Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: I Fratelli Musulmani alla conquista dell'Europa

The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe
I Fratelli Musulmani alla conquista dell'Europa
by Lorenzo Vidino
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2005
http://www.meforum.org/article/687
Since its founding in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (Hizb al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle 
East. Its motto is telling: "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our 
leader. The Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah 
is our highest hope."[1]
Fin dalla fondazione nel 1928, la Fratellanza Musulmana(Hizb al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun) ha profondamente influenzato la vita politica del Medio 
Oriente. Il suo motto dice: "Allah è il nostro obiettivo, il Profeta è la 
nostra guida, il Corano è la nostra legge, La Jihad è la nostra via. Morire 
lungo il cammino è la nostra più grande speranza."
While the Brotherhood's radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations 
of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and 
appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes 
and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more 
radical organizations.
Mentre le idee radicali del Fratelli Musulmani hanno formato le convinzioni 
di generazioni di islamisti, nelle ultimi due decenni, esse hanno perso una 
parte del loro potere e interesse nel Medio Oriente, schiacciate dalla dura 
repressione dei regimi locali e snobbate dalle giovani generazioni di 
islamisti, i quali spesso preferiscono organizzazioni ancora più radicali.
But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become 
an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Since the early 
1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and 
slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of 
mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic 
community, the Muslim Brotherhood's ultimate goal may not be simply "to help 
Muslims be the best citizens they can be," but rather to extend Islamic law 
throughout Europe and the United States.[2]
Ma il Medio Oriente é solo una parte del mondo islamico. L'Europa divenne l'incubatrice 
del pensiero islamico e del suo sviluppo politico. Fin dai lontani anni 60, 
i membri e i simpatizzati dei Fratelli Musulmani sono emigrati in Europa e, 
lentamente ma continuamente hanno fondato una vasta e ben organizzata rete 
di moschee, associazioni e organizzazioni islamiche.  Diversamente dalle più 
grandi organizzazioni islamiche, il fine dei Fratelli Musulmani non ö 
semplicemente quello di "aiutare i musulmani ad essere i migliori cittadini 
che possono essere", ma piuttosto di diffondere la legge islamica nell'Europa 
e negli Stati Uniti.
Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees 
who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now 
lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their 
engagement with Europe's political elite. Funded by generous contributors 
from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans 
nearly every European country.
Quattro decenni di predicazione e proselitismo hanno dato i loro frutti. Gli 
studenti rifugiati che emigrarono dal Medio Oriente 40 anni fa e i loro 
discendenti, guidano ora organizzazioni che rappresentano le comunità 
musulmane nel loro impegno con le elite politiche d'Europa. Finanziate da 
generosi donatori del golfo persico, essi presiedono una rete centralizzata 
che si estende in quasi tutti i paesi europei.
These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they 
continue to embrace the Brotherhood's radical views and maintain links to 
terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Dutch, and 
French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media 
alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them 
whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they 
seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.
Queste organizzazioni rappresentano esse stesse come corrente principale, 
cosi come continuano ad abbracciare le visioni radicali dei Fratelli 
Musulmani e mantengono contatti con i settoristi. Con una retorica moderata 
ben espressa nelle lingue tedesca, olandese, francese, essi si sono 
guadagnata l'accettazione sia presso i governi europei che presso i media. 
Politici di tutto lo spettro dei partiti accorrono per incontrarli ogni qual 
volta sopraggiunge un argomento che riguarda i musulmani, oppure, 
localmente, per cercare voti nelle comunità musulmane.
But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop 
their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about 
interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate 
and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly 
condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, 
they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. 
Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected 
Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible 
in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only 
because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played 
host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to 
the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government's reaction is 
also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood 
rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its 
activities.
Questi però, quando parlano prima con i loro seguaci musulmani in lingua 
araba o turca, abbandonano la loro facciata e abbracciano il radicalismo. 
Mentre i loro rappresentanti parlano di dialogo interreligioso e di 
integrazione in televisione, le loro moschee predicano l'odio e ammoniscono 
i fedeli sulla diabolica società occidentale. Mentre condannano 
pubblicamente l'uccisione dei pendolari a Madrid e dei bambini scolari in 
Russia, continuano a raccogliere denaro per Hamas ed altre organizzazioni 
terroristiche. Gli europei, ansiosi di creare un dialogo con la loro 
crescente minoranza musulmana disaffezionata, si lasciano sfuggire questa 
doppiezza. Questa situazione è particolarmente evidente in Germania, la 
quale è ritenuta un luogo di importanza chiave per la prima grande ondata di 
Fratelli Musulmani immigrati  e che accoglie la presenza meglio organizzata. 
La reazione del governo tedesco è anche istruttiva solo per mostrare il 
pericolo di accettare la retorica di facciata dei Fratelli Musulmani, senze 
gettare un più ampio sguardo sullo scopo delle loro attività.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The situation in Germany is particularly telling. More than anywhere else in 
Europe, the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany has gained significant power and 
political acceptance. Islamist organizations in other European countries now 
consciously follow the model pioneered by their German peers.
Parliamo in particolare della situazione tedesca. Più che in ogni altro 
luogo in Europa, i Fratelli Musulmani hanno conquistato in Germania un 
potere significativo e l'accettazione politica. Le organizzazioni islamiche 
nel resto d'Europa, seguono ora consapevolmente il modello tracciato dai 
loro compagni in Germania.
During the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of Muslim students left the Middle 
East to study at German universities, drawn not only by the German 
institutions' technical reputations but also by a desire to escape 
repressive regimes. Egyptian ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime was 
especially vigorous in its attempts to root out the Islamist opposition. 
Beginning in 1954, several members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled Egypt to 
escape arrest or assassination. West Germany provided a welcome refuge. 
Bonn's motivations were not simply altruistic. As terrorism expert Khalid 
Durán explained in his studies on jihadism in Europe,[3] the West German 
government had decided to cut diplomatic relations with countries that 
recognized East Germany. When Egypt and Syria established diplomatic 
relations with the communist government, Bonn decided to welcome Syrian and 
Egyptian political refugees. Often, these dissidents were Islamists. Many 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood were already familiar with Germany. 
