Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya

US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks expose some of the real reasons and
diplomatic tensions behind NATO�s ongoing bombardment of Libya. Far from initiating
a �humanitarian� intervention to protect civilians against Muammar Gaddafi�s
government, Washington backed the NATO intervention for one reason only�the
installation of a regime that better serves the strategic interests of the
US, as well as the operations of the giant oil and gas companies.
The cables date back to 2007, some three years after the Bush administration
had lifted sanctions and formally re-established relations with the Gaddafi
regime in a bid to secure access to Libya�s highly prized resources. Until
the outbreak of revolutionary uprisings across the Middle East this year, Gaddafi
was welcomed with open arms in Washington and internationally.
As the cables show, as recently as August 2009, US Senator John McCain led
a high-profile bipartisan congressional delegation to meet with Gaddafi. McCain
characterised the �overall pace of the bilateral relationship as excellent�.
Senator Joe Lieberman said �we never would have guessed ten years ago that
we would be sitting in Tripoli, being welcomed by a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi,�
before calling Libya an �important ally in the war on terrorism.�
It comes as no surprise that the cables refer to Libya�s �hydrocarbon producing
potential� and the �high expectations� among international oil companies. Significantly,
the Gaddafi regime held out to Washington the prospect of even greater riches.
According to a September 2009 cable, then acting head of Libya�s National Oil
Corporation (NOC), Ali Sugheir, told the US embassy that major �sedimentary
basins with oil and gas resources had been discovered in Libya,� with seismic
data indicating �much more remained to be discovered across the country.�
The scramble by dozens of international oil and gas companies to cash in on
the lifting of sanctions, however, soon produced two major problems for the
US government. Firstly, in the words of a November 2007 cable, �Libyan resource
nationalism��policies designed to increase the Libyan government�s �control
over and share of revenue from hydrocarbon resources.� The cable ominously
concludes that the US should demonstrate �the clear downsides� to the Libyan
regime of such an approach.
Gaddafi�s policy forced oil and gas corporations to renegotiate their contracts
under the latest iteration of Libya�s Exploration and Productions Sharing Agreement
(EPSA IV). Between 2007 and 2008, major companies such as ExxonMobil, Petro-Canada,
Repsol (Spain), Total (France), ENI (Italy), and Occidental (US) were compelled
to sign new deals with the NOC�on significantly less favourable terms than
they had previously enjoyed�and were collectively made to pay $5.4 billion
in upfront �bonus� payments.
A June 2008 cable says that the Oasis Group�including US firms ConocoPhillips,
Marathon and Hess�was reportedly �next on the block,� despite having already
paid $1.8 billion in 2005. The cable questions whether Libya could be trusted
to honour the new EPSA IV contracts, or would again �seek a larger cut.�
The cable further discusses the broader implications of the EPSA IV contracts.
While the contracts were �broadly beneficial� for oil companies, which stood
to make �a great deal more money per barrel of oil produced,� the threat of
forced renegotiation of contracts created a dangerous international precedent�a
�new paradigm for Libya that is playing out worldwide in a growing number of
oil producing countries.�
The oil giants and the US government were alarmed by threats Gaddafi made,
in a January 2009 video-conference to Georgetown University students, to nationalise
the oil and gas industry. A January 2010 cable recounts that �regime rhetoric
in early 2009 involving the possible nationalization of the oil sector � has
brought the issue back to the fore.�
Gaddafi also attempted to force the international oil companies (IOCs) to contribute
to the US-Libya Claims Compensation Agreement. Signed in August 2008, the agreement
established a fund for victims of bombings involving the two countries. Two
February 2009 cables report that Libya presented the oil companies with an
ultimatum: contribute to the fund or �suffer serious consequences.� NOC chairman
Shurki Ghanem explicitly referred to the threats made by Gaddafi to nationalise
the oil industry. The US ambassador warned that �putting pressure on US companies
�crossed a red line�.� He �urged Ghanem and his colleagues to consider the
long-term relationship with the United States.�
The second unwelcome consequence of the lifting of sanctions was that it enabled
Libya to develop closer relations with US rivals, notably in Europe, China
and Russia. A June 2008 cable describes a �recent surge of interest in Libya
on the part of non-Western IOCs (particularly from India, Japan, Russia and
China), who have won the bulk of concessions in the NOC�s recent acreage bid
rounds.�
A March 2009 cable describes how Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi witnessed the
ratification of the Italy-Libya �friendship and cooperation� treaty, under
which Italy was to pay $200 million per year for 25 years as compensation for
�colonial wrong-doing,� in exchange for guaranteeing �Italian companies preference
