Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: A Third Way

Un interessante punto di vista e un diverso modello di relazione tra USA 
e Iran, ma anche tra USA e altri paesi, che ripropone l'approccio 
politico-diplomatico come strumento per la costituzione di rapporti più 
solidi, più duraturi e meno conflittuali.
Potrebbe essere questa la nuova linea della prossima amministrazione 
democratica.  Del resto Hillary Clinton ha dichiarato che se fosse 
eletta sceglierebbe gli uomini migliori del suo paese e li manderebbe 
per il mondo ad offrire un nuovo patto di amicizia con gli Stati Uniti.
E' per questo che dicevo che la Lobby si troverebbe in controtendenza 
rispetto all'amministrazione.
--------------------------------------------
A Third Way
Normalizing relations will help both sides
Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani
Recent developments in Iran have convinced advocates of both “softer” 
arms-control approaches and more hard-line regime-change strategies that 
their analyses are correct and their policy prescriptions are working. 
The arms-controllers see a Tehran more willing to negotiate; the 
regime-changers see increasing repression. Though evidence for both 
claims can be marshaled, neither offers balanced insight into Iranian 
behavior or a sensible strategy for breaking the decades-long impasse in 
U.S.-Iranian relations. We need a novel approach, a third 
way—simultaneously pursuing arms control and democratization by means of 
engagement, not coercion.
Today Iran seems to be more willing to find a negotiated settlement to 
its problems with the international community. The April 2007 crisis 
over the British sailors held captive in Iran was solved with unexpected 
alacrity and relative ease. Moreover, Supreme Leader Khamenei has 
reportedly given Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, new 
special powers to negotiate on the nuclear issue (a meeting between 
Larijani and the EU’s Javier Solana suggests that there is something to 
the reports). At a May 2007 conference in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, 
Iranian diplomats met with their American counterparts. Meanwhile, 
Iranian advocates of confrontation with the West, lead by President 
Ahmadinejad, have recently suffered a sharp decline in power.
In the West, self-described pragmatists focused on the nuclear issue 
have asserted that the peaceful resolution of the hostage crisis coupled 
with renewed Iranian interest in meeting with American officials proves 
the futility of confrontation and the wisdom of accommodation. In their 
view, the United States must now forgo any dream of promoting democracy, 
offer the regime the respect it desires and deserves, and get on with 
the business of d¯©tente. For them, Nixon’s 1972 China gambit provides 
the model.
But the domestic situation is less promising. Concurrent with 
conciliatory diplomatic gestures, the Iranian regime has recently 
started a new campaign of imprisonment and intimidation against 
human-rights activists and dissidents. For the last quarter of a century 
in Iran, attacks on women have been an early harbinger and sensitive 
barometer of the level of violence and oppression used by regime in 
society at large. Today, a massive new operation in Tehran has begun to 
force women to abide by more rigid strictures on veiling. In one day 
alone in April 2007, more than 1,300 women were arrested, with 1,000 of 
them released after paying a fine, 300 spending the night in jail, and 
47 having their cars confiscated.
For proponents of regime change, this internal crackdown confirms the 
menacing nature of the Iranian government. Moreover, the decision to 
detain innocent soldiers and the odious practice of parading hostages 
before cameras—coming in the wake of the regime’s continued defiance of 
the UN Security Council and its relentless support for terrorists in 
Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine—all demonstrate the incorrigible evil of 
the mullahs, who understand only the language of raw power. Any 
negotiation affords the regime an undeserved legitimacy. Instead, the 
lesson to be learned from the hostage crisis and the new round of 
arrests is that we need more of the same: tighter embargos, more money 
for those willing to fight the regime (including for ethnic minorities 
seeking independence), and eventually a military attack on the regime’s 
nuclear facilities. The most recent American intelligence 
estimates—which suggest that Iran may have earlier access to nuclear 
weapons than previous assessments had predicted—only underscore the 
urgency of this more forceful approach.
Both interpretations of these recent developments and the policy 
recommendations that flow from them are flawed.
Iran remains an autocracy, intent on repressing its people at home and 
threatening the interests of the United States and its regional allies. 
This regime deserves no respect, legitimacy, or recognition from the 