Several had cooperated with the Nazis before and during World War II.[4] 
Some had even, reportedly, fought in the infamous Bosnian Handschar division 
of the Schutzstaffel (SS).[5]
Durante gli anni '50 e '60migliaia di studenti musulmani lasciarono il Medio 
Oriente per studiare nelle università tedesche, non solo dalla reputazione 
tecnica delle istituzioni tedesche ma anche dal desiderio di scappare dai 
regimi repressivi. Il regime egiziano del capo di stato Gamal Abdel Nasser 
fu particolarmente duro nel compito di estirpare l'opposizione islamica. A 
cominciare dal 1954, diversi membri dei Fratelli Mussulmani fuggirono dall'Egitto 
per evitare l'arresto o l'assassinio. La Germania occidentale diede loro un 
rifugio accogliente. Le motivazioni di Bonn non erano semplicemente 
altruistiche. Come esperto di terrorismo, Khalid Durán spiegò nei suoi studi 
sul movimento della jihad in Europa, che il governo Tedesco decise di 
rompere le relazioni diplomatiche  con quei paesi che riconoscevamo la 
Germania orientale. Quando Egitto e Siria stabilirono relazioni diplomatiche 
con il governo comunista, Bonn decise di accettare rifugiati politici 
siriani ed egiziani. Spesso questi dissidenti erano islamismi. Molti membri 
dei Fratelli Mussulmani avevano gia familiarità con la Germania. Diversi di 
loro avevano collaborato con i nazisti prima e durante la Seconda Guerra 
Mondiale. Alcuni avevano addirittura combattuto nell'infame divisione delle 
SS Bosnian Handschar.
One of the Muslim Brotherhood's first pioneers in Germany was Sa'id Ramadan, 
the personal secretary of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna.[6] 
Ramadan, an Egyptian who had led the Muslim Brotherhood's irregulars in 
Palestine in 1948,[7] moved to Geneva in 1958 and attended law school in 
Cologne.[8] In Germany, he founded what has become one of Germany's three 
main Muslim organizations, the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (Islamic 
Society of Germany, IGD), over which he presided from 1958 to 1968.[9] 
Ramadan also cofounded the Muslim World League,[10] a well-funded 
organization that the Saudi establishment uses to spread its radical 
interpretation of Islam throughout the world. The U.S. government closely 
monitors the activities of the Muslim World League, which it accuses of 
financing terrorism. In March 2002, a U.S. Treasury Department-led task 
force raided the group's Northern Virginia offices looking for documents 
tying the group to Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In 
January 2004, the Senate Finance Committee asked the Internal Revenue 
Service for its records on the Muslim World League "as part of an 
investigation into possible links between nongovernmental organizations and 
terrorist financing networks."[11] This privileged relationship with the 
oil-rich kingdom granted Ramadan an influx of money, which he used to fund 
the powerful Islamic Center of Geneva and to bankroll several financial and 
religious activities. Hani Ramadan, Sa'id's son, currently runs the Islamic 
Center. Among its other board members is Sa'id's other son, Tariq Ramadan, 
who recently made headlines in the United States when the Department of 
Homeland Security revoked his visa to teach at Notre Dame University.[12] Sa'id 
Ramadan's case is not isolated.[13]
Uno dei primi pionieri dei Fratelli Musulmani in Germania fu Sa'id Ramadan, 
il segretario personale di Hassan al-Banna, fondatore dei Fratelli 
Musulmani. Ramadan, un egiziano che guidò le formazioni irregolari dei 
Fratelli Musulmani in Palestina nel 1948, emigrò a Ginevra nel 1958 e 
frequentò giurisprudenza a a Cologna. In Germania fondò quella che poi 
divenne la principale organizzazione musulmana in Germania, l'Associazione 
Islamica Tedesca (IGD), che presiedette dal 1958 al 1968. Ramadan fu 
cofondatore delle Lega Mondiale Musulmana, una ben finanziata organizzazione 
utilizzata dal governo saudita per diffondere la sua radicale 
interpretazione dell'Islam nel mondo. Il governo statunitense controllò 
attentamente le attività della Lega Mondiale Musulmana, che fu accusata di 
finanziare il terrorismo. Nel marzo 2002 una commissione del dipartimento 
del tesoro degli USA fece irruzione negli uffici della Lega nel Nord 
Virginia alla ricerca di documenti che  collegano la Lega ad Al-Quaeda, 
Hamas, e alla Jihad Islamica di Palestina. Nel gennaio 2004 la Commissione 
delle Finanza del Senato chiese al Servizio delle Entrate Interne i loro 
documenti sulla Lega Mondiale Musulmana, come "parte di un'indagine sulle 
possibili connessioni tra organizzazioni non governative e reti di 
finanziamento del terrorismo." Questa relazione privilegiata con il 
ricchissimo stato petrolifero consenti a Ramadan un flusso di denaro che 
egli usò per finanziare il potente Centro Islamico di Ginevra (CH) e per 
bankroll diverse attività finanziarie e religiose. Hani Ramadan, figlio di 
Sa'id, guida attualmente il Centro Islamico. Fra gli altri membri del 
consiglio c'è l'altro figlio di Sa'id, Tariq Ramadan, che recentemente fece 
notizia negli USA quando il Dipartimento per la Sicurezza Nazionale revocò 
il suo visto per insegnare alla Notre Dame University. Il caso di Tariq Sa'id 
Ramadan non è isolato.
Following Ramadan's ten-year presidency of the IGD, Pakistani national Fazal 
Yazdani briefly led the IGD before Ghaleb Himmat, a Syrian with Italian 
citizenship, took the helm. During his long stewardship (1973-2002), Himmat 
shuttled between Italy, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the United 
States.[14] Intelligence agencies around the world have long scrutinized 
Himmat's terrorist connections. He is one of the founders of the Bank 
al-Taqwa, a powerful conglomerate dubbed by Italian intelligence, "Bank of 
the Muslim Brotherhood," which has financed terrorist groups since the 
mid-1990s if not earlier.[15] Himmat helped Youssef Nada, one of the Muslim 
Brotherhood's financial masterminds, run Al-Taqwa and a web of companies 
headquartered in locations such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the 
Bahamas, which maintain few regulations on monetary origin or destination. 
