Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Gilad Shalit has been brought home to an Israel that has no plan for peace

Nell'articolo ci sono un paio di sintesi amaramente divertenti a 
proposito del processo di pace tra israeliani e palestinesi.
 
Dice il palestinese: << Non si possono fare accordi su come dividere la 
pizza se la controparte la sta mangiando>>
 
E l'altra, sempre a proposito del processo di pace:
<< gli israeliani vogliono un processo ma non la pace; i palestinesi 
vogliono la pace ma non un processo>>
 
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Gilad Shalit has been brought home to an Israel that has no plan for peace
 
Jonathan Freedland
guardian.co.uk
, Tuesday 25 October 2011 18.48 BST
 
The posters are still up, showing the face of Gilad Shalit, the boy 
soldier freed last week after five years hidden in the dark. “How good 
it is to have you back home,” runs the slogan, appearing on the side of 
shopping malls in Tel Aviv and on lampposts in Jerusalem. Shalit’s 
return has enabled Israelis to walk with an unaccustomed spring in their 
step, despite their fear that the price was dreadfully high.
 
It should go without saying that Israelis would have preferred a 
one-to-one exchange, releasing a single Palestinian prisoner, rather 
than more than a thousand – many of them guilty of horrendous acts of 
violence – in return for Shalit. But, contrary to what some have 
suggested, it was Hamas, not Israel, that set that 1:1000 exchange rate; 
it was Hamas, not Israel, who decided that the freedom of a single 
Israeli was worth the freedom of a thousand Palestinians.
 
Yet the boost at Shalit’s return is unlikely to last long. Just as the 
sight of his emaciated face and sunken eyes on every front page confirms 
that the damage of his captivity will haunt him for years, so Israelis 
who yearn for the security that can only come with an accommodation with 
their neighbours know there is no remedy imminent for them either. 
Except now the familiar pessimism comes with a twist.
 
While their own government has next to no strategy to resolve the 
conflict, it is now the Palestinians, so often buffeted by events, who 
have a plan and are pursuing it. The problem is that both strategies, 
old and new, are insufficient.
 
Start with the Israeli position. A series of conversations with senior 
figures in the Israeli government reduces to a single public message: 
Israel wants to return to direct talks with the Palestinians without 
preconditions. What’s more, colleagues of the prime minister, Binyamin 
Netanyahu, point to a series of statements and signals, overlooked by 
both the Palestinians and world opinion, which indicate that, if 
Netanyahu were engaged in a serious face-to-face process, he would push 
for a genuine agreement.
 
One well-placed insider said that in the prime minister’s office the man 
with the highest hopes for negotiations is the prime minister himself, 
imagining that, when it came to it, he and Palestinian president Mahmoud 
Abbas could make a breakthrough: “He puts himself in the other guy’s 
shoes, thinking that ‘maybe he’ll take the jump with me’.” To that end, 
the Netanyahu team tells me, they have repeatedly sought to draw Abbas 
into talks. Every attempt has been rebuffed, they say, “the door slammed 
in our face”.
 
There are multiple problems with this account, but they all come down to 
a single word: credibility. For every encouraging smoke signal sent out 
by Netanyahu – aides mention his talk of “creativity” in resolving the 
radioactive issue of Jerusalem – there is at least one telegraphing an 
opposite message, often in the very same paragraph: that promise of 
“creativity”, for example, came with a warning that Jerusalem must 
forever remain the undivided capital of Israel, thereby closing the door 
on a key Palestinian demand.
 
Nothing renders Netanyahu’s offers of peace talks less credible to 
Palestinian ears than settlement building. I saw for myself the 
expansion of, among other places, the town of Beitar Illit across the 
Green Line that separates pre-1967 Israel from the West Bank. With some 
35,000 residents, Beitar Illit now hems in the Palestinian village of 
Wadi Fukin, choking off all future growth. Israelis say that such 
building does not connote bad faith: almost all of it is under way in 
blocs that will “inevitably” be allocated to Israel in any eventual 
peace deal – in return for land from inside Israel-proper – and that in 
previous negotiations Palestinians have conceded as much. But such 
thinking breaks a necessary rule of peacemaking: one side cannot bank 
concessions by the other until the entire deal is done. And no deal was 
done. Until it is, expanding settlements in occupied territory – 
recognised as illegal by almost every country except Israel – is bound 
to undermine any call for the Palestinians to come to the table. As 
Husam Zomlot, a senior figure in Fatah, put it to me in Ramallah: “You 
can’t have discussions about how we are going to share a pizza, while 
one side is eating the pizza.” This is a problem that predates Bibi.
 
