Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: La  Karpinski era pure una ladra !

Janis Karpinski è stata retrocessa da generale di brigata a colonnello 
su ordine del presidente George W. Bush. Si tratta del primo ufficiale 
di alto grado retrocesso in relazione allo scandalo: l'esercito ha 
giudicato il suo operato "gravemente carente", e l'ha anche accusata di 
avere tenuto nascosto un suo precedente arresto per taccheggio. Anni 
addietro aveva rubato profumi e cosmetici per un valore di 50 dollari in 
uno spaccio della base dove si trovava. Per questo era stata arrestata, 
ma aveva taciuto l'episodio ai suoi superiori e lo aveva omesso nei 
moduli ufficiali, nello spazio riservato alla domanda su eventuali 
arresti preceden
http://www.repubblica.it/2005/e/sezioni/esteri/iraq52/karpinsky/karpinsky.html
Torture,taccheggio,robe da matti :)

 Torture,taccheggio,robe da matti :)
Perche', ti sembra che ci sia un rapporto?
Io ho visto un intervista della Karpinski e ha sua discolpa aveva da 
dire che la prigione  le era stata praticamente tolta di mano dalle 
squadre della CIA e gruppi di interrogatori speciali, i quali 
comandavano anche il personale della prigione.
Ricordo anche che i metodi di carcerazione cambiarono dopo la visita del 
direttore di Guantanamo, che era stato mandato li' ad aggiornare i 
carcerieri.
Che tutto questo sia successo senza l'autorizzazione dei vertici 
militari e dello stesso Rumsfeld mi sembra molto difficile.
Punendo la Karpinski si e' ottenuto di mettere a tacere per ora le 
inchieste sui livelli piu' alti, anche se Human Rights Watch ha 
denunciato Rumsfeld.
Am.

comandavano anche il personale della prigione.
O queste persone erano autorizzate da qualcuno, e allora che fornisca
prove documentali, o lei se ne' fregata di controllare che autorita'
avessero e li ha lasciato liberi di fare quel che volevano.
-Stefano

 wrote in message
news:427BABF9...@people.it...

#_Perche`non esponi la tua ipotesi allora?
Chi puo`aver spedito l'ex direttore di Guantanamo e "operai" della CIA ?
...e perche`? Per riverniciare le celle?....Ku Fu? ...La Spectre???
Giano

 Giano
Be', io la sto prendendo alla lontana leggendo 'Ghost Wars' di Steve 
Coll del NYT, sull'origine del fenomeno Osama e l'Afghanistan.
Pero' non dubito che se fai google su Human Rights Watch avrai pane per 
i tuoi denti.
Nel libro si fa notare che i fondi della CIA sono ridicoli rispetto a 
quelli del Pentagono. Pero' se la CIA e corpi speciali operavano 
addiritttura in un capannone separato nel perimetro di Abu Grahib, c'e' 
da sospettare una politica del doppio binario dentro l'amminsitrazione.
Per inciso leggo che la Karpinski e' stata degradata per taccheggio, non  
per le torture. Altro esempio di massima ipocrisia.
Cmq. una volta rinunciato preventivamente alla Convenzione di Ginevra 
per gli Enemy Combatants, non c'era piu' nulla per arginare gli 
interrogatori.
Non vorrei errare, ma alla Karpinsi non si sarebbe mai arrivati senza le 
famose foto, le quali erano solo il softening up dei prigionieri.
Gli interrogatori veri e propri si svolgevano in spazi separati dalla 
prigione, ad opera di personale specializzato venuto da altrove. E se 
ricordo bene parecchie famiglie irakene dicono che c'e' parecchia gente 
che non e' piu' tornata indietro.
E' una storia ancora tutta da scrivere, cosi' come la deportazione dei 
prigionieri presso i paesi arabi per l'interrogatorio con aerei anonimi 
della CIA, storia raccontata dal Guardian, che ho postato.
Tutta roba con cui la Karpinski, non c'entra molto. La CIA risponde 
direttamente alla Presidenza USA, e ai suoi vari comitati. Il Pentagono 
e' tenuto a facilitare, in genere, cosi' come fece la Karpinski rispetto 
agli interrogatori CIA e corpi speciali venuti da fuori.
My 2 cents.
Am.

 da sospettare una politica del doppio binario dentro l'amminsitrazione.
#_Cosa che suppongo anch'io.
Credo infatti a due "americhe"(chiamiamole cosi`) con una di essa, in fase
di autogestione, capace di allearsi con "pirati" e il loro modo di
raggiungere gli scopi ( come fu daltronde gia`attuato durante l'Impero di
sua Maesta`).
Per aggirare le resposabilita` legate come firmatari della Convenzione di
Ginevra , non si e` esitato ad ingaggiare privati free lance a svolgere i
"lavori"... In Afghanistan, ci fu un caso marginale ed emblematico allo
stesso tempo dove, un gruppo di militari si erano "messi in proprio" per
riscuotere le taglie poste sulle teste dei talibans.
Giano

 comandavano anche il personale della prigione.
Tenendo conto che gli agenti della CIA è come se non esistessero, ci
si ritroverebbe a parlare del sesso degli angeli...ovvero, potrebbero
esserci veramente stati, come potrebbe essere una svicolata della
Karpinski per tentare di salvarsi il culo in extremis. Impossibile
determinarlo, a meno ovviamente di non essere un menbro della CIA, o
dell'entourage del presidente. De facto, non ci sono elementi per
incolpare altri che la K ed i suoi diretti sottoposti.
Raffaele

