Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Aggiornamenti geostrategici nel Caspio

Il viaggio della Rice e di D.Cheney , non ha portato a risultati 
apprezzabili.
Gli USA sono in declino coi contatti diplomatici nell'area del Caspio e la 
Russia si inserisce nelle sue vecchie repubbliche con accordi gia`avanzati. 
Di Importanza grandissima i rapporti col Kazakhstan e le sue enormi riserve 
di petrolio.
Un altro interessante articolo  fa il punto sulla situazione, con brevi 
riferimenti anche alla Georgia.
G.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JJ11Ag01.html
US standing in Caspian drips away
By M K Bhadrakumar
On Sunday, en route to Astana, Kazakhstan, after a "very nice trip to 
India", US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters accompanying 
her, "I just wish I could have stayed longer in India". New Delhi must be 
one of a handful of capitals where officials from the George W Bush 
administration receive an expectant welcome, and the doomsday warnings 
emitted from New York and Washington do not seem to matter.
But there was another reason for Rice's trepidation as her jet descended to 
Astana - US influence and prestige in Central Asia and the Caspian region 
has again plummeted. Rice realizes there is hardly any time left to retrieve 
lost ground, and the Bill Clinton administration's legacy in the Caspian and 
Central Asia has largely dissipated. Central to this has been the failure of 
the Bush
administration to handle relations with Russia. The stocktaking has already 
begun.
Writing in The Washington Post on Wednesday, former secretaries of state 
Henry Kissinger and George Shultz rebuked the Bush administration for its 
"drift towards confrontation with Russia" and pointed out that "isolating 
Russia is not a sustainable long-range policy". They said much of Europe is 
"uneasy". Their target was Rice, a self-styled "Sovietologist", and her 
inexcusably vitriolic attack on the Kremlin in a speech at the Marshall Fund 
of Germany in Washington on September 18.
Confrontational diplomacy
Kissinger and Shutlz particularly cautioned the Bush administration against 
encouraging confrontational diplomacy towards Russia by its neighbors, which 
would be counter-productive. Most certainly, there is already a backlash in 
the region. Azerbaijan, which the Bush administration once regarded as close 
regional ally, snubbed Vice President Dick Cheney during his visit to the 
capital, Baku, last month. Washington pretended not to notice, and deputed 
to Baku last week yet another top official - Deputy Secretary of State John 
Negroponte - whom the State Department's website describes as Rice's "alter 
ego".
On arrival on October 2, Negroponte forthwith said he was carrying a "simple 
message" - that the US has "deep and abiding interests" in Azerbaijan and 
these are "important interests" which hold implications for regional and 
international security. He implied Washington that was not going to roll 
over and give way to Moscow in the southern Caucasus.
Against the backdrop of the conflict in the Caucasus in August, the Caspian 
Sea basin has become a focal point. This was inevitable. At the core lies 
Washington's determination to avoid Russian participation in the European 
energy-supply chain. To quote Ariel Cohen of US conservative think-tank the 
Heritage Foundation, "Since August, US diplomats have been busy trying to 
shore up Washington's geopolitical position all around the Caspian, 
including Baku, [Turkmenistan capital] Ashgabat and Astana."
Russia is gaining the upper hand in the region. Despite robust US diplomacy 
in Ashgabat - over 15 American delegations arrived there in the past year - 
Turkmenistan, which already exports around 50 billion cubic meters of its 
gas through Russia, has responded well to Moscow's overtures. It has decided 
to stick to the terms of an April 2003 deal whereby virtually all its 
exports are handled by Russia "up through 2025", and Turkmen gas exports to 
Russia are expected to rise to 60-70 billion cubic-meters by 2009, leaving 
hardly any surplus for Western companies. Ashgabat has also committed to the 
construction of a pipeline to Russia via Kazakhstan along the eastern coast 
of the Caspian Sea.
The clincher was Russia's offer to buy Turkmen gas at "European prices" - 
the same approach that Moscow adopted for securing control of Kazakh and 
Uzbek gas exports. Russia has since made a similar offer to Azerbaijan, 
which Baku is considering. Azerbaijan was the true success story of US oil 
diplomacy in the post-Soviet era. Clinton literally snatched it from 
Russia's orbit in the 1990s by pushing through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [BTC] 
oil pipeline against seemingly impossible odds. Azerbaijan is now edging 
back toward Moscow.
It is negotiating with Russia an increase in the annual capacity of the 
Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline. Azerbaijan reducing its commitment to the 
US-supported Baku-Supsa and BTC pipelines, which have a massive capacity of 
60 million tonnes annually and could easily handle Azeri oil exports, is a 
breakthrough for Russia.
Russia's resolute stance in the Caucasus has caught Baku's attention. Baku 