Both Himmat and Nada reportedly funneled large sums to groups such as Hamas 
and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front[16] and set up a secret credit line 
for a top associate of Osama bin Laden.[17]
Dopo i dieci anni di presidenza di Ramadan, Fazal Yazdani di nazionalità 
pachistana guidò la IGD per breve tempo, prima che Ali Ghaleb Himmat, un 
siriano con cittadinanza italiana prese la guida. Durante la sua lunga guida 
organizzativa (1973-2002), Himmat fece la spola tra Italia, Austria, 
Germania, Svizzera e Stati Uniti. I servizi segreti di tutto il mondo hanno 
indagato sulle connessioni terroristiche di Himmat. Egli fu uno dei 
fondatori della Bank al-Taqwa , una potente conglomerate soprannominata dai 
servizi segreti italiani la "banca dei Fratelli Musulmani" la quale ha 
finanziato gruppi terroristici fin dalla metà degli anni '90 se non prima. 
Himmat aiutò Youssef Mustafa Nada, uno dei cervelli finanziari dei Fratelli 
Musulmani, a mettere in funzione Al-Taqwa ed una rete di società con sedi 
legali in paesi come Svizzera, Lichtensetein e Bahamas, che impongono poche 
regole sulle origini e le desinazioni finanziarie. Entrambi Himmat e Nada 
convogliarono, come risulta dai documenti, ingenti capitali verso gruppi 
come Hamas e il Fronte Islamico di Salvezza Algerino ed impostarono una 
linea di credito segreta per un alto dirigente di Osama bin Laden.
In November 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department designated both Himmat and 
Nada as terrorism financiers.[18] According to Italian intelligence, the 
Al-Taqwa network also financed several Islamic centers throughout Europe[19] 
and many Islamist publications, including Risalatul Ikhwan,[20] the official 
magazine of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the U.S. Treasury Department 
designation, Himmat resigned from the IGD's presidency. His successor was 
Ibrahim el-Zayat, a 36-year-old of Egyptian descent and the charismatic 
leader of numerous student organizations.
Nel novembre 2001 il Dipartimento del Tesoro USA definì Himmat e Nada come 
finanzieri del terrorismo. Anche secondo le valutazioni dei servizi segreti 
italiani, La rete di Al-Taqwa finanziava diversi centri islamici in tutta l'Europa 
e molte pubblicazioni islamiste, compresa la Risalatul Ikhwan, la rivista 
ufficiale dei Fratelli Mususlmani. Dopo l'accusa del Dipartimento del Tesoro 
USA, Himmat rassegnò le dimissioni dal IGD. Il suo successore divenne 
Ibrahim el-Zayat, di 36 anni di origine egiziana e leader carismatico di 
numerose organizzazioni di studenti.
The fact that IGD leaders Ramadan and Himmat are among the most prominent 
Muslim Brotherhood members of the last half-century suggests the links 
between the IGD and the Ikhwan. Moreover, reports issued by internal 
intelligence agencies from various German states openly call the IGD an 
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.[21] In particular, according to one 
intelligence report, the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has 
dominated the IGD since its early days.[22]
Il fatto che Ramadan e Himmat, capi dell'IGD, siano i più importanti membri 
dei Fratelli Musulmani dell'ultimo mezzo secolo, suggerisce i legami tra IGD 
e l'Ikhwan (Fratellanza).  Inotre i rapporti redatti dai servizi segreti di 
diversi stati tedeschi dichiarno apertamente la IGD come emanazione dei 
Fratelli Musulmani. In particolare, in accardo con i rapporti dei servizi, 
la corrente egiziana ha dominato la IGD fin dai primi giorni.
The Muslim Brotherhood-led by Ramadan and Himmat[23]-sponsored the 
construction of the imposing Islamic Center of Munich in 1960,[24] aided by 
large donations from Middle Eastern rulers such as King Fahd of Saudi Arabia 
who, according to a 1967 Sueddeutsche Zeitung article, donated 80,000 
marks.[25] The Ministry of Interior of Nordrhein-Westfalen states that the 
Islamic Center of Munich has been one of the European headquarters for the 
Brotherhood since its foundation.[26] The center publishes a magazine, 
Al-Islam, whose efforts (according to an Italian intelligence dossier),[27] 
are financed by the Bank al-Taqwa. According to the interior minister of 
Baden-Württemberg, Al-Islam shows explicitly how the German Brothers reject 
the concept of a secular state.[28] Its February 2002 issue, for example, 
states,
In the long run, Muslims cannot be satisfied with the acceptance of German 
family, estate, and trial law. . Muslims should aim at an agreement between 
the Muslims and the German state with the goal of a separate jurisdiction 
for Muslims.
The IGD, of which the Islamic Center of Munich is one of the most important 
members, represents the main offshoot of the Egyptian Brotherhood in 
Germany. But the IGD is also the quintessential example of how the Muslim 
Brotherhood has gained power in Europe. The IGD has grown significantly over 
the years, and it now incorporates dozens of Islamic organizations 
throughout the country. Islamic centers from more than thirty German cities 
have joined its umbrella.[29] Today, the IGD's real strength lies in its 
cooperation with and sponsorship of many Islamic youth and student 
organizations across Germany.
La Fratellanza Musulmana, guidata da Ramadan e Himmat, sponsorizzò la 
costruzione del Centro Islamico di Monaco di Baviera nel 1960, aiutata la 
ingenti donazioni dei capi di stato mediorientali come Re Fahd dell'Arabia 
Saudita che, come scritto nel 1967 nell'articolo del Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 
donò 80000 DM. Il ministro degli interni del Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
afferma che il Centro Islamico di Monaco é diventato uno dei quartier 
generali fin dalla fondazione. Il cento pubblica una rivista,  Al-Islam, la 
cui attività é finanziata da Bank al-Taqwa. Come dice il ministro degli 
interni del Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,  Al-Islam insegna esplicitamente come 
i Fratelli Musulmani rigettano il concetto dello stato laico. L'edizione del 
febbraio 2002, per esempio, dichiara:
in prospettiva, i musulmani non possono essere soddisfatti di accettare la 
famiglia tedesca, i costumi e le leggi penali.  . I musulmani devono cercare 
un patto tra musulmani e lo stato tedesco che definisca una condizione 
giuridica separata per i musulmani.
