Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: II memorandum per i polli

http://www.truthout.org/docs_03/060503A.shtml
Wolfowitz: 'Iraq War Was About Oil'
  By George Wright
  The Guardian
  Wednesday 04 June 2003
[...]
 The US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz - who has already
undermined Tony Blair's position over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by
describing them as a "bureaucratic" excuse for war - has now gone further by
claiming the real motive was that Iraq is "swimming" in oil.
  The latest comments were made by Mr Wolfowitz in an address to delegates
at an Asian security summit in Singapore at the weekend, and reported today
by German newspapers Der Tagesspiegel and Die Welt.
  Asked why a nuclear power such as North Korea was being treated
differently from Iraq, where hardly any weapons of mass destruction had been
found, the deputy defence minister said: "Let's look at it simply. The most
important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we
just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil."
[...]

 wrote in message
news:WIEDa.62646$lK4.1...@twister1.libero.it...

BINGO !
Giano
--
Le nostre vite cominciano a finire il giorno in cui iniziamo a tacere sulle
cose che contano
Martin Luther King Jr.

 riportano quelle di chissa' chi :)
Quando hai ragione hai ragione. Ecco le "correzioni" del Guardian. Shalom.
Namib
http://www.truthout.org/docs_03/060603J.shtml
UK Guardian: Corrections and Clarifications
  Thursday 05 June 2003
  A report which was posted on our website on June 4 under the heading
"Wolfowitz: Iraq war was about oil" misconstrued remarks made by the US
deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, making it appear that he had said
that oil was the main reason for going to war in Iraq. He did not say that.
He said, according to the Department of Defence website, "The ... difference
between North Korea and Iraq is that we had virtually no economic options
with Iraq because the country floats on a sea of oil. In the case of North
Korea, the country is teetering on the edge of economic collapse and that I
believe is a major point of leverage whereas the military picture with North
Korea is very different from that with Iraq." The sense was clearly that the
US had no economic options by means of which to achieve its objectives, not
that the economic value of the oil motivated the war. The report appeared
only on the website and has now been removed.

 Quando hai ragione hai ragione. Ecco le "correzioni" del Guardian. Shalom.
Stavo per scriverlo io :)
Aggiungo che e' anche le parole dell'intervista su Vanity Fair non e'
proprio che siano state riportate in modo fair (scusa il pessimo gioco di
parole).
Vedi trascrizione dell'intera intervista:
http://dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html
Ciao
Ale
-- 
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

Quando hai ragione hai ragione. Ecco le "correzioni" del Guardian.
A dimostrazione che e' importante conoscere le fonti originali e che la
citazione di altre fonti che non sono personalmente confermate e' di ben
scarso valore oltre ad essere un chiaro esempio di scarsa qualita'
professionale.
Il Guardian ha rifatto un'altra figuraccia.
-Stefano


Vedo dai i due interventi precedenti che sia Santini che De Cesari non hanno
capito la sottigliezza tua o del truthout .
Per quanto riguarda SdC non credo che ancora sia ruscito a trarre niente
nemmeno dalla favola di Cappuccetto Rosso .
C'e` chi entra in un aula di tribunale con un codice penale in mano e chi si
va` a sedere in tribuna per dividerne le emozioni.
Qualche volta ti viene da chiedere se ne vale il tempo !


 
http://dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html
Non mi funziona il link: è quello giusto?

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:bbvm2f$dvks6$1...@ID-125979.news.dfncis.de...
L'ho trovata e la posto:
Wolfowitz Interview with Vanity Fair's Tannenhaus
Friday, 30 May 2003, 2:17 pm
Press Release: US Department of Defence
Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair
NEWS TRANSCRIPT from the United States Department of Defense
DoD News Briefing
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
Friday, May 9, 2003
Q: What do you think all the conspiritorial talk is? Do you have any notion,
in Europe and here? What are people looking at this way?
Wolfowitz: I think it's pretty obvious and I think it's pretty disgraceful
but all you can do is ignore it and go on and get the job done.
Q: What is it? I mean some say anti-Semitism. I guess in Europe that would
be --
Wolfowitz: I just said all I'm going to say about it.
Q: Okay.
There's a question now as to whether in Iraq itself --
Wolfowitz: You know it's completely out in the open who holds what views in
this Administration. You couldn't be more transparent about what the
arguments are. The most significant thing that has produced what is
admittedly a fairly significant change in American policy is the events of
September 11th which are going to count as one of the -- If you had to pick
the ten most important foreign policy things for the United States over the
last 100 years it would surely rank in the top ten if not number one. It's
the reason why so much has changed, and people who refuse to look at that,
for whatever reason, or are unwilling to face up to the implications of that
then go around and look for some nefarious explanation. But it's shameful.
Q: Since you brought that up let me ask you something related to that. I've
looked at the remarkable Defense Policy Guidance of 1992 --
Wolfowitz: Wait a minute. Did you look at the guidance or did you look at
the draft that was leaked before I saw it?
Q: That's a very good point. Actually all I saw were summaries of it. Is
there a big discrepancy as to what was reported and what was in it?
Wolfowitz: Yes. In short. At some point I guess it's acquired such a life of
its own I ought to go back and refresh my memory.
But the way I remember it approximately is as follows. I gave a quite
substantial briefing to Secretary Cheney and what was then called I guess
the Defense Resources Board on a post-Cold War defense strategy, the essence
of which was to shift from a strategy for being prepared to fight a global
war, to being focused on two possible regional conflicts. And to downsize
the U.S. military by some 40 percent.
That was sort of taken to the President, promulgated in a speech in Aspen on
August 2, 1990, which you may recall happened also to be the day that Iraq
invaded Kuwait. In fact we had, in that briefing that I gave in May I think,
it focused on the Iraqi threat to the Arabian peninsula as one of the
regional problems we needed to be prepared to deal with. At the time that
was considered a revolutionary idea. By the time the President gave the
speech it had already happened. [Laughter]
Then that general briefing had to be translated into a guidance document for
the department. Some people on my staff wrote a draft. Before I even got to
see the draft someone leaked it to the New York Times, apparently because
they didn't like it. The New York Times then wrote about the draft.
