Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Sui rapporti tra Fatah e Hamas e le strategie palestinesi

Sono spiacente che il testo di questo articolo sia in inglese, ma mi sembra
molto equilibrato e analizza in maniera interessanti le opposte stategie di
Fatah e Hamas riguardo le prossime elezioni israeliane (APO ti consiglio di
leggerlo), la percezione e le aspettative che i palestinesi ripongono in
Mitzna e lo stato attuale delle relazioni tra Hamas e Fatah.
http://www.jrep.com/Palaffairs/Article-0.html
dal sito Jerusalem report, sezione Palestinian affairs
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Blessings & Bombs
Isabel Kershner
In the run-up to the Israeli elections, Yasser Arafat prays for Mitzna and
leaves Hamas to its murderous wont
In one of his occasional public appearances, Yasser Arafat emerged into the
daylight, on the steps of his office in the Muqata’ah, his Ramallah
headquarters, to congratulate, via the assembled media, ex-general Amram
Mitzna on his mid-November victory in the Israeli Labor party primaries.
Arafat, his face tinged with a ghost-like pallor, urged Mitzna, falteringly,
to follow in the footsteps of the late Yitzhak Rabin and strive for the
"peace of the brave." The beleaguered leader may see a straw to clutch at in
the new, dovish Labor leader, who has pledged to resume final-status
negotiations with the Palestinians, and even with the discredited
Palestinian Authority chairman himself, if he becomes prime minister.
After two years of Palestinian terrorism, however, such blessings from
Arafat, whom Israel holds responsible for the bloodshed, are more of a curse
than a blessing for an Israeli politician. They wouldn’t have won Mitzna
many votes in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Kiryat Menahem, where the next
morning bodies lay in the road covered in black plastic sheeting after a
Hamas suicide bomber blew up a bus, killing 11 civilians.
Following ordinary logic, this combination of blessings and bombs would
appear contradictory and mutually exclusive. For some Palestinians, however,
it might appear to be a reasonable formula in the run-up to the Israeli
elections on January 28. "Those on the Palestinian side who plan ahead and
wish to influence the course of the elections face a dilemma," explains Ziad
Abu Amr, a Gaza member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and head of
its political committee. "Arafat can’t influence Hamas and Islamic Jihad,
since he doesn’t have much to offer them. And even if there are no suicide
attacks, why should that improve Mitzna’s chances? Won’t Sharon and the
Likud take credit for that? By the same token, won’t a continuation of
suicide attacks inside Israel help Mitzna, proving that Sharon has failed?
I’m being cynical of course," adds Abu Amr. "I cannot see myself encouraging
violence for political goals."
Abu Amr, a political scientist, argues that Hamas and Islamic Jihad in any
case have no interest in seeing a Labor victory in Israel or a resumption of
the peace process they have played a key role in undermining. So, he
suggests, the Palestinian leadership should take more of a public position
stating its preference for Mitzna. To most Palestinians who feel the effects
of Israeli policies in their daily lives, he says, the Israeli elections are
no longer a purely internal affair. Such a "combination of gestures," though
uncoordinated, he says, would lay the choices out starkly for the Israeli
voters. If it’s a given that Arafat cannot control Hamas, the thinking goes,
the Palestinian leader could at least present "a credible political
alternative."
Other Palestinians encouraged by Mitzna’s rise are grappling with the same
dilemmas, searching for strategies that might weaken the Likud and
strengthen Labor, however much of a lost battle that may be according to the
polls. "A total cease-fire would hand Sharon victory," agonizes a leading
intellectual in Ramallah. Though requesting anonymity now, he has long been
one of the Palestinians most committed to a public stand against suicide
bombing and against the Palestinian resort to arms, warning from the first
weeks of the intifada that such a course would only visit catastrophe upon
the Palestinians.