La IGD, di cui il Centro Islamico di Monaco è uno dei più importanti membri, 
rappresenta la principale emanazione dei Fratelli Musulmani d'Egitto in 
Germania. Ma IGD è anche l'esempio di come i Fratelli Musulmani hanno 
guadagnato il potere in Europa. IGD è cresciuta significativamente durante 
gli anni, e ora incorpora dozzine di organizzazioni islamiche in tutto il 
paese.
This focus on youth organizations came after Zayat's succession. He 
understood the importance of focusing on the next generation of German 
Muslims and launched recruitment drives to get young Muslims involved in 
Islamic organizations. But a Meckenheim police report on the sharply dressed 
Zayat also reveals alarming connections. German authorities openly say he is 
a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. They also link him to the World Assembly 
of Muslim Youth (WAMY), a Saudi nongovernmental organization that seeks to 
spread Wahhabism, the radical and intolerant Saudi interpretation of Islam, 
throughout the world with its literature and schools.[30] WAMY, which falls 
under the umbrella of the Muslim World League, has the stated goal of 
"arming the Muslim youth with full confidence in the supremacy of the 
Islamic system over other systems." It is the largest Muslim youth 
organization in the world and can boast unparalleled resources.[31] In 1991 
WAMY published a book called Tawjihat Islamiya (Islamic Views) that stated, 
"Teach our children to love taking revenge on the Jews and the oppressors, 
and teach them that our youngsters will liberate Palestine and Al-Quds 
[Jerusalem] when they go back to Islam and make jihad for the sake of 
Allah."[32] The sentiments in Tawjihat Islamiya are the rule rather than the 
exception. Many other WAMY publications are filled with strong anti-Semitic 
and anti-Christian rhetoric.
L'attenzione alle giovani organizzazioni venne dopo la successione a Zayat. 
Egli capi l'importanza di concentrarsi sulla seconda generazione di 
musulmani in Germania e lanciò operazioni di reclutamento per coinvolgere i 
giovani musulmani nelle organizzazioni islamiche. Ma un rapporto della 
polizia di Meckenheim sul severo Zayat rivela relazioni allarmanti. Le 
autorità tedesche dicono apertamente che è membro della Fratellanza 
Musulmana. Inoltre lo legano alla Assemblea Mondiale dei Giovani Musulmani 
(WAMY), un'organizzazione saudita non governativa che cerca di diffondere 
nel mondo il Wahhabismo, l'interpretazione saudita radicale e intollerante 
dell'Islam, con letteratura e scuole. WANY, la quale si pone sotto l'ombrello 
della Lega Mondiale Musulmana, ha l'obiettivo dichiarato di "armare i 
giovani musulmani con una totale consapevolezza della supremazia del sistema 
islamico su ogni altro sistema." Essa è la più grande organizzazione al 
mondo di giovani musulmani e può vantarsi di risorse non paragonabili. Nel 
1991 pubblicò un libro dal titolo Tawjihat Islamiya (visuali Islamiche) che 
afferma, "insegnate ai vostri figli di desiderare la rivincita sugli ebrei e 
gli oppressori, ed insegnate loro che i vostri piu giovani libereranno la 
Palestina e Gerusalemme quando essi torneranno all'Islam e faranno la jihad 
per l'amore di Allah." Questi sentimenti sono la regola piuttosto che l'eccezione. 
Mote altre pubblicazioni della WAMY some colme di aspra retorica antisemita 
e anticristiana.
Meckenheim police also link Zayat to Institut Européen des Sciences 
Humaines, a French school that prepares European imams. Several radical 
clerics lecture at the school and several European intelligence agencies 
accuse the school of spreading religious hatred.[33] German authorities also 
highlight the fact that he is involved in several money laundering 
investigations.[34] Zayat has never been indicted for terrorist activity, 
but he has dubious financial dealings and maintains associations with many 
organizations that spread religious hatred. The IGD may have changed 
leadership after the U.S. Treasury's designation of Himmat, but it did not 
change direction.
La polizia di Meckenheim lega Zayat all'Istituto Europeo di Scienze Umane, 
una scuola francese che prepara gli imam europei. Numerose lezioni clericali 
radicali presso la scuola e numerose agenzie d'investigazione accusano l'istituto 
di diffondere l'odio religioso. Le autorità tedesche inoltre evidenziano il 
fatto che è indagata per numerosi coinvolgimenti di lavaggio di denaro 
sporco. Zayat non è nai stato accusato di attività terroristica, ma ha dubbi 
affari finanziari e intrattiene relazioni con molte organizzazioni che 
diffondono l'odio religioso. La IGD ha cambiato il capo, dopo l'incriminazione 
di Himmat da parte del Dipartimento del Tesoro USA, ma non ha cambiato la 
sua politica.
While the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has chosen Munich as its 
base of operations in Germany, its Syrian branch is headquartered in Aachen, 
a German town near the Dutch border. The former Carolingian capital, with 
its famous university, is now home to a large Muslim population including 
the prominent Syrian Al-Attar family. The first Attar to move to Aachen was 
Issam, who fled persecution in his native country in the 1950s when he was 
leader of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Other members of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood soon followed. With time, Islamists from other 
countries adopted Attar's Bilal mosque in Aachen as their base of 
operations.[35] From hosting exiled Algerian terrorists[36] to operating a 
charity designated by the U.S. Department of Treasury as a financial front 
for Hamas,[37] Aachen is well known to intelligence agencies throughout the 
world.
