Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: perche' la destra viene emarginata in Israele

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3878505,00.html
Martin Sherman
Consider the following remarkable facts regarding Israel’s parliamentary 
history:
(a) For 20 of the 28 years between 1977- when the Likud first won the 
elections on a platform of "Greater Israel - and 2005 - when a Likud 
government withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in stark contradiction to its 
electoral pledges - the Israeli government was headed by a prime 
minister from the Likud.
(b) When the Likud came to power, the entire Sinai Peninsula was under 
Israeli control, any suggestion that Israel might evacuate the Jordan 
Valley was virtually unthinkable, any thought of dividing Jerusalem was 
tantamount to blasphemy, and any hint of withdrawal from the Golan was 
almost akin to treason.
(c) Yet today, over a third of a century since Menachem Begin’s dramatic 
electoral victory, all the above are either already faits accomplis or 
are widely considered inevitable in the not-to-distant future.
This clearly demonstrates that although the "right-wing" consistently 
wins elections, it never really gets into power. It is a phenomenon that 
can only be explained by the existence of some influence extraneous to 
the political system that imposes policy outcomes that diverge radically 
from those that should be expected from regular operation of political 
routine.
As such it is a phenomenon that has virtually emptied the Israeli 
democratic process of any significance.
Thus, Yitzhak Rabin who in1992 was elected on the basis a series of 
hawkish "nays," radically switched his policy mid-term, transforming 
them all to dovish "yeas" which begot the Oslowian fiasco. Even more 
dramatically, Ariel Sharon, elected on a platform opposing any notion of 
unilateral withdrawal, adopted precisely such policy, advocated by his 
Labor party rival and rejected by the electorate.
Far-sighted wisdom?
Two claims not infrequently espoused to account for these cases of 
flagrant disregard for electoral pledges must be summarily repudiated.
The first is that they were the result of international - particularly 
US - pressure. However, nothing could be further from the truth. In the 
case of Oslo, the entire unfortunate process was covertly conceived 
exclusively by Israelis and Palestinians in remote Scandinavia without 
any international coercion. In fact, the PLO, cosignatory to the accords 
that emerged from this ill-considered initiative, was still listed a 
terror organization by the US governments at the time of their 
conclusion. Likewise, the disastrous disengagement was not a product of 
American pressure. Quite the reverse, Washington initially opposed 
unilateral initiatives and had to be convinced by Sharon as to the 
merits of the idea.
The second claim that needs to be dispelled is that these mid-term 
policy reversals reflect some far-sighted wisdom in dovish policies of 
territorial concessions and political appeasement that made the 
post-election abandonment of more hawkish political platforms inevitable.
Indeed, one of the most astonishing aspects of the Israeli political 
system is of ostensibly "hawkish" politicians adopting, once in power, 
"dovish" policies they previously repudiated. After all, these policies 
have consistently and continuously proved disastrous failures.
So if the most dramatic political initiatives over the last two decades 
cannot be attributed to international pressure, or to the far-sighted 
wisdom of Israeli leaders, or the preferences of the Israeli electorate, 
what can it be ascribed to?
Trinity of influence
The answer is to be found more in Israel's sociological structure than 
its political mechanisms. More specifically, it lies in composition of 
its civil society elites who control the legal establishment, dominate 
the mainstream media, and hold the sway in academia (specifically in the 
social sciences and humanities faculties - where the politically-correct 
dominates.) These groups comprise an interactive trinity of influence 
that in effect dominates the socio-political process in Israel, sets the 
direction of the national agenda at the strategic level and imposes, 
with great effectiveness, its views on elected politicians and the 
general public.
Thus, for example, the legal elite can impede any assertive initiative 
that the elected polity may wish to implement. Similarly, the media 
elite can promote any concessionary initiative that the elected polity 
may be loath to implement. And when the stamp of professional approval 
is required for either, the amenable academic elite is ever-ready to 
provide it.
It requires little analytical acumen to identify that these were the 
mechanisms that generated most of the major political processes over the 
last two decades. Accordingly, the ability to understand the political 
realities in Israel is contingent on understanding the worldview and the 
cost-benefit analysis of these powerful and influential elites.
For them, the approval of peer groups abroad is far more important in 
determining their agenda than the approval of Israeli citizens at home. 
Invitations to deliver keynote speeches at high-profile conventions, 
sought-after appointments as visiting scholars at prestigious 
institutes, lucrative grants for research projects are far more 
forthcoming if one in identified as empathetic to the Palestinian 
narrative than as committed to the Zionist one.
This reality has far reaching effects. For example, it prevents the 
adherents and all those under their considerable influence from 
portraying the Arabs in general, and the Palestinians in particular, in 
their true light. After all, such an assertive portrayal would make the 
dominant elites' worldview look outrageously irresponsible. They are 
thus compelled to depict the Arab/Palestinian side in a far more 
favorable light than reality warrants while portraying the Israeli side 
in a far more negative one - otherwise there would be no justification 
in handing over areas of vital strategic importance to Arab/Palestinian 
control.
Grave consequences
After all, to acknowledge Arab brutality and backwardness, to focus on 
the repression of women, the suppression of dissidents, oppression of 
homosexuals, to draw attention to the harassing of critical journalists 
and the hounding of political opponents would gravely undermine the 
prudence of any policy advocating establishment of a Palestinian entity 
barely a mile from the national parliament, overlooking Ben-Gurion 
airport, adjacent to the Trans-Israel highway and atop crucial water 
resources.
It is difficult to overstate the gravity of the consequences that the 
imposition of elite political preferences on Israeli policy has - for 
both the preservation of Israeli security and Israel democracy.
Firstly, with regard to security, the aversion to drawing attention to 
the real nature of the Arab world prevents Israel from persuasively 
presenting its case and creating international understanding for the 
dire dangers that it faces in contending with such adversaries.
Secondly, with regard to democracy, the dramatic elite-induced policy 
reversals since the early 90s constitute a powerful disincentive for 
partaking in the electoral. For what is the point of voting any party or 
person into power if they end up implementing precisely what was 
rejected by the voters?
Contending with this phenomenon is no easy matter within the constraints 
of democratic norms, and the operational details of a strategy to 
address it are beyond the scope of this article. However, whatever form 
such strategy may take, its point of departure would need to be an 
accurate articulation of the problem and its overriding objective to 
publicly expose those responsible for the dangerous distortions they 
impose on the nations political mechanisms, unveil their myopia and/or 
their malice, undermine their standing, and erode their status. This is 
the only way to neutralize their influence and contain enormous damage 
that they inflict on the nation.