 Raffaele
Gia', *pat pat*. Chissa' magari non leggi la stampa americana perche' 
non conosci l'inglese...
E magari non sei neanche in grado di cliccare:
http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=CIA+Abu+Grahib&ie=UTF
-8&oe=UTF-8
Oppure digita CIA Abu Grahib su Google.
Riprova, sarai piu' fortunato (TM SdC)
Am.

 wrote in message
news:1115415435.6...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
amalric wrote:


Raffaele
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content?040524fa_fact
Annals of National Security
THE GRAY ZONE
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib.
Issue of 2004-05-24
Posted 2004-05-15
The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie not in the criminal
inclinations
of a few Army reservists but in a decision, approved last year by Secretary
of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to expand a highly secret operation, which had been
focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to the interrogation of prisoners in
Iraq.
Rumsfeld's decision embittered the American intelligence community, damaged
the
effectiveness of élite combat units, and hurt America's prospects in the war
on
terror.
According to interviews with several past and present American intelligence
officials, the Pentagon's operation, known inside the intelligence community
by
several code words, including Copper Green, encouraged physical coercion and
sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in an effort to generate more
intelligence
about the growing insurgency in Iraq. A senior C.I.A. official, in
confirming
the details of this account last week, said that the operation stemmed from
Rumsfeld's long-standing desire to wrest control of America's clandestine
and
paramilitary operations from the C.I.A.
.............................[cut]..........................................
...

 Riprova, sarai piu' fortunato (TM SdC)
Aspettiamo quindi di rivederti all'opera :)  Magari sarai piu' fortunato
:)
-Stefano

last week,
Ma anche lui sotto anonimato :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 *LOL*
#_...e chi si esporrebbe alle "puttanate" con te ???
Tu vivi in un cosmo cristallizzato dove niente succede.
Illuminaci porcaccia troia!!!
Tu che sei da sempre a conoscenza della verita`assoluta e conosci
l'immobilita`dello scorrere dei fiumi, delle correnti oceaniche, delle
placche terrestri, del firmamento infinito...
MAREMMA MAIALA!...
tu li conosci i nomi...ce li dici tu?
G.   rrrr

 wrote:

Ma lascialo perdere, anche nel Watergate le fonti erano tutte anonime, 
eppure  il caso e' scopppiato ugualmente.
Seymour Hersh e' un grande giornalista, mentre questi due sono due 
signor nessuno - due reazionari da strapazzo che godono di vedere i 
mandanti delle torture impuniti - per ora...
'Sta storia, come la guerra in Irak, e' ben lungi dall'essere conclusa, 
e i sondaggi di Bush sono in  picchiata...
Am.
Am.

che godono di vedere i mandanti delle torture
Cosa della quale il noto fessacchiotto Amalric Bond ha le prove ma non
le vuole mostrare al mondo, giusto? :)
-Stefano

"amalric" <ama...@TOGLIMIaliceposta.it> wrote in message
news:SWXee.866836$b5.38...@news3.tin.it...

#_Mica ero incazzato...ogni tanto fo' cosě colla Lollona. :)
Giano

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:yQLee.83622$IN.14...@twister2.libero.it...


 -8&oe=UTF-8
Magari non sei neppure capace di scrivere Grahib nel modo giusto,
ovvero Ghraib?
Ad ogni modo, dovrebbe dimostrare qualcosa?
Dimostra al massimo che qualcuno "pensa che" la CIA sia coinvolta con i
fatti di Abu Ghraib, o che "tizio ha detto a caio che caino ha detto
che ermenegildo ha detto" che la CIA è coinvolta nei fatti di Abu
Ghraib. De facto, non c'è un solo elemento per montare una
qualsivoglia accusa contro chiunque non fosse la K, o un suo
sottoposto. Ergo, nulla che un qualsivoglia giudice possa considerare
sufficiente per aprire un'inchiesta.
Raffaele

 Raffaele
Non e' ancora detto che non ci si arrivi. E se tu fossi un *essere umano 
decente* te lo dovresti augurare, invece di metterti dalla parte di chi  
ha rinunciato alle Convenzioni di Ginevra preventivamente,  proprio per 
torturare in santa pace.
Per chi e' interessato a ripercorrere la dinamica dei *fatti* 
copioincollo un buon articolo del New Yorker, che spiega anche il ruolo 
rispettivo della CIA e del Pentagono. Poi c'e' il libro di Hersh.
 Il giudizio politico sull'amministrazione americana e' gia' stato dato. 
Non nei suk arabi, ma a Washington.
I sondaggio odierni confermano che il fallimento politico 
dell'amministrazione americana sta filtrando ormai anche tra gli 
elettori.
Am.
 
