Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Giorno 21. Avanti, stringendo i denti

Dedico il post di oggi alla Redfiddler
http://tonibaruch.blogspot.com/2006/08/diario-di-guerra-giorno-21.html
Dovunque ricada la maggior parte delle responsabilità, è impossibile 
negare che quello di Qana sia stato un disastro. Non si può negare che 
accettando la battaglia con un nemico disposto in mezzo ai civili, 
Israele abbia anche accettato la responsabilità di causare perdite tra 
innocenti. Era purtroppo la premessa di questa guerra, che è stata 
combattuta proprio per togliere ad Hezbollah il potenziale di 
deterrenza che nasce dalla capacità di colpire senza essere a propria 
volta colpiti.
Sottolineare i crimini di guerra di Hezbollah è importante per 
illuminare una faccia del problema che la macchina della propaganda 
antisraeliana cerca di tenere sotto il livello di visibilità. Ma non 
serve, e questo voglio chiarirlo dopo qualche discussione avuta ieri 
su IPII, a lavarsi le mani del sangue che i bombardamenti in centri 
abitati, per quanto attenti possano essere, causano inevitabilmente.
Non c'è nulla in una guerra di cui essere fieri. Non se ne esce 
puliti, per quanto si possa cercare di essere migliori possibile. Le 
guerre, tutte, sono un abisso di orrore: causano dolore, distruzione, 
morte. Ecco perché bisognerebbe combatterle, senza esaltazione ma con 
determinazione, solo quando si hanno ragioni importanti per farlo e 
quando si ha la possibilità e la volontà di vincerle. A me sembra che 
Peretz e Olmert lo abbiano ben chiaro, e questa è una novità 
importante rispetto all'impotenza cui Israele si è costretta nel 
braccio di ferro con Hezbollah per lungo, lunghissimo tempo. 

Sei una merda

 Sottolineare i crimini di guerra di Hezbollah è importante 
solo quelli di HA?
 
 
-- 
visitate 
http://www.comunisti-italiani.it/frames/index.htm
http://cubainforma.interfree.it/
il film sul 9/11 : 
http://www.loosechange911.com/
http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/Berlin.jpg
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 quando si ha la possibilità e la volontà di vincerle.
Qui invece la penso diversamente da te: bisognerebbe combatterle solo 
quando ci si trova a fronteggiare un attacco che mette in pericolo la 
sopravvivenza della propria comunità e quando non ci sono altre strade 
percorribili. E non sono del tutto convinto che Israele si trovasse in 
questa situazione.
Questa guerra mi sembra simile alle altre "guerre contro il terrorismo" 
di questo secolo (Afghanistan, Iraq...). Personalmente credo sia un 
metodo sbagliato per affrontare questo problema, ma non penso che coloro 
che siano favorevoli siano dei mostri bevitori di sangue.
E per piacere lasciamo i nazisti a marcire nelle loro tombe, o a 
bruciare all'inferno per chi ci crede.
-- 
Cris Carampa (
spamto:yossa...@operamail.com
)
  and we love to wear a badge, a uniform
  and we love to fly a flag
  but i won't

 Dedico il post di oggi alla Redfiddler
Bravo TB, solo gli imbecilli potrebbero interpretare questo tuo nuovo approccio 
come segno di debolezza mentre è, al contrario, indice di nuova forza d'animo.
E brava anche a Redfiddler che, evidentemente, c'entra qualcosa...

 indice di nuova forza d'animo.
Guarda che non c'è nessun "nuovo approccio".
Ci può essere qualche fraintedimento, dovuto al fatto che, mentre 
tutto il resto del mondo ulula dei crimini israeliani, mi sembra 
superfluo stare anch'io a titolare sulle responsabilità israeliane 
(anche se nel testo lo facevo) e mi dedico all'altra faccia della 
luna.
Comunque non c'è problema. E evidente che ci sono anche responsabilità 
israeliane nell'accettare questo tipo di scontro, IMHO inevitabile. Se 
serve chiarire lo facciamo.
Resta tutto quello che ho detto sui crimini di guerra Hezbollah, sulla 
ricerca della strage civile che è di HA e non dell'IDF, e anche (qui 
mi troverò in disaccordo con Red, ma pazienza) sulla immensa 
superiorità morale dell'IDF sul suo nemico attuale (e anche una 
discreta superiorità su molti eserciti amici).
Tutto ciò non fa della guerra una cosa morale o bella. Nessuno ha le 
mani pulite. Ma è bene definire le forze in campo, i loro obiettivi e 
i loro comportamenti.
Tb 