United States. Only a democratic Iran will become a peaceful neighbor in 
the Middle East and a reliable, predictable partner for the United 
States. American leaders and their allies must not be fooled by Iran’s 
behavior in freeing the hostages or seeking a meeting with Secretary 
Rice into assuming that this is a “normal” regime with which the United 
States can develop the kind of stable and cordial relations that Nixon 
launched with China 35 years ago.
However, the best strategy for nurturing democratic change in Iran is 
neither more sanctions nor military confrontation; instead we should 
encourage more interaction with the West, and with the United States in 
particular.
A comprehensive, uncompromising policy of engagement with Iran must 
begin with unconditional negotiations on all disputed topics: the United 
States must give up its precondition of verifiable suspension of 
enrichment activities before talks, and the Iranian regime must accept 
human rights and state sponsorship of terrorism as part of the agenda. 
To move forward, the negotiations will need to be founded on a basic 
trade: that Iran suspends all enrichment activities in exchange for (1) 
an internationally supplied source of nuclear fuel, (2) diplomatic 
relations with the United States, and (3) the lifting of blanket U.S. 
sanctions (though keeping smart sanctions in place). But negotiations do 
not end there. U.S. officials should not pursue diplomatic relations 
with Iran as a strategy for preserving the status quo (as Nixon did with 
China in the 1970s) but as a strategy for altering the status quo (as 
Reagan did with the Soviet Union in the 1980s).
For instance, opening an American embassy in Tehran should be used to 
facilitate interaction between Iranian and American societies, including 
sending more Iranians students in American universities, more American 
academic, scientific, and business delegations to Iran, and greater 
flows of information about the United States into Iran. Gradually, with 
normalized relations, American and European mass media and NGOs could 
open offices in Iran, establish ties with their Iranian counterparts, 
and promote cultural exchanges, free flows of information, and 
democratic development. Compared to Chinese society in the early 1970s, 
Iranian society today is wealthy, urban, educated, and organized, 
offering a wide range of potential contact points for constructive, 
mutually beneficial engagement with Iran. A U.S. ambassador in Tehran 
also could act as a vocal defender of Iranian human-rights groups and as 
a symbol of America’s desire to engage the Iranian people and society. 
At a minimum, an American diplomatic presence inside Iran would expand 
our knowledge about the nature of the Iranian regime and society.
Second, lifting American sanctions is likely to create new trade and 
investment opportunities for Iran’s genuinely private sector, not to 
generate new rents for the government. The regime has used the 
ineffective unilateral American sanctions not only to deflect criticism 
of its incompetent and corrupt economic policies, but also to enrich its 
cronies by giving them lucrative special licenses to import crucial 
material into Iran. Furthermore, the regime has been using dummy 
companies based in Dubai to import American commodities first into the 
United Arab Emirates and from there to Iran. Last year alone, the UAE 
“exported” commodities worth more than $12 billion to Iran—much of it 
American commodities “prohibited” by the U.S. sanctions. Many American 
investors seeking to work inside Iran are Iranian-Americans who despise 
the current regime. In the long run, with the embargo lifted, they will 
wield their economic clout to empower Iranian society at the expense of 
the mullahs.
In parallel to opening bilateral relations and lifting sanctions, U.S. 
officials should endorse the creation of a regional security 
organization in the greater Middle East that would include Iran, akin to 
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now called the 
OSCE) formed 30 years ago. Such an organization could begin to provide 
security guarantees between states in the region as well as those 
outside of the region with major security stakes. They also must keep 
the human-rights issues of the Iranian people in mind. When the OSCE 
first began, the Soviet Union and its allies were members. OSCE security 
guarantees helped to defuse tensions in Europe, while the human-rights 
guarantees codified in the OSCE founding charter—the so-called “basket 
three” items—eventually inspired human-rights groups in communist 
countries to pressure their governments for change.
Advocates of confrontation mistakenly believe that these bold policy 
changes would legitimate and strengthen a dangerous regime. While we 
share their analysis of the Iranian regime, we disagree with their 
strategy for dealing with and ultimately changing it.
The current policy of trying to coerce the regime into changing has not 
