Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Israele, minaccia numero 1 in Medio Oriente secondo l'AIEA

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/04/content_12181647.htm

 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/04/content_12181647.htm
Chiss� come mai questa versione � data dall'IRNA, dal People's Daily e altre 
simili fonti...
Invece il sito dell'IAEA contiene l'intera trascrizione della conferenza 
stampa, ed El Baradei non ha detto nulla del genere.
D'altra parte, una prestazione standard da parte del povero Bombacci. 
Ascolta fonti di parte e in pi� ci mette del suo, fino al punto che la sua 
versione ha ben poco in comune con la realt�.
Poich� sono buono, ecco la trascrizione di ci� che El Baradei ha detto 
veramente. Non che il povero Bombacci sia in grado di rendersi conto di aver 
preso l'ennesima cantonata, naturalmente.
Good afternoon, and let me welcome the members of the media to this press 
conference. I came here to discuss a broad range of issues with Dr. Ali 
Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Commission of Iran, and also 
with President Ahmadinejad. I am not a newcomer to Tehran. I have been 
coming here often to see how we can move forward with our cooperation in the 
area of verification, safety, technical cooperation. We have a broad range 
of activities here in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This time I came here, 
again to continue our dialogue on these issues, but specifically to discuss 
the issue of verification in the new facility under construction in Qom. We 
were informed over a week ago by the Iranian authorities that there is a 
facility being constructed, a pilot enrichment plant, under construction in 
Qom. It is, as I indicated to the Iranian authorities, important for us to 
send our inspectors to do a comprehensive verification of that facility to 
assure ourselves that it is a facility that is built for peaceful purposes; 
that we understand its relationship to Iran's nuclear program, its capacity 
and many other, technical questions that our inspectors would be interested 
in getting answers to. I am pleased to say that in consultation with Dr. 
Salehi, we agreed that our inspectors will come here on the 25th of October 
to do the inspection and to go to Qom. And I hope and I trust that Iran will 
be as transparent with our inspectors' team as possible, for us to be able 
to assess our verification at that facility as early as possible.
The other issue, as Dr. Salehi mentioned, is this project we have been 
working on for a number of months. Iran has requested cooperation by the 
Agency in securing fuel for the Tehran research reactor. I have been in 
consultation with a number of suppliers and I was pleased to see that there 
is a positive response to the Iranian request. That reactor is working to 
produce medical isotopes for treatment of cancer patients; it is a 
humanitarian purpose, and I was very pleased to see a positive response on 
the part of the number of prospective suppliers. To this end, we propose 
that Iran provides its LEU. It would be enriched; it would be then turned 
into fuel (fabrication) and then brought back here to Iran for use in the 
research facilities. We will have a meeting to that end to discuss the 
technical details and hopefully hammer out an agreement, as early as 
possible. We will have that meeting in Vienna, on the 19th of October, with 
the participation of the United States, Russia and France, and of course the 
Agency will act as a convenor of this meeting.
I am pleased; this is a positive development. I have always been of the view 
that the Iranian nuclear issue is an issue that can only be resolved through 
dialogue, through diplomacy. I have been saying for a number of years that 
we need transparency on the part of Iran, we need cooperation on the part of 
the international community. I feel that we are at a critical moment. I see 
that we are shifting gears, from confrontation into transparency and 
cooperation. I continue, of course, to call on Iran to be as transparent as 
possible. I indicated that because Iran has a comprehensive programme, has a 
fuel cycle, sensitive fuel cycle activities, it would help the Agency to 
have Iran subscribing, again, to our regulations that allow us to be 
informed of the construction of nuclear facilities as early as possible. It 
also would be of great help to us to have Iran reapply the Additional 
Protocol, which would give us the authority for more information, access to 
more locations. That would enable the Agency to start to provide assurances, 
not only about declared nuclear activities in Iran, but also about possible 
nuclear, undeclared activities in Iran. I believe we are on the right track. 
