Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: É curioso

Notare come le stesse persone che sostengono la possibilità che ad
uccidere i politici anti-siriani siano in realtà gli americani o la
S.P.E.C.T.R.E. siano anche dell'idea che sia impossibile che Putin
abbia fatto saltare in aria i palazzi di Mosca per dar la colpa ai
ceceni. Parimenti coloro che sostengono l'ipotesi della regia occulta
di Putin dietro agli attentati attribuiti ai ceceni, sono spspesso
assolutamente convinti che sia impossibile che a compiere gli omicidi
in Libano siano stati altri, piuttosto che i filosiriani. Misteri del
Guelfoghibellinismo.


Non sono due casi speculari.
Gli attentati a Mosca, come la strategia della tensione in Italia, sono quel 
tipo di terrore senza nome e apparentemente senza obiettivi politici che è stato 
più volte identificato come "terrorismo di stato".
A Mosca, le tracce dell'FSB si sono trovate. E' quantomeno possibile ipotizzare 
che gli attentati a palazzi e stazione della metropolitana abbiano la loro 
matrice nei servizi russi, salva ovviamente la necessità di dimostrarlo e di 
accettare qualunque evidenza contraria.
Gli omicidi politici, in Italia come in Libano, specialmente quando avvengono in 
serie, sono quel tipo di terrore che ha sempre una matrice politica e che 
difficilmente si può immaginare che sia autoinflitto.
I giudici antimafia (per quanto variegata e diversa possa essere la loro 
personalità) li hanno uccisi i mafiosi. La catena di omicidi contro politici 
antisiriani ha il suo mandante naturale a Damasco e tra le forze che appoggiano 
il regime di Assad il piccolo.
Ci sarebbe la necessità di dimostrarlo. Ma l'inchiesta, i siriani, non la vogliono.
E i politici antisiriani continuano a cadere sotto il fuoco.
Tb
-- 
[Tb] :
Il dovere di un comunista sarebbe quello di formare un cordone sanitario
attorno alla feccia nazi
[.sergio.]
No [...] se posta articoli che condivido      |     
http://snipurl.com/11s9a
--------------------------------------------------
Il mio blog: 
www.tonibaruch.blogspot.com

 Non sono due casi speculari.
Ci sono delle differenze, ma io notavo soprattutto il fatto che chi
sostiene il "complotto" in un caso, sostiene in genere anche la matrice
terroristica dell'altro caso, e viceversa. É questo a parermi
speculare.
Poi io ho le mie idee e, non essendo un fine pensatore, sono propenso a
ritenere che sia piuttosto ovvio che a uccidere Litvinenko siano stati
i russi, a mettere le bombe a Mosca i ceceni, a uccidere Gemayel i
siriani, e via dicendo.

 siriani, e via dicendo.
E' la cosa più ovvia.
Se però succedono cose come queste
===========
Ryazan incident
On the evening of September 22, 1999, an alert resident of an apartment 
building in the town of Ryazan noticed strangers moving heavy sugar 
sacks into the basement from a car. Militia (the local police) were 
called to the site and all residents were evacuated. The first test of 
the powder from the sacks showed the presence of an explosive. All roads 
from the town were brought under heavy surveillance but no leads were 
found. A telephone service employee tapped into long-distance phone 
conversations managed to detect a conversation in which an out-of-town 
person suggested to take care and to watch for patrols. That person's 
number was found to belong to an FSB office in Moscow.
Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti declared that the incident was a 
training exercise forty-eight hours later. The original chemical test 
was declared inaccurate due to contamination of the analysis apparatus 
from a previous test. The public inquiry committee could not come to a 
complete conclusion on this and other incidents due to incoherent 
answers from federal bodies. The General Prosecutor's office has closed 
the criminal investigation of the Ryazan incident in April 2000.
=======
Considerato che il terrorismo di stato esiste, considerato che quelle 
bombe hanno giustificato un'invasione immediatamente successiva, 
considerato che chi ha denunciato quei fatti è stato ucciso con ogni 
probabilità dai servizi russi...
... qualche dubbio è lecito porselo.
Tb

 accettare qualunque evidenza contraria.
vedi Tel Aviv con i kamikaze per giustificare l'occupazione
pluridecennale di Gaza e Cisgiordania? Se usi questa logica vale anche
questa ipotesi.

 ... qualche dubbio è lecito porselo.
In effetti sì. Mi pare strano però che in un paese così
gengiskhanamente democratico come la Russia, Putin debba ricorrere ad
autoattentati per poi poter, citando le sue parole, "ricacciare i
terroristi nel cesso"...

.sergio. wrote:

Hai trenta minuti per grattarti vigorosamente lo zuccone e capire perché hai 
detto una cazzata.


