Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Al Qaeda e' finita?

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/01/al-qaeda-on-the-ropes-one-fighter-s-inside-story.print.html
 
 
Al Qaeda on the Ropes: One Fighter's Inside Story
 
A young jihadist returns to his former unit on the Afghan border and
finds only the desperate remnants of bin Laden’s once-dreaded
organization.
 
by Sami Yousafzai , Ron Moreau  | January 2, 2012 12:00 AM EST
 
Deep among North Waziristan’s mountains, far from any village, Hafiz
Hanif finally tracked down the remnants of his old al Qaeda cell last
summer. The 17-year-old Afghan had wondered why he hadn’t heard from
his former comrades in arms. They didn’t even answer his text messages
in May, after the death of the man they all called simply the Sheik:
Osama bin Laden. Now Hanif saw why. Only four of the cell’s 15
fighters were left, huddled in a two-room mud-brick house, with little
or no money or food. Except for their familiar but haggard faces, they
looked nothing like the al Qaeda he once trained with and fought
beside. They welcomed him warmly but didn’t encourage him to stay.
They said the cell’s commander, a Kuwaiti named Sheik Attiya
Ayatullah, had gone into hiding. The others had either run off or
died. “Why should we call you back just to get killed in a drone
attack?” Hanif’s friends explained.
 
Is it still too soon to write al Qaeda’s obituary? Over the past two
years, the group’s ranks have been ravaged by America’s unmanned-
aerial-vehicle attacks and by a steady exodus of demoralized jihadis
fleeing Pakistan’s tribal areas. When Newsweek interviewed Hanif (his
nom de guerre) for our Sept. 13, 2010, cover story, “Inside Al Qaeda,”
he estimated that the group had roughly 130 Arabs in Waziristan, along
with dozens more Chechens, Turks, Tajiks, even recruits from Western
Europe. But little more than a year later, he estimates there are no
more than 40 to 60 al Qaeda operatives of any nationality on either
side of the border. “Al Qaeda was once full of great jihadis, but no
one is active and planning opera-tions anymore,” he complains. “Those
who remain are just trying to survive.”
 
The son of longtime Afghan war refugees living in Pakistan, Hanif had
just turned 15 when (against his parents’ strenuous objections) he ran
away to join the war against the U.S. forces in his home country. That
was in early 2009, and for the next year and more, the bright but
impressionable boy lived among al Qaeda fighters in the isolated wilds
of North Waziristan. His parents finally persuaded him to return home
in June 2010, but he headed out again this past June in hope of
reconnecting with his old unit. He was shocked by what he found. “The
flower is wilting,” he told a Newsweek correspondent who met with him
in December in a Taliban safe house near the Afghan town of Khost. “I
think the once-glorious chapter of al Qaeda is being closed.”
 
Few Americans share Hanif’s regret at the terrorist group’s decline.
But by all accounts, al Qaeda has been practically wiped out in its
former Afghan and Pakistani strongholds. Although America has
suspended its drone attacks inside Pakistan since mid-November—the
program’s longest hiatus in three years—the respite seems to have come
too late for bin Laden’s old associates. “The drone attacks may have
ended, but only after the near ending of al Qaeda in the tribal
areas,” says a senior Taliban intelligence officer who has been in
contact with surviving members of the group. “As far as I can tell,
the operational command of al Qaeda has almost been eliminated.”
Hanif’s uncle, a Taliban operative, tells Newsweek he’s been in
contact with a few al Qaeda members who have taken refuge outside the
tribal areas. “All of al Qaeda’s assets who had a strategic vision
have been eliminated,” they’ve told him.
 
Hanif says it’s been months since anyone in Waziristan has seen or
heard directly from bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The
Egyptian-born physician did post a video message on Dec. 1 boasting
that al Qaeda had seized aid worker Warren Weinstein, a 70-year-old
American, in Lahore—as if holding one old man hostage was an
achievement. “I think the martyrdom of our great Sheik was the end,”
Hanif says. “As long as the Sheik was alive, our leaders were strong
and were determined to fight. But his death and the drones have sucked
the blood out of our leadership. Now leaders seem to spend all their
time moving from one place to another for their safety.” Lying low
didn’t save Sheik Ayatullah; the drones got him soon after Hanif’s
return to Waziristan.
 
