Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Il programma nucleare Iraniano secondo gli Usa (State.Org)

Mi e' stato chiesto che prove vi sono che il programma nucleare iraniano 
punti ad armi di guerra. 
Cosa di meglio che andarle a trovare nella tana del lupo? Dopotutto 
l'intelligence USA dovrebbe servire a qualcosa...
Eccole a voi nelle parole dell'ambasciatore all'ONU Bolton (l'odiato 
Bolton).
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/35281.htm
Per completezza d'informazione bisogna ricordare che secondo una 
dichiarazione dell'IAEA dei giorni scorsi non vi sono prove *certe*. 
Tuttavia tendo a diffidare dell'IAEA, da quando il suo famoso rapporto 
sulle WMD Irakene (stella polare di SdC) e' stato fatto sparire dal sito 
senza tante storie.
Buona lettura <g>
Am.
Iran¹s Nuclear Weapons Program 
Let me start by describing several aspects of Iran¹s nuclear activities, 
and why they trouble us so much. There is much we do not know about 
Iran¹s weapons program, but much that we do know has been corroborated 
by a series of IAEA reports over the past year. It is the accumulation 
of this public and uncontradicted evidence, not just our own sensitive 
intelligence information, that leads us to our conclusions about Iran¹s 
true objectives. To this moment, Iran has never supplied coherent 
explanations for what it is up to, which is yet another indication that 
we are watching a clandestine nuclear weapons program in operation. 
Iran is pursuing two separate paths to nuclear weapons, one that would 
use highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons and one that would use 
plutonium. As to the uranium route, Iran has tried to develop two 
different uranium-enrichment methods in order to produce weapons-grade 
uranium. First, it has established a number of facilities for the 
manufacture and testing of centrifuges (many of which are owned by 
military industrial organizations), a pilot enrichment facility designed 
for 1,000 centrifuges, and a large buried facility intended to house up 
to 50,000 centrifuges. In parallel, Iran has pursued another program to 
enrich uranium with lasers. Both of these programs were successfully 
concealed from IAEA inspectors in Iran for years until an Iranian 
opposition group disclosed their existence. As IAEA DG ElBaradei¹s 
reports confirmed, Iran used both enrichment methods to secretly enrich 
uranium, enriching to at least 1.2% using centrifuges, and up to 15% 
using lasers. 
Iran has also developed a program for the production of plutonium, an 
alternate path to nuclear weapons. Covert construction of a large, heavy 
water production plant was also disclosed by an Iranian opposition 
group. Its purpose is to supply heavy water for a research reactor that 
Iran plans to begin constructing this year. The technical 
characteristics of this heavy water moderated research reactor are 
optimal for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Iran claims the 
purpose of the reactor is for isotope production for civil purposes, a 
claim that belies Iran¹s confirmed past interest in building hot cells 
at the heavy water reactor that appear to be designed for plutonium 
separation. 
Another potential source of plutonium for weapons is the Bushehr 
light-water power reactor, which is currently under construction. That 
reactor is under IAEA safeguards. Russia has agreed to provide all fresh 
fuel for that reactor, and Iran and Russia are discussing an agreement 
to return all spent fuel to Russia. However, if Iran should withdraw 
from the Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT") and renounce this agreement 
with Russia, the Bushehr reactor would produce enough plutonium each 
year for about 30 nuclear weapons. 
The potential to produce plutonium is just one of several proliferation 
concerns with the Bushehr reactor. This large nuclear project provides 
Iran with access to nuclear technology as well as expertise and training 
in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities. Bushehr can be 
used as a cover and a pretext for other sensitive and troublesome 
nuclear fuel cycle activities. For a variety of reasons, including the 
lack of agreement with Iran on the return to Russia of the spent fuel 
containing plutonium, Russia has not yet shipped fuel for initial 
operation of the Bushehr reactor. 
The costly infrastructure to perform all of these activities goes well 
beyond any conceivable peaceful nuclear program. No comparable oil-rich 
nation has ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of activities 
-- or would pursue them for nearly two decades behind a continuing cloud 
of secrecy and lies to IAEA inspectors and the international community 
-- unless it was dead set on building nuclear weapons. 
Cover stories put forward by Iran for the development of a nuclear fuel 
cycle and for individual facilities are simply not credible. For 
example, Iran is making an enormous investment in facilities to mine, 
process, and enrich uranium, and says it needs to make its own reactor 
fuel because it cannot count on foreign supplies. But for at least the 
next decade Iran will have at most a single nuclear power reactor. In 
addition, Iran does not have enough indigenous uranium resources to fuel 
even one power-generating reactor over its lifetime -- though it has 
