilians have also been killed in the same period - a figure which
many of these disturbing testimonies go some way to explaining.
Breaking the Silence contends that the inspiration for many orders,
which it says directly violate the international legal obligations of
an occupying power, came from the highest ranks. Certainly, Booomerang,
a new book by two prominent Israeli journalists, Ofer Shelah and Raviv
Druker, reports that at a conference of officers as early as May 2001,
Shaul Mofaz, now the Defence Minister but then Chief of Staff, asked
for the tape to be switched off before telling them that he wanted a
"price" exacted from the Palestinians of 10 killed a day on each of the
Army's seven fronts.
And after six Israeli soldiers were killed in Ein Arik in February
2002, the book says, Mr Mofaz personally ordered a revenge operation in
which for the first time Palestinian police officers would be shot,
whether they posed a threat or not. One soldier who took part in a raid
which killed four or five Palestinian policemen at a checkpoint 24
hours after Ein Arik told the IoS: "It felt bad even at that time. They
said Palestinian police are connected to terror and that the [killers]
passed through the checkpoint. Maybe the police are connected to terror
but for sure they didn't pass through all the checkpoints [attacked
that day]."
Much later, he says, the soldiers discussed the raid, using -
half-jocularly - the Hebrew term for a "terrorist attack" to describe
the operation: "Pigua." "Like they are doing terror attack to us and we
are doing it to them." This was also the period in which a tank shell
killed a woman and five children in Ramallah (see box, far right).
The IDF's conduct during more than four years of conflict was
highlighted this month when a former head of its southern command,
Major General Doron Almog, was advised not to get off his plane in
London because he faced arrest. A warrant was secured in Britain by a
Palestinian organisation for alleged war crimes under theGeneva
Conventions Act.
Unlike the 27 Israeli air force pilots who refused in 2003 to carry out
missions in the occupied territories at risk to civilian lives,
Breaking the Silence does not advocate refusal. But like the pilots,
its adherents see speaking out as a national obligation - a "patriotic
duty", as Avichai Sharon, the group's spokesman, puts it. "Ninety
percent of the 18,19, 20 year olds serving are regular, good decent
guys who come from good homes," he says, and many "feel corrupted" by
the nature of their service in the occupied territories.
His bag held explosives, the army said. It was pitta bread
Nablus, 18 December 2003
Paratroop sergeant: "We set up a machine gun position in the main
street of the [Nablus] Casbah, Firing orders were: anybody walking
around the Casbah at night was to be shot and killed. The order was
given us in a briefing by the squad commander. From what he told us,
the order originated with the Shomron brigade commander. The same order
was given many times ... And the answer was always: the info always
comes from the Shabak [Shin Bet, the domestic intelligence service].
How did the Shabak know that Ahmed the baker or Salim the carpenter
didn't have to get up at 3am for work?
"The sharpshooter's position, of which I was a part, identified a man
carrying a bag on Jama'a al Kabir [street] between 3 and 4am, I don't
remember. When this was reported,, the order was given to 'take him
down'. Killed. A man fell, something in the order of 70m from the
house. Then the jeep of the command post came and 'confirmed kill',
throwing two grenades on the body that smashed it completely. Then they
opened the bag to see what's in it and found: pitot (pitta breads).
Pitot.
"This thing was never investigated. The regiment commander cheers us
up. 'Listen guys, don't be demoralised. This man wasn't just walking
around innocently.' Of course he didn't have any substantive
information - 'Be assured that anyone walking round the Casbah at that
hour is no friend of Zion. He probably had a terrorist agenda, and you
performed a good job'"
Ala Adin Masud Adawiya 24, left home at around 2.30am on his second day
of work in the Silawi bakery in Nablus's old city. His 25-year-old
brother, Ayman, said he had just switched jobs to be nearer home. As
Ala Adin neared the square, he could see Israeli Army tanks massing.
