Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: il familismo amorale della società palestinese

una accurata analisi della societa' palestinese
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Sep/robinsonSep08.asp
 Introduction
Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is characterized
by three types of clan-like familial structures: tribes, clans, and
notable families. While all three share similar extended familial
attributes, behavioral obligations (especially on males), informal
networks, and honor-shame cultural systems, they are also quite
distinct in their origins and continuing importance.
Tribes
Of the three clan-like structures in Palestinian society, actual
tribes are the least politically and socially important. Here, tribes
refer to descendents of nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin populations.
Only a tiny handful of Palestinian tribes are currently still semi-
nomadic. About 15 percent of the Palestinian population is of tribal
origin—25 percent in the Gaza Strip, much less in the West Bank—with
the large majority of the Palestinian population derived from
sedentary (peasant) roots. Even those estimates are likely on the high
side.
Detribalization of Palestinians has occurred largely because of the
loss of the nomadic lifestyle, which itself is both the normal product
of modernization and a result of the hyper concern over property,
property rights, and property lines that has characterized the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The legal and physical ability of Bedouin tribes
to move about freely in Palestine has essentially ended, as have their
ability to shepherd livestock freely. Sedentarization and the loss of
the traditional division of labor have made tribal affiliation less
important. In addition, Palestinian Bedouin populations are among the
economically most deprived groups in the region, further diminishing
their political clout.
While tribes are not nearly as politically or economically important
in Palestine as they are throughout the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq,
Jordan and Syria, tribal identity for that impoverished group remains
strong. Patterns of marriage, the single most important measure of
group identity, are still largely dictated by tribal rules.
Tribes in Gaza are organized into six tribal confederations, or saffs,
with each confederation made up of at least a dozen individual tribes
(asha’ira). The tribal confederations in Gaza are the Hayawat,
Tarabeen, Tayaha, Ijbara, Azazma, and Jahalin. Tribes in the West Bank
are more geographically isolated, and are based primarily in the hill
country to the east of Hebron. There are scatterings of small tribes
east of Jerusalem and on the western flank of the Jordan Valley as
well. Not coincidentally, tribes in the West Bank are located in
territory that has historically not been suitable for agricultural
production.
Clans
The clan structure in Palestine is far more consequential than the
Bedouin tribes, and has become even more important since the breakdown
of the Palestinian Authority structures during the second uprising, or
intifadat al-Aqsa, beginning in 2000. A clan, or hamula (plural:
hama’il), will consist of at least several extended families (a’ila)
claiming a shared ancestry, and linked through the father’s male line.
Each extended family will generally include male first and second
cousins, the women they marry, and the children of that union. Female
children who marry outside of the hamula (and their children) then
belong to the other hamula. Their nasab, or “relationship in law”,
will bind them to a new hamula.
While clans will always claim to have a common male ancestor and are
thus linked by blood, it is often a fictitious claim, and the
boundaries of inclusion are historically more fluid than one might
otherwise expect. Palestinian dispossession and dispersal has made the
fluidity of clan inclusion greater than elsewhere in the Arab world,
largely out of necessity. Refugee camps have been known to recreate
clan identity and ties based on the village of origin rather than on
actual familial ties. Individual households (bayt) or families (a’ila)
from clans that have been geographically dispersed or otherwise
marginalized will often attempt to latch on to a more powerful local
clan, inventing stories about a shared ancestry. If it suits the
interests of the clan to absorb this new family, it will do so, and
adjust the family tree accordingly. With time, the nature of the
actual merger is forgotten, although the new family will likely remain
on the margins of the clan for a period.
Clans have served several historical functions that have contributed
to their survival in the modern period. First, clans are a source of
individual and family security. Outsiders will think twice before
attacking a member of a clan, particularly a powerful hamula, knowing
that revenge (tha’ir) will be taken. Where states are strong and can
reliably protect citizens, clans weaken; where states are weak, clans
are strong. This has become the central reason why Palestinian clans
have flourished both under Israeli occupation and under conditions of
PA breakdown.
Second, clans have historically been the organizing tool for
cultivating shared lands (mush’a lands). Hamulas are specifically
peasant-based, and peasant clans would share cultivation
responsibilities for most all fertile lands in Palestine (except for
small private, or mulk, plots, and in some cases miri, or state
lands). The prominence of mush’a lands has diminished consistently
since the adoption by the Ottoman Empire of the 1858 Land law Code,
the growing legal recognition of private property under British and
Jordanian rule, and, especially since 1981, Israel’s expansive
classification of state land in the West Bank for colonization
purposes. Thus, an economic pillar for clan life has weakened.
