Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: francia-russia

L' IRAQ esporta petrolio per il 75% alla Francia e per il 25% alla
Russia,ecco perche' la Francia e la Russia sono contrari alla guerra
informatevi ! Inoltre il carissimo Saddam elargisce da anni assegni da
30.000 dollari alle famiglie dei kamikaze per il loro sacrificio
terroristico in tutto il mondo. Brucia Saddam !! Grazie ai soldati della
coalizione ancora una volta impegnati per noi !!
--------------------------------
Inviato via 
http://usenet.libero.it

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:80Z180Z3Z77Y10...@usenet.libero.it...


 altro leader laico e non religioso.
Ma come, gli USA non dovevano mica portare la democrazia in Iraq? Mi
sembra che nelle democrazie il leader se lo scelgano i cittadini, o
sbaglio?
Ciao,
 L.
-- 
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http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 --
Infatti è esattamente quello che faranno i cittadini iracheni dopo che sarà
espugnata Baghdad. Dai tempo al tempo: tirato giù Saddam, si guarderanno
bene da mettere qualcuno al potere che abbia solo che un sentor di delirio
religioso o megalomane...

 religioso o megalomane...
Alcune considerazioni:
1) Saddam e' certamente megalomane ma non e' affatto religioso, il che
vuol dire che non e' che un leader laico dia garanzie di essere migliore
(peraltro Bush e' un integralista religioso, almeno a giudicare dai
discorsi, ma non so che opinione abbia tu di Bush come leader)
2) Come fai ad essere certo che la popolazione iraquena (gli sciiti in
particolare, che sono la maggioranza) non sia tentata dall'idea di
instaurare una teocrazia sul modello di quella iraniana? Persino nella
laicissima Turchia le elezioni sono state vinte dal partito islamico (per
non parlare di quello che succederebbe in Pakistan se Musharraf
permettesse di tenere libere elezioni), perche' non dovrebbe succedere in
Irak?



Ecco come Saddam Hussein contrabbandava petrolio
di Francesco Fusco
      Aggirare i controlli Onu sul petrolio era facile
      Ai "supervisori" bastava ricevere un fax
      Così l'Iraq praticava sconti molto particolari...
      ...lucrando miliardi di dollari per anni interi
 -QUEI MILIARDI GUADAGNATI CON L'EMBARGO
 I commenti dei lettori, positivi o polemici nei confronti di chi scrive
notizie
 provenienti da fonti non interessate, mi spinge ad approfondire l'argomento
dei
 miliardi di dollari di Saddam Hussein, ricavati oltre che da un improprio
 utilizzo dei fondi derivanti dal programma oil for food decretato dall'ONU
e da
 un fiorente contrabbando di quote di petrolio.
 Trecentocinquanta miliardi di dollari: a tanto ammontano i fondi affluiti
nelle
 banche arabe. Sono soldi da occultare in luogo più sicuro delle banche
svizzere
 o occidentali, dove avrebbero potuto essere battezzati (cioè individuata la
 provenienza) e quindi sequestrati? Le banche arabe naturalmente sono meno
 disposte a fornire, specialmente in questi momenti, informazioni a chi
volesse
 investigare. Sono tutti o in parte di Saddam Hussein? E' arduo fornire una
 risposta definitiva. Perciò abbiamo fatto una ricerca sui meccanismi che
 presiedono al famigerato oil for food e come Saddam Hussein abbia potuto
 aggirarlo.
 Il petrolio iracheno è proprietà dell'ente petrolifero di quel paese, il
Somo
 (State Organization for Marketing Oil), controllato da Saddam, con sede a
 Bagdad. In seguito all'invasione del Kuwait, il Consiglio di Sicurezza
dell'Onu
 emise nel 1990 unarisoluzione, la 661, che disponeva l'embargo totale nei
 confronti dell'Iraq. Risoluzione che venne modificata nel 1995 dalla "956"
che
 disponeva appunto il programma oil for food.
