Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: facciamo un favore ai goebbelsucci del likud del ng:ecco il rapporto HRW su IDF

 
Era cosi' difficile trovarlo, tonibaruch? E possibile che dal 2005 in cui
era stato pubblicato tu non ne avevi sentito mai parlare? 
Promoting Impunity
The Israeli Military’s Failure to Investigate Wrongdoing 
Summary
In May 2005, an Israeli military court convicted a soldier of “severe
intentional harm” to a civilian and sentenced him to twenty months in
prison. The soldier was charged with shooting an unarmed Palestinian man
in the southern Gaza town of Rafah in October 2003. This was, as the
Israeli daily Ha’aretz observed, “the harshest punishment imposed on an
IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldier in the four and a half years of
fighting in the territories.”1 
That same month, on May 19, 2005, the IDF announced that it had opened a
Military Police (mezah) investigation into the May 4 shooting deaths of
two Palestinian teenagers in the West Bank town of Beit Lakia. The
teenagers were among a large group that reportedly threw stones at
bulldozers Israel was using to construct a metal and concrete barrier, or
wall, in the West Bank.2 The IDF had suspended the officer who opened fire
the day after the incident. As one experienced journalist wrote, “Such a
swift acknowledgement by the military of improper behavior in the fatal
shooting of Palestinians is rare.”3 
It remains unclear if these two developments represent a change in IDF
policies regarding unlawful use of force resulting in deaths and serious
injury to Palestinian civilians. Those policies until now have been
characterized by inaction and cover-up. Such a change would therefore be
most welcome. 
In recent months several high-profile killings have drawn Israeli and
international attention to the army’s failure to conduct thorough and
impartial investigations where there is credible evidence of unlawful use
of force against civilians—none more so than the October 5, 2004, incident
in which Givati Brigade soldiers shot a thirteen-year-old Gaza schoolgirl.
An internal IDF debriefing immediately after the incident found that the
company commander had “not acted unethically.”4 Fellow soldiers then
released a communications tape to the media showing that another soldier
had warned the commander that the victim was “a little girl.” The tape
recorded the commander saying, “Anything that’s mobile, that moves in the
zone, even if it’s a three-year-old, needs to be killed.”5 On the tape he
also states that he “confirmed the kill” by firing at the girl’s body at
close range. The IDF responded by opening a Military Police investigation
that yielded a five-count indictment against the commander, but the
charges did not include murder or manslaughter.6 The commander’s trial was
still ongoing as of this writing in early June 2005.7 
Between September 29, 2000, and November 30, 2004, more than 1600
Palestinian civilians not involved in hostilities, including at least 500
children, were killed by Israeli security forces, and thousands more were
seriously injured.8 The IDF informed Human Rights Watch that as of May 10,
2004, it had criminally investigated just seventy-four alleged cases of
unlawful use of lethal force, less than 5 percent of the civilian deaths
in nearly four years of what is commonly known as the al-Aqsa intifada, or
uprising.9  As of June 6, 2005, the IDF had not responded to a February
2005 request for updated information on indictments and convictions since
its May 2004 communication.10
There are two situations in which the death or serious injury of civilians
should be investigated. The first is in situations of armed conflict where
there is prima-facie evidence or there are credible allegations of
unlawful killings, or where all feasible precautions were not taken to
protect civilians and other protected persons, resulting in preventable or
unjustifiable civilian casualties. International humanitarian law (IHL)
requires that armed forces distinguish at all times between combatants and
non-combatants, and absolutely prohibits any deliberate killing of
civilians. It also requires that armed forces observe the principles of
military necessity and proportionality. 
Independent and impartial investigations are also required when death or
serious injury results from the use of lethal force under circumstances
that do not constitute armed conflict. In this case, human rights
principles and the standards related to the use of force in policing and
law enforcement contexts apply. Almost all of the cases of death and
serious injury investigated in this report occurred in circumstances that
cannot fairly be characterized as situations of armed conflict. 
In any military occupation, the line between armed hostilities and law
enforcement can blur. However, both IHL and standards governing the use of
lethal force in law enforcement were established with the explicit intent
to provide protection for civilians. Therefore, where indications of armed
conflict conditions are ambiguous, the government should investigate to
ensure that civilians are receiving the protection to which they are
entitled under both IHL and human rights law. 
The recent investigations and prosecutions cited earlier notwithstanding,
Human Rights Watch has found that Israeli military’s investigative
practices and procedures are not impartial, thorough, or timely. The
military rarely has brought wrongdoers to justice, and existing practices
have exerted little deterrent effect. In May 2004, for example, Zvi
Koretzki was convicted for the negligent killing of sixteen-year-old
Muhammad `Ali Zaid; he was demoted and sentenced to two months of
imprisonment.11 In contrast, the same court system handed down a sentence
of six months to a defendant who had stolen a mobile phone, cigarette
lighter and $500 cash. Conscientious objectors have been sentenced to
twelve months in prison. 
Apart from the Koretzki case, Human Rights Watch is aware of only one
other conviction of an IDF soldier for negligent killing in the past four