Varg wrote:

Era ancora un uomo dell'FSB giovane e sconosciuto.
Aveva bisogno di un plebiscito che lo dichiarasse uomo della provvidenza.
Secondo l'interpretazione colpevolista, l'FSB gli ha fornito la campagna elettorale.
Poi, intendiamoci, non penso che tutto quello che si dice contro Putin sia 
necessariamente vero. Ma c'è il movente, c'è qualche indizio.
E purtroppo non c'è mai stata l'inchiesta, archiviata, curiosamente, per 
l'incapacità dell'FSB di fornire spiegazioni coerenti della presenza di suoi 
agenti in un palazzo di mosca con sacchi di esplosivo (e, ricordo, ma al momento 
non l'ho trovato) detonatori.


 Ma per mettere una bomba in una stazione non serve un complotto.
No, eh?
Eppure, ogni volta che vedo quel dannato squarcio nel muro al binario 1
della stazione, a me pare che ci sia stato.

 detto una cazzata.
tu di quanti minuti hai bisogno visto che ci sono video di terroristi
ceceni che si sono fatti esplodere in varie occasioni a Mosca e la seconda
guerra è scoppiata per l'invasione dei terroristi ceceni in Daghestan? (o
pure quelli erano agenti del FSB travestiti, coglionazzo fascistoide alla
lieberman? )
-- 
Qultura politica di Tonibaruch su It.Politica.Internazionale :
"Oltre al cumswapping e al cumdodging, fai anche il creampie, 
porno-razzi-catto-somarello?" 
http://groups.google.it/group/it.politica.internazionale/msg/1db9ef6abb0f7604?dmode=source&hl=it
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 tu di q
Ne sono rimasti 28
Tb
Ps: non ho dubbi sul fatto che il terrorismo ceceno, genuino, esista e abbia 
colpito. Ma mi resta anche il dubbio su quegli omoni con detonatori e sacchi di 
esplosivo, che avevano il telefono in una sede dell'FSB, ecco.


che avevano il telefono in una sede dell'FSB, ecco.
fascistello alla lieberman, se avessi seguito la faccenda come si deve
allora avresti saputo che furono fatte dell'esercitazioni per
verificare anche il grado di allerta delle fdo e dei loro collaboratori
.