Palestinians say this has been the story of the 18 years since the Oslo 
accords of 1993: endless on-and-off talks, while the material facts on 
the ground – from new roads to restrictions on access and movement – 
change and the settler population more than trebles. It is this which, 
above all, makes the call to resume talks not credible to Palestinian 
ears: why should they sit around talking for another 18 years, watching 
as more of their land is nibbled away? Accordingly, the Palestinians 
have devised another strategy. They plan to rely no longer on direct 
negotiations which they believe are hopelessly asymmetric, the power 
tilted so heavily in Israel’s favour. Those I spoke to insist there is 
no plan to return to violence, believing that the second intifada, with 
its suicide bombings of Israeli buses, pizzerias and discos, proved 
totally counterproductive – triggering an Israeli military response that 
rolled back not the occupation but most of the gains the Palestinians 
had made in the previous decade, destroying much that had been built up.
 
The new Palestinian strategy will involve neither “armed struggle”, nor 
a return to “meaningless, open-ended negotiations”. Instead it will try 
to deploy other tools. The first is “internationalisation”, seeking to 
change the Israel-Palestine conflict from a bilateral dispute between 
the two parties into a problem for the world community to resolve: hence 
last month’s statehood application to the UN and a current request to 
join Unesco. The aim is to ratchet up international pressure to such a 
degree that when the two sides do eventually return to the table – and 
Zomlot is adamant that “without negotiations this conflict can never 
end” – they will be, if not equally powerful, then closer to parity than 
ever before.
 
And there could be an additional pressure. There is hopeful talk of a 
“Palestinian spring”, a popular movement demanding independence that 
world opinion would find hard to oppose, one inspired by the first, 
stone-throwing intifada begun in 1987 rather than by the murderous 
second one that began in 2000. Such an uprising would also put pressure 
on the Israeli government to make the concessions necessary for peace, 
much as the first intifada pushed Israel into the Madrid and Oslo processes.
 
There are problems here too, starting with the fact that the first 
target of a Palestinian spring could well be the unreformed, 
still-corrupt Palestinian Authority – and that an initially nonviolent 
effort risks spiralling out of control. As for internationalisation, 
just as years of talks have not brought Palestinian independence, 
countless UN resolutions have not achieved much tangible for the 
Palestinians either. One diplomat says the old Israeli strategy and the 
new Palestinian one boils down to this: the Israelis want a process but 
no peace, the Palestinians want peace but no process. That may be glib, 
but it’s clear both strategies are incomplete.
 
What’s needed is either for Netanyahu, if he is serious, to make a 
gesture large and surprising enough to overcome Palestinian suspicion 
and render him credible – or for the international community to take 
charge of a refashioned peace process, gripping it the way London and 
Dublin oversaw the Northern Ireland negotiations. Either way, what is 
currently on offer is not enough – and will mean the end of this 
unending conflict slipping ever further out of sight.
-- 
Sostieni Rete ECO
 
http://rete-eco.it/it/sostienici.html
 
 

 pizza se la controparte la sta mangiando>>
 
c'è sempre il conto da far pagare alla parte digiuna. Questa è la
"pace" offerta dal mangiatore di pizza.

 Questa è la "pace" offerta dal mangiatore di pizza.
 
E dai suoi amici: crème della crème della civiltà del diritto.
 

 c'è sempre il
 
non ho letto l'articolo ma conosco bene Jonathan Freedland, perlomeno
dai tempi di questo articolo
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/04/gaza-jewish-community/print
 
sono ragionevolmente sicuro che Persio e Bombacci non abbiano capito
una fava di quest'altro che citano.
 
 
 

 non ho letto l'articolo ma conosco bene Jonathan Freedland
 
conosci bene un sacco di gente famosa. Che non ti conosce affatto....


In realta' basta leggere. Ma probabilmente in riviera romagnola i
libri di JF arrivano con qualche ritardo.

 In realta' basta leggere.
 
io mica ho quotato l'articolo


anche perche' non riesci a capirlo.