quite enough uranium to make several nuclear bombs. We are being asked 
to believe that Iran is building uranium enrichment capacity to make 
fuel for reactors that do not exist from uranium Iran does not have. 
Iran would have us believe it is building a massive uranium enrichment 
facility without having tested centrifuge machines, and building a heavy 
water production plant with no evident legitimate use for the product. 
The more credible explanation is that Iran is building the 
infrastructure to produce highly enriched uranium in centrifuges and 
plutonium in a heavy-water-moderated reactor. 
Finally, there is Iran¹s claim that it is building massive and expensive 
nuclear fuel cycle facilities to meet future electricity needs, while 
preserving oil and gas for export. All of this strains credulity. Iran¹s 
uranium reserves are miniscule, accounting for less than one percent of 
its vast oil reserves and even larger gas reserves. Iran¹s gas reserves 
are the second largest in the world, and the industry estimates that 
Iran flares enough gas annually to generate electricity equivalent to 
the output of four Bushehr reactors. 
Over the past two years, the IAEA has reported many details about Iran¹s 
nuclear program that leave no doubt of Iran¹s nuclear weapons 
intentions. Consider, for example, the urgency of Iran¹s push to master 
centrifuge technology in the face of calls by the international 
community to suspend enrichment activities. On June 19, 2003, the 
Chairwoman of the IAEA Board issued a statement of the Board urging Iran 
not to introduce nuclear material into its centrifuge cascade, pending 
resolution of the issues that have been raised about Iran¹s nuclear 
program. According to subsequent reporting by the IAEA Director General, 
just six days later, on June 25, Iran introduced uranium hexafluoride 
into its centrifuge cascade. Iran¹s stated purpose of producing fuel for 
nuclear power reactors whose construction has not yet begun -- and which 
will not be in operation for at least a decade -- hardly justifies this 
need to press ahead quickly. But this urgency is quite consistent with a 
desire to produce a nuclear weapon as soon as possible.
Consider also that the IAEA has discovered that Iran has produced 
Polonium 210 in the Tehran Research Reactor. The IAEA Director General¹s 
reports identify two primary uses for Polonium 210: neutron initiators 
in certain designs of nuclear weapons, and batteries for space 
satellites. Since Iran has no space satellites or deep space program, 
the nuclear weapons application is obviously of concern.
Another unmistakable indicator of Iran¹s intentions is the pattern of 
repeatedly lying to and providing false reports to the IAEA. For 
example, Iran denied testing centrifuges with uranium, denied the 
existence of a laser enrichment program, denied producing enriched 
uranium, and denied receiving any foreign assistance in its centrifuge 
program. In each case, Iran confessed the truth only when confronted 
with irrefutable technical evidence from IAEA inspections. Iran¹s 
October 2003 submission to the IAEA, a declaration that was supposed to 
be the correct, complete, and final story of Iran¹s nuclear program, 
omitted any mention of the development and testing of advanced P-2 
centrifuges, which IAEA inspectors discovered in early 2004.
Iran¹s violations of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA include 
production of plutonium by covertly introducing uranium targets into the 
Tehran research reactor and reprocessing the irradiated targets to 
separate the plutonium, and enrichment of uranium with centrifuges and 
lasers. The IAEA Director General concluded in November 2003 that, "it 
is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended 
period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement."
There are press reports of Iranian attempts to purchase deuterium, with 
speculation that this would be used for boosting the yield of nuclear 
weapons. Such reports underscore how incomplete our information is on 
the Iranian nuclear program. Why should Iran be seeking deuterium, when 
as I have said Iran is building a production facility for heavy water, 
another name for deuterium, to supply its heavy water reactor program? 
What other roles does deuterium play in the Iranian nuclear program? 
There are also troubling press reports of Iran¹s continued interest in 
procuring sensitive nuclear-related technologies from abroad that could 
have nuclear weapons applications, like dual-use high speed cameras and 
spark gaps. We hope the IAEA is investigating such procurement attempts 
closely and will report on any findings in the upcoming report. 
The impetus behind the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons is so great it 
has caused Iran to renege on its commitments to the IAEA to ratify the 
Additional Protocol and fully cooperate with inspectors, and renege on 
its commitment to the Europeans to suspend uranium enrichment 
activities. If we permit Iran¹s deception to go on much longer, it will 
be too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons.
-- 
Ovviamente hanno esagerato (oltretutto sbagliato anche i tempi)
ma non vedo nulla di scandaloso.
Tutti si danno del nazista o fascista reciprocamente (Capt. Kirk)

