Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: i Fratelli Musulmani

The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe
I Fratelli Musulmani alla conquista dell'Europa
by Lorenzo Vidino
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2005
http://www.meforum.org/article/687
Since its founding in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (Hizb al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle 
East. Its motto is telling: "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our 
leader. The Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah 
is our highest hope."[1]
Fin dalla fondazione nel 1928, la Fratellanza Musulmana(Hizb al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun) ha profondamente influenzato la vita politica del Medio 
Oriente. Il suo motto dice: "Allah è il nostro obiettivo, il Profeta è la 
nostra guida, il Corano è la nostra legge, La Jihad è la nostra via. Morire 
lungo il cammino è la nostra più grande speranza."
While the Brotherhood's radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations 
of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and 
appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes 
and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more 
radical organizations.
Mentre le idee radicali del Fratelli Musulmani hanno formato le convinzioni 
di generazioni di islamisti, nelle ultimi due decenni, esse hanno perso una 
parte del loro potere e interesse nel Medio Oriente, schiacciate dalla dura 
repressione dei regimi locali e snobbate dalle giovani generazioni di 
islamisti, i quali spesso preferiscono organizzazioni ancora più radicali.
But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become 
an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Since the early 
1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and 
slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of 
mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic 
community, the Muslim Brotherhood's ultimate goal may not be simply "to help 
Muslims be the best citizens they can be," but rather to extend Islamic law 
throughout Europe and the United States.[2]
Ma il Medio Oriente é solo una parte del mondo islamico. L'Europa divenne l'incubatrice 
del pensiero islamico e del suo sviluppo politico. Fin dai lontani anni 60, 
i membri e i simpatizzati dei Fratelli Musulmani sono emigrati in Europa e, 
lentamente ma continuamente hanno fondato una vasta e ben organizzata rete 
di moschee, associazioni e organizzazioni islamiche.  Diversamente dalle più 
grandi organizzazioni islamiche, il fine dei Fratelli Musulmani non ö 
semplicemente quello di "aiutare i musulmani ad essere i migliori cittadini 
che possono essere", ma piuttosto di diffondere la legge islamica nell'Europa 
e negli Stati Uniti.
Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees 
who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now 
lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their 
engagement with Europe's political elite. Funded by generous contributors 
from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans 
nearly every European country.
Quattro decenni di predicazione e proselitismo hanno dato i loro frutti. Gli 
studenti rifugiati che emigrarono dal Medio Oriente 40 anni fa e i loro 
discendenti, guidano ora organizzazioni che rappresentano le comunità 
musulmane nel loro impegno con le elite politiche d'Europa. Finanziate da 
generosi donatori del golfo persico, essi presiedono una rete centralizzata 
che si estende in quasi tutti i paesi europei.
These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they 
continue to embrace the Brotherhood's radical views and maintain links to 
terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Dutch, and 
French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media 
alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them 
whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they 
seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.
Queste organizzazioni rappresentano esse stesse come corrente principale, 
cosi come continuano ad abbracciare le visioni radicali dei Fratelli 
Musulmani e mantengono contatti con i settoristi. Con una retorica moderata 
ben espressa nelle lingue tedesca, olandese, francese, essi si sono 
guadagnata l'accettazione sia presso i governi europei che presso i media. 
Politici di tutto lo spettro dei partiti accorrono per incontrarli ogni qual 
volta sopraggiunge un'argomento che riguarda i musulmani, oppure, 
localmente, per cercare voti nelle comunità musulmane.
But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop 
their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about 
interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate 
and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly 
condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, 
they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. 
Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected 
Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible 
in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only 
because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played 
host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to 
the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government's reaction is 
also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood 
rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its 
activities.
Questi però, quando parlano prima con i loro seguaci musulmani in lingua 
araba o turca, abbandonano la loro facciata e abbracciano il radicalismo. 