If you go back, and you can do this with Lexis/Nexis. If you go back, the
excerpts from the draft are nowhere near as hysterical as the way the New
York Times reported it. So people in the first place were reacting to the
New York Times description of the draft as opposed to the actual text of the
draft which the Times in fact did publish.
I repeat, it was not a draft that I'd even reviewed yet.
As I recall, one of the pieces of hysteria was the idea that this is a
blueprint for a massive increase in U.S. defense spending, when in fact it
was a blueprint for a 40 percent reduction in U.S. defense spending. It goes
on from there.
When we did a revised draft that in fact I had reviewed carefully, the State
Department initially didn't want us to put it out, I think because it was a
little too much. Well, I don't know why. They didn't want us to put it out.
I don't want to speculate on motives. But in January of 1993 as we were
about to leave, I said to Cheney don't you think we should publish it? And
he said yes, we should. So it's available in the full text as the Regional
Defense Strategy of January, 1993.
I know people say oh well, they just sanded off the corners because the real
thing received such an adverse reaction. But the truth of the matter is what
the Times was writing about was something that I'd never seen. What is
published, while I will admit some of the corners are rounded off on it,
reflects my views.
Q: What did you make of the reaction at the time? You were an important
public official then, but you weren't particularly visible. And I looked at
the Times -- That was the right hand column front page story on the same
day, by the way, that the Whitewater story broke in the paper, March 8,
1992.
And of course there were Democratic primaries coming up, Super Tuesday. Was
this your first taste of what the media will do to you when they think they
have a story? Or were you schooled in that before?
Wolfowitz: I've run into it before. If the media had more of a right wing
bias I would have run into it in a major way with the Philippine policy. We
had a few shots at us from the conservative press that we were undermining
Reagan's good friend Ferdinand Marcos. No, I've been shot at from both
directions.
I think the first time was over the Team B exercise back in 1976.
Q: Oh, that's right.
Wolfowitz: It seems to go with the territory.
Q: And there again you'd written a fairly straightforward account, wasn't it
of intermediate missiles or something?
Wolfowitz: That's right. Which turned out to be, I wouldn't say prophetic,
but it was prescient. It was completely borne out by what came subsequently,
but it was again -- I don't know whether people caricature it in order to
discredit it, or they caricature it because they don't understand it. Or
maybe some of both.
But the way I would put it in terms of the '92 document and briefings is
that, you have to remember, the Cold War had ended. There were a lot of
people who said we don't need any of these Cold War alliances any more. We
don't need NATO any more. Then President Bush was asked why do you need NATO
now that the threat's gone away? He said the threat's still there. They said
what is it? He said the threat's uncertainty, and people sort of laughed at
that.
Well, it's not a bad description for what's happened in the Balkans in the
intervening period. And what we were basically arguing in that document is
that while we can manage with a substantially reduced U.S. defense force,
for a lot of people to retain 60 percent of it in those alliance
commitments, they somehow, I guess, thought we could go to complete
disarmament or something. I'm not sure what their model was.
In fact the New York Times specifically had this absurd line, I remember,
that we had abandoned 50 years of reliance on the doctrine of collective
security, I think. I'd have to go back and get the quote. But basically it's
as though for 50 years we'd been relying on the United Nations and this
document was going to undo it, as opposed to for 50 years we'd relied on
NATO and our alliances in Northeast Asia and this document was trying to
support them.
I remember at the time that a couple of Democratic senators -- It's easy to
recover them. You just go and look in Pat Buchanan's book -- sort of became
hysterical about this grand plan for continuing and maybe even expanding
American commitments. Because we did, in a sense one of the more radical
things in there was, if I can use an awful phrase, the adumbration of NATO
enlargement. We weren't quite so bold as to say it but we were hinting at
it. There was some discussion about, in a complementary document that was
also leaked, about whether the United States could honor a defense
commitment to Lithuania if we had one. This was considered wildly outrageous
and various Democratic senators attacked us.
Pat Buchanan's "Republic Not an Empire" book spends its first chapter
attacking the so-called Wolfowitz Memorandum.
Q: Right, I know that book.
Wolfowitz: And he laments the fact that these same Democratic senators who
were attacking--in his view, appropriately attacking--the Wolfowitz
Memorandum, had climbed on board the whole policy when it became Clinton's
policy in the mid 1990s. He's correct in saying that what was considered by
the New York Times to be such an outrageous document was U.S. consensus
foreign policy, but during the Clinton Administration, not in this
Administration. That is that these alliances needed to be retained, that
NATO could be enlarged successfully, that we could downsize our military but
we needed to retain a capability to deal with two major regional conflicts,
which, by the way, is something that needed revision by the time I got back
here. But it was the defense policy of the Clinton years, ironically.
Q: In fact John Louis Gaddis said that.
Wolfowitz: Who?
Q: John Louis Gaddis has said that, that if you look at Clinton's policy it
actually does come out of the '92 guidance to some extent.
Wolfowitz: Not to some extent. It's pretty much verbatim.
Q: But you're --
Wolfowitz: -- without acknowledgement.
Q: Except you have been skeptical about Clinton's, the sentimental
liberalism in his ideas, his approach to foreign policy, right?
Wolfowitz: Well, yes but let's remember that -- I think they made a serious
over-reach in Somalia when they went beyond just ending starvation and tried
to do nationbuilding. I think Haiti was a waste of American effort. I think,
as we've learned, the North Korea Framework Agreement was delusional. But on
two of the key things they did, namely Bosnia and Kosovo, Bob Dole supported
Clinton quite strongly and I would say courageously on Bosnia and I'm proud
to claim some credit in having advised --
Q: You did too.
Wolfowitz: I did too, but I also was there when Dole was being pushed by
some of his Republican colleagues to go after Clinton saying this would be a
catastrophe. I said no it won't be, and moreover, it's the right thing to
do.
If they had dropped the arms embargo on the Bosnians as they promised to do
when they came into office it might not have been necessary to still have
thousands of foreign troops in Bosnia. But by the time you got to it in 1995
it was the only alternative.