Mentre la corrente egiziana dei Fratelli Musulmani ha scelto Monaco come sua 
base d'operazioni in Germania, la corrente siriana si è installata ad 
Aachen, una città tedesca ai confini con l'Olanda. L'antica capitale 
carolingia, con la sua famosa università, è ora la casa di una vasta 
popolazione musulmana che include l'altolocata famiglia siriana dei 
Al-Attar. Il primo Attar a stabilirsi in Aachen fu Issam, che fuggì dalle 
persecuzioni del suo paese nativo negli anni '50, quando era a capo dei 
Fratelli Musulmani siriani. Lo seguirono presto altri membri dei Fratelli 
Musulmani siriani. Con il tempo, islamici di altre nazionalità usarono la 
maschea di Attar Bilal in Aachen come lo base d'operazioni. Dall'ospitalità 
a terroristi algerini esuli a operazioni caritatevoli che invece 
nascondevano, secondo il Dipartimento del Tesoro il finanziamento di Hamas, 
Aachen è ben nota in tutto il mondo dai servizi di sicurezza.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood base in Aachen kept close relations with their 
Egyptian counterparts. For example, confirming the tendency of important 
Muslim Brotherhood families to close alliance through intermarriage, Issam 
al-Attar's son married the daughter of Al-Taqwa banker Youssef Nada.[38] 
Links between the two Muslim Brotherhood branches are more extensive than a 
single marriage, however. The Aachen Islamic Center reportedly received 
funding from Al-Taqwa.[39] Staff members have rotated between the Islamic 
Centers in Aachen and Munich. For example, Ahmed von Denffer, editor of the 
Islamic Center of Munich's Al-Islam magazine, came to Munich from 
Aachen.[40] Nevertheless, some distance remains. The Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood has never joined the IGD, instead preferring to keep some form 
of independence.
I Fratelli Musulmani sirani di Aachen strinsero stretti legami con I loro 
confratelli egiziani. Per esempio, a conferma, dato il costume di stingere 
alleanze tra famiglie di Fratelli Musulmani tramite il matrimonio, il figlio 
di Issam al-Attar sposò la figlia di del banchiere di Al-Taqwa Youssef Nada. 
I legami tra le due correnti dei Fratelli Musulmani sono comunque più estese 
di un singolo matrimonio. È documentato che il centro islamico di Aachen 
ricevette finanziamenti da Al-Taqwa. Membri della struttura ruotarono fra i 
Centri Islamici di Aachen e Monaco. Per esempio, Ahmed von Denffer, editore 
della rivista Al-Islam del Centro Islamico di Monaco, giunse a Monaco da 
Aachen. Nonostante tutto, rimane una certa distanza. I Fratelli Musulmani di 
Siria non si sono mai associati all'IGD, preferendo di mantenere una certa 
indipendenza.
Milli Görüs
Of all of Zayat's financial activities, the one that has attracted the 
German authorities' greatest suspicion has been his association with 
officials of Milli Görüs (National Vision, in Turkish). Milli Görüs, which 
has 30,000 members and perhaps another 100,000 sympathizers,[41] claims to 
defend the rights of Germany's immigrant Turkish population, giving them a 
voice in the democratic political arena while "preserving their Islamic 
identity."[42] But Milli Görüs has another agenda. While publicly declaring 
its interest in democratic debate and a willingness to see Turkish 
immigrants integrated into European societies, some Milli Görüs leaders have 
expressed contempt for democracy and Western values. The 
Bundesverfassungsschutz, Germany's domestic intelligence agency, has 
repeatedly warned about Milli Görüs' activities, describing the group in its 
annual reports as a "foreign extremist organization."[43] The agency also 
reported that "although Milli Görüs, in public statements, pretends to 
adhere to the basic principles of Western democracies, abolition of the 
laicist government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic 
state and social system are, as before, among its goals."[44]
Di tutte le attività finaziarie di Zayat, quella che ha attirato I maggiori 
sospetti delle autorità tedesche è stata la sua associazione con i capi di 
Milli Görüs (Vision Nazionale, in Turco). Milli Görüs, che conta 30000 
membri e altri 100000 simpatizzanti circa, dichiara di difendere i diritti 
della popolazione turca immigrata in Germania, dando ad essa una voce nell'arena 
politica democratica per "preservare la sua identità islamica." Ma Milli 
Görüs ha un'altro programma. Mentre le dichiarazioni pubbliche mostrano 
interesse al dibattito democratico e la disposizione a vedere gli immigranti 
turchi integrati nelle siccità europee, molti leader di hanno espresso 
disprezzo per la Democrazia e per i valori occidentali. Il 
Bundesverfassungsschutz, l'agenzia della sicurezza tedesca, ha avvertito in 
non documentato sulle attività di , descrivendo il gruppo nei suoi rapporti 
annuali come una "organizzazione estremistica straniera". L'agenzia inoltre 
ha riportato che, sebbene Milli Görüs pretenda, nelle dichiarazioni 
pubbliche, di aderire ai principi di base delle democrazie occidentali, ha, 
come prima, tra i suoi obiettivi l'abolizione in Turchia del sistema di 
governo laico e la creazione di uno stato ed un sistema sociale islamici."
Milli Görüs' history alone indicates why the group should be considered 
radical. Former Turkish prime minister Nehmettin Erbakan, whose Refah Party 
was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court in January of 1998 for 
"activities against the country's secular regime,"[45] is still Milli Görüs' 
undisputed leader, even if his nephew Mehmet Sabri Erbakan is its president. 