 su molti eserciti amici).
Vabbé, miracoli non se ne possono chiedere.
Ma, uscendo dai casi e dalle posizioni personali, sarebbe importante se 
iniziasse a cambiare l'approccio semplicistico del governo Olmert alla realtà 
complessa che deve gestire, forse sarebbe ancora possibile uscire dalla crisi in 
modo positivo.
Un segno di questo potrebbe essere la proposta di scambiare i prigionieri.

 possibile uscire dalla crisi in modo positivo.
Vedi, ci sono prospettive diverse.
Per lo spettatore del carnaio televisivo dell'ora di cena, prima c'era 
una situazione in via di "normalizzzione" e la crisi è causata dal 
governo Olmert, che se smettesse di sparare riporterebbe la "pace".
Per chi sta con Hezbollah al confine, in riarmo sempre più frenetico i 
razzi puntati e le minacce quotidiane di sterminio e di distruzione in 
combinazione con l'Iran, uscire dalla crisi significa rimuovere la 
minaccia, militarmente o con un mix di azione militare e politica.
In ogni caso, mai e poi mai, tornare alla siuazione precedente.
Tb 

 che siano favorevoli siano dei mostri bevitori di sangue.
Non puoi mettere nello stesso fascio Afghanistan e Iraq.
Nel primo caso, la liberazione dell'Afghanistan dal regime
medieval-terroristico talebano-alqaedista, dopo l'attacco dell'11/9, si
tratta di un intervento legittimo sin dall'inizio e adeguatamente motivato,
anche se ora gli esiti sono incerti per oggettive difficoltà.
Nel secondo, la liberazione dell'Iraq dal dittatore Saddam, sia
legittamazione internazionale che reali motivazioni sono assai meno
cristalline.
La guerra in Libano invece ha motivazioni iniziali abbastanza chiare, ma la
condotta appare quantomeno incauta, e i risultati tutti da verificare. C'è
persino il rischio di consegnare una vittoria ad Hezbollah.
In comune, forse, gli effetti controproducenti di ampio raggio: libanizzare
l'Iraq e relibanizzare il Libano, facendone incubatori di altro odio e
terrorismo. 
Ai bevitori di sangue non credo neanch'io, ma vedo molto "intruppamento" e
voglia di menar le mani senza pensare alle conseguenze da entrambe le
parti. 

 persino il rischio di consegnare una vittoria ad Hezbollah.
Quoto. C'e' chi dice che sono tutti e tre guerra al terrorismo, ma IMHO 
non bisogna cadere nella sciagurata ideologia neocon, che volendo 
democratizzare il MO, ha finito per produrre un clash of civilisations 
Occidente-Islam.
Noi europei non ce lo possiamo permettere, e mi sembra, a questo punto, 
neanche Israele.
Am.

 Occidente-Islam.
E' per questo che quando sento la signora Riso dire che ci vorrebbe un 
"nuovo medio oriente" mi viene un brivido lungo la schiena...


 serve chiarire lo facciamo.
Sei un masochista.
Come fanno ad esserci "responsabilità israeliani nell'accettare questo
tipo di scontro" se lo scontro è "inevitabile"?
Se è inevitabile, cioè non c'è scelta, allora non c'è responsabilità.
Mirco

 un "nuovo medio oriente" mi viene un brivido lungo la schiena...
Non che Rice e i neocon abbiamo molto in comune, eh
Tb 



