Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Ma come sono acuti questi americani!

Baghdad, 29 novembre 2006
Il primo ministro iracheno al-Maliki non è in grado di gestire
l’esplosione di violenza nel Paese. Il giudizio negativo è contenuto
in un rapporto riservato preparato dal consigliere per la sicurezza
nazionale del presidente degli Stati Uniti George Bush.
Il memorandum è datato 8 novembre. Cinque pagine a firma di Stephen
Hadley, consigliere per la sicurezza nazionale di Bush, che è finito
nelle mani del New York Times.
Al termine di un viaggio a Baghdad per verificare di persona la
situazione sul campo, Hadley si è convinto che in Iraq è necessaria
una svolta.
Nel rapporto, infatti, si dice che se Maliki dovesse fallire ancora,
sarà necessario fare pressione su di lui per convincerlo a ripensare
il suo sostegno parlamentare. Un passo che gli Stati Uniti potrebbero
sostenere con finanziamenti diretti ai gruppi moderati e inviato
migliaia di nuove truppe a Baghdad per fare fronte all’attuale
debolezza dell’esercito iracheno.
Il documento fa un ritratto molto crudo di al-Maliki ed è basato su
informazioni derivante in buona parte da un colloquio avvenuto il 30
ottobre tra il premier iracheno e il consigliere di Bush.
“La verità – si legge nel rapporto - è che Maliki o ignora cosa sta
accadendo nelle strade di Baghdad o non è capace di tradurre le sue
intenzioni in azione”.
RAInews24
Propongo assunzione Catalano nei servizi di sicurezza USA per nuova
serie di "Quelli della notte". Mi raccomando ragazzi, mantenete il
segreto!

nelle mani del New York Times.
Che pero' non lo pubblica, ...... per convincere tutti che veramente e'
in suo possesso, esiste e dice esattamente quanto affermano.
-Stefano

-Stefano
Becca, stronzo:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29mtext.html
 
	Tonight: Live from Jordan - President Bush meets with Iraq's
Prime Minister. Will the violence end?	
 
