Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Haaretz:How we suffered a knockout

Cazzo,tutti dicono la stessa cosa <g>
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/750990.html
The United States' defeat in the Vietnam war started becoming evident
when Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. forces in
Vietnam, started using body counts as an alternative to military
victories. When he could not point to achievements on the battlefield,
Westmoreland would send a daily report to Washington of the number of
Vietcong soldiers his forces had killed.
In the past few weeks, the Israel Defense Forces has also adopted the
body count approach. When the largest and strongest army in the Middle
East clashes for more than two weeks with 50 Hezbollah fighters in Bint
Jbail and does not bring them to their knees, the commanders are left
with no choice but to point to the number of dead fighters the enemy
has left behind. It can be assumed that Bint Jbail will turn into a
symbol of the second Lebanon war. For the Hezbollah fighters it will be
remembered as their Stalingrad, and for us it will be a painful
reminder of the IDF's defeat.
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Ze'ev Schiff wrote in Haaretz on August 11 that we had "gotten a slap."
It seems that "knockout" would be a more appropriate description. This
is not a mere military defeat. This is a strategic failure whose
far-reaching implications are still not clear. And like the boxer who
took the blow, we are still lying dazed on the ground, trying to
understand what happened to us. Just like the Six-Day War led to a
strategic change in the Middle East and established Israel's status as
the regional power, the second Lebanon war may bring about the
opposite. The IDF's failure is eroding our national security's most
important asset - the belligerent image of this country, led by a vast,
strong and advanced army capable of dealing our enemies a decisive blow
if they even try to bother us. This war, it soon transpired, was about
"awareness" and "deterrence." We lost the fight for both.
The concept failed again
It does not matter one bit what the IDF's true capability is. There is
also no importance to the assertions that the IDF used merely a small
part of its force and that its arsenal still contains advanced weapons
that did not come into play. What really matters is the image of the
IDF - and in fact of Israel - in the eyes of our adversaries in the
region.
And herein lies the most serious failure of this war. In Damascus,
Gaza, Tehran and Cairo, too, people are looking with amazement at the
IDF that could not bring a tiny guerrilla organization (1,500 fighters
according to the military intelligence chief, and a few thousand
according to other sources) to its knees for more than a month, the IDF
that was defeated and paid a heavy price in most of its battles in
southern Lebanon. And most serious of all: an IDF that has not
neutralized Hezbollah's ability to fire rockets and keep more than 1
million Israeli citizens sitting in shelters for more than four weeks.
What happened to this mighty army, which after a month was not able to
advance more than a few kilometers into Lebanon? wonder many of those
who are planning their next wars against Israel.
Israel's deterrent power was based on the recognition by the enemy that
it would pay an extremely heavy price if it attacked Israel. For
example, Syria has not fired hundreds of missiles at the Israeli
homefront - even during times of war - because it fears a harsh Israeli
attack on Damascus and other important Syrian towns. But when more than
3,000 rockets are fired at the Galilee, Haifa and Hadera without Israel
demanding that someone pay, Israel's deterrence is damaged. At the next
opportunity, someone in Damascus may decide to fire rockets at Tel Aviv
to push forward a diplomatic process, since Israel did not only fail to
react severely to the rockets fired from Lebanon but also was forced to
agree to a UN arrangement that leaves the rocket stockpile in
Hezbollah's hands.
The Agranat Commission gave a negative connotation to the term
"concept" in the context of military intelligence. The commission of
inquiry that now hopefully will be set up will quickly conclude that on
the eve of the second Lebanon war, the IDF - and consequently policy
makers - were working with two mistaken concepts. First, over the past
six years, Israelis came to believe a large-scale fight against
Hezbollah would not be necessary: Any military actions in southern
Lebanon would be limited and short. Second, if a war arose against
Hezbollah, the IDF would dismantle the organization within a few days,
break its command backbone and end the fighting under conditions
favorable to Israel.
And this is how we entered the war. The army led the prime minister and
his cabinet to believe that the air force would annihilate Hezbollah's
fighting capability within several days and that thereafter a new
situation would prevail in Lebanon. On the basis of these promises,
Ehud Olmert set ambitious objectives for the war, which of course were
unattainable.
Just as before the Yom Kippur war, there was a destructive combination
of arrogance, boastfulness, euphoria and contempt for the enemy. The
generals were so certain of the air force's success that they did not