Mentre i loro rappresentanti parlanop di dialogo interreligioso e di 
integrazione in televisione, le loro moschee predicano l'odio e ammoniscono 
i fedeli sulla diabolica società occidentale. Mentre condannano 
pubblicamente l'uccisione dei pendolari a Madrid e dei bambini scolari in 
Russia, continuano a raccogliere denaro per Hamas ed altre organizzazioni 
terroristiche. Gli europei, ansiosi di creare un dialogo con la loro 
crescente minoranza musulmana disaffezionata, si lasciano sfuggire questa 
doppiezza. Questa situazione è particolarmente evidente in Germania, la 
quale è ritenuta un luogo di importanza chiave per la prima grande ondata di 
Fratelli Musulmani immigrati  e che accoglie la presenza meglio organizzata. 
La reazione del governo tedesco è anche istruttiva solo per mostrare il 
pericolo di accettare la retorica di facciata dei Fratelli Musulmani, senze 
gettare un più ampio sguardo sullo scopo delle loro attività.
i
The Muslim Brotherhood
The situation in Germany is particularly telling. More than anywhere else in 
Europe, the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany has gained significant power and 
political acceptance. Islamist organizations in other European countries now 
consciously follow the model pioneered by their German peers.
Parliamo in particolare della situazione tedesca. Piu che in ogni altro 
luogo in Europa, i Fratelli Musulmani hanno conquistato in Germania un 
potere significativo e l'accettazione politica. Le organizzazioni islamiche 
nel resto d'Europa, seguono ora consapevolmente il modello tracciato dai 
loro compagni in Germania.
During the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of Muslim students left the Middle 
East to study at German universities, drawn not only by the German 
institutions' technical reputations but also by a desire to escape 
repressive regimes. Egyptian ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime was 
especially vigorous in its attempts to root out the Islamist opposition. 
Beginning in 1954, several members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled Egypt to 
escape arrest or assassination. West Germany provided a welcome refuge. 
Bonn's motivations were not simply altruistic. As terrorism expert Khalid 
Durán explained in his studies on jihadism in Europe,[3] the West German 
government had decided to cut diplomatic relations with countries that 
recognized East Germany. When Egypt and Syria established diplomatic 
relations with the communist government, Bonn decided to welcome Syrian and 
Egyptian political refugees. Often, these dissidents were Islamists. Many 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood were already familiar with Germany. 
Several had cooperated with the Nazis before and during World War II.[4] 
Some had even, reportedly, fought in the infamous Bosnian Handschar division 
of the Schutzstaffel (SS).[5]
One of the Muslim Brotherhood's first pioneers in Germany was Sa'id Ramadan, 
the personal secretary of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna.[6] 
Ramadan, an Egyptian who had led the Muslim Brotherhood's irregulars in 
Palestine in 1948,[7] moved to Geneva in 1958 and attended law school in 
Cologne.[8] In Germany, he founded what has become one of Germany's three 
main Muslim organizations, the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (Islamic 
Society of Germany, IGD), over which he presided from 1958 to 1968.[9] 
Ramadan also cofounded the Muslim World League,[10] a well-funded 
organization that the Saudi establishment uses to spread its radical 
interpretation of Islam throughout the world. The U.S. government closely 
monitors the activities of the Muslim World League, which it accuses of 
financing terrorism. In March 2002, a U.S. Treasury Department-led task 
force raided the group's Northern Virginia offices looking for documents 
tying the group to Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In 
January 2004, the Senate Finance Committee asked the Internal Revenue 
Service for its records on the Muslim World League "as part of an 
investigation into possible links between nongovernmental organizations and 
terrorist financing networks."[11] This privileged relationship with the 
oil-rich kingdom granted Ramadan an influx of money, which he used to fund 
the powerful Islamic Center of Geneva and to bankroll several financial and 
religious activities. Hani Ramadan, Sa'id's son, currently runs the Islamic 
Center. Among its other board members is Sa'id's other son, Tariq Ramadan, 
who recently made headlines in the United States when the Department of 
Homeland Security revoked his visa to teach at Notre Dame University.[12] Sa'id 
Ramadan's case is not isolated.[13]
Following Ramadan's ten-year presidency of the IGD, Pakistani national Fazal 
Yazdani briefly led the IGD before Ghaleb Himmat, a Syrian with Italian 
citizenship, took the helm. During his long stewardship (1973-2002), Himmat 
shuttled between Italy, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the United 
States.[14] Intelligence agencies around the world have long scrutinized 
Himmat's terrorist connections. He is one of the founders of the Bank 
al-Taqwa, a powerful conglomerate dubbed by Italian intelligence, "Bank of 
the Muslim Brotherhood," which has financed terrorist groups since the 
mid-1990s if not earlier.[15] Himmat helped Youssef Nada, one of the Muslim 
Brotherhood's financial masterminds, run Al-Taqwa and a web of companies 
headquartered in locations such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the 
Bahamas, which maintain few regulations on monetary origin or destination. 
