Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: [Flasback Irak] The Downing Street Memos - L'invasione preparata  nel Luglio 2002

Questo documento ufficiale di Londra e' stato desecretato grazie al 
Freedom of Information Act.
Non ha solo un valore storico, ma mostra come Londra e Washington 
ingannarono l'opinione preparando le fasi finali dell'invasione gia' nel 
Luglio del 2002, molto tempo prima della fine delle ispezioni ONU nel 
marzo 2003.
(gli asterischi sono miei)
Am.
 Text of the Downing Street Memo - a document containing meeting minutes 
transcribed during the British Prime Minister's meeting on July 23, 2002
 As originally reported in the The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005
(to print in large text reliably, increase the text size view in your 
browser, the text will then print larger as well)
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
 From: Matthew Rycroft
 Date: 23 July 2002
 S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard 
Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally 
Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss 
Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It 
should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. 
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to 
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was 
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not 
convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime 
expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that 
regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public 
was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible 
shift in attitude. ******Military action was now seen as inevitable. 
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the 
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were 
being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN 
route, ******and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi 
regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the 
aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, 
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 
hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time 
of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous 
air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 
days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia 
and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were 
also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK 
involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a 
discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two 
Iraqi divisions.
*****The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of 
activity" to put pressure on the regime.***** No decisions had been 
taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military 
action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before 
the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this 
week. *****It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take 
military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case 
was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD 
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.***** We 
should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN 
weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification 
for the use of force.
*****The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not 
a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: 
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The 
first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 
1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of 
course change.******
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically 
and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime 
change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was 
producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with 
Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would 
support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan 
worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military 
plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was 
workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, 
or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said 
that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the 
Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military 
plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK 
interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK 
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the 
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in 
only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military 
involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many 
in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It 
would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political 
context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any 
military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we 
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we 
were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds 
could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed 
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) ******The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the 
background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to 
Saddam.*******
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of 
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member 
states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence 
update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would 
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
<end of document text>
********************************************
Cast of Charaterswho are the people mentioned here?
Below is a breakdown of the various individuals mentioned in the memo - 
all of whom were present during the meeting with the Prime Minister.
- Foreign Policy Advisor - David Manning
 - Matthew Rycroft - aide to Manning, wrote up the minutes of the 
meeting.
 - Defence Secretary - Geoff Hoon
 - Foreign Secretary - Jack Straw 
 - Attorney-General - Lord Goldsmith,
 - Cabinet Secretary - Sir Richard Wilson
 - Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee - John Scarlett,
 - Director of GCHQ - Francis Richards, head of the UK's "signals 
intelligence establishment", an intelligence agency, which reports to 
the Foreign Secretary.
 - Director of SIS (aka MI6) - Sir Richard Dearlove, identified as 'C' 
in the meeting minutes, heads the UK's foreign intelligence service 
 - Chief of the Defence Staff - Admiral Sir Michael Boyce
 - Chief of Staff - Jonathan Powell
 - Head of Strategy - Alastair Campbell
 - Director of Political & Govt Relations - Sally Morgan
We will be posting a revised version of this list with descriptions of 
the various roles and their US equivalents soon.
 Though it is sometimes difficult to equate a given official to his or 
her US counterpart, it's clear that this was a meeting at the highest 
level within the UK government.
Attendees included three members of the Cabinet (Prime Minister Blair, 
the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary), the nation's most 
senior bureaucrat (the Cabinet Secretary), three out of the four top 
people from the UK intelligence community (the JIC Chair and the heads 
of MI6 and GCHQ), the head of the armed forces and four of the innermost 
circle of the PM's political advisors.
The relatively junior level of the author bears no relevance to the 
contents, which describe the thinking and opinions of the principals.

Freedom of Information Act.
Puttanata, visto che ***A LONDRA*** non esiste il "Freedom of
Information Act", caro *COGLIONE MONONEURONE* :)
-Stefano



Sei un povero idiota, visto che in UK il FoIA esiste dal 1° Gennaio del 2005.
Vedi: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4134811.stm
I Downing Street Memos sono stati leaked su Internet e pubblicatiol 1 
maggio 2005 da The Times, che non lo avrebbe potuto fare con le leggi 
precedenti al Freedom of Information Act.
Comunque il punto e' che il  documento e' autentico e prova 
l'intenzione USA di invadere fino dall'estate del 2002, ispezioni o 
meno.
Adesso se cortesemente sei capace di commentare fallo. Se ne sei 
incapace,come sospetto taci.
Am.

Comunque il punto e' che il  documento e' autentico
Puttanata indimostrata fino ad ora :)
Ma puoi sempre provare a dimostrarla tu :)
-Stefano

 Ma puoi sempre provare a dimostrarla tu :)
L'ha gia' fatto il giornalista, dicendo che nessuno dei protagonisti ha 
smentito, e che nessuno ha chiesto a lui o al giornale di 
rettificare,come e' d'uopo.
Pero'  lo puoi fare sempre tu, dall'alto della tua acclarata 
credibilita' e conoscenza della legge inglese...
Am.

credibilita' e conoscenza della legge inglese...
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

 occurred were they forgeries.
Il punto e' che non e' mai stato riconosciuto come inautentico, nemmeno 
da Blair, che ha cercato di sminuirlo come un documento parziale.
 La pubblicazione di un documento di tale gravita' avrebbe invece 
dovuto essere querelata se il documento era falso. Cosa che invece non 
e' stata fatta.
E adesso se ti vuoi fare una cultura in materia di diritto inglese 
impara ad essere educato. Gli inglesi danno poca confidenza ai cafoni e 
agli sboccati.
Altrimenti grufola  nella mangiatoia del bue e dell'asino e contentati 
della loro felice, innocente ignoranza.
Am.

e contentati della loro felice, innocente ignoranza.
...disse l'ignorante felice di esserlo... :)
-Stefano

 diffamazione diretta verso il governo, caro *FESSO MONONEURONE*.
C'e' mezza amministrazione o governo  britannico in quei memos, e tu 
ancora cianci, hebetensis? 
Ma non sei lo stesso idiota che ha sostenuto che Ruini parla a titolo 
personale agli italiani?
Eppoi complimenti.abbiamo un nuovo specialista  di diritto britannico, 
materia  notoriamente facile per gli avvocati del continente...
Senti perche' non mi dai un appuntamento da qualche  parte in mail? Che 
poi ti spiego direttamente quella storia della diffamazione, mezzasega 
senza onore...
Am.

mezzasega senza onore...
...disse la mezzasega fascista senza onore... :)
-Stefano