And similarly, on Kosovo, when Bush was deciding whether to support it or
not, I was strongly urging him to do so. When some Republicans tried to
undercut Clinton on Kosovo, it was Bush and McCain together who told them
don't do that. It's wrong.
So it's not that everything they did was wrong, but I think things like
Haiti and Somalia were over-reached and generally there was, I think, a
difficulty in distinguishing what was American interest from what were sort
of vaguely seen as international community preferences. But I'm not a
unilateralist by any means. In fact I don't think you can get much done in
this world if you do it alone.
Q: Do you think there was a reluctance on their part even to use the threat
of force? To make force an option in the way that it's now become -- I think
about North Korea, Syria and Iran, and actually --
Wolfowitz: And Iraq.
Q: And Iraq. When I think about it, these other three that have now been
brought up, being discussed, have actually been very kind of multinational
and diplomatic and yet it's partly the threat of force that seems to
strengthen the approach, doesn't it?
Wolfowitz: There's no question that in certain -- First of all, diplomacy
that it's just words is rarely going to get you much unless you're dealing
with people who basically share your values and your interests. I'm not
against, I mean sometimes it does help to just have a better understanding.
But if you're talking about trying to move people to something that they're
not inclined to do, then you've got to have leverage and one piece of
leverage is the ultimate threat of force. It's something you need to be very
careful about because, as Rumsfeld likes to say, don't cock unless you're
prepared to throw it.
By the way I think there was a tendency to cock it too often with Kosovo. If
you go back and look at the year and a half or so leading up to when we
finally did use force there were so many empty threats issued that Milosevic
clearly concluded, ultimately wrongly, that we weren't serious.
So I think yeah, I think the threat of force is one of the instruments of
diplomacy, but it's one that needs to be used carefully.
I'm going to have to break here for a few minutes and we'll try to get back
to you soon.
Q: Thanks so much. Goodbye.
-END-
Session Two
Saturday, May 10, 2003
Wolfowitz: Hello.
Q: How are you doing?
Wolfowitz: Pretty good. How are you?
Q: Okay. I will try to make this painless. It reminds me of an interview I
read with Philip Ross once in the Times and he said what a day. First the
dentist, now a journalist. [Laughter]
Wolfowitz: The dentist was easy, so I hope you can stay below his threshold.
[Laughter]
You're kind of faint.
Q: I was telling Kevin, I have a headset and I type as we speak, which is
one reason I'll want to see the transcript just so I don't make errors. I'm
reliable, but I'm not a letter-perfect typist and I won't always be able to
keep up with you.
Can you hear me okay now?
Wolfowitz: Pretty well. It's okay.
Q: This is a feature magazine and people want to know a little about you so
let me just lead you through a few questions there.
One is, where were you on September 11th? Were you at the Pentagon when --
Wolfowitz: I was in my office. We'd just had a breakfast with some
congressmen in which one of the subjects had been missile defense. And we
commented to them that based on what Rumsfeld and I had both seen and worked
on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, that we were probably in for
some nasty surprises over the next ten years.
Q: Oh, my gosh.
Wolfowitz: I can't remember, then there was the sort of question of what
kind of nasty surprises? I don't remember exactly which ones we came up
with. The point was more just that it's in the nature of surprise that you
can't predict what it's going to be.
Q: Do you remember then the impact of the plane into the Pentagon? Or had
you first heard stories about New York? What was --
Wolfowitz: We were having a meeting in my office. Someone said a plane had
hit the World Trade Center. Then we turned on the television and we started
seeing the shots of the second plane hitting, and this is the way I remember
it. It's a little fuzzy.
Q: Right.
Wolfowitz: There didn't seem to be much to do about it immediately and we
went on with whatever the meeting was. Then the whole building shook. I have
to confess my first reaction was an earthquake. I didn't put the two things
together in my mind. Rumsfeld did instantly.
Q: Did he really?
Wolfowitz: Yeah. He went charging out and down to the site where the plane
had hit, which is what I would have done if I'd had my wits about me, which
may or may not have been a smart thing to do. But it was, instead the next
thing we heard was that there'd been a bomb and the building had to be
evacuated. Everyone started streaming out of the building in a quite orderly
way. Congregated on the parade ground basically right in front of the
Pentagon which would have been about the worst place to have a crowd of a
couple of thousand people in that moment if we'd again had our wits about
us. But we were out of the building anyway.
Q: Let me ask you then about the next couple of days. There is --
Wolfowitz: Just to complete it. We went back into the building and that was
an experience I won't ever forget. There was a huge fire, there was smoke
gradually filling -- not all, just the small number of us who were basically
in the command group. Rumsfeld was there and General Myers who was still the
Vice Chairman at that point. The Chairman was on his way back from overseas
and I was there. We were in the National Military Command Center and there
was this acrid smoke gradually seeping into the place. Rumsfeld simply
refused to leave. He finally made me leave, which I was not happy about.
I went up to this bizarre location that was prepared to survive nuclear war.
Q: Really?
Wolfowitz: Yes.
Q: In the Pentagon.
Wolfowitz: No, no. Way out of town.
Kellems: That's why he left, was to separate them.
Q: I see.
Kellems: To provide continuity.
Q: And then in the next few days, then there was the statement which now
looks remarkably [prescient] when you said this is a campaign. At that
point, I think it was the 13th, at that point was Iraq sort of moving into
the scope, under the radar screen? What was your thinking at that point?
Wolfowitz: I know my thinking at that point was that the old approach to
terrorism was not acceptable any longer. The old approach being you treat it
as a law enforcement problem rather than a national security problem. You
pursue terrorists after they've done things and bring them to justice, and
to the extent states are perhaps involved, you retaliate against them but
you don't really expect to get them out of the business of supporting
terrorism completely.
To me what September 11th meant was that we just couldn't live with
terrorism any longer.
Throughout the '80s and '90s it was sort of, I've never found quite the
right words because necessary evil doesn't describe it, but a sort of an
evil that you could manage but you couldn't eliminate. And I think what
September 11th to me said was this is just the beginning of what these
bastards can do if they start getting access to so-called modern weapons,
and that it's not something you can live with any longer. So there needs to
be a campaign, a strategy, a long-term effort, to root out these networks
and to get governments out of the business of supporting them. But that
wasn't something that was going to happen overnight.