Under strict instructions to tell his mother when he had reached the
bakery, he used his cellphone to report what he saw. His mother told
him to come back immediately, but never heard from him again. Ayman
went out to search for his brother in the narrow streets of the Casbah,
repeatedly trying to reach him on his mobile phone. "My mother was
weeping and praying," he says.
The Army, which said in early 2004 the victim had been identified as a
"terrorist" with Islamic Jihad, and that the bag contained explosives,
now acknowledges the shooting was a mistake. The family have a gruesome
video, made by a Palestinian TV company, of people crowding round his
multiply wounded body, in underpants soaked through with blood.
Why did the tank crew really fire?
Ramallah, 4 March 2002
Commander at tank position, Psagot settlement. Around 8am, as the
visiting battalion commander stood by, the tank fired three shells at a
police car in a populated area, but missed totally. The shells fell in
open ground. Later that morning, "the Battalion Commander left the
barracks, leaving me in command. He told me: 'If you see [policemen]
again, shoot'.
The commander receiving the order left his deputy in charge by the tank
and returned to his office - only to hear a few moments later the loud
boom of another shell. He ran back to the tank, where his equally
surprised deputy said he too had given no orders to fire. The explosion
from the shell was now sending up a black column of smoke from the
entrance to the Amari refugee camp.
Amazingly the commander says he did not demand to know why the tank
crew had fired without orders. But he told them to revert to previous
rules of engagement, and shoot only at targets who had "intent as well
as means" to do harm. He heard subsequently that one of the tank crew
"reacted emotionally" to what had happened and was moved to a
non-combat role, and that the tank and its crew were later replaced.
The only inquiry, he says, was carried out by a colonel heading an
investigating committee six months later, and he did not know the
outcome. He added: "I don't know if the initial order was legal, but it
was stupid. You can't fight like this all the time. You're taught means
and intent - and suddenly you are shooting for nothing." In his view,
such shelling may have been one element which escalated the conflict
into Operation Defensive Shield and full blown war.
Arafat al Masri, 16, and his four-year-old cousin Sheema had minutes
earlier climbed with four other children into a Subaru driven by
Arafat's uncle Imad. As they left al Amari camp, a Mitsubishi was
coming in the opposite direction. It was driven by Bushara Abu Kweik,
37, who was bringing her children - daughters Aziza, 14, and Bara'a,
13, and son Mohammed, 10 - home from school. At that moment the shell
struck, killing Arafat, Sheema, Mrs abu Kweik and her three children.
Arafat's father, Ibrahim al Masri is still convinced three years later
that his son died because of a failed assassination attempt on Mrs Abu
Kweik's husband Hussein, a prominent political figure in Hamas who ran
a local charity. But the testimony of the soldier, who has no vested
interest in supporting the official version that Mrs Abu Kweik's car
was not targeted, strongly indicates that the families' assumption is
wrong. The Army says the tank was attempting to hit armed Palestinian
police.
Mr al Masri said the loss of his son did not fully sink in until the
third day of mourning: "Then I missed him." He added: "I do not believe
in vengeance against Israelis. God will punish those that did it."
'No one thought we were going to shoot kids'
Nablus, 19 February 2003
Avichai Sharon, 24, elite unit, Golani Brigade. In late 2002, two men
in his unit, in an open backed vehicle during a search and arrest
operation, fired live ammunition at people throwing bricks at them. He
and fellow soldiers told the squad officer: "The rules of engagement
are not clear enough in this kind of situation. We don't have any
rubber bullets or tear gas or any alternatives other than our lethal
weapons." He says the men never got a reply.
While the squad was surrounding a house in Nablus a few months later,
one of its members fired at the legs of a teenager throwing stones. But
the boy was bending down to pick up a stone, and was instead shot in
the chest. Mr Sharon said the unit heard on the radio that the boy,
between 14 and 16, had been killed. "And then we just went back. We
finished our operation and continued our daily routine. There was no
questioning.
"No one did it intentionally. No one thought we were going to shoot
kids. Its just no one cares - it's just total disregard for human life.