years:  the February 2005 sentencing of a soldier for the shooting death
of a Palestinian at a West Bank checkpoint. Human Rights Watch is also
aware of two cases of convictions for inflicting “serious intentional
harm” (including the October 2003 incident mentioned at the beginning of
this report) and two convictions for unlawful use of a weapon that
resulted in serious injury or death.12 In no other case of which Human
Rights Watch is aware has an IDF soldier been convicted of any criminal
offense for killing or injuring a Palestinian. 
At the heart of the problem is a system that relies on soldiers’ own
accounts as the threshold for determining whether serious investigation is
warranted. Instead of initiating impartial investigations in such cases,
the IDF relies on operational de-briefings, which Israeli officials have
misleadingly referred to as “operational investigations,” “field
investigations,” or “military investigations.” The frequent discrepancies
between IDF accounts of civilian deaths and injuries, on the one hand, and
video, medical, and eyewitness evidence on the other hand, is the result
in part of the IDF’s practice of asking soldiers to “investigate” other
soldiers from the same unit or command, without seeking and weighing
testimony of external witnesses. Exculpatory claims of soldiers are taken
at face value, at best delaying and at worst foreclosing a prompt and
impartial investigation worthy of the name. So-called “operational
investigations” may serve a useful military purpose, but they do not
constitute proper investigations: they are wholly inadequate to determine
whether there is evidence of a violation of human rights or humanitarian
law, and they serve as a pretext for maintaining, incorrectly, that an
investigation has taken place. Another critical weakness of this current
system is the absence of victim involvement in the investigative process,
and the demonstrated failure of the IDF to solicit or take seriously
testimonies of victims or non-IDF witnesses as a basis for checking the
reliability of soldiers’ accounts. 
This critique of the system and its flaws is nothing new. Different
aspects of Israeli security forces’ impunity in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories have been aired in commissions and court cases, newspaper
articles, and Knesset meetings for more than twenty years. Investigators
rarely consult Palestinian witnesses, even though human rights groups and
victims’ families frequently present the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG)
office with directly relevant testimony from these witnesses. In the rare
instances in which investigators recommended prosecution, the victims have
tended to have foreign connections capable of producing external political
pressure. The trial of the soldier who shot and killed Tom Hurndall,
ongoing as of early June 2005, is a case in point (see below). When
investigations do occur, deaths and injuries to Palestinians are treated
less seriously than other infractions or violations, and differently from
cases where those harmed by the IDF are Jewish Israelis.13
What is new is the mounting number of deaths and injuries of civilians
that should, but do not, receive the serious investigation they deserve.
All civilian deaths and injuries in the 1988-93 Palestinian uprising were
investigated, although the quality of the investigations was often poor.14
Following the outbreak of clashes in late September 2000, the IDF changed
this policy, saying that deaths of civilians in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories would no longer be routinely investigated because the
situation was “approaching armed conflict” and that investigations would
be limited to “exceptional cases.” The IDF’s explanation fails to take
into account its obligation to investigate deaths and serious injuries of
civilians where there is prima facie evidence or there are credible
allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law, or
where deaths occur when lethal force is used in law enforcement rather
than armed conflict circumstances. 
Militaries investigate allegations of wrongdoing by their soldiers for
reasons of self-interest, among other reasons. They do so because members
of the armed forces must be accountable to their superiors in order to
maintain operational efficiency, enforce discipline, and uphold the
integrity of the armed forces. In a functioning democracy, the
accountability of individuals entrusted with the use of lethal force is
essential. 
Armies, furthermore, are obliged under IHL to investigate and criminally
punish those responsible for serious violations of the laws of war. Israel
has ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention and has a duty to prevent war
crimes and other violations of humanitarian law. In certain circumstances,
IHL holds commanders criminally liable for the crimes committed by their
subordinates.15
Israel’s duty to investigate alleged wrongdoing by its soldiers is
reinforced by its obligations under international human rights law. Israel
has signed and ratified a number of treaties that oblige it to investigate
violations and bring perpetrators to justice. These treaty obligations
together form an effective deterrent against unlawful killings, torture,
and other serious human rights abuses. These are the obligations to:
Investigate serious human rights violations; 
bring to justice and discipline and punish those responsible; 
provide an effective remedy for the victims of human rights violations; 
provide fair and adequate compensation to the victims and their relatives;
and 
establish the truth about what happened. 
An “effective remedy” for a serious human rights violation requires a
prompt, thorough, and effective investigation capable of determining
whether criminal wrongdoing has occurred and, if so, identifying the
person(s) responsible. An effective remedy also includes access by the
victim or complainant to the investigatory procedure, and, when
appropriate, the payment of compensation. Remedies must be effective in
practice, not just in theory, with a strong enough element of public
