Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Anche il Cato Institute boccia Bush

http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/43632.htm
GOP: PARTY OF BLOAT
By RYAN SAGER
THE Republican promise of smaller, less-intrusive gov ernment is
getting harder and harder to believe.
Especially when a more plausible plot line is unfolding every day:
that the GOP has put aside the ideals of Reagan and Goldwater in order
to pursue a political strategy based on big spending.
For the latest, check out a report just released by the libertarian
Cato Institute that tells a striking story about just how
out-of-control spending has gotten under President Bush.
Cato finds that:
* Bush has presided over the largest increase in federal spending
since Lyndon Johnson.
* Even excluding defense and homeland security spending, Bush is the
biggest-spending president in 30 years.
* The federal budget grew from 18.5 percent of the Gross Domestic
Product on President Bill Clinton's last day in office to 20.3 percent
at the end of Bush's first term.
Add to that Bush's massive Medicare prescription-drug benefit,
expected to cost $720 billion-plus over the next 10 years.
(The money for that new entitlement, the first created by a president
in a generation, will start flowing this year.)
Bush may have cut taxes, but that's not the same thing as shrinking
government.
And when government expands, as it has under Bush, taxes will
eventually have to follow suit.
And Bush's wild spending spree is no anomaly.
To Karl Rove's way of thinking, it's the only way for the Republican
Party to "seize the mantle of idealism" from the Democrats.
As Rove told a conference of conservative activists in February, he
believes the GOP has in the past been too "reactionary."
Republicans have to be for things, not against them.
They have to have "visionary goals."
This, Rove said, means "reforming" the tax code, health care, pension
plans, the legal system, public education and worker training;
"building" an Ownership Society of homes and businesses; "preparing"
Americans for meeting "the challenges of a free society; "building" a
culture of life; "supporting" religious charities, and "fostering" a
culture of "service and citizenship."
If this isn't activist government -- that thing conservatives used to
be against -- it's hard to say what would be.
And it costs a lot of money, as Cato makes clear:
* The budget for the Corporation for National and Community Service
(which funds Clinton pet project Americorps) rose 76 percent from 1995
to 2005.
* The Trade Adjustment Assistance program, which pays for job training
for workers "displaced" by international trade, has almost quadrupled
in size since 1995.
* The budget of the Department of Education (not long ago on the GOP's
short list for elimination) has grown by 38 percent in just four years
under Bush.
Congress is no innocent victim here -- it's an accomplice.
Under Clinton, the Republican Congress ratcheted down the president's
spending proposals year after year, according to the Cato report.
But, under a united Republican government, Congress has ratcheted up
Bush's spending proposals (larding them with pork) by about $91
billion from 2002-2005.
It's not always easy to see how radically Bush has transformed the GOP
-- from Reagan's admonition that "government is the problem" to
Dubya's own assertion that "when somebody hurts, government has got to
move."
But it's a real transformation -- and an expensive one.
Average Americans will eventually feel it in the taxes that will have
to be raised to fund Bush's massive federal expansion.
Republicans who have stuck by the party's leadership mainly because of
the War on Terror will begin to feel it in 2006 and 2008, when they
realize that Big Government Conservatism is not a strategy or a
philosophy -- but a sellout.

under Bush.
Soldi ben spesi.
-Stefano

 -Stefano
e infatti neanche lui li ha subiti due conflitti: LI HA CAUSATI
parliamo invece della lobotomia che hai dovuto subire tu
ok, ok, il bue all'asino ..... 

parliamo invece della lobotomia che hai dovuto subire tu
...disse il lobotomizzato... :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 Gli altri non hanno dovuto subire 2 conflitti e l'11 settembre.
Johnson aveva dovuto subire la guerra del Vietnam, iniziata da quel
cretino del suo predecessore, che era costata molte piu' vite americane
del 9/11 e delle guerre dell'Afghanistan e in Iraq. E non dimenticare
che della guerra in Iraq (al contrario di quella in Afghanistan) non
c'era assolutamente bisogno.

Afghanistan) non c'era assolutamente bisogno.
Se lo dici tu...
-Stefano

 cretino del suo predecessore,
J.F.K in Vietnam aveva inviato perlopiu' consiglieri militari e mezzi.
L'invio di un esercito Usa vero e proprio fu deciso da L.B.Jonhson dopo 
i noti fatti  del Golfo del Tonchino.

ha scatenati,
Puttanata.
-Stefano

 Gli altri non hanno dovuto subire 2 conflitti
Dece'. i suddetti conflitti il governo degli USA non li ha subiti, li
ha scatenati, nel caso in cui ti difettasse la memoria.

Stefano De Cesari:
Scusa ma mi potresti dire piu' o meno quali sono le tue opinioni
politiche?

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:4281C548...@people.it...

solo per te.
Gli Stati Uniti sono stati attaccati l'11/9 da un gruppo di terroristi.
 Hanno attaccato un paese sulla base del fatto che, secondo loro - visto che
non è mai stato trovato ne' provato - i covi di questi terroristi erano
proprio in Afghanistan ; incidentalmente hanno anche detto che lo facevano
per liberare il mondo dal regime talibano.
Quindi l'Afghanistan non ha mai attaccato gli US, a meno che tu non abbia le
prove da mostrare al mondo.
Per l'Iraq stessa storia.
Attaccati sulla base del "pericolo delle WMD", della cui esistenza non
esiste alcuna prova.
Ora argomenta il contrario, DePuttanatis.

 politiche?
....ma scherzerai!!!! St' animale non distingue il proprio orifizio anale
da quello orale, figurati se può detenere opinioni di tal fatta! 
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esiste alcuna prova.
Puttanata. Di prove vi sono tutte le WMD trovate e distrutte nel 2003
dall'IAEA.
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Cerchi ancora di co**ionarci con ste WMD, De Ce'? Anche Tony e la CIA 
hanno ammesso che non c'erano. Vuoi essere piu' bravo di loro? Vuoi 
essere insignito di qualche medaglia al valore?
Riprova, la prossima volta sarai piu' fortunato (TM SdC)
Am.
PS Sai con quanti elefanti Annibale varco' le Alpi, e con quanti arrivo' 
alla battaglia di Canne?
Se lo sai saprai la fine che hanno fatto gli Stinger di Osama...
La storia si ripete, De Cesaris...

Anche Tony e la CIA hanno ammesso che non c'erano. 
L'hanno ammesso solo nel mondo dei tuoi sogni, caro fessacchiotto di un
Amalric Bond :)
-Stefano

 wrote:
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Sbagliato. E comunque non era questa la domanda. Non  svicolare:
 Sai con quanti elefanti Annibale varco' le Alpi, e con quanti arrivo' 
alla battaglia di Canne?
Am.

,
 amalric <ama...@TOGLIMIaliceposta.it> wrote:
Dimenticavo di darti l'osso:
 € The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for  the 
revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group 
of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. 
Dal rapporto CIA del 6 ottobre 2004
http://cryptome.org/cia-wmd-key.htm
Sulle reazioni della stampa americana:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1055610,00.html
Am.


ce l'hai la traduzione in "itagliano" per caztagno&co ?
--------------------------------
Inviato via 
http://arianna.libero.it/usenet/

 Gli altri non hanno dovuto subire 2 conflitti
ROTFL....macchiettone d'un dece'!!!

 ce l'hai la traduzione in "itagliano" per caztagno&co ?
Non  pero' su Google Groups digitando 'WMD CIA Rapporto' ci sono alcune 
reazioni dei giornali italiani relative ad anticipazioni, reazioni, ecc. 
Ma di questo rapporto di *mille* pagine non sembrano al corrente.
Cmq. tanto che ci sono ecco per la parte inglese. Non vorrei piu' 
ritornare su questo tema, malgrado Castagno e De Ce' rimangano 
abbarbicati alle vecchie prove di WMD come vecchiette ai loro ricordi di 
gioventu'.
Ecco perche' con loro preferisco parlare di Annibale.
Am.
We got it wrong on Iraq WMD, intelligence chiefs finally admit 
  Richard Norton-Taylor 
Friday April 8, 2005
The Guardian 
  Intelligence chiefs have admitted for the first time that claims they 
made about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction were wrong and 
have not been substantiated.
 The admission is revealed in the annual report of the parliamentary 
intelligence and security committee which also sharply criticises the 
lack of communication between ministers and the Secret Intelligence 
Service, MI6.
 It discloses that late last year the joint intelligence committee (JIC) 
reviewed key judgments on Iraq's WMD capability and programmes behind 
the government's now discredited dossier published in September 2002.
 · The JIC claimed in 2002: "Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons 
programme." It now admits this "was wrong, in that Iraq was not pursuing 
a nuclear weapons programme". It says the claim was "correct on Iraq's 
nuclear ambitions".
 · The JIC judged in 2002: "Iraq retains up to 20 al-Hussein ballistic 
missiles." It now admits: "This has not been substantiated."
 · In 2002, the JIC judged: "Iraq may retain some stocks of chemical 
agents ... Iraq could produce significant quantities of mustard [gas] 
within weeks, significant quantities of Sarin and VX within months, and, 
in the case of VX may already have done so." It now admits: "Although a 
capability to produce some agents probably existed, this judgment has 
not been substantiated." It adds that the Iraq Survey Group found that 
Saddam "intended to resume a CW [chemical weapons] effort once [UN] 
sanctions were lifted".
 · The JIC in 2002 said: "Iraq currently has available ... a number of 
biological agents ... Iraq could produce more of these biological agents 
within days". It now says that the ISG found Iraq could resume 
production, "but not within the time frames judged ... and [it] found no 
evidence that production had been activated".
 · In 2002, the JIC judged: "Saddam ... might use CBW [chemical and 
biological weapons] against coalition forces, neighbouring states and 
his own people. Israel could be the first target." Based on Saddam's 
past behaviour that "would have remained a reasonable judgment", says 
the JIC. However, it notes that the Iraqi agent who made the claims was 
subsequently dropped by MI6.
 The parliamentary committee notes that three MI6 agents were 
"withdrawn" after the invasion of Iraq. They included one - mentioned in 
2002 to Tony Blair by Sir Richard Dearlove, then MI6 head - who claimed 
that Iraq was still making chemical and biological weapons.
 The committee also referred yesterday to the Butler inquiry which 
described the MI6 agent behind the claim that Iraq could deploy chemical 
weapons within 45 minutes as open to "serious doubts" and "seriously 
flawed".
 The committee says: "We are concerned at the amount of intelligence on 
Iraqi WMD that has now had to be withdrawn." It says that Mr Blair was 
not informed until a year later about an MI6 decision to drop an Iraqi 
agent he had earlier been told was potentially important.
 It also points out that the ministerial cabinet committee on the 
intelligence services has not met since December 2003, and that that 
meeting was the first in more than seven years. That is disappointing, 
it says, as regular meetings would "enable collective discussion by 
ministers of intelligence priorities and developments". At the moment, 
it adds, "ministers discuss intelligence only in the context of crisis 
or single-issues meetings".
 Yesterday's report confirms that MI5 is setting up "regional stations" 
around Britain. The Guardian has learned they will be based in 
north-west England, the Midlands, Scotland, Wales and the west of 
England, eastern England and south-east England. It's officers will work 
closely with the police special branch.
 The intelligence and security committee, chaired by the former Labour 
cabinet minister Ann Taylor, raps the knuckles of the intelligence 
agencies for a three-year delay in installing a secure computer network, 
called Scope.

