Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: "The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak"

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67348/carrie-rosefsky-wickham/the-muslim-brotherhood-after-mubarak?page=show
"The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak"
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham
With the end of the Mubarak era looming on the horizon, speculation has 
turned to whether the Muslim Brotherhood will dominate the new Egyptian 
political landscape. As the largest, most popular, and most effective 
opposition group in Egypt, it will undoubtedly seek a role in creating a 
new government, but the consequences of this are uncertain. Those who 
emphasize the risk of "Islamic tyranny" aptly note that the Muslim 
Brotherhood originated as an anti-system group dedicated to the 
establishment of sharia rule; committed acts of violence against its 
opponents in the pre-1952 era; and continues to use anti-Western, 
anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric. But portraying the Brotherhood 
as eager and able to seize power and impose its version of sharia on an 
unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features of 
the Brotherhood while ignoring others, and underestimates the extent to 
which the group has changed over time.
Founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has had the 
longest continuous existence of any contemporary Islamist group. It was 
initially established not as a political party but as a da'wa (religious 
outreach) association that aimed to cultivate pious and committed 
Muslims through preaching, social services, and spreading religious 
commitment and integrity by example. The group saw its understanding of 
Islam as the only "true" one and condemned partisanship as a source of 
national weakness. It called on Egyptians to unite to confront the 
forces of Zionism and imperialism and pursue economic development and 
social justice.
The Free Officers' Movement, which seized power in Egypt in 1952, was 
influenced by the Brotherhood and shared many of its concerns. But the 
new regime headed by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser did not support the 
Brotherhood's call for sharia rule and viewed the group as a potential 
rival. After a member of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser 
in 1954, Nasser had the pretext he needed to try to crush the 
organization -- interning thousands of its members in desert 
concentration camps and forcing others into exile or underground.
The leaders of the Brotherhood learned very different lessons from their 
experience during the Nasser years. Some, like the Brotherhood ideologue 
Sayyid Qutb, became radicalized and concluded that the only way to 
confront the vast coercive powers of the modern state was through jihad. 
Hasan al-Hudaybi, who succeeded Banna as the Brotherhood's General 
Guide, or leader, advocated moving toward greater judiciousness and 
caution. Umar Tilmisani, who succeeded Hudaybi in 1972, renounced 
violence as a domestic strategy altogether when then President Anwar 
el-Sadat allowed the group to join the political fold.
Individuals affiliated with the reformist faction of the Brotherhood, 
whether still active in the group or not, appear to be the most involved 
in leading Egypt's popular uprising. Beginning in 1984, the Brotherhood 
started running candidates in elections for the boards of Egypt's 
professional syndicates and for seats in parliament -- first as junior 
partners to legal parties and later, when electoral laws changed, as 
independents. Some of the group's leaders opposed participation, fearing 
that the Brotherhood would be forced to compromise its principles. But 
Tilmisani and others justified political participation as an extension 
of the Brotherhood's historic mission and assured critics that it would 
not detract from the Brotherhood's preaching and social services.
Although the Brotherhood entered the political system in order to change 
it, it ended up being changed by the system. Leaders who were elected to 
professional syndicates engaged in sustained dialogue and cooperation 
with members of other political movements, including secular Arab 
nationalists. Through such interactions, Islamists and Arabists found 
common ground in the call for an expansion of public freedoms, 
democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law, all of 
which, they admitted, their movements had neglected in the past.
By the early 1990s, many within the Brotherhood were demanding internal 
reform. Some pushed for revising the Brotherhood's ideology, including 
its positions on party pluralism and women's rights. Others criticized 
the old guard's monopoly of power within the Brotherhood's Guidance 
Bureau, demanding greater transparency, accountability, and stricter 
conformity with the internal by-laws governing the selection of leaders 
and the formation of policy.
In 1996, increasingly frustrated with the old guard's inflexible 
leadership, some prominent members of the "reformist" wing broke from 
the Brotherhood and sought a government license to form a new political 
party, Hizb al-Wasat (Center Party). Wasat leaders who used to be in the 
Brotherhood, along with a few reformers who remained in its fold, helped 
launch the cross-partisan Movement for Change, known by its slogan, 
Kefaya (Enough) between 2004 and 2005. They worked with secular 
democracy activists on such projects as creating a civic charter and a 
constitution, preparing for the time when a new democratic government 
came to power. During the past week of protests, members of these 
cross-partisan groups were able to quickly reactivate their networks to 
help form a united opposition front. These members will likely play a 
key role in drafting Egypt's new constitution.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood itself has been stunted in comparison to its 
analogues in Morocco and Turkey because of its constant vulnerability to 
repression combined with the parochial mindset of its aging leaders. 
Nevertheless, important changes, representing a departure from the 
group's anti-system past, have occurred. Over the last 30 years, 
