Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Zvi Zamir intervistato da Haaretz

Su Munich..ovviamente...parliamo dell'ex capo del Mossad.
Preventive measures
By Yossi Melman
In a quiet, somewhat monotonous voice, rather as if he were delivering
a prepared speech, the former head of the Mossad espionage agency, Zvi
Zamir, debunks myths and beliefs that have taken root as facts in the
Israeli public consciousness for some three decades. No, he says. The
assassinations of Palestinian terrorists after the 1972 Munich
Olympics were not an act of revenge. "There was no order given by
Golda [Meir, the prime minister at the time] to exact revenge," he
emphasizes. It was less a case of looking for those who had been
involved in the attack, he explains, and more a desire to strike at
the infrastructure of the terrorist organizations in Europe - "their
offices, liaison people, means of transportation, their
representatives." 
The term "liquidation" is not in Zamir's dictionary. Throughout the
interview he keeps using "the prevention of future threats." In other
words, he claims that terrorists who were killed by Mossad agents were
"not involved or connected with the planning or the execution of the
murder of the Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games. We reached the
conclusion that we had no choice but to start with preventive
measures. This decision was made," Zamir continues, because "Israeli
civilians in their travels abroad, and Israeli installations, were not
protected and even when the European authorities arrested the
terrorists, they immediately surrendered to their entreaties and
demands, and released them. As far as the terrorist organizations and
groups were concerned, there was no risk for them in attacking Israeli
targets." 
This is the second interview Zamir has given since he was appointed
head of the Mossad in September 1968, replacing Meir Amit. Zamir held
the post for six years; his successor was Yitzhak Hofi. Zamir's
six-year tenure was marked by the struggle against Palestinian
terrorism; efforts to obtain information regarding the intentions of
Arab states concerning another war (after their defeat in 1967);
immigrant operations aimed at bringing the Jews of Syria to Israel,
via Lebanon, and at bringing Iraqi Jews to Israel overland by way of
Iran; and provision of Israeli aid to the campaign of the Kurds in
Iraq and to that of the Christians in southern Sudan. 
Zamir paid secret visits to both Iraq and Sudan, thus continuing the
tradition by which the Mossad chief spends time in the field,
including enemy states, and closely monitors the operations on which
he sends his people. 
Zamir gave his first interview six years ago to the Jewish-Swiss
producer Arthur Cohn, producer of the film "One Day in September,"
which won the Academy Award for best documentary in 2000. At that time
Zamir was interviewed mainly about what happened during the Munich
Games themselves, events that he had to watch helplessly and which
ended in a botched rescue operation by the Bavarian police: The
Israeli hostages were murdered, but not all the terrorists were
killed. Now, for the first time, he comments also on the assassination
campaign after the Olympics, which he led. The catalyst for this
interview: Steven Spielberg's new film "Munich." 
A chance to clarify
The Mossad recently permitted several of its former senior personnel
to be interviewed for documentary films about the events in Munich in
1972, as part of a public relations campaign in the wake of
Spielberg's film. Was Zamir also asked to contribute his version? "The
reason I am giving an interview is my wish to explain and clarify the
whole background of what really happened." 
Zamir does not reveal his feelings toward Spielberg, but he is
unquestionably angry. It is not anger that stems from personal
affront. Its source lies in a genuine belief that "Munich" does an
injustice to Mossad personnel, to Israel and to the struggle against
terrorism. "I read that Spielberg hopes to get the Oscar for the film.
In my opinion, if he deserves a citation, it is one of opprobrium." 
Did the film thrill you? 
Zamir: "I see it as a cowboy movie. It did not thrill me. Spielberg is
of course a name that arouses curiosity, but I understand that the
film has not done well in Israel, and rightly so. The Israelis, who
understand the subject, know that the film does not reflect what
really happened." 
In what sense does it not reflect the events? 
"It is a disgrace that Spielberg compares Golda Meir to terrorist
leaders in Lebanon. For quite a lengthy period Golda rejected our
proposals - of the Mossad, Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet
[security service] - for operations against terrorism in Europe. She
hoped the Europeans would be vigilant and would take action themselves
against Palestinian terrorism aimed at Israel." 
What else bothers you in the film? 
"The 'sages' behind the film do not explain the blow, the shock that
Munich delivered to all our conceptions. Those things were pushed out
of the film in order to make room for operational depictions based on
the director's fertile imagination." 
And it didn't happen as he depicts it? 