understands Russia's resurgence in the southern Caucasus, and President of 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev dislikes the mercurial personality of Georgian 
President Mikheil Saakashvili. Azerbaijan might have lost $500 million in 
revenues due to the suspension of oil transportation via the Baku-Supsa and 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines in August due to the conflict, and Baku's new 
interest in the Russian pipeline stems from a desire to protect its 
relationship with Moscow.
The implications are quite serious for Washington. Any reduction in the 
Azeri exports via BTC could impact the viability of the pipeline, which has 
been a cornerstone of US oil diplomacy in the Caspian, pumping early 1 
million barrels of oil per day from Azerbaijan to Turkey's Mediterranean 
coast, where most of the supply is then shipped to Europe. The BTC pipeline 
looks secure for now, but has come under the increased watch of Russia.
Again, question marks have appeared regarding the future of the Nabucco gas 
pipeline, which, if constructed, would bypass Russian territory and bring 
Caspian gas from Azerbaijan via Georgia and Turkey to the European market. 
What if Azerbaijan accepts the Russian offer to buy gas at "European 
prices"? Has the Caucasus conflict fatally hurt Nabucco's prospects?
Russia comes out on top
There is indeed a new ambivalence in the geopolitics of the region. All 
across Western Europe, Eurasia and China countries are assimilating what 
happened in the Caucasus in August and are assessing their stakes vis-a-vis 
a resurgent Russia. They seek accommodation with Russia. Moscow has come out 
very much on top.
The war in Georgia has somewhat clouded the relations between Russia and the 
European Union. The final declaration of the EU summit on September 1 
underscored the need to reduce energy dependence on Russia. But the EU's 
options, too, are limited. Europe has pinned its hopes on Nabucco, but it 
can only be implemented with Russian participation. Claude Mandil, former 
head of the International Energy Agency, said recently in an interview with 
the Russian daily Kommersant, "There is much oil and gas in Central Asia, 
but still less than in Russia or Iran."
Mandil, who advises French President Nicolas Sarkozy on energy issues, was 
critical of the US pressure on Europe to isolate Russia, calling it 
"counter-productive". He said, "The EU alone should decide the issue of 
energy security. The US itself is highly dependent on oil imports from 
Venezuela, but no EU members tell Washington that it's time to attend to 
that problem".
China also recognizes the Russian consolidation in the Caspian-Central Asian 
region. A commentary in the People's Daily in early September took note that 
Russia's Central Asia diplomacy has been "crowned with great success". It 
noted that visits by Russian leaders to Central Asian capitals in August 
helped "consolidate and strengthen" Moscow's ties with the region and 
achieved "substantial outcomes" in energy cooperation.
The Chinese commentary concluded: "Against a global backdrop of Russia's 
growing contradictions with the West ? the high-level shuttle diplomacy of 
Russian leaders will further enhance Russia's strategic position in Central 
Asia, beef up the control of oil and gas resources and help coordinate the 
positions of Russia and these Central Asia nations on the Transcaucasia 
issue". Beijing has obviously made a realistic assessment of its own options 
in Central Asia.
In fact, during Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's visit to
Tashkent on September 1-2, Uzbekistan and Russia agreed to build a new 
pipeline with a capacity of 26 to 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually to 
pump Uzbek and Turkmen gas to Europe. Such a pipeline will undermine the US 
efforts to develop a trans-Caspian energy route bypassing Russia. Again, 
Russia's LUKoil has announced plans to produce 12 bcm gas in Uzbekistan's 
Kandym and Gissar fields annually.
All in all, therefore, Rice's visit to Kazakhstan took place against a grim 
backdrop. Neither Azerbaijan nor Kazakhstan appears interested in US 
entreaties to re-route energy exports to bypass Russia. Both hope to 
maintain good relations with the US but that cannot be done by picking a 
quarrel with Russia. At a press conference with Rice in Astana on Sunday, 
Kazakh Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin stressed relations with Russia will 
remain a top priority. "Our relationship with Russia, I can formulate, is 
just excellent. We have very good political relations. Russia is our 
strategic partner? At the same time, I should underline that our 
relationship with the United States has a stable, strategic character."
Neither Tazhin nor Kazakh President Nurusultan Nazarbayev apparently made 
any commitments to Rice regarding US-sponsored pipelines. On the contrary, 
addressing the media jointly with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
following the Russian-Kazakh border region forum in Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan, 
on September 22, Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan will be increasing its oil 