THE GRAY ZONE
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib.
Issue of 2004-05-24
Posted 2004-05-15
The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal li  not in the criminal 
inclinations of a few Arm  reservists but in a decision, approved last 
yea  by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, t  expand a highly secret 
operation, which ha  been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to th  
interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. Rumsfeldą  decision embittered the 
American intelligenc  community, damaged the effectiveness of élit  
combat units, and hurt Americaąs prospects i  the war on terror
 According to interviews with several past and present American 
intelligence officials, the Pentagonąs operation, known inside the 
intelligence community by several code words, including Copper Green, 
encouraged physical coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners 
in an effort to generate more intelligence about the growing insurgency 
in Iraq. A senior C.I.A. official, in confirming the details of this 
account last week, said that the operation stemmed from Rumsfeldąs 
long-standing desire to wrest control of Americaąs clandestine and 
paramilitary operations from the C.I.A.
 Rumsfeld, during appearances last week before Congress to testify about 
Abu Ghraib, was precluded by law from explicitly mentioning highly 
secret matters in an unclassified session. But he conveyed the message 
that he was telling the public all that he knew about the story. He 
said, łAny suggestion that there is not a full, deep awareness of what 
has happened, and the damage it has done, I think, would be a 
misunderstanding.˛ The senior C.I.A. official, asked about Rumsfeldąs 
testimony and that of Stephen Cambone, his Under-Secretary for 
Intelligence, said, łSome people think you can bullshit anyone.˛
The Abu Ghraib story began, in a sense, just weeks after the September 
11, 2001, attacks, with the American bombing of Afghanistan. Almost from 
the start, the Administrationąs search for Al Qaeda members in the war 
zone, and its worldwide search for terrorists, came up against major 
command-and-control problems. For example, combat forces that had Al 
Qaeda targets in sight had to obtain legal clearance before firing on 
them. On October 7th, the night the bombing began, an unmanned Predator 
aircraft tracked an automobile convoy that, American intelligence 
believed, contained Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban leader. A lawyer 
on duty at the United States Central Command headquarters, in Tampa, 
Florida, refused to authorize a strike. By the time an attack was 
approved, the target was out of reach. Rumsfeld was apoplectic over what 
he saw as a self-defeating hesitation to attack that was due to 
political correctness. One officer described him to me that fall as 
łkicking a lot of glass and breaking doors.˛ In November, the Washington 
Post reported that, as many as ten times since early October, Air Force 
pilots believed theyąd had senior Al Qaeda and Taliban members in their 
sights but had been unable to act in time because of legalistic hurdles. 
There were similar problems throughout the world, as American Special 
Forces units seeking to move quickly against suspected terrorist cells 
were compelled to get prior approval from local American ambassadors and 
brief their superiors in the chain of command.
Rumsfeld reacted in his usual direct fashion: he authorized the 
establishment of a highly secret program that was given blanket advance 
approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate łhigh value˛ 
targets in the Bush Administrationąs war on terror. A special-access 
program, or sap‹subject to the Defense Departmentąs most stringent level 
of security‹was set up, with an office in a secure area of the Pentagon. 
The program would recruit operatives and acquire the necessary 
equipment, including aircraft, and would keep its activities under 
wraps. Americaąs most successful intelligence operations during the Cold 
War had been saps, including the Navyąs submarine penetration of 
underwater cables used by the Soviet high command and construction of 
the Air Forceąs stealth bomber. All the so-called łblack˛ programs had 
one element in common: the Secretary of Defense, or his deputy, had to 
conclude that the normal military classification restraints did not 
provide enough security.
 łRumsfeldąs goal was to get a capability in place to take on a 
high-value target‹a standup group to hit quickly,˛ a former high-level 
intelligence official told me. łHe got all the agencies together‹the 
C.I.A. and the N.S.A.‹to get pre-approval in place. Just say the code 
word and go.˛ The operation had across-the-board approval from Rumsfeld 
and from Condoleezza Rice, the national-security adviser. President Bush 
was informed of the existence of the program, the former intelligence 
official said.
 
