Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Il confine siriano è poroso in entrambe le direzioni.

http://www.publiuspundit.com/?p=1535
SYRIA’S OPPOSITION, THE KURDISH ISSUE & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Joshua Landis at Syria Comment reproduces an interview with a Syrian 
human rights lawyer and opposition activist, Anwar al-Bunni. The entire 
post is worth reading, but I’m just going to excerpt part of it to focus 
on two issues: (1) the relationship between regime change in Iraq and 
the position of Kurds in Syria and (2) the relationship between the 
Syrian opposition and U.S. foreign policy. I’ll have some comments below.
This is an excerpt from the interview, “Anwar al-Bunni: Interview with 
Syria’s leading Human Right Lawyer, By Joe Pace“:
     …We hear a lot that the Iraq war empowered Syrian Kurds, but in 
what way? How did events in Iraq enhance their influence?
     The Kurds began playing a larger political role in Iraq, something 
which led the Arab opposition and the Syrian authorities alike to pay 
closer attention to the desires of the Kurds.
     Prior to the Iraq war, the Kurds did not play a political role in 
Syrian politics. Their role was limited to demands placed upon the 
authority—they didn’t engage in dialogue with the rest of Syrian 
political society. But after the events in Iraq, the Syrian Arabs began 
to feel that maybe the Kurds would assume a larger political role in 
Syria as they did in Iraq. So they had to pay attention to their demands 
in order to contain them.
     But how does a larger role for the Kurds in Iraq translate into 
greater influence for Syria’s Kurds?
     It was first and foremost a psychological effect because they began 
to feel as though there was protection; that they could depend at the 
very least on moral and emotional support from the Kurds in Iraq. This 
sort of support is of crucial importance, the mere face that someone is 
asking about them—what they’re suffering from, what they’re saying, etc. 
This is more important than military or financial support.
     Now they have a shelter. Before, if a Kurd needed to flee there was 
nowhere to go. He certainly couldn’t go to Iraq or Turkey. Here they 
were attacking them, there they were attacking them…But now they have a 
shelter and it has emboldened them. If something happens to someone here 
they can flee to Iraq.
     So what did the regime do in order to contain this new Kurdish problem?
     They tried to contain the Kurds by manipulating some of the Kurdish 
parties, and by promising them nationality in order to keep the parties 
in a relationship with the regime. [Ed. - Many Kurds in Syria don’t even 
have citizenship.] They created the problems in Qamashli in 2004 to 
weaken the Kurdish-Arab relationship and foster divisions between them. 
They tried to get the two sides to distance themselves from each other; 
of course, it didn’t work because people realized that the government 
was playing them.
     So has this newfound influence emboldened the Kurds to issue more 
demands for an independent or federalized state?
     The world was previously oblivious to the Kurdish issue. And the 
government was contending that the Kurds wanted an independent state. 
But recently, people have begun to speak out and they are starting to 
realize that the Kurds have a legitimate complain. But at the same time, 
Kurdish extremism is unacceptable. They aren’t going to overcome these 
old suspicions with ease. There is this ingrained suspicion that the 
Kurds want an independent state and what happened in Iraq scared the 
Arabs even more.
     The authorities have relied on qawmiya (here: Arab nationalism) and 
its grandiose slogans to legitimate its existence. And they have 
endeavored to conceal Kurdish features from sight. They tried to Arabize 
them; they took Kurdish land, Arabized the names of Kurdish villages, 
deprived them of their citizenship, denied them access to government 
jobs. Of course, there are Kurds in places like Damascus who lead normal 
lives without any of those problems. The problem is primarily in the 
northern regions.
     These tactics caused a backlash: people began to cling to their 
culture more, staking out more extremist positions. This is to be 
expected—if you close the door of participation in front of someone, 
they’ll find another partner to cooperate and communicate with. But 
among all of the Kurdish parties, not one advocates seceding from Syria…
     Most of the Kurds support America’s project of remaking the Middle 
East. They call Bush “father of freedom,” which I cannot imagine goes 
over too well with a lot Arabs. How does the Arab opposition react to this?
     No, in Syria you’ll find Arabs who say let Bush come here as well.
     But it’s a rarer sentiment among the Arabs than the Kurds.
     No, it’s not rare among the Arabs. That’s what happens when you 
block all other avenues for change. The Kurds may get the most publicity 
because in some of their demonstrators they were praising Bush. But even 
in Qadmus, where the ethnic conflicts erupted, some of the Isma’lis were 
calling for Bush to come. The same thing happened in Misyaf three months 
ago. So you shouldn’t think of it as a Kurdish predilection—it’s the 
natural result of closing the doors in front of the citizenry. I heard 
an old man saying the other day, “let Israel come and rescue us from 
this state.” Israel! And he was speaking in a loud voice in the middle 
of the street. These sentiments are the byproduct of oppression.
     But if there is a Kurdish party that openly supports the American 
project, does that create tensions between it and an Arab party who may 
share the same ideals but rejects American intervention?
     Maybe in the beginning it was a problem. But now that many of the 
Arabs have begun to speak more openly in their endorsement of the 
American project, it’s become less of a dividing line exclusively 
between the Kurds and Arabs.
     Ok, then what about oppositional parties in general that differ on 
the role of American intervention?
     Of course, it’s a point of contention. But, in general, its one of 
many points of contention. It’s a primary point that the nationalist 
Arab opposition clings to. There is a segment that cannot comprehend the 
concept of external powers playing a role in internal reform.
     We used to lambaste America for supporting those dictators. But now 
America is saying that it supports democratic leadership. And they still 
criticize. What do they want? What do they want America to do? When 
America supported despots they criticized her. Now America has admitted 
to making mistakes and says it supports freedom and democracy. So what 
do they want the Americans to do? What do they want the position of the 
largest country in the world to be? Should America be silent on everything?
     Then why do you think they continue to stand against America?
     For two reasons. First, they have been raised to dislike America, 
and especially because of its past mistakes, it has no credibility. No 
one believes that America has the people in its interests. The second 
reason is its position on the Israeli-Arab conflict. It has yet to usher 
a solution to the conflict and that’s an extremely sensitive point for 
Arabs. Then there is the Iraq war which left some 400,000 people dead. 
And then what? They expect that America will then withdraw and leave the 
people to die.
     The only thing they are certain of is that America is looking to 
protect its own interests. Defending human rights and democracy consists 
of pressuring the regimes in order to secure their own interests—it is 
not done in the defense of the people. So no one has faith that they can 
rely on America.
     I won’t rely on America but I am going to exploit American pressure 
to realize my goals. Don’t be part of the American project, but you 
should still position yourself to benefit from it. Allow America to put 
pressure on the regime and reap the benefits. Don’t participate in 
America’s project, but don’t fight it. They don’t understand this equation.
     You say that the opposition benefits from foreign pressure. How? 
Hypothetically, what would happen if foreign pressure came to a halt?
     We’d all be imprisoned. It’s that simple. [Emphasis added]
     The European Union has more credibility in the region and it’s 
taken a more reasonable stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
So people are willing to rely on them more than America. And I made this 
point to Ambassador Scobey before she returned to Washington: America is 
in dire need of credibility in the realm of democracy and human rights. 
How am I supposed to believe that America supports democracy and human 
rights when they are supporting Husni Mubarak for his fifth term or Zaid 
Eddin Ibn Ali for his third term when he is oppressing people in his 
country? There’s no balance in the policy. They need to be promoting 
human rights everywhere, not just in Syria but then disregarding human 
rights violations elsewhere.
     It has lost its credibility. But the more credibility the US gains, 
the larger its potential role becomes…
Here are my comments on the subject:
     * Freedom is contagious. We saw this in Eastern Europe following 
the fall of the Iron Curtain, we’ve been seeing it following last year’s 
Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, and now we are seeing it emanate out 
from Iraq. For decades - since independence in the mid-20th century - 
Arab countries have been dominated by autocratic regimes which closed 
down all avenues of expression except hatred of Israel and, to an 
extent, Islam. It should not be surprising that anti-Semitism and 
Islamism are therefore powerful attractions in newly free societies like 
Iraq, but the very fact that Iraqis are now negotiating freely and 
making their own decisions is having ripple effects elsewhere.
     * I think that al-Bunni’s comments on the role of U.S. foreign 
policy contain qualified validity. I do think we need to do more on 
Egypt; specifically, we need cut Egypt’s $2 billion in yearly aid 
significantly, if not entirely. But U.S. officials are speaking out on 
Egypt as much as could reasonably be expected.
     * But comparing Egypt and Tunisia to Syria or Baathist Iraq is a 
weak analogy: neither of the former two countries are even remotely as 
oppressive as the current regime in Syria and the former one in Iraq.
     * Furthermore, al-Bunni’s comments illustrate a common problem, and 
that is in overestimating what the United States can do, or what it is 
responsible for. Egypt was a stable autocracy before it ever received 
any aid from the U.S., and Tunisia has never received significant aid 
from the U.S. Tunisia is today what we might call a “soft autocracy,” 
and it maintains power through its own means. The U.S., like every other 
country, gives diplomatic recognition to Tunisia and has good economic 
relations with it. Egypt is the only non-democratic Arab country which 
receives significant aid from the U.S.
     * It must be noted that European countries have never pressured 
Egypt or Tunisia or any other Arab country toward reform. It is not 
simply a preference of diplomatic over military means; France in 
particular, which is popular in the Arab world, has done much to hold up 
dictatorial regimes.
     * Al-Bunni also has unreasonable expectations in regard to what the 
U.S. can or should do with regard to Israel. I once had a conversation 
with a Lebanese acquaintance who suggested that the U.S. could do more 
by supporting sanctions against Israel. I was shocked - to put sanctions 
on a free society defending itself against the most relentless terror 
campaign in modern history would be unthinkable. Yes, America supports 
the right of the Palestinians to live in a free, sovereign and viable 
state, but ending the terror campaign is a pre-condition for this.