Brotherhood leaders have become habituated to electoral competition and 
representation, developed new professional competencies and skills, and 
forged closer ties with Egyptian activists, researchers, journalists, 
and politicians outside the Islamist camp. Calls for self-critique and 
self-reform have opened heated debates on policy matters that were once 
left to the discretion of the General Guide and his close advisers. And 
although the Brotherhood was never a monolith, its leadership is more 
internally diverse today than ever before.
The factions defy easy categorization, but there seem to be three major 
groups. The first may be called the da'wa faction. It is ideologically 
conservative and strongly represented in the Brotherhood's Guidance 
Bureau and local branch offices. Its main source of power is its control 
over bureaucratic operations and allocation of resources. Because it has 
also managed to control the socialization of new recruits, it has 
cultivated loyalty among the youth, particularly in rural areas. The 
second faction, who we might call pragmatic conservatives, seems to be 
the group's mainstream wing. This group combines religious conservatism 
  with a belief in the value of participation and engagement. Most of 
the Brotherhood's members with legislative experience, including such 
long-time parliamentarians as Saad al-Katatni and Muhammad Mursi, fall 
into this category. The final faction is the group of reformers who 
chose to remain with the Brotherhood rather than breaking off. 
Advocating a progressive interpretation of Islam, this trend is weakly 
represented in the Guidance Bureau and does not have a large following 
among the Brotherhood's rank and file. Yet 'Abd al-Mun'em Abu Futuh, 
arguably the Brotherhood's most important reformist figure, has become 
an important model and source of inspiration for a new generation of 
Islamist democracy activists -- inside and outside the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Interestingly, Futuh first suggested that the Brotherhood 
throw its weight behind a secular reform candidate last February, 
prefiguring the Brotherhood's support for Mohamed El Baradei, the 
opposition's de facto leader, today.
Individuals affiliated with the reformist faction of the Brotherhood, 
whether still active in the group or not, appear to be the most involved 
in leading Egypt's popular uprising. It is not surprising, for example, 
that the reformist blogger Mustafa Naggar is one of the chief spokesman 
for El Baradei's National Coalition for Change. Still, the Brotherhood's 
participation has been low profile. It did not officially mobilize until 
January 28, days after the protests began. And unlike in previous 
demonstrations, when members of the Brotherhood held up copies of the 
Koran and shouted slogans such as "Islam is the solution," religious 
symbols have been conspicuously absent this time.
The Brotherhood knows from experience that the greater its role, the 
higher the risk of a violent crackdown -- as indicated by the harsh wave 
of repression that followed its strong showing in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections. Its immediate priority is to ensure that President Hosni 
Mubarak steps down and that the era of corruption and dictatorship 
associated with his rule comes to an end. To achieve that, the 
Brotherhood, along with other opposition groups, is backing El Baradei. 
The Brotherhood also knows that a smooth transition to a democratic 
system will require an interim government palatable to the military and 
the West, so it has indicated that it would not seek positions in the 
new government itself. The Brotherhood is too savvy, too pragmatic, and 
too cautious to squander its hard-earned reputation among Egyptians as a 
responsible political actor or invite the risk of a military coup by 
attempting to seize power on its own.
Still, it is unclear whether the group will continue to exercise 
pragmatic self-restraint down the road or whether its more progressive 
leaders will prevail. Such reformers may be most welcome among the other 
opposition groups when they draft a new constitution and establish the 
framework for new elections, but they do not necessarily speak for the 
group's senior leadership or the majority of its rank and file. It 
remains to be seen whether the Brotherhood as an organization -- not 
only individual members -- will accept a constitution that does not at 
least refer to sharia; respect the rights of all Egyptians to express 
their ideas and form parties; clarify its ambiguous positions on the 
rights of women and non-Muslims; develop concrete programs to address 
the nation's toughest social and economic problems; and apply the same 
pragmatism it has shown in the domestic arena to issues of foreign 
policy, including relations with Israel and the West. Over time, other 
parties -- including others with an Islamist orientation -- may provide 
the Brotherhood with some healthy competition and an impetus to further 
reform itself.
The Brotherhood has demonstrated that it is capable of evolving over 
time, and the best way to strengthen its democratic commitments is to 
include it in the political process, making sure there are checks and 
balances in place to ensure that no group can monopolize state power and 
that all citizens are guaranteed certain freedoms under the law. In the 
foreign policy domain, the Brotherhood rails against "U.S. and Zionist 
domination," demands the recognition of Palestinian rights, and may one 
day seek to revise the terms of Egypt's relationship with Israel through 
constitutional channels. The Brotherhood will likely never be as 
supportive of U.S. and Israeli interests in the region as Mubarak was. 
Yet here too, the best way for the United States to minimize the risk 
associated with the likely increase in its power is to encourage and 
reward judiciousness and pragmatism. With a track record of nearly 30 
years of responsible behavior (if not rhetoric) and a strong base of 
support, the Muslim Brotherhood has earned a place at the table in the 
post-Mubarak era. No democratic transition can succeed without it.
-- 
Namib
"Curialitas enim, frater carissime, est una de proprietatibus Dei" 
(Francesco d'Assisi)