Life is just totally cheap ... the guy that shot him really felt bad
about it, he was really uncomfortable."
Mohammed al Saber, 15, went off with some friends at the time of a
military operation. His brother Saed, 25, trying to piece together what
happened from Mohammed's friends, thought he had been on a roof at one
point. "They were eating biscuits; they were also playing with bottles.
They may have been throwing stones."
Mohammed was dead on arrival at Rafidia Hospital. The medical report
says he was shot by a bullet with an exit wound through the right
shoulder; there was another wound in his right leg. His father, Rabbia
al Saber, 58, says the shock of his son's death caused a stroke which
left him partially paralysed. Looking for a likeness of Mohammed, one
brother brought out a typical Fatah-produced "martyr" poster, depicting
him carrying a gun, but the family asked for it not to be photographed.
One said: "It makes him look like a soldier, but he wasn't. He was a
normal boy."
Still dressed in the loose sharwal trousers that he wears for his work
as a gardener, the 22-year-old ex-soldier sits across the café table
in a central Tel Aviv shopping mall, and says that when he joined the
Israeli army he just "wanted to kill Arabs".
Like most of the other 300 ex-soldiers who have so far testified about
their experiences to Breaking the Silence, an organisation formed a
year ago by a group of young men who had done their military service in
Hebron, the soldier doesn't want to give his real name. But he tells
how his attitude gradually changed when he came into contact with
Palestinians and Bedouin for the first time and saw the long delays,
and sometimes harassment, faced by them at the checkpoints he manned in
the Jordan valley.
The ex-soldier, who joined the religious Nahal brigade despite having
already shed his own ultra-orthodox background, talks about "initiated
action" he saw when serving at the military base at the Psagot
settlement on the edge of Ramallah in early 2002, and to which he says
officers sometimes turned a blind eye.
Instead of carrying out the instructions to use their machine guns and
M16s only when fired at by Palestinians militants, he suggests, "a
soldier would say: 'Why let them decide when the shooting takes place?
Let's show them who's boss.'"
With time, he says, "the soldiers got the feeling that they were at a
firing range, and for every shot fired ... they'd fire hundreds of
bullets in return. There's no need to add that they hit innocent
people, and sometimes afterwards we saw ... ambulances arriving there.
Nobody cared that they were liable to hit innocent people, they found
the whole thing funny."
So far the testimonies gathered by Breaking the Silence have triggered
17 official Israel Defence Force investigations and one internal
disciplinary process. Three of the accounts (see panels) have also been
followed up by The Independent on Sunday with the families of the
victims.
They have also helped to fuel a growing debate within parts of Israeli
society and the media about many military operations during the present
conflict, which was ignited exactly five years ago this Friday.
Central to the rapid escalation of that conflict were attacks by
Palestinian suicide bombers which since October 2000 have claimed the
lives of 745 Israeli civilians, and wounded over 5,100. But the Israeli
human rights agency B'tselem estimates that some 1,700 Palestinian
civilians have also been killed in the same period - a figure which
many of these disturbing testimonies go some way to explaining.
Breaking the Silence contends that the inspiration for many orders,
which it says directly violate the international legal obligations of
an occupying power, came from the highest ranks. Certainly, Booomerang,
a new book by two prominent Israeli journalists, Ofer Shelah and Raviv
Druker, reports that at a conference of officers as early as May 2001,
Shaul Mofaz, now the Defence Minister but then Chief of Staff, asked
for the tape to be switched off before telling them that he wanted a
"price" exacted from the Palestinians of 10 killed a day on each of the
Army's seven fronts.
And after six Israeli soldiers were killed in Ein Arik in February
2002, the book says, Mr Mofaz personally ordered a revenge operation in
which for the first time Palestinian police officers would be shot,
whether they posed a threat or not. One soldier who took part in a raid
which killed four or five Palestinian policemen at a checkpoint 24
hours after Ein Arik told the IoS: "It felt bad even at that time. They
said Palestinian police are connected to terror and that the [killers]
passed through the checkpoint. Maybe the police are connected to terror
but for sure they didn't pass through all the checkpoints [attacked
that day]."