"Of course not. He depicts the Mossad fighters as a gang of Englishmen
and Frenchmen - of mercenary types who take on the mission in return
for $200,000 or $300,000. And then there is the story of the squad
leader, a certain 'Avner,' who never existed." 
To show how sensitive Golda Meir was to human life and how she was not
obsessed with vengeance, Zamir relates the following anecdote which,
he says, has never before been made public: "In some of my
conversations with Golda, she expressed her concern that our people
might be involved in illegal actions on European soil. It was indeed
unavoidable, but illegal. Therefore, I suggested that Golda meet with
some of my people, so she could see who they are and draw her own
impression. She once told me: 'We are actually hitting people who were
never sentenced in a trial.' I felt that she might be having
hesitations and doubts about the judgment of the people who were doing
the work, who were taking part in the operations, and so I decided
that Golda should meet them. 
"When the opportunity arose I brought to a meeting with her one of the
people who had just returned from an operation, which he had carried
out almost independently, alone. He was responsible for a certain
sensitive action. He was a member of a pioneer youth movement, who
immigrated to Israel. A kibbutz member, a physician, Anglo-Saxon in
origin. Golda knew me and maybe one or two others who worked in the
Mossad, but she did not get to know the majority. So I wanted her to
form her own impression of the people, to place her trust in us and to
see the people to whom the mission was entrusted. 
"He spoke Hebrew with an accent, just like her. Golda heard him out.
She did not say much, but I saw in her eyes that he had made a
powerful impression on her. Later Golda visited his kibbutz and ran
into him by chance. She was so moved that she called me afterward to
tell me. And he is only one example of our human quality. Not
mercenaries and not Spielberg-type clowns." 
Munich turning point
The conversation takes place on the lushly green lawn of Zamir's home
in Zahala, a suburb north of Tel Aviv. "My wife, Rina, and I planted
the grass with our own hands 50 years ago," he says with obvious
pride. The Zamirs will soon be moving to a new home, close to their
children and grandchildren. This is a modest home, simply furnished,
which evokes times past, a different Israel, when being rich was not
considered a great honor. 
Zahala was originally the neighborhood of the country's security
establishment. Zamir's neighbors included Major Generals Ezer Weizman
and Mordechai Hod (both commanders of the air force) and Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan. Wandering around the lawn is a fat, vastly
contented cat, which the Zamirs adopted. "More precisely, he adopted
us," Zamir says. "I think he is a grandson, or maybe a great-grandson,
of a cat that hung around in Moshe Dayan's yard." 
Zamir, 81, was born in Poland and arrived in Palestine with his
parents at the age of seven months, in 1925. At the age of 18 he
joined the Palmah, the commando unit of the pre-1948 Haganah defense
force, fought in the War of Independence and remained in the Israel
Defense Forces, rising to the rank of major general. His last IDF
post, in 1966, was GOC Southern Command, after which he was appointed
IDF attache in Britain. He thus missed both the Six-Day War - the war
that enhanced the myth of the generals - and the postwar euphoria.
Nevertheless, in September 1968, the prime minister, Levi Eshkol,
named him chief of the Mossad, successor to the charismatic Meir Amit.
When Zamir, known as "Zvika" to his friends, took over the Mossad, he
discovered that Israel was up to its neck in a war against terrorism.
In January 1969 Palestinian terrorists hijacked an El Al plane to
Algeria and for the first time forced the Israeli government to
capitulate to their demands. At the end of 1969 terrorists attacked
the El Al counter at the airport in Athens. "Until Munich, the line
Israel followed was guided by the assumption that the European states
would not allow this terrorism to be perpetrated in their countries
and would not permit the wave of plane hijackings." 
In other words, Israel's working assumption was that there was no need
for action by you, by Israeli intelligence? 
"That is correct - that there was no need for illegal Israeli activity
in Europe. We - the Mossad, Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet -
believed, on the basis of what we knew, that the Palestinian
organizations, such as the organization of Wadia Hadad and Black
September, which was actually run by the Palestine Liberation
Organization, viewed terrorism in Europe as being relatively easy to
perpetrate. Easier than infiltrating into Israel across the borders
with neighboring states, and also more effective. Using terror, they
wanted to besiege Israel: to strike at the airlines by hijacking
planes. They wanted to place the Palestinian 'holocaust' on the world
agenda, to make it known to the world. 