Both Himmat and Nada reportedly funneled large sums to groups such as Hamas 
and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front[16] and set up a secret credit line 
for a top associate of Osama bin Laden.[17]
In November 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department designated both Himmat and 
Nada as terrorism financiers.[18] According to Italian intelligence, the 
Al-Taqwa network also financed several Islamic centers throughout Europe[19] 
and many Islamist publications, including Risalatul Ikhwan,[20] the official 
magazine of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the U.S. Treasury Department 
designation, Himmat resigned from the IGD's presidency. His successor was 
Ibrahim el-Zayat, a 36-year-old of Egyptian descent and the charismatic 
leader of numerous student organizations.
The fact that IGD leaders Ramadan and Himmat are among the most prominent 
Muslim Brotherhood members of the last half-century suggests the links 
between the IGD and the Ikhwan. Moreover, reports issued by internal 
intelligence agencies from various German states openly call the IGD an 
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.[21] In particular, according to one 
intelligence report, the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has 
dominated the IGD since its early days.[22]
The Muslim Brotherhood-led by Ramadan and Himmat[23]-sponsored the 
construction of the imposing Islamic Center of Munich in 1960,[24] aided by 
large donations from Middle Eastern rulers such as King Fahd of Saudi Arabia 
who, according to a 1967 Sueddeutsche Zeitung article, donated 80,000 
marks.[25] The Ministry of Interior of Nordrhein-Westfalen states that the 
Islamic Center of Munich has been one of the European headquarters for the 
Brotherhood since its foundation.[26] The center publishes a magazine, 
Al-Islam, whose efforts (according to an Italian intelligence dossier),[27] 
are financed by the Bank al-Taqwa. According to the interior minister of 
Baden-Württemberg, Al-Islam shows explicitly how the German Brothers reject 
the concept of a secular state.[28] Its February 2002 issue, for example, 
states,
In the long run, Muslims cannot be satisfied with the acceptance of German 
family, estate, and trial law. . Muslims should aim at an agreement between 
the Muslims and the German state with the goal of a separate jurisdiction 
for Muslims.
The IGD, of which the Islamic Center of Munich is one of the most important 
members, represents the main offshoot of the Egyptian Brotherhood in 
Germany. But the IGD is also the quintessential example of how the Muslim 
Brotherhood has gained power in Europe. The IGD has grown significantly over 
the years, and it now incorporates dozens of Islamic organizations 
throughout the country. Islamic centers from more than thirty German cities 
have joined its umbrella.[29] Today, the IGD's real strength lies in its 
cooperation with and sponsorship of many Islamic youth and student 
organizations across Germany.