Much later, he says, the soldiers discussed the raid, using -
half-jocularly - the Hebrew term for a "terrorist attack" to describe
the operation: "Pigua." "Like they are doing terror attack to us and we
are doing it to them." This was also the period in which a tank shell
killed a woman and five children in Ramallah (see box, far right).
The IDF's conduct during more than four years of conflict was
highlighted this month when a former head of its southern command,
Major General Doron Almog, was advised not to get off his plane in
London because he faced arrest. A warrant was secured in Britain by a
Palestinian organisation for alleged war crimes under theGeneva
Conventions Act.
Unlike the 27 Israeli air force pilots who refused in 2003 to carry out
missions in the occupied territories at risk to civilian lives,
Breaking the Silence does not advocate refusal. But like the pilots,
its adherents see speaking out as a national obligation - a "patriotic
duty", as Avichai Sharon, the group's spokesman, puts it. "Ninety
percent of the 18,19, 20 year olds serving are regular, good decent
guys who come from good homes," he says, and many "feel corrupted" by
the nature of their service in the occupied territories.
His bag held explosives, the army said. It was pitta bread
Nablus, 18 December 2003
Paratroop sergeant: "We set up a machine gun position in the main
street of the [Nablus] Casbah, Firing orders were: anybody walking
around the Casbah at night was to be shot and killed. The order was
given us in a briefing by the squad commander. From what he told us,
the order originated with the Shomron brigade commander. The same order
was given many times ... And the answer was always: the info always
comes from the Shabak [Shin Bet, the domestic intelligence service].
How did the Shabak know that Ahmed the baker or Salim the carpenter
didn't have to get up at 3am for work?
"The sharpshooter's position, of which I was a part, identified a man
carrying a bag on Jama'a al Kabir [street] between 3 and 4am, I don't
remember. When this was reported,, the order was given to 'take him
down'. Killed. A man fell, something in the order of 70m from the
house. Then the jeep of the command post came and 'confirmed kill',
throwing two grenades on the body that smashed it completely. Then they
opened the bag to see what's in it and found: pitot (pitta breads).
Pitot.
"This thing was never investigated. The regiment commander cheers us
up. 'Listen guys, don't be demoralised. This man wasn't just walking
around innocently.' Of course he didn't have any substantive
information - 'Be assured that anyone walking round the Casbah at that
hour is no friend of Zion. He probably had a terrorist agenda, and you
performed a good job'"
Ala Adin Masud Adawiya 24, left home at around 2.30am on his second day
of work in the Silawi bakery in Nablus's old city. His 25-year-old
brother, Ayman, said he had just switched jobs to be nearer home. As
Ala Adin neared the square, he could see Israeli Army tanks massing.
Under strict instructions to tell his mother when he had reached the
bakery, he used his cellphone to report what he saw. His mother told
him to come back immediately, but never heard from him again. Ayman
went out to search for his brother in the narrow streets of the Casbah,
repeatedly trying to reach him on his mobile phone. "My mother was
weeping and praying," he says.
The Army, which said in early 2004 the victim had been identified as a
"terrorist" with Islamic Jihad, and that the bag contained explosives,
now acknowledges the shooting was a mistake. The family have a gruesome
video, made by a Palestinian TV company, of people crowding round his
multiply wounded body, in underpants soaked through with blood.
Why did the tank crew really fire?
Ramallah, 4 March 2002
Commander at tank position, Psagot settlement. Around 8am, as the
visiting battalion commander stood by, the tank fired three shells at a
police car in a populated area, but missed totally. The shells fell in
open ground. Later that morning, "the Battalion Commander left the
barracks, leaving me in command. He told me: 'If you see [policemen]
again, shoot'.