No e' che non si capisce assolutamente quale siano le idee politiche di
SdC. A volte sembra un fanatico di sinistra, a volte di destra. Boh.

 
http://cryptome.org/cia-wmd-key.htm
Sulla mitica "atomica" di Saddam, poi, ecco cosa dice l'IAEA:
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC47/Documents/gc47-10.pdf
Da:
Board of Governors
General Conference
GOV/2003/50-GC(47)/10
Date: 8 August 2003
General Distribution
Original: English
For official use only
Item 6(a) of the Board's provisional agenda
(GOV/2003/44)
Item 20 of the Conference's provisional agenda
(GC/(47)/1)
Implementation of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq
Report by the Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency
[...]
C. Assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related activities and remaining
capabilities
12. By the time the Agency ceased its Security Council verification
activities in Iraq in March 2003, it had not found any evidence of the
revival of nuclear activities
prohibited under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). However, considering
the four-year absence of Agency inspectors from Iraq, the time available for
the renewed inspections was not sufficient to permit the Agency to complete
its overall review and assessment. This assessment would have required
further investigation of the various types of assets needed for Iraq to
reconstitute a nuclear programme, as well as investigation of all of the
possible processes of nuclear weapons development. It was the Agency's
intention to continue to implement additional verification activities to
provide the level of assurance required by the Security Council. Over the
longer term, the Agency would have implemented its Ongoing Monitoring and
Verification Plan, which was, inter alia, designed to ensure that Iraq could
not resume without detection prohibited nuclear activities even if it
retained the knowledge required for such nuclear activities through
documents, concealed equipment or the expertise of individuals.
13. In the areas of uranium acquisition, concentration and centrifuge
enrichment, extensive field investigation and document analysis revealed no
evidence that Iraq had
resumed such activities. While investigations could not be completed due to
the lack of time, no indication of post-1991 weaponization activities was
uncovered in Iraq. The Agency observed a
substantial degradation in facilities, financial resources and programmes
throughout Iraq that might
support a nuclear infrastructure. The former cadre of nuclear experts was
being increasingly
dispersed and many key figures were reaching retirement or had left the
country. Prior to the
evacuation of Agency personnel in 1998, there were no unresolved disarmament
issues in the nuclear area, although there remained a number of questions
and concerns about Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear programme, as described in the
Agency reports to the Security Council dated 7 October 1998
and 9 February 1999
During the inspections carried out after November 2002, no progress was made
in the
resolution of those remaining questions and concerns. The clarification by
Iraq of these
questions and concerns would have reduced the remaining uncertainties about
Iraq's programme.
D. Post-evacuation activities of the Agency
14. Since the withdrawal of Agency inspectors and other staff from Iraq in
March 2003, INVO has focused and continues to focus its activities on:
analysing the wealth of
additional information collected during inspections; collecting and
analysing a variety of new
information, including satellite imagery, to update its knowledge of the
relevant facilities in Iraq;
refining its plan for resumed verification activities, taking into account
the many uncertainties of the
present situation in Iraq; and evaluating lessons learned.
15. On 22 May 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1483 (2003), in
which it, inter alia, expressed its intention to revisit the mandates of the
IAEA and UNMOVIC
under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 1284 (1999) and 1441 (2002).
16. Following persistent media reports of looting of nuclear and radioactive
material at the Tuwaitha complex in Iraq, the Director General requested,
and the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq (hereinafter "the Authority") agreed, that the
Agency would conduct an
inspection, in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iraq, in
order to verify the nuclear
material subject to safeguards stored at the Location C Nuclear Material
Storage Facility near the Tuwaitha complex south of Baghdad. The inspection
mission took place from 7 to 23 June 2003
and was carried out relying on the logistical support provided by the
Authority. The inspection team
verified the nuclear material inventory according to Agency standards. The
team's estimate is that at
least 10 kg of uranium compounds could have been dispersed; for example, a
few grams of natural
uranium compound could have remained in each of the approximately 200
emptied containers when
upended by the looters, in the form of dust on the container walls or as
material adhering to the
bottom folds. The quantity and type of uranium compounds dispersed are not
sensitive from a proliferation point of view. However, the Director General
has requested the Authority to make every effort to recover this dispersed
material and, if and when the material is recovered, to return it to the
Location C Nuclear Material Storage Facility and to place it under Agency
safeguards. In addition to the nuclear material stored at Location C Nuclear
Material Storage Facility, there is also nuclear material subject to
safeguards stored at other locations in Iraq, principally material
previously recovered from rubble. In this connection, the Director General
has requested the Authority to ensure the physical protection and security
of the entire nuclear material inventory in Iraq.
17. In order to consolidate the Agency's overall picture of Iraq's past
nuclear programme, it is important that, if new information or evidence
regarding prohibited
activities is uncovered in Iraq, such new information be provided to the
Agency, in keeping with Security Council resolutions.
E. Conclusions
18. In the nearly four months during which the Agency was able to resume its
Security Council mandated inspections in Iraq, the Agency made significant
progress in
assessing the status of Iraq's nuclear-related capabilities. As of 17 March
2003, the Agency had found no evidence or plausible indication of the
revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. However,
the Agency did not have sufficient time to resolve completely the key
questions of whether Iraq's
nuclear activities and capabilities had changed since December 1998.
Provided that Iraq's
co-operation had remained active, and barring unforeseen circumstances, the
Agency would have been able to provide the Security Council, within an
additional two to three months of continuing verification activities, with
credible assurance regarding the absence of the revival of Iraq's nuclear
programme.
19. However, any such assurance, as with any verification process, would
have had a degree of uncertainty.
It is for that reason that the Agency, as requested by the Security Council,
would have moved to the implementation of its reinforced OMV system, which
was designed
to act as an effective deterrent to the resumption by Iraq of its nuclear
weapons programme, while
permitting the Agency to continue to look for possible past activities or
hidden assets, thus
providing the international community with an ongoing and real-time
assessment of Iraq's compliance witt its obligations under the relevant
Security Council resolutions.
20. As indicated above, the Security Council has, in resolution 1483 (2003),
underlined its intention to revisit the IAEA's and UNMOVIC's mandates as set
forth in resolutions 687
(1991), 1284 (1999) and 1441 (2002). Until that occurs, the mandate of the
Agency, except as it
relates to the implementation of sanctions now lifted by resolution 1483
(2003), remains
valid. While awaiting further guidance by the Security Council, the Agency
continues to remain
ready to resume its verification activities, particularly under resolution
715 (1991), in which
the Agency's OMV Plan was approved. The Agency will also continue to carry o
ut its work in connection with the notifications provided to it by States
pursuant to Security Council resolutions which require them to notify the
Agency of relevant exports to Iraq, taking into account the Export-Import
Mechanism approved by the Council in resolution 1051 (1996).

Sbagliato.
Bene. Porta copia delle loro ammissioni allora :)
Altrimenti, oltre a quella sopra, collezionerai un'altra figura di merda
:)
-Stefano

revival of WMD after sanctions.
E dove sta scritto che NON AVEVANO WMD caro fessacchiotto di un Amalric
Bond? :)
E sai cosa vuol dire "formal WRITTEN STATEGY OR PLAN"? :)
-Stefano

 ROTFL....macchiettone d'un dece'!!!
Ecco la fessacchiotta di una Miriam :)
-Stefano

 :)
Mah, io quella della CIA te l'ho data, e ti ho dato anche quella 
dell'MI6. Ma amgari non sai leggere in inglese e hai bisogno di una 
consulenza? 
Quanto a Tony Blair, anche se sgusciante come un anguilla, ha detto, fin 
dal 2004:
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,,1168885,00.html
 In his Sedgefield speech 10 days ago, he dismissed WMD as follows: 'Of 
course opponents [of the war] are boosted by the fact that though we 
know Saddam had WMD, we haven't found the physical evidence of them in 
the 11 months since the war. But in fact everyone thought he had them.' 
You only have to place the 45- minute claim against the 11-month search 
to know the weakness of Blair's case about the imminence of the threat.
Mi sa che e' proprio il tuo tipo, potreste avere conversazioni molto 
interessanti...
STRA dico STRA, ROTFL!
Am.

