Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: E se l'Iran invadesse il Messico?

What If Iran Had Invaded Mexico?
    By Noam Chomsky
    TomDispatch.com
    Thursday 05 April 2007
Putting the Iran crisis in context.
    Unsurprisingly, George W. Bush's announcement of a "surge" in Iraq
came despite the firm opposition to any such move of Americans and the
even stronger opposition of the (thoroughly irrelevant) Iraqis. It was
accompanied by ominous official leaks and statements - from Washington
and Baghdad - about how Iranian intervention in Iraq was aimed at
disrupting our mission to gain victory, an aim which is (by
definition) noble. What then followed was a solemn debate about
whether serial numbers on advanced roadside bombs (IEDs) were really
traceable to Iran; and, if so, to that country's Revolutionary Guards
or to some even higher authority.
    This "debate" is a typical illustration of a primary principle of
sophisticated propaganda. In crude and brutal societies, the Party
Line is publicly proclaimed and must be obeyed - or else. What you
actually believe is your own business and of far less concern. In
societies where the state has lost the capacity to control by force,
the Party Line is simply presupposed; then, vigorous debate is
encouraged within the limits imposed by unstated doctrinal orthodoxy.
The cruder of the two systems leads, naturally enough, to disbelief;
the sophisticated variant gives an impression of openness and freedom,
and so far more effectively serves to instill the Party Line. It
becomes beyond question, beyond thought itself, like the air we
breathe.
    The debate over Iranian interference in Iraq proceeds without
ridicule on the assumption that the United States owns the world. We
did not, for example, engage in a similar debate in the 1980s about
whether the U.S. was interfering in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, and I
doubt that Pravda, probably recognizing the absurdity of the
situation, sank to outrage about that fact (which American officials
and our media, in any case, made no effort to conceal). Perhaps the
official Nazi press also featured solemn debates about whether the
Allies were interfering in sovereign Vichy France, though if so, sane
people would then have collapsed in ridicule.
    In this case, however, even ridicule - notably absent - would not
suffice, because the charges against Iran are part of a drumbeat of
pronouncements meant to mobilize support for escalation in Iraq and
for an attack on Iran, the "source of the problem." The world is
aghast at the possibility. Even in neighboring Sunni states, no
friends of Iran, majorities, when asked, favor a nuclear-armed Iran
over any military action against that country. From what limited
information we have, it appears that signific'nt parts of the U.S.
military and intelligence communities are opposed to such an attack,
along with almost the entire world, even more so than when the Bush
administration and Tony Blair's Britain invaded Iraq, defying enormous
popular opposition worldwide.
    "The Iran Effect"
    The results of an attack on Iran could be horrendous. After all,
according to a recent study of "the Iraq effect" by terrorism
specialists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, using government and
Rand Corporation data, the Iraq invasion has already led to a seven-
fold increase in terror. The "Iran effect" would probably be far more
severe and long-lasting. British military historian Corelli Barnett
speaks for many when he warns that "an attack on Iran would
effectively launch World War III."
    What are the plans of the increasingly desperate clique that
narrowly holds political power in the U.S.? We cannot know. Such state
planning is, of course, kept secret in the interests of "security."
Review of the declassified record reveals that there is considerable
merit in that claim - though only if we understand "security" to mean
the security of the Bush administration against their domestic enemy,
the population in whose name they act.
    Even if the White House clique is not planning war, naval
deployments, support for secessionist movements and acts of terror
within Iran, and other provocations could easily lead to an accidental
war. Congressional resolutions would not provide much of a barrier.
They invariably permit "national security" exemptions, opening holes
wide enough for the several aircraft-carrier battle groups soon to be
in the Persian Gulf to pass through - as long as an unscrupulous
leadership issues proclamations of doom (as Condoleezza Rice did with
those "mushroom clouds" over American cities back in 2002). And the
concocting of the sorts of incidents that "justify" such attacks is a
familiar practice. Even the worst monsters feel the need for such
justification and adopt the device: Hitler's defense of innocent
Germany from the "wild terror" of the Poles in 1939, after they had
rejected his wise and generous proposals for peace, is but one
example.
    The most effective barrier to a White House decision to launch a
war is the kind of organized popular opposition that frightened the
political-military leadership enough in 1968 that they were reluctant
to send more troops to Vietnam - fearing, we learned from the Pentagon
Papers, that they might need them for civil-disorder control.
    Doubtless Iran's government merits harsh condemnation, including
for its recent actions that have inflamed the crisis. It is, however,
useful to ask how we would act if Iran had invaded and occupied Canada
and Mexico and was arresting U.S. government representatives there on
the grounds that they were resisting the Iranian occupation (called
"liberation," of course). Imagine as well that Iran was deploying
massive naval forces in the Caribbean and issuing credible threats to
launch a wave of attacks against a vast range of sites - nuclear and
otherwise - in the United States, if the U.S. government did not
immediately terminate all its nuclear energy programs (and, naturally,
dismantle all its nuclear weapons). Suppose that all of this happened
after Iran had overthrown the government of the U.S. and installed a
vicious tyrant (as the US did to Iran in 1953), then later supported a
Russian invasion of the U.S. that killed millions of people (just as
the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980, killing
hundreds of thousands of Iranians, a figure comparable to millions of
Americans). Would we watch quietly?
    It is easy to understand an observation by one of Israel's leading
military historians, Martin van Creveld. After the U.S. invaded Iraq,
knowing it to be defenseless, he noted, "Had the Iranians not tried to
build nuclear weapons, they would be crazy."