for development projects.� An Italian official told the US embassy that the
order of Italy�s interests in Libya was �oil, oil, oil, and migration.�
China�s growing presence also generated concern. According to a February 2009
cable, China Railway was awarded an $805 million contract that year and a $2.6
billion contract the year before. A May 2009 cable reports that Gaddafi told
the Commander of US African Command General William Ward that �China would
prevail� in Africa �because it does not interfere in internal affairs.� A September
2009 cable said, �Chinese companies have carved out some niches for themselves
in the Libyan market, namely in construction and telecommunications.�
Several cables point to closer Libyan relations with Russia. In April 2008,
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly flew into Libya, accompanied by
400 assistants, journalists and executives, to secure an �agreement to swap
Libya�s $4.5 billion Soviet-era debt to Russia� for �a large railroad contract
and several future contracts in housing construction and electricity development.�
Several memoranda of understanding were signed with Russian energy giant Gazprom.
At that meeting, Gaddafi expressed opposition to NATO�s expansion to Ukraine
and Georgia, both sensitive issues for Russia.
Most significantly from a US strategic perspective, Gaddafi apparently �voiced
his satisfaction that Russia�s increased strength can serve as a necessary
counterbalance to US power, echoing the Libyan leader�s frequent support for
a more multi-polar international system.�
In this context, the US cultivated relations with certain figures in Gaddafi�s
regime, and secretly discussed the benefits of Gaddafi�s removal from the scene.
A July 2008 cable relates how Ibrahim el-Meyet, a �close friend� of Ghanem
(and a source to �strictly protect�) told the US embassy that he and Ghanem
�concluded that there will be no real economic or political reform in Libya
until al-Qadhafi passes from the political scene,� and this �will not occur
while al-Qadhafi is alive.�
Another cable from January 2009 said there were reportedly �two strains of
thinking� within the Libyan government�a �pro-US camp and a group that remained
suspicious of US motives and steadfastly opposed to a broader suite of engagement.�
While Gaddafi and his sons apparently belonged to the �pro-US group,� Gaddafi
�supported increased US-Libya cooperation, but with �conditionalities� born
of an abiding concern that the eventual goal of US engagement with Libya was
regime change� (emphasis added).
Gaddafi�s fears were well-founded. Behind the scenes, tensions increased with
the advent of the Obama administration. A February 2009 cable says the Libyan
government was �anxious that the new US administration could adopt markedly
different policies toward Libya.� It refers to �powerful individuals in Libya
who strongly oppose an improved relationship with the United States, who stand
to lose a great deal if the existing system changes significantly, and who
view the US as a likely catalyst of such reform.�
The cables show that the US government closely monitored political opposition
to Gaddafi�s regime in eastern Libya, where the �rebel� Transitional National
Council is now based. A February 2008 cable refers to a reportedly deliberate
Libyan government policy to �keep the east poor as a means by which to limit
the potential political threat to Qadhafi�s regime,� which led �many young
eastern Libyan men� to believe they had �nothing to lose by participating in
extremist violence at home� and against US forces in Iraq.
Relations were also stepped up with elements inside Gaddafi�s government. When
Foreign Minister Musa Kusa met General William Ward in May 2009, he reminded
the general that he �shared his views frequently and openly with his US contacts
in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of State.� Kusa
fled Libya to England by private jet on March 30 this year.
The WikiLeaks cables further demonstrate that the Obama administration�s bid
to topple the Libyan government and its recognition of the unelected �rebel�
regime in Benghazi have nothing whatever to do with �humanitarian� concerns.
On the contrary, the White House responded to the destabilising impact of the
struggles erupting throughout Arab countries, including in Libya, by turning
sharply against its erstwhile �important ally.�
The Obama administration activated preparations, stretching back to at least
2007, to seek to oust the regime and install one more closely aligned to American
interests. Far from protecting civilians, the US government sought to head
off any genuine popular revolt against Gaddafi, with the entire shift based
on calculated economic and strategic considerations, driven by mounting great
power rivalries and corporate profit demands.
http://wsws.org/articles/2011/jul2011/wiki-j27.shtml
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uomo bianco parla con lingua biforcuta.
il Diamat � la spiegazione di tutte le cose

 Am.
Ciao! 

lo avrebbero fatto con un intervento di terra,
britt e frogs stanno fallendo con una portarei in due, dove vogliono intervenire?


Rosica pure Quarta Sponda, in Europa si e' riso dei vostri voltafaccia
quando vi faceva comodo il voltafaccia, non lo chiamavate alto tradimento,
ma "patto di Londra". 


 US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks
ehi, che fine ha fatto Assange? Si sono spenti i riflettori? :-)