 Sulla mitica "atomica" di Saddam, poi, ecco cosa dice l'IAEA:
E che ca**o c'entra ora l'atomica di Saddam sai anche spiegarlo? :)
-Stefano

fin dal 2004:
Che Saddam aveva le armi e che il non aver trovato evidenze fisiche
della quantita' di armi che aveva dice ben poco sulla validita' del
fatto in se :)
Ora ne porti uno dove Blair dice che non c'erano WMD in Iraq, caro
fessacchiotto di un Amalric Bond?
O vuoi una consulenza in inglese per cercare una simile notizia?
*LOL*
-Stefano

 wrote:

Ah, ci siamo: i tuoi soliti problemi semantici e di educazione.
E' un modo cortese e ahum-ahum di dire che non ne avevano.
Infatti la parola critica qui e' 'revival'.
Vedi che hai bisogno di una consulenza.
Comunque, siccome disponi anche di un solido buonsenso apprezzato 
oltremanica, ti copioincollo quello che la tua curiosita' avrebbe potuto 
scoprire da sola in un post precedente dello stesso thread.
Sei bene installato nella tua poltrona? Con gli occhi aperti e le 
orecchie sturate? Bene,ora fa un sospirone  e rilassati. Quello ahce hai 
sempre sognato sta per verificarsi.
Una spiegazione breve e concisa, ad opera dello stesso servizio in cui 
opero' quel Bond che non e' mio parente, ahime', il fulgido MI6, 
retaggio discreto degli ex- costruttori d'impero:
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Capisci? Il povero Blair e' stato tenuto all'oscuro di tutto? Come non 
poteva essere imbarazzato?
Tieni conto infine che il rapporto della CIA, la grande e danarosa 
sorella dell'MI6, conferma che di WMD non ve n'erano. Forse un 
desiderio, un'ispirazione, un refolo, un'inespressa potenzialita' nella 
mente del Saddam, ma di prove materiali nisba.
E siccome questo errore e' costato diecine di migliaia di vite, faresti 
bene a svegliarti, 77.800 Omissis, e a guardare con occhi fermi la 
realta'.
Am.

e a guardare con occhi fermi la realta'.
E la realta' e' che spari delle enormi puttanate collezionando delle
sesquipedali figure di merda :)
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Bell'espressione, Ste'.
Vuoi che ti dia di nuovo quell'indirizzo della BBC per quelle 
trasmissioni di Inglese 'ludendo discere'?
Forse prima di affrontare il rapportino di 1000 pagine della CIA di cui 
ti ho inviato l'indirizzo, faresti meglio.
Cmq, e' ufficiale Ste'. Le WMD non c'erano, cosi' come il Reichstag non 
fu bruciato dai comunisti.
R. I. P.
Am.

 R. I. P.
Sei deceduto per tutta la merda che ti sei tirato addosso?
-Stefano

amalric:
anche se non sono d'accordo con alcune cose che hai scritto, vorrei
ricordarti che discutere con stefano decesari e' completamente inutile.

inutile.
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Specchietto, De Ce'.
Comunque non hai risposto alla domanda cruciale:
Con quanti elefanti Annibale varco' le Alpi, e con quanti arrivo' 


Comunque non hai risposto alla domanda cruciale:
Invece tu alle mie domande hai risposto? :)
Ce ne sono una fila intera :) Tutte quelle di tutte le figure di merda
che hai fatto :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 Allora sei proprio defunto :)
De Ce' stiamo parlando di eventi che varcano i secoli, come la voce 
della Sibilla.
Quanti elefanti aveva Annibale, ecc...
Non dirmi che non sei un classicista, non questa delusione...
Am.

De Ce' stiamo parlando di eventi che varcano i secoli,
Se lo dici tu... :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 wrote:

De Ce'... Ebbasta!  Stai facendo una brutta figura...
Quanti elefanti?
Am.

 De Ce'... Ebbasta!  Stai facendo una brutta figura...
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 SdC. A volte sembra un fanatico di sinistra, a volte di destra. Boh.
A me sembra uno stronzo "sic et simpliciter".
Azzardando una analisi appena più dettagliata e che non mi compete,
ritengo che, se di fanatismo si tratti, sia fanatico solo di se stesso e
patologicamente innamorato della sua insulsa stronzaggine. Anyway, l'unica
cosa che mi infastidisce a livello epidermico è il suo modo di "popolare"
un luogo "pubblico" quale questo ( ed altri NG ) mediante una protervia
che - senza essere affatto sostenuta da alcun sostrato qualitativo
rimarchevole - non potrebbe usare in una qualsivoglia situazione REALE, 
senza subirne le prevedibili conseguenze.
Ciò detto, me ne sbatto che sia destrorso o altro.... 
 
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 patologicamente innamorato della sua insulsa stronzaggine. 
Per me lo scopo del DeCe' è semplicemente quello di postare tanto da 
vincere il recor mondiale.
Poi quello che scrive non ha alcuna importanza per lui.

Massimo1 ha scritto:
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
Ok, potrebbe essere, se gli basta tanto poco per sentirsi vivo, o
realizzato, nessun problema, ha diritto come chiunque altro di optare per
ciò che ritiene essere il meglio per lui. 
Ma mi "pesta i coglioni" quel modo da sussiegoso saccente. Se anche lo
fosse, mi sarebbe inviso l'uso di tanta tracotanza. Ma considerando che
invece trattasi di un coglione beota di prima scelta, bhè.....la cosa
diventa davvero insostenibile : nessun apporto reale in nessun 3d,
"sfascio al cazzo" inutile, compulsivo e onnipresente, insulti gratuiti
distribuiti senza logica alcuna, e - per finire - quando lo si mette al
cospetto delle sue stesse "responsabilità" ( chiamiamole così ) eccolo
inscenare patetici tentativi di fuga che lui stesso rinfaccia poi ad altri
utenti.
Insomma - cristodiundio - se incontri uno così al bar ( esempio ) ogni
mattina.....ma non glielo rifili un calcione nel culo, sooner or later?   


 
Mettigli un filtro ,no ?
Io l'ho gia' fatto e sto benissimo senza leggere il DeCe' :)

 Io l'ho gia' fatto e sto benissimo senza leggere il DeCe' :)
Capisco, o quanto meno credo di capire. 
Fatto sta che - forse a torto - ritengo diversa la questione : non
necessito di alcun filtro per non leggerlo. Basta evitare di farlo, ci
riesco anche senza l'aiuto della tecnologia, essendo nel pieno possesso di
ciascuna delle mie facoltŕ. Ritengo altresě che uno stronzo del genere non
dovrebbe proprio postare, a quelle condizioni ed in quella scervellata
modalitŕ. O almeno dovrebbe essere possibile rendergli ciň che gli č
dovuto ogni qualvolta lo chieda a gran voce come č solito fare.
Spero averti reso meglio la questione.
Saluti 


 Poi quello che scrive non ha alcuna importanza per lui.
Idem come sopra.
-Stefano

>alcuna,
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

 fatto in se
E come è possibile che un fatto *non provato* da "evidenze fisiche" abbia
"validità in sé"? La validità è determinata dalle prove, e non dalle
chiacchiere.
Namib

La validità è determinata dalle prove, e non dalle chiacchiere.
E prove della presenza di WMD ci sono.  Non ne sono state trovate nelle
quantita' che gli stessi ispettori dell'ONU avevano indicato
precedentemente come ancora da distruggere.
-Stefano

 wrote:

Certo alla malafede di De Ce' non ci si abitua mai.
Ho postato le conclusioni finali di CIA e MI6 sulle WMD, e ancora non 
basta.
Si ostina a dire che el Baradei aveva le prove delle'esistenza di WMD, 
allorche' Bolton ne sta chiedendo la testa proprio perche' aveva detto 
che non c'erano.
Le mostri queste prove e questi fantomatici documenti se ce li ha 
altrimenti taccia per sempre.
Questo era il documento finale di Blix, che gli americani hanno 
rifiutato. Per poi ammettere con la CIA che *non c'erano WMD* un anno 
dopo (vedi mio post precedente).
Gli si rida in faccia a questo sepolcro imbiancato.
Am.
 
