Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Chi e`responsabile del petrolio iracheno?

Un altro rapporto del " Iraq Revenue Watch" 
http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org
Questo un estratto da:
http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/reports/020304.pdf
Oil Revenue Accountability in Iraq:
Breaking the Resource Curse OSI Svetlana Tsalik, director of the Open
Society Institute’s Revenue Watch program, told the U.S. Institute of Peace
on January 22 that Iraq’s oil revenues are likely to become a source of
instability if they are not managed in a transparent manner by a government
that the Iraqi people see as legitimate. Tsalik, who has done extensive
studies on oil revenue and transparency issues, described the current
management of Iraqi’s oil revenues as marked by confusion and having
virtually no oversight. She said all oil revenue spending decisions are made
by the U.S. installed Coalition Provisional Administration’s (CPA) Program
Review Board, which is composed almost entirely of CPA appointees. The Board
’s one Iraqi member, Iraq’s Finance Minister Kamel al-Keilani has attended
only two of the Board’s twice weekly meetings, according to Board minutes.
Meanwhile, the Board has spent over 2 billion dollars without any audits or
oversight mechanisms in place.In addition to highlighting the current lack
of transparency and accountability in Iraq, Tsalik pointed out that these
problems are likely to be exacerbated by a combination of economic and
political challenges known as the “resource curse.”
nel post attaccato , l'articolo intero.
Giano
-- 
"Tell people something they know already and they will thank you for it.
Tell them something new and they will hate you for it."
George Monbiot

.Tsalik pointed out that these problems are likely to be exacerbated by a
combination of economic and political challenges known as the “resource
curse.”
2 REVENUE WATCH BRIEFING NO. 5
The resource curse is a paradox faced by resource-rich countries like Iraq
where the natural resource wealth that should propel development actually
results in slower economic growth, increased poverty, higher levels of
corruption, worse governance, and greater potential for violent conflict.
One reason that so many countries suffer from the resource curse is because
natural resource revenues discourage good governance and the absence of good
governance permits poor fiscalpolicy.“The challenge of avoiding the resource
curse in Iraq will be doubly difficult,”Tsalik said. “Even oil-rich places
that look good today, like Norway and Alaska, struggled for years with
inflation,unemployment,and erratic boom-bustcycles.”Tsalik noted that in an
oil-based economy like Iraq’s, the resource curse can weaken the non-oil
sector of the economy as foreign currency for oil floods in and makes
domestic goods more expensive than those produced abroad. Without proper
planning, oil-based economies create non-labor intensive industries that
generate only a small number of jobs that require high skills and training.
In developing countries, these jobs are often filled by foreigners.
Meanwhile, other sectors of the economy with er and over all unemployment
increases. Finally, because oil prices are unsteady, any medium to long-term
budget planning will be extremely difficult for an Iraqi economy based
largely on oil.Beyond these economic effects, Tsalik explained that the
resource curse can also create or reinforce significant political
problems.Having natural resources exclusively in the hands of undemocratic
governments gives unaccountable leaders enormous power. Such governments do
not have to compete in elections and are not accountable for choices about
taxation, spending policies, and use of oil revenues. And, as Saddam-era
Iraq and Saudi Arabia demonstrate, unaccountable governments can use their
control of oil revenues to buy off influential group stop reserve and
entrench their rule.Tsalik added that the lack of good governance in
oil-rich states like Iraq enables government to keep oil revenue information
secret and pursue poor fiscal policies that provide little public
benefit.Tsalik then examined the potential problems of the resource curse
given Iraq’s history and its current situation. She said Iraq does not have
a tradition of fiscal transparency or accountability.During Saddam’s long
rule, government budgets were a state secret and any disclosure was punished
with either imprisonment or death.Under tight UN sanctions and Saddam’s
reign, corruption flourished and continues to thrive after his fall. Iraq’s
Oil Ministry recently estimateds that 25 percent of Iraqi oil meant for
domestic consumption is smuggled out of the country.
O I L R E V E N U E A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y I N I R A Q : B R E A K I N
G T H E R E S O U R C E C U R S E
The unemployment rate in Iraq continues to range from 60 to 70 percent.
Narrow, oil-based development policies will do little to alleviate this
massive joblessness. Most Iraqis who do have jobs work at one of 192
state-owned enterprises. Tsalik said that many of these businesses are
likely to be privatized or restructured soon, thus further increasing
unemployment.The International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) mandated
by the UN in May, and comprised of representatives from the UN, the IMF, the
World Bank, and the Arab Development Fund, finally has started to operate
aftermonths of wrangling with the CPA over how much monitoring and
enforcement power it should have. Yet Tsalik said it remains to be seen
whether the IAMB will have the authority and the resources to be effective.