prepare an alternative. And when it became clear after about one week
that Hezbollah was not disintegrating and that its ability to fire
rockets had not been significantly thwarted, the IDF found itself in a
state of acute distress and embarrassment. This is the reason for the
hesitancy in using force and the lack of determination in the use of
the ground forces.
The commission of inquiry will have to examine how the army entered the
war without formulating alternative operations or plans to end the war.
The failure of the government lies in its adoption of the army's
proposal without examining its logic, chances of success or
alternatives. The decision-making process that led to the war once
again revealed the most serious defect in the formation of national
security policy. Since the establishment of the state, no government
has had the good sense to set up professional advisory bodies that
could assist it in dealing with IDF proposals, or at least to examine
them seriously. As in all the other conflicts, the army and not the
government decided what Israel should do in Lebanon. The National
Security Council - whose job this is precisely - was not asked to look
over the IDF's plans and their implications, nor was it asked to
provide alternatives.
The missing command
The arrogance and the overconfidence that characterized the top brass
left the home front unprotected. If it was clear that the air force
would destroy the rocket launch pads within a few days, why call on the
residents of the north to prepare the air raid shelters and stockpile
food? We know the outcome: More than one million people sat for more
than one month in stinking shelters, some of them without food or
minimal conditions.
In this context, the inquiry commission should look into the home front
command. Millions of shekels were invested in this command. A major
general, brigadiers general, colonels and many other officers and
soldiers man this command. And what was its contribution to the war?
Warning notices broadcast over the radio and televisions about alarms
and sirens. That's it. For more than a month, the entire command made
do with drafting public notices about seeking shelter and staying in
interior rooms. Where was this command over the past six years? Was it
not its task to examine and check whether the shelters were
satisfactory?
And of course, the intelligence. Once again there were surprises and
failures, some of which were based on the mistaken concept of
Hezbollah's capacities. The militia's success in surprising an IDF
patrol and abducting two soldiers - the catalyst for the war - stems
from a military intelligence failure. IDF intelligence did not assess
correctly Hezbollah's fighting capability, did not know about the
tunnels next to the organization's strongholds, and erred in its
assessments of the deployment inside Bint Jbail, and there were many
more other intelligence failures.
The navy's intelligence failed because it did not know about the
Iranian land-to-sea missiles in Hezbollah's hands, and its assessments
about Hezbollah's ability to fire rockets were mistaken. Hezbollah's
successful handling of anti-tank missiles also revealed an intelligence
failure that resembles to a large extent that of the 1973 war. The
Patriot missile batteries stationed near Haifa and Safed were announced
by the IDF with much fanfare. The wide media coverage given to these
deployments was supposed to quiet residents' fears. Since then we have
not heard a single word about that wonderful defense system. As far as
is known, not even one attempt was made to knock down missiles fired at
Haifa and Hadera. The commission of inquiry will also have to deal with
the army's decisions about anti-missile defense. Billions of dollars
were invested in the defense systems to combat missiles, but this was
unapparent when it came to the test. In addition, the army's decision
to stop developing the Nautilus - a laser-based anti-Katyusha defense
system - must be examined.
The state allocates some 11 billion dollars annually for the defense
budget. Almost 15 percent of the GNP is devoted to security. (The
official figure is 10 percent, but this does not include all the
investments in security issues). But when the reservists are called up,
they discover that they lack basic equipment: flak jackets, helmets,
vehicles and even stretchers. Entire units were forced to fight more
than 24 hours without food or water. Where did the money go? This will
have to be examined by the commission of inquiry. The height of the
chutzpah is the hints by senior officers that the dearth of equipment
is due to the defense budget cuts. This should be the chance to break
the myth about these budget cuts: Not only was the defense budget not
cut in the past decade, it actually grew during the years 2002 and
2005. Israel allocates to security more of its total resources than any
other democracy in the world (15 times more than Japan and three times
more than the U.S.). It should be checked whether there is
justification for this.
The Yom Kippur war is remembered as a seminal event that damaged the
public's trust in the army. Quite a few years passed before this trust
was restored. It is still too early to assess whether the second
Lebanon war will be remembered as the turning point at which the public
awakes from the illusion about the unlimited might of the Israeli
military force.

