Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: "Al-Qa'eda eurocentrica": il delirio di un ritardato

Sembra incredibile constatare come lo scimunito responsabile del delirio che
posto infra possa esser stato consulente della Cia per il MO; ma questo
radicale travisamento della realtà (basato su pregiudizi da trivio) è stato
scritto da un membro di quella cricca (meglio sarebbe dire "gang") di
"pensatori" che ha messo a ferro e fuoco il mondo (chiamando tutto ciò
"pace" e "libertà"), e che continuerebbe a farlo (nonostante i dolorosi
calci nel culo che la realtà ha loro più volte appioppato) se, per disgrazia
di tutti noi, Bush il Piccolo dovesse vincere le elezioni. Cmq, ad una cosa
questo art. serve: a chiarir*ci* che, nonostante le nostre attuali "buone
relazioni" con gli USA, gli americani non escludono affatto, nel lungo
periodo, uno scontro (forse anche militare) con la UE, e (giustamente) si
stanno lentamente riposizionando in vista dei *due* obiettivi di lunghissimo
periodo: UE e Cina. Sarebbe saggio che la UE, invece di perder tempo con
fenomeni militarmente marginali come il terrorismo islamico, si occupasse
del suo core business: la difesa. Chi aveva riso delle "freedom fries",
farebbe bene a prendere mooolto sul serio il problema delle spese militari
UE (e quindi della fiscalità, da armonizzarsi senza esitazione) e della
politica estera comune ed univoca, "terzista" ed autonoma. Hasta luego.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/883ehetk.a
sp
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/883ehetk.a
sp?pg=2
Holy War in Europe
From the March 29, 2004 issue: Is al Qaeda a Eurocentric organization?
by Reuel Marc Gerecht
03/29/2004, Volume 009, Issue 28
ON AUGUST 26, 1995, a militant Islamic group led by a 24-year-old French
Muslim named Khaled Kelkal attempted to blow one of France's high-speed
trains off its rails. Luckily, the bomb's detonator, which used an ordinary
12-volt battery, failed. Later that fall, other bombs would go off in
France: two in double-decked commuter rail cars in Paris, one in a trash can
along the very bourgeois Avenue de Friedland, another in a Parisian open-air
market, and one more in a provincial Jewish school. In all there were nine
attacks in three months, which killed 10 people and wounded 114.
The bombings in 1995 provoked a widespread awareness for the first time in
France that the country had a radical-Muslim problem, which was increasingly
homegrown and not imported. Kelkal moved to France from Algeria when he was
one month old; not known for being religious in his troubled youth, he
became an Islamic militant in a French jail, as have hundreds of highly
Westernized French Muslims. Many more thoroughly secularized French Muslims,
who did not have crime-filled youths, have become Islamic radicals,
culturally at war with the society that made them. Zacarias Moussaoui, the
"twentieth hijacker" of 9/11, is the most notorious example of an areligious
Frenchman who became intoxicated with the holy-war ideology preached in many
radical mosques throughout Western Europe.
This phenomenon of highly Westernized Muslims and converted Christians
becoming radicalized believers has happened throughout Western Europe.
Relatively few Turks have joined radical Islamic organizations allied with
Osama bin Laden's
al Qaeda, even though Turkish fundamentalists are numerous and often
hardcore. At home and abroad, they are perhaps more numerous and better
organized than are fundamentalists of any other nationality. But the Turks
who have been arrested for association with al Qaeda usually share one bond:
They were either born or raised in Germany and are culturally more German
than they are Turkish Muslim. These young men are part of what the
Iranian-French scholar Farhad Khosrokhavar has called the néo-umma
guerrière--"the new holy-war community of believers" that recognizes neither
national nor ethnic identity nor traditional Islamic values. Their Islam is
"a new type of Nietzscheanism" where suicide and murder become sacred acts
of an elite, self-made race of believers who want to bring on a purifying
Apocalypse.
A small cadre of European scholars, mirrored by a small group of European
internal-security and intelligence officials, have followed the growth of
Islamic radicalism in Europe for nearly 20 years. They know, even if
European politicians do not, that Europe's most fearsome Muslim true
believers are not products of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, or the
First Gulf War, or the American troop presence in Saudi Arabia after 1990,
or the Algerian civil war, or the Bosnian war, or the strife in Chechnya, or
the Hindu pillaging of mosques, or the war in Afghanistan, or the second
American war against Saddam Hussein, or the globalization of American
culture. These events are banners that men who are already converted to
jihad wave as they march to give battle. The holy warriors in Europe do not
want to see peace in Palestine any more than Hamas's spiritual chief Ahmad
Yassin or Osama bin Laden or Iran's clerical guide Ali Khamenei wants to see
Israelis and Palestinians solve their problems in two separate, peacefully
coexisting states. They do not care about Israeli settlements.
 Europe's jihadists are born from their imperfect assimilation into Western
European societies, from the particular alienation that young Muslim males
experience in Europe's post-Christian, devoutly secular societies. The
phenomenon is vastly more common among Arabs than among African or Asian
Muslims. The reasons why these young, predominantly Arab males are drawn to
the most militant expressions of Islam are complex and always personal. But
their journey--which they usually begin as highly Westernized,
modern-educated youths of little Islamic faith and end as practitioners of
bin Ladenism--is a thoroughly European experience.
The jihadists of Europe have drunk deeply from the virulently anti-American
left-wing currents of Continental thought and mixed it with the Islamic
emotions of 1,400 years of competition with the Christian West. It's a
Molotov cocktail of the third-world socialist Frantz Fanon and the Muslim
Brother Sayyid Qutb. Muslims elsewhere have gone through similar
