Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: New Carnegie Report on WMD

Altra documentazione per gli scettici rimasti; ce ne sarebbe piu`che a
sufficienza per "impeciare" Bush e cricca.
Giano
"America will lose its most precious commodity in the world, its
international legitimacy."
 Charles Kupchan
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/IraqReport3.asp?from=pubdate
WMD IN IRAQ
Evidence and Implications
Summary of New Carnegie Report
WMD in IRAQ: Evidence and Implications, a new study from the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, details what the U.S. and international
intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the
war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter
transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process,
and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.
The report distills a massive amount of data into side-by-side comparisons
of pre-war intelligence, the official presentation of that intelligence, and
what is now known about Iraq's programs.
The authors of the report are: Jessica T. Mathews, president; George
Perkovich, vice president for studies, and Joseph Cirincione, senior
associate and non-proliferation project director of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Changes to U.S. Policy
· Revise the National Security Strategy to eliminate a U.S. policy of
unilateral preventive war, i.e., preemptive war in absence of imminent
threat.
· Create a nonpartisan, independent commission to establish a clearer
picture of what the intelligence community knew and believed it knew about
Iraq's weapons program.
· Consider changing the post of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from
a political appointment to a career appointment, based on the outcomes of
the independent commission.
· Make the security of poorly protected nuclear weapons and stockpiles of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium a much higher priority for national
security policy.
International Action
· The United States and United Nations should together produce a complete
history and inventory of Iraq's WMD and missile programs.
· The UN Secretary General should commission a high-level analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of the WMD inspection processes in Iraq, and how
inspections could be strengthened in the future.
· The UN Security Council should consider creating a permanent,
international, nonproliferation inspection capability.
· Make the transfer of WMD a violation of international law.
Changes to Threat Assessments
· Recognize distinctions in the degree of threat posed by the different
forms of "weapons of mass destruction" - chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons pose vastly different risks and cost-benefit calculations of actions
to combat them.
· Recognize red flags indicating that sound intelligence practices are not
being followed.
· Examine and debate the assertion that the combined threat of evil states
and terrorism calls for acting on the basis of worst-case reasoning.
· Examine assumption that states will likely transfer WMD to terrorists.
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
Iraq WMD Was Not An Immediate Threat
· Iraq's nuclear program had been suspended for many years; Iraq focused on
preserving a latent, dual-use chemical and probably biological weapons
capability, not weapons production.
· Iraqi nerve agents had lost most of their lethality as early as 1991.
· Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, and UN inspections and sanctions
effectively destroyed Iraq's large-scale chemical weapon production
capabilities.
Inspections Were Working
· Post-war searches suggest the UN inspections were on track to find what
was there.
· International constraints, sanctions, procurement, investigations, and the
export/import control mechanism appear to have been considerably more
effective than was thought.
Intelligence Failed and Was Misrepresented
· Intelligence community overestimated the chemical and biological weapons
in Iraq.
· Intelligence community appears to have been unduly influenced by
policymakers' views.
· Officials misrepresented threat from Iraq's WMD and ballistic missiles
programs over and above intelligence findings.
Terrorist Connection Missing
· No solid evidence of cooperative relationship between Saddam's government
and Al Qaeda.
· No evidence that Iraq would have transferred WMD to terrorists-and much
evidence to counter it.
· No evidence to suggest that deterrence was no longer operable.
Post-War WMD Search Ignored Key Resources
· Past relationships with Iraqi scientists and officials, and credibility of
UNMOVIC experts represent a vital resource that has been ignored when it
should be being fully exploited.
· Data from the seven years of UNSCOM/IAEA inspections are absolutely
essential. Direct involvement of those who compiled the
more-than-30-million- page record is needed.
War Was Not the Best-Or Only-Option
· There were at least two options preferable to a war undertaken without
international support: allowing the UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections to continue
until obstructed or completed, or imposing a tougher program of "coercive
inspections."

 program of "coercive inspections."
E se lo dicono loro :)
*LOL*
Azz... Una documentazione veramente significativa :)
-Stefano

 Quali?   1 2 X
Buona fortuna a chi vuol giocare!
Giano
P.S.-Mi piacerebbe sapere da quale mondo vieni e perche`mazzo sei sbarcato
in questo pianeta tutto pieno di idioti e ciarlatani.
Una volta te l'ho gia`chiesto e te lo ripeto, anch'io con una variante : A
parte Pippo (1), Paperino(X) e Topolino(2) e la tripla Qui-Quo-Qua chi e`che
ti convince di cio`che afferma ? Illuminami per piacere.
Grazie.
G.ambadilegno

sbarcato in questo pianeta tutto pieno di idioti e ciarlatani.
...disse il bue all'asino... :))
*LOL*
-Stefano

 Loro erano gia`a bordo, ma tu ti sei attaccato al timone dell'arca di
Noe'!?
G.

Noe'!?
Se lo dici tu... :)))
-Stefano