Now, he says, the point is to make the resistance acceptable and capable of
conveying a clear message. Under the present circumstances, with Israel
essentially having reoccupied the whole of the West Bank and continuing with
its assassination policy against the perpetrators of terror, he asserts that
it is impossible to talk about halting the violence altogether. "I’m now
trying to rationalize the violence," he says, "to make it more measured on
both sides and make it more human" -- for example, by having the
Palestinians limit their attacks to mainly military targets within the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
Even if the violence could be controlled, Abu Amr counters, that strategy
wouldn’t necessarily work. "It would only make a difference for the segment
of the Israeli public that already believes Israel should withdraw from the
occupied territories," he remarks.
Moreover, he adds, Israel would not differentiate between the various types
of attacks in its response. "Sharon would still carry on sanctioning
assassinations and the like." Indeed, after three Islamic Jihad gunmen
managed to kill nine Israeli soldiers and three civilian security men in an
alleyway in the West Bank city of Hebron in mid-November, Israel retaliated
by bombing and raiding a main PA Preventive Security apparatus compound in
Gaza, which it said was being used as a base and weapons store for the
intifada.
An eerie quiet pervades the Muqata’ah, where Arafat has been holed up since
last March. Driving around the perimeter of the ruined compound, with most
of its buildings reduced to massive piles of concrete rubble by Israeli
bulldozers, there are no visible signs of life. The covered bridge
connecting Arafat’s shuttered offices with his sleeping and reception
quarters has been restored since it was damaged during the last Israeli
invasion of the compound in mid-September, following a Hamas suicide bombing
of a bus in Tel Aviv.
Days after the attack on the soldiers in Hebron, there are no Palestinian
security or other personnel obviously milling about in the courtyard. And if
there are still any Israeli troops watching from high-rise buildings in the
vicinity, they are keeping well out of sight.
The Palestinian Authority chairman and symbol of the Palestinian cause has
come to embody an absolute contradiction in terms. On the one hand, his
leadership and presence are hardly felt. "Do you think Arafat had anything
to do with Hebron?" asks one Palestinian commentator, sitting in his
Ramallah home. "We don’t even feel that he’s alive. I’m 400 meters from the
Muqata’ah, and I don’t feel him."
On the other hand, Arafat’s autocratic grip has tightened to the extent that
most of his political critics, from within the Fatah movement and without,
have been intimidated into silence. It has been made clear to outspoken
intellectuals and would-be political reformers who have recently been trying
to impose democratization on the PA that during wartime, and with Israeli
Prime Minister Sharon and U.S. President Bush calling for Arafat’s removal,
such internal opposition will not be tolerated.
"The reformers haven’t gone away, but they’ve gotten fewer," says Abu Amr, a
vocal member of the reformist camp. "Yet the need for reform has gotten even
bigger. No reform is taking place now. Things may even be regressing."
Arafat had been put to the test by his own Fatah legislators in September,
when they threatened to vote no confidence in the Palestinian cabinet
following some new appointments on grounds that ministers perceived as
corrupt had not been replaced. They gave Arafat two weeks to come up with
another cabinet, but the reform dynamic was interrupted by Israel’s last
invasion of the Muqata’ah. Finally, a vote was held at the end of October.
Through what Abu Amr calls "political blackmail and intimidation," Arafat
ensured party discipline by arguing that anyone who voted against the new
government -- which looked suspiciously like the old one -- would be vetoing
Arafat and essentially voting with Sharon and Bush. A few bold voices
challenged the argument as spurious, saying that Arafat could achieve the
same thing by having his legislators vote on a good government as opposed to
a bad one. But most kept quiet, having been co-opted or cowed into
acceptance. The government was voted in by a majority of 56 to 18.