"We, who understood this, tried to persuade Golda of the need to
respond and operate abroad, too. But Golda rebuffed all our proposals.
She did not want to be dragged into anything by us, even though there
were cabinet ministers, such as Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon, who
supported us. But Golda believed that the European states would wake
up in the light of the terrorist offensive on their soil and take
action by themselves." 
And did they? 
"No. And by taking action, we meant intelligence - not police -
treatment of terrorism. But they didn't do it. Some countries even
refused to allow the El Al security guards to be armed. European
intelligence had no idea what was going on in the Arab states. They
did not know and did not understand. They had no sources and they did
not speak the language. The European services also lost their
deterrent capability. Even when they uncovered and arrested
terrorists, they immediately released them the moment one of their
planes was hijacked or they received threats. I remember a
conversation with the head of one security service, who told me:
General Zamir, you are trying to drag us into this." 
And you were better prepared than them? 
"Certainly. We believed that we had to prepare for the worst and we
improved our sources of information. That was a critical major
effort." 
A gift from the Italians
Can you give me an example of Israeli capability as compared with the
Europeans' inaction? 
"Yes, although this is an event that happened after Munich. We
received information about an intention by terrorists to down an El Al
plane lifting off from Fiumicino Airport in Rome using Strella
missiles. We identified the terrorists' arrival in Italy and, with
many difficulties, kept them under surveillance. They entered an
apartment building that overlooked the runway. When I saw the location
I immediately ordered the plane's takeoff - it was on the way to New
York - to be delayed." 
You were on the scene, in Rome? 
"Yes. I was with a team of six or eight who managed the operation. The
problem was that it was a building of 50 or 100 apartments and we did
not know which apartment the terrorists were in. I decided that the
Italian security service had to be informed immediately. I called the
head of intelligence, a Sicilian general whom I knew and was friendly
with, and I told him I was on my way to him about an urgent matter. He
was surprised to see me in jeans, because in our meetings I always
wore a suit and tie. I told him what we knew. He was stunned. 
"I asked only one favor of him: that if Strella missiles were found in
the apartment, to let me have one. Our people wanted very much to get
to know the missile. The general said: But we will need the missile as
evidence. I told him that if he were to need it in court, I promised
to give it back. He agreed and informed the security service, who sent
men to the apartment immediately. They found one Arab there and
Strella missiles wrapped in packages. The others, another four or five
people, were in a nearby cafe, and our people, who were following
them, informed the Italians, who arrested them. 
"The Italian general thanked me, even though he didn't really like us
operating in Italy, and promised that if their guilt would be proved
in court, they would rot in jail for many years. But what happened was
that a few months later the Palestinians hijacked a plane and the
Italians gave in and released them. Our problem was that Israelis were
exposed to attack, while the terrorists knew that their comrades would
get them released. The European states did not want to and could not
deal with the problem." 
Some time after the operation, in 1974, an old Dakota transport plane
of the Italian air force crashed. Fifteen years later, in 1989, a
judge was appointed to investigate the circumstances of the crash and
found that the Mossad blew up the plane, to avenge the Italians'
release of the terrorists. Zamir says the charge is groundless.
Nevertheless, the investigative magistrate issued arrest warrants for
Zamir and for Asa Lappin, both of them Mossad liaison officers with
the Italian intelligence services. Only three years later did an
Italian court refute the charge. 
'Horrific spectacle'
As soon as the report came in that Palestinian terrorists had seized
Israeli athletes in Munich as hostages, Zamir rushed to the Knesset
for an emergency meeting with the prime minister. Other participants
in the meeting were the director of Military Intelligence, Eli Zeira,
Shin Bet chief Yosef Harmelin, and a few ministers. "It became clear
very quickly that it would not be possible to organize a military unit
that would be able to board a plane and reach the Olympic Village in
daylight, before dark, in order to get acquainted with the territory,"
Zamir explains. 
Then, after Golda Meir spoke with German Chancellor Willy Brandt, it
also became clear that the German Constitution prohibited foreigners
from carrying out military operations on German soil. Thus the Germans
were unable to allow an Israeli force - the ultra-elite Sayeret Matkal
commando unit, which just five months earlier had gained world renown
after freeing the passengers of a Sabena plane that had been hijacked
to Lod Airport - to carry out the rescue operation. Zamir adds that
Golda Meir suggested that the defense minister and the chief of the
Mossad go to Munich. Zamir was not eager to do so, but agreed. 
