Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Un altro "Downing St. Memo"

Difficile giudicare l'attendibilità di questo documento. Attendiamo :)
Namib
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http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0506/S00116.htm
      Another Downing St Memo - Wrongfooting Saddam
      Thursday, 9 June 2005, 4:37 pm
      Article: The Scoop Editor
SCOOP EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is a transcript of another document
leaked to the media concerning the build up to the Iraq war. It concerns a
discussion in early 2002 between the UK Ambassador to the US and then Deputy
Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.
Importantly the following document appears to confirm the thrust of the
allegations made concerning the so-called "Downing Street Memo", namely that
the Bush Administration had already made up its mind to go to war against
Iraq before it began the diplomatic offensive in the second half of 2002.
The transcript that follows was transcribed by a member of the Democratic
Underground forums from the PDF version posted online. Some of the typos are
from the original. Emphasis has been added to key passages.
- Scoop Co-Editor Alastair Thompson
  CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
  British Embassy Washington
  From the Ambassador
  Christopher Meyer KCMG
  18 March 2002
  Sir David Manning KCMG
  No 10 Downing Street
  IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: CONVERSATION WITH WOLFOWITZ
  1 Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, came to Sunday lunch on
17 March.
  2 On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used
with Condi Rice last week, We backed regime change, but the plan had to be
clever and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us
domestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it
alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to
be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I
then went through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspectors and the UN
SCRs and the critical importance of the MEPP as an integral part of the
anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skilfully, we were
fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board.
  3 I said that the UK was giving serious thought to publishing a paper that
would make the case against Saddam. If the UK were to join with the US in
any operation against Saddam, we would have to be able to take a critical
mass of parliamentary and public opinion with us. It was extraordinary how
people had forgotten how bad he was.
  4 Wolfowitz said that he fully agreed. He took a slightly different
position from others in the Administration, who were focussed on Saddam's
capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction. The WMD danger was of
course crucial to the public case against Saddam, particularly the potential
linkage to terrorism. But Wolfowitz thought it indispensable to spell out in
detail Saddam's barbarism. This was well documented from what he had done
during the occupation of Kuwait, the incursion into Kurdish territory, the
assault on the Marsh Arabs, and to his own people. A lot of work had been
done on this towards the end of the first Bush administration. Wolfowitz
thought that this would go a long way to destroying any notion of moral
equivalence between Iraq and Israel. I said that I had been forcefully
struck, when addressing university audiences in the US how ready students
were to gloss over Saddam's crimes and to blame the US and the UK for the
suffering of the Iraqi people.
  5 Wolfowitz said that it was absurd to deny the link between terrorism and
Saddam. There might be doubt about the alleged meeting in Prague between
Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker on 9/11, and Iraqi intelligence (did we, he
asked, know anything more about this meeting?). But there were other
substantiated cases of Saddam giving comfort to terrorists, including
someone involved in the first attack on the World Trade Center (the latest
New Yorker apparently has a story about links between Saddam and Al Qaeda
operating in Kurdistan).
  6 I asked for Wolfowitz's take on the stuggle inside the Administration
between the pro- and anti- INC lobbies (well documented in Sy Hersh's recent
New Yorker piece, which I gave you). He said that he found himself between
the two sides (but as the conversation developed, it became clear that
Wolfowitz was far more pro-INC than not). He said that he was strongly
opposed to what some were advocating: a coalition including all outside
factions except the INC (INA, KDP, PUK, SCIRI). This would not work.
Hostility towards the INC was in reality hostility towards Chalabi. It was
true that Chalabi was not the easiest person to work with. Bute had a good
record in bringing high-grade defectors out of Iraq. The CIA stubbornly
refused to recognise this. They unreasonably denigrated the INC because of
their fixation with Chalabi. When I mentioned that the INC was penetraded by
Iraqi intelligence, Wolfowitz commented that this was probably the case with
all the opposition groups: it was something we would have to live with. As
to the Kurds, it was true that they were living well (another point to be
made in any public dossier on Saddam) and that they feared provoking an
incursion by Baghdad, But there were good people among the Kurds, including
in particular Salih (?) of the PUK. Wolfowitz brushed over my reference to
the absence of SUnni in the INC: there was a big difference between Iraqi
and Iranian Shia. The former just wanted to be rid of Saddam.
  7 Wolvowitz was pretty dismissive of the desirability of a military coup
and of the defector generals in the wings. The latter had blood on their
hands. The important thing was to try to have Saddam replaced by something
like a functioning democracy. Though imperfect, the Kurdish model was not
bad. How to achieve this, I asked? Only through a coalition of all the
parties was the answer (we did not get into military planning).

Difficile giudicare l'attendibilità di questo documento. Attendiamo :)
Come "difficile"? :)
Il testo dice chiaramente che
----
from the PDF version posted online.
----
Quindi basta solo fornire il link alla "pdf version posted online" :)
Che aspettano a farlo? :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 wrote in message
news:42AA09C6...@people.it...

#_...Non e` differente dal ".html" ...
http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/letters/bushsecretmemoltr5505.pdf
... ma "NOI" sappiamo come mai "TU" sei piu`interessato alle PeDoFile. :-/
G.   rrrr

... ma "NOI" sappiamo come mai "TU" sei piu`interessato alle PeDoFile. 
....disse il PeDoFile... :)
-Stefano

 ?????????????
#_Corri a vedere sul follow up la risposta alla tua ????????????
Intano, qui, prenditi pure un bel "vaffan-fondo-schiena".
Giano