Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Come la Turchia ha perso il biglietto della lotteria

La cosiddetta primavera araba sembrava la grande occasione della Turchia
per raccogliere i frutti della sua nuova politica delle mani libere, un po'
islamista un po' no, un po' alleato NATO un po' stato canaglia.
L'eccesso di machiavellismo, i tempi sbagliati per le mosse sbagliate, un
approccio insieme arrogante e incomprensibile, hanno finito per alienare
tutti gli interlocutori, sia vecchi che nuovi, trasformandosi in una
disfatta generale della politica estera neo-ottomana.
Da Foreignpolicy.com
The Arab uprisings seemed tailor-made for the “new Turkey” to exert its
much-vaunted influence in the Middle East. Since the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) came to power almost nine years ago, Ankara has
actively courted the region, cultivating warm relations with certain Arab
countries, winning plaudits from Rabat to Ramadi for its principled stand
on Gaza, and using its prestige to solve problems in Lebanon, Iraq, and
Syria. A central focus of Turkey’s so-called “zero problems” foreign policy
has been a concerted effort to improve and expand relations with the
countries to its south and east. Now, with millions of Arabs standing up
and demanding their freedom, Turks are not the only ones to have held up
the “Turkish model” — the democratic development of a predominantly Muslim
society in an officially secular political system — as a possible way
forward for the rest of the Middle East.
Yet five months into the turmoil buffeting the Arab world, it is hard to
discern exactly if Turkey has a policy to deal with the change going on
around it. Indeed, rather than a regional leader with a clear sense of
purpose, Ankara has been downright clumsy in dealing with the Arab
upheavals.
It didn’t have to be this way. The Arab revolutions actually started out
pretty well for Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was way ahead
of other world leaders in demanding that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak heed the
desires of his people and resign. Whether or not Ankara saw the writing on
the wall quicker than most, the position was entirely in keeping with the
Justice and Development Party’s worldview — and the role Erdogan and other
principle party figures fashioned for themselves — as promoters of
democratic change at home and abroad. Of course, the difficult personal
relationship between Erdogan and Mubarak made it easier for the Turkish
leader to dump his counterpart in favor of the multitudes camped out in
Tahrir Square. And there was a regional rivalry at play here, too: Ankara
sensed that Cairo’s influence was waning and wanted to fashion itself as a
new Middle East powerbroker. It seemed that once again Erdogan and his team
had insights into the politics of the region that seemed beyond the grasp
of others — most notably the Obama administration, which, hamstrung by
Washington’s strategic relationship with Mubarak, was far more cautious and
circumspect than Ankara.
Then came Libya. Despite the brutality and chaos instigated by Muammar
al-Qaddafi, Erdogan found it difficult to decisively cut ties with the
Libyan leader: Not only was the Turkish prime minister a personal recipient
of the al-Qaddafi International Prize for Human Rights, but with 30,000
Turks working on $1.5 billion worth of construction projects for the Libyan
government, there was a clear economic imperative to maintaining good
relations. Indeed, when NATO members began discussing in late February the
prospect of a no-fly zone, Turkey — an early member of the alliance —
objected. On Feb. 28, Erdogan pointedly told the Turkish-German Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, “NATO’s intervention in Libya is out of the
question. We are against such a thing.” A few days later, the Turkish
Foreign Ministry declared that foreign intervention on behalf of the Libyan
opposition would rob the rebels of the satisfaction of bringing Qaddafi
down on their own — this at a time when the Interim Libyan National Council
was practically begging for foreign support.
Once the Arab League approved a no-fly zone, the Turkish position became
truly strange. Erdogan expressed “heartfelt support” for prohibiting
Qaddafi’s use of airpower while simultaneously rejecting the “foreign
intervention in friend and brother Libya.” Even as NATO airstrikes took out
loyalist air defenses, Ankara remained ambivalent toward Qaddafi’s use of
force against his own people, curiously committed to the Libyan leader. And
though the Turks positioned themselves as the leading provider of
humanitarian aid to Libya, they consistently rejected the use of force to
protect rebel fighters, arguing instead for a Turkish-brokered cease-fire
after which Qaddafi could begin the process of political reform. To the
Benghazi rebel leadership, the Turks were, in fact, the culprits behind the
noticeable downshift in the NATO air campaign in the previous few weeks. In
time, as Turkish diplomatic efforts — primarily through direct
communication between the two leaders — to persuade Qaddafi to stand down
bore little in the way of positive results, Ankara ultimately came to the
conclusion that almost everyone but Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and a group of
motley African countries arrived at months ago: Qaddafi must go. On May 3,
Erdogan declared to a gathering of journalists in Istanbul, “We wish to see
Libya’s leader step down immediately and leave Libya immediately for his
own sake and for the sake of his country’s future.”
Turkey seems to be engaged in a similar diplomatic dance with regard to
Syria. At one time, Ankara and Damascus were hostile neighbors in conflict
over the downstream flow of the Euphrates river and Syrian support for the
terrorists of the Kurdistan Workers Party, which targeted the Turkish state
in a quixotic campaign of Kurdish independence. During AKP’s tenure,
however, relations between the two countries warmed considerably. Syrians
and Turks no longer require visas for travel between each country and
Turkey has become Syria’s largest trading partner. Although there has been
precious little talk of foreign intervention in Syria, just to be sure,
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu warned that “internationalization”
of the unrest there could lead to “undesired outcomes.” Chief among them,
from the Turkish perspective, would be the downfall of Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad and his regime. The Turks have much to be worried about
when it comes to a destabilized Syria — in particular a restive Kurdish
region just to Turkey’s south. It would also be a setback for Ankara’s
Middle East strategy, of which warm relations with Damascus have been
central. Given those interests, it is unlikely that the Turks will break
with Assad in the way they have now abandoned Qaddafi.
Instead, the Turks have indulged in cynical posturing. As Assad deploys
troops and tanks against peaceful protestors, the Turkish foreign ministry
counseled the Syrian leader to “implement [reforms] without further delay”
and subsequently expressed satisfaction with Assad’s efforts. To which the
only reasonable reply is, “What democratic reforms?” The Turkish position
on Syria has not yet placed Ankara at odds with Washington or Brussels. But
should the United States or Europe shift on Assad — a distinct possibility
— then Turkey would find itself supporting a dictator against the will of
its two most important allies, as well as the will of the Syrian people.
Among the many myths that the Arab spring has shattered is the legend of
Turkish foreign policy in the era of the AKP. If officials in Ankara are to
be believed, Turkey’s diplomacy has, over the course of the last decade —
and very often over the objections of Washington — had a decisively
positive effect on conflicts and problems from the Balkans and the Caucuses
to Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. But Turkey’s prideful
rhetoric only masked the contradictions and weaknesses at the heart of its
foreign policy. Erdogan, Davutoglu, and their advisors have to come to
grips with how hard it is to master the Middle East.
There was always a lot less to Ankara’s influence in the Arab world than
met the eye. Turkish leaders love the anecdotes about Arabs watching
Turkish soap operas, the posters of Erdogan in the Sabra and Shatila
refugee camps, and the comparison between the Turkish prime minister and
Gamal Abdel Nasser — but the new Ottomans have found it as difficult to
manage the politics of the region as the Sultans before them. At base, the
Turks managed a measure of influence during a period of Arab decay.
It was easy to be influential when the Arab world was politically dead and
devoid of authentic leadership. Like it or not, Ankara’s interests are
wrapped up in the old regional order. As a result, at a moment of
unprecedented regional change, when people power and democracy is sweeping
the Middle East, the Turks look timorous, maladroit, and diminished — not
at all the regional leader to which Ankara has aspired.
-- 
recoil is insignificant when there is a tiger on the head of your elephant