    Surely no sane person wants Iran (or any nation) to develop
nuclear weapons. A reasonable resolution of the present crisis would
permit Iran to develop n'clear energy, in accord with its rights under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but not nuclear weapons. Is that outcome
feasible? It would be, given one condition: that the U.S. and Iran
were functioning democratic societies in which public opinion had a
significant impact on public policy.
    As it happens, this solution has overwhelming support among
Iranians and Americans, who generally are in agreement on nuclear
issues. The Iranian-American consensus includes the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere (82% of Americans); if that
cannot yet be achieved because of elite opposition, then at least a
"nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East that would include both
Islamic countries and Israel" (71% of Americans). Seventy-five percent
of Americans prefer building better relations with Iran to threats of
force. In brief, if public opinion were to have a significant
influence on state policy in the U.S. and Iran, resolution of the
crisis might be at hand, along with much more far-reaching solutions
to the global nuclear conundrum.
    Promoting Democracy - at Home
    These facts suggest a possible way to prevent the current crisis
from exploding, perhaps even into some version of World War III. That
awesome threat might be averted by pursuing a familiar proposal:
democracy promotion - this time at home, where it is badly needed.
Democracy promotion at home is certainly feasible and, although we
cannot carry out such a project directly in Iran, we could act to
improve the prospects of the courageous reformers and oppositionists
who are seeking to achieve just that. Among such figures who are, or
should be, well-known, would be Saeed Hajjarian, Nobel laureate Shirin
Ebadi, and Akbar Ganji, as well as those who, as usual, remain
nameless, among them labor activists about whom we hear very little;
those who publish the Iranian Workers Bulletin may be a case in
point.
    We can best improve the prospects for democracy promotion in Iran
by sharply reversing state policy here so that it reflects popular
opinion. That would entail ceasing to make the regular threats that
are a gift to Iranian hardliners. These are bitterly condemned by
Iranians truly concerned with democracy promotion (unlike those
"supporters" who flaunt democracy slogans in the West and are lauded
as grand "idealists" despite their clear record of visceral hatred for
democracy).
    Democracy promotion in the United States could have far broader
consequences. In Iraq, for instance, a firm timetable for withdrawal
would be initiated at once, or very soon, in accord with the will of
the overwhelming majority of Iraqis and a significant majority of
Americans. Federal budget priorities would be virtually reversed.
Where spending is rising, as in military supplemental bills to conduct
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would sharply decline. Where
spending is steady or declining (health, education, job training, the
promotion of energy conservation and renewable energy sources,
veterans benefits, funding for the UN and UN peacekeeping operations,
and so on), it would sharply increase. Bush's tax cuts for people with
incomes over $200,000 a year would be immediately rescinded.
    The U.S. would have adopted a national health-care system long
ago, rejecting the privatized system that sports twice the per-capita
costs found in similar societies and some of the worst outcomes in the
industrial world. It would have rejected what is widely regarded by
those who pay attention as a "fiscal train wreck" in-the-making. The
U.S. would have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon-dioxide
emissions and undertaken still stronger measures to protect the
environment. It would allow the UN to take the lead in international
crises, including in Iraq. After all, according to opinion polls,
since shortly after the 2003 invasion, a large majority of Americans
have wanted the UN to take charge of political transformation,
economic reconstruction, and civil order in that land.
    If public opinion mattered, the U.S. would accept UN Charter
restrictions o' the use of force, contrary to a bipartisan consensus
that this country, alone, has the right to resort to violence in
response to potential threats, real or imagined, including threats to
our access to markets and resources. The U.S. (along with others)
would abandon the Security Council veto and accept majority opinion
even when in opposition to it. The UN would be allowed to regulate
arms sales; while the U.S. would cut back on such sales and urge other
countries to do so, which would be a major contribution to reducing
large-scale violence in the world. Terror would be dealt with through
diplomatic and economic measures, not force, in accord with the
judgment of most specialists on the topic but again in diametric
opposition to present-day policy.
    Furthermore, if public opinion influenced policy, the U.S. would
have diplomatic relations with Cuba, benefiting the people of both
countries (and, incidentally, U.S. agribusiness, energy corporations,
and others), instead of standing virtually alone in the world in
imposing an embargo (joined only by Israel, the Republic of Palau, and
the Marshall Islands). Washington would join the broad international
consensus on a two-state settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict,
which (with Israel) it has blocked for 30 years - with scattered and
temporary exceptions - and which it still blocks in word, and more
importantly in deed, despite fraudulent claims of its commitment to
diplomacy. The U.S. would also equalize aid to Israel and Palestine,
cutting off aid to either party that rejected the international
consensus.
    Evidence on these matters is reviewed in my book Failed States as
well as in The Foreign Policy Disconnect by Benjamin Page (with
Marshall Bouton), which also provides extensive evidence that public
opinion on foreign (and probably domestic) policy issues tends to be
coherent and consistent over long periods. Studies of public opinion
have to be regarded with caution, but they are certainly highly
suggestive.
    Democracy promotion at home, while no panacea, would be a useful
step towards helping our own country become a "responsible
stakeholder" in the international order (to adopt the term used for
adversaries), instead of being an object of fear and dislike
throughout much of the world. Apart from being a value in itself,
functioning democracy at home holds real promise for dealing
constructively with many current problems, international and domestic,
including those that literally threaten the survival of our species.
    --------
    Noam Chomsky is the author of Failed States: The Abuse of Power
and the Assault on Democracy (Metropolitan Books), just published in
paperback, among many other works.

     By Noam Chomsky
E se gli idioti come Chomsky evitassero di scrivere cazzate in campi che
non gli competono?
-Stefano