I believe that we have to continue to work together -- the Agency, Iran and 
the rest of the international community -- to move in the right direction, 
to assure the international community about Iran's nuclear programme, to 
open the dialogue about the broad range of issues that we need to address 
between Iran and the international community. As you have seen, there was a 
Six-Parties talk that has taken place in Geneva last week. The reaction from 
both sides has been quite positive. President Obama said "This is a 
constructive beginning." President Ahmadinejad said that he expresses 
satisfaction with the initial results. So it is a critical moment; it is a 
moment when all of the parties should put their heads together, should start 
to build confidence and trust. This is the way we need to go both on the 
nuclear issue and on the broad range of issues that Iran and the 
international community need to work out, so that hopefully we reach a point 
when Iran is fully integrated with the international community.
Q: [awaiting translation from Farsi]
Thank you very much for your kinds words and I hope it is not, definitely, 
my last visit to Iran -- definitely not as a private citizen. Iran is an 
ancient civilization and I would be very happy to come here as many times as 
I can. On the fuel issue, we are still working on the details. Dr. Salehi 
will be coming to Vienna, as I mentioned, on the 19th of October. We'll have 
the meeting there with the Americans, the Russians and the French, and we 
will work out and hammer out the new deal. The fuel in the Tehran reactor is 
still available for a year and a half, so we have time to do it. The idea is 
that once we have the agreement, we should accelerate the new core for the 
fuel for the reactor as early as possible. On the visit to Qom, this in 
accordance with the Safeguards Agreement that when a country builds a 
reactor, the Agency has to come and do design information verification. That 
is what we will be doing when we come to Qom on the 25th of October.
I should add maybe a couple of things. One is that you should not confuse 
the Six-Parties talks with the Agency process. Our process is completely 
independent. What we are doing here is on the one part, a verification under 
the NPT, and (it) is Technical Cooperation, again under the Agency's 
Statute. And I should say that for the international community now to be 
able to say to Iran, we are ready to accept your LEU, enrich it to the 20% 
required for the research reactor, convert it into fuel, is an act of good 
faith, is an act of cooperation. And I hope that would open the way, as I 
mentioned, to a broader discussion on many of the outstanding issues between 
Iran and the international community.
Q: from Aljazeera [awaiting translation from Arabic ]
I will answer in English only. Agency regulations require, with all 
countries, without exception, that they should inform the IAEA on the day 
they decided to construct a nuclear facility. Iran has joined that 
regulation in 2002, then in 2007 decided they will go back from that 
arrangement or regulation and decided to apply the old regulation, which 
says that 6 months before the nuclear material is introduced, they should 
inform the Agency. We disagree with that interpretation by Iran; our legal 
interpretation, in the Agency, is that Iran should have informed us the day 
they decided to construct that facility. That is the Agency's view; that is 
the regulation that is applied to all parties of the NPT, without exception. 
Iran takes a different view, but the Agency view (is) as I explained.
Q: from Press TV reporter - What is the guarantee for the future and the 
future of the region that the countries will be free of nuclear weapons of 
mass destruction?
Well as you know, I have always taken the view that the world would only be 
safe when we have a world free from nuclear weapons. And also, that the 
region of the Middle East can only see regional stability and regional 
security when it is established as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Unfortunately 
on the last issue, a Middle East free from nuclear weapons, we haven't yet 
made much progress. There is still a major difference between Israel on the 
one side and the Arab and other parties, Arab countries and Iran on the 
other side. I should tell you, however, that all countries, including 
Israel, agree that the long-term goal should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
in the Middle East. How to go about it is one issue, and that we are still 
discussing, and I hope that we should be able to make progress in the near 
term. Because there is no stability, in my view, there is no enduring 
security in the Middle East without having the Middle East free from all 
inhumane weapons, nuclear weapons, chemical or biological weapons.
On a world free from nuclear weapons: unfortunately the weapons states did 
not really make good on their commitment for 30 years under the NPT. 
