Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: What Israelis Really Think Should Be Done About Gaza

http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1997832,00.html
What Israelis Really Think Should Be Done About Gaza
By Karl Vick / Jerusalem
Until the flotilla fiasco, the blockade of Gaza was not a matter of 
great concern to the Israeli public. And Thursday's decision by Israel's 
government to loosen its grip on the flow of goods into the territory — 
vague on specifics and heavy on conspicuous intent — was aimed squarely 
at a world watching from beyond missile range. "Look, I come from a 
kibbutz that's very close to Gaza," says Ran, a 40-year-old in Tel Aviv. 
"I go there to visit, and it's not nice."
The agricultural collective he comes from, called Nirim, grows organic 
peanuts and sweet potatoes in fields that run right up to the barrier 
that encloses 1.5 million Palestinians within Gaza. From the northern 
tip of the enclosure, an area of trash-strewn lots, militants scramble 
across to launch homemade rockets, then scramble off before Israeli 
artillery homes in on the launch coordinates. The rockets do not travel 
far, but they can reach Nirim. In March, shrapnel killed a Thai man 
working in a field there. (See how Israel has eased but not ended its 
Gaza blockade.)
The problem, from Ran's perspective, is not that Israel's grip on Gaza 
is too tight. The problem is the opposite. "The country doesn't do 
enough," he says, then shrugs. "But you do what you can."
In a small country united by, among other things, an abiding sense of 
vulnerability, the missile attacks are synonymous with "Gaza." And 
though they have grown less frequent since Israel invaded the coastal 
strip in December 2008, what remains foremost in the popular imagination 
are periods when they seemed incessant. Gallingly, rocket attacks surged 
after Israel pulled its settlers and soldiers out of the coastal strip 
five years ago. (See pictures of Israeli commandos storming Turkish ships.)
Dahlia Scheindlin, a pollster and political consultant who works largely 
with the Israeli left, says that preoccupation with security, if not 
punishment, trumps concerns about hardship inside Gaza. "The pragmatic 
center, they don't see it," Scheindlin says, referring to the swing bloc 
that carries elections. "The narrative is, 'We left Gaza and got a rain 
of Qassam rockets. We gave them everything they wanted and we got a rain 
of Qassam rockets and a Hamas takeover.' I hear it over and over again 
in focus groups."
That perspective drives Israel's internal politics, and accounts for the 
defiant tone of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's pushback in the face 
of the global outrage that greeted the botched commando raid on the Mavi 
Marama, which left nine activists dead. "Going to the tom-tom of the 
tribe: 'The whole world's against us,'" former Knesset speaker Avrum 
Burg said of the prime minister's remarks.
But a senior government official, speaking privately in advance of 
Thursday's cabinet decision on the blockade, acknowledged the core 
problem was Israel's policy. While the effort to keep arms out of Gaza 
was easy to justify, the official told TIME, Israel clearly 
miscalculated when it tried to squeeze Hamas by making life even more 
miserable for ordinary people there by barring the importation of things 
like spices and toys. Thursday's announcement implicitly acknowledged as 
much by omitting the specifics ("nutmeg," "coriander") that critics in 
the past have waved like flags.
"The whole idea of expanding the closure, the blockade, above and over 
strict military things was a mistake," says the senior official. "It 
helped give the impression they are hurting economically so everybody 
wants to help them. They don't want to help them with weapons, they want 
to help with drugs, with medicines, with food. Which may not be in 
shortage, but a hated group called Hamas — hated in the Arab world, 
hated by Egypt — becomes popular [as a consequence]." He adds, "It's a 
mistake. I think it was our mistake."
Hamas, known to the outside world chiefly as a group that glorifies 
suicide bombings, is known inside Gaza — just as Hezbollah is known 
inside Lebanon — also for providing social services and aid to the 
dispossessed. Also frequently overlooked: The group first came to power 
in Gaza by winning a 2006 election over the Fatah party notorious for 
corruption. The electoral victory flummoxed Israel, Washington and 
Fatah, which was driven out of Gaza by force of arms the following year. 
(See pictures of Hamas recruitment day.)
The blockade followed, and remained in place until the Mavi Marmara 
shattered the status quo, and set Israel groping for a new policy. One 
well-connected former defense official suggests essentially writing Gaza 
off. Giora Eiland, a retired major general chosen to head one narrow 
inquiry into the day's events, said in an interview with TIME that 
Israel could end the sea blockade by permitting sea cargo only from 
"trusted countries." With Gaza reliably supplied by sea, Israel could 
permanently seal off its land portals into the territory. That would 
mean walking away from its legal obligations as an occupation force, 
inviting yet more international opprobrium, but has the appeal of making 
the Gaza Strip someone else's problem. "Israel made a move five years 
ago when it evacuated the settlements," Eiland says. "But unfortunately 
it failed to get rid of the responsibility for what's going on in Gaza."

 Until the flotilla fiasco,
uh? C'è qualcosa che non quadra. Non si può saltare dalla fase uno
alla fase cinque in un solo colpo...