Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Israele sa cosa sta facendo

http://www.jidaily.com/AP7Q4/r
Might Israel Know What It’s Doing?
By Lazar Berman 15/06/2011 03:00
Filed under: World Watch, Government & Politics
Tracking the outcome of recent controversial Israeli actions,
surprisingly, portrays Israel in an entirely different strategic
light.
Sometimes, it seems Israel doesn’t have a clue.
The narrative that Israel is tactically proficient but strategically
hapless continues to gain currency. Commentators often criticize the
Jewish state for its overreliance on force and its inability to
consider the strategic ramifications of its responses to Hezbollah,
Hamas, and myriad attempts to delegitimize Israel.
These criticisms grew louder in the wake of this month’s deadly
clashes with Palestinian protesters on Israel’s northern borders.
Andrew Exum, the insightful creator of the Abu Muqawama blog at Center
for a New American Security, wrote that the “IDF almost always seems
to do the strategically stupid thing in these situations, either using
force more than is necessary or using force indiscriminately.” UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay urged Israel to adhere to
international law, cautioning that “the use of live ammunition against
allegedly unarmed protesters, resulting in large numbers of deaths and
injuries, inevitably raises the question of unnecessary and excessive
use of force.”
To be sure, Israel, like the United States, makes its share of foolish
and sometimes downright perplexing mistakes. But it is easy to
disparage Israel’s actions without appreciating the complexity of the
unceasing challenges with which it must cope. What’s more, there has
been a dearth of sustained analysis of the ramifications of Israeli
“blunders.” Tracking the outcome of recent controversial Israeli
actions, surprisingly, portrays Israel in an entirely different
strategic light. Though often caught off-guard, the Israeli government
and military learn quickly, understand the calculations of its
enemies, and are able to minimize continued bloodshed by firm
deterrent responses.
Challenge and Response
Israel’s recent challenges range from intense battles against
Hezbollah fighters to mostly unarmed protesters trying to cross
Israel’s borders. In the major incidents with which Israel has had to
cope in recent years, the immediate reaction, domestically and abroad,
was that its response was ineffective and ill-conceived.
The grand strategic question of Israel’s presence in the West Bank,
while important, is not germane to this discussion. Hezbollah, Hamas,
Iran, and the various anti-Israel activists are fighting Israel’s
existence, not its policies in territory captured in 1967. Israel
would face the same, if not worse, challenges if it was not in these
areas.
Against Hezbollah in 2006, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) relied
heavily on standoff firepower—air and artillery strikes instead of
ground maneuver—to damage the organization, leading to significant
destruction in parts of Lebanon and what is seen widely as a
disappointing performance from the IDF. The Economist boldly declared,
“Nasrallah wins the war.”
 Israel fought again in late 2008, this time against Hamas in Gaza. In
this operation, the IDF maneuvered hard on the ground, using massive
firepower, while Israeli Air Force jets pounded strategic targets and
provided close air support. But in so doing, the IDF killed at least
300 civilians, and brought upon itself the opprobrium of the
international community. The UN Goldstone Report accused Israel of
perpetrating “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to
punish, humiliate, and terrorize a civilian population, radically
diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for
itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency
and vulnerability.”
On May 30, 2010, a flotilla organized by the Free Gaza Movement and
the Turkish NGO IHH (described by the Carnegie Endowment’s Henri
Barkey as an organization that “has been deeply involved with Hamas
for some time”) was intercepted by Israeli naval commandoes. After
being attacked by knives and clubs, the soldiers opened fire on the
mob, killing nine passengers. The international community reacted
angrily, with British Prime Minister David Cameron declaring, “Let me
be clear: the Israeli attack on the Gaza flotilla was completely
unacceptable.”
On May 15, 2011, annual “Nakba Day” protests reached a new intensity
as Palestinians in Syria and Lebanon attempted to infiltrate Israel’s
borders. In the Golan Heights, hundreds of protesters stormed the
border fence and crossed into a Druze town. IDF fire killed four
protesters and wounded many more.
On the Lebanese border, similar scenes played out. Ten protesters were
killed climbing the border fence, and Israel was blamed for the
deaths. The IDF, however, maintained that most of the dead and wounded
were hit by indiscriminate fire from the Lebanese Army (LAF).
Maddeningly, the IDF decided not to release surveillance footage
showing the LAF firing on the protesters, arguing that the LAF could
not be coerced into preventing future protests if it was embarrassed
by the released footage.
Palestinian protesters from Syria returned to the border on June 5,
“Naksa Day,” commemorating the Arab defeat in the Six Day War. This
time, IDF forces kept the protesters from infiltrating, though some
were killed. The obviously suspect Syrian state media reported 23
dead, though Israel expressed serious skepticism, arguing that many of
the casualties resulted from land mines on the Syrian side. Still, the
IDF was shown in the media firing on mostly unarmed protesters,
evoking comparisons, unfair as they may be, of the crackdowns in
neighboring Arab regimes.
More Than Meets the Eye
Many wondered why Israel was repeatedly caught unprepared, and why its
reactions repeatedly lead to PR disasters. With all of Israel’s
resources, experience, and brainpower, could it really not come up
with better solutions? But recent developments indicate Israel’s
decisions, though criticized at the time, emerge from a coherent
understanding of its security situation and from a plan, imperfect
though it may be, for dealing with those challenges.
On June 5, the date of the Naksa Day protests, the LAF did exactly
what Israel hoped it would when the IDF decided not to release the
surveillance footage. After the Lebanese Army declared the border a