worked for over a quarter of a century. Sanctions, isolation, and 
coercion may make Americans feel morally righteous, but such policies 
almost never lead to democratization or arms control. Sanctions against 
apartheid in the 1980s did help to spur the negotiated transition to 
democracy in South Africa. But these sanctions had teeth because of deep 
U.S. investments in South Africa, a condition that does not hold in Iran 
today. Nor have sanctions deterred countries from seeking nuclear 
weapons. They did not work against India, Pakistan, or North Korea and 
are unlikely to work against the current regime in Iran. Only when a 
government changes its strategic thinking about threats and allies, as 
the South Africans, Brazilians, Ukrainians, and Kazakhs did during 
periods of transition, do countries decide to forego nuclear weapons. 
Coercion did play a role in getting Libya to abandon its nuclear 
program, but Libya’s case is very different from Iran’s. Libya’s 
investment in a nuclear program and its capacity to sustain and develop 
the technology were only a fraction of Iran’s. Khaddafi was never fully 
serious about developing nuclear capability; the Iranian government is. 
Khaddafi also had reason to fear a U.S. military strike, which could 
have eliminated not only his nuclear-weapons programs but also his 
entire armed forces and maybe even himself and his regime. Iran, on the 
other hand, is a much larger and more complex country, with 75 million 
people and a hydra-headed regime not organized around one leader and his 
family. Especially with U.S. forces overstretched and bogged down in 
Iraq, Iranian leaders no longer fear a full-scale invasion. Any other 
kind of strike would benefit them politically.
Moreover, diplomatic relations, if handled properly, do not accord 
legitimacy. The Reagan administration maintained diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union, while also sharply criticizing the regime and 
encouraging engagement with dissidents. And Secretary of State George 
Shultz began talks about nuclear weapons with his Soviet counterparts 
well before Gorbachev came to power.
While our proposed strategy may not yield short-term Iranian political 
liberalization, it will help to delay the regime’s quest for nuclear 
weapons, an important objective that current American policy is not 
achieving.
It is essential to understand that, in defending this new policy, we 
follow the course advocated by most leaders of the democratic movement 
inside Iran. No major figure in the Iranian opposition supports 
sanctions, let alone military action. On the contrary, according to 
Akbar Ganji, arguably the country’s most important moral advocate of 
democracy, the vast majority of Iran’s democratic leaders and thinkers 
believe that normalized relations with the United States and greater 
integration of Iran into international institutions will strengthen 
their democratic cause.
If new, comprehensive relations between the United States and Iran have 
the potential to foster internal liberalization, why would the current 
Iranian government ever pursue such relations? They would be tempted 
because they believe that they could manage the new political and 
economic developments that would result from normalized relations. 
Autocrats always overestimate their capacity to manage change. But even 
if they did reject such overtures, rejection itself would produce a 
major positive development inside Iran. Because a majority of Iranians 
want better relations with the United States, a regime that rejected the 
possibility of normalized relations would not be popular. Moreover, if 
the United States agreed to lift sanctions, but the regime in Tehran 
refused, the regime would lose a valuable propaganda asset—“blaming the 
Americans” for all of Iran’s economic woes. More generally, any policy 
that shifts attention away from nuclear issues and toward domestic 
issues is good for Iranian democrats and for U.S. foreign policy.
After 30 years of stalemate and failure in dealing with Iran, why not 
listen to Iran’s democratic voices and pursue a policy that goes beyond 
bombing or arms control. A new policy that combines the objective of 
democratic change with a strategy of engagement offers a bold third way.
The Iranian and American governments have many common interests in the 
Middle East and can more effectively help bring regional peace and 
stability through cooperation. It will not be easy, but one thing is 
certain: lasting peace and stability cannot be established through 
violence.
Michael McFaul teaches political science at Stanford University and, 
with Abbas Milani, directs the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover 
Institution.
Abbas Milani teaches political science at Stanford University and, with 
Michael McFaul, directs the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover 
Institution.
http://bostonreview.net/BR32.3/mcfaul.html