production by 12 million metric tons in 2009 and it proposes to pump the 
additional oil via Russia. "It is very important that Kazakh oil should pass 
through Russia", he said.
Kashagan puzzle
Nazarbayev hinted Astana would use the Russian-controlled Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) to carry Kazakh crude from the Kashagan deposit in 
2012-2013 to the Russian terminal on the Black Sea. Nurlan Balagimbayev, 
adviser to Nazarbayev, said on Thursday that Kazakhstan is interested in 
buying an additional 13.7% of stakes belonging to both BP and Oman in the 
CPC, in which Russia holds 24% besides Chevron, Shell and ExxonMobil.
Rice would have utilized her visit in Astana to check out Kashagan. 
Kazakhstan and a group of Western oil companies led by Italy's Eni are due 
to finalize details on Kashagan's future by October 25. A new operating 
company is expected to be formed and individual companies - Eni, Shell, 
ConocoPhillips, Japan's Inpex Holdings and Kazkhstan's KazMunaiGas - are 
likely to control different aspects of the operation such as production or 
shipping.
Kashagan is estimated to hold 7 billlion to 9 billion barrels of recoverable 
reserves and is undoubtedly the jewel in the crown of the Caspian Sea Basin. 
Several different routes are likely to be needed for delivering oil from 
Kashagan to customers, involving the construction of major new oil 
pipelines. Rice would have easily anticipated the keen rivalries that lie 
ahead in advance of the 2013 production start date of Kashagan. The battle 
for Kashagan is about to be joined.
The transportation route for the Kashagan will have a vital bearing on the 
long-term economic viability of the BTC pipeline. But Astana has shown no 
hurry so far in committing Kashagan oil to the BTC. Kazakhstan may well be 
playing for time and synchronizing with Russia's expected completion of the 
pipeline from East Siberia to the Pacific (ESPO) by 2012 for routing oil to 
the Asian markets.
Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko said on Wednesday that Kazakhstan's 
state-owned oil pipeline operator KazTransOil is interested in transporting 
Kazakh oil through the ESPO. "Our Kazakh partners are looking at the project 
with great interest and enthusiasm. We are happy about that", he said at a 
function launching a section of the ESPO between Talakan and Taishet. The 
Taishet-Talakan section of the ESPO line was completed in September, while 
the remaining stretch to Skovorodino, near the Chinese border, is scheduled 
to be completed by end-2009.
Will Astana decide to ship its projected oil output - 150 million tons a 
year by 2015 - through ESPO? If that happens, China will be a huge 
beneficiary and the geopolitics of the Caspian will undergo a historic 
transformation.
Russian-Kazakh "oil alliance"
Rice put on an appearance, saying, "This is not some kind of contest for the 
affection of Kazakhstan between the countries of the region". But it is very 
obvious that Washington is nervous Kazakhstan is showing alarming signs of 
shifting towards Moscow. Astana supported the Russian action in the Caucasus 
and cut down its investment in Georgia. If Rice was hopeful of encouraging 
Kazakhstan to stand up to Russian "bullying", she was disappointed.
On the eve of Rice's arrival in Astana, Nazarbayev said, "I personally was a 
witness to the fact that Georgia attacked first. I was in Beijing on August 
8 with Mr Putin, when we first heard the news. I think the coverage of those 
events was biased. Whoever you may blame for the conflict, the facts are bad 
enough."
Since assuming office in the Kremlin on May 7, Medvedev has visited 
Kazakhstan three times. During his last visit, he promised, "We [Russia and 
Kazakhstan] will keep building up the production and the export of 
hydrocarbon raw materials, build new pipelines when it is beneficial and 
necessary, and attract large-scale investment into the fuel and energy 
sector."
On Wednesday, while on a visit to Almaty, Kazakhstan's largest city, the 
influential head of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) committee 
of the Russian parliament, Vadim Gustov, floated a new idea that the two 
countries needed to develop a common energy market. He said an "oil 
alliance" would be mutually advantageous.
"A common energy market of Russia and Kazakhstan would help develop energy 
cooperation, supply cheap energy resources to the domestic markets and 
increase energy supplies to third countries", Gustov said. According to him, 
Russia and Kazakhstan should develop and adopt a joint concept of the energy 
market, which could serve as basis for Euroasian Economic Community space.
Evidently, Washington is barely keeping pace with the Russian diplomacy. To 
make matters worse, the financial crisis at home has eroded US credibility. 
An entire ideology of economic development that US diplomats propagated in 
the region stands discredited.
There is huge political symbolism when Iceland expresses "disappointment" 
with the Western world and turns to Moscow for a 4 billion euro (US$5.5 
billion) loan to salvage its economy from imminent bankruptcy. Such images 
make a lasting impression on the Central Asian steppes.