The economic justification for clan organization has now shifted from
shared cultivation of mush’a lands to shared financial wellbeing in
desperate economic times. Numerous clans have, in recent years,
established foundations, NGOs, or other institutional tools to jointly
manage finances and investments across the hamula. Particularly in
Gaza, such clan-based management and distribution of wealth has been
essential to the survival of individual households where employment is
scarce and savings often non-existent. Members of the clan living in
the Diaspora contribute to these funds, in some cases in the tens of
thousands of dollars.
A third continuing impetus for the strength of Palestinian clans
besides security and economic rationales is social: clans provide an
important source of spouses in a society where half of all marriages
are to cousins, and more broadly, a trusted network for all social
occasions.
The formal cement that ties together clan members is a mithaq al-
sharaf, or code of honor, which is binding on all male members. The
mithaq is often a formal written agreement, pages long, that ties
together all the disparate families that constitute the hamula. They
pledge not only their loyalty to each other, but agree that an attack
(physical or honor based) on one member constitutes an attack on all
members of the hamula. Given that Palestinian society shares the honor-
shame social system common to Mediterranean countries, individual
members cannot easily violate this code without dishonoring themselves
and their families. It is a powerful social glue, especially in the
absence of a functioning state that can provide public security.
Absent such a state, the code of vendetta and revenge often becomes
dominant.
A final note by way of introduction on clans: clans and clan leaders
have considerable local power, but not national power. This is no
Palestinian clan that by dint of its numbers and reputation can
dominate and even largely impact national Palestinian politics. Clans
become politically important in two major ways. First, as an
institution—as the sum of their whole—clans can become politically
powerful. Hamas is discovering that now in Gaza as it takes on clan
politics. Hamas is far stronger than any one clan, but as all (or
many) clans feel threatened by Hamas policies, they have tended to act
in concert. Second, as noted below, when elections are structured by
districts, clans can become centrally important in electing
representatives in any one district. As the election law has now
shifted to a national proportional representation, single district
system, clans should become less important in legislative elections in
the future.
Small clans will typically range in size from several dozen to a
couple hundred male members, while the very largest clans may claim up
to 1,000 male members.
Notable Families
The third clan-like grouping in Palestine in the urban elite notable
family, a social formation typical throughout the Arab lands of the
Ottoman Empire. Many of the most well known and prominent Palestinian
families come from this notable, or a’yan, social class: Husayni,
Nashashibi, Dajani, Abd al-Hadi, Tuqan, Nabulsi, Khoury, Tamimi,
Khatib, Ja’bari, Masri, Kan’an, Shaq’a, Barghouthi, Shawwa, Rayyes,
and others. These are extended families that dominated Palestinian
politics until the 1980s, and are still relatively prominent today.
Outside of Anatolia, the Ottoman state ruled its empire in an indirect
manner. That is, Istanbul relied on local officials and prominent
local families (who often became the local officials) in the Arab
lands as intermediaries to the population to enforce Ottoman power,
often using their own manner and judgment to do so. The autonomy of
these local notables increased substantially in the nineteenth century
as the Ottoman Porte afforded them more power and discretion,
primarily linked to their ability to deliver increased tax revenues to
the central government. Successful military officers, prominent
members of the ‘ulama, and, increasingly, the emerging commercial
elite all figured prominently in the making of notable families.
Following adoption of the 1858 land law code, notable families also
became significant landowners throughout Palestine and the Bilad al-
Sham.
Just as the Ottomans relied on these notable families to ensure their
rule, so did the British during the Mandate period. Indeed, tension
among notable families reached a crescendo under British rule, made
famous by the historic rivalry between the Husayni and Nashashibi
families, the former characterized by their increasing hostility to
the British, and the latter known for its cooperation with the Mandate
authorities. The British were able to play the game of divide and
conquer, weakening Palestinian society, and giving a clear advantage
to the emerging Zionist foothold in Palestine during the 1920s and
1930s.
Jordan and Egypt similarly used notable families as intermediaries to
the Palestinian populations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
respectively. Jordan essentially bolstered notable families as long as
they did not engage in nationalist politics. Egypt relied on the
Shawwa and Rayyes families in Gaza to help administer that territory.