 disfatta generale della politica estera neo-ottomana.
estikazzi che rosicata. E ancora deve venire il bello...

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Cioè mi dispiace che la Turchia sia finita all'angolo?
Eppure di rodere dovresti intenderti...
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 Cioè mi dispiace che la Turchia sia finita all'angolo?
no, ti piacerebbe, ma non è così.

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Discutine con l'autore di questo ottimo pezzo, se te ne intendi di politica
internazionale
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 no, ti piacerebbe, ma non è così.
Il principale alleato della Turchia ad est al momento rischia il rogo
per stregoneria.
Chi resta?


Steven cook è un fazioso sostenitore degli interessi israeliani (per 
come li concepiscono quelli come lui, ovviamente).
Fa parte di quella torma di "opinionisti" sempre pronti a spacciare 
punti di vista allineati alle indicazioni della lobby sionista.
Alla Turchia, storico alleato di Israele, costoro intendono far pagare 
l'affronto di aver protestato per qualcosa che Israele ha fatto.  E ora 
colgono ogni occasione per presentare quel paese nel modo peggiore 
possibile, e brigano al Congresso per mettergli contro gli USA e in ogni 
altro paese nel quale la lobby abbia influenza per indurre opinioni 
pubbliche e governi a fare altrettanto.
In questo modo fanno di tutto per distaccare sempre più Israele da un 
paese che sarebbe un alleato prezioso, che storicamente è stato un 
alleato prezioso.
E dicono di difendere gli interessi di Israele...
-- 
Sostieni Rete ECO
http://rete-eco.it/it/sostienici.html

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eppure sempre lì resta, con buona pace del tuo fegato

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Obama.

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è Obama che rischia il processo? E che ha fatto?