Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: la guerra trasformata (english)

 The War on Terror Turns Into War on Afghanistan  
William Pfaff International Herald Tribune 
Saturday, November 3, 2001  
 
PARIS- What set out to be an American war on terrorism has become a
war against Afghanistan. The substitution of Afghanistan for
terrorism, or the identification of the one with the other, is not
only unjust but diverts U.S. policy from where it was intended to go,
to where it is the most simple to go.
Afghanistan has been substituted for terrorism because Afghanistan is
accessible to military power, and terrorism is not. The employment of
high-tech munitions against irrelevant targets is a distraction from
measures that actually deal with the threat.
"War" is feasible against Qaida, the clandestine association of
like-minded Muslim fundamentalists led by Osama bin Laden, because it
is a matter of police and intelligence work. Remarkable progress has
been made during the last four weeks, thanks to unprecedented
international cooperation.
However, Qaida is not identical with terrorism. Nor is bin Laden
himself, even though Washington has cast him as the personification of
evil. Terrorism is simply a form of violent political action, with
political motives and objectives, and it is a recurrent phenomenon in
history. Washington's inability to track down and seize or kill bin
Laden is why the Taliban government has been substituted as America's
enemy. The Kabul government's defiance is in turn responsible for the
situation of frustration in which the United States finds itself, and
which threatens to prove a damaging setback in more than one respect.
Fear of American air attacks have provoked a huge exodus of refugees
from Afghanistan. The country is already suffering the consequences of
a drought that has crippled its agriculture. The attacks themselves
have made it all but impossible for relief agencies to go into the
country. Misdirected bombings that have twice hit International Red
Cross relief depots add to the misery the United States is inflicting
upon these people, and for which international opinion holds it
responsible.
The utility of the bombings is hard to defend. It was believed able to
bring down the Taliban government, but that is not happening. There is
no reason whatever to expect more bombs to make the Taliban
authorities hand over bin Laden. The administration itself lacks
confidence that an eventual ground expedition will seize him;
Afghanistan is not Panama.
The original plan depended less on bombing than on organization of the
existing military and political opposition; cutting off the support
Pakistan was giving to the regime; and enlistment of the country's
other neighbors, including Iran, all with ethnic or religious clients
inside Afghanistan. The authority of the former king and the United
Nations was to underwrite a new coalition government. This plan has
suffered a series of setbacks, and official Washington is rapidly
losing interest in political solutions. There is an increasing
disposition toward brute force, and the use of whatever allies are at
hand, even if that threatens to leave Afghanistan in chaos, and the
war on terrorism stranded.
One might think it sensible to change a policy that is failing, but
that is not the case in a government whose primordial motivation is to
appease Congress and the media. Although bin Laden has not been found,
operations against Qaida seem to be going well. An extensive apparatus
for tracking terrorist communications, organizations and funding is
being put into place. The United States and its allies could take
advantage of these successes, and of the arrival of Ramadan and
Afghanistan's harsh winter to suspend the bombings. The situation in
Afghanistan and among Washington's Muslim allies could be allowed to
evolve over the winter months. The result might prove constructive.
Washington might take the time to reflect on its responsibility, which
is to deal intelligently with the terrorist threat to the United
States. Bin Laden and his group are merely instances of that threat.
If he is killed, he will be replaced. The causes of terrorism will
remain, and they are political. Afghanistan and its people are no
threat to the United States, but they are the ones taking the full
weight of America's indignation. The administration's priorities are
upside-down.
Los Angeles Times Syndicate. 
 Copyright © 2001 The International Herald Tribune 
http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&ArticleId=37717

 weight of America's indignation. 
L'articolista si dimentica che a quanto sappiamo, i terroristi di Al Qaeda
provengono in buona parte dalla 55° Brigata "Araba". Araba, cioè, composta
non da afgani ma da sauditi ecc., però pur sempre integrata nell'esercito
talebano (anzi, la sua unità scelta), che serviva come base di reclutamento
ed addestramento per coloro che poi diventavano terroristi all'estero.
Coloro che fanno attualmente parte di questa unità  _sono_ una minaccia per
l'Occidente, e l'eliminazione e/o la neutralizzazione di questi terroristi
in fieri è un obiettivo pratico e più che legittimo della campagna in
corso. Questa brigata è un bell'esempio della sovrapposizione tra
"terrorismo internazionale" e talebani. Ecco perchè non è un "bersaglio
irrilevante".
Saluti,
Marco