The people assigned to the program worked b  the book, the former 
intelligence official tol  me. They created code words, and recruited  
after careful screening, highly traine  commandos and operatives from 
Americaąs élit  forces‹Navy seals, the Armyąs Delta Force, and the 
C.I.A.ąs paramilitary experts. They also asked some basic questions: łDo 
the people working the problem have to use aliases? Yes. Do we need dead 
drops for the mail? Yes. No traceability and no budget. And some 
special-access programs are never fully briefed to Congress.˛
 In theory, the operation enabled the Bush Administration to respond 
immediately to time-sensitive intelligence: commandos crossed borders 
without visas and could interrogate terrorism suspects deemed too 
important for transfer to the militaryąs facilities at Guantánamo, Cuba. 
They carried out instant interrogations‹using force if necessary‹at 
secret C.I.A. detention centers scattered around the world. The 
intelligence would be relayed to the sap command center in the Pentagon 
in real time, and sifted for those pieces of information critical to the 
łwhite,˛ or overt, world.
Fewer than two hundred operatives and officials, including Rumsfeld and 
General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were 
łcompletely read into the program,˛ the former intelligence official 
said. The goal was to keep the operation protected. łWeąre not going to 
read more people than necessary into our heart of darkness,˛ he said. 
łThe rules are ŚGrab whom you must. Do what you want.ą ˛
One Pentagon official who was deeply involved in the program was Stephen 
Cambone, who was named Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in 
March, 2003. The office was new; it was created as part of Rumsfeldąs 
reorganization of the Pentagon. Cambone was unpopular among military and 
civilian intelligence bureaucrats in the Pentagon, essentially because 
he had little experience in running intelligence programs, though in 
1998 he had served as staff director for a committee, headed by 
Rumsfeld, that warned of an emerging ballistic-missile threat to the 
United States. He was known instead for his closeness to Rumsfeld. 
łRemember Henry II‹ŚWho will rid me of this meddlesome priest?ą ˛ the 
senior C.I.A. official said to me, with a laugh, last week. łWhatever 
Rumsfeld whimsically says, Cambone will do ten times that much.˛
Cambone was a strong advocate for war against Iraq. He shared Rumsfeldąs 
disdain for the analysis and assessments proffered by the C.I.A., 
viewing them as too cautious, and chafed, as did Rumsfeld, at the 
C.I.A.ąs inability, before the Iraq war, to state conclusively that 
Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction. Camboneąs military 
assistant, Army Lieutenant General William G. (Jerry) Boykin, was also 
controversial. Last fall, he generated unwanted headlines after it was 
reported that, in a speech at an Oregon church, he equated the Muslim 
world with Satan.
Early in his tenure, Cambone provoked a bureaucratic battle within the 
Pentagon by insisting that he be given control of all special-access 
programs that were relevant to the war on terror. Those programs, which 
had been viewed by many in the Pentagon as sacrosanct, were monitored by 
Kenneth deGraffenreid, who had experience in counter-intelligence 
programs. Cambone got control, and deGraffenreid subsequently left the 
Pentagon. Asked for comment on this story, a Pentagon spokesman said, łI 
will not discuss any covert programs; however, Dr. Cambone did not 
assume his position as the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
until March 7, 2003, and had no involvement in the decision-making 
process regarding interrogation procedures in Iraq or anywhere else.˛
In mid-2003, the special-access program was regarded in the Pentagon as 
one of the success stories of the war on terror. łIt was an active 
program,˛ the former intelligence official told me. łItąs been the most 
important capability we have for dealing with an imminent threat. If we 
discover where Osama bin Laden is, we can get him. And we can remove an 
existing threat with a real capability to hit the United States‹and do 
so without visibility.˛ Some of its methods were troubling and could not 
bear close scrutiny, however.
 By then, the war in Iraq had begun. The sap was involved in some 
assignments in Iraq, the former official said. C.I.A. and other American 
Special Forces operatives secretly teamed up to hunt for Saddam Hussein 
and‹without success‹for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But they 
werenąt able to stop the evolving insurgency.
In the first months after the fall of Baghdad  Rumsfeld and his aides 
still had a limited vie  of the insurgency, seeing it as little more tha  
the work of Baathist łdead-enders,˛ crimina  gangs, and foreign 
terrorists who were Al Qaed  followers. The Administration measured it  
success in the war by how many of those on it  list of the fifty-five 
most wanted members of th  old regime‹reproduced on playing cards‹ha  
been captured. Then, in August, 2003, terro  bombings in Baghdad hit the 
Jordania  Embassy, killing nineteen people, and the Unite  Nations 
headquarters, killing twenty-thre  people, including Sergio Vieira de 
Mello, th  head of the U.N. mission. On August 25th, les  than a week 
after the U.N. bombing, Rumsfel  acknowledged, in a talk before the 
Veterans o  Foreign Wars, that łthe dead-enders are stil  with us.˛ He 
went on, łThere are some toda  who are surprised that there are still 
pockets o  resistance in Iraq, and they suggest that thi  represents 
some sort of failure on the part of th  Coalition. But this is not the 
case.˛ Rumsfel  compared the insurgents with those tru  believers who 
łfought on during and after th  defeat of the Nazi regime in Germany.˛ A 
fe  weeks later‹and five months after the fall o  Baghdad‹the Defense 
Secretary declared,łIt is  in my view, better to be dealing with 
terrorists i  Iraq than in the United States.
 Inside the Pentagon, there was a growing realization that the war was 
going badly. The increasingly beleaguered and baffled Army leadership 
was telling reporters that the insurgents consisted of five thousand 
Baathists loyal to Saddam Hussein. łWhen you understand that theyąre 
organized in a cellular structure,˛ General John Abizaid, the head of 
the Central Command, declared, łthat . . . they have access to a lot of 
money and a lot of ammunition, youąll understand how dangerous they are.˛
The American military and intelligence communities were having little 
success in penetrating the insurgency. One internal report prepared for 
the U.S. military, made available to me, concluded that the insurgentsą 
łstrategic and operational intelligence has proven to be quite good.˛ 
According to the study:
 Their ability to attack convoys, other vulnerable targets and 
particular individuals has been the result of painstaking surveillance 
and reconnaissance. Inside information has been passed on to insurgent 
cells about convoy/troop movements and daily habits of Iraqis working 
with coalition from within the Iraqi security services, primarily the 
Iraqi Police force which is rife with sympathy for the insurgents, Iraqi 
ministries and from within pro-insurgent individuals working with the 
CPAąs so-called Green Zone. 
 The study concluded, łPolitically, the U.S. has failed to date. 
Insurgencies can be fixed or ameliorated by dealing with what caused 
them in the first place. The disaster that is the reconstruction of Iraq 
has been the key cause of the insurgency. There is no legitimate 
government, and it behooves the Coalition Provisional Authority to 
absorb the sad but unvarnished fact that most Iraqis do not see the 
Governing Council˛‹the Iraqi body appointed by the C.P.A.‹łas the 
legitimate authority. Indeed, they know that the true power is the CPA.˛
By the fall, a military analyst told me, the extent of the Pentagonąs 
political and military misjudgments was clear. Donald Rumsfeldąs 
łdead-enders˛ now included not only Baathists but many marginal figures 
as well‹thugs and criminals who were among the tens of thousands of 
prisoners freed the previous fall by Saddam as part of a prewar general 
amnesty. Their desperation was not driving the insurgency; it simply 
made them easy recruits for those who were. The analyst said, łWeąd 
killed and captured guys who had been given two or three hundred dollars 
to Śpray and sprayą ˛‹that is, shoot randomly and hope for the best. 
łThey werenąt really insurgents but down-and-outers who were paid by 
wealthy individuals sympathetic to the insurgency.˛ In many cases, the 
paymasters were Sunnis who had been members of the Baath Party. The 
analyst said that the insurgents łspent three or four months figuring 
out how we operated and developing their own countermeasures. If that 
meant putting up a hapless guy to go and attack a convoy and see how the 
American troops responded, theyąd do it.˛ Then, the analyst said, łthe 
clever ones began to get in on the action.˛
By contrast, according to the military report, the American and 
Coalition forces knew little about the insurgency: łHuman intelligence 
is poor or lacking . . . due to the dearth of competence and expertise. 
. . . The intelligence effort is not coördinated since either too many 
groups are involved in gathering intelligence or the final product does 
not get to the troops in the field in a timely manner.˛ The success of 
the war was at risk; something had to be done to change the dynamic.
 