Fortunately, however, recently, Barack Obama has taken an initiative to work 
through concrete steps toward a world free from nuclear weapons. They are 
negotiating now, the US and Russia, negotiating an agreement to cut their 
nuclear arsenal by one third by the end of the year. There has been a 
Security Council (meeting) at the summit level last week where I took part, 
which adopted a resolution that affirms the goal of a nuclear-weaponfree 
world, through concrete steps, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
through a treaty which prohibits production of nuclear material for weapon 
purposes. This was the first time when I had a glimmer of hope that we are 
on the right track, that we should focus on abolishing nuclear weapons, not 
only in one region but in the entire globe. The risk of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of 
extremist groups, is the number one security threat we are facing today in 
our world.
Q: [inaudible]
Let me tell you first that my conscience is no different from my role as a 
Director General. I have always assumed my role in full...conscience. Iran, 
of course, has mastered enrichment technology. There are, however, still 
some questions about the intentions of Iran, and that is why we are working 
with Iran and working with the international community to provide assurance 
that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The 
measures I mentioned today, the fuel project I mentioned, the verification 
in Qom, are all part of this process to reach a point when we, the 
international community, through the Agency, can feel that their concern has 
been alleviated. Iran has a very impressive, scientific base. Iran has 
acquired, is running a research reactor; is about to run a power reactor; 
they have fuel cycle activity. Iran has the technology. The key of course, 
is to reconcile these activities with the concerns of the international 
community, and that is what we are putting our focus on right now.
is the past and the present activity, and that's where we are trying, 
through verification, to clarify remaining concerns, and why I also said if 
Iran were to apply the Additional Protocol, that would help us a lot in 
providing clarity and assurance about possible undeclared activities. There 
are concerns about Iran's future intentions, and that is, as I have always 
said, not an issue of verification; it's an issue of building trust. That's 
why we have now the Six-Party talks. I am happy that it is at least moving 
in the right direction. That is why I am very pleased with the fuel project, 
because underlining the fuel project is confidence building and building 
trust. That is something that we need to continue to build on.
Q: regarding news reports by the Associated Press [mostly inaudible]:
As I have said many times, and I continue to say today, the Agency has no 
concrete proof there is an ongoing weapons programme in Iran. There are 
allegations that Iran has conducted weaponization studies; however, these 
are issues which we are still looking into. And we are looking to Iran to 
help us clarify. We are looking to those suppliers of information to help us 
on the question of authenticity, because that is really a major issue. It is 
not an issue that involves nuclear material; it's a question of allegations, 
paper work studies, and of course the key issue there is authenticity. We 
are seeking clarification from Iran; we are seeking clarification from the 
supplier of the information. But we don't have any information that nuclear 
material has been used. We don't have any information that any components of 
nuclear weapons have been manufactured. That is why I continue to say that 
we are concerned but we are not in any way panicking about the Iranian 
nuclear programme. However, we need to continue to work with Iran to clarify 
these issues. This is an issue that has to do with war and peace, and the 
Agency has to work on the basis of fact and facts only.
On the other question that the Agency has information that has been 
withheld, and that there is information which has (not) been shared with the 
Board: this is maybe for the hundredth time that I have been saying and the 
Agency has been saying that this is totally baseless, totally groundless. 
All information that we have received that has been vetted, assessed in 
accordance with our standard practices, has been shared with the Board. If 
any country has more information that they would like to share with us or 
with the Board, they are welcom to do that. But we stand by our statement 
that all information that has been corroborated, assessed, critically 
assessed, has been shared with the Board and on the basis of that I make my 
statement that we have no concrete evidence that Iran has an ongoing 
programme. There are concerns by the international community and we are 
working on these. But there is a difference between concern and a statement 
that Iran has an ongoing weapons programme. As to the pressure, I think our 
record throughout the years -- including before the Iraq war, when we made 
it very clear that we had not seen any evidence that Iraq had revived its 
nuclear weapons programme, despite a lot of allegations and assumptions -- I 
think that our record speaks for itself.
Thank you very much.
I should just add one sentence also, that in clarifying the so-called 
studies about weaponization, I need to make it very clear that we are not in 
any way interested in the conventional military capability of Iran, or its 
missile programme. All we wanted is to exclude that it is nuclear-related, 
and I need to make that very clear. We are not, in any way, trying to get 
into Iran's conventional military capabilities.
Thank you very much.