Q: Right. So Iraq naturally came to the top of the list because of its
history and the weapons of mass terror and all the rest, is that right?
Wolfowitz: Yes, plus the fact which seems to go unremarked in most places,
that Saddam Hussein was the only international figure other than Osama bin
Laden who praised the attacks of September 11th.
Q: So now there is the much-reported, I just want to make sure I get it
right, famous meeting at --
It's been reported in a couple of different ways, and I'd like to get it in
your words if I can, the famous meetings that first weekend in Camp David
where the question of Iraq came up. I believe the President heard you
discussing Iraq and asked you to elaborate on it or speak more about it. Can
you give us a little sense of what that was like?
Wolfowitz: Yeah. There was a long discussion during the day about what place
if any Iraq should have in a counterterrorist strategy. On the surface of
the debate it at least appeared to be about not whether but when. There
seemed to be a kind of agreement that yes it should be, but the disagreement
was whether it should be in the immediate response or whether you should
concentrate simply on Afghanistan first.
There was a sort of undertow in that discussion I think that was, the real
issue was whether Iraq should be part of the strategy at all and whether we
should have this large strategic objective which is getting governments out
of the business of supporting terrorism, or whether we should simply go
after bin Laden and al Qaeda.
To the extent it was a debate about tactics and timing, the President
clearly came down on the side of Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a
debate about strategy and what the larger goal was, it is at least clear
with 20/20 hindsight that the President came down on the side of the larger
goal.
Q: Believe it or not, because this is a feature magazine, I'd like to ask
you a little bit about your background. None of this is going to be
personal. I know that you protect the privacy of your family so this has
really nothing to do with that.
First of all, the question of ideas. That is, is there anything at all, we
talked about this a little off the record, is there anything at all to the
Straussian Connection?
Wolfowitz: It's a product of fevered minds who seem incapable of
understanding that September 11th changed a lot of things and changed the
way we need to approach the world. Since they refused to confront that, they
looked for some kind of conspiracy theory to explain it.
I mean I took two terrific courses from Leo Strauss as a graduate student.
One was on Montesquieu's spirit of the laws, which did help me understand
our Constitution better. And one was on Plato's laws. The idea that this has
anything to do with U.S. foreign policy is just laughable.
Q: There is something kind of humorous in it because a few weeks ago all we
heard was he's been the kind of cowboy, rampaging around the globe looking
for evildoers. And now he seems to be in the vehicle of erudite philosophy.
This is very helpful.
Wolfowitz: It sort of calls to mind the joke about the President and the
Pope are on a boat, and the Pope's hat blows off. The President says, no,
I'll get it for you and walks across the top of the waves, picks up the hat
and walks back across the top of the waves, hands the hat to the Pope and
the next day the headlines are, "President Bush can't swim." [Laughter]
Q: Let me ask about one other [inaudible], and that's Albert Wohlstetter. A
couple of people, believe me, who are not [inaudible] at all, say that
Wohlstetter was a far-sighted military strategist whose notions have been
about low yield nuclear weapons that we're hearing about today, and
different ways of fighting wars. It doesn't have to be an all or nothing,
zero sum, no mutually assured destruction. Are there any notions like that
on where the military is today or how you look at --
Wolfowitz: Wohlstetter is a much more relevant figure and it's interesting
too, by the way, that the same fellow who, or one of the same fellows who
discovered the Straussian Conspiracy kind of throws Wohlstetter in as a
Straussian when Wohlstetter was actually philosophically a student of Quine.
Q: The analytical --
Wolfowitz: Exactly. If there was anything anathema to Leo Strauss it was
analytical philosophy.
Q: I bet.
Wolfowitz: And Wohlstetter was somebody who really just almost painfully
resisted being labeled even as to political party. He was so insistent on
ascertaining the facts. He had a very fact-based approach to policy. It's
very impressive. And indeed, I was his student and often identified as such,
and it occasionally troubled me just a little bit that I thought, well,
maybe he was also associated with these sort of cold-blooded systems
analysts who kind of seemed to leave the moral piece of politics and
strategy as though it wasn't part of the equation.
It was terrifically gratifying to me as I got to know him better, to realize
that there were intensely moral considerations in the way he approached
these issues. Most dramatically in his deep concern about the fate of Bosnia
in his late years.
But to come back to sort of more concretely, I mean here's something that I
think is quite important, quite relevant. Albert Wohlstetter was one of the
first people, most influential people, to understand what a dramatic
difference it would make to have accurate weapons. And that in particular
what he was really interested in was the ability, two things. Number one, to
be able to use conventional weapons in ways that people, that only nuclear
weapons could be used, to be able to get out of the nuclear mindset kind of
things.
But secondly and importantly, to be able to avoid unnecessary loss of
innocent life in war. And in fact there's a fairly seminal document that was
done under Fred Ikle when he was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
called Discriminate Deterrence which may be interesting to know if you can
find it on the internet. As I recall, even at the time, the State Department
didn't like it because for some reason or other it offended some of our
allies.
Q: Was that when you were working --
Wolfowitz: No, no. I was actually doing East Asia policy at the time. I
can't claim any credit for it.
Q: This was in the '80s then.
Wolfowitz: Yes, mid '80s. '84 or '86, I don't remember which.
But going back much earlier, Albert, starting in '73 or '74 put together
something called the New Alternative Workshop or New Alternative Panel. I
think it was Workshop. To look at the implications of new technology. But
the ones that interested him the most were the ones that promised great
improvements in accuracy. And as a result he was the first intellectual
figure to recognize that the Tomahawk cruise missile which was being
developed by the Navy primarily as a nuclear delivery system, was much more
significant as a conventional delivery system because it could give you very
accurate weapons with ranges of what we have now, 600 miles or more.
If it hadn't been for Albert, I believe the Tomahawk cruise missile would
have been traded away in the SALT II talks in 1976. But what happened -- am
I getting into too much historical detail?
Q: No, this is fascinating.
