Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Talebans-Al Qaeda

Uno degli articoli piu`interessanti da quando e` iniziato il confitto, mette 
meglio in luce i rapporti tra i due.
Non e`strano che tanta verita`sull'operato di entrambi, esca proprio adesso 
che i Talebani devono essere inseriti (per forza) nel governo Karzai.
Cio`prova pure che la responsabilita`dei talebani, nel 9/11 non c'e`mai 
stata.
G.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LB13Df01.html
How the Taliban pressed bin Laden
By Gareth Porter
WASHINGTON - Evidence now available from various sources, including recently 
declassified United States State Department documents, shows that the 
Taliban regime led by Mullah Mohammad Omar imposed strict isolation on Osama 
bin Laden after 1998 to prevent him from carrying out any plots against the 
United States.
The evidence contradicts claims by top officials of the Barack Obama 
administration that Mullah Omar was complicit in bin Laden's involvement in 
the al-Qaeda plot to carry out the terrorist attacks in the United States on 
September 11, 2001. It also bolsters the credibility of Taliban statements 
in recent months
asserting that they have little interest in al-Qaeda's global jihadi aims.
A primary source on the relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar 
before 9/11 is a detailed personal account provided by Egyptian jihadi Abu'l 
Walid al-Masri and published on Arabic-language jihadist websites in 1997.
Al-Masri had a unique knowledge of the subject because he worked closely 
with both bin Laden and the Taliban during the period. He was a member of 
bin Laden's Arab entourage in Afghanistan, but became much more sympathetic 
to the Afghan cause than bin Laden and other al-Qaeda officials from 1998 
through 2001.
The first published English-language report on al-Masri's account, however, 
was an article in the January issue of the CTC Sentinal, the journal of the 
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, by Vahid Brown, a fellow at 
the CTC.
Mullah Omar's willingness to allow bin Laden to remain in Afghanistan was 
conditioned from the beginning, according to al-Masri's account, on two 
prohibitions on his activities: bin Laden was forbidden to talk to the media 
without the consent of the Taliban regime or to make plans to attack US 
targets.
Former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil told Inter Press 
Service in an interview that the regime "put bin Laden in Kandahar to 
control him better". Kandahar remained the Taliban political headquarters 
after the organization seized power in 1996.
The August 1998 US cruise missile strikes against training camps in 
Afghanistan run by bin Laden in retaliation for the bombings of two US 
embassies in East Africa on August 7, 1998, appears to have had a dramatic 
impact on Mullah Omar and the Taliban regime's policy toward bin Laden.
Two days after the strike, Omar unexpectedly entered a phone conversation 
between a State Department official and one of his aides, and told the US 
official he was unaware of any evidence that bin Laden "had engaged in or 
planned terrorist acts while on Afghan soil". The Taliban leader said he was 
"open to dialogue" with the United States and asked for evidence of bin 
Laden's involvement, according to the State Department cable reporting the 
conversation.
Only three weeks after Omar asked for evidence against bin Laden, the 
al-Qaeda leader sought to allay Taliban suspicions by appearing to accept 
the prohibition by Mullah Omar against planning any actions against the 
United States.
"There is an opinion among the Taliban that we should not move from within 
Afghanistan against any other state," bin Laden said in an interview with 
al-Jazeera. "This was the decision of the Commander of the Faithful, as is 
known."
Mullah Omar had taken the title "Commander of the Faithful", the term used 
by some Muslim caliphs in the past to claim to be "leader of the Muslims", 
in April 1996, five months before Kabul fell to Taliban forces.
During September and October 1998, the Taliban regime apparently sought to 
position itself to turn bin Laden over to the Saudi government as part of a 
deal by getting a ruling by the Afghan Supreme Court that he was guilty of 
the embassy bombings.
In a conversation with the US charge in Islamabad on November 28, 1998, 
Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, Omar's spokesman and chief adviser on foreign 
affairs, referred to a previous Taliban request to the United States for 
evidence of bin Laden's guilt to be examined by the Afghan Supreme Court, 
according to the US diplomat's report to the State Department.
Muttawakil said the United States had provided "some papers and a video 
cassette". but he complained that the video had contained nothing new and 
had therefore not been submitted to the Supreme Court. He told the charge 
that the court had ruled that none of the evidence that had been presented 
warranted the conviction of bin Laden.
Muttawakil said the court trial approach had "not worked" but suggested that 
the Taliban regime was now carrying out a strategy to "restrict [bin 
Laden's] activities in such a way that he would decide to leave of his own 
volition."
On February 10, 1999, the Taliban sent a group of 10 officers to replace bin 
Laden's own bodyguards, touching off an exchange of gunfire, according to a 
New York Times story of March 4, 1999. Three days later, bodyguards working 
for Taliban intelligence and Foreign Affairs Ministry personnel took control 
of bin Laden's compound near Kandahar and took away his satellite telephone, 
according to the US and Taliban sources cited by the Times.
Taliban official Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, who was then in the Taliban embassy 
in Pakistan, confirmed that the 10 Taliban bodyguards had been provided to 
bin Laden to "supervise him and observe that he will not contact any 
foreigner or use any communication system in Afghanistan", according to the 
Times story.
The pressure on bin Laden in 1999 also extended to threats to eliminate 
al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan. An e-mail to bin Laden from two 
leading Arab jihadis in Afghanistan in July 1999, later found on a laptop 
previously belonging to al-Qaeda and purchased by the Wall Street
Journal, referred to "problems between you and the Leader of the Faithful" 
as a "crisis".
The e-mail, published in an article by Alan Cullison in the September 2004 
issue of The Atlantic, said: "Talk about closing down the camps has spread." 
The message even suggested that the jihadis feared the Taliban regime could 
go so far as to "kick them out" of Afghanistan.
In the face of new Taliban hostility, bin Laden sought to convince Mullah 
Omar that he had given his personal allegiance to Omar as a Muslim. In April 
2001, bin Laden referred publicly to having sworn allegiance to Mullah Omar 
as the "Commander of the Faithful".
But al-Masri recalls that bin Laden had refused to personally swear such an 
oath of allegiance to Omar in 1998-99, and had asked al-Masri himself to 
give the oath to Omar in his stead. Al-Masri suggests that bin Laden 
deliberately avoided giving the oath of allegiance to Omar personally so 
that he would be able to argue within the Arab jihadi community that he was 
not bound by Omar's strictures on his activities.
Even in summer 2001, as the Taliban regime became increasingly dependent on 
foreign jihadi troop contingents, including Arabs trained in bin Laden's 
camps, for its defense against the military advances of the Northern 
Alliance, Mullah Omar found yet another way to express his unhappiness with 
bin Laden's presence.
After a series of clashes between al-Qaeda forces and those of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Taliban leader intervened to give overall 
control of foreign volunteer forces to Tahir Yuldash of the IMU, according 
to a blog post last October by Leah Farrall, an Australian specialist on 
jihadi politics in Afghanistan.
In late January, Geoff Morrell, the spokesman for US Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates, suggested that the United States could not negotiate with 
Mullah Omar because he has "the blood of thousands of Americans on his 
hands", implying that he had knowingly allowed bin Laden's planning of the 
9/11 attacks.