Sì, certo. Però il "clash of civilisations" è la rappresentazione che
vogliono venderci quelli che ci speculano sopra, ma il vero scontro è per
il potere all'interno dei rispettivi campi, come in Iraq così in Libano.
Che ne dite 
p.es
. di questa ricostruzione dell'ascesa di Hezbollah sullo
scenario libanese, con la "guerra al sionismo" come paravento per far fuori
la Rivoluzione dei Cedri?
When Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah held his press
conference to declare his new victory over his enemy, Israel, he was
triggering –probably without knowing- a new era in the history of Lebanon
and the region. “We will continue in faithfulness to our line,” he
declared, in legitimizing his cross border attack on an Israeli patrol,
killing soldiers and kidnapping two. But the real “fidelity” Nasrallah was
referring to wasn’t to his captured men in Israeli jails, but to the
regimes decision-makers in Tehran and Damascus. The “operation of July”
came as a tipping point in a larger conflict, which superseded Hezbollah’s
detainee, the Shebaa farms, borders skirmishes and Israeli tactical
responses. Beyond and above the events of that day, Hezbollah was
triggering the first Iranian war on Lebanon’s soil: A Syrian-supported
offensive, even at the height of the Assad II regime. Brining fire and
smoke to the Lebanese-Israeli borders, and week before to the Gaza-Israel
demarcation lines, is not simply two local disputes, one over unilateral
Israeli withdrawal in Gaza and the other over real estate on the western
slopes of Mount Hermon. Nasrallah (as well as his counterpart of Hamas) has
calculated perfectly how to conduct a hit and run with the Israelis ordered
by regional regime who have miscalculated their strategies. Pressured by
the new regional realities and world concerns about nuclear threats and
Terrorism, Iran and Syria wanted to throw their allies into the greatest
uncertainties of survival. 
The road to the current Conflict 
But as Israel’s Air Force began to pound Nasrallah’s organization and
Lebanon’s transportation and communications infrastructure, and the media
reported the war in progress with its horrific images, world opinion and
decision-centers commenced to swing in all directions, seeking a name to
the War and a projection of its ending, with great difficulties. Attempts
are still ongoing to frame it from the most simplistic to the most
conspiratorial: Lebanon is a beautiful country, it doesn’t deserve violence
and victimization, says the less informed. Indeed such lamentation should
have been expressed since 1975, when this country was thrown to the lions.
Between the PLO attacks since the beginning of the War, the Syrian
occupation as of June 1976, the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the Iranian
penetration of the 1980s, in addition to the civil war between all
communities, more than 180,000 people were massacred and killed, with very
little compassion under the Cold War and despite its end in 1990. While
most militias disarmed in 1991, only one camp dodged that duty:
Iranian-backed Syrian-protected Hezbollah and its allies. Co-ruling the
country with Syria’s security services, the militia presented itself as a
“resistance” for a whole decade, building its networks, and consolidating
power inside the country while claiming liberation against Israel’s
occupation of the south. The “Khumeinist resistance” endorsed the Syrian
“occupation” of Lebanon and never struggled to free its compatriots in
Damascus’ jails. In May 2000 it achieved victory over Israel and its local
allies, by occupying the so-called “security zone” in southern Lebanon
after the latter being evacuated by the Israeli Government. Since then,
Hezbollah reached its golden age: Control of about 70 km of international
borders with the “Zionist entity,” warranting hundreds of millions of
dollars and other military support from Iran’s Pasdarans; but also
appropriation of enormous Government assets and resources under the
auspices of Syrian control. 
Between 2000 and 2005, Hezbollah increased its influence in Lebanese
politics, becoming the dominant force, and remaining the principal ally of
Syrian occupation. In this half decade, Tehran supplied the organization
with weapons capable of reaching remote areas inside Israel. In those years
as well, Hezbollah extended and grew its cells around the world including
in South America, North America, West Africa and Western Europe. But the
surge to high power, both in Lebanon and worldwide began to face challenges
as of September 11, 2001. 
The crisis years 
From when the American public mobilized against Terrorism in general to the
