Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: E il New Yorker scarica Obama

http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2010/05/17/100517taco_talk_packer
Last June, in Cairo, President Barack Obama, at the heart of his speech
to the Islamic world, enumerated the many issues that have created
tension between the United States and Muslim nations. “The fourth issue
that I will address is democracy,” he said, and continued, “I know there
has been controversy about the promotion of democracy in recent years,
and much of this controversy is connected to the war in Iraq. So let me
be clear: no system of government can or should be imposed upon one
nation by any other.” Then the President paused, apparently expecting
this sensible recognition to prompt a round of applause, but there was
silence, and he seemed to stumble. His timing was off; the people in his
mostly Egyptian audience had already done their clapping when he uttered
the word “democracy.” Tom Malinowski, of Human Rights Watch, who had
been an informal adviser to the Obama campaign, said, “I don’t think he
was aware that the audience both despised George W. Bush and desperately
wanted Bush’s help in their cause.”
Obama, in his Cairo speech and throughout his first year in office, has
rightly felt the need to cleanse the air of the arrogance and the folly
of his predecessor. There is no more American moralizing or hectoring
about freedom, no simplistic division of the world into good and evil.
Instead of “with us or against us,” the key phrase in Obama’s foreign
policy has been “mutual interest and mutual respect.” Rather than
asserting America’s moral right to dominate, Obama has spent much of his
term renewing American partnerships with countries like Russia,
rebuilding multilateral institutions like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and trying to engage with hostile regimes like Iran.
Early on, to prepare the ground for a strategy of engagement, Obama
muted his Administration’s criticisms of authoritarian states. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, on her first official trip to China, in
February, 2009, assured her hosts that human rights wouldn’t interfere
with economic and security concerns—a comment that was greeted with
dismay by human-rights advocates. The President’s envoy to Sudan, Scott
Gration, announced that the U.S. would deal directly with the regime of
President Omar al-Bashir, who has been charged with war crimes by the
International Criminal Court. Since last June’s fraudulent elections in
Iran, Administration officials, including the President, have not found
a consistent way to condemn the state’s violence against demonstrators.
Last November, on a trip to China, Obama spoke in support of dialogue
with the Dalai Lama and against censorship but allowed the Communist
government to keep tight control over a town-hall meeting in Shanghai.
Over time, the President and his officials have acquired a more supple
voice, finding a better balance between engagement and criticism. In
January, for example, Clinton delivered an important speech on freedom
of the Internet, a blow aimed at Beijing, among others. Obama has begun
to speak more frequently and forcefully about what he calls “universal
rights,” emphasizing that they are not an American invention. But the
perception has been established: this Administration will devote its
energy to repairing relations with foreign governments, and will not
risk them for the sake of human rights. Where the stakes are low, as in
the West African nation of Guinea, the Administration speaks out against
atrocities, with positive effect; but where there’s a strategic
interest, as in Ethiopia, which has jailed dozens of journalists and
opposition politicians, the policy is mainly accommodation.
Obama never placed democracy and human rights at the center of his
foreign policy. He campaigned on three initiatives—withdrawing from
Iraq, redoubling in Afghanistan, and reëngaging with friends and enemies
alike. He has expressed admiration for the foreign policy of the first
President Bush and his national-security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and,
on one level, Obama fits their mold of classic realism: wary of moral
posturing, he analyzes the world country by country, calibrating
American interests accordingly, without trying to impose a single
abstract doctrine everywhere.
At the same time, Obama is reaching far beyond Realpolitik. Beginning in
Cairo, continuing last summer with speeches in Moscow and Accra, and
culminating, in December, with his Nobel Peace Prize address in Oslo, he
has articulated a vision of international relations as something more
than a zero-sum power struggle, of human interconnectedness beyond the
old divisions—“an insistence,” he said in Oslo, “that there’s something
irreducible that we all share.” (Perhaps the most dramatic example is
Obama’s push for a reduction of nuclear weapons worldwide.) In all his
major foreign-policy speeches, he has made a point of offering this
vision to young people, obviously aware of his power to inspire them.
But in some countries inspiration is falling into the gap between
soaring speeches and concrete action. An important test is Egypt: with
elections coming this year, a nepotistic kleptocracy is trying to
suppress the ferment of a diverse and growing opposition. Egypt
represents the most significant prospect for democratic reform in the
Arab world. So far, however, the Administration has stood by a policy of
strengthening relations with the government of Hosni Mubarak: the U.S.
has reduced funding for programs that support local democracy activists,
and, at Cairo’s insistence, has cut most aid for civil-society
organizations (such as independent election monitors) that are not
officially registered—that is, groups that aren’t tools of the regime.
The Cairo speech laid out a series of initiatives for America’s
reëngagement with Muslim countries. Almost a year later, as a few of
those initiatives have begun to take shape, a general pattern has
emerged. The programs focus on entrepreneurship and business
development, science education, women’s and children’s health, student
exchanges. They do not cover human rights, political empowerment of
women, or governance. After an internal debate, the Administration
decided to stay away from these more sensitive topics at first and,
instead, to build credibility in worthy but uncontroversial areas. It
was a legitimate decision, but it has reinforced a view among some Arab
reformers that, according to a recent report by the Project on Middle
East Democracy, “President Obama has said the right words, but is
unwilling or unable to offer substantive new policies to support the
aspirations of people in the Middle East.”
Obama is coming up against the limitations of engagement. What if people
around the world want more than a humble adjustment in America’s tone
and behavior? What if American overtures to nasty regimes fail, because
those regimes have a different view of their own survival? Then the
President will have to devise a fallback strategy—preferably one that
answers the desires of the people who applauded in Cairo, and doesn’t
leave another generation cynical about American promises. ♦
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http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2010/05/17/100517taco_talk_packer?printable=true#ixzz0nVwckVPy


http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2010/05/17/100517taco_talk_packer
[snip]
Almeno per alzare il costo del lavoro in Cina e per continuare a
difendere i riformisti nel campo islamico, Obama avrebbe dovuto invece
continuare a sostenere il rispetto dei diritti umani e, soprattutto
per i leader cinesi, anche il rispetto dei sindacati e lo sviluppo di
uno stato sociale.
Questo avrebbe potuto contribuire ad allentare la pressione cinese sui
mercati internazionali e dare un po' di fiato alle imprese moribonde.

 ha scritto nel messaggio 
news:4be7f81a...@news.tin.it...

lol come se fosse possibile. Avrebbe avuto la credibilit� di uno che parla e 
da lezioni sul ponte del titanic.
Voi liberisti non avete ben presente la situazione dell'occidente mi sa.