 Bene, chi voleva comprare petrolio dall'Iraq, e ne aveva i requisiti,
bastava
 facesse una richiesta agli oil overseers (i supervisori) dell'Onu, i quali
a
 mezzo fax (una paginetta prestampata di cui abbiamo copia) inviavano
 l'autorizzazione con l'obbligo che il pagamento della partita venisse
concordato
 con lo stesso Onu, su un conto speciale dal quale l'Iraq poteva effettuare
i
 pagamenti delle merci ammesse (cibo e medicinali) e destinate alla
popolazioni.
 Spesso a fare tali richieste erano importanti raffinerie, ma sovente erano
anche
 brokers di tutte le parti del mondo. In particolare ? anche per la loro
 collocazione geografica ? erano operatori residenti negli Emirati Arabi
Uniti
 (spiegheremo dopo perché usiamo l'imperfetto).
 Siamo riusciti ad ottenere la copia di uno di questi fax, con
l'intestazione in
 inglese e francese "Nazioni Unite" indirizzato proprio da "The Oil
Overseers
 under Security Council Resolution 956 (1995)", regolarmente siglato da
questi, e
 indirizzato a "The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the
United
 Nations", con il quale si autorizza l'acquisto di una grossa partita di
 petrolio. La data è del giugno 2000, e si riferisce ad una richiesta del 5
 maggio di quell'anno. Solo che quel fax non reca alcun numero di
 identificazione (o è stato scolorito?) prima della fotocopia, e pertanto è
 facilmente riproducibile all'infinito, rendendo così possibile
l'autorizzazione
 da parte dell'ONU per una quantità di contratti a volontà. Un facile
giochetto
 per chi volesse procurarsi un'autorizzazione fittizia. Se sono stati questi
i
 controlli ONU allora stiamo freschi!
 Siamo andati a vedere ancora più a fondo e siamo riusciti ad identificare
una
 società di brokeraggio appunto residente negli emirati. Questa proprio nel
 settembre 2000 offre un contratto "open" , vale a dire aperto, cioè
illimitato
 ma "nell'ambito delle quantità previste da Somo e Nazioni Unite". Si
stabilisce
 quanto previsto di solito circa le caratteristiche del compratore, il tipo
di
 contratto da firmare con la Somo, il tipo di pagamento, eccetera. Poi
alcune
 clausole fanno sorgere i primi sospetti che dietro tutte quelle formalità
di
 rito si nasconda qualcosa di diverso.
 Dapprima il porto d'imbarco di Jeyhan, (o Ceyuhan) nel sud della Turchia, e
in
 alternativa quello di Al Baker (o Mina al Baka) nel Golfo Arabo (ma
 inutilizzabile perché i suoi impianti sono danneggiati), e non quello di Um
 Qasr (vicino Bassora divenuto famoso in questi giorni di guerra).
 Poi il prezzo. Il Somo vendeva a prezzi ufficiali (OSP, Official selling
price)
 fissati appunto con le Nazioni Unite con uno sconto di 6 dollari sul prezzo
di
 cartello (per esempio DTD Brent). Invece, nella proposta si faceva
riferimento a
 uno sconto diverso da quello stabilito da Somo e Nazioni Unite: sconto di
3-4
 dollari se esportato in Asia o Africa, 3,50/4,50 dollari sotto il Brent se
 esportato in Europa, e 4 dollari sotto il West Texas se diretto negli Stati
 Uniti. Ma poi veniva fuori un'altra clausola destinata a insospettire: "per
il
 momento Somo non accetta alcun contratto con società degli Stati Uniti,
 Inghilterra e Olanda". Come mai? Badate siamo nel settembre 2000. Avevano
paura
 di essere scoperti?
 L'offerta si riferiva sia a petrolio cosiddetto "pesante" (Api 27-28 con
3-4
 per cento di zolfo) sia a petrolio leggero (Api 32-36 con 1 per cento di
zolfo).