This focus on youth organizations came after Zayat's succession. He 
understood the importance of focusing on the next generation of German 
Muslims and launched recruitment drives to get young Muslims involved in 
Islamic organizations. But a Meckenheim police report on the sharply dressed 
Zayat also reveals alarming connections. German authorities openly say he is 
a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. They also link him to the World Assembly 
of Muslim Youth (WAMY), a Saudi nongovernmental organization that seeks to 
spread Wahhabism, the radical and intolerant Saudi interpretation of Islam, 
throughout the world with its literature and schools.[30] WAMY, which falls 
under the umbrella of the Muslim World League, has the stated goal of 
"arming the Muslim youth with full confidence in the supremacy of the 
Islamic system over other systems." It is the largest Muslim youth 
organization in the world and can boast unparalleled resources.[31] In 1991 
WAMY published a book called Tawjihat Islamiya (Islamic Views) that stated, 
"Teach our children to love taking revenge on the Jews and the oppressors, 
and teach them that our youngsters will liberate Palestine and Al-Quds 
[Jerusalem] when they go back to Islam and make jihad for the sake of 
Allah."[32] The sentiments in Tawjihat Islamiya are the rule rather than the 
exception. Many other WAMY publications are filled with strong anti-Semitic 
and anti-Christian rhetoric.
Meckenheim police also link Zayat to Institut Européen des Sciences 
Humaines, a French school that prepares European imams. Several radical 
clerics lecture at the school and several European intelligence agencies 
accuse the school of spreading religious hatred.[33] German authorities also 
highlight the fact that he is involved in several money laundering 
investigations.[34] Zayat has never been indicted for terrorist activity, 
but he has dubious financial dealings and maintains associations with many 
organizations that spread religious hatred. The IGD may have changed 
leadership after the U.S. Treasury's designation of Himmat, but it did not 
change direction.
While the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has chosen Munich as its 
base of operations in Germany, its Syrian branch is headquartered in Aachen, 
a German town near the Dutch border. The former Carolingian capital, with 
its famous university, is now home to a large Muslim population including 
the prominent Syrian Al-Attar family. The first Attar to move to Aachen was 
Issam, who fled persecution in his native country in the 1950s when he was 
leader of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Other members of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood soon followed. With time, Islamists from other 
countries adopted Attar's Bilal mosque in Aachen as their base of 
operations.[35] From hosting exiled Algerian terrorists[36] to operating a 
charity designated by the U.S. Department of Treasury as a financial front 
for Hamas,[37] Aachen is well known to intelligence agencies throughout the 
world.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood base in Aachen kept close relations with their 
Egyptian counterparts. For example, confirming the tendency of important 
Muslim Brotherhood families to close alliance through intermarriage, Issam 
al-Attar's son married the daughter of Al-Taqwa banker Youssef Nada.[38] 
Links between the two Muslim Brotherhood branches are more extensive than a 
single marriage, however. The Aachen Islamic Center reportedly received 
funding from Al-Taqwa.[39] Staff members have rotated between the Islamic 
Centers in Aachen and Munich. For example, Ahmed von Denffer, editor of the 
Islamic Center of Munich's Al-Islam magazine, came to Munich from 
Aachen.[40] Nevertheless, some distance remains. The Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood has never joined the IGD, instead preferring to keep some form 
of independence.
Milli Görüs
Of all of Zayat's financial activities, the one that has attracted the 
German authorities' greatest suspicion has been his association with 
officials of Milli Görüs (National Vision, in Turkish). Milli Görüs, which 
has 30,000 members and perhaps another 100,000 sympathizers,[41] claims to 
defend the rights of Germany's immigrant Turkish population, giving them a 
voice in the democratic political arena while "preserving their Islamic 
identity."[42] But Milli Görüs has another agenda. While publicly declaring 
its interest in democratic debate and a willingness to see Turkish 
immigrants integrated into European societies, some Milli Görüs leaders have 
expressed contempt for democracy and Western values. The 
Bundesverfassungsschutz, Germany's domestic intelligence agency, has 
repeatedly warned about Milli Görüs' activities, describing the group in its 
annual reports as a "foreign extremist organization."[43] The agency also 
reported that "although Milli Görüs, in public statements, pretends to 
adhere to the basic principles of Western democracies, abolition of the 
laicist government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic 
state and social system are, as before, among its goals."[44]
Milli Görüs' history alone indicates why the group should be considered 
radical. Former Turkish prime minister Nehmettin Erbakan, whose Refah Party 
was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court in January of 1998 for 
"activities against the country's secular regime,"[45] is still Milli Görüs' 
undisputed leader, even if his nephew Mehmet Sabri Erbakan is its president. 
