Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Cracks in Hamas

Jan. 18, 2009
Ehud Ya’ari ,
 21, February 2, 2009 f The Jerusalem Report.
As the fighting continued in Gaza, important changes took place in
Hamas - changes that will have a powerful effect at the end of the
war. Of course, Hamas leaders will crown themselves with the victors'
laurels and try to sell a tale of success. But as Israel's campaign
entered its third week, the were hard-pressed to find buyers for their
stories.
In the Arab world, an atmosphere of skepticism about Hamas's claims of
achievements on the battlefield prevailed, since, for the most part,
these claims have turned out to be little more than transparent lies.
The growing criticism was best expressed on the important Arabic
electronic newspaper ELAPH by Abd al-Fattah Shehadeh, who wrote on
January 9 that Hamas is hiding behind the civilian population instead
of defending it, as it had promised. Hamas, wrote Shehadeh, dug
bunkers and tunnels, instead of building shelters for the residents of
Gaza.
They brought catastrophe upon the Palestinians with the misguided
calculation they had learned from Hizballah: "They turned houses and
mosques into battlegrounds so that the people would protect them and
those who trusted them now regret it."
In this climate, it's no wonder that a senior Hamas leader in
Damascus, Muhamad Nazzal, has twice threatened to walk out of live
broadcasts on Arab TV networks because the scathing questions posed to
him were not to his liking. In one incident, Nazzal found it necessary
to deny that Gazans had shown resentment against Hamas - a rare, if
indirect, admission that a deep rift has opened up between Hamas and
its constituency.
The simple fact is that Hamas was not fighting in the areas penetrated
by the IDF, even though its defensive doctrine - drawn up under
Iranian supervision with the assistance of Hizballah - is based on an
attempt to stop the IDF's infantry brigades outside of Gaza City, or
at least to detain them.
Hamas abandoned the heart of "Qassamland" - the areas surrounding Beit
Lahiya, Beit Hanoun and Atatra - almost without resistance. The
offensive array of bunkers and tunnels, booby-trapped buildings
prepared for detonation from afar, and all the other tricks adopted by
Hamas were captured intact. From the perspective of the people of
Gaza, Hamas simply abandoned the arena and fled into the crowded
neighborhoods.
Once there, since the second day of the campaign, Hamas fighters have
hurriedly shed their uniforms. Many of them simply deserted and
returned to their families, taking their guns with them. In some
locations, Hamas prevented civilians from leaving neighborhoods that
were in the line of fire; overall, it invested great effort in
blocking civilians who wished to flee to the south of the Strip.
Hamas forcefully appropriated the few international aid deliveries,
hijacked ambulances in order to move from one location to another, and
carried out public executions of Fatah activists. In many cases, Hamas
fighters showed "forgiveness" and made do with shooting the Fatah men
in the legs.
All of this was going on while the entire political leadership of
Hamas was hiding in the basements of hospitals such as Shifa in Gaza
City or Kamal Adwan near Beit Lahiya.
Sporadically, they released videos from their places of hiding. The
rather pathetic impression they created is that of a leadership that
abandoned its population and was busy trying to save its own skin.
The same goes for the military leadership. The entire command of the
Izz-al-din al-Qassam Brigades went into hiding, leaving only rocket
crews to continue firing according to pre-prepared plans, to the
extent that they were able to do so. Gradually, the signs of distress
became evident here too, due to Israel's accurate hits from the air
and sea and tank fire on the rocket launchers.
Voices began to emerge from within Hamas - in particular from
activists in the West Bank, but also from Gaza - contending that the
movement's military wing not only carried out a putsch in June 2007
when it captured the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian Authority, but
did the same thing within the movement as well, taking over the
decision-making process in the political wing of the Palestinian
Muslim Brotherhood.
These critics contend that the organization thus dragged the Strip
into a premature and hopeless military conflict.
More than once, I have heard from sources close to Hamas that the
situation in Gaza is similar to the disaster that befell the Syrian
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, when its military wing, led
by Marwan Hadid, instigated an insurrection in Syria without the
authorization of the spiritual leadership. This resulted in the
massacre carried out by then-president Hafiz Asad in the town of Hamma
and the wholesale slaughter of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood
detainees at the Tadmor Prison.
To this day, in internal Muslim Brotherhood discourse, the "Hamma
Affair" is seen as the classic example of how not to do things.
The case of Gaza may well take its place in the same bracket.
What we have seen thus far during the fighting is a transformation of
Hamas from a government to an underground body, from a popular mass
movement to a loose group of armed gangs. This situation will not
necessarily continue for a long time, but its memory will not be
easily erased.
Hamas has the ability to rehabilitate itself and this should not be
taken lightly. But this time it will be hard to mollify Palestinian
public opinion. There is no enthusiasm for Hamas's period in power;
its fighting prowess has hardly inspired awe, and there is no longer
any faith in its leaders.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1232275660144&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull
---
"In queste condizioni, in qualunque stato occidentale si sarebbe
ragionato"   (Luca Logi / rodewalder / Golda Meir, febbraio 2008)
http://raionim.blogspot.com/2009/01/certo-che-i-qassam-sono-pericolosi_05.html

 its constituency.
Psst...
Non è bello ignorare così i dogmi che vedono nel palestinese un 
imbecille irrimediabile, disposto a seguire i suoi leader suicidi e 
omicidi, con tanto più entusiasmo tanto più lo spingono alla catastrofe.
Tb


tanto li volete ammazzare tutti, sarebbero idioti a non ricambiarvi


l'immagine dei soldati di Hamas che buttano via la divisa, magari,
potrebbe spiegare qualcosa sul numero delle vittime civili. Quanto
quella del prode leader che, in diretta alla TV (siriana!), se ne esce
sbattendo la porta. Elementi che sfuggono ai pirla, ai rossibruni e ai
dalemiani. Quindi non esistono.
---
"se il rischio è grave" (Luca Logi / rodewalder / Golda Meir, febbraio
2008)
http://raionim.blogspot.com/2009/01/certo-che-i-qassam-sono-pericolosi_05.html

quella del prode leader che, in diretta alla TV (siriana!),
Essere infastidito dai giornalisti televisivi di un regime amico è 
effettivamente una cosa che non capita spesso...
-- 
"Il Basileus che siede a Costantinopoli vince sempre".
Kekaumenos. 

 wrote:

Invece? Non hanno seguito i loro leaders fino alla catastrofe?

 effettivamente una cosa che non capita spesso...
L'Annunziata ha un po' tracciato la via...
-- 
Baci,
Mony

 L'Annunziata ha un po' tracciato la via...
Naaa, l'aveva già fatto il premier...


 Naaa, l'aveva già fatto il premier...
Ma non con giornalisti di un regime amico.
-- 
Baci,
Mony

 Ma non con giornalisti di un regime amico.
Neanche l'Annunziata.


 Neanche l'Annunziata.
Sempre succursali di Telekabul, no?
-- 
Baci,
Mony