 La quantità patteggiata era di 300.000 tonnellate al mese, vale a dire 2
milioni
 e 100mila barili, da spedire con preavviso di 10 giorni.
 Vogliamo fare allora un poco di conti ? In quel momento con gli sconti
 praticati, il prezzo netto per Bagdad era di 23 dollari a barile, franco
porto
 turco. 23 dollari, per duemilioni centomila barili, fanno 48,3 milioni di
 dollari al mese, per dodici mesi fanno 579,600 milioni di dollari!
All'anno, e
 per un solo contratto!
 Volevamo tuttavia approfondire ancora di più e abbiamo cercato di
contattare il
 broker negli Emirati. Ma senza successo. L'emiro che aveva firmato
l'offerta, M
 B A ,(riportiamo solo le iniziali per ovvi motivi) non era più
rintracciabile
 telefonicamente. Lo abbiamo cercato sul web. E abbiamo fatto una
interessante
 scoperta che giustifica l'imperfetto con il quale ci esprimevamo: il sito
del
 gruppo, quello privato dell'emiro, quello delle società collegate, non sono
più
 rintracciabili, sono stati cancellati, chiusi. Sapete quando? Quello
privato il
 27 marzo scorso, alle 0,18 del mattino, quello del gruppo il giorno prima,
il 26
 marzo alle 3,38. Che siano stati scoperti? Che la Cia abbia provveduto a
fare
 un'irruzione? Difficile saperlo.
 Chi ci legge provi ora a mettere tutto assieme, e soprattutto a immaginare
 quanti contratti da due milioni di barili al mese l'Iraq ha potuto
realizzare
 negli ultimi dieci anni. Con dieci all'anno si arriva facilmente a cinque
 miliardi di dollari annui, che naturalmente non sono rimasti a dormire: una
 parte è andata a finanziare gli "amici", a pagare tangenti per l'acquisto
di
 armi, a fare la bella vita, ma il resto è stato investito. E i miliardi
 producono altri miliardi. Almeno se affidati a esperti finanzieri, magari
in
 Svizzera, o Francia, o Lussemburgo o Liechtenstein. Alla faccia di quei
poveri
 iracheni dai visi precocemente invecchiati, di quei bambini che si vogliono
 trasformare in guerriglieri, o scudi umani, e che sono serviti e servono
 inconsapevolmente come strumenti propagandistici di un satrapo (non vi è
nome
 più adatto) che li destina a una vita miserevole, e che nei prossimi giorni
 corrono il rischio di essere immolati, vittime innocenti della follia
 distruttiva di un conflitto.
 (2 APRILE 2003, ORE 10)

  L.
A presto,
--
Admiror te, paries, non defatigavisti qui tot scriptorum taedia sustineas.
Zadi Kof Resh

 ultradittatoriale?
Io dico che potrebbero mettere al potere un leader democraticamente eletto
che sarebbe fortemente condizionato da una maggioranza ultrareligiosa (o
da una minoranza consistente ed agguerrita) in parlamento, che
condizionerebbe pesantemente la vita pubblica del paese, come avviene per
Khatami in Iran che non e' certo un integralista ma e', almeno
parzialmente, ostaggio di Khamamei e delle guardie della rivoluzione.


 dello Scià Reza Pahlevi, in Iran, 
"relativamente avanzato" rispetto a che, cialtrone?
Ma sai che la CIA con lo Scia' rovesciarono un governo democratico,
quello di Mossadeq?
28 August 2000: Link to original New York Times PDF files:
http://cryptome.org/iran-cia/cia-iran-pdf.htm
11 July 2000: Typographical errors corrected. See also: 
An informative commentary on July 6, 2000 about this report by Mark
Gasiorowski, a political science professor at Louisiana State
University: 
http://www.iranian.com/History/2000/July/Coup/index.html
.