 rispetto all'amministrazione.
No, l'hai detto perche' sei un coglione disinformato.
La piovra ebraica controlla anche Hilary Clinton. Anzi l'ha creata.
http://www.liesexposed.net/nfp/issue0109/israel.htm
http://www.americandaily.com/article/17059
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/10/14/4532/
O per passare a discorsi piu' seri, Clinton sta raccogliendo la maggior 
parte della "pro israel money" da parte democratica.
In altre parole, comunque la si giri, Persio e' sempre un pirla.
Tb

 per il mondo ad offrire un nuovo patto di amicizia con gli Stati Uniti.
bella scusa per disfarsi dei rompiscatole....

 In altre parole, comunque la si giri, Persio e' sempre un pirla.
Tu, bagarozzo, hai una concezione "dirigistica" della politica, un po' 
come Bush e i neocon.
La Clinton, o chiunque altro sarà eletto, dovrà fare ciò che gli sarà 
*possibile* fare, oppure potrà tentare di opporsi al possibile e 
sfasciare tutto, compreso se stesso e il suo paese, come sta facendo Bush.
La politica "possibile" per gli USA sarà quella consentita dalla sua 
collocazione nel contesto degli equilibri geopolitici globali, non 
quella consentita da ADL/AIPAC.
Ed è con questa politica "possibile", che io credo sarà praticata dal 
prossimo presidente, qualunque impegno precedente avesse preso, che la 
Lobby si troverà in contrasto.
Questa almeno è la mia previsione.

 quella consentita da ADL/AIPAC.
Quindi, secondo te, "The Lobby" sarebbe ADL/AIPAC?
E' una idea molto diversa da quella di W&M.
E un semplice sguardo alla linea dell'AIPAC e a quella delle 
amministrazioni USA nel periodo in esame, dimostrera' che l'AIPAC non 
solo e' una parte (minortitaria) degli ebrei americani che si dichiarano 
sionisti. Ma una parte spesso sconfitta, che contribuisce alla politica 
americana nella misura, abbastanza scarsa, del suo peso numerico e 
finanziario.
Certamente potrebbe essere sconfitta ancora, ma e' dubbio che al di 
fuori di pochi coglioni antisemiti la sua sconfitta sia vissuta come una 
liberazione del popolo USA dal giogo giudaico.
Tb

 liberazione del popolo USA dal giogo giudaico.
Questa è tutta roba tua: la solita allusione calunniosa nello stile 
della Lobby.

rispetto all'amministrazione.
Certo, certo.... :)
*pat pat*
-Stefano

 Questa è tutta roba tua: la solita allusione calunniosa
Si chiama riassunto.
I tuoi tarabaralla interminabili hanno bisogno di un po' di condensazione.
Tb

 della Lobby.
stara' parlando di qualche suo parente che non tirava molotov ai nazisti
ma ai sovietici...
-- 
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 ma ai sovietici...
IMHO non sei credibile

 I tuoi tarabaralla interminabili hanno bisogno di un po' di condensazione.
Si chiamano mistificazione e calunnia, una roba da bagarozzi neri.

si rivolgono le più infamanti calunnie
Certo, certo... :)
*LOL*
<CUT resto dell'immondizia *ANTICONFORMISTA*>
-Stefano

 Si chiamano mistificazione
E' esattamente quello che hai detto.
Meno cazzate, su.
Abbi il coraggio della merda "non conforme" che cerchi, poco efficientemente, di 
diffondere.
Tb
-- 
Libertà per i comunisti siriani in carcere: Fateh Jamus, 'Isam Dimashqi,
Basel Hurani, 'Abd al-Halim Rumieh, Ratib Sha'bu, and Doha 'Ashur
al-'Askari 
http://snipurl.com/1oqtm

 efficientemente, di diffondere.
Sto avvertendo per tempo delle conseguenze di una certa linea d'azione di certe 
organizzazioni.  Poi ognuno faccia quello che crede.