Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: la cosiddetta tregua

1. On June 17, 2008 , after several months of indirect contacts
between Israel and Hamas through Egyptian mediators, Egypt and Hamas
individually announced that a lull arrangement ( tahadiya ) had been
reached between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and it
would go into effect at 06.00 hours on the morning of June 19 . Israel
's position was that the lull had no time limit. The position of Hamas
and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations was that it would
remain in force for six months and they then expected it to be
extended to Judea and Samaria . Spokesmen of Hamas and other terrorist
organizations later stated that it would end on Friday morning,
December 19; in the field it had been seriously eroded since November
4.
2. The lull arrangement was based on unwritten understandings and
called for the cessation of the fighting in the Gaza Strip. Hamas
committed itself to enforce the arrangement on the other Palestinian
terrorist organizations which had not expressed their opposition (some
organizations opposed it, some were reserved). The cessation of the
fighting was supposed to lead to the opening of the crossings between
the Gaza Strip and Israel , to initiate negotiations for the release
of Gilad Shalit , the abducted Israeli soldier, and to lead to
discussions about the opening of the Rafah crossing between the Gaza
Strip and Egypt .
3. The lull arrangement brought relative quiet to the western Negev
population and the Gaza Strip, especially during its first months, but
it did not completely end the rocket and mortar shell attacks. In the
six months the arrangement was in force, 329 rockets and mortar shells
were fired at Israel , most of them during the month and a half after
November 4. That was significantly fewer than the rockets and mortar
shells fired during the six months preceding the lull, during which
2,278 rockets and mortar shells were launched (an average of 380 a
month).
4. An analysis of the situation on the ground indicates two distinct
periods:
i) A period of relative quiet between June 19 and November 4 : As of
June 19, there was a marked reduction in the extent of attacks on the
western Negev population. The lull was sporadically violated by rocket
and mortar shell fire, carried out by rogue terrorist organizations,
in some instance in defiance of Hamas (especially by Fatah and Al-
Qaeda supporters). Hamas was careful to maintain the ceasefire. The
IDF refrained from undertaking counterterrorism activities in the Gaza
Strip, taking only routine defensive security measures along the
border fence. Between June 19 and November 4, 20 rockets (three of
which fell inside the Gaza Strip) and 18 mortar shells (five of which
fell inside the Gaza Strip) were fired at Israel .
    ii) The escalation and erosion of the lull arrangement, November 4
to the time of this writing, December 17 2: On November 4 the IDF
carried out a military action close to the border security fence on
the Gazan side to prevent an abduction planned by Hamas, which had dug
a tunnel under the fence to that purpose. Seven Hamas terrorist
operatives were killed during the action. In retaliation, Hamas and
the other terrorist organizations attacked Israel with a massive
barrage of rockets. Since then, 191 rockets and 138 mortar shells have
been fired. The attacks have been continuous and some were carried out
by weapons not previously used, such as 122mm standard Grad rockets
and 120mm mortar shells. Hamas has been directly involved in the
attacks in cooperation with the other terrorist organizations.
5. During the second period a new dynamic was created which replaced
the former relative calm: Hamas and the other terrorist organizations
extended their attacks (rocket and mortar shell fire, IEDs and light-
arms fire), the IDF operated to prevent attacks within the Gaza Strip
(Israeli Air Force attacks, firing at terrorist squads within the Gaza
Strip near the border), the terrorist organizations responded with
barrages of rocket and mortar shell fire to retaliate for their losses
and continued daily sporadic fire, in response to which Israel closed
the border crossings, exerting pressure on Hamas and the Gaza Strip
residents.
6. During the first period the crossings between Israel and the Gaza
Strip were open most of the time ( Israel closed them for short
intervals in response to rocket fire). Scores of trucks delivered
large quantities of consumer goods through the Karni and Sufa (and
later Kerem Shalom) crossings on a daily basis, including supplies of
commodities Israel had previously not permitted into the Gaza Strip,
such as cement and iron. Hamas leaders admitted that there was an
improvement in the supply of goods and that civilian life was
returning to normal. Life also returned to normal in the western Negev
towns and villages for the first time in the period preceding the
lull.
7. With the escalation in rocket and mortar shell attacks which began
on November 4, Israel began closing the crossings for longer periods .
That led to shortages of basic goods in the Gaza Strip and to
disruptions in the supply of various types of fuel (although
electrical power was not cut off, since the plant in Ashqelon , which
supplies 65% of the Gaza Strip's electricity, provided an
uninterrupted flow of power).
8. Hamas did nothing to stop the attacks against Israel , preferring
to deal with the problem of the closed crossings by instituting a
propaganda campaign in the international media . Hamas hoped it would
exert pressure on Israel (and Egypt ) and force it to open the
crossings, even while the rocket and mortar shell attacks continued.
At the same time, Hamas found alternatives to the crossings,
institutionalizing the tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border and setting
up a maritime delivery service from abroad. The alternatives have
eased the shortages but have not provided an appropriate solution for
the problem of the closed crossings.
9. Israel 's expectations that the lull arrangement would speed up
negotiations for the release of the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad
Shalit , and Hamas's expectations that it would lead to discussions
regarding the Rafah crossing, were not realized during the six months
the arrangement was in force. When it came to Gilad Shalit, Hamas
obstinately refused to budge from its former demand for the massive
release of Palestinian murderers from Israeli jails. As to the issue
of the Rafah crossing , Egypt does not seem eager to negotiate,
possibly as a way of exerting pressure on Hamas because it is
disappointed with Hamas's policies regarding a variety of internal
Palestinian issues and because it fears Hamas will establish a radical
Islamic emirate in the Gaza Strip. In our assessment such an emirate
might try to establish closer contact with the Egyptian-based Muslim
Brotherhood, its mother organization and a major, longstanding
opposition group to the Egyptian secular-oriented regime.
10. During the lull, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations
exploited the pause in IDF activity in the Gaza Strip to continue
their military buildup and improve their preparedness for the expected
confrontation with the IDF “the morning after.”  They smuggled vast
quantities of weapons into the Gaza Strip through the tunnels, stepped
up the pace of the military training of their operatives and continued
developing their weapons-manufacturing capabilities. Hamas and the
other terrorist organizations gave extensive media coverage to their
activities to frighten both Israeli and internal Palestinian public
opinion.
11. Conclusion : It is safe to say that the lull arrangement,
especially its first period, provided a breathing-space in the daily
fighting between Israel and Hamas. During that time there was also a
significant increase in the amount of goods delivered to the Gaza
Strip through the crossings. However, when the terrorist organizations
began a policy of continuous rocket and mortar shell attacks against
Israel , accompanied by other forms of terrorism, the lull arrangement
was eroded to the point where it remained only on paper as its first
six months drew to a close.
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e017.pdf
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"si secchi" (Luca Logi / rodewalder)
cfr 
http://raionim.blogspot.com/2008/12/luca-logi-e-i-piselli.html

 wrote:
continuo a non vedere i 49 palestinesi seccati e l'embargo che ha
costretto i gazani a mangiare erba, ma saranno i miei occhiali vecchi