A 1997 New York Times report on the CIA's claim that all coup records
were lost: 
http://www.iranian.com/History/June97/CIA/index.shtml
A 1978 coup account published by the British journal Lobster in 1998
which identified coup participants: 
http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-lob.htm
25 June 2000 
On June 16, 2000, the New York Times published on its Web site PDF files
of a secret CIA report: "CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY, OVERTHROW OF
PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN, November 1952-August 1953," an operation
planned and executed by the CIA and British SIS:
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html
 
The Times wrote in an introductory note that names of participants in
the overthrow were digitally edited from the report "after consultations
with historians who believed there might be serious risk that the
families of some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution
in Iran."
Cryptome has recovered the majority of the edited text of the files and
is publishing the report unedited except for unrecoverable redactions
(some sections were secured by a method which prevented recovery, as
noted at their beginning below) and those sections and appendices which
were not edited.
Restored text is shown in brackets below. 
More on the edited text recovery method at:
http://cryptome.org/cia-iran.htm
The New York Times is commended for publishing the report. It is a
disturbing document that should be widely read and pondered for the harm
it so vividly describes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    CS Historical Paper
                                    No.      208     
              CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORY
         OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN
               November 1952-August 1953
                                      Date written  :  March 1954
                                      Date publsihed:  October 1969
                                      Written by    :  Dr. Donald N.
                                                         Wilber
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
                 HISTORIAN'S NOTE
     This paper, entitled Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq
of Iran, was written in March 1954 by Dr. Donald N. Wilber
who had played an active role in the operation.  The study
was written because it seemed desirable to have a record
of a major operation prepared while documents were readily
at hand and while the memories of the personnel involved
in the acitivity were still fresh.  In addition, it was
felt advisable to stress certain conclusions reach after
the operation had been completed and to embody some of
these in the form of recommendations applicable to future,
parallel operations.
     Documents pertaining to the operation described in
this paper are in the Project TPAJAX files which are held
by the Iran Branch of the Near East and South Asia Division.
     All proper names mentioned in this paper have been
checked for accuracy and completeness.  A serious effort
has been made to supply the first name and middle initial
of each individual.  The omission of any first names and
middle initials indicates that such information could not
be located.
                                   Dean L. Dodge
                                   NE Division
                                   Historical Officer
                                   March 1969
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[By the New York Times]
June 18, 2000
Editor's note:
The C.I.A.'s history of the 1953 coup in Iran is
made up of the following documents: a historian's
note, a summary introduction, a lengthy narrative
account written by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, and, as
appendices, five planning documents he attached.
On April 16, 2000, The New York Times on the Web
published the introduction and several of the
appendices.
The Times has now decided to publish the main body
of the text after removing certain name and
identifying descriptions. The editing was done after
consultations with historians who believed
there might be serious risk that the families of
some of those named as foreign agents would face
retribution in Iran.
The introduction summary and the main body
of the document are inconsistent on a few dates
and facts. In its reporting on the document, the
Times has relied upon details presented in the
main body of the text.
The table of contents provides navigation throughout
the document. Each entry is linked to the relevant
section of this file. The table of contents page
appears at the end of each chapter and appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           S E C R E T
                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                     Page
       HISTORIAN'S NOTE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    i
       SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  iii
   I.  PRELIMINARY STEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    1
  II.  DRAFTING THE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    5
 III.  CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN  . . . . . . . . .   12
  IV.  THE DECISIONS ARE MADE:  ACTIVITY BEGINS  . . . . . .   16
   V.  MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHAH  . . . . . . . . .   22
  VI.  THE FIRST TRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   39
 VII.  APPARENT FAILURE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   44
VIII.  "THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   65
  IX.  REPORT TO LONDON  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   78
   X.  WHAT WAS LEARNED IN THE OPERATION . . . . . . . . . .   85
       APPENDICES
       A  Initial Operation Plan for TPAJAX, as Cabled
          from Nicosia to Headquarters on 1 June 1953
       B  "London" Draft of the TPAJAX Operational Plan
       C  Foreign Office Memorandum of 23 July 1953 from
          British Ambassador Wakins to under Secretary
          of State Smith
       D  Report on Military Planning Aspect of TPAJAX
       E  Military Critique - Lessons Learned from TPAJAX
          re Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'Etat
                                ii
                           S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Redactions in this section could not be restored; shown by [  ].