 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3878505,00.html
Emarginata? Ma non è al governo?
PP

 Emarginata? Ma non è al governo?
con il programma della sinistra, si'.

 con il programma della sinistra, si'.
Mi pari capzioso: la destra ha governato Israele per buona parte degli
scorsi 30 anni. Non mi pare una situazione definibile come
"emarginazione".
PP

Palmiro Pangloss ha scritto:

IMHO avete ragione entrambi. La destra ha vinto quasi sempre, ed è 
incontestabilmente vero. Ma il programma della Grande Israele non ha 
vissuto nemmeno per un giorno, poi è stato anche ufficialmente rigettato 
dal Likud. E i gruppi che ancora lo difendono sono diventati poco più 
che folkloristici.
La destra politica ha vinto. Ma la politica destra ha perso, credo per 
sempre. Almeno sul piano territoriale.
Sul piano culturale, le cose sono ben più complicate.
Tb (bieco illuminista)
-- 
"A vote is like a rifle, it's usefulness depends upon the character of
the user."
~ Theodore Roosevelt

 Sul piano culturale, le cose sono ben più complicate.
Non si puo' dire semplicemente che la destra israeliana è
semplicemente cambiata?
PP

 semplicemente cambiata?
leggendo certi scritti di Jabotinsky, parlerei piu' che altro di ritorno 
alle origini.

 alle origini.
Non conosco gli scritti di Jabotinsky, ma a maggior ragione allora non
è emarginata.
PP