Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: The Solution to the Kosovo Problem

The Solution to the Kosovo Problem 
Partition within a partition  
by Ivan Eland 
Now that the deadline has passed without an international agreement on the
future of Kosovo – the Serbian province that has enjoyed autonomy under
the tutelage of the United Nations since the NATO-Serb war of 1999 – a
showdown in the UN Security Council looms. No matter what the outcome of
Wednesday's debate, don't be surprised if Kosovo, with the support of the
Western powers, declares its independence. Such a provocative action would
anger Serbia and its ally Russia, and could cause a resumption of violence
there. 
Since 1999, the province has been governed autonomously from the Serbian
central government by the Muslim Albanian Kosovars, who constitute 90
percent of the population. Naturally, the Serbian government is concerned
about the future of the minority Serb population in an independent Kosovo.
A study of past partitions and secessions, however, might allay Serb
fears. Historically, when only a small minority lives in a majority area,
much less violence results, because the majority isn't threatened. Only
when a large minority is present do both factions become nervous. Each
side may arm to defend itself, triggering additional fears of attack, and
war may ensue. For example, following 1921, when majority-Protestant
Northern Ireland was partitioned from predominantly Catholic Ireland,
decades of violence ensued in Northern Ireland, because the substantial
minority of Catholics (more than one-third of their population) presented
a security threat to the Protestants, and vice versa. But in Ireland,
Protestants numbered less than 10 percent, and have lived in peace with
the Catholics during that period.
Although there has been tension and sporadic violence between the Kosovar
Serbs and Albanians, Kosovo's Serb minority is likely small enough to
avoid major security anxiety by the Albanian majority. In addition, the
international community has demanded that Albanians provide substantial
security guarantees for the Serb minority.
A greater problem may be the fact that many Serbs regard Kosovo as the
cradle of their civilization. In the Middle Ages, Serbian civilization was
centered in the province; Serbian religious and historical shrines remain
there, including Gazimestan, the site of an important battle lost to the
Turks. 
History shows that nationalities often are less willing to trade off or
substitute for land of such "intangible" value than they might be to trade
economically or strategically valuable land. So the Serbs may feel
compelled to fight over these sites. They have certainly been unwilling to
acknowledge the independence of Kosovo, despite international pressure.
The Russians have hinted that in the partition of Kosovo from Serbia,
Kosovo should also be partitioned, and the land with the Serbian shrines
should be returned to Serbia. Predictably, the Albanian majority rejects
this idea, because they want the biggest country possible. Less
understandably, the U.S. and its European allies reject it too. They want
to defend prior boundaries, contain Serbia, and play hardball with
Serbia's Russian ally. This stance is unwise.
A more stable, long-term solution is to adjust the border so that Serbia
can retain some – if not most – of these critical historical and religious
sites. Although the new state of Kosovo would be slightly smaller, it
would be more secure against its stronger Serb neighbor. For security
purposes, Kosovo would not have to be a ward of the U.S. and Europe. Such
a settlement might avoid a future Serb-Kosovo war that could escalate to a
confrontation between the U.S. and Russia – two nuclear-weapon states.
Although merely redrawing the current Serb-Kosovo border to incrementally
expand Serb-controlled lands is preferable, more creative gerrymandering
might be possible. A Kosovo partitioning wouldn't necessarily need to give
Serbians land contiguous to Serbia. In that case, any important
noncontiguous Serbian shrines surrounded by the new Kosovo could be
protected by the UN
Also, the Serbs might have to compromise on which historical or religious
sites would be reabsorbed into Serbia. Less important sites might have to
be ceded to the new country of Kosovo.
This partition of Kosovo, within the partition of Kosovo from Serbia,
would give the new state the best chance for a long-term stable
relationship with its powerful neighbor. As in Palestine, giving up land
for peace is the right path to long-term stability and security. In both
parts of the world, dispassionate analysts can define fairly well where a
political settlement would end up, but cooling red-hot historical
animosity to get there is another thing entirely. A start down that road
in Kosovo would be to drop U.S. objections to the "partition inside a
partition" approach.
 
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 riferimento a data e fonte,
i cretini britannici nazipedof decidono sulla base della date e la fonte
se qualcosa e' condivisibile e non sulla base di quel che leggono
nell'articolo?


 della parola scritta, dall'universita' all'infimo giornale.
cioč tu ti basi solo sulla data e sulla fonte? sei sempre piu' cretino ,
lo sai?
E poi se vuoi vedere la fonte prendi il nome dell'autore e fai una ricerca
con google, no cretino?
 
-- 