 
                    S E C R E T
I.  PRELIMINARY STEPS
     Representatives of British Intelligence met with Near
East and Africa (NEA) Division representatives in Washing-
ton during November and December 1952 for the purpose of
discussing joint war and staybehind plans in Iran.  In
attendance for British Intelligence were Mr. Christopher
Montague Woodhouse, recently Chief of Station for British
Intelligence in Tehran; Mr. Samuel Falle of the British
Intelligence station in Tehran; and Mr. John Bruse
Lockhart, SIS Washington representative.  In attendance
for NEA Division were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of
Division, Mr. John H. Leavitt, Chief of Iran Branch;
Mr. John W. Pendleton, Deputy Chief of Division; and
Mr. James A. Darling, Chief of NEA Paramilitary Staff.
     Although it was not on the previously agreed agenda
of the meeting, British Intelligence representatives brought
up the proposition of a joint political action to remove
Prime Minister Mossadeq.  The NEA Division had not intended
to discuss this question at all and was unprepared to do so.
The meeting concluded without any decision being made and
with the NEA Division committing itself only to study in
more detail the political action proposals advanced by
British Intelligence.
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
     In March 1953 a telegram was received from the Tehran
Station which stated that General [ ] had
contacted the assistant military attache and had requested
Ambassador Henderson's views as to whether or nor the US
Government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian
military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq.  A meeting was
held in the Embassy at which Headquarters personnel, then
in the field, and station personnel were in attendance.
A cautiously worded reply was drafted at Headquarters and
its substance delivered to General [ ].  The reply
did not commit the United States in any way but was mildly
encouraging and revealed some US interest in the idea.
     On the basis of the [ ] overture and other
clear signs that determined opposition to Mossadeq was tak-
ing shape, and in view of the totally destructive and reck-
less attitude of the government of Prime Minister Mossadeq,
General Walter Bedell Smith, Undersecretary of State,
determined that the US Government could no longer approve
of the Mossadeq government and would prefer a successor
government in which there would be no National Frontists.
The change in policy was communicated to CIA, and the NEA
Division was informed that it was authorized to consider
operations which would contribute to the fall of the
Mossadeq government.  The Department of State and CIA
                         2
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
jointly informed Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of
Station, Roger Goiran, of the new policy and of the opera-
tional authorization.  The Director, on 4 April 1953,
approved a budget of $1,000,000 which could be used by
the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the
fall of Mossadeq.  Full authority was given to Ambassador
Henderson and the Chief of Station enabling any part or
all of the $1,000,000 to be used without further authority,
as long as the Ambassador and the station concurred.
     On 16 April 1953 a comprehensive study entitled:
"Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was 
completed.  The Study indicated that a Shah-General Zahedi
combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial
backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mossadeq,
particularly if this combination should be able to get the
largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable portion of
the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mossadeq's orders.
     Subsequent contact was made with General [ ].
Although his motives appeared serious, it soon became
apparent that he had no concrete plan and was in fact in
no position to take action against Mossadeq.
     General Zahedi, who at one time was a member of
Mossadeq's cabinet, stood out as the only major personality
in undisguised opposition to Mossadeq.  For this reason
                         3
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
he attacted to himself a considerable following.  The
Tehran Station, in April 1953, reestablished covert contact
with Zahedi through Commander Eric Pollard, the US Naval
Attache.  In order to make the covert liaison with Zahedi
more effective and reliable, and also for security reasons,
Zahedi's son, Ardeshir Zahedi, was selected as the means
of contact with General Zahedi in June 1953.  After 21 July
1953, contact with General Zahedi was made directly.