Wolfowitz: What happened was the Ford Administration at the time was trying
very hard to get a SALT II agreement based on the agreement in principle
that emerged in Vladivostok. The Soviets were basically saying they would
only make an agreement if we banned all cruise missiles at ranges greater
than 600 kilometers which would have included the Tomahawk. The Navy,
frankly, was quite happy to give it up because they'd only built it in some
measure at Kissinger's urging earlier on, when Kissinger wanted some nuclear
delivery system he could use as bargaining material in the SALT talks and as
far as they were concerned, it was just an unnecessary burden to be carried
by attack submarines that had only limited torpedo space.
It was Albert and his group who said wait a minute, if you can have a
conventional delivery system it's worth the torpedo space, I mean an
accurate conventional delivery system, and the way I understood the history
but I'm sure there are slightly different versions of this, he and I
persuaded Fred Ikle who was then the Director of ACDA that we should oppose
giving up the tomahawk on arms control grounds because it had the potential
to substitute conventional for nuclear weapons and that was a good thing
from the point of view of arms control.
The Secretary of Defense at the time who was somebody named Rumsfeld, by
whatever means he came to it, concluded it was not something he wanted to
give up even if the Navy brass were prepared to. As a result it was not sort
of used as a bargaining chip in those negotiations, although I think absent
those two individuals it probably would have been.
So it was a matter of considerable personal satisfaction to watch those
missiles turning right angle corners in the Gulf War in 1991 and
demonstrating that this stuff really could do what Albert Wohlstetter had
envisioned 15 years before it might be able to do.
It's also an interesting case I think, without wanting to suggest that
there's anything unintelligent about the military, it's too easy to
misinterpret this comment. I mean there are very smart people trying very
hard to do the right thing, but what's involved here is a tradeoff between a
very expensive system that might some day be accurate, against things that
are available here and now and that are much cheaper, and they may not be
accurate but they seem to "do the job".
It's been true also of things like global positioning systems and the JDAM,
the accurate GPS bombs that were used so heavily in the last war. The last
two wars. It took a certain amount of pressure from the Congress to get the
Air Force and the other services to invest adequately in those systems
because a certain skepticism about the promise of briefing charts versus the
reality of the here and now, and I think it was -- It's somewhat, I'm going
way too far off on this. But if you wanted to understand Albert Wohlstetter
you've got to understand how somebody can perceive that a seemingly cold
technical fact like this fact about accuracy translates into a whole
transformation of strategy and politics.
That had a similar impact in the 1950s when he was asked to look at, by the
Air Force, at what's the most cost-effective way to base our bomber force
and came out of that with the observation which is like a blinding flash of
the obvious but no one had noticed it before then, that the real issue isn't
what's cost effective, the real issue is how do you build a bomber force
that's not vulnerable to a first strike by the other side?
Q: That was seminal.
Wolfowitz: Absolutely seminal. And it derived not from reading Plato,
believe me. Nor did it derive from any ideological prejudices whatsoever. It
derived from saying here's the problem, look at it factually, see what the
questions are that emerged from the thing itself so to speak -- inductive
rather than deductive -- and I suppose that's the difference between
ideological thinking and pragmatic thinking.
Q: Is that true for your own approach as well?
Wolfowitz: Well, it turns out he was a mixture and I think I'm a mixture.
People ask me how do you characterize yourself. I guess the closest I can
come to saying it is I think I'm a practical idealist. I mean I don't like
the caricature Wilsonian view that says we're going to impose something on
the world regardless of whether it can take in the real world. But I also
don't like the sort of, the kind of pragmatism -- I consider myself
pragmatic but I don't like the kind of pragmatism that sort of stares at
people who hold principles very strongly and think that it's all just a
matter of doing business and being sensible.
Q: Which leads me to the last couple of questions --
Wolfowitz: I remember once when the President in the middle of a discussion
about a particular country said just how brutal are its leaders. I thought
it was an incredibly perceptive question and it's too often left out of the
equation as a sort of pragmatic view that you've got to deal with them as
the leaders of country X and you shouldn't inquire too deeply into what kind
of people they are. I think you do have to deal with all kinds of dubious
characters in the world in order to accomplish the national security
objectives of the country.
But it's really important to keep in mind what this country is about. It's a
lot more than just physical security or economic health.
Q: Does that also raise a question then if you're looking at leader who
truly is brutal, [inaudible], raising that question, and also maybe someone
who doesn't necessarily think the way you do. I know Wohlstetter had this
phrase, I think he called it Western preferred Soviet strategy.
Wolfowitz: Exactly. It's probably the second greatest source of intelligence
error is mirror imaging. I mean I think the greatest mistake is assuming
that people will behave, well it's a version of mirror imaging, I guess.
People will be rational according to our definition of what is rational.
Q: Right.
Wolfowitz: I guess they really are the same thing.
Q: I'm sorry. What's the first one?
Wolfowitz: The first one is that people will, the kind of mistake that in a
sense I think we made implicitly in assuming that anyone who was intelligent
enough to fly an airplane wouldn't commit suicide with it. Or the mistake
that Saddam Hussein made of thinking that -- Let me back up. I guess I'm
getting --
The mistake that Saddam made was in assuming that we would behave in a
certain way, i.e. we would never go to war until we'd had six weeks of
bombing first. That's a sort of classic intelligence failure, to have a
certain expectation and then see all the evidence in light of that
expectation.
Hitler made the same mistake in assuming that of course we'd attack in
Calais, so we achieved one of history's great deceptions by reinforcing that
conviction of his. But the sort of second and related source is mirror
imaging. Those are not examples of mirror imaging. In fact Saddam was
assuming that we were too weak to go in on the ground, unlike his tough
macho approach to life. But mirror imaging I think is another major source
of error.
What was that phrase, U.S. preferred Soviet --
Q: I think it's Western preferred Soviet strategy, which is kind of an
ingeniously [compressed] phrase.
Wolfowitz: That's typical Albert, yeah.
Q: And of course that was part of his approach to the Cold War as well. And
also the sort of standard, now we are getting off the track but it is
interesting, that the sort of standard arms negotiation which entails that
we should sort of remove options from our side of the table actually kind of
limited our ability to have choices and to maybe even win the Cold War,
right?