scrutiny to ensure true accountability. A key requirement is that those
investigating an alleged crime must be effectively independent from those
implicated in the events in question.
The Israeli military’s system for investigating wrongdoing by Israeli
soldiers fails all of these requirements. The system is opaque,
cumbersome, and open to command pressure. Victims and their
representatives have little practical access to the investigation process.
Furthermore, it is not independent.  As a result, only a handful of
perpetrators have been brought to justice. The Knesset has passed
legislation that effectively prevents almost all future compensation
claims. The system does not provide justice or truth or meaningful
reparation. 
The most significant factor underlying impunity is the reluctance of the
JAG’s office to investigate incidents, even when witnesses are accessible
and the breach of international law is clear. JAGs are able to receive
complaints, or at their own initiative open a preliminary investigation in
any case where, in their opinion, there is an offense that a military
court is competent to address.16 
The JAG’s office has shown that there are some abuses that it will not
tolerate, such as sexual violence, in which it has often quickly and
effectively identified and located the perpetrators and brought
proceedings against them. Action in these cases contrasted strongly with
those involving death or serious injury of Palestinians, in which case the
default response has been to whitewash or ignore possible abuses. Many
such cases drop off the radar screen entirely. In two cases of severe
beatings of Palestinians while in IDF custody detailed below, for
instance, one of which resulted in the man’s death, an IDF spokesman
responded to Human Rights Watch inquiries saying, “The incident is unknown
to us.” 
Another factor is the practical inability of most victims, i.e.
Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, to initiate a
complaint. When the IDF declines or refuses to investigate, there are no
alternative forms of accountability. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are
ruled under military law: Palestinians cannot seek prosecution of Israelis
in Israeli military courts, or in the courts administered by the
Palestinian Authority. In theory, victims or their representatives can
appeal a decision not to indict to the JAG and, if unsuccessful, to the
High Court of Israel. None of the families interviewed by Human Rights
Watch were aware of this option, which in any case would be limited to
those with the financial resources and connections to obtain Israeli
representation. Under prevailing conditions of strict closure, which
sharply restrict freedom of movement in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories and between the territories and Israel, Palestinians find it
extremely difficult to have physical access to Israeli institutions.
In many other countries, other institutions have the power to investigate
human rights abuses. Unlike Mexico or Northern Ireland, Israel has no
national human rights institution to receive complaints of human rights
violations. Unlike Turkey, Colombia, or the Russian Federation, Israel is
not subject to the jurisdiction of a regional human rights court. Israel’s
ongoing problems of military, security service, and police impunity will
continue to fester until Israel chooses to strengthen its own
accountability mechanisms.
The IDF has argued that investigating civilian deaths would harm the
special nature of combat operations, and that only “exceptional” cases
should be pursued, without indicating what the criteria would be. While it
is true that not all deaths or injuries of civilians need trigger an
independent investigation, the IDF’s position cannot be reconciled with
Israel’s obligations under the international human rights and humanitarian
law treaties that it has ratified. There are clearly established standards
for determining whether particular actions have violated IHL in situations
of armed conflict or constitute unlawful use of force in policing
situations. The IDF should adhere to those standards.
The IDF has also maintained that armies elsewhere facing similar levels of
hostilities do not carry out such investigations, sometimes citing U.S.
practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has argued that the practical
difficulties of investigating civilian deaths in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories are simply too much for the system to bear. 
In fact, the U.S. does not itself follow a “best practices” approach, with
consequences in Iraq that are similar to those of Israel in the occupied
West Bank and Gaza Strip.17 There are, however, other positive examples.
In the last fifteen years, countries such as Britain, Canada, and Belgium
have reformed their military justice systems and introduced external
accountability mechanisms. While those countries did not face armed
conflict situations, their relevance should not be dismissed out of hand,
because they do include, for instance, British military and police
engagement in the Northern Ireland conflict.  There is, moreover, an
emerging consensus in international law that military justice should not
be used to try military personnel in cases where civilians are victims,
and that military justice systems should investigate only offences that
are strictly military in nature.18 The challenge for Israel is to ensure
that its practices evolve to meet international standards and benefit from
good practice elsewhere. 
Apart from emerging standards, though, Israel’s existing obligations are
clear. If lethal force is used in situations of armed hostilities, Israeli
forces must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants,
never direct attacks at a civilian population or individual civilians, and
refrain from attacks that indiscriminately harm civilians. Israel has an
obligation to conduct independent and impartial investigations in all
cases involving prima facie evidence or credible allegations that troops
violated these principles. When performing law enforcement functions,