Text of U.S. Security Adviser’s Iraq Memo
 
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Published: November 29, 2006
Following is the text of a Nov. 8 memorandum prepared for
cabinet-level officials by Stephen J. Hadley, the national security
adviser, and his aides on the National Security Council. The five-page
document, classified secret, was read and transcribed by The New York
Times.
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Reach of War
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We returned from Iraq convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister
Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas
being promoted by others. Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share the
same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek Shia
hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The answers to these
questions are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in
Iraq.
Maliki reiterated a vision of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish partnership,
and in my one-on-one meeting with him, he impressed me as a leader who
wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do
so. Maliki pointed to incidents, such as the use of Iraqi forces in
Shia Karbala, to demonstrate his even hand. Perhaps because he is
frustrated over his limited ability to command Iraqi forces against
terrorists and insurgents, Maliki has been trying to show strength by
standing up to the coalition. Hence the public spats with us over
benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks.
Despite Maliki’s reassuring words, repeated reports from our
commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki’s
government. Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas,
intervention by the prime minister’s office to stop military action
against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal
of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts
to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries — when combined with the
escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi’s (JAM) [the Arabic name for the Mahdi
Army] killings — all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in
Baghdad.
While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia
power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting
participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his
small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation
of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and
sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia
hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of
Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on,
misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet
sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.
Steps Maliki Could Take
There is a range of actions that Maliki could take to improve the
information he receives, demonstrate his intentions to build an Iraq
for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities. The actions listed below
are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some point, may require
additional political and security resources to execute, as described
on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should:
¶Compel his ministers to take small steps — such as providing health
services and opening bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods — to
demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities;
¶Bring his political strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and
bring to justice any JAM actors that do not eschew violence;
Shake up his cabinet by appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats
in key service (and security) ministries;
Announce an overhaul of his own personal staff so that “it reflects
the face of Iraq”;
Demand that all government workers (in ministries, the Council of
Representatives and his own offices) publicly renounce all violence
for the pursuit of political goals as a condition for keeping their
positions;
Declare that Iraq will support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for
multinational forces and will seek, as appropriate, to address
bilateral issues with the United States through a SOFA [status of
forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next year;
Take one or more immediate steps to inject momentum back into the
reconciliation process, such as a suspension of de-Baathification
measures and the submission to the Parliament or “Council of
Representatives” of a draft piece of legislation for a more judicial
approach;
Announce plans to expand the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and
Declare the immediate suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a
robust program of embedding coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the
Interior] units while the MOI is revetted and retrained.
What We Can Do to Help Maliki
If Maliki is willing to move decisively on the actions above, we can
help him in a variety of ways. We should be willing to:
Continue to target Al Qaeda and insurgent strongholds in Baghdad to
demonstrate the Shia do not need the JAM to protect their families —
and that we are a reliable partner;
Text of U.S. Security Adviser’s Iraq Memo
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Published: November 29, 2006
(Page 2 of 2)
¶Encourage Zal [Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador] to move
into the background and let Maliki take more credit for positive
developments. (We want Maliki to exert his authority — and demonstrate
to Iraqis that he is a strong leader — by taking action against
extremists, not by pushing back on the United States and the
Coalition.);
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Reach of War
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¶Continue our diplomatic efforts to keep the Sunnis in the political
process by pushing for the negotiation of a national compact and by
talking up provincial council elections next spring/summer as a
mechanism for Sunni empowerment;
¶Support his announcement to expand the Iraqi Army and reform the MOI
more aggressively;
¶Seek ways to strengthen Maliki immediately by giving him additional
control over Iraqi forces, although we must recognize that in the
immediate time frame, we would likely be able to give him more
authority over existing forces, not more forces;
¶Continue to pressure Iran and Syria to end their interference in
Iraq, in part by hitting back at Iranian proxies in Iraq and by
Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in
early December; and
¶Step up our efforts to get Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in
supporting Iraq by using its influence to move Sunni populations in
Iraq out of violence into politics, to cut off any public or private
funding provided to the insurgents or death squads from the region and
to lean on Syria to terminate its support for Baathists and insurgent
leaders.
Augmenting Maliki’s Political and Security Capabilities
The above approach may prove difficult to execute even if Maliki has
the right intentions. He may simply not have the political or security
capabilities to take such steps, which risk alienating his narrow
Sadrist political base and require a greater number of more reliable
forces. Pushing Maliki to take these steps without augmenting his
capabilities could force him to failure — if the Parliament removes
him from office with a majority vote or if action against the Mahdi
militia (JAM) causes elements of the Iraqi Security Forces to fracture
and leads to major Shia disturbances in southern Iraq. We must also be
mindful of Maliki’s personal history as a figure in the Dawa Party —
an underground conspiratorial movement — during Saddam’s rule. Maliki
and those around him are naturally inclined to distrust new actors,
and it may take strong assurances from the United States ultimately to
convince him to expand his circle of advisers or take action against
the interests of his own Shia coalition and for the benefit of Iraq as
a whole.
If it is Maliki’s assessment that he does not have the capability —
politically or militarily — to take the steps outlined above, we will
need to work with him to augment his capabilities. We could do so in
two ways. First, we could help him form a new political base among
moderate politicians from Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and other communities.
Ideally, this base would constitute a new parliamentary bloc that
would free Maliki from his current narrow reliance on Shia actors.
(This bloc would not require a new election, but would rather involve
a realignment of political actors within the Parliament). In its
creation, Maliki would need to be willing to risk alienating some of
his Shia political base and may need to get the approval of Ayatollah
Sistani for actions that could split the Shia politically. Second, we
need to provide Maliki with additional forces of some kind.
This approach would require that we take steps beyond those laid out
above, to include:
Actively support Maliki in helping him develop an alternative
political base. We would likely need to use our own political capital
to press moderates to align themselves with Maliki’s new political
bloc;
Consider monetary support to moderate groups that have been seeking to
break with larger, more sectarian parties, as well as to support
Maliki himself as he declares himself the leader of his bloc and risks
his position within Dawa and the Sadrists; and
Provide Maliki with more resources to help build a nonsectarian
national movement.
If we expect him to adopt a nonsectarian security agenda, we must
ensure he has reasonably nonsectarian security institutions to execute
such as through a more robust embedding program.
We might also need to fill the current four-brigade gap in Baghdad
with coalition forces if reliable Iraqi forces are not identified.
Moving Ahead
We should waste no time in our efforts to determine Maliki’s
intentions and, if necessary, to augment his capabilities. We might
take the following steps immediately:
Convince Maliki to deliver on key actions that might reassure Sunnis
(open banks and direct electricity rebuilding in Sunni areas,
depoliticize hospitals);
Tell Maliki that we understand that he is working his own strategy for
dealing with the Sadrists and that:
• you have asked General Casey to support Maliki in this effort
• it is important that we see some tangible results in this strategy
soon;
Send your personal representative to Baghdad to discuss this strategy
with Maliki and to press other leaders to work with him, especially if
he determines that he must build an alternative political base;
Ask Casey to develop a plan to empower Maliki, including:
Formation of National Strike Forces
Dramatic increase in National Police embedding
More forces under Maliki command and control
Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to make a recommendation
about whether more forces are need in Baghdad;
Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to devise a more robust
embedding plan and a plan to resource it;
Direct your cabinet to begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to
play a leadership role on Iraq, connecting this role with other areas
in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S. action;
If Maliki seeks to build an alternative political base:
Press Sunni and other Iraqi leaders (especially Hakim) [Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq, a Maliki rival] to support Maliki
Engage Sistani to reassure and seek his support for a new nonsectarian
political movement.

 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29mtext.html
Scusami ma delle paginette web uguale a quelle posso scriverle pure io.
Non mi basta il "read and transcribed by The New York Times".
-Stefano

-Stefano
Sei cretino a 360 gradi. Prima dici che il NYT non non pubblica il
memrandum. Ti si dimostra che hai detto l'ennesima cazzata. E ora che
cosa farnetichi? Che quello non è il sito del NYT o che il NYT ha
pubblicato un falso? Rivolgiti a uno psichiatra.

Rivolgiti a uno psichiatra.
...disse il bue all'asino...
-Stefano