Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Analysis: The Egyptian army is making a comeback

Possono i militari rimanere indifferenti al lento degrado del paese?
No di certo: se continua in questo modo dovranno farsi avanti e 
rimettere al potere un uomo forte.  Forte ma ragionevole nei confronti 
di chi finanzia le magre casse statali, ovviamente.
 
Suvvia, la strategia era facilmente intuibile: se si riuscisse a tenere 
accesa la crisi per un tempo sufficiente la probabilità che si torni al 
nfdp diventerebbe ottima.
ElBaradei sembra volercela mettere tutta nell'approfondier la crisi; 
disperati da prezzolare per qualunque azione in Egitto non mancano; non 
mancano occidentali pronti a sostenere la rivolta nei confronti degli 
impresentabili islamisti (sono al potere grazie ad una regolare 
elezione, ma questo è un dettaglio per i democratici).
 
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Analysis: The Egyptian army is making a comeback
By ZVI MAZEL
02/24/2013 01:07
As the clash between the regime and the opposition shows no signs of 
abating, can the military remain indifferent to the country’s slow 
degradation?
 
Never has Egypt been so close to civil war and today it seems that only 
the army can prevent the worse from happening.
 
The Muslim Brothers and the opposition are both doing their utmost to 
bring the army to their side, with little success so far: Field Marshal 
Abd el-Fattah El-Sisi, the defense minister, never loses an opportunity 
to state that the army is taking no part in the political struggle and 
devotes its energy to protecting the country – while adding that it will 
not let it plunge into chaos. The opposition, in contrast, feels that 
only the army can bring back order – the way they want. During last 
Friday’s demonstrations people called on the army to “Get out of the 
barracks and make President Mohamed Morsi resign and call for new 
presidential elections.”
 
That state of affairs leaves the Brotherhood and Morsi with mixed 
feelings. In the course of the past few weeks they have became painfully 
aware of the fact that the army will not protect the regime should it 
lose its legitimacy and try to resort to force to stay in power. Last 
week the rumor that Morsi intended to fire the defense minister spread 
like wildfire, prompting an “unnamed military source” to warn that it 
would be “political suicide” for the president since the army – soldiers 
and officers alike – are angry with the regime. One of the president’s 
representatives hastened to placate army commanders and the army in turn 
distanced itself from the “unnamed source.”
 
Three days later Morsi declared that he had full confidence in the army 
and “the deepest appreciation” for the defense minister; the declaration 
was duly published in the media next to a photo of El- Sisi sitting 
opposite Morsi in the president’s office. The rumor may have been a 
trial balloon launched by the Brothers who wanted to gauge what kind of 
reaction could be expected to such a radical move. However the incident 
can also be seen as part of a wider series of clashes between the army 
and the Brotherhood.
 
Morsi first became aware of the problem last November during the violent 
demonstrations led by the opposition to protest the new Islamic 
constitution and the presidential declaration granting the president 
legislative power and full immunity for his decisions.
 
The army issued a call for dialogue between “both sides” while stressing 
“the legitimacy of the people.”
 
Suddenly the army was acting as an independent force distinct from the 
regime while asserting that legitimacy was vested in the people and not 
in the rulers, even though they had been democratically elected in free 
elections. There were some hasty – and secret – talks and the army 
shelved its call. However the Brothers will not forget that the army did 
not acknowledge the legitimacy of the elected president.
 
Especially since the Port Said riots last month between opposing 
demonstrators and security forces which leaving 60 dead, El-Sisi stated 
that the army was ready to intervene “to prevent the collapse of the 
country should no political solution be found.” Shortly afterward 
El-Sisi was quoted as allegedly having said that he would not let the 
Muslim Brotherhood take over the army.
 
There was an angry reaction from the Brotherhood and its Supreme Guide 
Mohammed Badie condemned “the widespread corruption of the army.” It was 
the turn of the army to protest and Badie apologized.
 
Maj.-Gen. Sedki Sobhi, commander in chief of the army, added fuel to the 
fire by saying that “the army does not intervene in politics but it will 
take to the streets if the people need it.” Deeds followed words.
 
When Morsi declared a state of emergency in the Suez canal zone 
following the Port Said clashes and imposed a curfew, the army refused 
to supervise it and Morsi had no choice but to cancel the state of 
emergency.
 
El-Sisi took Morsi by surprise and embarrassed him greatly by issuing on 
December 23, 2012 a ministerial decree turning the eastern border of 
Egypt with Israel and the Gaza Strip into a closed military zone five 
km. deep, Rafah city excluded.
 
Selling or renting land there was forbidden because it was a strategic 
area of military importance. The decree was issued days after the 
Egyptian government, in an attempt to promote better relations with 
Sinai Beduin and improve their lot, had informed them that they could 
sell or rent land in the peninsula.
 
El-Sisi had acted in order to tighten control over the border zone where 
the army is trying to prevent infiltration of jihadi operatives into 
Egypt from Gaza, and attacks on Israel from the Egyptian side while 
keeping a close watch on the contraband tunnels. However, he had 
apparently “forgotten” to consult with the president when he issued his 
decree – something well within his ministerial prerogatives.
 
The decree led to a renewed wave of anger from the Beduin who are 
threatening a civil disobedience campaign if it is not rescinded. The 
army has entered into negotiations with them with no result so far, and 
the situation remains volatile in the extreme.
 
Then it became known that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has 
been meeting from time to time to discuss the situation in the country – 
without informing the president who is officially the head of the 
council. The meetings were described as “informal” which does not make 
them more palatable to Morsi.
 
Tensions between the army and the Brotherhood are a source of deep 
concern for the regime. Morsi had gotten rid of the former army 
commanders swiftly and unexpectedly a few weeks after his election, 
naming in their stead El-Sisi and Sobhi who were seen as devout Muslims; 
it was rumored that El-Sisi was a member of the Brotherhood.
 
However it soon transpired that though his wife wears the veil, El-Sisi 
is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, high-ranking 
elements in the Justice and Freedom Party tried to have him fired and 
the official party paper ignored him completely for weeks until Morsi 
himself explained to the Brotherhood that there was no use trying to 
reverse the situation.
 
However, Muslim Brothers are suddenly remembering that the army has 
always been against their movement – from Nasser to Mubarak – and that 
it was Islamic terrorists raised on their doctrine who assassinated Sadat.
 
There are widespread rumors to the effect that the Brotherhood is 
forming a clandestine militia while setting up listening posts to 
monitor the army, to be ready to confront the army should it become 
necessary.
 
And while the clash between the regime and the opposition shows no signs 
of abating, the president has called for parliamentary elections to be 
held over an unprecedented period of two months starting in late April.
 
Morsi will do all he can to achieve the complete takeover of the country 
before the new parliament can be convened in July. The opposition is up 
in arms threatening to boycott the elections if a new national unity 
government is not formed to ensure that they are free and fair, the 
large Coptic minority is outraged since polling will be held on their 
holy Easter week – and the country’s economy is still spiraling out of 
control.
 
What will the army do, if anything? On the one hand, the new 
constitution grants it powers beyond its wildest dreams. On the other 
hand, the army, for so long the symbol of Egypt’s greatness, cannot 
remain indifferent to the country’s slow degradation.
 
The writer, a fellow of The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, is a 
former ambassador to Romania, Egypt and Sweden.
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?ID=304269&R=R1
 
-- 
Sostieni Rete ECO: 
http://rete-eco.it/2012/sostienici.html
 
 

 elezione, ma questo è un dettaglio per i democratici).
 
o magari chiedersi come mai i FM alla fine si sono fatti "amare" così 
tanto dal popolo che li ha votati in massa...