Town mayors, city councilman, and other prominent local officials in
the West Bank and Gaza during the 1950s and 1960s almost always came
from these patrician families.
Even during the first 15 years of Israeli rule, notable families
maintained their privileged position, although they increasingly
espoused a more nationalist line consistent with the growing power of
the PLO in the 1970s. Israel undertook contradictory policies vis-à-
vis the notable families in the 1980s (and beyond) that helped weaken
their position in society. On the one hand, Israel still sought to
organize the occupation indirectly, through dispersing patronage
resources via the notables. On the other hand, other Israeli policies
directly undermined the notable families. Foremost among those
policies was the confiscation of lands for the settlement project in
the West Bank, which expanded rapidly after 1981. Notable families had
much of their lands confiscated, and lost the ability to control other
village lands that they did not own but over which they had had
considerable influence. The short-lived Village Leagues policy
likewise undermined the position of the notable families by shifting
resources to discredited rural second-tier elites.
Notable families were also undermined by social modernization, in
particular the growing prominence of an educated middle class, or new
political elite, that threw its weight squarely behind the PLO in the
1980s. The mobilization of Palestinian society by the new elite in the
1980s not only politically marginalized the notable families to a
significant extent, but also brought about the first intifada, or
uprising, from 1987 to 1993.
Most notable families aligned with Fatah politically with the
establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994. In addition, some
notable families were independent politically, but assumed a
mainstream nationalist posture consistent with Fatah’s ideology under
the Oslo accords. Notable families have an interest in stability and a
relatively effective state as only under these circumstances can
notables use their superior skills sets (education and resources) to
maximum advantage. Chaos and state breakdown work to the advantage of
those with guns and brawn, which are not the comparative advantage of
the notables. This is one key difference between clans and notables:
clans are most powerful when the state is weak, while notables benefit
the most from a stronger state.
Tribes, Clans and Families under Arafat
As noted, the first Palestinian intifada weakened the power of
Palestinian clans and notable families by bringing to power, at the
societal level, a new elite that was relatively modernist in its
orientation. This elite (also known at the intifada elite, or young
guard in Khalil Shikaki’s nomenclature) emphasized institutional
authority and was critical to the building of civil society
organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. Civil society represents non-
familial, horizontal forms of social organization, at odds with
clannish social organization (which is familial and vertical).
Yasir Arafat instituted a ‘politics of antithesis’ in order to
consolidate his power and the power of an externally-based PLO elite
that returned from exile, largely from Tunisia, in 1994. In spite of
the fact that the intifada elite, or young guard, was linked to the
PLO, they still represented a threat to the ‘Tunisian’ PLO because of
their superior everyday, grassroots authority in West Bank and Gazan
society. In order to weaken this competing elite and strengthen his
own political hand, Arafat instituted policies designed to undermine
institutional politics and strengthen the politics of personality,
family and patronage. In short, there was a ‘tribalization’ of
politics under Yasir Arafat as a means to consolidate his power.
Encouraging the empowerment of local leaders, especially those from
powerful clans, would tend to undermine national leaders and parties
who had no one particular geographical base, but could appeal all
across Palestine. The single most important step taken toward
‘tribalizing’ Palestinian politics under Arafat was the adoption of a
Fatah-supported elections law the governed the January 1996
parliamentary (PLC) elections. The election law divided the West Bank
and Gaza Strip into 16 electoral districts, and all parliamentary
representatives had to be elected from their home district in a first-
past-the-post format. Most analysts had recommended a single district,
proportional representation system for a geographic region as small as
the PA, but this would have disadvantaged local shaykhs, patriarchs,
clan elders and notables who had no national standing. By contrast,
larger and more populous Israel has a single district, proportional
representation system.
Clans became kingmakers in their own districts, often maneuvering to
have one of their own members elected to parliament. Even where clans
backed candidates outside of their own hamula, the clan diwan became a
major focus of politicking and deal making during the election
campaign.