 
 Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC by Executive 
Chairman Dr. Hans Blix (07/03/2003)
AS DELIVERED 
SECURITY COUNCIL, 7 MARCH 2003 
Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC
 Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix
7 March
Thank you, Mr. President,
Mr. President, for nearly three years, I have been coming to the 
Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of UNMOVIC. They have 
described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in 
Iraq. The 12th quarterly report is the first that describes three months 
of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The 
report was finalized ten days ago and a number of relevant events have 
taken place since then. Today¹s statement will supplement the circulated 
report on these points to bring the Council up-to-date.
Inspection process
Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to 
process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few 
difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by 
UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong 
outside pressure.
Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks Dr. 
ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections 
or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings which we 
have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about 
helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones 
were overcome. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is 
free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform 
professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial 
surveillance.
American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us 
valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect 
soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft 
offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add 
low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. 
We are grateful not only to the countries which place these valuable 
tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, 
which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.
Documents and interviews
Mr. President,
Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to 
provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons 
programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and 
been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment 
that Iraq¹s Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary 
evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment 
of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When 
proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible 
accounts that is needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist.
Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with 
persons who may have relevant knowledge and experience may be another 
way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its 
records and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the 
last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may 
be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part 
in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and 
chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991. This provision of 
names prompts two reflections :
The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding 
those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must 
also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning 
the various items destroyed.
The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it 
becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes 
and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is 
given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have 
encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials, 
so-called minders, or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring 
the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. 
Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our 
intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite 
remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started 
requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, 
of which 10 accepted under our terms, 7 of these during the last week.
As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that 
weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in 
particular, that there are mobile production units for biological 
weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. 
Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in 
relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile 
laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large 
containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed 
activities has so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the 
development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground 
transportation.
Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq¹s programme for Remotely 
Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data 
being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the 
various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.
There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed 
activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on 
any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of 
weapons of mass destruction. During inspections of declared or 
undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building 
structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground 
penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No 
underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage 
were found so far.
I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and 
for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase 
our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of staff. I would 
rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to 
inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.
Recent developments
On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become 
more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed 
new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the 
current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively 
little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in 
the report before you.
As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the 
Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have 
declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, 
the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the 
opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and 
associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction 
under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a 
substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle 
of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal 
weapons are being destroyed.
However I must add that the report I have today tells me that no 
destruction work has continued today. I hope this is a temporary break.
Until today, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including 4 training missiles, 2 
combat warheads, 1 launcher and 5 engines have been destroyed under 
UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the 
parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme.
Two ¹reconstituted¹ casting chambers used in the production of solid 
propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or 
encased in concrete.
The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending 
further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that 
missile.
More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. 
Many have been found to restate what Iraq already has declared, and some 
will require further study and discussion.
There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source 
of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, 
which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort 
concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full 
investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq 
has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact 
R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also 
found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction 
site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of 
bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and 
credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type 
bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is 
moving on and may yield results.
Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the 
amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even 
if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax 
said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to 
interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of 
course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually 
produced.
With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to 
quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in 
the summer of 1991.
Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the 
presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies 
from engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject 
is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter from 
UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.
Mr. President,
What are we to make of these activities ? One can hardly avoid the 
impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there 
has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the 
end of January.
This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged 
by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. 
This is not yet clear.
Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has 
cooperated "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC, as 
is required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can 
be seen from the factual descriptions that I have provided. However, if 
more direct answers are desired, I would say the following :
The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did 
regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. It has not, however, so far 
persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our 
inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.
It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken 
by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open 
disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these 
initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to 
constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all 
areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is 
responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved 
disarmament issues.
Mr. President,
Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 
1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of 
the Security Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted in 
accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC 
but also continues to guide much of our work. Under the time lines set 
by that resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported 
to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific.
Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to "address unresolved 
disarmament issues" and to identify "key remaining disarmament tasks" 
and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the 
context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft 
work programme this month as required.
UNSCOM and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the 
disarmament issues, which were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC 
has used this material as starting points but analysed the data behind 
it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile 
its own list of "unresolved disarmament issues" or, rather, clustered 
issues. It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our 
inspection activities, and it is also from the list of these clustered 
issues that UNMOVIC will identify the "key remaining disarmament tasks". 
As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is 
ready.
UNMOVIC is only required to submit the work programme with the "key 
remaining disarmament tasks" to the Council. As I understand, several 
Council members are interested in the working document with the complete 
clusters of disarmament issues, and we have declassified it and are 
ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this 
working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new 
information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the 
outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which Members usually 
refer to. Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of 
points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq¹s 
cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of 
issues.
I should note that the working document contains much information and 
discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998 - including 
information which has come to light after 1998. It contains much less 
information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily 
because of paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence agencies 
have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or 
restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed 
programmes and items are located in underground facilities that I 
mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The 
working document contains some suggestions on how these concerns may be 
tackled.
Mr. President,
Let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the 
work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this 
month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining 
disarmament tasks ; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing 
monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement ; 
it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the 
programme, for instance, for aerial surveillance, for information from 
governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road 
traffic, etc.
How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament 
tasks ? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at 
any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive 
Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still 
take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview 
relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor 
weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want 
disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered 
that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained 
inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified 
disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were 
seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programme.
Thank you, Mr. President.
10 mars 2003
  
 
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/irak/a9904

the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced.
Opss.... :)
E niente che affermi che in Iraq non ci siano WMD :)
Povero Amalric Bond! :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 riguardo all'assenza di WMD in Iraq :)
Eccoti servito. LEGGITELE.
Tutte le incertezze del 2003 sono state superate dalle conclusioni del 
2004 e del 2005 di CIA e MI6 (Il rapporto integrale CIA te l'ho  fornito 
due giorni fa), cioe' dei servizi di informazione delle potenze che 
hanno occupato l'Irak, e hanno potuto cercare le WMD in lungo e in largo.
Esse hanno RITRATTATO rispetto al 2003.
La CIA ritratta:
CIA Corrects Itself on WMD
 A report, the first of its kind, says Baghdad ended its chemical 
weapons program in '91.
 By Greg Miller
 Times Staff Writer
 02/01/05 "Los  Angeles Times" -- WASHINGTON ‹ In what may be a formal 
acknowledgment of the obvious, the CIA has issued a classified report 
revising its prewar assessments on Iraq and concluding that Baghdad 
abandoned its chemical weapons programs in 1991, intelligence officials 
familiar with the document said.
 The report marks the first time the CIA has officially disavowed its 
prewar judgments and is one in a series of updated assessments the 
agency is producing as part of an effort to correct its record on Iraq's 
alleged weapons programs, officials said.
 The CIA's decision to distribute the report ‹ titled "Iraq: No 
Large-Scale Chemical Warfare Efforts Since Early 1990s" ‹ in classified 
channels underscores the awkwardness the agency faces as it continues to 
reconcile its prewar reporting with postwar realities in Iraq. Before 
the war, the CIA asserted that Iraq had stockpiled biological weapons 
and was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
 A U.S. intelligence official said the document was "not a high-level 
report," meaning it was designed to supplant outdated assessments still 
on classified computer networks and was not meant to be called to the 
attention of President Bush or other senior government officials.
 "It's basically updating the books," said the official, who spoke on 
condition of anonymity, "so the information on the shelf is the most 
current." 
 Current and former intelligence officials described it as a highly 
unusual step for the CIA. 
 "It's stunning that they would actually put on paper a reversal" of 
previous intelligence estimates, said one intelligence official who had 
seen the document.
 Richard J. Kerr, a former senior CIA official who was hired by the 
agency last year to conduct an internal review of its prewar analysis, 
said he couldn't recall the agency ever issuing such a revisionist 
report on any subject.
 "But the situation is rather unique," Kerr said, noting that Iraq's 
postwar reality had made the agency's failings obvious. "Ordinarily, 
you're never proven wrong in a clean, neat way." 
 The report is based largely on findings by the Iraq Survey Group, a 
CIA-led team of weapons experts that searched the country for more than 
a year without finding clear evidence of active illegal weapons programs.
 U.S. intelligence officials have long acknowledged that the prewar 
assessments were flawed. David Kay, the former head of the search team, 
told Congress last January, "We were almost all wrong."
 But other officials' statements have been more qualified. In a speech 
at Georgetown University last February, then-CIA Director George J. 
Tenet said that "when the facts of Iraq are all in, we will neither be 
completely right nor completely wrong." 
 The new report from the CIA, which is dated Jan. 18, retreats from the 
agency's prewar assertions on chemical weapons on almost every front. It 
concludes that "Iraq probably did not pursue chemical warfare efforts 
after 1991." 
 The report notes that its new conclusions "vary significantly" from 
prewar judgments "largely because of subsequent events and direct access 
to Iraqi officials, scientists, facilities and documents." 
 A note in the report describes the document as the second in a 
"retrospective series that addresses our post-Operation Iraqi Freedom 
understanding of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and delivery system 
programs." 
 A Jan. 4 report focused on Scud missiles and other delivery systems. 
Intelligence officials said future reports would revise the agency's 
claims that Iraq had stockpiles of biological weapons and was rebuilding 
its nuclear weapons program. Those allegations were a centerpiece of the 
Bush administration's case for war with Iraq.
http://207.44.245.159/article7938.htm
L'MI6 ritratta
We got it wrong on Iraq WMD, intelligence chiefs finally admit 
 Richard Norton-Taylor 
Friday April 8, 2005
The Guardian 
  Intelligence chiefs have admitted for the first time that claims they 
made about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction were wrong and 
have not been substantiated.
 The admission is revealed in the annual report of the parliamentary 
intelligence and security committee which also sharply criticises the 
lack of communication between ministers and the Secret Intelligence 
Service, MI6.
 It discloses that late last year the joint intelligence committee (JIC) 
reviewed key judgments on Iraq's WMD capability and programmes behind 
the government's now discredited dossier published in September 2002.
 * The JIC claimed in 2002: "Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons 
programme." It now admits this "was wrong, in that Iraq was not pursuing 
a nuclear weapons programme". It says the claim was "correct on Iraq's 
nuclear ambitions".
 * The JIC judged in 2002: "Iraq retains up to 20 al-Hussein ballistic 
missiles." It now admits: "This has not been substantiated."
 * In 2002, the JIC judged: "Iraq may retain some stocks of chemical 
agents ... Iraq could produce significant quantities of mustard [gas] 
within weeks, significant quantities of Sarin and VX within months, and, 
in the case of VX may already have done so." It now admits: "Although a 
capability to produce some agents probably existed, this judgment has 
not been substantiated." It adds that the Iraq Survey Group found that 
Saddam "intended to resume a CW [chemical weapons] effort once [UN] 
sanctions were lifted".
 * The JIC in 2002 said: "Iraq currently has available ... a number of 
biological agents ... Iraq could produce more of these biological agents 
within days". It now says that the ISG found Iraq could resume 
production, "but not within the time frames judged ... and [it] found no 
evidence that production had been activated".
E adesso cortesemente togli il disturbo.
Am.
PS suggerisco che i due brani vengano copiaincollati e postati a SdC 
ogni volta che si azzarda a ritirare fuori le WMD e la sua coda di 
paglia.

paglia.
E io copiaincollero' le risposte ai due brani che ti ho dato e al quale
non hai saputo ribattere in alcun modo :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 dovevano essere distrutte sotto supervisione ONU :)
La guerra è stata fatta a causa di WMD, che non sono state trovate DOPO
l'inizio della guerra. Affermavano ci fossero. Hanno iniziato una guerra per
questo. NON le hanno POI trovate. Ergo, non ci sono.
Namib

 -Stefano
Disse il bue all'asino...

 :)
Che ridi? Era l'unico agente irakeno su cui UKUSA avevano basato il loro 
concetto di 'Clear and Present Danger' in Irak.
Mi spiace per te ma non hai la voglia o la possibilita' di seguire il 
dibattito internazionale. Chiaramente segui solo i riflessi italiani che 
sono molto lacunosi, e su quelli ti basi, magari anche quelli di una 
sola parte politica. Ma qui non stiamo parlando di baie protette, ma di 
mare aperto.
Si poteva pensare che UKUSA avessero fonti protette di Intelligence, 
migliori di Blix, e per questo hanno deciso l'intervento. Invece non le 
avevano. E' una sconfitta della loro intelligence e della loro 
credibilita'.
Un problema grave anche per chi non e' americano o inglese,visto che 
l'invasione dell'Irak ha irritato le masse arabe e islamiche, e fa 
temere che questo genere di errore si possa ripetere.
Am.