The concept failed again
It does not matter one bit what the IDF's true capability is. There is
also no importance to the assertions that the IDF used merely a small
part of its force and that its arsenal still contains advanced weapons
that did not come into play. What really matters is the image of the
IDF - and in fact of Israel - in the eyes of our adversaries in the
region.
Proporrei in particolare a tutti gli armchair generals questo singolo
concetto. Lo stesso si poteva dire dei tedeschi dopo mosca e
stalingrado: erano ancora un'armata potente dotata di mezzi tecnologici
superiori rispetto a quelli russi anche se in alcuni campi come quello
dei tank i russi possedettero un disceto vantaggio inficiato da
tattiche disastrose, ma questi avevano imparato come affrontarli e il
loro morale si alzò sensibilmente.

A me sembra che state perdendo un pò la Trebisonda.
Israele non ha subito nessuna stalingrado.
Israele ha martellato i quertieri generali di hezbollah, ingaggiato le sue 
forze di terra, occupato il sud del paese con solo 7 000 uomini dispiegati 
in un territorio infimo e preparato a puntino.
Sinceramente non vedo come questo possa invogliare gli arabi a lanciarsi 
contro israele. 

 A me sembra che state perdendo un pò la Trebisonda.
Siamo in buona compagnia<g> visto che la stampa israeliana è
ipercritica contro Olmert e la sua conduzione della guerra.
Da alcuni giorni sto postando articoli del Jerusalem Post,Haaretz che
affermano cio'
Riguardo al fatto che Israele abbia" occupato" il sud del Libano mi
pare cosa non vera visto che gli hezbollah sono attualmente schierati
nella zona con uomini e mezzi....

Daniele ha scritto:

oh dillo ad ha'aretz e a tutti i giornali arabi e occidentali
importanti nonchè israeliani, questa è la percezione le tue
considerazioni servono a poco.
Ah gli uomini erano 30000 non 7000 e i guerriglieri hezbollah erano al
max qualche migliaio.

Massimo1 ha scritto:

Se li sono lasciati dietro non bonificando quasi nulla. Bisognerebbe
essere in zona per capire, ma credo sia proprio così, se i razzi sono
caduti su israele fino ad il cessate il fuoco vuol dire che il sud del
libano non è libero da hezbollah neppure oggi anche se non si spara.

max qualche migliaio.
Di le cose bene.. 30 000 a partire da sabato scorso fino a lunedi.
7000 per tutta la durata del conflitto.
Che il sud del libano sia stato neutralizzato non lo posso dire con 
certezza, ma i fatto che i BM-21 o qualsiasi carretta usino si siano 
spostati a nord un motivo c'č. 

 spostati a nord un motivo c'è.
chi ti dice che si sono spostati a nord? Non sono bm-21 sono i razzi
del sistema bm-21 (copie iraniane o forse anche fatte da hezbollah
visto che per fare un razzo del genere non ci vuole molto) tra gli
altri montati su mezzi di fortuna in modo da essere velocemente
mimetizzabili e difficilmente individuabili.

and for us it will be a painful reminder of the IDF's defeat.
Certo, certo... :)
*pat pat*
-Stefano

nella zona con uomini e mezzi....
E del fatto che siano "schierati nella zona con uomini e mezzi" ne hai
le prove ma non le vuoi mostrare al mondo, vero? :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

Daniele wrote:

L'importante è che sia chiaro dove deve esserlo: nella testa di Nasrallah, a 
Teheran e un po' anche a Beirut. Là lo è.
Se poi le fanfaluche confezionate per la piazza araba entusiasmano qualcuno 
anche al di fuori, non è un gran danno.
Vedremo quando e come Hezbollah spara il prossimo razzo. Eh?
Tb
-- 
Diario di guerra
www.tonibaruch.blogspot.com

 spostati a nord un motivo c'č. 
1) fonte?
2) come ti contatto per email? La mia č buona e se mi mandi la tua mi farebbe
piacere.
Shlm


 affermano cio'
Certo, poi ci sono quelli che sostengono il contrario.
Una domanda a margine.
Se, a quanto pare, l'unico rilevante successo di Hezbollah è quello di 
continuare ad esistere ed avere unito gli sciiti e il mondo arabo in un feroce 
odio antisraeliano, al prezzo di perdite di terreno, di materiale e di soldi 
rilevanti, come si può definire il risultato di Israele?
1) Non solo continua ad esistere, ma avanza e distrugge ottima parte delle forze 
del nemico
2) Non solo ottiene una risoluzione che, per quanto sia il solito pantano ONU a 
rischio di inutilità, è a suo favore come mai si era visto
3) Ma anche unisce gli israeliani nella determinazione a combattere Nasrallah, 
al punto che l'opinione pubblica è in subbuglio perché ritiene che dopo 30 
giorni, bombardamenti su tutte le struttire, invasione del sud, non sia stato 
ancora legnato *abbastanza*.
Se qualunque arabo avesse ottenuto un risultato del genere, ci sarebbero i 
clacson per strada da Jedda e Montreal, nevvero?
Ma per Israele rimane una mezza vittoria, poco soddisfacente.
Bene così.
Tb


evil empire ha scritto:

Esattamente.
Un po' come nel Vietnam,gli americani erano dislocati nel vietnam nel
sud ma non ne avevano il controllo dato che la guerriglia vietcong era
praticamente ovunque