 verificare anche il grado di allerta delle fdo e dei loro collaboratori
ROTFL
Tb
Ps:
1
The Shadow of Ryazan: Who Was Behind the Strange Russian Apartment Bombings in 
September 1999?
David Satter
The Hudson Institute April 19, 2002
The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Russian and Eurasian 
Studies 1619 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036 phone: 
202-663-5795
; 
fax: 
202-663-5747
; e-mail: 
bpar...@jhu.edu
 website:
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/depts/res
 This project is funded by the Smith Richardson 
Foundation. The views expressed are those of the author alone. Publication in 
this series does not imply endorsement by the project by SAIS, or the Smith 
Richardson Foundation.
2
The Shadow of Ryazan Executive Summary For two and half years, the government of 
Vladimir Putin has been haunted by the possibility that there will be a serious 
examination of the Russian apartment bombings that took place in September 1999. 
There is compelling evidence that, contrary to claims that the bombings were the 
work of Chechen terrorists, they were, in fact, carried out by the Russian 
government itself. First, the bombings came at a moment when the corrupt 
oligarchy that ruled Russia faced the loss of its power. The bombings, by 
seeming to justify a new Chechen war, propelled Putin into power, and he 
preserved the oligarchy and the Yeltsin era division of property intact. Second, 
the organization of the bombings, including the speed and efficiency with which 
they were carried out, suggest the participation of an intelligence service. 
Finally, the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) was caught planting a bomb in the 
basement of an apartment building in Ryazan under circumstances nearly identical 
to those of the Moscow bombings. The subsequent FSB claim that it was conducting 
a “test of vigilance” is unconvincing. The weight of the evidence therefore 
points to official responsibility for this terrorist act and, at the very least, 
demands an open inquiry. * * * *
3
For the last two and a half years, a specter has haunted the government of 
Vladimir Putin. This is the possibility of a serious examination of the strange 
apartment house bombings that took place in September 1999 in Moscow, Buinaksk, 
and Volgodonsk and cost three hundred lives. The bombings terrorized Russia. The 
Russian authorities immediately accused Chechen rebels of responsibility for the 
attacks, and this galvanized public opinion in support of a second war in 
Chechnya. The war, in turn, made Putin, the former head of the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), an overnight hero and the leading candidate for the Russian 
presidency. Almost from the start, however, there were doubts about the timing 
of the bombings that could not have been better calculated to rescue the 
political fortunes of the ruling, Yeltsin era oligarchy. Suspicions only 
deepened when a fifth bomb was discovered in the basement of a building in 
Ryazan, and those responsible for placing it turned out to be agents of the FSB. 
Until recently, attempts to call attention to some of the paradoxes surrounding 
the bombings, one of the most pivotal events in post-communist Russian history, 
proceeded sporadically and were easily countered by the information apparatus of 
the state. On March 5, however, Boris Berezovsky, a self-exiled oligarch and 
former key Kremlin adviser, held a press conference in London in which he 
accused the FSB of carrying out the bombings with Putin’s complicity in order to 
justify a second Chechen war.1 He presented as evidence the testimony of Nikita 
Chekulin, a former acting director of the Russian Explosives
4
Conversion Center, a scientific research institute under the Ministry of 
Education, who was recruited by the FSB as a secret agent. Chekulin stated, and 
confirmed with documents, that in 1999–2000, a large quantity of hexogen, the 
explosive that is believed to have been used in the apartment bombings, was 
purchased by the institute from various military units and then, under the guise 
of gunpowder or dynamite, shipped all over the country to unknown destinations. 
Berezovsky also presented a documentary film that was largely based on a 
previous television program about the Ryazan incident that was shown on NTV and 
reported in Novaya Gazeta. In fact, the press conference did not offer much that 
was new. Nonetheless, it was significant because it renewed discussion of an 
issue that had never really gone away. At the same time as the press conference 
was being held, a pamphlet novel by Alexander Prokhanov, a Russian nationalist 
leader, entitled “Mr. Hexogen,” was enjoying a wide circulation in Russia. The 
novel, based on information from sources in the intelligence agencies, describes 
a conspiracy to unleash the second Chechen war and use it to elect a successor 
who would protect the interests of the corrupt Yeltsin “family.” In explaining 
his support for the American led anti-terrorist coalition after September 11, 
2001, Putin said that Russia had also been a victim of terrorism. This 
experience, however, looks rather different if the bombings in September 1999 
were organized by leaders of the Russian government as part of an effort to 
preserve the power and wealth of a criminal oligarchy. The view that the 
bombings were the work of elements of the Russian government is based on three 
types of evidence: the logic of the political situation at the time of the attacks;
5
what is known about the bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgodonsk; and the 
implications of the so-called “training exercise” in Ryazan. Unfortunately, in 
all three cases, the weight of the evidence supports the view that the bombings 
were not the work of Chechen terrorists, but rather the action of leaders of the 
Russian government undertaken to justify the launching of the second Chechen 
war. In August 1999, on the eve of the bombings, it appeared that the Yeltsin 
“family” and the rest of the corrupt oligarchy that ruled Russia were facing an 
unavoidable day of reckoning. As the economic situation in Russia got steadily 
worse, Yeltsin’s approval rating dropped to 2 percent and an uneasy awareness 
spread among the persons closely connected to the Yeltsin regime that their 
positions, their wealth, and possibly their freedom and even their lives were in 
jeopardy. In August 1998, Russia experienced a devastating financial crisis and, 