New recruits have stopped coming, Hanif says. “When new people came
they brought new blood, enthusiasm, and money. All that has been
lost.” The money may be a bigger problem than the manpower, he says.
Al Qaeda used to receive millions of dollars a year from Arabian Gulf
contributors, but Hanif’s uncle says his contacts tell him the
donations have dried up. Instead, he believes, the money is going to
the more productive and generally nonviolent Arab Spring movements in
North Africa, Syria, and Yemen. “I think Arab people now think the
fight should be political at home and not terrorism aimed at the
West,” says the uncle. “The peaceful struggle on Arab streets has
accomplished more than bin Laden and Zawahiri ever have.”
Ayman Al-Zawahri
 
Hanif recalls how al Qaeda logistics operatives used to visit his unit
to ask what the men needed in terms of weapons, medicine, food, and
money. And he used to love making supply runs to the bazaar in North
Waziristan’s capital, Miran Shah, with pockets full of cash for sweets
and tea and to use the Internet. The town is still thronged with
Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, shopping side by side with Pakistani
soldiers, but now the Arabs have mostly vanished, and the shops
specializing in olive oil, Arabian dates, and other Arab favorites are
deserted or closed. Fighters subsist on minimal rations—if they aren’t
left to fend for them-selves. That’s not easy, since al Qaeda has few
friends in the area. Villagers fear that bin Laden’s men could bring
drone strikes and the danger of civilian casualties, and al Qaeda has
nothing left to offer local militants. The group is broke, and most of
its best explosives and technical specialists have either died or left
the vicinity. There aren’t even enough fighters left to act as
reinforcements.
 
Still determined to rejoin the jihad, Hanif enlisted in the Taliban-
allied Pashtun army led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. Ever fearful of the
drones, the network’s top commander keeps a low profile these days,
says Hanif. When traveling, Haqqani covers his face with a scarf that
hides all but his eyes. (Most of his lieutenants and bodyguards do the
same.) Although he and his men fit into tribal life in a way that al
Qaeda’s Arabs never could, the Haqqani leadership takes no chances,
evidently convinced that the region is rife with locals in the pay of
the CIA. As a result, Haqqani employs a brutal and feared hit squad of
masked men called the Khurasan force, which has murdered, and in many
cases beheaded, scores of suspected spies.
 
Hanif says he spent the next five months with the Haqqanis and took
part in several cross-border raids into Afghanistan—“picnics,” his
fellow fighters called them. “We’d cross the border on operations of
one, two, or three days; make short, sharp attacks; and then return,”
he says. “Crossing into Afghanistan is easier than ever. There’s no
one to stop us.” When Haqqani fighters run into Pakistani troops, they
just keep going, Hanif says; they’re never challenged. “I think
there’s an understanding,” he says.
 
He says the network’s fighters are brave, but they’re not as
disciplined and pious as al Qaeda fighters were. “Fifty percent of
these young mujahedin are looking for something to do,” Hanif says.
“They’re not really fighting for Islam.” Even so, he likes their
fighting spirit. “They may be careless and not religiously motivated,
but they are good jihadis.”
 
He isn’t sure what he’ll do next. At present he’s taking time off from
the war, staying with relatives in Afghan-istan. He says he’s still
determined to rid Afghanistan of Americans and foreign influence and
to reestablish Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Islamic Emirate, although he’s
disappointed that al Qaeda can no longer help him achieve those goals.
He stays in touch with his parents by phone, and they keep urging him
to return home to Ka-rachi, get married, and perhaps go into business.
Hanif hates the idea. To do so, he says, would be a betrayal of his
political and religious beliefs. Still, he says, he’s thinking of
going home—just for a little while.
Tags:

 Al Qaeda on the Ropes: One Fighter's Inside Story
 
Bisognerà retrospettivamente riconoscere che, pur in una sequenza
catastrofica di errori e tragedie tattiche, la strategia di Bush era stata
formulata abbastanza correttamente nei tempi (una guerra che sarebbe durata
anni) e alla fine ha vinto, lasciandoci un MO incasinato, com'è
inevitabile, ma molto meno ostile e pericoloso di prima.
 
 
-- 
Io non gufo l'Inter. Le spacco le corna.

 Al Qaeda on the Ropes: One Fighter's Inside Story
 
Al Qaeda fù creata dagli Stati Uniti, in particolare fù un prodotto della
destra conservatrice americana. Se ‘al Qaeda’ non è mai esistita, poco
importa, la si inventa e la si chiama in causa per giustificare le guerre
all’estero e il giro di vite sulle libertà personali!
Chi la ha creata la ha fatta esistere virtualmente attraverso la stampa i
comunicati stampa, la propaganda e le bugie intenzionali che hanno tentato
di abbindolare il pubblico americano!
 
Bin Laden dovrebbe pagare un canone alla destra conservatrice degli Stati
Uniti poichè egli è stato beneficiario di una celebrità improvvisa,è stato
elevato ad arci nemico degli Stati Uniti! La sua persona è falsamente
caratterizzata dal ‘mega-terrorista’ ideatore di una sinistra
Organizzazione terroristica che assomiglia ad una piovra con tentacoli in
ogni attacco terroristico reale o fittizio. Non si era mai visto nulla di
simile, per lo meno da quando Bond aveva combattuto SPECTRE,
un’organizzazione terroristica malvagia,specializzata nel terrorismo e
nell’estorsione. La parte di Blofeld è interpretata da Bin Laden.
 