The commander receiving the order left his deputy in charge by the tank
and returned to his office - only to hear a few moments later the loud
boom of another shell. He ran back to the tank, where his equally
surprised deputy said he too had given no orders to fire. The explosion
from the shell was now sending up a black column of smoke from the
entrance to the Amari refugee camp.
Amazingly the commander says he did not demand to know why the tank
crew had fired without orders. But he told them to revert to previous
rules of engagement, and shoot only at targets who had "intent as well
as means" to do harm. He heard subsequently that one of the tank crew
"reacted emotionally" to what had happened and was moved to a
non-combat role, and that the tank and its crew were later replaced.
The only inquiry, he says, was carried out by a colonel heading an
investigating committee six months later, and he did not know the
outcome. He added: "I don't know if the initial order was legal, but it
was stupid. You can't fight like this all the time. You're taught means
and intent - and suddenly you are shooting for nothing." In his view,
such shelling may have been one element which escalated the conflict
into Operation Defensive Shield and full blown war.
Arafat al Masri, 16, and his four-year-old cousin Sheema had minutes
earlier climbed with four other children into a Subaru driven by
Arafat's uncle Imad. As they left al Amari camp, a Mitsubishi was
coming in the opposite direction. It was driven by Bushara Abu Kweik,
37, who was bringing her children - daughters Aziza, 14, and Bara'a,
13, and son Mohammed, 10 - home from school. At that moment the shell
struck, killing Arafat, Sheema, Mrs abu Kweik and her three children.
Arafat's father, Ibrahim al Masri is still convinced three years later
that his son died because of a failed assassination attempt on Mrs Abu
Kweik's husband Hussein, a prominent political figure in Hamas who ran
a local charity. But the testimony of the soldier, who has no vested
interest in supporting the official version that Mrs Abu Kweik's car
was not targeted, strongly indicates that the families' assumption is
wrong. The Army says the tank was attempting to hit armed Palestinian
police.
Mr al Masri said the loss of his son did not fully sink in until the
third day of mourning: "Then I missed him." He added: "I do not believe
in vengeance against Israelis. God will punish those that did it."
'No one thought we were going to shoot kids'
Nablus, 19 February 2003
Avichai Sharon, 24, elite unit, Golani Brigade. In late 2002, two men
in his unit, in an open backed vehicle during a search and arrest
operation, fired live ammunition at people throwing bricks at them. He
and fellow soldiers told the squad officer: "The rules of engagement
are not clear enough in this kind of situation. We don't have any
rubber bullets or tear gas or any alternatives other than our lethal
weapons." He says the men never got a reply.
While the squad was surrounding a house in Nablus a few months later,
one of its members fired at the legs of a teenager throwing stones. But
the boy was bending down to pick up a stone, and was instead shot in
the chest. Mr Sharon said the unit heard on the radio that the boy,
between 14 and 16, had been killed. "And then we just went back. We
finished our operation and continued our daily routine. There was no
questioning.
"No one did it intentionally. No one thought we were going to shoot
kids. Its just no one cares - it's just total disregard for human life.
Life is just totally cheap ... the guy that shot him really felt bad
about it, he was really uncomfortable."
Mohammed al Saber, 15, went off with some friends at the time of a
military operation. His brother Saed, 25, trying to piece together what
happened from Mohammed's friends, thought he had been on a roof at one
point. "They were eating biscuits; they were also playing with bottles.
They may have been throwing stones."
Mohammed was dead on arrival at Rafidia Hospital. The medical report
says he was shot by a bullet with an exit wound through the right
shoulder; there was another wound in his right leg. His father, Rabbia
al Saber, 58, says the shock of his son's death caused a stroke which
left him partially paralysed. Looking for a likeness of Mohammed, one
brother brought out a typical Fatah-produced "martyr" poster, depicting
him carrying a gun, but the family asked for it not to be photographed.
One said: "It makes him look like a soldier, but he wasn't. He was a
normal boy."


 dal Mossad, i tizi di cui si parla qua' sotto erano Targets o no?
No. E' chiaramente specificato nell'introduzione allo studio.
