Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Milliband: How to End the War in Afghanistan

http://tinyurl.com/ydcw3qx
How to End the War in Afghanistan
By David Miliband
Neither the UK nor the US started the war in Afghanistan. In the 1990s
that country's Taliban government provided a safe haven and support for
al-Qaeda. In return Osama bin Laden provided the Taliban with money and
fighters. Afghanistan became the incubator for the September 11 attacks.
The international intervention in response to those attacks had
widespread support around the world. But we never meant for our
militaries to be there forever. Eight years later, with al-Qaeda pushed
into Pakistan, it is not enough to explain to people why the war
started. We need to set out how it will be ended—how to preserve what
has been achieved and protect South Asia from a contagion that would
affect us all.
The route to progress depends on recognizing the centrality of politics
to issues of war and peace. Violence of the most murderous,
indiscriminate, and terrible kind started this Afghan war; politics will
bring it to an end. A political settlement for Afghanistan must have two
dimensions. First, a new and more inclusive internal political
arrangement in which enough Afghan citizens have a stake, and the
central government has enough power and legitimacy to protect the
country from threats within and without. And second, on which the first
depends, a new external settlement that commits Afghanistan's neighbors
to respect its sovereign integrity and that carries enough force and
support to ensure that they abide by that commitment.
Britain fought three wars in Afghanistan between 1839 and 1919. Each
time it was defending its power base—and economic stake—in British
India. And each time it suffered military reverses as it sought to
establish order. Yet on every occasion, once that lesson had been
learned the hard and bloody way, Britain's imperial strategists
sought—and secured—a saner and more sustainable objective: a
self-governing, self-policing, but heavily subsidized Afghanistan, whose
tribes balanced each other and that posed no threat to the safety of
British India.
Bath Spa University / Creative Writing Dept.
Soviet strategists reached strikingly similar conclusions. When the
Soviet forces in Afghanistan withdrew in 1989, they left behind a
government, led by the Afghan Communist Mohammad Najibullah, that
survived for three years. It did so—in the words of advice from the
Kremlin—by "forgetting communism, abandoning socialism, embracing Islam,
and working with the tribes." As with every other regime in modern
Afghan history, the Najibullah government could not have existed without
external subsidy. And so it fell when Boris Yeltsin's newly independent
Russia cut all aid to Kabul.
Britain's experience in the nineteenth century, and the Soviet Union's
in the twentieth, showed that the best way, perhaps the only way, to
stabilize Afghanistan in the long term is to empower the Afghans
themselves in charge so that they can secure and govern their own
villages and valleys. To achieve this, the Afghans need full political
and military support, and generous economic subsidy, from outside. But
the Afghan people neither need nor welcome our combat troops on their
soil any longer than is necessary to guarantee security and set them on
a course to regulating their own affairs.
A recent study of Britain's bloody withdrawal from Kabul in 1842
concluded that the first cause of that disaster was the reluctance of
junior officers to tell their superiors the truth about the dire
situation the British forces found themselves in. I know from my own
discussions with diplomats and commanders in the field that such "happy
talk" is no longer the order of the day. Getting Afghanistan right means
getting down to ground truth. These are the facts as I see them:
     • The Afghan people are tired of thirty years of war. They have
been traumatized by the fighting and the denial of basic rights and
opportunities. The majority of them hate, for good reason, the brutality
of the Taliban. But sometimes they see them as their only protection
from other brutal powerbrokers or warlords.
     • The Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai faces competing demands
from its own people, from powerful criminal and commercial interests,
and from the international community. But it lacks the capacity to
govern. The concerns about its credibility run deeper than last fall's
elections, which were marred by widespread corruption and fraud. They
also relate to the very structure of the political system.
     • The Afghan insurgency is a broad but shallow coalition, with
shifting relationships, geographical bases, and tactics. The Taliban is
led by members of the former Talib regime under Mullah Omar, who has
been based in Pakistan's border areas. A variety of other factions are
also operating, including the Haqqani network, Hizb-e-Islami, and a
range of smaller groups. These groups all trade on the uncertainties of
the people and the weaknesses of the state.