closed military zone, organizers of the march cancelled it altogether.
Israel could not have hoped for a better LAF response. The decision
not to release the tapes of the LAF firing on protesters, though
damaging for short-term PR, had the effect Israel wanted. Thankfully,
no more blood was spilled on the Lebanese border.
Though flotillas keep on coming, Israel seems to be in a much-improved
situation following the May 31, 2010, incident. Subsequent flotillas,
including the Malaysian Finch, were turned away with little effort or
media attention.
The new flotilla organized by IHH, expected at the end of June, is
feared to be a more aggressive version of the Mavi Marmara flotilla.
However, quiet diplomatic efforts have begun to pay off for Israel.
After repeatedly refusing to condemn the flotilla, Turkey’s Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said last week that organizers should
reconsider their plans, using the opening of the Egyptian-Gaza border
as a pretext. Turkish newspapers also reported that the U.S.
government was trying to convince Ankara to stop the flotilla in
exchange for a Mideast peace conference in Turkey, a sign Israel’s
diplomacy has convinced the Obama administration of the flotilla’s
potential for violence.
The threats posed by Hamas and Hezbollah are complex and ongoing, but
as time goes by, Israel’s strategic gains from the recent conflicts
against them have looked more impressive. As I’ve written in the
American Enterprise Institute’s Center for Defense Studies blog,
Israel’s approach to counter-insurgency (COIN) is based on deterrence,
in which a few years of quiet is an important accomplishment. An
expanded United Nations Interim Force in southern Lebanon, timid
behavior from Hezbollah, and no response after the killing of Imad
Mughniyeh is a significant strategic gain for Israel at the relatively
modest cost of 122 military deaths. Before 2006, Hezbollah regularly
fired rockets into Israel for a variety of reasons, but even at the
height of Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s campaign against Hamas in
2008-2009, it held its fire. There were certainly problems for Israel
during the war, and both Lebanon and Cast Lead cost Israel PR points,
but damaging terrorist organizations while deterring them for years is
no mean feat.
Even the Palestinian plan to pursue UN recognition in September,
hugely problematic for the Israelis, is beginning to fray. President
Obama is firmly opposed to the plan, and other Western leaders,
including Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, are publicly warning the
Palestinians against making any unilateral moves. The AP is reporting
that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas even wants to
“climb down from the tree” and forgo the UN plan, but cannot because
of public pressure. The impending September diplomatic tsunami may
well turn out to be nothing but harmless ripples.
The Complexity of No Good Options
Evaluations of Israel’s actions must take into account the bewildering
complexity of challenges it faces. Take the fight against Hamas, for
example. Israel has tried the range of non-diplomatic and coercive
means to discourage Hamas from targeting its citizens. It pulled every
Israeli soldier and civilian out of the Gaza Strip, agreed to a series
of cease-fires, and, with Egypt, blockaded Hamas’s territory. Still,
Hamas launched Qassams, killed soldiers, and smuggled advanced
weaponry. Israeli leaders faced a dilemma—continue the status quo and
allow 1 million Israelis to live under Hamas attacks or move to a
military option that will undoubtedly harm Palestinian civilians.
When Israel finally opted for a military operation, Hamas’s tactics
forced the IDF to balance military necessity with its ethical
restraints. Battling enemies who fire rockets from Palestinian schools
and civilian areas as a matter of policy, the IDF compromised military
effectiveness to protect enemy civilians, allowing Hamas more
breathing room. In the words of British Colonel Richard Kemp, former
commander of British forces in Afghanistan, “Many missions that could
have taken out Hamas military capability were aborted to prevent
civilian casualties. During the conflict, the IDF allowed huge amounts
of humanitarian aid into Gaza. To deliver aid virtually into your
enemy's hands is, to the military tactician, normally quite
unthinkable. But the IDF took on those risks.”
Israel faces similar challenges across the spectrum—Iran’s nuclear
program, Hezbollah and Hamas rockets, neighboring regimes falling,
flotillas, protesters willing to die, international pressure, and
terrorism, to name a few.  Outnumbered by hostile forces, both on the
ground and in the international community, Israel is further
restricted by an ethical code that limits its responses to enemies for
whom all Israelis are legitimate targets. Somehow, Israel usually
manages to find a balance, striking a blow to its adversaries while
remaining within the bounds of military and Jewish ethics. This is no
easy feat. Though its responses often seem haphazard and excessively
violent, the long view indicates that Israel’s mix of diplomacy,
deterrence, and force keeps its citizens safe and minimizes extended
bloodshed.
In a reality in which there are often no good options, Israel just
might know what it’s doing.

 Might Israel Know What It’s Doing?
certo che lo sa.
Peres preoccupato: “di questo passo Israele scomparirà”
http://www.news2u.it/2011/06/17/peres-preoccupato-di-questo-passo-israele-scomparira/


Peres è abbastanza vecchio da non aver paura della morte e da essere al 
riparo da accuse di stupro; abbastanza onesto da non temere di essere 
incastrato con accuse di corruzione; abbastanza provato nella sua lealtà 
ad Israele da essere al riparo da accuse di tradimento; abbastanza 
autorevole da non poter essere tacitato di incompetenza.
Avrebbe tutte le possibilità per spezzare il muro di conformismo e di 
silenzio che sta conducendo Israele al baratro.
Purtroppo è anche troppo vecchio per avere il coraggio di farlo.
Una osservazione sulla frase:  “Non abbiamo bisogno di boicottaggio - ha 
detto -. Basterebbe che i porti in Europa o in Canada fermassero lo 
scarico di merci israeliane”.
Sembra una inconscia richiesta di aiuto.
-- 
Sostieni Rete ECO
http://rete-eco.it/it/sostienici.html

 Sembra una inconscia richiesta di aiuto.
"per pieta', boicottateci!" LOL