NON le hanno POI trovate. Ergo, non ci sono.
Ergo ... la fava :)
-Stefano

Iraq nel 2002/2003.
I link sono proprio del sito dell'IAEA :)
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Disse il bue all'asino...
P.S.: Non mi portare le prove delle WMD distrutte a suo tempo dagli 
ispettori, eh? 

 IO aspetto eh!
Ma anche se fosse,cosa di cui dubito, quello che sottolineo e' che i 
servizi di spionaggio dei paesi occupanti hanno sottolineato a partire 
dal 2004 e confermato che nel 2005 queste armi non c'erano!
Ubi major minor cessat (o qualcosa del genere).
Le prove di Blix e el Baradei, estorte in tre mesi, e sottoposte a 
pressioni fortissime da parte di USAUK ,anche se avessero qualche 
incertezza, verrebbero oggi completamente superate. Dalle ammissioni 
degli organismi di intelligence che hanno confessato di aver fornito 
prove sbagliate o parziali ai loro governanti.
Chi sostiene il contrario,o si riferisce ai vecchi dati, o e' un ingenuo 
provinciale,oppure fa prova di profonda disonesta' intellettuale. O 
entrambi.
Am.

e fa temere che questo genere di errore si possa ripetere.
Se lo dici tu... :)
Intanto ci vuoi dire dove affermano che ***NON C'ERANO WMD IN IRAQ***
prima del conflitto? :)
O dobbiamo aspettare ancora a lungo? :)
-Stefano

ispettori, eh?
Perche' non dovrei? Sono meno WMD solo perche' le hanno *TROVATE* e poi
distrutte, cara fessacchiotta di una Miriam? :)
-Stefano

 entrambi.
Su Steve, oramai è chiaro che vale la seconda.

oppure fa prova di profonda disonesta' intellettuale.
...disse il disonesto... :)
-Stefano

Su Steve, oramai è chiaro che vale la seconda.
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Che pazienza... L'ha detto Blix a tutto il mondo: sono stati trovati dei 
missili con portata al limite delle WMD, ma con le testate vuote, che 
sono stati distrutti dall'UNMOVIC, eppoi dei drone, che erano degli 
aeromodelli da sorveglianza...
Li vuoi considerare WMD? 
Be ne' la CIA ne' l'MI6 li hanno considerati tali. In altre parole ce ne 
sarebbe dovuto essere un numero maggiore, in piena operativita', con 
delle testate piene di agenti chimici che non c'erano, ecc...
A me sinceramente,dopo questi due rapporti, quello che pensi della 
presenza o dell'assenza delle WMD,non me ne puo' frega' di meno.
Il giudizio, oltre che dalle due agenzie di intelligence e' stato dato 
dagli elettori. Sondaggi in picchiata per Bush, fine del consenso alla 
guerra in Irak, perdita di diecine di seggi per Blair, a causa delle sue 
menzogne sull'Irak.
Se vuoi sostenere il contrario accomodati, ma sei dalla parte di quelli 
che dicono che la NASA non e' mai stata sulla Luna. Un dietrologo 
insomma.
E' triste ma e' cosi'.
Am.

 Ergo ... la fava :)
Cioč, siccome NON le hanno trovate, ci sono? :))))
Namib

Cioč, siccome NON le hanno trovate, ci sono? :))))
Siccome non le hanno trovate .... non puoi dire ne che ci sono ne che
non ci sono :)  Solo che "non le hanno *ANCORA* trovate" :)
E anche ammesso che sia vero che "non ci sono", ora siamo nel 2005. Il
conflitto e' iniziato nel 2003.
E' dura da dimostrare che "non c'erano" nemmeno allora :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 non ci sono :)  Solo che "non le hanno *ANCORA* trovate" :)
Significa che, allo stato attuale, solo un allucinato direbbe che ci siano
WMD in Iraq. Non sono io che debbo dimostrare che ci siano; sono quelli che
dicevano ci fossero, che debbono farlo. Puoi farlo? No. Punto. Vuoi credere
che dette WMD possano esser trovate in un futuro piů o meno lontano? OK. E'
una convinzione NON suffragata da prove. Per metterla in modo che perfino tu
possa capire: il fatto che tu non sia morto significa solo che "non sei
*ANCORA* morto" :) Il che, secondo la tua logica riemanniana (che taluni
direbbero semplicemente "del cazzo"), significherebbe che tu non puoi
dimostrare di non essere morto. In effetti... :))))))))
Namib

di non essere morto.
Al massimo e' la tua logica quella :)
-Stefano

 *LOL*
Hai toppato ancora De Cesaris. Eccoti il famoso rapporto dell'IAEA a cui 
ti riferisci con tanta sicumera. Ti e' stato chiesto e non l'hai mai 
prodotto. A ragion veduta, troll da quattro soldi e sepolcro imbiancato.
Am.
Ecco, dritto alla fonte:
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml
 
Statements of the Director General
7 March 2003 | New York, USA
 Statement to the United Nations Security Council
 The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification activities in 
Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other 
relevant resolutions.
Inspection Activities
When I reported last to the Council, on 14 February, I explained that 
the Agency's inspection activities had moved well beyond the 
"reconnaissance phase" - that is, re-establishing our knowledge base 
regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities - into the "investigative phase", 
which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to 
disarmament: whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its defunct 
nuclear weapons programme over the last four years.
At the outset, let me state one general observation: namely, that during 
the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial capacity 
has deteriorated substantially, due to the departure of the foreign 
support that was often present in the late 1980s, the departure of large 
numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade, and the lack of 
consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. At only a few 
inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and 
manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel been 
taken on. This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally 
of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons 
programme.
 Inspections
 The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 
sites, including 21 that had not been inspected before. In addition, 
IAEA experts have taken part in many joint UNMOVIC-IAEA inspections.
Technical Methods
 Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The 
three operational air samplers have collected, from key locations in 
Iraq, weekly air particulate samples that are being sent to laboratories 
for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and 
material sample analyses have been received from the relevant 
laboratories.
Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2000 kilometres 
over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 
facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, 
truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential areas.
Interviews
 Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel - at times with 
individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced 
inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key 
scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's 
past nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews 
even when the conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA's 
preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much information as 
possible - information that could be cross-checked for validity with 
other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas 
under investigation.
As you may recall, when we first began to request private, unescorted 
interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and 
keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our insistence, individuals 
have been consenting to being interviewed without escort and without a 
taped record. The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the 
last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct private interviews 
will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq.
I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities 
for conducting interviews, to ensure that they are conducted freely, and 
to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other 
Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way 
to ensure that interviews are free. We intend therefore, to request such 
interviews shortly. We are also asking other States to enable us to 
conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those 
States.
Specific Issues
In the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of 
documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of 
particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium tubes, 
its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities, 
and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch briefly on the 
progress made on each of these issues.
 Uranium Enrichment
 Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of 
IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding 
issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich 
uranium through the use of centrifuges. For that purpose, the IAEA 
assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge 
manufacturing experts.
Aluminium tubes: The IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of 
Iraq's attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminium 
tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that these aluminium 
tubes were sought for rocket production. Extensive field investigation 
and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq 
intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse 
engineering of rockets.
The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these 
rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided copies of design 
documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and 
supporting data and samples. A thorough analysis of this information, 
together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, 
has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted 
purchases and intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well as the 
rationale behind the changes in the tolerances.
Drawing on this information, the IAEA has learned that the original 
tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987, and were based on 
physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in 
Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse engineer the rockets met 
with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following years 
as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize the project and improve 
operational efficiency. The project languished for long periods during 
this time and became the subject of several committees, which resulted 
in specification and tolerance changes on each occasion.
Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's 
efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been 
related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was 
highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design 
needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. However, this 
issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.
Magnets: With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import 
high-strength permanent magnets - or to achieve the capability for 
producing such magnets - for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I 
should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets 
for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of twelve 
different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired 
magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial 
machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to 
research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and 
analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such 
magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets 
that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic 
bearing.
In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line, 
for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet 
occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel 
indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, the contract 
has been evaluated by the IAEA centrifuge enrichment experts. They have 
concluded the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet 
production seems reasonable from an economic point of view. In addition, 
the training and experience acquired by Iraq in the pre-1991 period 
makes it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture 
high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment 
centrifuges. The IAEA will continue therefore to monitor and inspect 
equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for 
enrichment centrifuges.
Flow forming capabilities: Iraq has used its relatively low-accuracy 
flow forming capability for the production of rocket parts in steel. 
Investigations in the field indicate that Iraq has recently started to 
flow form its own tubes in aluminium as well.
Based upon Iraqi documentation, experts' observations of Iraq's 
industrial capabilities and the IAEA's knowledge of Iraq's industrial 
assets - including the availability of raw materials - our assessment to 
date is that Iraq still possesses an abundance of high-strength 
aluminium materials procured during the 1980s, and has the expertise 
needed to produce pre-forms of high quality, but that it currently has 
low-quality flow forming equipment. In addition, Iraq's lack of 
experience and expertise in this field makes it highly unlikely that it 
is currently able to produce aluminium cylinders consistently to the 
tolerances required for centrifuge enrichment. Nevertheless, the IAEA 
will monitor all potentially capable machines and facilities using 
24-hour camera surveillance, supported by a regime of unannounced 
inspections. The IAEA will also continue to assess the level of 
centrifuge-related expertise remaining in Iraq.
Uranium Acquisition
 The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq 
sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was 
centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an 
agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 
and 2001.
The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and 
Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place. For 
its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of 
its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official 
to a number of African countries, including Niger, in February 1999, 
which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was 
also able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the 
Government of Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and 
signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged 
procurement-related documentation.
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence 
of outside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for 
the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger - are 
in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific 
allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any 
additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq to 
illicitly import nuclear materials.
Procurement Patterns
 Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear 
programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported by a 
number of States. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure 
commodities and products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have 
been conducted in contravention of sanction controls specified under 
Security Council resolution 661 and other relevant resolutions.
The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, 
and further verification will be forthcoming. An IAEA team of technical 
experts, customs investigators and computer forensic specialists is 
currently conducting a series of investigations, through inspections at 
trading companies and commercial organizations, aimed at understanding 
Iraq's patterns of procurement.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear 
weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in 
Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little 
over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my 
last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress 
in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in 
its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past 
nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections 
were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated:
   *  There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those 
buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as 
being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of 
nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
   *  There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium 
since 1990.
   *  There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium 
tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued 
such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in 
manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question.
   *  Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and 
magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported 
magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.
As I stated above, the IAEA will continue further to scrutinize and 
investigate all of the above issues.
After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no 
evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons 
programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities, 
making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution 1441 
and all additional tools that might be available to us, including 
reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to 
continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our 
mandate. I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a 
result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq 
has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with regard to 
the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that 
could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope 
that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of 
its co-operation.
The detailed knowledge of Iraq's capabilities that IAEA experts have 
accumulated since 1991 - combined with the extended rights provided by 
resolution 1441, the active commitment by all States to help us fulfil 
our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi co-operation - 
should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with 
an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related 
capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will endeavour 
- in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification 
process, and, particularly in light of Iraq's past record of 
co-operation - to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on a continuous basis as 
part of our long-term monitoring and verification programme, in order to 
provide the international community with ongoing and real time 
assurances.
 »  More DG Statements
Copyright 2003, International Atomic Energy Agency, P.O. Box 100, 
Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, Austria 
 Telephone (+431) 2600-0; Facsimile (+431) 2600-7; E-mail: 
Offici...@iaea.org
Disclaimer

