Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Ex ministro degli esteri Israeliano: "Se fossi stato Palestinese avrei rifiutato Camp David"

Questo dovrebbe essere l'ultimo chiodo nella tomba del mito della
"generosa offerta" di Camp David.
A dirlo e' Shlomo Ben Ami,l'ex ministro degli Esteri Israeliano, in un
dibattito con lo storico Norman Finkelstein.
Per l'intero dibattito, in due parti, andate sul sito della stazione
radio Democracy Now!, a
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/02/14/1518230
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/02/14/1518235

in un dibattito con lo storico Norman Finkelstein.
Un noto coglione antisemita che di "storico" ha ben poco.
-Stefano

 "generosa offerta" di Camp David.
piu' che altro una "geniale propaganda" ........


L'intero intervento dello stesso Ben Ami, in realta', smonta pezzo per
pezzo questa propaganda.
Dal 1948:
----------------------------
SHLOMO BEN-AMI: In 1948, what was born was a state, but also original
superpower in many ways. We have prevailed over the invading Arab
armies and the local population, which was practically evicted from
Palestine, from the state of Israel, from what became the state of
Israel, and this is how the refugee problem was born. Interestingly,
the Arabs in 1948 lost a war that was, as far as they were concerned,
lost already in 1936-1939, because they have fought against the British
mandate and the Israeli or the Jewish Yishuv, the Jewish pre-state, and
they were defeated then, so they came to the hour of trial in 1948
already as a defeated nation. That is, the War of 1948 was won already
in 1936, and they had no chance to win the war in 1948. They were
already a defeated nation when they faced the Israeli superpower that
was emerging in that year.
AMY GOODMAN: You have some very strong quotes in your book, of your own
and quoting others, like Berl Katznelson, who is the main ideologue of
the Labor movement, acknowledging that in the wake of the 1929 Arab
riots, the Zionist enterprise as an enterprise of conquest. You also
say, "The reality on the ground was that of an Arab community in a
state of terror facing a ruthless Israeli army whose path to victory
was paved not only by its exploits against the regular Arab armies, but
also by the intimidation and at times atrocities and massacres it
perpetrated against the civilian Arab community. A panic-stricken Arab
community was uprooted under the impact of massacres that would be
carved into the Arabs' monument of grief and hatred." Explain that
further.
---------------------
Al 1991:
-----------------------
SHLOMO BEN-AMI: Well, the Oslo peace process was an agreement -- it
started as an agreement between two unequal partners. Arafat conceived
Oslo as a way, not necessarily to reach a settlement, but more
importantly to him at that particular moment, in order to come back to
the territories and control the politics of the Palestinian family.
Don't forget that the Intifada, to which Oslo brought an end, started
independently of the P.L.O. leadership, and he saw how he was losing
control of the destiny of the Palestinians. His only way to get back to
the territories was through an agreement with Israel. So in Oslo, he
made enormous concessions.
In fact, when he was negotiating in Oslo with us, an official
Palestinian delegation was negotiating with an official Israeli
delegation in Washington, and the official Palestinian delegation was
asking the right things from the viewpoint of the Palestinians --
self-determination, right of return, end of occupation, all the
necessary arguments -- whereas Arafat in Oslo reached an agreement that
didn't even mention the right of self-determination for the
Palestinians, doesn't even mention the need of the Israelis to put an
end to settlements. If the Israelis, after Oslo, continued expansion of
settlements, they were violating the spirit of Oslo, not the letter of
Oslo. There is nothing in the Oslo agreement that says that Israelis
cannot build settlements. So this was the cheap agreement that Arafat
sold, precisely because he wanted to come back to the territories and
control the politics of Palestine.
--------------------------------------------
Al 2000
-----------------------------------------------------
 This is something I put in the book. But Taba is the problem. The
Clinton parameters are the problem, because the Clinton parameters, in
my view --
NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Maybe you could explain to them what that is. I
don't think most people will know the Clinton parameters.
SHLOMO BEN-AMI: Well, the Clinton parameters say the following. They
say that on the territorial issue, the Palestinians will get 100% of
Gaza, 97% of the West Bank, plus safe passage from Gaza to the West
Bank to make the state viable. There will be a land swap. The 97%,
which I mentioned, takes into account the land swap, where they will
get 3% on this side, within the state of Israel, so we will have the
blocks of settlements and they will be able to settle refugees on this
side of the border.
About Jerusalem, it says what is Jewish is Israeli, and what is
Palestinian is -- sorry, and what is Arab is Palestinian. It includes
full-fledged sovereignty for the Palestinians on Temple Mount, on the
Haram al-Sharif, no sovereignty, no Jewish sovereignty on the Haram
al-Sharif, which was at the time and continues to be a major, major
problem for Israelis and Jews, that these things mean to them a lot.
And then, with the question of refugees, it says that the refugees will
return to historic Palestine, to historical Palestine, and that Israel
will maintain its sovereign right of admission. That is, it will have
to absorb a number of refugees but with restrictions that need to be
negotiated between the parties. But the bulk of the refugees will be
allowed to return to the state of Palestine. This is the essence of the
Clinton parameters.
 This is something I put in the book. But Taba is the problem. The
Clinton parameters are the problem, because the Clinton parameters, in
my view --
NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Maybe you could explain to them what that is. I
don't think most people will know the Clinton parameters.
SHLOMO BEN-AMI: Well, the Clinton parameters say the following. They
say that on the territorial issue, the Palestinians will get 100% of
Gaza, 97% of the West Bank, plus safe passage from Gaza to the West
Bank to make the state viable. There will be a land swap. The 97%,
which I mentioned, takes into account the land swap, where they will
get 3% on this side, within the state of Israel, so we will have the
blocks of settlements and they will be able to settle refugees on this
side of the border.
About Jerusalem, it says what is Jewish is Israeli, and what is
Palestinian is -- sorry, and what is Arab is Palestinian. It includes
full-fledged sovereignty for the Palestinians on Temple Mount, on the
Haram al-Sharif, no sovereignty, no Jewish sovereignty on the Haram
al-Sharif, which was at the time and continues to be a major, major
problem for Israelis and Jews, that these things mean to them a lot.
And then, with the question of refugees, it says that the refugees will
return to historic Palestine, to historical Palestine, and that Israel
will maintain its sovereign right of admission. That is, it will have
to absorb a number of refugees but with restrictions that need to be
negotiated between the parties. But the bulk of the refugees will be
allowed to return to the state of Palestine. This is the essence of the
Clinton parameters.