The 2002 European Milli Görüs meeting held in the Dutch city of Arnhem, 
where Nehmettin Erbakan was the keynote speaker, provides a glimpse into 
Milli Görüs' ideology. After a tirade against the evils of integration in 
the West and U.S. policies, Erbakan declared that "after the fall of the 
wall, the West has found an enemy in Islam."[46] A Bundesverfassungsschutz 
report reveals Milli Görüs' real aims:
While in recent times, the Milli Görüs has increasingly emphasized the 
readiness of its members to be integrated into German society and asserts 
its adherence to the basic law, such statements stem from tactical 
calculation rather than from any inner change of the organization.[47]
Milli Görüs pushes an agenda similar to that of the IGD, even if its target 
is more limited. Nevertheless, both Milli Görüs and the IGD collaborate on 
many initiatives. There is also a family connection. Zayat married Sabiha 
Erbakan, the sister of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan.[48] The siblings' mother is 
also involved in politics and runs an important Islamic women's organization 
in Germany. The Zayat family is active as well. Ibrahim el-Zayat's father is 
the imam of the Marburg mosque; other members of his family are involved in 
Islamic organizations. As Udo Ulfkotte, a political science professor 
specializing in counterespionage at the University of Lueneburg and an 
expert on Islamic terrorism, notes, the Erbakans and the Zayats lead 
networks of organizations that aim at the radicalization, respectively, of 
the Turkish and Arab communities in Germany.[49]
IGD and Milli Görüs are active in their efforts to increase political 
influence and become the official representatives of the entire German 
Muslim community. With well-endowed budgets, their mosques provide social 
services, organize conferences, and distribute literature nationwide. As the 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Landesverfassungsschutz) in 
Hessen[50] notes:
The threat of Islamism for Germany is posed . primarily by Milli Görüs and 
other affiliated groups. They try to spread Islamist views within the 
boundaries of the law. Then they try to implement . for all Muslims in 
Germany a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and of the Shari'a. . Their 
public support of tolerance and religious freedom should be treated with 
caution.[51]
It presents a problem that politicians and security services in Germany view 
the IGD and Milli Görüs so differently. But, as Ulfkotte wrote about Zayat 
in his book, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten (The War in Our Streets),[52] 
"politicians of all colors and parties try to reach out to him."[53] For 
example, the prestigious Berlin Catholic Academy invited Zayat to represent 
the Muslim point of view in an inter-religious meeting organized by the 
academy in October 2002.[54] German politicians and Christian institutions 
regularly partner themselves with Milli Görüs in various initiatives. Milli 
Gazete, the official journal of Milli Görüs, once stated that "Milli Görüs 
is a shield protecting our fellow citizens from assimilation into barbaric 
Europe."[55] Nevertheless, German politicians meet regularly with Milli 
Görüs officials to discuss immigration and integration issues. The fact that 
an official like Ahmed al-Khalifah, IGD secretary general, represents Islam 
before members of parliament who are discussing religious tolerance,[56] 
shows the success of Brotherhood-linked organizations' efforts to gain 
acceptance as the representatives of German Muslims. The Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution well described these efforts, saying that 
Milli Görüs (and the IGD) "strives to dominate regional or nationwide 
federations and umbrella organizations for Muslims which are increasingly 
gaining importance as interlocutors for state and ecclesiastical authorities 
and thus to expand its influence within society."[57]
Zentralrat, the Islamist Umbrella
In 1989, under the auspices of Abdullah at-Turki, powerful dean of Bin Saud 
University in Riyadh, the Saudis created the Islamische Konzil Deutschland 
(Islamic Council of Germany). Turki assumed the presidency with other top 
positions held by Ibrahim el-Zayat, Hasan Özdögan, a high-ranking Milli 
Görüs official, and Ahmad Khalifa, an officer from the Islamic Center of 
Munich.[58] While an official German parliament report describes the 
Islamische Konzil as just "another Sunni organization," such an assumption 
indicates a dangerous misunderstanding of the Saudi relationship to German 
Islamists.[59]
The trend toward consolidation took a step forward in 1994 when German 
Islamists realized that a united coalition translated into greater political 
relevance and influence. Nineteen organizations, including the IGD, the 
Islamic Center of Munich, and the Islamic Center of Aachen, created an 
umbrella organization, the Zentralrat der Muslime. According to a senior 
German intelligence official, at least nine out of these nineteen 
organizations belong to the Muslim Brotherhood.[60] The German press has 
recently investigated the Zentralrat president, Nadeem Elyas, a 
German-educated Saudi physician and an official of the Islamic Center of 
Aachen. Die Welt linked Elyas to Christian Ganczarski, an Al-Qaeda operative 
currently jailed as one of the masterminds of the 2002 attack on a synagogue 
in Tunisia.[61] Ganczarski, a German of Polish descent who converted to 
Islam, told authorities that Al-Qaeda recruited him at the Islamic 
University of Medina where Elyas sent him to study.[62] Elyas said he could 
not remember meeting him but did not deny the possibility that Ganczarski, 
who never completed high school, might have been one of the many individuals 
he had sent over the years to radical schools in Saudi Arabia.[63] Saudi 
donors paid all of Ganczarski's expenses.[64] Ganczarski was not alone. 
Elyas admitted to having sent hundreds of German Muslims to study at one of 
the most radical universities in Saudi Arabia.[65]
The Zentralrat, which portrays itself as the umbrella organization for 
German Muslim organizations, has become, together with the IGD and Milli 
Görüs, the de facto representative of three million German Muslims. Even 
though the IGD is a member of the Zentralrat, the two organizations often 
operate independently. Their apparent independence is planned. With many 
organizations operating under different names, the Muslim Brotherhood fools 
German politicians who believe they are consulting a spectrum of 
opinion.[66] The media seek the Zentralrat's officials when they want the 
Muslim view on everything from the debate about the admissibility of the 
hijab (headscarf) in public schools, to the war in Iraq, and so forth. 
Politicians seek the Zentralrat's endorsement when they want to reach out to 
the Muslim community. Many German politicians are uninformed about Islam and 
do not understand that the view and the interpretation of Islam that the 
Zentralrat expresses, as does the IGD and Milli Görüs, is that of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and not that of traditional Islam. Accordingly, the Zentralrat 
expresses total opposition to any ban of the hijab, supports 
Wahhabi-influenced Islamic education in schools, and endorses a radical 
position on the Middle East situation.[67] While many Muslims endorse these 
views, the problem is that the Zentralrat neither represents nor tolerates 
those with divergent views. Moderate German Muslim groups lack the funding 
and organization of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups. In terms of numbers, 
influence on the Muslim community, and political relevance, the Zentralrat 
and its two most important constituent parts, the IGD and Milli Görüs, 
dominate the scene. With ample Saudi financing, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
managed to become the voice of the Muslims in Germany.