in its wake, Yeltsin was forced to compromise with the State Duma and accept as 
prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, the foreign minister and former head of the 
Foreign Intelligence Service. Primakov authorized a series of investigations 
that affected the members of the “family” themselves. One investigation involved 
Berezovsky, who, in January 1999, was suspected of appropriating money belonging 
to the national airline, Aeroflot. More important for the “family,” however, was 
the investigation into possible kickbacks to Pavel Borodin, the head of the 
property administration in the presidential administration, from the Swiss firm, 
Mabetex, in connection with construction and repair work on the Kremlin. On 
January 22, 1999, the Mabetex
6
office in Lugano was raided, and records were discovered that showed payments of 
$600,000 on the credit cards of Yeltsin’s daughters, Tatyana Dyachenko and 
Yelena Okulova. The threat to some of the country’s most powerful figures 
prompted a response. Yuri Skuratov, the prosecutor general who was leading the 
investigations, was removed after a video of him engaged in “sex acts” with two 
prostitutes in a sauna linked to a Moscow criminal organization was shown on 
prime-time television. The cases involving Berezovsky and Mabetex, however, were 
not forgotten. Dissatisfaction with Yeltsin was spreading and, in May 1999, 
Yeltsin fired Primakov and his government and installed as acting premier, the 
interior minister, Sergei Stepashin. A move to impeach Yeltsin for, among other 
things, illegally suppressing the Supreme Soviet in 1993 and launching the war 
in Chechnya in 1994, was narrowly defeated with the help of the distribution of 
bribes to wavering deputies. But the Fatherland-All Russia movement that was 
organized by Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, was gaining strength. On August 
23, Luzhkov promised that if Primakov, the most popular politician in the 
country, was to run for president, he would support him. The prospect of 
Primakov as president was frightening for the Yeltsin entourage because he had 
already demonstrated his readiness to pursue corruption cases and, as Skuratov 
was later to state, it was possible to bring criminal cases against every one of 
the oligarchs of the Yeltsin era.
7
By the summer of 1999, there was reported to be an atmosphere of near panic in 
the Kremlin, and there were reports that the Yeltsin “family” was planning 
provocations in Moscow, including acts of terror, in order to discredit Luzhkov. 
One such report, by Alexander Zhilin, which appeared on July 22 in Moskovskaya 
Pravda said that there was a plan to destabilize the atmosphere in Moscow by 
organizing terrorist acts, kidnappings, and a war between criminal clans. The 
plan, known among insiders as “Storm in Moscow,” was never implemented, possibly 
because an even more effective plan took its place. On August 5, a Muslim force 
led by Shamil Basayev, a Chechen guerilla leader, entered western Dagestan from 
Chechnya, ostensibly to start an anti-Russian uprising. On August 9, Stepashin 
was dismissed, and Putin became prime minister. On August 22, the force withdrew 
back into Chechnya without heavy losses, amid suspicion that the incursion had 
been a provocation. At the end of August, Russian aircraft bombed Wahhabi 
villages in Dagestan in seeming retaliation for the incursion. This was 
followed, days later, by the explosions that obliterated the apartment buildings 
in Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgodonsk. The bombings stunned Russia but, in their 
wake, the stage was set for the rescue of the Yeltsin era oligarchy. Popular 
anger over corruption was redirected against the Chechens. Putin, whose 
popularity rating had been 2 percent, launched a war against Chechnya and, in 
the process, became Russia’s savior. In April 2000, he was easily elected 
president and, in that capacity, he granted immunity from prosecution to Yeltsin 
and his family, put an end to all talk of a re-division of property, and 
preserved the Yeltsin era oligarchy virtually intact.2
8
Besides the logic of the political situation in August 1999 that suggested that 
only by provoking a war could the Yeltsin leadership retain their property and 
their power, the role of the Russian government in the bombings is suggested by 
the character of the explosions themselves. The four bombings all had the same 
“handwriting” as attested to by the nature of the destruction, the way the 
buildings’ concrete panels collapsed, and the volume of the blast. In each case, 
the explosive was said to be hexogen, and all four bombs were set to go off at 
night to inflict maximum casualties. To do what they were accused of having done 
without expert assistance, however, Chechen terrorists would have needed to be 
able to organize nine explosions (the four that took place and the five that the 
Russian authorities claimed to have prevented) in widely separated cities in the 
space of two weeks. They also would have needed the ability to penetrate top 
secret Russian military factories or military units to obtain the hexogen.3 
Finally, Chechen terrorists would have needed technical virtuosity. In the case 
of the Moscow apartment buildings, the bombs were placed to destroy the weakest 
critical structural elements so each of the buildings would collapse “like a 
house of cards.” Such careful calculations are the mark of skilled specialists, 
and the only places in Russia where such specialists were trained were the 
spetsnaz forces, military intelligence (GRU), and the FSB.4 Another troubling 
aspect of the apartment bombings was the timing. The bombings were explained as 
a response to the Russian bombing of Wahhabi villages in Dagestan in August 
1999. A careful study of the apartment bombings, however, showed that it would 
have taken
9
from four to four and half months to organize them. In constructing a model of 
the events, all stages of the conspiracy were considered: developing a plan for 
the targets, visiting the targets, making corrections, determining the optimum 
mix of explosives, ordering their preparation, making final calculations, 
renting space in the targeted buildings, and transporting the explosives to the 
targets. Assuming that these calculations were even approximately correct, 
planning for the apartment bombings had to begin in the spring. They therefore 
could not have been retaliation by Chechen terrorists for the Russian attack in 