Israeli forces should be provided with the equipment and training
necessary for this purpose and should not use firearms except when
strictly necessary to defend themselves or others against the imminent
threat of death or serious injury, and then only to the extent necessary
to avert the actual danger faced. Curfew enforcement and control of
demonstrations, for instance, should comply with law enforcement
standards, and rules of engagement should be changed to reflect this.
Deaths and serious injuries to civilians in these circumstances, when
there is not a situation of active armed hostilities, should always be
investigated. When the circumstances of a death or serious injury are
unclear, the authorities should err on the side of investigating, with the
objective of providing the greatest possible protection to the civilian
population. 
Conducting serious investigations can be difficult in circumstances of
military occupation. Every Israeli official interviewed by Human Rights
Watch emphasized the difficulty of obtaining witness testimony.
Undoubtedly many witnesses are reluctant to cooperate with IDF
investigations, for reasons ranging from fear of retribution to cynicism
about the intentions and effectiveness of the investigators. Yet, as the
cases reviewed in this report show, there are many cases in which IDF
investigators simply do not attempt to contact witnesses to abuse, even
when they are readily available. 
There is much the Israeli authorities can do to improve the accountability
of their armed forces for arbitrary killings and other serious human
rights abuses against civilians. The government of Israel should: 
Establish an independent body to receive and investigate complaints of
serious human rights abuses committed by IDF soldiers and the agents of
the Israel Security Service (Shin Bet). 
Ensure that international norms are reflected in the operational and
training manuals of the Military Police. 
Publicize widely information on how to file complaints, including in the
Hebrew and Arabic media and on the internet. 
Ensure that when a complaint is not upheld after an investigation, the
complainant is given a reasoned decision in writing, in his or her own
language, which sets out the evidence as well as the investigative
findings. 
Establish clear guidelines and procedures for all individuals involved in
organizing and obtaining witness testimony of individuals residing in Area
A, which is under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction19; and 
Compensate all individuals who have suffered harm as a result of unlawful
or criminal behavior by state agents – and amend current laws that make
such compensation effectively inaccessible or unavailable to victims.20 
These and other changes are practical, possible, and necessary if Israel
wishes to develop a justice system that effectively counters the impunity
now granted to its security forces. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Amos Harel, “Soldier who fired at unarmed Palestinian sentenced to 20
months in prison,” Ha’aretz, May 18, 2005 [online]. According to the
statement on the IDF website, the maximum prison sentence for inflicting
“severe intentional harm” is twenty years (“IDF Soldier Convicted in Rafah
Incident,” available at
www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?si=EN&id=7&clr=1&docid=39891.EN
).
[2] Amos Harel and Arnon Regular, “Beit Latakia boys killed in IDF ambush,
Palestinians claim,” Ha’aretz, May 20, 2005 [online]. Harel and Regular
wrote in conclusion: “The Beit Lakia incident is not unusual. Every day,
soldiers and border police officers operate in some 15 villages near this
section of the separation fence, sometimes without either crowd control
equipment or clear rules of engagement. Since work on that section of the
fence began, at least 10 Palestinians have been killed during protests
against it, including eight children. Dozens of others have been injured,
some by live fire.” 
[3] Joel Greenberg, “Israel suspends officer in killings of 2 Palestinian
teens,” Chicago Tribune, May 6, 2005 [online]. 
[4] IDF Official Website, “Investigation into the incident in which a
13-year-old girl was killed near an outpost on the Israeli-Egyptian
border,” October 15, 2004, available at
http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl=EN&id=7&docid=34453
.  
[5] A portion of the transcript of the radio communication appeared in the
May 2005 issue of Harper’s Magazine, p.19.
[6] The charges were: two counts of illegal use of weapons, obstructing
justice, unbecoming behavior, and the improper use of authority that
endangered others (Margot Dudekevitch, “Officer indicted for killing
girl,” The Jerusalem Post, November 23, 2004). Ha’aretz reported in March
that “the trial seems to be more focused on the Military Police’s
investigation and the Judge Advocate General’s handling of the case than
on R.’s behavior. And irrespective of how the judges rule on whether R.
did use his weapon illegally, did try to obstruct justice and other
behavior unbecoming an officer, the case has already been very
unflattering to the MPs and the JAG officers.” See, Amos Harel, “Case of
Capt. R casts a shadow over the Military Police,” Ha’aretz, March 21, 2005
[online]. 
[7] The al-Hams family and the Public Committee against Torture in Israel
(PCATI) petitioned Israel’s High Court of Justice in January requesting
that the investigation be turned over to civilian authorities, and that it
also address command responsibility for open-fire orders. In February the
court declined to halt the military trial; the next hearing on the
petition is scheduled for October 2005. 
[8] The IDF does not appear to keep statistics on the number of
Palestinian civilians killed but several Israeli and Palestinian NGOs have
attempted to calculate the number. The figures vary depending on
methodology, access to victims and witnesses, and other factors. According
to the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem, between the beginning
of the intifada and the end of November 2004, 3,040 Palestinians were