 Quanto alle lacrime di coccodrillo ...
#...Di chi ha voluto questa guerra, arriveranno mai??
Basteranno a ripagare migliaia di innocenti ammazzati?
Se le sbattono il resto degli afghani! 

 spudoratamente agli stranieri.
ROTFL, che lurido razzista. E comunque mentire agli invasori è
sacrosanto, wannabe genocida...

 Uno che di guerre afghane del passato non se ne intende affatto.
fortuna che voi britt siete esperti...
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/6/6d/Remnants_of_an_army2.jpg
AHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHAAHAHAHAHHAHA


http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/6/6d/Remnants_of_an_army2.jpg
poverino...posti sempre le stesse cose, evidentemente il seguito della 
storia ti brucia ancora... :-)) 

 Non ultimo quelle che ci vogliono grandi palle
anche i mafiosi hanno grandi palle, eppure io li chiamo criminali, non
gente con le palle. Idem dicasi per i tuoi genocidi

 Wars, fatti degni di Leonida alle Termopili.
ci vuole la faccia  di culo di un britt per paragonare una battaglia
in cui ci si difendeva da un'invasione a battaglie imperialiste.
Vergognati, becchino della libertà degli infiniti popoli colonizzati
da voialtri!

 Fatte per proteggere l'India da un'invasione islamica
e gli indiani dai vostri genocidi premeditati tramite carestia (che
siete troppo vigliacchi per ammazzarli uno ad uno) chi li salvava?

 Dogumenda pure, Otre di Luoghi Comuni.
http://www.ibs.it/code/9788807103360/davis-mike/olocausti-tardovittoriani-nintildeo

 le carestie.
in effetti, ricordo bene, mi impegnai molto in tal senso... ;-)) 

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:32eafd54-ebb4-4abe...@36g2000yqu.googlegroups.com...

mi domando come tu faccia a dire una simile sciocchezza. In India le 
carestie ci sono sempre state. E questo per fattori di varia natura, in 
primis quello climatico legato ai monsoni. I primi che hanno cercato di fare 
qualcosa per limitare i danni delle carestie indiane sono stati proprio gli 
inglesi. Se poi tu citi libri tendenziosi scritti solo da coloro che 
vogliono gettare fango per motivi politici fa pure...certamente tutto questo 
ti qualifica per quello che sei...ovvero uno che mente sapendo di 
mentire...un vile calunniatore! 

 Am
Amaryllide/Bombacci riesce sempre a dare il meglio di se in questi casi...� 
particolarmente dotato... :-)