Dagestan, which occurred only days before the bombings took place. They might, 
however, have been part of a plan that included the Chechen invasion of 
Dagestan, the Russian bombing of the Wahhabi villages, and the apartment 
bombings. But such a plan could only have been implemented by elements of the 
regime in cooperation with the FSB.5 As both the Chechen war and the 
presidential campaign progressed, some observers noted that events were 
unfolding in a manner that matched the conditions described by Harold Laswell, a 
University of Chicago political scientist, as being optimal for successful 
propaganda. In his book, Propaganda Technique in the World War, Laswell said a 
propagandist’s success is limited by the tension level of the subject 
population. “The propagandist who deals with a community when its tension level 
is high, finds that a reservoir of explosive energy can be touched off by the 
same small match which would normally ignite [only] a bonfire.” Some persons who 
knew of the popularity of American political science literature with the FSB
10
became convinced that events were being played out according to a scenario 
written by Lasswell.6 The strongest indication that elements of the Russian 
government were responsible for the bombings, however, was the history of the 
supposed training exercise in Ryazan. In that incident, the FSB was forced to 
admit that they had put a bomb in the basement of a civilian apartment building 
because they were caught in the act. The incident began on the night of 
September 22, six days after the bombing of Volgodonsk, when police answering a 
call reporting suspicious activity discovered a bomb in the basement of the 
building at 14/16 Novosyelov Street. Experts arriving at the scene found that 
the bomb tested positive for hexogen. Within minutes, not only the building but 
also the surrounding neighborhood was evacuated. In all, nearly 30,000 persons 
spent the night on the street. Police surrounded the airport and railroad 
stations, and roadblocks were set up on all of the roads leading out of the 
city. The origin of the bomb was determined, however, in a totally unexpected 
way. On the evening of September 23, a call to Moscow was made from a public 
telephone bureau for intercity calls. The operator who connected the call caught 
a fragment of conversation in which a caller said there was no way to get out of 
town undetected. The voice at the other end of the line said, “Split up and each 
of you make your own way out.” The operator reported the call to the police and 
they traced the number. To their astonishment, it belonged to the FSB.7 A short time
11
later, with the help of tips from the population, the police arrested two 
terrorists. They produced identification from the FSB and were released on 
orders from Moscow. On September 24, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the FSB, 
announced that the bomb in the basement at 14/16 Novosyelov had been a dummy and 
that the incident had been a “test.” He congratulated the residents of Ryazan on 
their vigilance. This explanation stupefied the residents who had assumed that 
the bomb was real. The FSB said that the bomb was a dummy and that the explosive 
material in the sacks attached to the detonator was sugar. It said the gas 
analyzer that detected hexogen had malfunctioned. Several months after the 
incident, however, Pavel Voloshin, a reporter for Novaya Gazeta, interviewed 
Yuri Tkachenko, the sapper who defused the “dummy” bomb. He insisted that it was 
real. Tkachenko said that the detonator, including a timer, power source, and 
shotgun shell, was a genuine military detonator and obviously prepared by a 
professional. At the same time, the gas analyzer that tested the vapors coming 
from the sacks unmistakably indicated the presence of hexogen. Voloshin asked 
Tkachenko if the gas analyzer could have given a false result. Tkachenko said 
that this was out of the question. The gas analyzers were of world class 
quality. Each cost $20,000 and was maintained by a specialist who worked 
according to a strict schedule, checking the analyzer after each use and making 
frequent prophylactic checks. These were necessary because the device contains a 
source of constant radiation. In the end, Tkachenko pointed out,
12
meticulous care in the handling of the gas analyzer was a necessity because the 
lives of the bomb squad’s experts depended on the reliability of their 
equipment. Voloshin also interviewed the police officers who answered the 
original call and discovered the bomb. They also insisted that the incident was 
not an exercise and that it was obvious from its appearance that the substance 
in the bags was not sugar. Voloshin’s articles in Novaya Gazeta had a major 
impact. Doubt became so widespread that the FSB agreed to participate in a 
televised meeting between its top officials and residents of the building at 
14/16 Novosyelov. The purpose of the program was to demonstrate the FSB’s 
openness, but the strategy backfired. During the program, which was aired on 
NTV, on March 23, FSB spokesmen could not explain why the “exercise” was carried 
out without measures to protect the health of the residents, why the gas 
analyzer detected hexogen, or why bomb squad experts mistook a dummy bomb for a 
real one. When the program ended, the residents were more convinced than ever 
that they had been unwitting pawns in a FSB plot and only through a miracle 
escaped with their lives. In fact, the building at 14/16 Novosyelov Street was 
an odd choice for a test of vigilance because there was an all-night grocery 
store in the building, and residents could easily have assumed that someone 
unloading sacks of sugar was doing so for the store. As the target of a 
terrorist attack, however, the building was very well suited, especially if the 
goal was to claim the maximum number of lives. Like the building on Kashirskoye 
Highway in Moscow, 14/16 Novosyelov Street was a brick building of standard 
construction. In the event of an explosion, it
13
would have offered little resistance, and there would have been little chance 
for anyone to survive. At the same time, since the building was on an elevation, 
in the event of an explosion it would have hit the adjacent building with the 
force of an avalanche and, because the weak, sandy soil in the area offered 
little support to either building, probably would have toppled it. In this way, 
