Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: US/MIDEAST:  Status Quo Stifling Political Reforms

Alcune interessanti osservazioni (a mio parere) sulla asincronia 
esistente tra società e leadership al potere nei paesi del M.O., grazie 
anche all'azione degli interessi occidentali che premono sull'area.
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US/MIDEAST:  Status Quo Stifling Political Reforms
By Khody Akhavi
WASHINGTON, Feb 1 (IPS) - In his final State of the Union speech Monday 
night, President George W. Bush once again reminded the U.S. public of 
the cornerstone of his administration's foreign policy: "We trust that 
people, when given a chance, will choose a future of freedom and peace."
He cited, as evidence, "stirring images" of liberty from around the 
Middle East: Lebanese taking to the streets, Afghans emerging from the 
tyranny of the Taliban, and "jubilant" Iraqis holding up ink-stained 
index fingers. But in the last seven years, Washington's pursuit of 
democracy promotion in the region has been eclipsed by the "war on terror".
As the president drifts further into irrelevance -- repeating the 
rationale for a disastrous Iraq war and framing the struggle for 
political liberty in the Middle East as a battle against radical Islamic 
terrorism -- his regional allies have increasingly eschewed Washington's 
calls for political reform.
"Whether the U.S. was interested in democracy promotion or not, it came 
to halting end at the end of 2005 and 2006," said Samer Shehata, a 
political science professor at Georgetown University.
Citing the electoral experiences of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and 
Palestinian Hamas, as well as the Hezbollah-Israel war, he said: "After 
that period, many in Washington were saying that [Egyptian] President 
Mubarak looked very good compared to [Hassan] Nassrallah."
For citizens of Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and 
Kuwait, the path to political reform remains obscured. And as their 
societies grow and advance, there is little evidence to suggest that 
their leaders have any intention of shifting the status quo or to truly 
"democratise" their states, according to the authors of a new book 
examining the region's chequered history.
"Society and economic systems have changed at a very rapid pace and the 
political systems have not. There is a feeling that the region is out of 
synch, not only with the rest of the world. They are out of synch with 
themselves. Something has to change," said Marina S. Ottaway, who edited 
"Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World".
Arab leaders may wish to compare themselves to the "enlightened 
monarchs" of 18th century Europe, but their "top down" approaches to 
reform -- a vision that begins with the idea of modernising the economy, 
and culminating in political democratisation -- offer cosmetic changes 
at best. In the absence of institutions, local councils, and parliaments 
that have the procedural ability to check executive power, it appears 
the Arab regimes are simply "paying lip service to the idea of political 
reform," according to Ottaway, who also heads the Middle East programme 
at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Either the recent developments reflect a nascent political opening, a 
"planting of seeds" that may later yield a democratic bounty, she said, 
or "these countries are simply finding ways to blow off a little steam, 
to provide the illusion of political participation, and a way to earn 
some brownie points with the international community."
Arab leaders are familiar with the language of democracy: calls for 
reform emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as many Arab regimes 
dealt with acute economic crisis brought on by massive budgetary 
deficits and external debts. Structural adjustment programmes, initiated 
by international lenders such as the International Monetary Fund, 
provided highly conditioned loans. Regimes had to privatise inefficient 
public sectors, change budgetary patterns, and cut subsidies, all of 
which threatened to shift the economic arrangements of elites.
But economic reform does not necessarily translate into political opening.
"There is no solid evidence that economic growth leads to democracy, or 
that economic liberalisation leading to economic growth," said Julia 
Choucair-Vizoso, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment who co-edited 
"Beyond the Façade".
In the case of Egypt, privatisation schemes during the 1990s often 
served to rearrange elite networks already in place, not bolster 
economic benefits for lower or middle classes.
Choucair-Vizoso said that there exist few pro-democracy NGOs in the 
region; they are often co-opted by the state, fragmented, remain heavily 
dependent on foreign funds, and tend to exhibit a lack of "internal 
democracy". As such, civil society has not emerged as a key actor to 
promote change.
For Arab states to move towards democracy, she said, the pressure for 
change will have to come from domestic political entities outside the 
ruling elites. Secular parties remain weak and divided, and due to 
structural conditions of the system, they have limited space to manoeuvre.
"Secular parties have been plagued by internal schisms and a failure to 
articulate a coherent agenda or vision," said Choucair-Vizoso.
The most effective opposition to these authoritarian regimes instead 
comes from Islamist movements, much to the displeasure of most 
U.S.-based democracy advocates.
"It is impossible to think about democratisation in the Middle East 
without thinking about Islamists in some way or another," said Shehata.
In contrast to secular parties, Islamists retain strong organisational 
cohesion, and can circumvent certain legal conditions for meeting, 
including through robust social welfare networks, schools, and the mosque.
"If you go and talk to the representatives of political parties in the 
Arab world, secular parties often have their offices in the downtown 
area, in the business district. The Islamists have theirs in poor 
districts, in slums," said Ottaway. "They have different ways of 
approaching the problem of organising."
(END/2008)
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41040

  Status Quo Stifling
uh. latino ed inglese. Quante lingue conosce il nostro parastatale.
Chissà se sa come si dice pirla in quelle due lingue?

 Chissà se sa come si dice pirla in quelle due lingue?
Dillo tu: scoprirei un ulteriore modo per definirti, oltre che squadrista.