Wolfowitz: I think that's right, but I'd rather you not put those words --
Q: No, I wouldn't put them in your mouth.
Wolfowitz: It's too complicated a subject to --
Q: I was just curious to see what you had to say about that.
Wolfowitz: I think if one dug into it that's not a bad characterization.
Q: Then, and this is about as personal as I'm going to get, your father was
at distinguished mathematician. You studied math and I think chemistry at
Cornell. Were you interested in politics all along? I know you were in
Washington I believe in '63 when Dr. King made his great speech.
Wolfowitz: '64 I think it was.
Q: I think it was '63, but --
Wolfowitz: Whichever year it was, the "I have a dream" speech.
Q: Right. And you were there. You were interested in politics and also
questions of social justice and democracy? How did all this happen for
someone who was kind of a science guy?
Wolfowitz: I think my father deserves a large part of the blame or whatever
it is. It's a funny thing because he really did think that the ultimate
thing in life was to be a mathematician or a theoretical physicist. There's
a certain snobbery about mathematicians and theoretical physics, in some
ways a branch of mathematics almost that is well known among scientists at
least.
I was good at math but I kept feeling it was too abstract and I thought
maybe if I could work on a cure for cancer I'd be more fully satisfied which
is why I sort of headed into the chemistry major. I was actually accepted
for a PhD at MIT which I was going to do in biophysical chemistry, but I had
also, I think unbeknownst to my father. I don't remember now, applied to --
I'm not saying it was -- There's no deep, dark secret here. I had applied to
Chicago for political science. And what I remember is the decisive moment
was when I had to decide with respect to Harvard, was I going to apply for
government or chemistry. And I finally came out realizing that I wanted to
do government, applied to Harvard in government, and told my father and all
my chemistry professors that I had looked at the MIT catalog and I had
already completed the first two years of graduate course requirements in
chemistry so I could afford to take a year and experiment with political
science.
They all saw through it and they basically said you don't understand son,
the real stars have already completed three years of graduate course work in
chemistry. That wasn't really the point. The point was they knew I was -- If
you're serious about hard science you don't go off and experiment for a year
with something as soft as political science.
Q: You applied to Harvard as well?
Wolfowitz: Yeah.
Q: You were admitted everywhere?
Wolfowitz: Yeah. They just loved having mathematicians, it was sort of
funny.
But to go back to why -- He was one of these scientists, and there are
many, -- I don't know whether it's many. I think largely because of the
experience of World War II and also because -- Well, he read the New York
Times every day as though the future of the world depended on his reading
the New York Times. And he had an absolutely passionate interest in politics
and history, read a lot of history, knew a lot of history, and I can't help
thinking that's where I got the bug from at a fairly young age.
I remember when I was in high school, ninth grade, I'd been looking for Alan
Paton's "Cry the Beloved Country" in English, and we arrived on what was
going to be a long three or four months in Europe, arrived in France and
there it was in French on a book stand. I'd had one year of high school
French and not a very good year at that. But I picked it up and I sort of
struggled my way through it with a dictionary. And it was partly because I
wanted to learn French, but it's also because that sort of, I don't know if
you know "Cry the Beloved Country" --
Q: Oh, yeah, I know the novel. It's a tremendous important novel in that
era, late '50s, early '60s.
Wolfowitz: It really was, and it was sort of gripping from a political,
moral point of view. Those are the kinds of things I tended to read a lot
of. George Orwell. Books about the Holocaust unfortunately. John Hersey's
Hiroshima.
Q: Did you look at --
Wolfowitz: I did not -- See, this was my big recognition my senior year in
college was that when I had spare time I read politics and history and when
my fellow math majors had spare time they did extra math problems. I
realized there was a message there.
To be really good at something you need to do more than just do well in your
coursework. You need to be consumed by it.
Q: And just to get this straight, the Allen Bloom connection. You've now
entered literary history because a Nobel Laureate has fictionalized,
referenced you at least.
Wolfowitz: It's half of one paragraph, which again -- [Laughter]
Q: Well, it's irresistible for journalists. Because there he is, the great
American novelist and you are a very important figure and you're in his
novel, and if it [inaudible], it's hard not to use --
Wolfowitz: By the way, that conversation never happened. That particular
one.
Q: It didn't make sense. He was fabricating then.
Wolfowitz: He was sort of -- He wasn't fabricating the fact that Bloom loved
to talk to any students of his who were in government, and even though I
wasn't his closest student I was probably one at the highest level in
government so it gave him the most bragging rights. And I'm sure that every
time we had a conversation, judging from the way Bellow describes it and I
would have expected it. He sort of -- He had a way of seeing everyone as
larger than life. Almost everyone he dealt with was a figure from a platonic
dialogue almost. In a way it's -- The way of looking at the world that was
eye-opening in a certain sense, maybe the story -- [Laughter] Anyway, I'm
sure that whatever things were exchanged were exaggerated.
The thing I was grateful to Bellow for was noting very clearly that nobody
would ever have told Bloom anything that was classified because he couldn't
be trusted with a secret.
Q: That's right. He was very clear about that. He said in fact that
[inaudible] doesn't tell him anything that you don't want to appear in
tomorrow's press. [Laughter]
Did you take several courses with Bloom?
Wolfowitz: I actually only took one course with Bloom but he was a resident
faculty member of the place where I was living.
Q: That was Teluride?
Wolfowitz: Yeah.
Q: And is it true that, Bellow actually had I think, [inaudible] faculty
actually warning your father against Bloom. Is that something [inaudible] at
that point?
Wolfowitz: I think it's a composite of various Bloom students. I don't
think -- Certainly the way it's put there is not my father, and my father
was not a business professor. In fact my father was actually one of the
leading figures in mathematical statistics and, even though Bloom didn't
have a clue as to what the whole subject was, he knew that my father was
something much more than a, however it's described in there.
Q: Right.
Wolfowitz: In fact I remember he was in some awe of my father because he
would do his work pacing the large quadrangle of the Arts and Sciences
College at Cornell, lost in pure thought, without a pencil or paper, and
working, and I think it's a fairly rare phenomenon --
Q: This is your father who did that?
