Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Russia & Siria

Intelligence Brief: Russia's Moves in Syria
Drafted By:
http://www.pinr.com
In early June, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported Moscow's decision
to establish naval bases in the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia. The
Russian Defense Ministry officially denied the report, even though more than
one source confirmed it.
As part of the plan, the port of Tartus would be transformed into a naval
base for Russia's Black Sea Fleet when it is away from the Ukrainian port of
Sevastopol. The Russian plan involves the installation of an air defense
system with S-300PMU-2 Favorit ballistic missiles. The missiles have a range
of 200 kilometers (124 miles), allow a larger warhead and are equipped with
a better guidance system than the previous version. The air defense system
would be operated by Russia for the defense of the Tartus base and would
provide potential protection for a large part of Syria. Through these
initiatives, it is clear that Russia wants to strengthen its position in the
Middle East.
Russia is searching for a new role in the diplomatic balance in the Middle
East and a decision to move into Syria is a step on the path toward
increasing its influence in the region. Syria seems to be the best target
for this approach because of Damascus' heightened weakness as a result of
its international isolation that was reinforced after the U.S. intervention
in Iraq and Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad is searching for allies to move the country out of isolation. This
increases its incentive to turn to Moscow, even if this relationship will
not be as strong as it was during the Cold War era. For Russia, its
increasing ties with Syria provide Moscow with added leverage in the region.
[See: "Russia's Future Foreign Policy: Pragmatism in Motion"]
During the first five years of Putin's presidency, Moscow and Damascus did
not share close relations; since the beginning of 2005, however, that
situation changed. In the last two years, Russia has built a closer
relationship with Syria. The country is an important cash-buyer of Russian
arms and an interesting partner for Russia's energy industries. Moreover,
Putin is searching for a stronger role in the Israeli-Arab peace process;
Russia's February 2006 meeting with Hamas is a clear example of this policy.
Through that meeting, Russia tried to seize the initiative from the United
States and the European Union, with the latter two's decision-making about
the future of the peace process paralyzed by Hamas' election victory. [See:
"Intelligence Brief: Recognizing Hamas, Iran Welcomes Shi'a Control in
Iraq"]
The increase of Syrian strategic dependence on Russia will strengthen
Moscow's political role in the region, even if Russian arms sales to Syria
risk damaging the good relations built with Israel in recent years. Of
course, stronger Russian influence in Syria could be used by Putin in a dual
way. For example, if Russia needs to improve relations with Israel and the
United States, it could possibly compel Syria to take a softer approach
toward these countries. On the flip side, if Russia needs to increase
pressure on these countries, it can use Syria as its arm for this purpose.
When connecting these latest initiatives in Syria to Russia's good ties with
Iran, it is clear that Moscow is planning on playing a stronger role in the
political and diplomatic dynamics of the Middle East.
Another reason why Moscow wishes to preserve the Bashar government's
stability is to guarantee Russian economic contracts in the country. For
example, in December 2005 Russia and Syria signed an important agreement
worth US$370 million in the gas sector. This agreement presupposes the
construction of a section of pipeline that ends in the Syrian city of Ar
Rayyan, and of a gas processing plan next to Palmyra, built by
Stroitransgaz -- Russia's most important engineering company in the oil and
gas industry. The gas industry is one of the economic sectors in which the
relationship between the two countries is growing. Commercial ties are also
increasingly strong in the military and oil sectors.
Moreover, from Russia's point of view, Bashar's good relationship with
pro-Russian Chechen groups is an important guarantee for Russian homeland
security. A Sunni fundamentalist regime in Damascus is seen as a threat for
Moscow because it will probably give financial and logistical support to
terrorist groups operating in the Chechen conflict. The need for a stable,
Bashar-led regime is also shared by Israel and the United States because the
Syrian regime could be replaced by one that is more radical and more of a
threat to U.S. and Israeli interests.
Moscow is in search of a new role in the Middle East. Russia is trying to
moderate U.S. dominance of the international system, and the Middle East is
a focal point of this strategy. Putin knows that modern-day Russia does not
have the same assets as the former Soviet Union to influence the diplomatic
dynamics of the Middle East, but he wishes to use every window of
opportunity to increase Russian power. Decisions such as helping Syria,
having a more decisive role in the Israeli-Arab peace process and playing a
primary role in the Iranian nuclear affair are steps on the path to
strengthen Russia's position in the Middle East and to increase Moscow's
power to better serve its national interests.


MI sa che il Libano dovrà sbrigarsi a prendere una direzione, sennò
risiamo punto e a capo

 Intelligence Brief: Russia's Moves in Syria
AFAIR l'URSS aveva gia' diritti di approdo negli stessi porti, IMHO non
stabiliranno una vera e propria base navale ma qualcosa del genere.
Attualmente comunque il problema per i russki non sono le basi bensi'
le navi: la ex-marina sovietica da potente forza d'altura si sta
trasformando in una forza da difesa costiera via via che le navi
ex-URSS vengono ritirate dal servizio e vengono rimpiazzate in misura
ridotta e mediamente con unita' piu' piccole.
Palmiro Pangloss