superpower
*ROOOOOOOTTTTTTFFFFFFFLLLLL*
Ma non lo hanno ancora rinchiuso in qualche casa di cura o mandato a
qualche talk show televisivo? :)
-Stefano

 degli esteri.
A te meraviglia che un politico (magari trombato) spari cazzate insensate 
come Israele che nel 1948 nasce come una "superpower"?
A me no.
Un "esercito" che contava su poche centinaia di migliaia di cittadini, aveva 
vissuto in semiclandestinità fino a quel momento, senza vero addestramento 
militare, senza arei, senza carri armati, senza armamento pesante decente 
(c'era in linea qualche cannone risalente alla guerra franco-prussiana) era 
una superpower?
Anche il parallelo 1936-1948 è risibile per varie ragioni.
Nei pogrom del 1936, gli arabi se la devono vedere anzitutto con gli 
inglesi. L'autodifesa ebraica è poco coodinata, si riduce a poche occasioni 
isolate ed è perlopiù fallimentare.
Nel 1948, a seguito del verticale peggioramento delle relazioni tra yishuv e 
auorità del mandato,  gli inglesi operano invece con una neutralità 
piuttosto benevola verso gli arabi, a cui vengono passate posizioni militari 
e i cui eserciti regolari migliori (la legione araba) sono armati e 
comandati da inglesi. Tutto il peso della difesa cade sulle milizie 
ebraiche, che daranno ottima (e inaspettata) prova di sé.
La situazione sul terreno è tanto diversa che le autorità inglesi, cioè 
quelle che conoscono la situazione sul terreno meglio di chiunque altro, 
prevedono una rapida sconfitta degli ebrei e una loro cacciata a mare.
Tb

 
No, non mi meraviglia, ma quello che mi incuriosisce e' come fosse a fare il
ministro degli esteri (non dell'industria o dell'agricoltura), oltre
all'ambasciatore e al professore di storia, dato che tutte e 3 le
professioni implicano un minimo di conoscenza della storia e di politica
estera.
Il mio commento era anche una battuta un po' contorta sul fatto che SdC
abbia quotato e rotflato la parte sulla superpower, ma non quella sugli
accordi di Camp David. 
Volevo dare un po' di fuoco alle polveri, vedere cosa succedeva e a che ora
SdC cominciava il suo lavoro quotidiano sul newsgroup. Pura curiosita'.
Avendo detto questo, anche a me (con la mia modesta conoscenza del periodo
in questione), la storia della "superpower" sembra una bufala.

 in questione), la storia della "superpower" sembra una bufala.
Eh, beh.
Tb 

Interessante come uno meno informato di te su Israele sia stato
Hai detto bene: SIA STATO.
-Stefano

che ora SdC cominciava il suo lavoro quotidiano sul newsgroup.
Certo, certo... :)
*pat pat*
*LOL*
-Stefano