The 2002 European Milli Görüs meeting held in the Dutch city of Arnhem, 
where Nehmettin Erbakan was the keynote speaker, provides a glimpse into 
Milli Görüs' ideology. After a tirade against the evils of integration in 
the West and U.S. policies, Erbakan declared that "after the fall of the 
wall, the West has found an enemy in Islam."[46] A Bundesverfassungsschutz 
report reveals Milli Görüs' real aims:
While in recent times, the Milli Görüs has increasingly emphasized the 
readiness of its members to be integrated into German society and asserts 
its adherence to the basic law, such statements stem from tactical 
calculation rather than from any inner change of the organization.[47]
Milli Görüs pushes an agenda similar to that of the IGD, even if its target 
is more limited. Nevertheless, both Milli Görüs and the IGD collaborate on 
many initiatives. There is also a family connection. Zayat married Sabiha 
Erbakan, the sister of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan.[48] The siblings' mother is 
also involved in politics and runs an important Islamic women's organization 
in Germany. The Zayat family is active as well. Ibrahim el-Zayat's father is 
the imam of the Marburg mosque; other members of his family are involved in 
Islamic organizations. As Udo Ulfkotte, a political science professor 
specializing in counterespionage at the University of Lueneburg and an 
expert on Islamic terrorism, notes, the Erbakans and the Zayats lead 
networks of organizations that aim at the radicalization, respectively, of 
the Turkish and Arab communities in Germany.[49]
IGD and Milli Görüs are active in their efforts to increase political 
influence and become the official representatives of the entire German 
Muslim community. With well-endowed budgets, their mosques provide social 
services, organize conferences, and distribute literature nationwide. As the 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Landesverfassungsschutz) in 
Hessen[50] notes:
The threat of Islamism for Germany is posed . primarily by Milli Görüs and 
other affiliated groups. They try to spread Islamist views within the 
boundaries of the law. Then they try to implement . for all Muslims in 
Germany a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and of the Shari'a. . Their 
public support of tolerance and religious freedom should be treated with 
caution.[51]
It presents a problem that politicians and security services in Germany view 
the IGD and Milli Görüs so differently. But, as Ulfkotte wrote about Zayat 
in his book, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten (The War in Our Streets),[52] 
"politicians of all colors and parties try to reach out to him."[53] For 
example, the prestigious Berlin Catholic Academy invited Zayat to represent 
the Muslim point of view in an inter-religious meeting organized by the 
academy in October 2002.[54] German politicians and Christian institutions 
regularly partner themselves with Milli Görüs in various initiatives. Milli 
Gazete, the official journal of Milli Görüs, once stated that "Milli Görüs 
is a shield protecting our fellow citizens from assimilation into barbaric 
Europe."[55] Nevertheless, German politicians meet regularly with Milli 
Görüs officials to discuss immigration and integration issues. The fact that 
an official like Ahmed al-Khalifah, IGD secretary general, represents Islam 
before members of parliament who are discussing religious tolerance,[56] 
shows the success of Brotherhood-linked organizations' efforts to gain 
acceptance as the representatives of German Muslims. The Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution well described these efforts, saying that 
Milli Görüs (and the IGD) "strives to dominate regional or nationwide 
federations and umbrella organizations for Muslims which are increasingly 
gaining importance as interlocutors for state and ecclesiastical authorities 
and thus to expand its influence within society."[57]
Zentralrat, the Islamist Umbrella
In 1989, under the auspices of Abdullah at-Turki, powerful dean of Bin Saud 
University in Riyadh, the Saudis created the Islamische Konzil Deutschland 
(Islamic Council of Germany). Turki assumed the presidency with other top 
positions held by Ibrahim el-Zayat, Hasan Özdögan, a high-ranking Milli 