conversions--the United States, too, has had its Muslim jihadists and will,
no doubt, produce more. And the globalization of this virulent strain of
fundamentalist, usually Saudi-financed, Islam is real and probably getting
worse. But the modern European experience seems much more likely to produce
violent young Muslims than the American. Europe may be competitive with the
worst breeding grounds in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
For Americans, after 9/11, this is obviously not just of academic interest.
For the future of al Qaeda--if al Qaeda is to have a future where killing
Americans en masse remains its transcendent raison d'être--is in Western
Europe. September 11 could not have happened without
a European base of operations.
Though the State Department wasn't particularly discriminating in issuing
visas to Saudis before 9/11, it does a much better job now. The security
review of visas granted to Middle Eastern men will only become more
stringent with time, doing enormous injustice to the innocent and greatly
complicating the operational lives of the guilty. Western European travel
documents--which still allow easy access to the United States--are essential
for al Qaeda and its allied organizations. But obtaining travel-worthy false
European passports for non-state-supported terrorist organizations is
becoming harder and harder (this is particularly true since the European
Union forced the Belgians to implement better control of their passports,
which had been "disappearing" routinely in large numbers). Thus, Islamic
holy-warrior terrorist organizations need European Muslims who can lawfully
obtain Western European passports.
Al Qaeda knew this a long time ago, which is why the recruitment of Muslims
who could travel and operate in the West was a high priority. If al Qaeda or
allied holy-warrior organizations cannot operationally enlist and train
American Muslims to strike within the United States--and the evidence before
and after 9/11 suggests that al Qaeda has done a poor job of finding
American Muslims who need to kill non-Muslim Americans to express their love
of God--then they must enlist European Muslims or risk compromising the most
important element in their recruitment call to holy war. French-born holy
warriors could perhaps spiritually survive bombing France, but it's not the
same as attacking the United States. America is the cutting edge of Western
civilization--not France--and modern Muslim holy warriors want ideally to
terrify and humble their enemy's advance guard, not the more lightly armed,
less threatening troops behind.
WHICH BRINGS US TO SPAIN. It is possible that if the Spanish were to
withdraw from Iraq, they might save themselves from further jihadist attack.
It has been a long time since Spain was the preeminent Christian foe of the
Muslim world. Unlike France, which is still a cultural force in North Africa
(even if, increasingly, it is only a French translation service for American
civilization), Spain is irrelevant to the dreams, aspirations, and hatreds
of Arabs. France has a Muslim population now deeply and permanently anchored
in its national psyche and daily life. Spain does not. And as much as some
Muslim denizens of Spain may hate their non-Muslim neighbors, it is a little
hard to envision even the most historically sensitive Spanish Muslim holy
warrior bombing Madrid repeatedly because of the medieval loss of
"Andalusia" to the Catholic princes of Castille and counts of Barcelona.
Spain could probably walk away from the United States, pillory America as
loudly as possible (anti-Americanism in Spain runs deep and is historically
much more heartfelt than in France), emphasize the glories of Muslim Spain
and sincerely regret its fall, and not get bombed anymore.
The bombings in Spain could easily produce a Europe-wide temptation to duck:
While quietly assisting America in its counterterrorist efforts (the French
have been superb allies in this regard since 9/11), they publicly would take
as much distance as possible from the United States and ratchet up the
"pro-Muslim," "pro-Arab" propaganda. This approach would naturally blend
into Western Europe's current official analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian
confrontation as the crux of all the bad blood between the Muslim world and
the West. It could dovetail nicely with the developing Democratic party
campaign argument depicting Iraq as a mistake, as a digression from the war
on terror that has made counterterrorism more difficult. Muslim holy
warriors might still try to bomb American embassies or businesses in Europe,
which of course could cause numerous European victims, but that would be
better than having European passenger trains blown off their rails or Alpine
highway tunnels firebombed.
President Bush has said that we, the West, are all in this together. But
this simply isn't true. The néo-umma guerrière doesn't really want to strike
Spain, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Germany,
Poland, or even France as much as it wants to bomb the United States. It
would be a delicious irony if small bands of Muslim holy warriors in the
twenty-first century accomplished the opposite of what the Ottomans, the
most powerful of Islam's empires, achieved in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. The latter helped bring the West together; the former may help
tear it apart.
If a Western split doesn't happen, then we will probably have the French to
thank. They know that Zacarias Moussaoui was once upon a time a good
Frenchman. They know that more Khaled Kelkals are being born in the
banlieues. They know that even the most dedicated Muslim holy warriors might
sometimes have to settle for attacking the second best. But then again,
Paris hated losing on Iraq. Many in the French elite--most prominently, the
foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin--want the democratic experiment in
Iraq to fail. With the American loss of Spain and the waffling in Poland,
the French sense victory in Europe. It will be interesting to see whether
France's envy of American hegemony trumps its own experience and fear of
Muslim holy warriors trying to blow their way into heaven.