the tragedy in Ryazan would have eclipsed all the others. In the face of 
evidence of FSB involvement in the bombing of the Russian apartment buildings, 
the government has refused to respond. It reacted to Berezovsky’s allegations by 
accusing him of funding the terrorist activities of Chechen rebels. The most 
serious evidence that the leaders of the government bombed their own citizens, 
however, is presented by the Ryazan incident and, in that case at least, the 
Russian authorities are perfectly equipped to refute the allegations that have 
been made against them. They need only to produce the persons who carried out 
the Ryazan training exercise, the records of the exercise, and the dummy bomb 
itself. The FSB, however, has refused to do this on grounds of secrecy and 
evidence relating to the Ryazan incident has been sealed for seventy-five 
years.8 The government has also prevented any inquiry by the parliament. In 
March 2000, a group of deputies proposed to send to the general prosecutor a 
request for answers to questions regarding the incident in Ryazan. The Duma 
voted 197 in favor and 137 against. However, 226 votes, an absolute majority, 
were needed for passage, and this was not achieved because the pro-Kremlin Unity 
party voted unanimously against. In February, another attempt was made to open a 
parliamentary inquiry into the Ryazan incident. In this case, 161 deputies voted 
in favor and
14
only seven against, but the remainder of the 464 members of the Duma abstained. 
As a result, the attempt failed. In fact, the greatest support for the 
government’s denial of any involvement in the bombings is fear of the 
implications if it turns out that the regime was behind them. Even the residents 
of the building at 14/16 Novsyelov were reluctant to draw conclusions about 
possible government involvement, although they unanimously rejected the notion 
that the incident had been a test. The most they would say was that someone 
tried to blow them up without offering an opinion as to who. The question of 
“who,” however, is very significant. If, as the available evidence indicates, 
the bombings were carried out by the FSB, it means the present government of 
Russia is illegitimate. It also means that a tradition has been established in 
Russia that can only lead to the country’s degeneration. Russia has experienced 
three years of economic growth after more than a decade of steady decline, and 
Putin has enacted some needed reforms. None of these changes, however, affect 
the real challenges facing Russia—crime, ideological disorientation, and 
demographic collapse. These problems are symptoms of a deep spiritual malaise 
and they can only be resolved by establishing the authority of moral values in 
the country that, in practical terms, would be expressed in the rule of law.
15
Under these circumstances, it is important to Russia’s future that the bombings 
not be ignored. Failing to react to evidence of a crime by the Russian 
government means implicitly condoning it and leaving unchallenged a precedent 
that will serve as a standing temptation for the future, demonstrating to all 
subsequent Russian leaders how elections can be “won” and putting paid to the 
effort to apply law consistently and establish the authority of moral values in 
Russia. Any effort to examine seriously the true authorship of the apartment 
house bombings would, by right and of necessity, be non-violent. It is possible 
that if the regime were seriously threatened, it would react with repression. A 
hypothetical repressive response from the government, however, would only 
actualize what had always been a potential, and the Russian public would have, 
at least, confirmed that it rejected the government’s crime and was not 
complicit in it. The worst outcome would be for the Russian public to become 
gradually convinced that the present government was established as the result of 
an act of terror but to treat that as a normal phenomenon because, in that way, 
they would not only be accepting criminal domination but also cutting off the 
moral roots of their own subsequent regeneration.
16
Notes 1. The role of Berezovsky is ironic. He actively participated in the 
effort by the Yeltsin family to install their own successor to Yeltsin. After 
Putin became president, however, he began to limit the power of Berezovsky and, 
apparently in response, Berezovsky began to accuse the authorities of 
participation in the bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk. “The more hopeless 
became his chances of returning to the political arena in Russia, the louder 
became his accusations… It seems that he opened a completely new form of 
political business: blackmail the authorities with the exposure of one’s own 
crimes.” Andrei Piontkovsky, “Rassledovanie. Priznanie Oligarkha Prokuroru 
Respubliki,” Novaya Gazeta, January 21, 2001. Berezovsky’s odious reputation in 
Russia has also been useful in helping the authorities to avoid answering his 
charges and those raised in the documentary film. Although the film, which was 
made by French documentary filmmakers, was only 25 percent financed by 
Berezovsky, it has been consistently described in Russia as the “Berezovsky 
film.” FSB officials, when they have commented on the charges of FSB complicity 
in the bombings at all, have said that they did not intend to enter into 
polemics with Berezovsky. In general, the Russian authorities have responded to 
the controversy over the bombings by pretending it does not exist. There have 
been attempts to try supposed participants in the bombings but this is, in all 
likelihood, part of an effort to reassure the public that the FSB is doing 
“something” to investigate the bombings and that the issue has not been 
completely forgotten. In the fall of 2001, two persons who were not ethnic 
Chechens were tried in Stavropol for participation in the Moscow bombings, but 
both were acquitted. They were convicted of other serious crimes, but the 
evidence that they had any connection to the Moscow bombings was too obviously 
falsified even for a normally obedient Russian court. 2. This was not the first 
time that the prospect of elections had led to acts of terror in Moscow. In June 
1996, on the eve of the first Presidential elections, a bomb went off in the 
Moscow metro, killing four persons and injuring twelve, and two trolleybus 
explosions injured thirty-eight. These explosions worked in favor of Yeltsin’s 
candidacy by creating fear of instability. In the case of the Manezh bombing, an 