first US-led intervention in Afghanistan, Tehran’s leaders got extremely
nervous about the changes hitting their neighborhood. Any democracy
anywhere around them is a bad omen. When the Taliban regime was removed
from Kabul in 2001, Tehran’s Khumenists witnessed the rise of women in the
electoral process and within the Afghani Government. Iranian leaders
understood the future implications at home. When Saddam’s regime was
removed from Baghdad, Khamenei’s elite wasn’t unhappy with the removal, but
with the multi party process that followed, even though they succeeded in
inserting their influence in it. And when UNSCR 1559 was voted calling on
Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and Hizbollah’s disarming, both Tehran and
Damascus felt the heat pressuring their joint influence on the Eastern
Mediterranean. The Syrian Baathist reaction to the new era was quick with
the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on
February 14, 2005. Assad paid a dear price for this fast drawing and
shooting against his opponents in Lebanon. In March of that year, and
despite an attempt by Hezbollah to shore up popular support to the Syrian
President inside Lebanon, one million and a half citizens marched in the
street of Beirut, shattering the myth of both Syrian “brotherly” occupation
and Hizbollah’s untouched position in the country. With the political
weakening of its allied organization by the public and the pulling out of
Damascus’ regular troops from Lebanon, Iran’s regime mobilized for the
counter regional attack. Hezbollah readied for its role in the general
Jihadi offensive. 
The counter offensive 
The Jihadi Syro-Iranian offensive started simultaneously in early 2005,
with the Hariri assassination in Lebanon and the selecting of Mahmoud
Ahmedinijad as head of the Islamic Republic in Tehran. In Lebanon and as
the pro-Syrian Government collapsed, new elections were held and an
anti-Syria majority was established, Hezbollah executed a sophisticated one
year plan in preparation for the war launched in July 2006. It began with
Nasrallah imposing on the Seniora Government a strange offer: taking three
members of the Party into his cabinet, while Hezbollah maintains a
strategic relation with Syria’s regime. That success brought other moves
forward. For six months, political leaders and journalists of the Cedars
Revolution were assassinated with car bombs: Samir Qassir, George Hawi and
Gebran Tueni. This sufficed to convince the anti-Syrian politicians that
any serious obstruction of the Iranian-Syrian axis and opposition to
Hezbollah will be “punished.” The terror treatment seemed to have worked,
as the Government was forced to abandon the implementation of UNSCR 1559
and have its components sit down with Hezbollah to “discuss” the future of
its weapons. In short, it took Nasrallah and his allies less than a year to
contain and weaken the Cedars Revolution and the Government it has
produced. Twelve months passed after Syria’s withdrawal from the country,
and yet the Lebanese army was not allowed by Hezbollah’s veto power inside
the Seniora cabinet to deploy along the borders or even inside the
sensitive area of south Lebanon. Strategically, Hezbollah absorbed the
consequences of the Syrian withdrawal, penetrated the Government and along
with pro-Syrian politicians created further divisions within Lebanon’s
religious communities, including within Sunni, Druze and Christian
political establishments. 
Regional acceleration 
During 2006, several factors pushed Iran and Syria to press their allies in
Lebanon and in Palestine for havoc. The nuclear crisis with Tehran was the
principal factor for convincing the Mullahs that a major crumbling of the
region’s new democracies and peace processes is vital to deflect the crisis
away from Tehran. In fact the international determination to remove the
Iranian nuclear threat was breaking Ahmedinijad’s ambitions for increasing
international power. The several elections in Iraq, despite terrorism,
indicated the rise of the political process in that country, with future
impact on Iran itself. Syria’s isolation as a result of the UN
investigation in the Hariri assassination further convinced the Assad
regime that inflaming the Gaza and the Israeli-Lebanese borders is the
recipe to overshadow the UN report. Hamas also had developed interest in
the clash with the “Zionist enemy,” as the financial credibility of their
newly formed Government in the Palestinian areas was sinking down and a
civil war with Fatah looming on the horizon. And finally Hezbollah: the
militia-turned party and still listed as a Terrorist organization on the US