     • The Taliban are still despised—one recent poll suggests that only
6 percent of Afghans want them back in power. But they do now have
organized cadres that enjoy some limited support—in the south, east, and
north—and are able to mount operations in Kabul and elsewhere.
     • Having fled Afghanistan, al- Qaeda's senior leadership is now
also hiding in Pakistan's tribal areas. A significant number of its
leaders have been killed or arrested. Despite the historical ties
between al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, their relationship is
predominantly tactical and local. Yet al-Qaeda retains the
capacity—including through its affiliates in other countries, such as
Yemen—to plan and carry out deadly attacks around the world.
     • There has been a significant change in Pakistan in the last
eighteen months under President Asif Ali Zardari's democratic
government. The reality and threat of domestic terrorism has brought new
purpose to civilian and military leadership, and new consensus between
leaders and the Pakistani electorate. It is now realistic to talk about
complementary pressure on the insurgencies on both sides of the border.
The Afghan and international strategy over the last eight years has been
to focus on building up the key functions of the state and delivering
better lives for the Afghan people. Despite many setbacks, there is a
real record of achievement here, continuing today. The return of five
million refugees in recent years is perhaps the greatest sign of the
growing confidence of Afghans in their safety and security, and an
important indicator of our own progress in protecting them. Still,
polling shows that Afghans regard the lack of security as one of the
biggest problems; last year more Afghan civilians were killed in
insurgent attacks than ever.
In 2003 the Afghan National Army numbered fewer than two thousand. Today
it is over 100,000 strong, though the ethnic balance within it—and
particularly the proportion of Pashtuns—is weak. The total will grow by
a third by the end of the year, and further in the years to come. Afghan
soldiers are gaining frontline combat experience, including in the
current Moshtarak operation in Helmand province. Plans are now being
developed for the transfer of "lead security responsibility" to the
Afghans—district by district and province by province—once the Afghan
National Security Forces, local government, and other institutions are
able to meet key conditions of effectiveness. As the Afghan National
Army gets stronger, international forces will be able to withdraw from
combat operations—although their training and mentoring of their Afghan
counterparts will need to continue for a number of years.
Concerning education and health, in 2001 only one million Afghan
children attended school, all of them boys. This year we expect to see
seven million Afghan children enrolled in school—a third of them girls.
Eight out of ten Afghans now have access to health care.
Poppy growing and the drug trade are major problems for Afghanistan; but
during the past two years there have been successive reductions in poppy
cultivation: 19 percent in 2008, 22 percent in 2009. The UN Office on
Drugs and Crime estimates that cultivation will not increase in 2010.
Improvements in governance and security, along with high wheat prices,
have supported these results.
The achievements of the National Solidarity Programme—which aims to
improve local and regional government—would be a remarkable story in any
country. Over 22,000 village councils have been elected by their peers
since 2003. They have not just designed but implemented almost 40,000
development projects, and are now forming, from the bottom up, district
councils.
There are also areas where progress has not been so impressive. We are
now stepping up our efforts to address these concerns, and the Afghan
government needs to do much more:
     • Justice and law and order are a critical battleground. The Afghan
National Police number almost 100,000, but the biggest problem is now
quality, not quantity. Part of the force is involved in the drug trade.
It also suffers from illiteracy, patronage by criminals and insurgents,
and corruption. The Afghan government is launching a robust and
far-reaching program of reform. But the government needs, with our help,
to build up the informal judicial structures for resolution of criminal
and civil disputes. That is, after all, what Afghans often mean by the
rule of law.
     • Despite the success of the National Solidarity Programme, civil
administration remains an extremely difficult and uphill struggle. In
large parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent;
half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have
electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. Over
the next two years the international community has promised to help
train 12,000 civil servants to serve on the district level.
     • Last, there is the problem of corruption. According to January's
BBC/ABC/ARD poll, 95 percent of Afghans see corruption as a problem in
their local area. In some regions Afghans are paying an average of $100
in bribes to officials every year. Such widespread abuse has deep roots.