 Eccole a voi nelle parole dell'ambasciatore all'ONU Bolton
#_Ecco! Anche meglio; colla ciliegina di Bolton, siamo al completo.
Giano

Giano ha scritto:

non è ridicolo che il russofobo coglionazzo del BNP pretende di
saperne piu' dell'AIEA? 
 LOL!!!!!!

 Tuttavia tendo a diffidare dell'IAEA,  
ROTFL !

.sergio. ha scritto:

Ad Amalric le "dritte" vengono fornite da Blair <G>

 e renditi conto di aria spira in quei meandri.
Sempre meglio che la tua intelligence/nza personale in materia, oh  
liberatore di atolli  <g>
Eppoi le fonti sono sicuramente piu' l'intelligence elettronica del NSA, 
notoriamente buona, piu' che quella umana della CIA.
Am.


 ROTFL !
Diffidare delle sue conclusioni politiche, sensibili alle circostanze, 
non delle sue informazioni scientifiche.
Infatti la maggior parte delle deduzioni di Bolton sono basate proprio 
sui rapporti IAEA.
Cmq. dalla prontezza della tua riposta concludo che non hai neanche 
letto il suo rapporto, e che quindi sei la solita rana dalla bocca larga.
Peccato perche' l'Iran ha tempo altri 14 gg. per chiarire la sua 
posizione ed e' probabile che se si interrompono i negoziati, scatti 
tutt'altra fase in MO, una di tensione, con i nostri militari in mezzo.
L'equivicino FM fara' bene a darsi una seria mossa.
Am.



#_Illuminante...non c'e`che dire!
Va da se che sia sempre soggetta all'uso e manipolazione
umana...nevvero!?...A meno che fuori dagli atolli non siate tutti nelle
grinfie della cibernetica.
A guardare Bolton posso crederci al punto che devo pizzicarmi per essere
sicuro di non vivere un incubo.
Giano

 
wrote:

Pizzicati pure, Atollaro, e se hai qualche fisico atomico nelle 
vicinanze fagli leggere il materiale.
La preoccupazione e' reale per tutti, variano solo le valutazioni 
dell'imminenza dell'armamento nucleare di Teheran.
E dal poco che ricordo di quello che lessi al tempo delle manifestazioni 
antinucleari, a produrre plutonio in Europa Occidentale negli anni '60 
erano solo Francia e UK, e lo facevano solo per produrre bombe nucleari.
Un programma per usare il plutonio in un reattore francese veloce a fini 
pacifici si areno' presto a causa degli incidenti pericolosissimi pedr 
la polazione. E all'epoca si disse che aveva un senso cmq. solo se c'era 
un programma militare a monte che produceva plutonio per bombe nucleari.
Altrimenti tanto valeva usare reattori nucleari lenti, che sono quelli 
che si usano per l'energia pacifica. 
Roba che coincide in piu' punti con l'analisi di Bolton e del 
Dipartimento di Stato.



Bolton parla "pro domo sua" e del suo padrone....
Io gente del genere non sono piu' disposta ad ascoltarla nè ad
attribuirgli alcun valore,a differenza di te

 attribuirgli alcun valore,a differenza di te
lui mica ascolta, gli porge il c..o 
-- 
visitate 
http://www.comunisti-italiani.it/frames/index.htm
http://cubainforma.interfree.it/
il film sul 9/11 : 
http://www.loosechange911.com/
http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/Berlin.jpg
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 attribuirgli alcun valore,a differenza di te
lui mica ascolta, gli porge il c..o 