The solution, endorsed by Rumsfeld an  carried out by Stephen Cambone, 
was to ge  tough with those Iraqis in the Army priso  system who were 
suspected of being insurgents  A key player was Major General Geoffre  
Miller, the commander of the detention an  interrogation center at 
Guantánamo, who ha  been summoned to Baghdad in late August t  review 
prison interrogation procedures. Th  internal Army report on the abuse 
charges  written by Major General Antonio Taguba i  February, revealed 
that Miller urged that th  commanders in Baghdad change policy an  place 
military intelligence in charge of th  prison. The report quoted Miller 
a  recommending that łdetention operations mus  act as an enabler for 
interrogation.
 Millerąs concept, as it emerged in recent Senate hearings, was to 
łGitmoize˛ the prison system in Iraq‹to make it more focussed on 
interrogation. He also briefed military commanders in Iraq on the 
interrogation methods used in Cuba‹methods that could, with special 
approval, include sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and 
heat, and placing prisoners in łstress positions˛ for agonizing lengths 
of time. (The Bush Administration had unilaterally declared Al Qaeda and 
other captured members of international terrorist networks to be illegal 
combatants, and not eligible for the protection of the Geneva 
Conventions.)
 Rumsfeld and Cambone went a step further, however: they expanded the 
scope of the sap, bringing its unconventional methods to Abu Ghraib. The 
commandos were to operate in Iraq as they had in Afghanistan. The male 
prisoners could be treated roughly, and exposed to sexual humiliation.
 łThey werenąt getting anything substantive from the detainees in Iraq,˛ 
the former intelligence official told me. łNo names. Nothing that they 
could hang their hat on. Cambone says, Iąve got to crack this thing and 
Iąm tired of working through the normal chain of command. Iąve got this 
apparatus set up‹the black special-access program‹and Iąm going in hot. 
So he pulls the switch, and the electricity begins flowing last summer. 
And itąs working. Weąre getting a picture of the insurgency in Iraq and 
the intelligence is flowing into the white world. Weąre getting good 
stuff. But weąve got more targets˛‹prisoners in Iraqi jails‹łthan people 
who can handle them.˛
 Cambone then made another crucial decision, the former intelligence 
official told me: not only would he bring the sapąs rules into the 
prisons; he would bring some of the Army military-intelligence officers 
working inside the Iraqi prisons under the sapąs auspices. łSo here are 
fundamentally good soldiers‹military-intelligence guys‹being told that 
no rules apply,˛ the former official, who has extensive knowledge of the 
special-access programs, added. łAnd, as far as theyąre concerned, this 
is a covert operation, and itąs to be kept within Defense Department 
channels.˛
 The military-police prison guards, the former official said, included 
łrecycled hillbillies from Cumberland, Maryland.˛ He was referring to 
members of the 372nd Military Police Company. Seven members of the 
company are now facing charges for their role in the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. łHow are these guys from Cumberland going to know anything? The 
Army Reserve doesnąt know what itąs doing.˛
Who was in charge of Abu Ghraib‹whether military police or military 
intelligence‹was no longer the only question that mattered. Hard-core 
special operatives, some of them with aliases, were working in the 
prison. The military police assigned to guard the prisoners wore 
uniforms, but many others‹military intelligence officers, contract 
interpreters, C.I.A. officers, and the men from the special-access 
program‹wore civilian clothes. It was not clear who was who, even to 
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, then the commander of the 800th 
Military Police Brigade, and the officer ostensibly in charge. łI 
thought most of the civilians there were interpreters, but there were 
some civilians that I didnąt know,˛ Karpinski told me. łI called them 
the disappearing ghosts. Iąd seen them once in a while at Abu Ghraib and 
then Iąd see them months later. They were nice‹theyąd always call out to 
me and say, ŚHey, remember me? How are you doing?ą ˛ The mysterious 
civilians, she said, were łalways bringing in somebody for interrogation 
or waiting to collect somebody going out.˛ Karpinski added that she had 
no idea who was operating in her prison system. (General Taguba found 
that Karpinskiąs leadership failures contributed to the abuses.)
By fall, according to the former intelligence official, the senior 
leadership of the C.I.A. had had enough. łThey said, ŚNo way. We signed 
up for the core program in Afghanistan‹pre-approved for operations 
against high-value terrorist targets‹and now you want to use it for 
cabdrivers, brothers-in-law, and people pulled off the streetsą ˛‹the 
sort of prisoners who populate the Iraqi jails. łThe C.I.A.ąs legal 
people objected,˛ and the agency ended its sap involvement in Abu 
Ghraib, the former official said.
 The C.I.A.ąs complaints were echoed throughout the intelligence 
community. There was fear that the situation at Abu Ghraib would lead to 
the exposure of the secret sap, and thereby bring an end to what had 
been, before Iraq, a valuable cover operation. łThis was stupidity,˛ a 
government consultant told me. łYouąre taking a program that was 
operating in the chaos of Afghanistan against Al Qaeda, a stateless 
terror group, and bringing it into a structured, traditional war zone. 
Sooner or later, the commandos would bump into the legal and moral 
procedures of a conventional war with an Army of a hundred and 
thirty-five thousand soldiers.˛
The former senior intelligence official blamed hubris for the Abu Ghraib 
disaster. łThereąs nothing more exhilarating for a pissant Pentagon 
civilian than dealing with an important national security issue without 
dealing with military planners, who are always worried about risk,˛ he 
told me. łWhat could be more boring than needing the coöperation of 
logistical planners?˛ The only difficulty, the former official added, is 
that, łas soon as you enlarge the secret program beyond the oversight 
capability of experienced people, you lose control. Weąve never had a 
case where a special-access program went sour‹and this goes back to the 
Cold War.˛
In a separate interview, a Pentagon consultant, who spent much of his 
career directly involved with special-access programs, spread the blame. 
łThe White House subcontracted this to the Pentagon, and the Pentagon 
subcontracted it to Cambone,˛ he said. łThis is Camboneąs deal, but 
Rumsfeld and Myers approved the program.˛ When it came to the 