President Karzai has promised to tackle corruption and build independent
institutions to monitor and drive progress. The international community
will judge him by his actions, not his words. Donors are trying to
provide him with incentives by promising to channel more aid through the
government as certain tests are met, for example the verification and
publication of the assets of senior officials and ministers; the
adoption of new procedures for senior appointments; and a clear timeline
for the enactment of comprehensive anti-corruption legislation.
The achievements of the last eight years would not have been possible
were it not for the tireless efforts and unstinting bravery of our
troops. Without them, the insurgency would have overwhelmed the Afghan
government and probably overrun Kabul. Our development work would have
ground to a halt. And al-Qaeda would have seized more space to plan its
terrorist atrocities.
The work ahead—on each of these fronts—is both clear and pressing. The
additional troops that the United States, Britain, and others are
deploying are vital if progress is to be made. Britain's commitment and
determination will endure until we have achieved our shared objective—an
Afghanistan that must not again be used as a basis for international
terrorism.
However, even on the most optimistic reading of present plans, the
Afghan authorities will not be able to govern their land in sustainable
or acceptable ways unless the scale of the insurgency itself is reduced.
And only then will we be able to withdraw our forces confident that we
will not have to return. The strengthened efforts of our military forces
are an important part of this. As General McChrystal said recently, the
role of the military is to "try to shape conditions which allow people
to come to a truly equitable solution to how the Afghan people are
governed." This raises the core political challenge for Afghanistan, one
that has been neglected for far too long.
The Bonn Agreement of 2001 and the process that followed it fell short
of a truly balanced political settlement. The Northern Alliance came to
Bonn as the new masters of Afghanistan. But they were not representative
of the broader Afghan population, including the Pashtun majority in the
south. It was right that the Taliban leaders were excluded from Bonn.
But other more significant and legitimate groups were seriously
underrepresented, most notably the various Pashtun confederations from
which the Taliban draws its strength.
The two jirgas that followed Bonn led to a top-down, highly centralized
political structure for a country whose people have always had a strong
predilection for managing their own affairs at the local level.
Furthermore, new arrangements in Kabul did not do justice to tribal and
other informal, traditional, and community-based structures. Corruption
has exacerbated these problems. The unconstrained accumulation of
financial resources by malign power brokers has eroded tribal balance.
Finally, from Iran in the west to Pakistan in the east, from the Central
Asian Republics in the north to the regional powers of India, China,
Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Turkey, the Bonn Agreement failed to bind
Afghanistan's neighbors into the long-term project of building a new,
more peaceful country.
The lesson I draw from history is that Afghanistan will never achieve a
sustainable peace unless many more Afghans are inside the political
system, and its neighbors are in agreement with a political settlement.
Political Outreach
There is now an international consensus behind a program to reintegrate
Taliban fighters, which the UN defines as "the process by which
ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment
and income." The logic behind this program is simple. As military
pressure on the insurgency increases—as the dangers of continuing the
fight grow and the prospects of success look more remote—those on the
periphery of the insurgency will start to review their allegiances. We
have seen this happening in fits and starts in recent years.
For such realignments to be sustained there needs to be not just
employment but protection from retaliation by former allies. That is the
significance of President Karzai's proposed National Council for Peace,
Reconciliation, and Reintegration, and of the $150 million the
international community has already pledged to fund it.
But I would emphasize that a re-integration program will have a major
impact only if it is coupled with a serious effort to address the
grievances of those whom President Karzai describes as his "disaffected
compatriots"—i.e., the Taliban and other insurgents. Without a genuine
effort to understand and ultimately address the wider concerns that fuel
the insurgency, it will be hard to convince significant numbers of
combatants that their interests will be better served by working with
the government than by fighting against it.
Some insurgents are committed to al-Qaeda's violent extremist agenda.
There will never be reconciliation with them—they must be beaten back.
But the majority are not. They share conservative Islamic beliefs and,
linked to that, strong views about what is a just social order. Their
rallying cry is the expulsion of international forces. But they are also
motivated by their intense dissatisfaction with the Afghan government
and Afghan politics—which they see as corrupt and incompetent.