Am.
Ti rendi conto che cazzata hai detto?
Quella dei fratelli musulmani non è un'organizzazione democratica, ma
fondamentalista, totalitaria. Se prende il potere, l'Egitto diventa
come l'Iran. La prima cosa che faranno sarà di liberarsi di tutte le
forze concorrenti. Non a caso, appena prese il potere Komeini fece
fuori centinaia di migliaia di comunisti iraniani, che pure l'avevano
fortemente aiutato. Contenti voi...
Bisogna vietare che qualsiasi partito religioso possa partecipare ad
elezioni. Finchè lo potranno fare, non ci sarà libertà per i popoli
islamici. Queste rivolte laiche stanno tramutandosi in confessionali
prima ancora di potere riuscire a mettere insieme un governo
provvisorio.
La democrazia è un "gioco" che può essere giocato solo da soggetti
democratici. Se arriva un soggetto totalitario e se dovesse vincere le
elezioni, si ingoia lo Stato intero con tutti i cittadini, com'è già
successo nella Germania degli anni '30.
Venire fuori da questa imprudenza ci è costata qualcosa come 60
milioni di morti: la seconda guerra mondiale.
Le elezioni vinte dal FIS in Algeria e annullate, costarono a quel
paese sui 200.000 morti.

 milioni di morti: la seconda guerra mondiale.
Oh, da lontano rugge
l'ambulanza, ché fugge
un internato e mugge
disperato.


 paese sui 200.000 morti.
per merito di chi ha vinto le elezioni, o di chi ha usato l'esercito
contro i vincitori?

 Namib
ecco che il comunista Namib risplende in tutta la sua 'demokraticitï¿œ'... 

 democratici.
la cosa piu' divertente e' che i fautori della democraticita' degli
islamisti sono in cerca di ragioni per mettere fuori legge la Lega
Nord e Forza Italia. Chissa', magari preferirebbero vivere in un Paese
islamista che non nell'Italia attuale.
Qualcuno ce lo manderei anche.

Qualcuno ce lo manderei anche.
In effetti, la sinistra non è sempre democratica. Lo percepisci anche
nel modo di parlare dall'alto in basso che usano con chi non è dei
loro. Prendono delle cantonate tremende, ma le loro certezze non
vengono minimamente scosse.

 Nord e Forza Italia.
e non ce ne sono, per partiti piduisti (quindi nati dall'eversione) e
razzisti, giusto?