The electoral law produced what it was designed to produce: a
parliament of clan leaders, largely pliant to the wishes of Arafat and
his cabinet, with only a relative handful of independent, national
leaders elected. The most prominent national leader elected to the PLC
and the man who won the most votes of any candidate, the late Haydar
‘Abd al-Shafi, ultimately resigned from parliament, citing its
uselessness
A second major PA institution designed to empower tribal and clan
interests under Arafat was the establishment of the Department of
Tribal Affairs. This department legitimated and empowered tribal (and
large clan) groups in numerous ways, not least of which by directing
state resources to tribal social formations. In addition to patronage
flows, the Department of Tribal Affairs also undermined the formal
institutions of the rule of law in Palestine by promoting the
‘informal’ justice sector—that is, the tribal ‘sulha’ conflict
resolution method. Indeed, the office of the PA presidency established
a specialized corps of intermediaries designed as a ‘rapid reaction’
reconciliation force to prevent tribal murders from becoming full-
fledged tribal (or clan) wars. In addition to this corps of tribal
mediators, the PA established specialized departments in ‘urf
(customary law) and islah (customary conflict resolution).
At first glance, empowering tribal mediation and tribal customary law
may strike an observer as a positive development designed to decrease
internal social conflict among Palestinian social groups. And, indeed,
it did so to some degree, especially after the destruction of PA
police facilities beginning in 2000. However, there are serious
shortcomings to such an approach, beyond undercutting the formal
institutions of justice in Palestine. For example, more powerful
tribes tend to get more justice; women are systematically excluded
from the tribal justice process and thus get no justice; marginalized
individuals and families, like women, enjoy no protection under tribal
law.
The PA acted as though it were a large tribe in a number of cases. In
particular, when a police or security official killed a Palestinian
civilian, the PA often paid diya—blood money—rather than perform an
official investigation and hold parties personally responsible.
A final example of the tribalization of politics under Arafat was the
recruitment process by the various security forces (about 14 in all).
Each security force tended to recruit new members from specific clans.
Thus, security forces became an extension of clan politics and
interests, and rivalries amongst clans then got reflected in rivalries
among security forces. Clan rivalry was not the only source of
fragmentation among the security forces, but it was a major
contributing factor.
The logic of tribalizing politics, as noted, was to undermine the new
elite and the political parties and factions they represented. While
this policy was particularly directed at Hamas and cadres from the
leftist parties of the PLO (which tended to be better organized than
Fatah) it did also tend to disempower the more modernist elements from
Fatah as well. Fatah transformed itself into a large and fragmented
party that added any social and political element that wanted to enjoy
the flows of patronage. While tribes and clans are not ideologically
inclined by nature, they were happy to hop on the Fatah bandwagon
after 1994. Arafat’s political agenda matched up nicely with the
interests of Palestinian tribes and clans. Fatah became the party of
choice for most clans.
The Role of Clans under Conditions of State Breakdown, 2000-2008
By contrast to the first uprising, the second intifada that began in
2000 following the collapse of peace negotiations strengthened
Palestinian clans. It did so for two primary reasons. First, six years
of PA rule under Arafat had generally strengthened clan politics and
undermined institutions-based politics for the reasons noted above. So
clans were generally in a good position to take advantage of the
societal crisis that the intifadat al-Aqsa created. That major clans
were also now armed, meant that they could provide protection and
security for members, making them more attractive. As the police and
security forces dissolved, many members simply took their weapons and
returned to the clan’s quarters.
PA institutions of law and order collapsed rapidly with the second
uprising, largely because they were the primary targets of Israeli
military activities. All Palestinian police stations and security
force buildings were destroyed by Israel. With an inoperative police
force, the court system barely functioned. In short, the institutional
framework of the Palestinian Authority was destroyed, compelling
Palestinians society to function in the absence of any state
authority, either their own or an occupying power. In this return to a
near Hobbesian state of nature, primordial groups—clans—were best
situated to provide security and some other basic social functions to
their members.
The ability of clans to provide protection for their members became an
essential feature of Palestinian life in the near absence of a state,
especially as anti-Israeli actions slowly gave way to more intra-
Palestinian factional fighting and general increases in crime.
Palestinians from weaker clans found themselves more vulnerable to
crime as their family name was no deterrent. Palestinians from
powerful clans could often avoid being victims of crime simply because
of their clan name. Perpetrators would know there would be serious
consequences for attacking someone from a powerful clan.