The idea of anyone reaching out to political engagement with those who
would directly or indirectly attack our troops is difficult. We have no
more right to betray our own values than those of the Afghan people who
pray that the Taliban never come back. But dialogue is not appeasement;
nor is allowing political space for discussion with opposing forces and
politicians.
The Afghans must own, lead, and drive such political engagement. It will
be a slow, gradual process. But the insurgents will want to see
international support for it; and international mediation—for example
under the auspices of the UN—may ultimately be required. So there needs
to be clarity about the preconditions for any agreement: those who want
a political say in their country's future must permanently sever ties
with al-Qaeda, give up their armed struggle, and accept the Afghan
constitutional framework. In doing so their interests would be
recognized and given a political voice but would be constrained by the
nation's laws and balanced by the interests and views of others.
In his repeated offers to talk directly to insurgents, President Karzai
has made clear that while such preconditions should set the terms of any
eventual agreement, they should not prevent a dialogue from developing.
The build-up of international and Afghan military forces should
concentrate everyone's mind. Dialogue provides an alternative to fight
or flight. Any such process of political outreach will take time and
effort to prepare, let alone conclude. But the time to start laying the
foundations for dialogue is now, so as to take advantage of the growing
Afghan and international military presence.
President Karzai has proposed for April 29 a great consultation—a grand
peace jirga—involving around 1,400 members and guests. They are to
include parliamentarians, provincial councils and governors, religious
and tribal leaders, and representatives from civil society organizations
and women's groups. This should be the start of a process of building a
new national political settlement. He has said:
     The objective will be to get guidance from the Afghan people on how
to move forward towards reintegration and reconciliation —where
reconciliation may be possible—and chart out an action plan in
consultation with the Afghan people.
What might such a political settlement look like? An outsider can only
offer suggestions.
First, there should be arrangements, whether formal or informal, to
ensure that the legitimate tribal, ethnic, and other groups that feel
excluded from the post-Bonn political settlement are given a real stake
in the political process and are able to compete for political
representation. A peace settlement must include the vanquished as well
as the victors. To do this, the new arrangements should give voice to
the different blocs of opinion and influence. Access to political office
and government jobs should be opened up. And efforts should be made to
broaden the ethnic base of the Afghan National Army. All of this would
encourage Afghans to address their grievances, and those of their
broader community, from within the system. And it would offer them a
part in building stability and security in Afghanistan so that—and this
is a key objective of many of the insurgents—the international forces
will be able to withdraw from combat, initially into a training and
support role, and then altogether.
Second, the provincial and district governors and their associated
assemblies of elders should be given new governing powers, so that the
walis (or provincial governors) and the uluswals (district governors)
have the confidence, competence, and capacity to govern in the best
interests of those they represent. Recruiting the right people for these
jobs is essential—and in view of the challenges of upholding justice and
the rule of law, the police chief and local magistrates are equally
important. Local governors and local assemblies also need to be given
more direct responsibility for overseeing development, adjudicating
disputes, providing local security, and reintegrating local insurgents
and their sympathizers.
Third, a new legislative process should be established—not necessarily
involving constitutional change—between president and parliament, in
order to give parliamentarians a real stake in the success of the
political settlement. Such a stake would encourage them to participate
as well as to criticize, and would ultimately lead to the development of
something completely alien in Afghanistan today, but critical to
democracy—a constructive or loyal opposition.
Fourth, underpinning all this must be a more concerted effort to prevent
and eradicate corruption. President Karzai's promises to tackle the
culture of impunity and to establish a new anti-corruption unit are
important. Emphasis must also be put on how the Afghan government—with
international help —can counter the extensive drug trade. This goes to
the heart of ordinary people's concerns about corruption and lack of the
rule of law. Part of this is about ensuring that the new political
settlement includes many more checks and balances—such as independent
courts—and much greater emphasis on transparency and accountability to
ensure that government at all levels and in all guises is the servant,
not the master, of the Afghan people.
The External Political Settlement
No country's politics can exist in a vacuum, least of all Afghanistan's.