killed by Israeli security forces, including 606 children, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories. According to their investigations at least 1,661
of those killed (including 531 children under the age of 18) were not
involved in hostilities when they were killed. B'Tselem has not been able
to determine whether an additional 550 Palestinians (including 31
children) participated in hostilities.  According to the Palestinian
Center for Human Rights, Israeli forces have killed 2,191 Palestinian
civilians in the Occupied PalestinianTerritories between the beginning of
the intifada and April 2004 (including 493 children under the age of 17).
The most detailed and up-to-date statistics are those of the Palestine Red
Crescent Society, which put the number of deaths of children under
eignteen at 612 through the end of October 2004. 
[9] Response of the IDF Spokesperson to Human Rights Watch inquiry, with a
cover letter from Maj. Sam Wiedermann, May 10, 2004. The IDF response
indicated that indictments had been issued in sixteen of these cases but
provided no details; nor did the response indicate how many of the
seventy-four investigated shooting incidents had resulted in deaths or
injuries. 
[10] On February 28, 2005, in an email to Jaron Pazi, Head of
International Organizations Section, IDF Spokesperson Office, Human Rights
Watch asked for an update on the cases mentioned in this report as well as
an update in the total number of indictments, convictions and sentences of
IDF soldiers for killing or serious injury of Palestinians during the
current intifada.   Human Rights Watch followed up this request with
several phone calls to the IDF Spokesperson Office, but as of early June
2005 no new or additional information had been provided. 
B’Tselem told Human Rights Watch on May 22, 2005 that as of that date a
total of 108 investigations had been opened into cases involving deaths
and injuries to Palestinians, resulting in nineteen indictments and six
convictions— two for manslaughter, two for causing grave harm, and two for
illegal use of a weapon (Human Rights Watch interview with Ronen
Schnayderman, Jerusalem, May 19, 2005). 
[11] Captain Koretski was sentenced on May 3, 2004, to two months of
imprisonment, four months of “military tasks,” and six months probation
for the October 5, 2002 killing. Koretski was also demoted to the rank of
first lieutenant. See, Amos Harel, “IDF Captain Jailed for Death by
Negligence of Palestinian Teen,” Ha’aretz, May 5, 2004 [online].
[12] The details of the six convictions mentioned here (two for negligent
killing, two for severe intentional injury, and two for unlawful use of a
weapon) were gathered from media reports and confirmed by B’Tselem on May
22, 2005. 
[13] Even so, the IDF’s investigative mechanisms for dealing with
accidents that kill IDF soldiers have also come under fire within the
military. See Amos Harel, “Accidents will happen,” Ha’aretz, November 12,
2004 [online]. Harel writes that over the past two years a team of reserve
battalion commanders “worked on formulating a new proposal for
investigating accidents. The reserve officers came to the conclusion that
the IDF lacks a professional body with the requisite knowledge and
experience in investigating accidents that occur on land and sea.... In
addition, there is great ignorance among officers and soldiers regarding
the various investigative procedures…and the authority of each, as well as
the rights of those under investigation… The reserve battalion commanders
expressed concern that a continuation of the current system might lead to
transferring the investigation of accidents out of the hands of the IDF.” 
[14] See, Human Rights Watch [Middle East Watch], The Israeli Army and the
Intifada: Policies that Contribute to the Killings (August 1990), pp.
64-159. For a detailed examination of one investigation in this period,
see, John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of
Torture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 2000), chapters 2, 6, 10, and 14.
[15] Under the doctrine of command responsibility, a superior can share
culpability for crimes committed by subordinates if the superior ordered
the crime to be committed, if the superior knew or had reason to know that
a crime was about to be committed but failed to take necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent it, or if the superior knew or had reason
to know that the crime had been committed and failed to take necessary and
reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators. 
[16] Article 178 (4), Military Justice Law. 
[17] See Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds: Post-war Civilian Deaths in
Baghdad Caused by U.S. Forces (October 2003), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq1003/index.htm
. 
[18] See below, “What makes a good investigation?”
[19] Under the Oslo Accords the West Bank and Gaza were divided into three
areas: Area A, under full Palestinian control; Area B, under Israeli
military control and Palestinian civil control; and Area C, under full
Israeli control.   Area A comprises major Palestinian population centers
outside East Jerusalem and amounts to approximately 18% of the West Bank. 
[20] These recommendations are consistent with Human Rights Watch policy
for all victims of abuse regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.
il rapporto completo è su 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/iopt0605/
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 Era cosi' difficile trovarlo, tonibaruch?
Non so, sei tu che me ne hai parlato. Era ora che lo trovassi.
Magari due parole su che cosa pensi non sarebbero state fuori luogo.
Me lo leggero con calma.
Nel frattempo, magari, mi dirai che pensi del fatto che il tuo segretario 
continui a ignorare la sorte dei comunisti siriani arrestati e torturati.
Sai che anche loro sono in detenzione amministrativa, vero?
Tb
-- 
Libertą per i comunisti siriani in carcere: Fateh Jamus, 'Isam Dimashqi,
Basel Hurani, 'Abd al-Halim Rumieh, Ratib Sha'bu, and Doha 'Ashur
al-'Askari 
http://snipurl.com/1oqtm