A ragion veduta, troll da quattro soldi e sepolcro imbiancato.
...disse il troll da quattro soldi e sepolcro imbiancato... :)
-Stefano

 rapporto che riguarda solo ed esclusivamente il punto di vista nucleare
Complimenti. IAEA si occupa solo di questioni nucleari.
Abbi la gentilezza di fornire il rapporto a cui ti riferisci.
Il mio e' quello conclusivo alla vigilia dell'attacco all'Irak.
Am.

 ne sono state trovate? :)
e quando le trovavano se nn venivano loro consegnate :-)

Il mio e' quello conclusivo alla vigilia dell'attacco all'Irak.
Ma riguarda solo il nucleare. E le WMD non sono nucleari.
Riprova.
-Stefano

 No, sono state consegnate :-)
Da chi, visto che l'Iraq e Saddam affermavano che erano state *TUTTE*
distrutte?
*LOL*
-Stefano

 Riprova.
Ma certo. Di quelle non nucleari si occupava l'UNMOVIC cioe' Blix, di 
cui ho pubblicato qui le note risultanze prima dell'attacco all'Irak.
Tu stai facendo di nuovo il furbo. Se dici che la percezione USAUK in  
marzo del 2003 ci fossero armi, malgrado i rapporti di Blix e el 
Baradei, e' un conto.
Se dici che ci fossero queste armi in quantita' significativa per fare 
distruzione di massa e' tutt'altro conto.
 Questo e' stato *smentito* nel 2004 e nel 2005 da CIA e MI6.
Dunque quello che era legittimo *aspettarsi* nel 2003 oggi lo *sappiamo* 
con certezza da queste due agenzie.
Continui a farneticare di un 'altro' rapporto AIEA su armi non nucleari.
Il rapporto finale dell'AIEA l'ho pubblicato qui e l'AIEA si occupa solo 
di nucleare.
Il tuo rapporto invece non l'ha visto nessuno. Senon sei in grado di 
postarlo, taci e piantala di prendere il NG per i fondelli,  buffone. 
Am.

taci e piantala di prendere il NG per i fondelli, buffone.
...disse il buffone.... :)
-Stefano

 non ci sono :)  Solo che "non le hanno *ANCORA* trovate" :)
Ok: con questo approccio metodologico, possiamo, anche, affermare
che esista un quid di intelligenza nel De Cesari.
Solo che non lo hanno ancora trovato.

 affermava che erano state *TUTTE* distrutte :)
E invece la valutazione degli ispettori ONU, i soli a poter valutare 
l'esistenza di un programma di WMD, e' stata proprio quella.
Comunque tutto cio' e' stato *superato* dal rapporto CIA e MI6, che 
affermano che WMD non ve n'erano.
Prima hai chiesto l'indirizzo del rapporto CIA, adesso che ce l'hai ti 
guardi bene dal citarlo.
Continua ad arrampicarti sugli specchi, buffone che mente per la gola.
Adesso, con i rapporti UNMOVIC, AIEA, CIA e MI6 tutti pubblicati in 
questo 3d, e tutti concordanti,  sei in trappola, davanti a tutti.
Sei un patetico bugiardo, incapace di fornire un rapporto a sostegno, 
dopo averli pretesi tutti. Sbruffone sbugiardato.
E ora vedi se c'e' ancora qualcuno nel NG che ti da retta. Per mepuoi 
andare direttamente a it.fan.culo
Am.

Solo che non lo hanno ancora trovato.
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

Per me puoi andare direttamente a it.fan.culo
Intanto ci mando te :)
-Stefano

 prove" :)
Quando una cosa non si trova, vuol dire che - *per quel che se ne sa* - NON
c'è: al più, *potrebbe* esserci. Non esiste certezza che verrà trovata (e
finora NON è stata trovata). Tranne che per gli allucinati.
Namib

Tranne che per gli allucinati.
....disse l'allucinato.... :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

amalric, attento ai f/up dell'astutissimo autocecato

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:428437CC...@people.it...

E se lo dici tu che lo affermava Saddam,  questo nn puo' che essere vero
allora :-)

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:42844976...@people.it...

E' un bue saggio, però :)))
Namib

 Il che continua a dire ben poco :)
Dice che non necessariamente sarà trovata.
Namib

 E' un bue saggio, però :)))
Se lo dice quel fesso di Namib come non credergli!
*LOL*
-Stefano

Dice che non necessariamente sarà trovata.
Il che continuerebbe a dire ben poco :)
-Stefano

 internazionale. :)
No. I governi UK USA hanno mentito all'ONU dicendo che ci fossero le 
WMD, *indipendentemente dagli sipettori ONU*, quando non c'erano. Tanto 
e' vero che non essendo state trovate un anno dopo l'occupazione e con 
il rientro a mani vuote dei team di ispezioni angloamericani (Kay), CIA 
e MI6 hanno ritrattato per cercare di salvarsi  la pelle rispetto ai 
governanti che le hanno accusate di averli ingannati.
Quello che SdC vorrebbe e' che siccome si e' dichiarato prima della 
guerra chele WMD c'erano, allora ci devono essere ancora.
Ci chiede di prendere la bugia di partenza per buona, allorche' gli 
stessi servizi che l'hanno pronunciata, l'hanno smentita.
In altre parole si reputa piu' furbo di CIA e MI6,cosi' come in genere 
si reputa piu' furbo di quotidiani autorevoli.
E' un vero politico, che pensa che a forza di ripetere una bugia si 
finira' per crederla. Peccato che i veri politici hanno rinunciato a 
ripeterla molto tempo prima di lui.
Am.

prima di lui.
...disse il vero politico.... :)
*LOL*
(Ops... I veri politici sono quelli che ripetono bugie... :) )
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Bene: si aspetta sempre questo fantomatico rapporto che provi 
l'esistenza di WMD alla *vigilia* del conflitto (quelle che c'erano 10 
anni prima, non costituisce una prova che ci fossero 10 anni dopo, visto 
le sanzioni) .
Di quali armi si trattava? (chimiche/biologiche *e*balistiche - deve 
essere provata la loro compresenza in numero e quantita' sufficiente) 
Dove sono state nascoste? Come mai non sono state trovate alla vigilia 
del conflitto ne' da UNMOVIC ne da IAEA? E come mai non sono state 
trovate a invasione  avvenuta dai team americani specializzati di Kay, 
che incaricati dal governo USA, li hanno cercati per un anno e si sono 
ritirati spontaneamente?
E come mai adesso le agenzie di spionaggio di USA e UK, CIA e MI6 
dichiarano entrambe che queste armi non c'erano alla *vigilia* del 
conflitto? (vedi rapporto MI6).
Qui si stanno ripetendo i vecchi sofismi. E cioe' che gli Irakeni 
dovevano fornire le prove di avere distrutto le WMD, non l'incontrario. 
Ma le autorita' irakene essendo state scalzate dalle potenze occupanti 
questa responsabilita' di prova **e' ricaduta sulle potenze occupanti**. 
E queste prove le agenzie di informazioni di UK e USA hanno detto al 
mondo che non potevano fornirle, dopo *un anno*di ricerche a 360°.
*Questo* e' lo stato dell'arte delle fantomatiche WMD Irakene, non gli 
pseudoragionamenti di un troll.
Am.

non gli pseudoragionamenti di un troll.
...disse il troll... :)
-Stefano

 ...disse il troll... :)
AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
 AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
 AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
 AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
 AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
 AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
 AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
 AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!
Am.