Moreover, it is unclear what institution will continue the IAMB’s watchdog
function once it is dissolved with the establishment of an internationally
recognized government in Iraq.In order to meet these challenges, Tsalik made
several recommendations.The first priority, she said,is to establish a
government that is recognized by the Iraqi people as legitimate and not an
American puppet. Iraq’s economic recovery will require a total overhaul of
the economy, and a break with Saddam’s patronage system that rewarded loyal
families with lucrative contracts at public expense. These reforms will only
be possible with a government that Iraqis consider to be their own and
working in their interests. A second priority identified by Tsalik was to
avoid rushing economicle form. Ambassador Bremer has proposed the most
liberal trade regime in the Middle East for Iraq, with provisions that far
exceed anything found even in the United States. Bremer’s plan would allow
100 percent foreign ownership of Iraqi state-owned enterprises, except in
the oil sector; suspend tariffs and duties for imports and exports; permit
unrestricted repatriation of profitsand assets—a policy believed to have
contributed to the crises in Southeast Asia and Argentina; and a flat tax
rate of 15 percent—a goal long sought by conservatives in the United States.
According to Tsalik, such an approach runs the risk of a Russia-style
privatization in which property moves into private hands before a system of
corporate governance and law exists, and creates incentives for asset
stripping, not investing to build asset value. Moreover, in a rushed Iraqi
privatization, the buyers most likely to have the resources to purchase
state assets are those who prospered handsomely under Saddam Hussein’s
regime. A third priority should be to bring transparency to Iraq’s
rebuilding process. Procedures must be introduced to ensure that Iraqis are
getting good value and an equal chance at employment in the reconstruction
of their country. Tsalik said that many Iraq reconstruction contracts are
going to well-connected Western and regional companies, while unemployed
Iraqis experienced in rebuilding their war-torn country could do the job at
a fraction of the cost. She pointed out that even Ambassador Bremer admitted
in testimony to the U.S. Congress that Iraqi construction costs are about a
tenth of those of U.S. companies. The CPA should announce the winners of
tenders as well as provide the names of companies that have bid. It should
also ensure that Iraqis are represented on all committees to evaluate
tenders.
4 R E V E N U E W A T C H B R I E F I N G N O . 5
Finally, Tsalik said that the idea of establishing an Alaska-style public
dividend fund based on oil revenues is gaining popularity in Iraq. Revenue
Watch has produced an oil funds book with 10 case studies including the
Alaska Permanent Fund. According to Tsalik, this research has shown that
dividend style funds are most appropriate when there are large oil resources
and a small population, strong
fiscaltransparency,effectivecorruptioncontrols,andan
efficientcivilservice.For Tsalik, such a dividend fund in Iraq is premature
for two reasons. First, it is likely to be a long time before Iraq’s oil
resources generate enough revenue to start paying dividends to citizens.
According to the 2004 Iraqi budget, Iraq’s oil revenues are not even enough
to sustain the government’s operating costs, let alone fund the country’s
costly reconstruction. Iraq’s budget for 2004 is estimated to close with a
$600 million deficit. Second, distributing dividends to every eligible Iraqi
requires a trustworthy civil service. Tsalik felt that Iraq’s tattered civil
service and the country’s current, extreme levels of corruption could not
guarantee that dividend payments get to the designated recipients.Tsalik
urged those involved in the rebuilding of Iraq, particularly the United
States and the CPA, to consider these recommendations. She concluded that
effective oil revenue tracking, transparent budgeting, and independent
auditing to monitor fiscalaccountabilitycan play a critical role in helping
Iraq overcome its current problems and those posed by the resource curse.
Copyright © 2003 Open Society Institute. All rights reserved.Anthony
Richter, Director, Middle East Initiatives and Central Eurasia Project
Svetlana Tsalik, Director, Revenue Watch Isam al Khafaji, Baghdad Director,
Iraq Revenue Watch Julie McCarthy, Researcher Iraq Revenue Watch monitors
Iraq’s oil industry to ensure that it is managed with the highest standards
of transparency and that the benefits of nationa loil wealth flow to the
people of Iraq.Iraq Revenue Watch complements existing Open Society
Institute initiatives that monitor revenues produced by the extractive
industries. In many parts of the world, the lack of proper stewardship over
oil resources has resulted in corruption, the continued impoverishment of
populations, and abuses of political power. By prompting governments to
tackle these problems early, the Open Society Institute hopes to help Iraq
avoid this plight.The Open Society Institute currently supports a recently
launched initiative, Caspian Revenue Watch, which monitors the development
of oil production in the Caspian basin. The goal is to promote transparency,
accountability, and public oversight in the management of oil and natural
gas revenues. Iraq faces even greater challenges than the Caspian region. If
Iraq is to become an open, democratic society it will need to develop
transparent accountable institutions for ensuring honest management of oil
revenues.There is an urgent need for Iraq Revenue Watch given the current
occupied status of the country. The Coalition Provisional Authority and the
Iraqi Governing Council should establish rules that ensure complete
transparency regarding Iraqi oil revenues. So doing will foster a stable,
democratic Iraq, and will protect the Coalition Provisional Authority from
charges of misappropriation during this period of trusteeship over Iraq’s
reconstruction.The Open Society Institute, a private operating and
grantmaking foundation based in New York City, implements a range of
initiatives throughout the world to promote open society by shaping
government policy and supporting education, media, public health, and human
and women’s rights, as well as social, legal, and economic reform.
For more information, contact:Iraq Revenue Watch program Open Society
Institute 400 West 59th Street New York, New York 10019USAE-mail:
i...@sorosny.org
 -
http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTEMiddle East and North Africa InitiativesCentral
Eurasia Project