Recently, the German public was shocked to hear what is preached inside 
Saudi-funded mosques and schools. In the fall of 2003, a hidden 
camera-equipped journalist from Germany's ARD television infiltrated the 
Saudi-built King Fahd Academy in Bonn and taped what it taught to young 
Muslim children. One teacher called for jihad against the infidels.[68] 
While the images elicited a rebuke from German politicians, the rather 
sterile debate about Saudi influence on German Muslims has not effected 
tangible change. Saudi officials and Saudi-run nongovernmental organizations 
continue to groom Muslim Brotherhood organizations.
First Germany, Then Europe
While the Muslim Brotherhood and their Saudi financiers have worked to 
cement Islamist influence over Germany's Muslim community, they have not 
limited their infiltration to Germany. Thanks to generous foreign funding, 
meticulous organization, and the naïveté of European elites, Muslim 
Brotherhood-linked organizations have gained prominent positions throughout 
Europe. In France, the extremist Union des Organisations Islamiques de 
France (Union of Islamic Organizations of France) has become the predominant 
organization in the government's Islamic Council.[69] In Italy, the 
extremist Unione delle Comunita' ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia 
(Union of the Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy) is the 
government's prime partner in dialogue regarding Italian Islamic issues.[70]
Mentre I Fratelli Musulmani e i loro finanziatori sauditi hanno operato per 
cementare l'influenza islamica sulla comunità islamica tedesca, essi non 
hanno limitato la loro infiltrazione solamente in Germania. Grazie a 
generosi finanziamenti stranieri, all'organizzazione meticolosa, alla 
ingenità delle elite europee, le organizzazioni collegate ai Fratelli 
Musulmani hanno guadagnato posizioni di prestigio in tutt'Europa. In Francia 
l'estremistica Unione delle Organizzazioni Islamiche di Francia è diventata 
l'organizzazione dominante nel governo del Consiglio Islamico. In Italia la 
Unione delle Organizzazioni Islamiche d'Italia è diventata il principale 
interlocutore del governo per le questioni islamiche.
In parallel to European Union integration efforts, the Muslim Brotherhood is 
also seeking to integrate its various European proxies. Over the past 
fifteen years, the Muslim Brotherhood has created a series of pan-European 
organizations such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, in 
which representatives from national organizations can meet and plan 
initiatives.[71] Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood's greatest pan-European 
impact has, as with the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland, been with its 
youth organization. In June 1996, Muslim youth organizations from Sweden, 
France, and England joined forces with the Federation of Islamic 
Organizations in Europe and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth to create a 
European Islamic youth organization.[72] Three months later, thirty-five 
delegates from eleven countries met in Leicester and formally launched the 
Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), which 
maintains its headquarters in Brussels.[73]
According to its official publications, FEMYSO is "a network of 42 national 
and international organizations bringing together youth from over 26 
different countries." FEMYSO proudly stated in 2003 that over the preceding 
four years it had become
The de facto voice of the Muslim youth in Europe. It is regularly consulted 
on issues pertaining to Muslims in Europe. It has also developed useful 
links with: the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the United 
Nations, the European Youth Forum, and numerous relevant NGOs at the 
European level.[74]
Ibrahim el-Zayat, who held the presidency until his commitments in Germany 
forced him to step down, even used the FEMYSO perch to address the European 
Parliament.[75] Because the Muslim Brotherhood provides the bulk of FEMYSO's 
constituent organizations, it provides the "de facto voice of the Muslim 
youth in Europe." While FEMYSO claims that it "is committed to fighting 
prejudices at all the levels, so that the future of Europe is a 
multicultural, inclusive and respectful one,"[76] such statements ring 
hollow given the position of sponsors like the World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth which believes that "the Jews are enemies of the faithful, God, and 
the Angels; the Jews are humanity's enemies. . Every tragedy that inflicts 
the Muslims is caused by the Jews."[77]
The Muslim Brotherhood's ample funds and organization have contributed to 
their success in Europe. But their acceptance into mainstream society and 
their unchallenged rise to power would not have been possible had European 
elites been more vigilant, valued substance over rhetoric, and understood 
the motivations of those financing and building these Islamist 
organizations. Why have Europeans been so naïve? Bassam Tibi, a German 
professor of Syrian descent and an expert on Islam in Europe, thinks that 
Europeans-and Germans in particular-fear the accusation of racism.[78] 
Radicals in sheep's clothing have learned that they can silence almost 
everybody with the accusation of xenophobia. Any criticism of Muslim 
Brotherhood-linked organizations is followed by outcries of racism and 
anti-Muslim persecution. Journalists who are not frightened by these 
appellatives are swamped with baseless and unsuccessful but expensive 
lawsuits.
In some cases, politicians simply fail to check the backgrounds of those who 
claim to be legitimate representatives for the Muslim community. As in the 
United States, self-described representatives for the Muslim community are 
far more radical than the populations they represent. In other cases, 
politicians realize that these organizations are not the ideal counterparts 
in a constructive dialogue but do not take the time to seek other less 
visible but more moderate organizations, several of which exist only at the 
grassroots level, impeded by financial constraints.
What most European politicians fail to understand is that by meeting with 
radical organizations, they empower them and grant the Muslim Brotherhood 
legitimacy. There is an implied endorsement to any meeting, especially when 
the same politicians ignore moderate voices that do not have access to 
generous Saudi funding. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle of 
radicalization because the greater the political legitimacy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the more opportunity it and its proxy groups will have to 
influence and radicalize various European Muslim communities. The ultimate 
irony is that Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna dreamed of 
spreading Islamism throughout Egypt and the Muslim world. He would have 
never dreamed that his vision might also become a reality in Europe.
Lorenzo Vidino is deputy director at the Investigative Project, a Washington 
D.C.-based counterterrorism research institute.
[1] "Homepage," Muslim Brotherhood Movement website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[2] The Chicago Tribune, Sept. 19, 2004; also see Daniel Pipes, The Islamic 
States of America?, FrontPageMagazine.com, Sept. 23, 2004.