Disse il figlio di un asino e di una vacca (appellativo arabo)
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 haI POSTATO UN TUBO di documento, fesso.
Forse non vuole mostrare le sue prove al mondo :)
Namib

 Adesso i tuoi genitori si parlano?
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

Forse non vuole mostrare le sue prove al mondo :)
Le ha gia' mostrate in parte Amalric :)
E io le ho gia' mostrate a suo tempo caro fessacchiotto di un Namib. :)
Non per niente ti sei ben guardato dall'affermare che non sono *MAI*
state trovate WMD in Iraq prima del conflitto :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 ...disse il bue all'asino... :)
E perché i genitori dell'asino non si parlano? :)
Namib

 state trovate WMD in Iraq prima del conflitto :)
E' *dopo* il conflitto (scatenato per le wmd), che le wmd NON sono state
trovate. Ergo, *per quel che ne sappiamo ora*, NON ci sono.
Namib

Ergo, *per quel che ne sappiamo ora*, NON ci sono.
No. Per la lingua italiana, che poverina si stara rivoltando ad ogni tuo
post con cui la martorizzi, *per quel che ne sappiamo ora* NON sono
state trovate (dopo il conflitto) :)
-Stefano

 Il che dice ben poco :)
A te. Il resto del mondo ha capito, però.
Namib

 Gia' provato :)  Fatti una ricerchina :)  E senza la parola "missili" :)
Trad.: "Hai le prove, ma, da bravo fesso, non intendi mostrarle al mondo"
(cit.).
Namib

 A te. Il resto del mondo ha capito, però.
Ha capito ... che sono state trovate prima del conflitto quando
affermavano che erano state tutte distrutte :)
Come ha capito che gli ispettori hanno rilevato infinite violazioni
degli accordi di cessate il fuoco, con menzogne a non finire :)
-Stefano

mondo" (cit.).
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 *LOL*
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/ma_iraq_2702.shtml
Ripeto che sono state ''ritrovate'' grazie ad un qualcuno che ha detto loro
dove cercare :-)
E torno a ripetere: e quando le trovavano se non dicevano loro dove cercare
:-)

cercare
Semplice: le cercavano dove potevano essere e dove le avevano
dimenticate. :)  Eh si, perche' la scusa dichiarata e' stata quella che
non si ricordavano piu' di averle :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/ma_iraq_2702.shtml
Mah a me sembrate tutti pazzi. Che potenziale di sitruzione di massa 
avevano queste armi?
Erano relitti del '91, poche unita' in disarmo di programmi precedenti. 
E le vorreste far passare per una filiera di WMD nel 2003?
Non c'e' piu' bisogno di un casus belli, tesori. la guerra e' gia' 
avvenuta, e malgrado tutte le spiate possibili non s'e' trovato nulla.
Un po' poco, no, per scatenare un invasione,  a meno di averla decisa *a 
prescindere*...
Am.
(disse trattenendo il vomito per la disonesta')

(disse trattenendo il vomito per la disonesta')
Lo sapevamo che sei un disonesto :)  Ne hai appena data riprova, casomai
ve ne fosse stato ancora bisogno. :)
-Stefano


Il tempo purtroppo e' per tutti nemico della memoria :-),
e' pero' un fatto che Saddam nn negava di aver costruito quel tipo di bombe
e l'importante e' che le abbiano fatte ritrovare.
E fino ad ora e' stato dimostrato solo che le "centinata di tonnellate" di
antrace, di tossine, di botulino, di gas nervino di cui l'amministrazione
Bush si diceva certa nn ci sono.

cui l'amministrazione Bush si diceva certa nn ci sono.
Anche tu che martori la povera lingua italiana!!!
Dante stara' rotolandosi nella tomba a sentire te e Namib sparare simili
orrori :)
Perche' "fino ad ora e' stato dimostrato solo che" .... NON SONO ANCORA
STATE TROVATE :)
-Stefano

 (disse trattenendo il vomito per la disonesta')
Addirittura :-)

 STATE TROVATE :)
Ma dimmi un po, tu credi al destino?
ROTFL

 ve ne fosse stato ancora bisogno. :)
Be' allora cerca di dimostrare un po' di serieta',perche' *non a caso* 
UKUSA hanno cambiato fucile di spalla indicando il regime change come 
motivazione della guerra in Irak. Nessuno credeva piu' infatti a 
invasione compiuta all'esistenza di WND, senon a quei quattro catorci 
che risalivano al '91 e che non erano parte dello schieramento militare.
A quelle non e'stato dato peso -sono state ignorate - sia da CIA che da 
MI6 che erano subentrati agli ispettori,cosi' denigrati da UKUSA per le 
loro insufficienti risultanze nel 2003.
La controprova e' che ne CS ne Assemblea ONU autorizzarono l'invasione 
su base di quelle risultanze.
E le agenzie di UKUSA hanno smentito la presenza di WMD *prima della 
guerra*. Non dei singoli elementi sparsi, che non contano, ma del loro 
schieramento offensivo in quantita' credibile.
D'altraparte e' probabile che Saddam, dopo dieci anni di sanzioni, non 
avesse piu' nessuna possibilita' materiale di farlo.
Mi vengano risparmiate le solite obiezioni infantili. L'opinione 
pubblica ha gia' deciso in materia, dopo due anni di mezze verita' e di 
previsioni errate.
Am.

>ANCORA STATE TROVATE :)
C.V.D. :)
-Stefano

L'opinione pubblica ha gia' deciso in materia,
Se lo dici tu che l'hai intervistata personalmente persona per
persona.... :)
*LOL*
-Stefano


Sai... dopo nove anni ho capito che l'ignoranza e' un bene :-) cosa hai
dimostrato?

 -Stefano
Lasciamo che decida il NG su chi e' il fesso disonesto.
Di seguito i brani significativi dei rapporti *finali* ElBaradei e Blix 
del marzo 2003, rispetto ai quali tu hai citato un rapporto AIEA 
precedente e fuori contesto dalle conclusioni di questi due organismi.
I brani che cito, che invocavano, nel caso di Blix, maggiori ispezioni 
*mentre il processo di disarmo irakeno continuava, e' stato completato 
dai rapporti CIA e MI6 del 2005.  Secondo  questi rapporti, resi noti 
dalla stampa di tutto il mondo vi erano in Irak ne' armi chimiche, 
biologiche,o nucleari in Irak, cioe' quelle che vengono chiamate WMD.
Dal rapporto AIEA Marzo 2003:
 The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Conclusion
In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear 
weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in 
Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little 
over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my 
last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress 
in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in 
its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past 
nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections 
were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated:
   *  There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those 
buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as 
being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of 
nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
   *  There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium 
since 1990.
   *  There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium 
tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued 
such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in 
manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question.
   *  Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and 
magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported 
magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.
As I stated above, the IAEA will continue further to scrutinize and 
investigate all of the above issues.
After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no 
evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons 
programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities, 
making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution 1441 
and all additional tools that might be available to us, including 
reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to 
continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our 
mandate. I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a 
result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq 
has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with regard to 
the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that 
could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope 
that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of 
its co-operation.
The detailed knowledge of Iraq's capabilities that IAEA experts have 
accumulated since 1991 - combined with the extended rights provided by 
resolution 1441, the active commitment by all States to help us fulfil 
our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi co-operation - 
should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with 
an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related 
capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will endeavour 
- in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification 
process, and, particularly in light of Iraq's past record of 
co-operation - to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on a continuous basis as 
part of our long-term monitoring and verification programme, in order to 
provide the international community with ongoing and real time 
assurances.
Da:
Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC by Executive 
Chairman Dr. Hans Blix (07/03/2003)
AS DELIVERED 
SECURITY COUNCIL, 7 MARCH 2003 
As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that 
weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in 
particular, that there are mobile production units for biological 
weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. 
Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in 
relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile 
laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large 
containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed 
activities has so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the 
development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground 
transportation.
Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq?s programme for Remotely 
Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data 
being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the 
various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.
There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed 
activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on 
any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of 
weapons of mass destruction. During inspections of declared or 
undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building 
structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground 
penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No 
underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage 
were found so far.
I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and 
for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase 
our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of staff. I would 
rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to 
inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.
Recent developments
On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become 
more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed 
new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the 
current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively 
little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in 
the report before you.
As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the 
Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have 
declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, 
the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the 
opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and 
associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction 
under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a 
substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle 
of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal 
weapons are being destroyed.
CIA Corrects Itself on WMD
 A report, the first of its kind, says Baghdad ended its chemical 
weapons program in '91.
 By Greg Miller
 Times Staff Writer
 02/01/05 "Los  Angeles Times" -- WASHINGTON a In what may be a formal 
acknowledgment of the obvious, the CIA has issued a classified report 
revising its prewar assessments on Iraq and concluding that Baghdad 
abandoned its chemical weapons programs in 1991, intelligence officials 
familiar with the document said.
 The report marks the first time the CIA has officially disavowed its 
prewar judgments and is one in a series of updated assessments the 
agency is producing as part of an effort to correct its record on Iraq's 
alleged weapons programs, officials said.
 The CIA's decision to distribute the report a titled "Iraq: No 
Large-Scale Chemical Warfare Efforts Since Early 1990s" a in classified 
channels underscores the awkwardness the agency faces as it continues to 
reconcile its prewar reporting with postwar realities in Iraq. Before 
the war, the CIA asserted that Iraq had stockpiled biological weapons 
and was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
 A U.S. intelligence official said the document was "not a high-level 
report," meaning it was designed to supplant outdated assessments still 
on classified computer networks and was not meant to be called to the 
attention of President Bush or other senior government officials.
 "It's basically updating the books," said the official, who spoke on 
condition of anonymity, "so the information on the shelf is the most 
current."?
 Current and former intelligence officials described it as a highly 
unusual step for the CIA.?
 "It's stunning that they would actually put on paper a reversal" of 
previous intelligence estimates, said one intelligence official who had 
seen the document.
 Richard J. Kerr, a former senior CIA official who was hired by the 
agency last year to conduct an internal review of its prewar analysis, 
said he couldn't recall the agency ever issuing such a revisionist 
report on any subject.
 "But the situation is rather unique," Kerr said, noting that Iraq's 
postwar reality had made the agency's failings obvious. "Ordinarily, 
you're never proven wrong in a clean, neat way."?
 The report is based largely on findings by the Iraq Survey Group, a 
CIA-led team of weapons experts that searched the country for more than 
a year without finding clear evidence of active illegal weapons programs.
 U.S. intelligence officials have long acknowledged that the prewar 
assessments were flawed. David Kay, the former head of the search team, 
told Congress last January, "We were almost all wrong."
 But other officials' statements have been more qualified. In a speech 
at Georgetown University last February, then-CIA Director George J. 
Tenet said that "when the facts of Iraq are all in, we will neither be 
completely right nor completely wrong."?
 The new report from the CIA, which is dated Jan. 18, retreats from the 
agency's prewar assertions on chemical weapons on almost every front. It 
concludes that "Iraq probably did not pursue chemical warfare efforts 
after 1991."?
 The report notes that its new conclusions "vary significantly" from 
prewar judgments "largely because of subsequent events and direct access 
to Iraqi officials, scientists, facilities and documents."?
 A note in the report describes the document as the second in a 
"retrospective series that addresses our post-Operation Iraqi Freedom 
understanding of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and delivery system 
programs."?
 A Jan. 4 report focused on Scud missiles and other delivery systems. 
Intelligence officials said future reports would revise the agency's 
claims that Iraq had stockpiles of biological weapons and was rebuilding 
its nuclear weapons program. Those allegations were a centerpiece of the 
Bush administration's case for war with Iraq.
http://207.44.245.159/article7938.htm
L'MI6 ritratta
We got it wrong on Iraq WMD, intelligence chiefs finally admit 
 Richard Norton-Taylor 
Friday April 8, 2005
The Guardian 
  Intelligence chiefs have admitted for the first time that claims they 
made about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction were wrong and 
have not been substantiated.
 The admission is revealed in the annual report of the parliamentary 
intelligence and security committee which also sharply criticises the 
lack of communication between ministers and the Secret Intelligence 
Service, MI6.
 It discloses that late last year the joint intelligence committee (JIC) 
reviewed key judgments on Iraq's WMD capability and programmes behind 
the government's now discredited dossier published in September 2002.
 * The JIC claimed in 2002: "Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons 
programme." It now admits this "was wrong, in that Iraq was not pursuing 
a nuclear weapons programme". It says the claim was "correct on Iraq's 
nuclear ambitions".
 * The JIC judged in 2002: "Iraq retains up to 20 al-Hussein ballistic 
missiles." It now admits: "This has not been substantiated."
 * In 2002, the JIC judged: "Iraq may retain some stocks of chemical 
agents ... Iraq could produce significant quantities of mustard [gas] 
within weeks, significant quantities of Sarin and VX within months, and, 
in the case of VX may already have done so." It now admits: "Although a 
capability to produce some agents probably existed, this judgment has 
not been substantiated." It adds that the Iraq Survey Group found that 
Saddam "intended to resume a CW [chemical weapons] effort once [UN] 
sanctions were lifted".
 * The JIC in 2002 said: "Iraq currently has available ... a number of 
biological agents ... Iraq could produce more of these biological agents 
within days". It now says that the ISG found Iraq could resume 
production, "but not within the time frames judged ... and [it] found no 
evidence that production had been activated".
Quelli che ho citato sono quattro rapporti finali, contro un rapporto 
parziale e intermedio.
Il lettore puo' rendersi facilmente conto delle'esistenza o meno delle 
WMD in Irak, se essa giustificasse una guerra con diecine di migliaia di 
morti.
E anche, piu' modestamente, si puo' rendere conto di chi sia il 'fesso 
disonesto' che ha manipolato i dati sulla pelle degli Irakeni, 
standosene comodamente seduto in poltrona.
Am.