 E per un Europa da Lisbona a Vladivostok, come il Progetto Eurasia?
#_Niente illazioni, io riporto quegli articoli che espongono la realta` 
della situazione che tu manco leggi...
La Russia fa, con pieno diritto, quello che gli USA vorrebbero fare.
Io mi auguro che il grande orso possa far parte della EU; non e`un sogno, e` 
una certezza , ma che non avro`il tempo necessario per vederla realizzata.
G.


#_No. partecipazione a pieni diritti e doveri; senza NATO ovviamente e se 
fosse necessario fuori anche UK.
G. 

 G.
aggiornamenti del Minculpop avresti dovuto scrivere... 


Curz Roba fascista.
Il discastero venne istituito dal regime fascista il 22 maggio 1937, ma in
realtà tale organo politico era già operativo dal 1925, con l'istituzione di
un primo "Ufficio Stampa"; nel 1937 si ebbe l'ampliamento dei poteri con
conseguente cambio di nome, fino a farlo diventare un vero e proprio
ministero.
Il ministero aveva l'incarico di controllare ogni pubblicazione,
sequestrando tutti quei documenti ritenuti pericolosi o contrari al regime e
diffondendo i cosiddetti ordini di stampa (o veline) con i quali
s'impartivano precise disposizioni circa il contenuto degli articoli,
l'importanza dei titoli e la loro grandezza. Più in generale, questo
ufficio, si occupava della propaganda, quindi non solo controllo della
stampa.
Inizialmente, sarà a capo di questo ministero Galeazzo Ciano, poi trasferito
al Ministero degli Esteri. Con la caduta del fascismo il ministero perse
ogni importanza e venne soppresso ufficialmente dal Governo Badoglio II.
Oggi si chiama RFE.
Domanda al Barucco che ci lavora
Puo' trovare un buon posto anche per te, hai la stoffa.
Saluti
--------------------------------
Inviato via 
http://arianna.libero.it/usenet/

"Lord Curzon" <lord....@curzon.cur> wrote in message 
news:48f1ee84$0$1092$4faf...@reader1.news.tin.it...

#_Il "miculpop" di Cheney in Azerbaijan e della Rice di sicuro. 

 Su', aria, che ammorbi.
#_Ti decidessi di levarti dalle palle, invece di spargere fumi d'alcool ad 
ogni mio post, sarebbe anche meglio,
tanto te l'ho gia` detto e ridetto : niente da fa'...non te scopo!
G.

 Saluti
quello che a me pare abbia bisogno di un posto di lavoro nella 
disinformacjia sei tu, Putin non ha ancora provveduto? Un vero peccato... 

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:gctb63$4vc$1...@nnrp-beta.newsland.it...

il minculpopo dell'amico dei talebani di sicuro...