Wolfowitz: Yeah.
Q: He would think it through --
Wolfowitz: He would be thinking about math problems in his head. On the one
hand Bloom was somewhat disdainful of hard science in general because it
left out the philosophical dimension, but on the other hand I think he was
in some awe of, he believed in the life of the mind and theory and all of
that, that somebody could actually be thinking through fundamental questions
simply in his head.
Q: This is great.
Wolfowitz: So it's a kind of a mixture. When I read that particular
paragraph I could have --
Wolfowitz: -- that I had never sort of really seen before. I mean there was
a bravery about the guy which included his facing death the way he did I
think that's pretty remarkable. I mean I'm not saying I didn't see it
before, but I saw it more clearly.
There's an uglier side that I don't want to get into here, but it is sort of
glossed over.
Q: It's fair to say you're not a disciple of Allen Bloom. We can say that.
You studied with him.
Wolfowitz: And I didn't even study a great deal with him. He had a lot to do
with my coming to appreciate that the study of politics could be a serious
business even though it wasn't science in the sense that I understood
science to be. That was an important eye-opener. But I never, for better and
for worse, took the political theory either way most of his other students
did.
Q: Did he know Wohlstetter? Bloom had studied with Strauss at Chicago and --
Wolfowitz: No, it was kind of an interesting accident. In trying to choose
between Harvard and Chicago, Harvard seemed to have the advantages of a much
stronger international relations department and Chicago had the advantage of
a much stronger political theory department. Even though I thought
international relations was what I wanted to do, I have more confidence in
my ability to sort of learn that without a lot of help, and I thought -- I
mean Strauss really is quite a remarkable figure. That doesn't make me an
acolyte but he really is pretty remarkable. I thought well here's a chance
you shouldn't pass up.
Q: So you knew who he was.
Wolfowitz: Yes, I certainly knew who he was. And one of my professors at
Cornell said, and by the way there's this guy Albert Wohlstetter who's just
moving to Chicago from Rand and you and he would probably get along very
well. I'd never heard of the man, if that tells you something about how
unconnected I was to the field. This was 1965.
I arrive in Chicago. The first student/faculty tea I'm introduced to
Wohlstetter and he said, "Oh, are you related to Jack Wolfowitz?" I said as
a matter of fact that's my father. He said I studied mathematics with him
and Abraham Wald at Columbia. Then he said, what's your --
Q: They were collaborators, weren't they? Your father and Wald?
Wolfowitz: Yeah. My father was Walds' student and then his principal
collaborator until Wald died in an airplane accident in India at too young
an age.
But then when Albert discovered I was a math major he immediately glommed
onto me. I was his dream of -- His approach to issues was very technical and
very technologically oriented and I was the perfect student.
By the way, Alan Greenspan also was a student of my father's. He says that
my father had a fundamental influence on his understanding of what was then
the brand new field of econometrics.
Q: Right, so this is at Cornell?
Wolfowitz: No, that was at Columbia. That was 1949-1950.
Q: I see. When did he go to Cornell?
Wolfowitz: -- my father, I shouldn't do that.
Q: We're supposed to brag about our fathers.
When did you all go to Ithaca?
Wolfowitz: The first move there was the fall of '51--'52, and then my father
immediately had a sabbatical -- no, '52--'53 we moved to Ithaca. Then he
immediately had a sabbatical and '53--'54 we spent half in Los Angeles and
half in Urbana, Illinois. I still remember, the reason I see the
announcement of Stalin's death in 1954 was the street I lived on in Urbana,
Illinois at the time.
Q: You'd been living in Manhattan before that?
Wolfowitz: Manhattan. I was born in Brooklyn but we grew up in Manhattan,
one block down on Morningside Drive in a house that no longer exists. One
block down from the President of Columbia who for part of that time was
Dwight Eisenhower. My sister tells me that she remembers seeing Eisenhower
go to his car as we were roller-skating on that block, but it didn't make
any impression on me. I was probably three or four.
Q: This is all very helpful.
This is sort of the two very small, well, they're big questions but I don't
expect you to give me extended answers to the questions of the day. One is
there is some question as to whether the Pentagon underestimated Iran's
readiness to intervene in Iraq and whether that upset the plans at all, the
post-war plans.
Wolfowitz: That's nonsense.
Q: Okay. That had been reported.
Wolfowitz: There's so much that's reported that -- No. In fact it's, I don't
want to comment [inaudible] government. We've understood very clearly that
Iraq, especially the Shia population of Iraq, is both a source of danger and
opportunity to the Iranians. I think it's more danger than it is
opportunity. But the danger itself is incentive for them to try to intervene
because the last thing they want to see, which I think is a real
possibility, is an independent source of authority for the Shia religion
emerging in a country that is democratic and pro-Western.
Q: That's a --
Wolfowitz: There's going to be a huge struggle for the soul of Iraqi Shiism,
there's no question about it.
Q: What about the notion that the military campaign went so quickly and so
brilliantly that you did not have everything else as much as you might have
in place for this later era, later period [inaudible]?
Wolfowitz: It certainly has gone quickly. People that remember when you want
to take your story, I mean we're, 50 days after the war began people
started -- Having been wrong about the first quagmire saying we were in a
quagmire in terms of the restoration of the civil services in Iraq or
dealing with any number of other obvious problems. To me what's remarkable
is how much was accomplished in 50 days.
Things are not going to happen overnight. The notion -- I mean policy, like
life, is fundamentally about choices and the notion that we should have
chosen to delay until we had a huge force and go more slowly and deal with
all the problems that would have come from going slowly so that we would
have had enough people, for example, to guard the museum in Baghdad is
frankly absurd. And it may well turn out, in fact, that the museum in
Baghdad was looted before the war even began, in which case no amount of
guarding would have done any good.