obscure, anti-consumerism group called the
17
Union of Revolutionary Writers left leaflets at the scene in which the group 
appeared to take credit for the explosion. The leaflet read, in part, “A 
hamburger not eaten to the end by the dead consumer is a revolutionary 
hamburger.” In the past, inane claims of responsibility by previously unknown or 
little-known groups have been a way of signaling that the real responsible 
parties were the intelligence services. 3. At the Berezovsky press conference in 
London, Chekulin described how large quantities of hexogen were purchased by his 
institute but, insofar as the institute had ties to both the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and the FSB, this information actually casts little light on 
how hexogen could have reached the hands of Chechen terrorists unless the 
terrorists were working for the FSB. 4. See David Satter, “Anatomy of a 
Massacre,” The Washington Times, October 29, 1999. Of course, Chechens could 
have received demolitions training in the Russian military, but the high level 
of expertise demonstrated in the bombings resembled the product of years of 
specialized education rather than the rudimentary training that would have been 
provided in the Soviet or Russian army. 5. See “Silence after the Explosions,” 
Investigation. Moskovsky Komsomolets, January 19, 2000. Although the bombings 
may have been organized by elements of the Russian government, the FSB and other 
investigative agencies, most of whose employees would have been in the dark 
about a conspiracy, conducted traditional investigations. This model of how the 
bombings were organized was based on the results of their investigations that 
were leaked to Moskovsky Komsomolets. Beginning in September, press reports 
alleged that Berezovsky; Alexander Voloshin, by then the head of the 
presidential administration; Anton Surikov, a former member of the GRU; and 
Basayev met in France in June or July to plan the incursion into Dagestan. At 
the same time, on September 13–14, the newspaper, Moskovsky Komsomolets, 
published parts of the transcript of a conversation between a man with a voice 
similar to that of Berezovsky and a man with a voice similar to Movladi Udugov, 
the unofficial spokesman for the radical Chechen opposition, including Basayev 
and Khattab, in which they appear to be on friendly terms and appeared to 
discuss the transfer of money from the person resembling Berezovsky to the 
radicals. Pavel Gusev, the chief editor of
18
Moskovsky Komsomolets, said that he had confirmed that the FSB officer who taped 
the conversation was later murdered “on the orders of those who had been 
recorded.” It was the combination of these publications that may have inspired 
Tretyakov, the trusted, chief editor of Berezovsky’s most important publication, 
to offer a version of events which, if not absolving Berezovsky, at least 
suggested that he was not the only person involved in organizing the fateful 
incursion into Dagestan. Tretyakov wrote: “It is perfectly obvious that the 
Chechens were lured into Dagestan… in order to provide a legitimate excuse for 
restoring federal power in the republic and beginning the offensive phase of 
struggle against the terrorists grouped in Chechnya. Clearly it was an operation 
by the Russian special services… that was, moreover, politically authorized from 
the very top.” “In light of all this, here is my own personal hypothesis: at 
worst, Berezovsky may have been used without his knowledge by the Russian 
special services or, more than likely, he acted in coordination with them… My 
hypothesis is far more realistic than the theory that ‘Berezovsky set everything 
up,’ which presumes his absolute influence on the two warring sides 
simultaneously.” If Russian authorities were involved in the planning of the 
invasion of Dagestan, it is at least possible that they learned of a 
pre-existing Chechen plot to blow up Russian apartment buildings and decided to 
facilitate it for their own purposes. If the cycle of invasion and retaliation 
had not taken place, however, it is hard to imagine what would have motivated an 
attack by Chechens on random apartment blocks. 6. Harold Laswell, Propaganda 
Technique in the World War (New York: Garland Publishers, 1972) p.190 7. The 
alert telephone operator, Nadezhda Yukhnova, was given a color television set as 
an award for “vigilance” by the FSB at an awards ceremony in September. 8. The 
FSB has insisted that the persons who took part in the “exercise” are 
clandestine agents and cannot appear in public. However, there is no legal 
barrier to making the agents available to journalists. Article seven of the law on
19
state secrets of the Russian Federation, adopted July 21, 1993, states that 
among the things which cannot be considered state secrets and declared to be 
secret evidence are evidence about “extraordinary accidents and catastrophes 
threatening the security and health of the citizens and their consequences… 
facts about the violation of the rights and freedoms of citizens… [and] facts 
about the violations of the law by state organs and officials.” Zdanovich said 
that if the agents were necessary for the investigation, they would be produced. 
Since, however, the case [which, despite the FSB’s explanation of the Ryazan 
events, the general prosecutor refused to close] was one of terrorism, the needs 
of the investigation were determined by the persons conducting it: the FSB. The 
FSB has also shown no inclination to allow an examination of the forensic 
evidence. The rubble from the bombings was cleared almost immediately despite 
the objections of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Emergency 
Situations. The haste with which the crime scenes were destroyed was all the 
more striking in light of the fact that, in the case of the bombings of the 
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, suspects were identified and 
eventually arrested as a result of the careful sifting of the rubble from the 
explosions, a process that went on for months. The Russian authorities also 
declined offers of forensic assistance from the United States and other Western 
countries. David Satter is a senior fellow of the Hudson Institute and a 
visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS). This is based on his book, Darkness at 
Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State, which is forthcoming from the Yale 
University Press.


 Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State,
Satter un personaggio al di sopra di ogni sospetto eh visto che scrive
per riviste come
The New Republic che dava per buone le panzane sulle WMD e anche dopo
che la verita' li ha smerdati continuavano ancora a giustificare
l'invasione dell'Iraq e va spesso su radio e tv "obiettivissime" (LOL!)
 come Radio Liberty, the Voice of America , Fox News
goebbelsuccio di corso magenta ritenta con qualcos'altro se non vuoi
apparire come un coglionazzo


Contami in mezzo.    Non ho la minima idea di chi sia stato, in tutti e
due i casi (uno dei quali purtroppo mi e vicino: Ho ancora parenti e
amici a Mosca).
Qualche considerazione:
a)  Lidea che Putin abbia ordinato lomicidio di Litvinenko, per di piu
con veleni radioattivi, secondo me e semplicemente assurda.
Litvinenko, aldila dei misteri sugli appartamenti esplisi, era un
cazzaro ("Prodi uomo del KGB in Italia.  Bin Laden agente del KGB"),
non era cagato da nessuno.   Ucciderlo in questo modo, seminando
"prove" radioattive a destra e a manca, sarebbe semplicemente idiota.
 E Putin, che piaccia o no, non e un idiota (Basti pensare a come ha
riconquistato lUkraina, senza sparare un colpo, dagli "arancioni").
b)  Sul chi abbia assassinato Hariri, come ho detto, non ho la minima
idea.
Come dice nel guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1954670,00.html
quelli che ci guadagnano sono solamente gli anti-Siriani.   Come, del
resto, e successo
con lULTIMO assassinio.
La Siria avrebbe tutto da guadagnarci fomentando un movimento populista
sciita per cambiare la costituzione Libanese verso il principio "un
uomo un voto"
Oltre che conveniente (vincerebbero senza problemi Hizbollah e
alleati), sarebbe estremamente facile da proporre, visto che il
principio e piu che giusto
(per ora il gruppo piu numeroso, e piu povero, e artificialmente
limitato nella rappresentanza da un sistema di voto che ricorda l
Apartheid).
Non avrebbe nulla di guadagnarci con unaltro omicidio che sembra fatto
apposta per fomentare lopinione antisiriana.
L elite economica Libanese (clan Hariri in testa) e estremamente
corrotta (la conversione di Rafik Hariri alla "liberazione" del Libano
dalla siria, fu, appunto, per motivi economici) e possibili mandanti
dellassassinio, anche senza cercare fra CIA e Mossad (che,
intendiamoci, potrebbero averlo fatt) non mancano.
( vedi anche
http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2006/11/buried-in-morning-news-broadcast-on.html
 )
Oh, non sarei neanche stupito se fosse stato Assad.   Sarebbe
unidiozia, ma non mi pare un genio, quindi...
c)  Altra piccola considerazione.   La Falange, rappresentata da
Gamayel, e un partito fascista.   Non "islamofascista", ma proprio
fascista.  Fondato su ispirazione della Falange di Franco, da uno
(Bashir Gamayel) che alluniversita dormiva con un poster di Hitler sul
muro.   Che fonda il suo potere su giovanotti armati di manganello che
compiono spedizioni punitive contro gli avversari.
Questi peccatucci, a suo tempo, non hanno ovviamente impedito agli
Israeliani di collaborare con la falange in quella odierna Marzabotto
che fu Sabra e Shatila.
E non impediscono, ai filo-Israeliani oggi, di citare le cazzate di un
giornale fascista come oro colato.
Nulla di nuovo sotto il sole.

 Nulla di nuovo sotto il sole.
Ehm... Al Mustaqbal è il giornale del partito sunnita di Hariri.
Ovvero: Torrieri, sei un idiota.
Tb


 che fu Sabra e Shatila.
ma che smemorato il nostro goebbelsuccio di corso magenta eh? mica se
li ricorda fatterelli del genere.
E ovviamente i suoi discorsi da cretino politico non valgono quando si
prende il discorso della presenza di un razzista come Lieberman nel
governo di Tel Aviv...


 ma perche' ora come si vota in Libano?
Le comunita' hanno posti parlamentari assegnati.
Se sei uno sciita, voti per la parte del parlamento sciita.
Le proporzioni, fatte decenni fa, sono considerevolmente fuori fase con
gli effettivi pesi demografici delle due comunita', a favore dei
cristiani e sfavore degli Sciiti (il gruppo piu' numeroso, e piu
povero).
GT