Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Israel's Intelligence Failure & The Iraq War

Ecco qua qualcosa gia` accennato da un ex insider (John Le Carre) nel mio
post : "I fill the same for the American!"
Nell'intervista da lui concessa a Tim Sebastian della BBC ,Hardtalk, fa
accenno ad un intervento dell'Intelligenge Office Israeliano.
Anche questo rapporto viene dalla CEIP Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
Giano
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=5739
            Israel's Intelligence Failure & The Iraq War
            by Samia Amin, Junior Fellow
            Thursday, December 11, 2003
            The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has led
to a
            close scrutiny of the role of intelligence agencies in both the
            United States and Britain. As Brigadier General (ret.) Shlomo
Brom,
            points out, Israeli intelligence, which was in full agreement
with
            American and British intelligence estimates, has, however,
remained
            "in the shadows." General Brom, a senior research associate at
Tel
            Aviv University's Jaffe Center, calls for an inquiry into the
            performance of Israeli intelligence agencies. In an article
titled
            "The War in Iraq: An Intelligence Failure," first published in
            "Strategic Assessment," General Brom makes three key points: (1)
            Israeli intelligence agencies failed because they did not
realize
            that Saddam Hussein's main goal was survival; (2) Israeli
            intelligence tends to adopt the worst-case scenario; (3)
Inflated
            threat assessments exact a heavy price.
            Survival
            General Brom offers insight into why Israeli intelligence
agencies
            miscalculated Saddam Hussein's actions. Israeli intelligence
agents
            were convinced that Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat
because
            they held "a one-dimensional perception" of Saddam Hussein as an
            evil man "possessed by a compulsion to develop weapons of mass
            destruction in order to strike Israel and others." General Brom
            criticizes the Israeli intelligence agency's failure to identify
            Saddam's primary motive as that of survival. He argues that
after
            1991, Saddam Hussein must have realized that "activities in the
            realm of weapons of mass destruction became a factor that
threatened
            his survival rather than ensured it."
            Brom posits that Saddam's desire for survival obviates both
theses
            developed by Israeli intelligence agencies as explanations of
why
            Iraq might attack Israel with non-conventional weapons. The
first
            thesis predicted that "when Saddam's "back was against the
wall"… he
            would strive for a dramatic conclusion to his regime - one that
            'would take Israel with him.'" The second theory argues that
Saddam
            would try to hamper American military operations by preemptively
            striking Israel before the war.
            "Both [theses] disregarded the unequivocal indications in
Saddam's
            behavior prior to the war that he was focused on strengthening
his
            chances of survival. This was manifested first in his attempt to
            prevent the war, and then in his search for a way to survive
even if
            war erupted. However, no intelligence efforts were made to
assess
            whether or not an attack on Israel would contribute to his
survival…
            All signs indicated that on the eve of the war, Saddam was
trying to
            convince the international community that he did not possess
weapons
            of mass destruction and that there was therefore no reason to go
to
            war. Had he initiated a preemptive strike, he would have given
the
            United States the ultimate excuse for war….The back-to-the-wall
            thesis [similarly]… disregards the fact that a survivor like
Saddam
            would strive to resurface even after defeat, especially given
the
            not infrequent phenomenon among Arab dictators of surviving
severe
            losses and bitter defeats. … Furthermore, this thesis ignores
the
            difficulty people have - especially people of Saddam Hussein's
type
            - to acknowledge that they are "done for" until the very last
            moment. Thus, the dogmatic, one-dimensional conception of Saddam
            tainted all pieces of information and prevented the emergence of
any
            alternative interpretation."
            Worse-Case Scenario Assessments
            General Brom attributes the Israeli intelligence community's
            adoption of the worst-case scenario to a desire to evade
culpability
            for under-preparedness. According to Brom, the intelligence
lapse
            prior to the Yom Kippur War created a culture of "assigning
            culpability and punishing those responsible as a primary purpose
in
            assessing events." The Israeli media is particularly responsible
for
            encouraging this tendency. As a result, Brom argues,
intelligence
            estimates tend to be dire.
            "If investigating the truth, that is, aiming to uncover the
facts
            and learn lessons to prevent the recurrence of similar mistakes,
            does not lie at the heart of the investigation of an event,
rather
            it is driven by finding and punishing the responsible party,
even
            for inadvertent mistakes, then every decision-maker will tend to
            make decisions completely devoid of risk, even if it is not done
            consciously. This has created an unworkable situation in the
            intelligence community, since generating intelligence means
creating
            a picture of reality in a state of uncertainty. ..Intelligence
            analysts feel that by giving bleak assessments they decrease the
            threat to themselves: if the assessment ends up being correct
they
            will be heroes, and if it ends up being untrue, no one will give
            them any trouble because everyone will be pleased that their
bleak
            prophecies did not materialize."
            Costs of Inflated Intelligence Assessments
            General Brom warns that making faulty and overblown intelligence
            assessments can exact a heavy price. It erodes the public's
trust in
            the intelligence community and in decision makers. It can
seriously
            harm international relations, rendering foreign services wary of
            accepting Israeli intelligence. The psychological impact and the
            propensity to panic amongst the population, as witnessed prior
to
            the war, reduces the "public's fortitude." It may also be
            detrimental to Israel's security concerns because it propagates
an
            image of weakness and vulnerability. "Israel's potential enemies
            might conclude in retrospect that if Israel was so frightened by
            what was apparently such a negligible threat, it clearly has
good
            reason to be." Investigating Israel's intelligence failure in
the
            war in Iraq, he says, is crucial for ensuring Israel can evade
these
            costs in the future.
            Additional Resources:
              "The War in Iraq: An Intelligence Failure," by Brigadier
General
              (ret.) Shlomo Brom, Strategic Assessment, November 2003
              "Israel Shares Blame on Iraq Intelligence, Report Says,"
              Washington Post, 5 December 2003

beato chi sa maneggiare i Computer ; altro che WMD!
Giano
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