There are choices that had to be made and I don't think there's any question
that the fundamental speed of the operation, the remarkable speed of the
operation, played a role in preventing a number of the worst things that we
feared from happening. We'll never know exactly why the oilfields were not
destroyed. We did not have an environmental disaster resulting from huge
hydrogen sulfide fires in the north. We did not have attacks on Israel. We
did not have a fortress Baghdad. We did not have a civil war in northern
Iraq or a Turkish intervention in northern Iraq. We didn't have an Iranian
intervention to speak of in southern Iraq. We didn't have any Arab
governments collapse. Should I keep going?
Q: These were all possibilities you weighed, right?
Wolfowitz: Absolutely. And most of these were things that people warned were
absolutely certain to happen if we went to war. I think a few of them I
thought were exaggerated. The one that has always worried me the most was
the use of weapons of mass destruction. We still don't know why they weren't
used. That's something maybe we'll know more about one of these days, I
don't know.
But there seems to be very little doubt that everything came at the Iraqi
regime much faster than they expected it. That the war began sooner, that
the ground troops moved in faster, that they moved up north faster, that
they moved into Baghdad faster, and a lot of things happened before for that
matter some of the meddling neighbors could interfere, either.
One of our senior generals in a discussion of a related but different
subject made the observation that speed kills, as in it kills the enemy, and
that getting to an objective quickly is often the thing that's most
effective militarily. There's always usually a tradeoff between speed and
mass.
Q: And then the last question, you've been very patient and generous. That
is what's next? Where do we stand now in the campaign that you talked about
right after September 11th?
Wolfowitz: I think the two most important things next are the two most
obvious. One is getting post-Saddam Iraq right. Getting it right may take
years, but setting the conditions for getting it right in the next six
months. The next six months are going to be very important.
The other thing is trying to get some progress on the Israeli-Palestinian
issue. I do think we have a better atmosphere for working on it now than we
did before in all kinds of ways. Whether that's enough to make a difference
is not certain, but I will be happy to go back and dig up the things I said
a long time ago which is, while it undoubtedly was true that if we could
make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue we would provide a better set
of circumstances to deal with Saddam Hussein, but that it was equally true
the other way around that if we could deal with Saddam Hussein it would
provide a better set of circumstances for dealing with the Arab-Israeli
issue. That you had to move on both of them as best you could when you
could, but --
There are a lot of things that are different now, and one that has gone by
almost unnoticed--but it's huge--is that by complete mutual agreement
between the U.S. and the Saudi government we can now remove almost all of
our forces from Saudi Arabia. Their presence there over the last 12 years
has been a source of enormous difficulty for a friendly government. It's
been a huge recruiting device for al Qaeda. In fact if you look at bin
Laden, one of his principle grievances was the presence of so-called
crusader forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina. I think just lifting
that burden from the Saudis is itself going to open the door to other
positive things.
I don't want to speak in messianic terms. It's not going to change things
overnight, but it's a huge improvement.
Q: Was that one of the arguments that was raised early on by you and others
that Iraq actually does connect, not to connect the dots too much, but the
relationship between Saudi Arabia, our troops being there, and bin Laden's
rage about that, which he's built on so many years, also connects the World
Trade Center attacks, that there's a logic of motive or something like that?
Or does that read too much into --
Wolfowitz: No, I think it happens to be correct. The truth is that for
reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we
settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of
mass destruction as the core reason, but -- Hold on one second.
(Pause)
Kellems: Sam there may be some value in clarity on the point that it may
take years to get post-Saddam Iraq right. It can be easily misconstrued,
especially when it comes to --
Wolfowitz: There have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons
of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the
criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say
there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first
two. Sorry, hold on again.
Kellems: By the way, it's probably the longest uninterrupted phone
conversation I've witnessed, so --
Q: This is extraordinary.
Kellems: You had good timing.
Q: I'm really grateful.
Wolfowitz: To wrap it up.
The third one by itself, as I think I said earlier, is a reason to help the
Iraqis but it's not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, certainly
not on the scale we did it. That second issue about links to terrorism is
the one about which there's the most disagreement within the bureaucracy,
even though I think everyone agrees that we killed 100 or so of an al Qaeda
group in northern Iraq in this recent go-around, that we've arrested that al
Qaeda guy in Baghdad who was connected to this guy Zarqawi whom Powell spoke
about in his UN presentation.
Q: So this notion then that the strategic question was really a part of the
equation, that you were looking at Saudi Arabia --
Wolfowitz: I was. It's one of the reasons why I took a very different view
of what the argument that removing Saddam Hussein would destabilize the
Middle East. I said on the record, I don't understand how people can really
believe that removing this huge source of instability is going to be a cause
of instability in the Middle East.
I understand what they're thinking about. I'm not blind to the uncertainties
of this situation, but they just seem to be blind to the instability that
that son of a bitch was causing. It's as though the fact that he was paying
$25,000 per terrorist family and issuing regular threats to most friendly
governments in the region and the long list of things was of no account and
the only thing to think about was that there might be some inter-communal
violence if he were removed.
The implication of a lot of the argumentation against acting -- the
implication was that the only way to have the stability that we need in Iraq
is to have a tyrant like Saddam keeping everybody in check -- I know no one
ever said it that way and if you pointed it out that way they'd say that's
not what I mean. But I believe that really is where the logic was leading.
Q: Which also makes you wonder about how much faith there is in spreading
democracy and all the rest among some of those who --
Wolfowitz: Probably not very much. There is no question that there's a lot
of instability that comes with democracy and it's the nature of the beast
that it's turbulent and uncertain.
The thing is, at a general level, I've encountered this argument from the
defenders of Asian autocracies of various kinds. Look how much better off
Singapore is than Indonesia, to pick a glaring contrast. And Indonesia's
really struggling with democracy. It sort of inherited democracy under the
worst possible conditions too, one might say. But the thing that -- I'd
actually say that a large part of Indonesia's problems come from the fact
that dictatorships are unstable in the one worst way which is with respect
to choosing the next regime. Democracy, one could say, has solved, not solve
perfectly, but they represent one of the best solutions to one of the most
fundamental instabilities in politics and that's how to replace one regime
with another. It's the only orderly way in the world for doing it other than
hereditary monarchy which doesn't seem to have much of a future.
Q: Thanks so much.
Wolfowitz: You're very welcome.