Ho letto namib quelli come altri articoli da "the weekly standard" i neocons
sono un buon termometro della gigantesca sconfitta che sono state per l'asse
del male vero (quello di Bush) le elezioni spagnole ormai l'Europa
filoamericana o "nuova" Europa per loro è sepolta. Comunque ormai il
pensiero neocon mi sembra bbastanza isolato e Bush ha perso ogni iniziativa
diplomatica a scapito di Francia Germani e Russia che alle prossime sedute
consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU dirigeranno un'orchestra di paesi contro
Bush.

 che a furia di gridare al lupo...
Da un'analisi superficiale dei programmi militari usa per i prossimi 20 anni
emerge chiaramente che sono rivolti a contrastare non la Cina (troppo
indietro tecnologicamente per essere fonte di preoccupazioni reali) ma
l'Europa.

 a écrit dans le message de
news:m6%7c.91852$z23.3...@news3.tin.it...

Appunto, da un'analisi troppo superficiale.

 del suo core business: la difesa. 
siete al delirio da manicomio...
Franz
-- 
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http://www.Mailgate.ORG

 siete al delirio da manicomio...
Tu sei da manicomio perchè se leggessi l'articolo ti renderesti conto anche
tu di che idee circolano in America.


No no caro mio...

 tu di che idee circolano in America.
circolano nelle menti dei deficienti che credono a ste stronzate...


 circolano nelle menti dei deficienti che credono a ste stronzate...
Weekly standard č una rivista conservatrice americana tra le piů autorevoli.

 Weekly standard è una rivista conservatrice americana tra le più autorevoli.
mai sentita nominare...
