Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Iraq. Come inventarsi una guerra

A secret memo publicized in Britain confirms the lies on which Bush based
his Iraq policy. Why has it received so little notice in the U.S. press?
http://www.salon.com/opinion/conason/2005/05/06/bush_blair_iraq/
Eh, già. Perché? Ecco, qui di seguito, il documento di cui parla Conason,
ove si spiega l'ovvio a coloro che difettano del buon senso necessario ad
arrivarci da soli. Buona lettura.
Namib
--------------------------------------
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
The Sunday Times - Britain
May 01, 2005
The secret Downing Street memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard
Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It
should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried
and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced
that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their
neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was
poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift
in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around
the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for
publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little
discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld
on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour)
air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days
(30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air
campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with
the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and
Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also
important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a
discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi
divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he
thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was
January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional
elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this
week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military
action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less
than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an
ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would
also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal
base for military action. There were three possible legal bases:
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first
and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of
three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and
legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and
WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the
WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the
political context were right, people would support regime change. The two
key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the
political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was
workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or
if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that
Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence
Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan
unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only
when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military
involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in
the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be
important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were
considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could
be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military
campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on
the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries
in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider
legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

necessario ad arrivarci da soli.
Infatti :)  L'ovvio e' che di quel documento non c'e' alcuna prova della
sua reale esistenza :)
Oltretutto e' veramente comico che sembri quasi una mail mandata in
prima istanza all'ambasciatore UK in USA e solo "per conoscenza" alle
piu' importanti cariche del paese :)
-Stefano