 
http://www.publiuspundit.com/?p=1535
Sempre blog di estrema destra cazzo o siti ultras di Bush... Che strapalle
-- 
You_fuck_with_the_bull-You_gonna_get_the_horns

Mirco Romanato wrote:
ti sei ridotto come pomero e sergio che non fanno altro che copiaincollare,
ma almeno loro hanno la decenza di 
1 portare articoli in italiano
2 portare articoli di gente pagata per scrivere (per cui almeno le
sgrammaticature ce le risparmiano)
-- 
You_fuck_with_the_bull-You_gonna_get_the_horns

 sgrammaticature ce le risparmiano)
Da quando essere pagati per scrivere è una nota di merito?
Vale anche per quelli che scrivono per la parte a te avversa?
Questa è gente che scrive, in molti casi, gratuitamente.
E riporta quello che vede o le sue considerazioni, che di norma sono 
molto più ponderate delle tue.
Mirco

 molto più ponderate delle tue.
Le mie non saranno ponderate, ma più valide di quelle di un pappagallo che
non altro che ripetere la propaganda dell'amato leader a stelle e strisce
si. Hanno il pregio di non essere copie almeno.
-- 
You_fuck_with_the_bull-You_gonna_get_the_horns

 si. Hanno il pregio di non essere copie almeno.
Fino a che lo credi tu...
Mirco

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:bW2Ne.81128$fm.54...@news4.tin.it...

a Mirco Hitler gli fa una sega