In addition to personal security, clans tended to become a refuge for
financial security under circumstances of high unemployment and a
collapsing economy. What few jobs were available would be filled by
family members, especially in an economy dominated by small family-run
businesses. In addition, clans often redistributed scarce income
across all family units, insuring that all members had enough
resources to survive. Increasingly, this type of familial
redistribution of resources (an old function of clans, after all),
became formalized with a clan fund managed by trusted senior members
of the clan. Diaspora members of the clan were expected to contribute
to this fund, and some did so to the tune of tens of thousands of
dollars. These familial funds were—and are, especially in Gaza—
essential to the prevention of even higher rates of malnutrition and
deprivation among Palestinians.
In the absence of state regulation, clans have played a major role in
the informal economy as well. In some cases, this economy was based on
extortion. For example, clans would periodically set up roadblocks and
charge vehicles fees for safe passage. Again, this was done
principally in the Gaza Strip. Kidnappings by clans for ransom also
increased during this period, with journalists being a favorite
target. Other criminal activities, such as car theft and resale,
tended to be organized primarily along clan lines. Smuggling became a
major source of funding for some clans. While smuggling occurred in
both the West Bank and Gaza, it was a more pressing, and thus
profitable business in the Strip. This became even more true following
the January 2006 election of Hamas and the increasingly tight siege
placed by Israel around Gaza.
Smuggling via tunnels from Rafah to the Egyptian side of the border
has been a particularly important source of revenue for some clans.
Reportedly, the powerful Samhadana clan controls many of these
smuggling tunnels, and charges fees for their use. Fuel, cigarettes
and other popular consumer goods appear to be the most commonly
smuggled items into Gaza. Israel charges that these tunnels have also
been used to smuggle in weaponry. Hamas’ recent ability to fire
rockets into Ashqelon supports the allegation, as these rockets are
reportedly Katyushas, not Qassams, and thus had to get into Gaza
somehow.
The death of Arafat in November 2004 had a centrifugal effect on
Palestinian clans. Arafat was the personal hub that distributed and
controlled the flow of patronage to various actors, including allied
clans. While Arafat’s control over clan politics had weakened
substantially in the several years before his death, especially in
Gaza, he did represent the last vestige of PA control over the clans.
Neither the PA nor Fatah nor the PLO has anyone that has been able to
substantially replace Arafat in his ability shape and manipulate clan
politics and behavior. Abbas simply does not have the ties, history
and knowledge of the clan networks and dynamics that Arafat did. While
Fatah continues to reach out to clans and encourages a culture of
vendetta in Gaza as a means to undermine Hamas’ rule there, it has not
been able to replicate Arafat’s mastery of clan politics.
Perhaps the most symbolic representation of the rise of clan power in
the period of PA state collapse occurred in Gaza following Israel’s
withdrawal from its settlements there in 2005. Following Israel’s
departure, powerful clans grabbed some of the abandoned settlement
lands—prime real estate along the beach. Whether under Fatah control
or now Hamas control of Gaza, the PA has not been able to eject the
clans from those settlement lands to this day.
Clan Politics under Hamas Rule in Gaza
Hamas’ victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections
substantially enhanced its power in Palestine, and especially in Gaza
where it has always been strongest. Fatah’s unwillingness to
relinquish the perquisites of power—of more than a decade of
essentially single party rule in Palestine—was chiefly behind 17
months of tension and periodic bloodshed between Hamas and Fatah.
Fearing an imminent coup d’état, Hamas launched a four-day offensive
against Fatah in Gaza in June 2007, effectively expelling Fatah forces
from the Strip. Since June 2007, Hamas alone has ruled Gaza.
Hamas initially took a hard line stand against the clans as part of a
broader law-and-order posture. Indeed, Hamas enjoyed significant
success in decreasing lawlessness in Gaza. The murder rate—which had
increased 50 percent in 2006 from 2005—was returned to normal levels.
Hamas also effectively banned the use of clan and factional roadblocks
and the extortion that went with them. Hamas also banned the public
display of guns, the use of gunfire at weddings, and the wearing of
masks in public. Hamas gained high marks in public surveys for its law-
and-order campaign. Even in its rhetoric, Hamas took on an explicit
anti-‘asabiya posture. ‘Asabiya, meaning communal loyalty, has a long
and valued tradition in the Arab world, celebrated most famously by
Ibn Khaldun. To openly challenge such loyalty constituted a political
risk by Hamas, but one that they seemed to win.
Hamas in its zeal sought to disband the militia attached to clans, and
it started by taking on the powerful Dughmush clan which in March 2007
had abducted BBC journalist Alan Johnston. Political entreaties to
free Johnston had failed, so Hamas went after the Dughmush militarily.