For too long it has been the victim of external meddling and
interference. Today competing regional interests are being pursued in
Afghanistan, and the country's tribal and ethnic groups—in the south,
the east, and the north—still roam freely and find refuge across its
borders. Those who oppose the government still draw on funding, support,
and shelter from abroad. If Afghanistan is to have a more peaceful and
prosperous future, it needs not just a new internal political settlement
but also a new external political settlement.
Given the scale of the geopolitical challenges in this region—including
the long-running tensions between India and Pakistan and the presence of
Iran—it can seem that Afghanistan is fated to remain the victim of a
zero-sum scramble for power among hostile neighbors. The logic of this
position is that Afghanistan will never achieve peace until the region's
most intractable problems are solved. But there is an alternative and
ultimately more promising possibility, by which Afghanistan poses so
many dangers that it becomes the place where more cooperative regional
relations are forged.
The first step is a greater recognition by all of Afghanistan's
neighbors and the key regional powers of two simple facts. Fact one: no
country in the region, let alone the international community, will again
allow Afghanistan to be dominated, or used as a strategic asset, by a
neighboring state. Fact two: the status quo in Afghanistan is damaging
to all. Crime, drugs, terrorism, and refugees spill across its borders
when Afghanistan's great mineral wealth and agricultural land should
instead be of benefit to the region. These two facts can and must
provide the basis of a shared interest around which the countries of the
region can coalesce.
Second—and this point is more complex—there needs to be a more honest
acknowledgment of the different interests and concerns of Afghanistan's
neighbors, so that efforts can be made to provide reassurances. Pakistan
is essential here. It holds many of the keys to security and dialogue.
It clearly has to be a partner in finding solutions in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is a country of 170 million people. It is a nuclear power.
Pakistan will act only according to its own sense of its national
interest. That is natural. Its relationship with Afghanistan is close to
the core of its national security interests. Pakistan fears the build-up
of a non-Pashtun Afghan National Army on its doorstep, and it is
perpetually worried about India's relationship with Afghanistan.
It has also had a difficult relationship with the US for a generation.
That is the significance of the Obama administration's determination to
pursue a new security, economic, and political relationship with
Pakistan. This policy opens up a vital opportunity to address Pakistan's
concerns—and ours. The Kerry-Lugar Act—which provides for over $7
billion in nonmilitary aid over the next five years, but makes the
support conditional on the Pakistani government taking effective action
against militants in its territory—is an important down payment in this
regard.
But progress cannot be achieved simply by a more serious, more equal
US–Pakistan strategic security understanding, crucial though that is.
Alongside Pakistan's fears about its western border, fears about
Pakistan's own involvement in Afghanistan need to be addressed. Every
country needs to accept that, just as there will be no settlement in
Afghanistan without Pakistan's involvement, so there will be no
settlement in Afghanistan unless India, Russia, Turkey, and China are
also involved in the search for solutions. China is Afghanistan's
largest foreign investor. India has already pledged $1.2 billion for
reconstruction in Afghanistan. It has a big part to play. Moreover, the
Iranian regime—whose nuclear policies have flouted the UN and that has a
record of attempting to destabilize its neighbors—must acknowledge that
the best way to protect its investments or promote the interests of
Afghans that share its Shia faith is to work to promote peace, not
undermine it. The Iranian government's refusal to take part in the
recent London Conference on Afghanistan was completely shortsighted.
Third—and this is where the external settlement connects most clearly to
the internal political settlement—there needs to be greater transparency
with respect to the future direction of Afghan foreign policy. It is for
the Afghans to decide how to do this, but their involvement is critical
in building confidence and reducing miscalculation. Linked to this,
there will need to be consistency and clarity about the presence,
activities, and future plans of the international forces in Afghanistan.
Fourth, economics should be the great lubricant for better regional
relations. Afghanistan can benefit all its neighbors if it becomes the
land bridge of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Gulf. After all, the
Silk Road was the passage for trade for many centuries. There are common
interests not just in trade and transport, but in managing and sharing
water and electricity and harnessing economic growth for the benefit of
Afghanistan and the neighboring countries.