(In Ron Maiberg's documentary "Munich: Operation Bayonet," which was
screened on Israel's Channel 2 about 10 days ago, Rafi Eitan, a former
senior Mossad man, claimed that Zamir had no experience in combating
terrorism and therefore suggested that he accompany the Mossad chief
to Munich. Eitan did not bother to mention that by then he had not
been in the Mossad for some time, because Zamir did not want his
services, and in any event, even if he had gone to Munich, he would
not have been able to save the Israeli athletes.) 
In the end, Dayan stayed in Israel. He feared a failure that could
harm his image, and persuaded Golda Meir that information about his
arrival - which would not be kept secret because of the many
journalists who were in Munich to cover both the Olympics and the
kidnapping - was liable to prompt the terrorists to kill the hostages.
Thus a special El Al flight departed for Munich carrying Zvi Zamir and
Victor Cohen, who headed the Shin Bet's interrogations branch and,
along with Dayan, had held the contacts with the terrorists who
hijacked the Sabena plane. 
The story of the German fiasco, as Zamir and Cohen witnessed it in
Munich, has been told many times and was skillfully documented in
Arthur Cohn's film. Zamir says only that one particular image has been
etched in his consciousness for all time: the bound Israeli athletes
being led by the armed terrorists to the helicopters that were waiting
in the Olympic Village, as thousands of participants in the Olympic
Games and media representatives watched mutely. "To see that on German
soil was a terrible sight. I told Victor that if this horrific
spectacle that we were watching would lead to the athletes' release,
that would be our consolation." 
Zamir: "Munich was a shock for us. A turning point. What we had
foreseen and expected, happened. Now it was clear to everyone,
including the opponents and to Golda Meir as well, that the Europeans
would not do what was called for. The cabinet held a discussion about
how to proceed. In the discussion I said that we in the Mossad would
do our best to integrate into the policy of defending Israeli
facilities and Israeli citizens abroad." 
But the liquidation operations were about offense, not defense. 
"There is no defense without an offensive foundation. We knew the
modus operandi of the terrorist organizations, and because they did
not send battalions of terrorists to Europe, but individuals, we
decided to deal with their liaison people, their officers, their
representatives, their means of transportation in Europe. But we
viewed this as part of the defensive alignment and deterrence that
would put an end to open Palestinian terrorism in Europe. And I think
that in the war which developed in the wake of Munich, we succeeded in
putting an end to the type of terror that was perpetrated." 
Because of your actions? 
"Not only. Of course, it was not just 10 or 12 Mossad people, or
whatever number we were - and we were few - who brought about order in
Europe. Gradually it became clear to the local services that it is
their duty to fight terrorism and put an end to it. It was joint
work." 
Was there no element of vengeance in the decision to take action
against the terrorists? 
"No. We were not engaged in vengeance. We are accused of having been
guided by a desire for vengeance. That is nonsense. What we did was to
concretely prevent terrorism in the future. We acted against those who
thought that they would continue to perpetrate acts of terror. I am
not saying that those who were involved in Munich were not marked for
death. They definitely deserved to die. But we were not dealing with
the past; we concentrated on the future." 
Did you not receive a directive from Golda Meir along the lines of
"take revenge on those responsible for Munich"? 
"Golda abhorred the necessity that was imposed on us to carry out the
operations. Golda never told me to 'take revenge on those who were
responsible for Munich.' No one told me that." 
How was it decided who was slated to be assassinated? 
"Without going into operational considerations, I will say that there
was a thorough examination within the system." 
And what about Committee X, the famous ministerial body that was
informed about each proposed liquidation and acted as a kind of
special court for executions? 
"Who said there was a Committee X?" 
Was there no such body? 
"I will not comment on that. I will say only that the whole issue of
whom to strike at was given meticulous consideration and the probable
consequences were evaluated. What guided us was [the need] to strike
at the infrastructures of terrorism and at those who might attack
Israelis in the future." 
The hitches
Apart from Lillehammer - the Norwegian town in which a Moroccan waiter
was mistakenly killed - were there other hitches which the public does
not know about? 
"Yes. There were hitches. We were always careful not to hurt innocent
people, only the target we chose, the accused and not others. However,
there was one case in which the rule was not kept and someone whom we
did not want to hurt was hurt. He was simply not supposed to have been
there." 
What was the role in the operation of Mike Harari, the head of the
operations division, the Caesarea Division? 
"I will not comment on specific names." 