 Me lo leggero con calma.
ecco bravo. buona lettura.
 
-- 


 ecco bravo. buona lettura.
Nel frattempo mi dici che pensi del fatto che il tuo segretario continui ad 
ignorare i comunisti siriani arrestati e torturati? Sono anche loro in 
detenzione amministrativa.
Non ti chiedo un atto di umanità e generosità come quello di comprendere le 
ragioni dei tuoi nemici e condannare gli abusi dei tuoi "amici". Non so, dire 
qualcosa sui 300.000 morti ceceni denunciati da HRW. Sarebbe ottimismo eccessivo.
Solo sugli abusi sui tuoi compagni. E sul complice silenzio del tuo partito, che 
intrattiene rapporti amichevolissimi con i torturatori.
Ci conto, eh.
Io nel frattempo guarderò il paper di HRW sull'IDF.
Tb
-- 
Libertà per i comunisti siriani in carcere: Fateh Jamus, 'Isam Dimashqi,


 Nel frattempo mi dici 
no, non ti dico anche perche' su questa vicenda come al solito ti sei
comportato da imitatore di goebbels addebitandomi cose che non avevo
scritto .


 no, non ti dico
Eh beh. E' troppo chiederti di ragionare sulle ragioni dei nemici.
Certo che non essere capace di dire una parola nemmeno sui *tuoi* compagni in 
carcere, è davvero il fondo.
Va beh, somaro.
Io il paper di HRW me lo guardo lo stesso. Stammi bene.


 Eh beh.
Del resto parlare di detenzione con un rosabrunopugnettaro che in assenza
di prove e di processo definisce terroristi persone innocenti da anni e
anni detenute nelle carceri di Tel Aviv è un po' strano.
A proposito, sai se sono stati pure torturati in quelle carceri mentre
sono in attesa di un qualche processo?


 rosabrunopugnettaro 
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HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH
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HI HO HI HO
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Davide

 HI HO HI HO
quoto

 wrote:

Pasturavo per somari ed ha abboccato un brunobruno...
Buono, vą che ti slamo.
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Davide