After a fierce firefight in early July, the Dughmush relented and
freed Johnston. Fresh off of its defeat of the Dughmush militia, Hamas
took on the Hillis clan in October—a clan known for its close ties to
Fatah. While Hamas was able to defeat the Hillis militia, it was
startled to find other clan militia coming to the defense of the
Hillis. Clans do not normally unite in common defense, so it was a
troubling development.
In 2008, Hamas has begun to use a more nuanced and sophisticated
approach to the clans of Gaza. While Hamas still takes a hard line on
the public display of weapons, it has allowed the clan militia to hang
on to their arms privately. Hamas seems to have recognized that trying
to challenge the clans directly is a politically problematic tactic,
especially given Fatah’s embrace of the clans as a vehicle to
undermine Hamas’ power in Gaza. By taking a more balanced approach to
the clans, Hamas hopes to neutralize clan opposition to Hamas’ rule.
It is a policy that appears to be paying dividends.
As part of its greater charm offensive toward the clans, Hamas has
changed its rhetoric to some degree. Instead of blasting ‘asabiya,
Hamas now praises urf (tribal customary law) as largely consistent
with and complementary to shari’a, Islamic law. Hamas has also praised
the conservative social customs of traditional clans, recognizing it
shares those values in kind.
Hamas may also have learned the lesson to play some clans off against
each other, as opposed to uniting them in common against Hamas
policies. There is considerable evidence and many claims that Hamas is
more closely allying with some smaller clans with the aim of
diminishing the power of larger clans in Gaza. In any case, Hamas’
dominant strategy appears to neutralize the ability of clans to be a
vehicle for Fatah power in Gaza, and that neutralization must include
both carrots and sticks.
Clans and Political Islam
Tribes, clans and notable families are not social organizations
generally receptive to radical Islamism or jihadism. Indeed, they are
forces for conservative, status-quo oriented social norms. Clans,
particularly those in Gaza, have recently been accused of harboring
jihadi tendencies, but this is an error in interpretation. It seems to
derive primarily from the Dughmush clan’s militia being named jaysh al-
Islam(the Army of Islam) and its leader using jihadi rhetoric to
justify the kidnapping of a BBC journalist. Whether or not an
individual member of the Dughmush might be a jihadi is not relevant.
The point is that the clan’s militia, in acting in the clan’s
interest, will eschew radical ideologies and pursue activities that
advance the clan’s interests. The militia will act in a way to
materially advance those interests, not out of ideological purity.
Masking clan interests by assigning an Islamic name to a militia is
not at all unusual.
Reminiscent of Edward Banfield’s old study of clans in southern Italy,
Palestinian clans act on the principle of amoral familialism. That is,
members of the clan will act to advance the interests of the clan over
all other social ties. Such actions are neither moral nor immoral, but
simply reflect the ascendancy of clan identity under current
circumstances. Thus, the kidnapping of a journalist for ransom, or the
setting up of a roadblock to extort ‘safe passage fees’ both promote
the material interests of the clan (by providing it resources). While
these actions may strike an outside observer as normatively
problematic, even immoral, they would be seen as morally consistent
with advancing the interests of the clan by fellow clan members.
Amoral familialism amongst clans thrives especially in circumstances
of state breakdown or the absence of state authority, such as in
Somalia or Gaza. Giving such actions an Islamic name, as happens in
both places, only hides the fact that it is clan interests at work,
not jihadism (which almost always comes from atomized individuals).
The fact that Hamas has had seriously strained relations with the
clans and their “Islamic” militia underlines this fact.
Notable families in Palestine have long provided the upper ranks of
the ‘ulama, or clergy. In fact, the relationship between the upper
merchant class and the high clergy has been strong in Palestine as
throughout most of the Middle East. The Husayni family is the
stereotypical example of a notable landowning family that produced
both well-to-do merchants and top members of the clergy, most famously
the Mufti of Jerusalem under the British, Haj Amin al-Husayni.
The broad growth in educational opportunities and other social changes
have opened up the ranks of Palestinian ‘ulama to more economically
modest families, who can have a greater affinity for more radical
interpretations of Islam. However, Palestinian radical Islamism, like
radical Islamism everywhere, is led primarily by lay Islamists, not
clerics. And where clerics are involved, they tend to be from the
lower ranks of the ‘ulama. In any case, notable families and the
clerical members they still generate almost never embrace radical
interpretations of Islam. They are almost always a force for
ideological moderation.