Görüs official, and Ahmad Khalifa, an officer from the Islamic Center of 
Munich.[58] While an official German parliament report describes the 
Islamische Konzil as just "another Sunni organization," such an assumption 
indicates a dangerous misunderstanding of the Saudi relationship to German 
Islamists.[59]
The trend toward consolidation took a step forward in 1994 when German 
Islamists realized that a united coalition translated into greater political 
relevance and influence. Nineteen organizations, including the IGD, the 
Islamic Center of Munich, and the Islamic Center of Aachen, created an 
umbrella organization, the Zentralrat der Muslime. According to a senior 
German intelligence official, at least nine out of these nineteen 
organizations belong to the Muslim Brotherhood.[60] The German press has 
recently investigated the Zentralrat president, Nadeem Elyas, a 
German-educated Saudi physician and an official of the Islamic Center of 
Aachen. Die Welt linked Elyas to Christian Ganczarski, an Al-Qaeda operative 
currently jailed as one of the masterminds of the 2002 attack on a synagogue 
in Tunisia.[61] Ganczarski, a German of Polish descent who converted to 
Islam, told authorities that Al-Qaeda recruited him at the Islamic 
University of Medina where Elyas sent him to study.[62] Elyas said he could 
not remember meeting him but did not deny the possibility that Ganczarski, 
who never completed high school, might have been one of the many individuals 
he had sent over the years to radical schools in Saudi Arabia.[63] Saudi 
donors paid all of Ganczarski's expenses.[64] Ganczarski was not alone. 
Elyas admitted to having sent hundreds of German Muslims to study at one of 
the most radical universities in Saudi Arabia.[65]
The Zentralrat, which portrays itself as the umbrella organization for 
German Muslim organizations, has become, together with the IGD and Milli 
Görüs, the de facto representative of three million German Muslims. Even 
though the IGD is a member of the Zentralrat, the two organizations often 
operate independently. Their apparent independence is planned. With many 
organizations operating under different names, the Muslim Brotherhood fools 
German politicians who believe they are consulting a spectrum of 
opinion.[66] The media seek the Zentralrat's officials when they want the 
Muslim view on everything from the debate about the admissibility of the 
hijab (headscarf) in public schools, to the war in Iraq, and so forth. 
Politicians seek the Zentralrat's endorsement when they want to reach out to 
the Muslim community. Many German politicians are uninformed about Islam and 
do not understand that the view and the interpretation of Islam that the 
Zentralrat expresses, as does the IGD and Milli Görüs, is that of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and not that of traditional Islam. Accordingly, the Zentralrat 
expresses total opposition to any ban of the hijab, supports 
Wahhabi-influenced Islamic education in schools, and endorses a radical 
position on the Middle East situation.[67] While many Muslims endorse these 
views, the problem is that the Zentralrat neither represents nor tolerates 
those with divergent views. Moderate German Muslim groups lack the funding 
and organization of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups. In terms of numbers, 
influence on the Muslim community, and political relevance, the Zentralrat 
and its two most important constituent parts, the IGD and Milli Görüs, 
dominate the scene. With ample Saudi financing, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
managed to become the voice of the Muslims in Germany.
Recently, the German public was shocked to hear what is preached inside 
Saudi-funded mosques and schools. In the fall of 2003, a hidden 
camera-equipped journalist from Germany's ARD television infiltrated the 
Saudi-built King Fahd Academy in Bonn and taped what it taught to young 
Muslim children. One teacher called for jihad against the infidels.[68] 
While the images elicited a rebuke from German politicians, the rather 
sterile debate about Saudi influence on German Muslims has not effected 
tangible change. Saudi officials and Saudi-run nongovernmental organizations 
continue to groom Muslim Brotherhood organizations.