interrogation operation at Abu Ghraib, he said, Rumsfeld left the 
details to Cambone. Rumsfeld may not be personally culpable, the 
consultant added, łbut heąs responsible for the checks and balances. The 
issue is that, since 9/11, weąve changed the rules on how we deal with 
terrorism, and created conditions where the ends justify the means.˛
Last week, statements made by one of th  seven accused M.P.s, Specialist 
Jeremy Sivits  who is expected to plead guilty, were released  In them, 
he claimed that senior commanders i  his unit would have stopped the 
abuse had the  witnessed it. One of the questions that will b  explored 
at any trial, however, is why a group o  Army Reserve military 
policemen, most of the  from small towns, tormented their prisoners a  
they did, in a manner that was especiall  humiliating for Iraqi men
 The notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual humiliation 
became a talking point among pro-war Washington conservatives in the 
months before the March, 2003, invasion of Iraq. One book that was 
frequently cited was łThe Arab Mind,˛ a study of Arab culture and 
psychology, first published in 1973, by Raphael Patai, a cultural 
anthropologist who taught at, among other universities, Columbia and 
Princeton, and who died in 1996. The book includes a twenty-five-page 
chapter on Arabs and sex, depicting sex as a taboo vested with shame and 
repression. łThe segregation of the sexes, the veiling of the women . . 
. and all the other minute rules that govern and restrict contact 
between men and women, have the effect of making sex a prime mental 
preoccupation in the Arab world,˛ Patai wrote. Homosexual activity, łor 
any indication of homosexual leanings, as with all other expressions of 
sexuality, is never given any publicity. These are private affairs and 
remain in private.˛ The Patai book, an academic told me, was łthe bible 
of the neocons on Arab behavior.˛ In their discussions, he said, two 
themes emerged‹łone, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that the 
biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation.˛
The government consultant said that there may have been a serious goal, 
in the beginning, behind the sexual humiliation and the posed 
photographs. It was thought that some prisoners would do 
anything‹including spying on their associates‹to avoid dissemination of 
the shameful photos to family and friends. The government consultant 
said, łI was told that the purpose of the photographs was to create an 
army of informants, people you could insert back in the population.˛ The 
idea was that they would be motivated by fear of exposure, and gather 
information about pending insurgency action, the consultant said. If so, 
it wasnąt effective; the insurgency continued to grow.
łThis shit has been brewing for months,˛ the Pentagon consultant who has 
dealt with saps told me. łYou donąt keep prisoners naked in their cell 
and then let them get bitten by dogs. This is sick.˛ The consultant 
explained that he and his colleagues, all of whom had served for years 
on active duty in the military, had been appalled by the misuse of Army 
guard dogs inside Abu Ghraib. łWe donąt raise kids to do things like 
that. When you go after Mullah Omar, thatąs one thing. But when you give 
the authority to kids who donąt know the rules, thatąs another.˛
In 2003, Rumsfeldąs apparent disregard for the requirements of the 
Geneva Conventions while carrying out the war on terror had led a group 
of senior military legal officers from the Judge Advocate Generaląs 
(jag) Corps to pay two surprise visits within five months to Scott 
Horton, who was then chairman of the New York City Bar Associationąs 
Committee on International Human Rights. łThey wanted us to challenge 
the Bush Administration about its standards for detentions and 
interrogation,˛ Horton told me. łThey were urging us to get involved and 
speak in a very loud voice. It came pretty much out of the blue. The 
message was that conditions are ripe for abuse, and itąs going to 
occur.˛ The military officials were most alarmed about the growing use 
of civilian contractors in the interrogation process, Horton recalled. 
łThey said there was an atmosphere of legal ambiguity being created as a 
result of a policy decision at the highest levels in the Pentagon. The 
jag officers were being cut out of the policy formulation process.˛ They 
told him that, with the war on terror, a fifty-year history of exemplary 
application of the Geneva Conventions had come to an end.
The abuses at Abu Ghraib were exposed o  January 13th, when Joseph 
Darby, a youn  military policeman assigned to Abu Ghraib  reported the 
wrongdoing to the Armyąs Crimina  Investigations Division. He also 
turned over  CD full of photographs. Within three days,  report made its 
way to Donald Rumsfeld, wh  informed President Bush
 The inquiry presented a dilemma for the Pentagon. The C.I.D. had to be 
allowed to continue, the former intelligence official said. łYou canąt 
cover it up. You have to prosecute these guys for being off the 
reservation. But how do you prosecute them when they were covered by the 
special-access program? So you hope that maybe itąll go away.˛ The 
Pentagonąs attitude last January, he said, was łSomebody got caught with 
some photos. Whatąs the big deal? Take care of it.˛ Rumsfeldąs 
explanation to the White House, the official added, was reassuring: ł 
ŚWeąve got a glitch in the program. Weąll prosecute it.ą The cover story 
was that some kids got out of control.˛
In their testimony before Congress last week, Rumsfeld and Cambone 
struggled to convince the legislators that Millerąs visit to Baghdad in 
late August had nothing to do with the subsequent abuse. Cambone sought 
to assure the Senate Armed Services Committee that the interplay between 
Miller and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the top U.S. commander in 
Iraq, had only a casual connection to his office. Millerąs 
recommendations, Cambone said, were made to Sanchez. His own role, he 
said, was mainly to insure that the łflow of intelligence back to the 
commands˛ was łefficient and effective.˛ He added that Millerąs goal was 
łto provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the 
expeditious collection of intelligence.˛
 It was a hard sell. Senator Hillary Clinton, Democrat of New York, 
posed the essential question facing the senators:
 If, indeed, General Miller was sent from Guantánamo to Iraq for the 
purpose of acquiring more actionable intelligence from detainees, then 
it is fair to conclude that the actions that are at point here in your 
report [on abuses at Abu Ghraib] are in some way connected to General 
Millerąs arrival and his specific orders, however they were interpreted, 