 
ERRATA CORRIGE
Bisogna leggere:
dai rapporti CIA e MI6 del 2005.  Secondo  questi rapporti, resi noti 
dalla stampa di tutto il mondo NON vi erano in Irak armi chimiche, 
biologiche,o nucleari in Irak, cioe' quelle che vengono chiamate WMD.
Am.

Sai... dopo nove anni ho capito che l'ignoranza e' un bene :-)
Resta pure ignorante allora :)
-Stefano

disonesto'
Quello che continua a non rispondere delle sue affermazioni evitando
accuratamente di rispondere alle domande piu' volt ripetute riguardo
alle stesse? :)
-Stefano

 Iraq prima del conflitto :)
Gia' tu il  'parere' morale non sai neanche cosa sia, lo sappiamo. Non 
esistono i morti della guerra in Irak, una bambina a Gaza  e un ferito a 
terra a Falluja sono pericolosi terroristi da uccidere sul posto (cit.). 
Del manifestante ucciso a Genova chissenefrega, e cosi di Giuliana Masi.
Perche' dovrebbe fregarti niente della devastazione dell'Irak.
L'unica cosa che conta e' il tuo lurido Ego di assassino in poltrona.
Am.

L'unica cosa che conta e' il tuo lurido Ego di assassino in poltrona.
...disse l'assassino in poltrona.... :)
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Affonda pure nelle tue contraddizioni e confusione: io i dossier sulle 
WMD li ho dati, mentre tu hai dato solo la tua considerata opinione di 
fesso notorio, e cialtrone bugiardo di universale reputazione.
L'esistenza di  WMD come casus belli di un'invasione e' stata ripudiata 
ormai dall'enorme maggioranza dell'opinione pubblica, ma tu piuttosto di 
ammettere di aver sbagliato, continui a metter bocca con impavida 
fesseria. Buon divertimento!
Giudichino i lettori, se non si sono annoiati da tempo...
Am.

 Giudichino i lettori,
Cit:
Direi che e' lapalissiano visto che alle mie domande per l'ennesima
volta hai evitato di rispondere :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 fesso notorio, e cialtrone bugiardo di universale reputazione.
Ma perche' continui a prenderlo sul serio ?
L'unico suo scopo è produrre flame per poter postare a piu' non posso e 
finire sul Guinnes dei primati.....

L'unico suo scopo è produrre flame
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Gia'. Vale la pena di tradurre anche per il pubblico inglese, nella tua 
lingua di Oxford:
amalric wrote:  ..disse the assassin in seat....:)  He also sinks in 
your contradictions and confusion:  ... he said the ox to the ass...:)  
I the dossier on the WMD have given them,  Sin that does not say how 
much asserts:) * LOL *  while you have only given yours considered 
cleaved opinion of well-known,  ... it said the well-known one 
cleaved....:)  and cialtrone bugiardo of universal reputation.  ... it 
said the bugiardo cialtrone of universal reputation....:)  The existence 
of WMD like casus beautiful of an invasion e' be repudiated by now from 
the enormous majority of the public opinion, And if Amalric Bond says to 
it...!!! * LOL *  but you rather than to admit than to have mistaken,  
On what? On a fantomatico I repudiate from part of the public opinion? I 
of it have not just spoken:) In fact I do not scramble up on the mirrors 
every time that makes me question precise, as it happens to you:)  he 
continues to put mouth with fearless fesseria.  ... he said the cleaved 
one...:)  They judge the readers,  Cit: They said that e' lapalissiano 
inasmuch as to my questions for ennesima the time you have avoided to 
answer:) * LOL * 
 - Stefano
Regards,
Am.

tua lingua di Oxford:
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

hit and had fallen.
SdC: E in quei 4 minuti cosa ha fatto la ragazzina?
X. Richiamo alla netiquette per mr. De Ce**ri, noto per i suoi non
segnalati follow-up ad it.fan.culo:
RFC 1855: In NetNews parlance, "Posting" refers to posting a new article to
a group, or responding to a post someone else has posted. "Cross-Posting"
refers to
posting a message to more than one group. If you introduce Cross-Posting to
a group, or if you direct "Followup-To:" in the header of your posting, warn
readers! Readers will usually assume that the message was posted to a
specific group and that followups will go to that group. Headers change this
behavior.

C.D.O.
-Stefano

 *LOL*

volere o sapere ricercare? :-)
Bella domanda :)  Risponditi da solo visto che di ricerche per sostenere
le tue puttanate non ne hai fatte :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 Ma perche' continui a prenderlo sul serio ?
Gia' me lo chiedo anche io, ha passato gli ultimi anni della sua vita a
cercare lui quando il decesari e' una vita...una vita intera che cerca.....
cerca...... ma non trova :-)


C.V.D.
Stai cominciando a convincerti nevvero? :-)
Buona la capacita' di adattamento, di improvvisazione...
la tua debolezza nn e' nella tecnica,
quello che devi migliorare e' l'astuzia nell' eludere tutto o parte delle
contestazioni che ti vengono mosse.
Del tutto assente il coraggio di ritirarti con onore. :-)
6 1 spasso :-) LOL

Del tutto assente il coraggio di ritirarti con onore. :-)
Ibidem :)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 -Stefano
Qualcuno vede schede? Almeno a Medjuogorje vedevano la Madonna :))))
Namib

 Qualcuno vede schede? Almeno a Medjuogorje vedevano la Madonna :))))
Namib, tu sai che ti stimo, come ho avuto modo di farti capire, spero,
durante i nostri pochi scambi nell' ormai defunto ips. Ti leggo sempre
volentieri, anche quando posti la quinta pagina del Milwuakee Chronicle. Per
questo mi chiedo: perche' sprechi il tuo talento con codeste cazzate? Mi
rendo conto dell' aspetto ludico, ma insomma...
Lo dico anche per me.
JP

 *LOL*

 Attendo ancora di farmi smentire... che aspetti?.. se ci riesci :-)
Cit:
E dimmi: che senso ha smentire quando nn si ha nemmeno la capacita' di
volere o sapere ricercare? :-)
*LOL*
-Stefano

 wrote:

Eh, ce lo chiediamo tutti.Perche' ti sei ridotto cosi'?
Troppa fretta di arrivare all'80.000? ?
Am.

 Eh, ce lo chiediamo tutti.Perche' ti sei ridotto cosi'?
...disse il bue all'asino... :)
-Stefano

 Lo dico anche per me.
"Talento" a parte, hai ragione. Torniamo alle cose serie. Shalom. P.S. La
stima è reciproca. Bye.
Namib

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:4288381D...@people.it...

Hai fatto la cosa piu' saggia, sei giunto alla verita'..
stai imparando a conoscere meglio te stesso
ti mancano le capacita' :-)
ROTFL

ti mancano le capacita' :-)
Idem come sopra :)
-Stefano

 nell' ormai defunto ips. 
Perche' defunto?
Dicky Roper