 Dipartimento di Stato.
#_Piu`che dell'analisi, andrei a scartabellare nel AEI ( American Enterprise
Inst.) fra i programmi dei neocon. per rendersi conto come mai il gallo
canta anche dopo l'alba.
Mio Post del 6/3/2003 :  ( TUTTO SECONDO I PIANI )! ! !
Published on Tuesday, May 27, 2003 by the Inter Press Service
US: Neo-cons Move Quickly on Iran
by Jim Lobe
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0527-06.htm
Il 6 Maggio '03 , AEI ha ospitato una conferenza intitolata "il futuro
dell'Iran"  : "Mullahcracy , Democracy , and War on Terror" ; i partecipanti
includevano: Lendeen, Sobhani , Gerecht , Morris Amitay  tutti
neo-conservatori del "Jewish Institute for National Security Studies"  e Uri
Lubrani  del Ministero della Divesa Israeliano.
Meyrav Wurmser ( moglie di David W. ex impiegato dell'AEI ) specialista del
Hudson Institute Middle East intervenne cosi`: "La nostro scontro in Iraq e
solo una battaglia di una lunga guerra "..." Sarebbe nocivo pensare di
fermarci in Iraq......dobbiamo muoverci e alla svelta".
" E` stato un grave errore spedire ( Khalilzad ) per discutere , nelle
ultime settimane invece di presentarci come forza vincente ( in Iraq ) e
rispettati ; noi siamo ancora
impegnati in una vecchia diplomazia , quella sorta di politica che ha
portato all'11 Settembre "
Alcuni giorni dopo, il canale Khalilzad improvvisamente è stato chiuso, ed
un Christian-Right  alleato dei neo-conservatori,il Senatore Sam Brownback ,
ha introdotto la  'Iran Democracy Act'  che istaura come scopo della
politica U.S. " un referendum controllato internazionalmente  che permetta
al popolo iraniano di cambiare pacificamente il sistema di governo" "Non è
adesso il tempo di coccolare questo regime terroristico," ha detto.
"È adesso il tempo di tenere duro e sostenere  le persone di Iran-che sono
le sole che possono vincere questa battaglia importante."
Giano
P.S.:
http://www.rawstory.com/news/2006/Intelligence_officials_doubt_Iran_uranium_
claims_0818.html
The Bush administration continues to bypass standard intelligence channels
and use what some believe to be propaganda tactics to create a compelling
case for war with Iran, US foreign experts and former US intelligence
officials tell RAW STORY.

 andare a stuzzicare Wikipedia.
Dal che il lettore capira' che non sei in grado di seguire un 
ragionamento in materia, ma che ragioni per autorita' terze.
 E sulla scarsa affidabilita' politica del auctor ho gia' commentato. 
Quanto a quella scientifica dell'IAEA e' utilizzata da Bolton, con 
argomenti cogenti, per arrivare a tutt' altra conclusione del suo 
direttore, che non puo' sbilanciarsi.


 direttore, che non puo' sbilanciarsi.
#_Sii piu`chiaro circa l'identita` del " direttore", perche` sulle diretture
dell'ambassador John Bolton si puo`fare tutto un altro post molto
interessante...e di sicuro si sara`tacciati di antisemitismo.
Giano

 Giano
Fai pure. Ti si chiede solo di respingere chiari indizi che l'Iran si 
stai dotando di un programma nucleare militare.
Te lo si chiede da due post senza che tu abbia fornito alcunche' altro 
che tentativi di character assassination. 
Roba ben nota nel NG, ma che sfortunatamente per te non sostituisce 
prove.
Respingere l'accusa di antisemitismo in anticipo, e' solo un pretesto un 
po' fesso per risparmiarsi l'onere di smentire quegli indizi.


 po' fesso per risparmiarsi l'onere di smentire quegli indizi.
#_A degli indizi ho risposto e ri-postato, dopo qualche anno fa, indizi
provenienti da altra fonte che mostrano le intenzioni del American
Enterprise Institute.
Giano

 
Sogna pure caro, oppure inizia a quotare. Argomenti o indizi che provano 
la mancanza di un programma militare iraniano.


 Am.
PS non lo faccio per cattiveria ma perche' a me non risulta la 
costruzione di centrifughe (centinaia) per alimentare un solo reattore 
veloce che non serva prima per la costruzione di bombe nucleari. Pero' 
non sono un tecnico e aspetto delucidazioni da chi lo e'.
Tu in compenso mi sa che non hai neanche indizi, coug, cough...
Am.