[3] Khalid Duran, "Jihadism in Europe," The Journal of Counterterrorism and 
Security International, Fall 2000, pp. 12-5.
[4] Richard Labeviere, Dollars for Terror: The U.S. and Islam (New York: 
Algora Publishing 2000), p. 141.
[5] Georges Lepre, "Himmler's Bosnian Division: The Waffen SS Handschar 
Division 1943-45," Schiffer Aviation History, Jan. 2000, pp. 31-4.
[6] M. H. Faruqi, "Les Frères Musulmans. Politique de 'rabbaniyya,' les 
prières avant le pouvoir Dr. Saïd Ramadan, 1926-1995," Historique du Centre 
Islamique, Islamic Center of Geneva.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] "Prasidenten der IGD," Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland website, 
accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[10] Faruqi, "Les Frères Musulmans," Historique du Centre Islamique.
[11] "Senators Request Tax Information on Muslim Charities for Probe," U.S. 
State Department news release, Jan. 14, 2004.
[12] Fouad Ajami, "Tariq Ramadan," The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 7, 2004.
[13] Labeviere, Dollars for Terror, p. 122.
[14] Official dossier on Ahmed Nasreddin (hereafter Nasreddin dossier), 
Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica (Italian secret 
service, SISDE), Apr. 6, 1996, p. 10.
[15] Ibid., p. 24.
[16] Ibid., p. 31.
[17] Newsweek, May 12, 2004.
[18] "Recent OFAC Actions," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, Nov. 7, 2001.
[19] Nasreddin dossier, p. 31.
[20] Ibid.
[21] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland" Innenministerium, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen land website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004; "Islamismus," 
Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Hessen website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[22] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen land.
[23] Official Guide to the Munich Mosque (Munich: The Islamic Center of 
Munich), purchased by the author at the Milli Görüs' bookstore, Cologne, 
Feb. 2004.
[24] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen land.
[25] Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), July 29-30, 1967.
[26] "Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," Innenministerium, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen land.
[27] Nasreddin dossier, p. 31.
[28] Report on radical Islam, Baden Württenberg state 
Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2003, p. 48.
[29] "Koordination mit Zentren in folgenden Städten," Islamische 
Gemeinschaft in Deutschland website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[30] Report on Ibrahim el-Zayat, Cologne police, Aug. 27, 2003, p. 3.
[31] David Kane, FBI senior special agent, affidavit in "Supplemental 
Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention," United States of America v. 
Soliman S. Biheiri, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia. The affidavit also details WAMY's links to the Palestinian 
terrorist organization Hamas.
[32] Kane, "Supplemental Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention."
[33] The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 15, 2003.
[34] Report on el-Zayat, Aug. 27, 2003, p. 4.
[35] Duran, "Jihadism in Europe," pp. 12-5.
[36] Klaus Gruenewald, "Defending Germany's Constitution," Middle East 
Quarterly, Mar. 1995, p. 10.
[37] See Al-Aqsa Foundation, "Recent OFAC Reports," U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 6, 2003.
[38] Nasreddin dossier, p. 9.
[39] Ibid., p. 30.
[40] Duran, "Jihadism in Europe," pp. 12-5.
[41] "Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus," Innenministerium, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen land website, accessed Dec. 22, 2004.
[42] Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Bundesverfassungsschutz), 2000, Cologne, p. 174.
[43] Annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Bundesverfassungsschutz), 1999, Cologne, p. 165.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Agence France-Presse, Jan. 16, 1998.
[46] Mehmet Ülger, "Manifestatie Milli Görüs in Arnhem," De Humanist, July 
2003.
[47] Annual report, Bundesverfassungsschutz, 2000, p. 198.
[48] Udo Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten (Frankfurt: Eichborn 
Publishing, 2003), pp. 32-3.
[49] Author interview with Udo Ulfkotte, Frankfurt, Feb. 2004.
[50] Within the German federal system, each state has its own Office of the 
Protection for the Constitution (Landesverfassungsschutz), which is 
independent from the national Bundessverfassungsschutz.
[51] "Islamismus," Landesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Hessen.
[52] Frankfurt: Eichborn Publishing, 2003.
[53] Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 38.
[54] "Christentum und Islam," German Association of Muslim Social Scientists 
(GMSG), Oct. 26, 2002.
[55] Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1998/9 (Tel Aviv: Stephen Roth Institute, Tel 
Aviv University, 2000).
[56] Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 38.
[57] Annual report, Bundesverfassungsschutz, 2000, p. 174.
[58] Ulfkotte, Der Krieg in unseren Staedten, p. 164.
[59] Ibid., p. 162.
[60] Hartwig Mueller, head of the Verfassungsschutz of Nordrhein Westfahlen, 
interview on German television SWR, Mar. 21, 2003.
[61] Die Welt (Berlin), May 6, 2003.
[62] Michael Waller, testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Oct. 14, 2003.
[63] The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 2003.
[64] Die Welt, May 6, 2003.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Author interview with Ulfkotte, Frankfurt, Feb. 2004.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Time, Nov. 2, 2003.
[69] Ibid., Apr. 27, 2003.
[70] Renzo Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili. Gli Italiani e l'Islam (Bari: Laterza 
Publishing, 2003), p. 14.
[71] "The Global Community," MABOnline, Muslim Association of Britain, Dec. 
20, 2004.
[72] Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations brochure, 
emailed to author by a representative of FEMYSO, Jan. 2004.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] "L'Islam en Europe ou L'Islam d'Europe," conference program, European 
Parliament, Brussels, Dec. 11, 2002.
[76] FEMYSO brochure.
[77] "Animosity toward the Jews, " A Handy Encyclopedia of Contemporary 
Religions and Sects (WAMY), FBI translation from Arabic; Steven Emerson, 
statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, July 9, 2003; Kane, "Supplemental Declaration in Support of 
Pre-Trial Detention."
[78] Bassam Tibi, Islamische Zuwanderung, Die gescheiterte Integration 
(Munich: DVA, 2002), p. 135.
 

  Spesso questi dissidenti erano islamismi.
Non ne dubito.
Am.