E’ tutta una bufala!
 
E ‘stata la CIA a creare quell’immagine di Bin Laden che lo vede come
sinistro terrorista, che comanda una rete capillare in tutto il mondo
dalle profondità di una grotta a Tora Bora. Una fiction scarsa. Molti
produttori di Hollywood avrebbero riso dai loro uffici sentendo una trama
del genere! Sembra la brutta copia di Ali baba e i 40 ladroni. L’immediata
accettazione della teoria ufficiale di Bush dimostra lo scarso QI di
coloro che insistono nel crederci. La consolazione è questa: la CIA non ha
alcun futuro a Hollywood!
Una ciofeca di b-movie!
Secondo la versione ufficiale della menzogna (caritatevolmente: del
‘mito’) la storia fù questa: la CIA e l’Arabia Saudita finanziarono ed
armarono Bin Laden per tutti gli anni 80. La sua missione? impossibile:
scatenare la jihad contro l’occupazione russa dell’Afghanistan. In
effetti, Bin Laden stava lavorando per la CIA.
Semplicemente-Al-Qaeda significa “la base”, in questo caso- il database
dei computer contenenti i dati di migliaia di mujaheddin addestrati e
reclutati dalla CIA. La missione: sconfiggere i russi. Questa è roba da
James Bond durante la guerra fredda solamente scritta male. La vita, a
volte, imita i film di spionaggio.
Il problema è emerso nel corso del tempo: Washington non sapeva cosa fare
con questo ‘database’,questo network ormai obsoleto, dopo la dissoluzione
dell’Unione Sovietica. Bin Laden fù solo il capro espiatorio ideale per un
lavoro interno che sarebbe diventato il pretesto, l’uomo nero, citato per
giustificare una guerra per le risorse petrolifere nell’Iraq e per il
papavero (oppio) in Afghanistan.
L’inventore del nome ‘al Qaeda’ è Sir Robin Cook, l’ex ministro degli
Esteri britannico. Cook si dimise dal suo lavoro, per evitare possibili
scandali.
 
 
 
-- 
 
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 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:531443905347191161.678...@news.eternal-september.org...

mah, la strategia di Bush ha prodotto dei mutamenti radicali che certamente 
aprono scenari del tutto nuovi, alcuni positivi, altri negativi. Da un punto 
di vista americano queste guerre hanno dissanguato l'economia mettendo in 
forse la capacità americana di intraprendere azioni di portata analoga per 
molti anni nel caso si configurasse una situazione di necessità reale di 
intervento, a meno di non produrre ulteriori gravi dissesti finanziari 
nazionali e non solo. Curiosamente i maggiori beneficiati sono quei popoli 
che hanno visto smuovere le acque della politica e della storia nel proprio 
paese dopo decenni di immobilismo. In talune situazioni tuttavia ciò è stato 
possibile solo grazie al ritiro degli stessi cordoni americani dovuto 
all'impossibilità finanziaria di tenere in piedi "la baracca". Forse una 
vittoria di Pirro per gli americani, un futuro del tutto nuovo per molti ma 
a spese poi di chi? La situazione egiziana ne è un chiaro esempio. 
 

 inevitabile, ma molto meno ostile e pericoloso di prima.
 
Se noti, le rivolte (che tu reputi pericolose e incontrollabili) hanno
convinto molti più arabi che democrazia e elezioni fossero la strada
giusta di quanto abbia fatto l'invasione irachena, lo dice lo stesso
articolo di cui sopra.
 
Putacaso invece queste rivolte a te preoccupano, e sotto sotto
preferivi tenerti il buon vecchio Mubarak, sbirciando preoccupato ad
ogni suo starnuto di ottuagenario.

 wrote:

Non stai capendo, ma fa niente
 
 
-- 
recoil is insignificant when there is a tiger on the head of your elephant


Tafazzi è così imbecille che si incapretta anche davanti ad Antola, il
tifoso dei vagoni piombati per negri dell'AV

 Non stai capendo, ma fa niente
 
Non sei sereno. Inoltre, non hai letto l'articolo...

 Non sei sereno. 
 
Non stai capendo, ma fa niente.


tifoso dei vagoni piombati per negri dell'AV
 
AHAHAHHAHAHAHH il capetto e il sottoposto ai ferri corti... anche nel
regno del bacherozzo ci sono le rivolte... scommetto che per un po'
dovr� scordarsi le lucidate di culetto.

 dovr scordarsi le lucidate di culetto.
 
ma no, Antola fa apposta a fare il boy dispettoso, così dà al master
la scusa per "punirlo"