Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: A proposito di missili nucleari in Europa (Center for Nonproliferation studies)

Per chi vuole capire come la questione Ucraina cambia o non cambia il dispiegamento di ordigni nucleari tattici in Europa.
 
Si tenga conto che Putin ha fatto coincidere una eseercitzione con missili nucleari tattici, con la riunione NATO nel Galles, quindi il messaggio e' chiaro. Mosca intende uscire dal trattato INF e/o rinegoziarne uno nuovo.
 
 
Qui:
 
http://www.nonproliferation.org/nato-nuclear-dilemma/
 
 
Do' la conclusione:
 
The list of concerns about the status and future of the INF treaty is not limited to the suspected intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. There are also concerns about a new strategic missile, R-26, which was tested several times at an intermediate distance. Legally, this is not a violation because that missile classifies as strategic, since it was at least once tested to a range above 5,500 kilometers, but some suspect that the true mission of that missile is for substrategic ranges (on the other hand, the flights to shorter distances could have been simply intended to test missile defense penetration capabilities). Regardless of the legal status of the issue, that missile could also become a subject for discussion in Wales.
 
Furthermore, there are suspicions that the new tactical missile system, Iskander, which can use both ballistic and cruise missiles, might have a range longer than allowed under the INF Treaty. Some studies have claimed that the ballistic missile version of Iskander could have the range of 700 kilometers; the maximum range of the cruise missile version is unknown, but it is widely believed that its design is based on a sea-launched cruise missile, which has the range of 2,000 kilometers. There is no legal case against this system, but these suspicions will certainly contribute to a discussion of whether and how NATO should react to the apparent unraveling of the INF Treaty.
 
Whether the high likelihood of eventual Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the suspicions about intermediate-range capability of its new tactical missiles warrant a change in NATO's nuclear posture remains to be seen and could become a subject for a serious discussion at the summit. Any response will have to take into account financial and political limitations: a decision to develop and deploy new intermediate-range missiles would involve high costs, which the alliance probably cannot afford at the moment. Moreover, convincing European publics to accept a new deployment of nuclear weapons was difficult enough in the 1980s when the United States successfully used this plan to leverage Russia into withdrawing its own intermediate-range forces. This is virtually impossible to imagine today, not to mention that carrying out such a step could revive the very dangerous missile stand-off of the 1980s, which the INF Treaty resolved. In short, new NATO deployments of the systems INF bans do not seem likely in the current circumstances.
 
Commentaries and analysis by American nongovernmental experts have almost uniformly argued against deploying new missiles. In the end, the United States and its allies still have unquestionable superiority in long-range conventional strike assets, in particular in air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, which are not subject to the INF Treaty. Thus, escalation to the nuclear level will be not only dangerous and expensive, but also unnecessary, especially since conventional assets are more usable and thus more pertinent than nuclear ones. There are also reasons to believe that Russia is also shifting emphasis to long-range conventional weapons.
 
Under normal circumstances, the likelihood that the United States and NATO would assume a cautious attitude and refrain from an immediate reaction to concerns about Russian behavior with regard to intermediate-range missiles would be high. Of course, the crisis in and around Ukraine changes much in this regard. It is much more difficult to advocate caution while some alliance members will likely demand a substantive response to the perceived new challenge. Financial constraints remain the strongest obstacle to any change of posture to counter Russian INF developments.
 
Conclusion
 
The Wales Summit will most likely mark the end of debates about retaining US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Proponents of the continued presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe were strengthened by Russian actions in Ukraine and in regard to the INF Treaty.
 
The stability of NATO nuclear policy will probably last for a number of years. If it is shattered, the jolt may come from a less-discussed direction: Russian efforts to acquire a modern long-range conventional precision-guided capability. Russia already has some capability in that area--Iskander tactical missile systems as well as air- and sea-launched cruise missiles--and many other weapon systems, as well as targeting, command and communication systems, are still under development. These efforts will hardly succeed before the end of this decade, or even early in the next. If Russia acquires that capability, NATO's nuclear policy might have to change again. Conventional weapons are perhaps less glamorous or scary than nuclear ones, but they are more usable and in this sense might represent a more dangerous development. It will be difficult to predict whether NATO will decide to counter in kind--i.e., with conventional weapons--or by enhancing its reliance on nuclear capability, and will likely depend on the vision of the next US president as well as the budget realities of the day.

 
 
Un commento che mi viene a caldo. L'esercitazione missilistica russa ha fatto capire che la NATO non potra' negoziare la restituzione della Crimea.
 
I missili tattici nucleari servono solo in caso di invasione manifesta. Percio' Putin ha scelto la lenta infiltrazione di Forze Speciali, travesite da patrioti., prendendo la NATO alla sprovvista.
 
Sara' interessante vedere se Newport tppera' questo buco militare, cioe' la guerra asimmetrica.
 

 Un commento che mi viene a caldo.
 
"si faccia una domanda e si dia una risposta" (cit.)
Ormai Cirry parla da solo anche su IPI, dopo l'assommoir del cinese...

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Viene confermato che non conviene dare perlas ad porcos.
 
Tuttavia il numero di lurker dell'articolo, conferma la sua importanza.
 
Richiede uno stomaco ed una equanimita', che tu non hai mai avuto.

 On Friday, September 5, 2014 2:26:09 PM UTC+2, Giovannino wrote: > Il giorno venerdì 5 settembre 2014 12:44:06 UTC+2, amalric ha scritto: > > > On Friday, September 5, 2014 5:00:26 AM UTC+2, amalric wrote: > > > > > > Un commento che mi viene a caldo. > > > > "si faccia una domanda e si dia una risposta" (cit.) > > Ormai Cirry parla da solo anche su IPI, dopo l'assommoir del cinese... Viene confermato che non conviene dare perlas ad porcos. Tuttavia il numero di lurker dell'articolo, 
 
dov'è?

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Su Google c'e' un contatore delle views, 'gnurant.

> Su Google c'e' un contatore delle views, 'gnurant.
 
minchia, 18. Da cui togliamo le cinque di chi ha scritto i post successivi.
13 lettori. Per dare un esempio della folla immensa, io ho una trentina di follower via twitter, e di mio non pubblico quasi niente, sono praticamente tutti repost...:D

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Rosica pure compostamente. Per altro lo stai mandando avanti questo thread.
 
Io trovo interessante che ci sia una soglia in cui l'esercito russo possa essere fermato, nonostante i numeri, con missili nucleari.
 
Mi riporta indietro agli anni '80, e alla coraggiosa decisione di Craxi, che stronco' la stupida protesta.