First Germany, Then Europe
While the Muslim Brotherhood and their Saudi financiers have worked to 
cement Islamist influence over Germany's Muslim community, they have not 
limited their infiltration to Germany. Thanks to generous foreign funding, 
meticulous organization, and the naïveté of European elites, Muslim 
Brotherhood-linked organizations have gained prominent positions throughout 
Europe. In France, the extremist Union des Organisations Islamiques de 
France (Union of Islamic Organizations of France) has become the predominant 
organization in the government's Islamic Council.[69] In Italy, the 
extremist Unione delle Comunita' ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia 
(Union of the Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy) is the 
government's prime partner in dialogue regarding Italian Islamic issues.[70]
In parallel to European Union integration efforts, the Muslim Brotherhood is 
also seeking to integrate its various European proxies. Over the past 
fifteen years, the Muslim Brotherhood has created a series of pan-European 
organizations such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, in 
which representatives from national organizations can meet and plan 
initiatives.[71] Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood's greatest pan-European 
impact has, as with the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland, been with its 
youth organization. In June 1996, Muslim youth organizations from Sweden, 
France, and England joined forces with the Federation of Islamic 
Organizations in Europe and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth to create a 
European Islamic youth organization.[72] Three months later, thirty-five 
delegates from eleven countries met in Leicester and formally launched the 
Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), which 
maintains its headquarters in Brussels.[73]
According to its official publications, FEMYSO is "a network of 42 national 
and international organizations bringing together youth from over 26 
different countries." FEMYSO proudly stated in 2003 that over the preceding 
four years it had become
The de facto voice of the Muslim youth in Europe. It is regularly consulted 
on issues pertaining to Muslims in Europe. It has also developed useful 
links with: the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the United 
Nations, the European Youth Forum, and numerous relevant NGOs at the 
European level.[74]
Ibrahim el-Zayat, who held the presidency until his commitments in Germany 
forced him to step down, even used the FEMYSO perch to address the European 
Parliament.[75] Because the Muslim Brotherhood provides the bulk of FEMYSO's 
constituent organizations, it provides the "de facto voice of the Muslim 
youth in Europe." While FEMYSO claims that it "is committed to fighting 
prejudices at all the levels, so that the future of Europe is a 
multicultural, inclusive and respectful one,"[76] such statements ring 
hollow given the position of sponsors like the World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth which believes that "the Jews are enemies of the faithful, God, and 
the Angels; the Jews are humanity's enemies. . Every tragedy that inflicts 
the Muslims is caused by the Jews."[77]
The Muslim Brotherhood's ample funds and organization have contributed to 
their success in Europe. But their acceptance into mainstream society and 
their unchallenged rise to power would not have been possible had European 
elites been more vigilant, valued substance over rhetoric, and understood 
the motivations of those financing and building these Islamist 
organizations. Why have Europeans been so naïve? Bassam Tibi, a German 
professor of Syrian descent and an expert on Islam in Europe, thinks that 
Europeans-and Germans in particular-fear the accusation of racism.[78] 
Radicals in sheep's clothing have learned that they can silence almost 
everybody with the accusation of xenophobia. Any criticism of Muslim 
Brotherhood-linked organizations is followed by outcries of racism and 
anti-Muslim persecution. Journalists who are not frightened by these 
appellatives are swamped with baseless and unsuccessful but expensive 
lawsuits.
In some cases, politicians simply fail to check the backgrounds of those who 
claim to be legitimate representatives for the Muslim community. As in the 
United States, self-described representatives for the Muslim community are 
far more radical than the populations they represent. In other cases, 
politicians realize that these organizations are not the ideal counterparts 
in a constructive dialogue but do not take the time to seek other less 
visible but more moderate organizations, several of which exist only at the 
grassroots level, impeded by financial constraints.
What most European politicians fail to understand is that by meeting with 
radical organizations, they empower them and grant the Muslim Brotherhood 
legitimacy. There is an implied endorsement to any meeting, especially when 
the same politicians ignore moderate voices that do not have access to 
generous Saudi funding. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle of 
radicalization because the greater the political legitimacy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the more opportunity it and its proxy groups will have to 
influence and radicalize various European Muslim communities. The ultimate 
irony is that Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna dreamed of 
spreading Islamism throughout Egypt and the Muslim world. He would have 
never dreamed that his vision might also become a reality in Europe.
Lorenzo Vidino is deputy director at the Investigative Project, a Washington 
D.C.-based counterterrorism research institute. 

 
Era bello che ci fosse una traduzione. Poi ti sei stufato?
Am.