Fifth is the question of the forum in which this work should move
forward. The process must be led by the countries in the region. Only
these governments can decide whether the multitude of existing bodies
such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference can provide the basis for the
serious and sustained regional engagement that is now needed. The
Afghans should take the lead, in partnership with the UN. In time
perhaps this could lead to a standing Conference on Stability, Security,
and Cooperation in South Asia. Above all, Afghan citizens must decide
the future political process in their country. Important as the
neighbors' legitimate interests are, they cannot supplant, nor will we
allow them to supplant, the Afghan government and the Afghan people. The
days are long gone when powerful countries would dispose of a smaller,
vulnerable neighbor to suit their own ends.
Conclusion
If we successfully implement the strategy I have outlined, a better
future for Afghanistan is not a utopian goal. Within two to five years
it is realistic to aspire to see the country still on an upward
trajectory, still poor but stable, with a just peace, with democracy and
inclusive politics taking hold at all levels, and with incomes growing.
The urban population should have access to electricity. More shops will
be open in the local bazaars and more children—in particular more
girls—will be going to schools. Most grassroots insurgents —the
so-called ten-dollar-a-day Taliban—should be resettled in their villages
with at least some of the insurgent leaders taking part in the
legitimate political process. Communities will be increasingly able to
rely on the Afghan National Security Forces for protection—or to protect
themselves. International troops will have stepped back from the front
line—though they will still have a role, and sometimes a dangerous role,
in training and mentoring their Afghan counterparts. The neighbors will
be working together, preventing trouble, not fueling it. And above all,
al-Qaeda will be kept out.
I have been to Afghanistan six times as British foreign secretary. On my
first visit in July 2007 I attended the funeral of its last king,
Mohammed Zahir Shah. The grief I witnessed was palpable and deep, but so
too was the sense of national unity. Ethnic allegiances and historic
feuds were put aside to mourn the passing of the "father of the nation."
This unity is not expressed today through allegiance to a monarch.
Instead it is founded on a deep desire among the people to live life as
they see fit. The military surge is vital to success; so is investment
in the civilian economy; but now is the time for Afghans to pursue a
political settlement with as much vigor and energy as we are pursuing
the military and civilian effort. That is how to end the war in Afghanistan.
—April 1, 2010

 By David Miliband
ho letto questo lungo articolo e sono sostanzialmente d'accordo per quanto 
concerne le cause del 'malessere' afgano e le sue possibili cure. 
Soprattutto mi sembra assolutamente condivisibile l'idea di allargare al 
maggior numero possibile di soggetti politici afgani le responsabilità di 
governo a tutti i livelli. Vedo tuttavia molto difficile ottenere quella 
'maturazione' in merito alla non ingerenza negli affari interni afgani da 
parte di attori regionali come Iran e Cina che stanno costruendo la loro 
politica esterna sul sentiero di una espansione della propria sfera di 
influenza in Asia centrale. Come ha notato lo stesso Miliband l'Afganistan 
ha potuto godere di una relativa stabilità interna (ovviamente il termine 
'relativa' andrebbe contestualizzato rispetto alla realtà afgana) quando 
c'erano ai suoi confini due solide realtà statuali che avevano la forza di 
imporre il non intervento ai vicini 'più piccoli', ovvero l'India britannica 
e l'URSS. Ovvero stiamo parlando di fatto di protettorato. Così ragionando 
forse l'Afganistan, accerchiato da stati in fase espansiva (perchè se 
fossero deboli magari un leader afgano forte potrebbe comunque garantire una 
sorta di unità relazionandosi con i capi tribali delle varie province afgane 
secondo un sistema di tipo feudale), può sopravvivere solo come tale ovvero 
con il concorso di un insieme di nazioni che si fanno garanti materiali 
della sua stabilità. Insomma: andare via dall'Afganistan oggi non è 
possibile a meno di non voler far piombare di nuovo il paese nel caos. La 
fine del caos potrebbe realizzarsi se un altra potenza regionale riuscisse 
ad imporre la sua linea nel paese. La domanda allora è: l'occidente può 
permetterselo? Quale potenza regionale potrebbe garantire quella 'continuità 
di politica estera' tale per cui l'interesse occidentale non venga 
compromesso a favore di altri attori 'ostili'? E' su questi punti che si 
dovrebbe ragionare in futuro.