Clans, Tribes and the State: Some Conclusions and Policy
Implications
    * Clans are a double-edged sword. On one, clans clearly enhance
social stability and mitigate against societal collapse under extreme
conditions of state breakdown. They provide personal security and
financial survival in Hobbesian circumstances. On the other hand, clan
militia and systems of tribal justice directly undermine state
building and state efficacy. Clan militia prevent states from enjoying
a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a cornerstone of what a
state is. Tribal conflict resolution, while helpful to social peace in
the absence of a state, undermine state institutions and standards of
equal justice under conditions of state building. Thus, policies that
encourage the empowerment of clans may be appropriate in extreme
circumstances where a humanitarian disaster lurks, or as part of a
counter insurgency strategy as in the Sunni tribal areas of Iraq. But
there is a clear downside to such policies when a goal is to
strengthen and make more efficacious institutions of a state, which in
turn can provide greater stability, security, and standards of
justice.
    * The power and identity of tribes/clans are in inverse proportion
to those of the state. The power of Palestinians clans, especially in
Gaza, is far greater today than it was even a decade ago or at any
time in the past 40 years. Clans and clan identity have become more
important as the PA has collapsed. Even under a military occupation by
the Israeli state, clans assumed a lesser role in the lives of
Palestinians. So while clans do not disappear as the state becomes
stronger and more efficacious, they do play a diminished role in
people’s lives, limited mostly to social activities. As the state
weakens, clans take on greater roles, including physical and financial
security.
    * Do not romanticize tribes and clans. Tribes today are not the
same thing as tribes a generation ago, 50 years ago, or a century ago.
Palestinian clans, like clans and tribes everywhere in the Arab world
today, produce their share of smart, well-educated doctors, lawyers,
and engineers. While tribes a century or two ago could exist without
ever encountering state power, that is no longer the case. Today
politics lies at the nexus of interaction between the state and
various social groups. Tribes and clans, cell phones and laptops in
hand, figure out ways to tap into state resources. States figure out
ways to best use tribes and clans for their own political purposes.
Even in the brief history of a relatively effective PA, the nexus of
state and clan was very much at the center of the practice of politics
and political power. Oil wealth over the past 35 years has made this
nexus of state and tribe even more important in other Arab countries.
The balance of resources between state and tribe is now heavily,
heavily tilted in favor of the state in a way that it wasn’t even in
the early part of the twentieth century. Tribes know this, and
configure strategies to take advantage of it. This sort of calculation
was virtually unknown in the old orientalist state. If we think about
tribes and clans in a Lawrence of Arabia type way, we will miss the
very different and modern ways in which tribes now engage the state,
and vice-versa.
    * Clans benefit from a weak state, notables from a coherent state.
A key difference between notable families and clans, is that clans
were better suited to take advantage of a power vacuum when the PA
collapsed. Be it creating substantial militia or digging tunnels for
smuggling in the gray economy, large clans showed an aptitude for
advancing their interests in the absence of state power. Conversely,
elite urban notable families do not do well in the rough and tumble of
a Hobbesian environment. Rather, their strengths are better suited
toward taking advantage of a rather more coherent state in a
relatively stable environment. Their education, resources, and access
to the hallways of power can best be put to use under conditions of
relative stability.
    * Clans are not ideologically committed, will play off outsiders.
Palestinian clans practice amoral familialism designed to advance the
interests of the clan above all else (especially in conditions of
statelessness). Amoral familialism means, among other things, that
clans are not prone to extreme ideological commitment. Thus,
Palestinian clans, qua clans, are highly unlikely to join the ranks of
jihadism, although individual members may on their own. It also means
that clans are prone to play off outsiders—be it Hamas or Fatah—to get
the best deal for the clan, and will ‘change sides’ if a better deal
is to be had. Thus, policy makers should not expect certain clans to
be eternal allies or implacable foes. Their alliance patterns will
shift according to the totality of the resource packages being
offered. As noted above, as the state strengthens, the autonomy of
clans to shift alliances, and the importance of it if they do,
declines. As the state weakens, clans become more autonomous players,
and the importance of their shifts increases.

 una accurata analisi della societa' palestinese
e quindi? Hai studiato tanto per capire che israeliani e palestinesi
sono come gli italiani e per finire a pagare il pizzo? Contento te...