by those MPs and the military intelligence that were involved.. . 
.Therefore, I for one donąt believe I yet have adequate information from 
Mr. Cambone and the Defense Department as to exactly what General 
Millerąs orders were . . . how he carried out those orders, and the 
connection between his arrival in the fall of ą03 and the intensity of 
the abuses that occurred afterward. 
 Sometime before the Abu Ghraib abuses became public, the former 
intelligence official told me, Miller was łread in˛‹that is, briefed‹on 
the special-access operation. In April, Miller returned to Baghdad to 
assume control of the Iraqi prisons; once the scandal hit, with its 
glaring headlines, General Sanchez presented him to the American and 
international media as the general who would clean up the Iraqi prison 
system and instill respect for the Geneva Conventions. łHis job is to 
save what he can,˛ the former official said. łHeąs there to protect the 
program while limiting any loss of core capability.˛ As for Antonio 
Taguba, the former intelligence official added, łHe goes into it not 
knowing shit. And then: ŚHoly cow! Whatąs going on?ą ˛
If General Miller had been summoned by Congress to testify, he, like 
Rumsfeld and Cambone, would not have been able to mention the 
special-access program. łIf you give away the fact that a special-access 
program exists,˛the former intelligence official told me, łyou blow the 
whole quick-reaction program.˛
 One puzzling aspect of Rumsfeldąs account of his initial reaction to 
news of the Abu Ghraib investigation was his lack of alarm and lack of 
curiosity. One factor may have been recent history: there had been many 
previous complaints of prisoner abuse from organization like Human 
Rights Watch and the International Red Cross, and the Pentagon had 
weathered them with ease. Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that he had not been provided with details of alleged abuses 
until late March, when he read the specific charges. łYou read it, as I 
say, itąs one thing. You see these photographs and itąs just 
unbelievable. . . . It wasnąt three-dimensional. It wasnąt video. It 
wasnąt color. It was quite a different thing.˛ The former intelligence 
official said that, in his view, Rumsfeld and other senior Pentagon 
officials had not studied the photographs because łthey thought what was 
in there was permitted under the rules of engagement,˛ as applied to the 
sap. łThe photos,˛ he added, łturned out to be the result of the program 
run amok.˛
The former intelligence official made it clear that he was not alleging 
that Rumsfeld or General Myers knew that atrocities were committed. But, 
he said, łit was their permission granted to do the sap, generically, 
and there was enough ambiguity, which permitted the abuses.˛
 This official went on, łThe black guys˛‹those in the Pentagonąs secret 
program‹łsay weąve got to accept the prosecution. Theyąre vaccinated 
from the reality.˛ The sap is still active, and łthe United States is 
picking up guys for interrogation. The question is, how do they protect 
the quick-reaction force without blowing its cover?˛ The program was 
protected by the fact that no one on the outside was allowed to know of 
its existence. łIf you even give a hint that youąre aware of a black 
program that youąre not read into, you lose your clearances,˛ the former 
official said. łNobody will talk. So the only people left to prosecute 
are those who are undefended‹the poor kids at the end of the food chain.˛
The most vulnerable senior official is Cambone. łThe Pentagon is trying 
now to protect Cambone, and doesnąt know how to do it,˛ the former 
intelligence official said.
Last week, the government consultant, who ha  close ties to many 
conservatives, defended th  Administrationąs continued secrecy about th  
special-access program in Abu Ghraib. łWh  keep it black?˛ the 
consultant asked. łBecaus  the process is unpleasant. Itąs like makin  
sausage‹you like the result but you donąt wan  to know how it was made. 
Also, you donąt wan  the Iraqi public, and the Arab world, to know  
Remember, we went to Iraq to democratize th  Middle East. The last thing 
you want to do is le  the Arab world know how you treat Arab male  in 
prison.
 The former intelligence official told me he feared that one of the 
disastrous effects of the prison-abuse scandal would be the undermining 
of legitimate operations in the war on terror, which had already 
suffered from the draining of resources into Iraq. He portrayed Abu 
Ghraib as ła tumor˛ on the war on terror. He said, łAs long as itąs 
benign and contained, the Pentagon can deal with the photo crisis 
without jeopardizing the secret program. As soon as it begins to grow, 
with nobody to diagnose it‹it becomes a malignant tumor.˛
 The Pentagon consultant made a similar point. Cambone and his 
superiors, the consultant said, łcreated the conditions that allowed 
transgressions to take place. And now weąre going to end up with another 
Church Commission˛‹the 1975 Senate committee on intelligence, headed by 
Senator Frank Church, of Idaho, which investigated C.I.A. abuses during 
the previous two decades. Abu Ghraib had sent the message that the 
Pentagon leadership was unable to handle its discretionary power. łWhen 
the shit hits the fan, as it did on 9/11, how do you push the pedal?˛ 
the consultant asked. łYou do it selectively and with intelligence.˛
 łCongress is going to get to the bottom of this,˛ the Pentagon 
consultant said. łYou have to demonstrate that there are checks and 
balances in the system.˛ He added, łWhen you live in a world of gray 
zones, you have to have very clear red lines.˛
 Senator John McCain, of Arizona, said, łIf this is true, it certainly 
increases the dimension of this issue and deserves significant scrutiny. 
I will do all possible to get to the bottom of this, and all other 
allegations.˛
łIn an odd way,˛ Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights 
Watch, said, łthe sexual abuses at Abu Ghraib have become a diversion 
for the prisoner abuse and the violation of the Geneva Conventions that 
is authorized.˛ Since September 11th, Roth added, the military has 
systematically used third-degree techniques around the world on 
detainees. łSome jags hate this and are horrified that the tolerance of 
mistreatment will come back and haunt us in the next war,˛ Roth told me. 
łWeąre giving the world a ready-made excuse to ignore the Geneva 
Conventions. Rumsfeld has lowered the bar.˛ 
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sta filtrando ormai anche tra gli elettori.
E se lo dice Amalric Bond! :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Altro essere umano di cui ci si chiede se sia decente...
Am.