list of terrorist group, used extreme patience since 2000 in building its
hyper-arsenal across the country, infiltrated the Army and avoided major
escalation against Israel. But on Bastille Day Sayyed Nasrallah ended the
previous era of preparedness: Now is the time for a qualitative Jihad, he
seemed to imply. 
Lebanese factors 
In addition to the regional injunctions to strike Israel in order to focus
the international heat on the Arab Israeli conflict, Hezbollah has also
included a number of “Lebanese” factors in its decision to flare up the
borders with its enemy. Back in March 2005, the leaders of the
Iranian-backed organization saw in disbelief the enormous masses marching
against Syria, and by ripple effect, against Hezbollah. Not only the
largest democracy demonstration in the history of the Middle East, but also
a multiethnic and multi-religious one: Christians, Druze, Sunnis and even
some Shiites broke the taboo of Hezbollah’s “sacred” character in Lebanon.
Second nightmare was with the actual withdrawal of the Syrian army from the
country, opening the path for the implementation of the second item of the
UNSCR 1559, i.e., disarming the fundamentalist militia. The third nightmare
came when this anti-Syrian coalition brought a majority in Parliament
during the May-June 2005 legislative elections in Lebanon. The threat to
Hezbollah was not the formation of a cabinet opposing Syrian influence in
as much as it was a signal that the people of Lebanon wasn’t endorsing the
“resistance” story, or put it simply, wasn’t buying the party’s story
period. The Cedars Revolution was the worse development the Khumeinist
movement had to absorb since its inception. The sight of a million young
men and women in colorful outfits marching in downtown Beirut was the
beginning of a new era: liberal democracy, freedom and rejection of the
dark ideology of Nasrallah. Hence, it became a must to eliminate that
revolution at any price. 
The slaughter of the Cedars Revolution 
In a few months, a number of leading politicians and journalists were
savagely murdered by the pro-Syrian camp: Syrian intelligence, Hezbollah
and other groups were suspected as being behind the assassination campaign.
In parallel, Hezbollah and its allies outmaneuvered the parliamentary
majority, which was supposed to form an anti-Baathist Government, bring
down the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud and remove the pro-Syrian
speaker of the House, Nabih Berri. A magic hand convinced the so-called
politicians of the March 14 movement, that none of these measures is
feasible. Hence Syria maintained its power in Lebanon, while U.S and French
Presidents were singing the praise of the liberation of Lebanon.
Furthermore, and in a suicidal move the Lebanese cabinet, headed by Fouad
Seniora invited Hezbollah to join the Government, before the latter disarm.
By the summer of last year, the Cedars Revolution was bleeding seriously.
Not only entrenched in the legal Government of Lebanon, but Hezbollah
succeeded in a penetration of the Christian community, the hardcore of the
anti-Syrian resistance, by enlisting the former commander of the Lebanese
Army who performed an about face after 10 years in exile, where he claimed
opposition to Syria. Michel Aoun signed an agreement of “understanding”
with Hassan Nasrallah during the spring of 2006. The “revolution” was
beheaded and Hezbollah was waiting for the right time to operate its come
back into the center of Lebanese politics, while executing the instructions
of Tehran and Damascus. 
The “Waad al sadeq” operation 
By early July 2006, Hezbollah’s preparations for the bloody return to the
top were fulfilled. The organization had already accomplished its Lebanese
tasks: 
1) Elimination (direct or in conjunction with Syrian intelligence or Syrian
Social Nationalists) of visible symbols of anti-Syrian leadership: Tueni,
Qassir and Hawi, and attempts against others such as May Chidiac, as an
intimidation lesson to all others. 
2) Paralysis of PM Seniora’s cabinet from the inside and in cooperation
with President Lahoud networks on the outside. 
3) Paralysis of the parliament in collaboration with speaker Berri and the
Aoun bloc. 
4) Dragging the political forces in the country in the so-called national
dialogue on the weapons of Hezbollah, a major waste of time and
marginalization of the 1559 stipulation 
[ecc. ecc....]
http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=151270

 Dedico il post di oggi alla Redfiddler
Grazie TB
Un bel testo
A

 E brava anche a Redfiddler che, evidentemente, c'entra qualcosa...
segui il gruppo
A

 neanche Israele.
quoto
A