Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Frutti di primavera

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Jan-10/159326-what-values-drive-the-arab-movements-of-revolt.ashx#axzz1kB1x75Ot
 
 
What values drive the Arab movements of revolt?
 
January 10, 2012 01:36 AM
 
By Mansour Moaddel
 
The Daily Star
 
The self-immolation a year ago of Tunisian street vendor Mohammad 
Bouazizi triggered a wave of protests that spread across the Arab world, 
forcing out dictators in Egypt, Libya and Yemen.
 
What values are driving these movements, and what kind of change do 
their adherents want? A series of surveys in the Arab world last summer 
highlights some significant shifts in public opinion.
 
In surveys, 84 percent of Egyptians and 66 percent of Lebanese regarded 
democracy and economic prosperity as the goal of the “Arab Spring.” In 
both countries, only about 9 percent believed that these movements aimed 
to establish an Islamic government.
 
For Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, where trend data are available, the 
Arab Spring reflected a significant shift in people’s values concerning 
national identity. In 2001, only 8 percent of Egyptians defined 
themselves as Egyptians above all, while 81 percent defined themselves 
as Muslims. In 2007, the results were roughly the same.
 
In the wake of the Arab Spring, however, these numbers changed 
dramatically: Those defining themselves as Egyptians rose to 50 percent, 
2 percent more than those who defined themselves as Muslims. Among 
Iraqis, primary self-identification in national terms jumped from 23 
percent of respondents in 2004 to 57 percent in 2011. Among Saudis, the 
figure jumped from 17 percent in 2003 to 46 percent in 2011, while the 
share of those claiming a primary Muslim identity dropped from 75 
percent to 44 percent.
 
There has also been a shift toward secular politics and weakening 
support for Shariah (Islamic religious law). Among Iraqis, the 
percentage of those who agreed that Iraq would be a better place if 
religion and politics were separated increased from 50 percent in 2004 
to almost 70 percent in 2011.
 
Finally, an analysis of a nationally representative sample of 3,500 
Egyptian adults, who rated their participation in the anti-Hosni Mubarak 
movement, showed that participants were more likely to be younger single 
males with higher socio-economic status, users of the Internet, 
newspaper readers, urban residents, and believers in modern values and 
free will. Religiosity did not predict participation, while religious 
intolerance reduced participation.
 
These figures seem at odds with the results of Egypt’s recent 
parliamentary election, in which the Muslim Brothers and the Salafists 
together gained about 65 percent of the popular vote. It remains true 
that religion is an important factor for Egyptian voters, as 66 percent 
of those surveyed “strongly agree” or “agree” that it would be better if 
people with strong religious belief held public office; and 57 percent 
consider a government’s implementation of Shariah “very important” or 
“important.” Nonetheless, nationalism trumps religion. Fully 78 percent 
agreed with the statement that it would be better if more people with a 
strong commitment to national interests rather than with strong 
religious views held public office.
 
How, then, to explain the inconsistency between the survey data and 
Egypt’s election results? First, the Islamists benefited from years of 
political organizing and activism, and thus were better able to mobilize 
their supporters, whereas the liberals, who led the uprising against the 
former regime, lacked nationwide organization and had little time to 
translate their newly acquired political capital into votes.
 
Second, the liberals’ priorities were misplaced. Instead of pushing 
their agenda forward among Egyptians, they focused on the wrong enemy, 
spending invaluable time organizing rallies against the army.
 
Finally, the election outcome is not as bad as it appears. Liberalism 
has been under continuous attack for decades from religious extremists 
and religious institutions, and liberal organizations were stifled by 
oppressive rules. If the Mubarak regime had fallen under the banner of 
political Islam, Islamists would have been in a much better position to 
advance exclusivist claims over the revolution and the country.
 
But it was liberals who delivered Egypt from authoritarianism. This, in 
turn, brought legitimacy to liberalism and generated the powerful 
feeling of nationalist awareness among Egyptians. As a result, support 
for Shariah declined and national identity soared. Insofar as political 
discourse is focused on national rebuilding and freedom, Islamists, in 
Egypt and elsewhere, will face an uphill battle.
 
Mansour Moaddel, a professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan 
University, has been principle investigator of several Middle East 
surveys between 2001 and 2011. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary 
in collaboration with Project Syndicate © (
www.project-syndicate.org
).
-- 
Namib
 
Nous n'arrivons pas à changer les choses suivant notre désir, mais peu à 
peu notre désir change (M. Proust)


 
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