What caused the failure at Lillehammer? 
"It was a coincidence of erroneous information, which went with an
amazing facial resemblance between the wanted person and the person
who was attacked mistakenly." 
There were reports in the past that the Mossad had an informer who
deliberately misled you and brought you to Ahmed Bouchiki instead of
Hassan Salameh. 
"I will not talk about operational details. But there was no
deliberate deception." 
Did you examine the matter well? 
"After every operation there were debriefings to draw lessons." 
Was Salameh a central target not only in Lillehammer? 
"He was an important target, because he wielded influence in the PLO's
operational alignment. But there were other important operations,
which did not earn the attention they deserved. There was the firing
of rockets at Wadia Hadad's house in Beirut, for example. Those people
started to be concerned about their safety and some of them went
underground and were less preoccupied about planning attacks against
us." 
Was Yasser Arafat also a target for assassination in that period? 
"The question of how far to go always comes up. We dealt with an
operational infrastructure and not with the political level. Those who
engaged in political discussions did not kill Israelis." 
Why did you, along with those responsible for the failure at
Lillehammer, not resign? 
"Why was resignation called for?" 
Because there was a major failure. An innocent man was killed and
Mossad agents were caught and sentenced to prison. 
"Regarding the failure we apologized and paid the family compensation.
It was clear to me then that I was doing a mission. If you send
someone on a dangerous and complicated mission, you have to take into
account that mistakes can be made. If my superiors had thought that I
should be fired, they would have fired me." 
Spielberg's film talks about contrition and pangs of conscience
experienced by some of those who took part in the operations. Were
there such feelings? 
"Wars are not pretty. It was not simple for those who did it. People
shared fears. But I spoke to them before the mission, during the
mission and afterward, too, and I knew them all. Thanks to their high
quality, they did what they did out of understanding and awareness and
trust in their commanders. I admire them and they deserve to be part
of the Israeli record and not through crappy films. They should be
thanked and told that they achieved the mission that was set for
them." 
There are those who say that the Mossad's struggle against terrorism
diverted attention from the most important goal of intelligence -
collecting information about the military capability of the Arab
states and issuing a warning about a war - and that this led to the
blunder in the Yom Kippur War. 
"No. The Mossad was capable of dealing with a number of missions and
coping on several levels: immigration of Jews from various countries,
preparations for war and also the struggle against terrorism. It's
true that it is impossible to do everything, and therefore during my
time, the effort my predecessors made to hunt down Nazi war criminals
was greatly diminished. But anyone who reads the report of the Agranat
Commission, which investigated the intelligence situation before the
war, knows that the Mossad deserved praise. In my view, the greatest
achievement of the Mossad in my term of office was the information
about the preparations made by Egypt and Syria to go to war and the
warning we provided about the war. That, of course, is the achievement
of everyone in the Mossad, not mine."
-- 
E' in discussione su it.news.gruppi la RFD 
di it.politica.internazionale moderato

 
Si e infatti si è visto quanto abbiano funzionato le loro misure preventive,
a momenti nel 1973 Israele spariva e il Mossad non era venuto minimamente a
sapere del piano di attacco arabo.

Ah poi c'è l'episodio della mini-beslan israeliana dei tardi anni '70 quando
tre militanti palestinesi presero in ostaggio una scuola intera e prima di
essere abattuti uccisero 60 alunni, un bel successo della politica
preventiva del Mossad.

 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maalot_Massacre
leggi leggi è del 1974 mi sono anche sbagliato

sapere del piano di attacco arabo.
Alla fine delle ostilitą il 16/10 Tsahal controllava 775 km quadrati
di Siria . 1130 km quadrati di Egitto, aveva distrutto il 70% dei
mezzi corazzati  egiziani...ed era arrivata a km da Damasco,
Studia, imbecille.
"a momenti spariva"
Che patetico idiota...
MMAX


 "a momenti spariva"
Coglione la sai che differenza c'è tra un servizio segreto e un esercito?
Quanta parte delle riserve israeliane era mobilitata in previsione
dell'attacco arabo di ottobre? Sono andati a pescarli nelle sinagoghe tanto
la cosa era inattesa il confine con l'Egitto era sorvegliato da neppure
mille effettivi. Studia tu coglione.

 "a momenti spariva"
senza contare che sono stati fermati e protetti dagli americani se no
Israele spariva sul serio per la risposta sovietica (probabilmente
nucleare)