 Altro essere umano di cui ci si chiede se sia decente...
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
Allora? Dove sono i *fatti* caro fessacchiotto di un Amalric Bond?
Dov'e' la tua fonte anonima dei sondaggi? :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 wrote:

Fonte: Gallup
May 5, 2005
http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/login.aspx?ci=16162
Americans' Views of the Iraq War Sour
President Bush's approval ratings on Iraq hold steady at 42%
by Joseph Carroll
Americans' responses to three key measures about the war in Iraq 
continue a downward trend after showing temporary improvement following 
the Iraq elections in late January. Fifty-seven percent of Americans now 
say it was not worth going to war in Iraq. A majority of Americans also 
say things are going badly for the United States in Iraq. The public is 
more divided as to whether or not it was a mistake to send troops to 
Iraq. President George W. Bush's job approval rating on Iraq has settled 
back down to the low 40% range, which is among the worst of his 
presidency.
Riprovaci, la prossima volta avrai piu' successo.
Am.

 Riprovaci, la prossima volta avrai piu' successo.
Tocca a te riprovarci :)  Ed elencarci anche tutti gli altri *fatti* di
cui hai tanto cianciato :)
-Stefano

 torturare in santa pace.
Scusa il decesarismo ma...se lo dici tu...
Raffaele

 -Stefano
O sei fesso o sei bugiardo (e anche incolto)
1. l'articolo menzionato e' perfettamente leggibile. 
2. Il Gallup e' il piu' autorevole istituto di sondaggi al mondo.
3. Pagali, che cosi' ti danno i dettagli. A me basta che quei numeri 
siano stati citati da tutti i giornali pochi giorni fa.
Eccoti sbugiardato.
Quanto ai fatti dell'altro articolo, prova a sbugiardarli te.
Il New Yorker ne sa sicuramente piu' di te delle gole profonde di 
Wahington e di Hersh. Non risulta che ti chiedano informazioni.
Grazie per non farmi perdere ulteriormente tempo.
am.

Wahington e di Hersh.
Cosa che saprai dimostrare, vero? :)
*LOL*
Perche' fino ad allora le tue non sono che mere illazioni senza nulla a
sostegno :)
-Stefano