So fed up are the Palestinians with the ineffective and corrupt rule of the
obviously ailing Arafat, that some prominent analysts privately predict he
would lose a presidential election. "Most of the Palestinians are political
independents today," states one expert, adding that a single, respected
consensus candidate would stand a very good chance running against the "Old
Man," as Arafat has been affectionately and less affectionately nicknamed
for years. Other analysts disagree, assuming that Arafat would prevail. In
fact, the debate is moot. Under pressure from the reformists, Arafat had
called PA presidential and legislative elections for January 20, 2003. Given
the upcoming Israeli elections, the circumstances on the ground and the lack
of preparation, however, that date is not feasible any more. "The objective
reality doesn’t allow for elections now," says Abu Amr.
In the meantime, Arafat retains all the autocracy and none of the
accountability. Radwan Abu Ayyash, chairman of the PA’s official Palestinian
Broadcasting Corporation, says the Palestinians are "very enthusiastic"
about Mitzna, and may be ready to give concessions on certain issues if they
see some hope on the horizon. But, he adds, the "logic of the people
perpetrating the violence is totally different to ours."
Abu Ayyash currently sits in temporary offices a few minutes away from the
main TV building in Ramallah. The PBC headquarters, a symbol of Palestinian
sovereignty, were targeted by Israeli missiles in a retaliatory raid last
January.
When asked about documents Israel has seized revealing Arafat’s direct
payments to Fatah field commanders, who use the cash to dispatch terrorists
against Israel, Palestinian officials say the documents may not be genuine,
and that the PA head would "never put money for military operations on
paper." Israeli security sources said that Arafat recently paid $20,000 to
Muhammad Naifeh, a Fatah Al-Aqsa Brigades leader in Tul Karm. Naifeh is
believed to have sent out the gunman who killed five Israelis, including a
mother and her two young children, in Kibbutz Mezer in Israel proper, just
inside the 1967 Green Line. He has since been captured by Israel.
Palestinians describe Arafat routinely approving payments for legitimate
social and political activities, though usually half of what was asked for,
without a second thought and without being able to control how the cash
actually gets used or abused by local strongmen trying to build up their own
reputations.
"Arafat works with us like a father," Abu Ayyash explains, describing the
Palestinian leader as a generous patriarch doling out cash as if to his
relatives. "He doesn’t know if one of them is going to use their pocket
money to buy Molotov cocktails."
As for Arafat calling for a complete, unconditional end to all violence, Abu
Ayyash argues, "He is the leader of a people under occupation. He cannot
dance on this high tightrope without any guarantees" of what he might
receive in return.
What’s more, Palestinian sources say, some members of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa
Brigades have recently been receiving money from Hamas, especially in Jenin
in the northern West Bank, which is the area least under anybody’s control.
The failure of the recent Fatah-Hamas dialogue to produce any understandings
or agreements is likely to further Arafat’s argument that he does not
control the Islamic radicals who carry out most of the attacks inside
Israel. The mid-November talks, held in Cairo and brokered by the Egyptians
with European involvement, didn’t result in a hoped-for cessation of suicide
attacks in Israel. Fatah had been looking for national unity; Hamas, for
power-sharing with the PA, an end to PA pressure on the organization and to
Israeli assassinations of its leaders.
But in Abu Amr’s view, the whole exercise was ill-conceived and based on
wrong assumptions. For one thing, he says, Arafat has no interest in giving
his rivals in Hamas the veto power they were demanding over important
decisions. And moreover, he says, the Egyptian, European, Palestinian and
Israeli backers of the talks were "naive" to assume that Hamas would want to
help Labor win the elections by stopping their attacks in Israel.
Palestinian officials were offended by the brazenness of Hamas demanding to
be consulted by the PA on important decisions. "They said they are ready to
coordinate, as if they are of equal height, and as if Fatah is not the
dominant power," says Abu Ayyash.
Hamas perhaps emerged as the ultimate winner from the talks, notes Abu Amr,
in that it "got treated as a respectable party." In the strange logic of the
Palestinian dilemma, however, Hamas might end up helping Mitzna by not
stopping its attacks in the run-up to the Israeli elections. Either way, the
bloodshed is slated to continue.
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