                          4
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Redactions in this section could not be restored, shown as [ ]; 
supposed redactions shown by [ ] are based on restored redactions
of other sections.
                    S E C R E T
II.  DRAFTING THE PLAN
     Near the end of April 1953 Dr. Donald N. Wilber, cov-
ert consultant to NEA, was selected by the Division to go
to Nicosia and, in close collaboration with SIS, draw up
a plan for the overthrow of Mossadeq.  The assumption by
Headquarters was that the planners would come up with a
project which they could conscientiously recommend.
     The discussions were begun at Nicosia on 13 May 1953
between Wilber and SIS Officer Norman Matthew Darbyshire.
Occasionally Mr. H. John Collins, Chief of SIS station at
Nicosia, was also present.  Mr. Darbyshire, who was in
charge of SIS's Iran branch, had been in Iran for several
years and was fluent in the language.  Discussions were
concluded on 30 May 1953, and the completed draft of a
recommended operational plan was cabled by Dr. Wilber to
Headquarters on 1 June.
     The opening meetins consisted of a review of all
the important personalities on the political scene in
Iran with a view toward determining whether General Zahedi,
the most prominent politician in opposition to Mossadeq,
was in fact the sole figure worthy of support and, if so,
what individuals and elements should be enlisted in his
support.  It soon became apparent that Dr. Wilber and
                         5
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
Mr. Darbyshire held quite similar views of Iranian person-
alities and had made very similar estimates of the factors
involved in the Iranian political scene.  There was no
friction or marked difference of opinion during the dis-
cussions.  It alsop quickely became apparent that the SIS
was perfectly content to follow whatever lead was taken
by the Agency.  It seemed obvious to Wilber that the Brit-
ish were very pleased at having obtained the active coop-
eration of the Agency and were determined to do nothing
which might jeopardize US participation.  At the same time
there was a faint note of envy expressed over the fact that
the Agency was better equipped in the way of funds, person-
nel, and facilities than was SIS.
     Wilber reported the preliminary conversations concern-
ing a three-way channel, set up for this occasion, which
was designed to insure immediate relay between Washington,
Nicosia, and Tehran.  That is, a message originating at any
one of these places would be sent by the most expeditious
route to the other two.  This route was the Middle East
Communications Authority (MECA) link, the relay station
a few miles outside of Nicosia.*
_____________________
*Unfortunately, communications between Nicosia and
 Tehran were not as rapid as was hoped during this
 period in which more than 45 cables were exchanged.
                         6
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
     Discussions at Nicosia moved on to a disclosure of
assets by both parties.  Those by SIS were centered upon
the contacts of the Rashidian brothers in such fields as
the armed forces, the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), reli-
gious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and
other influential figures.  When this material was relayed
from Nicosia, the Tehran Station commented that it was
their belief that these assets had been far overstated
and oversold.  In reply it was pointed out that SIS was
as aware as we of the weaknesses of the Rashidians, but
that one of the strongest points in their favor was their
avowed willingness to risk their possessions and their
lives in an attempt against Mossadeq.  In the critical
days of August 1953 the Rashidians did display such a
willingness.  SIS disclosures were followed by those of
Dr. Wilber for CIA.  Prior to Wilber's departure a dis-
cussion was held at Headquarters to determine which of the
station assets should be disclosed to the SIS in return for
promised disclosures by the SIS of the assets which they
were prepared to put into an operational plan.  It was
agreed at Headquarters that the identities of the vitally
important principal agents of the Tehran Station, [Djalili]
[and Keyvani]
[ ] would not be disclosed.  Since the SIS had been
                         7
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
informed during the November 1952 meetings referred to
above that CIA had two major principal agents in Iran, it
was necessary to offer two such in place of [Djalili and]
[Keyvani].  This was done, naming a station agent and a
sub-agent** of [ ] to these important posts.
To the best of our knowledge [Djalili and Keyvani] were not
uncovered by the Rashidian brothers or any other SIS agents
during the course of this operation.
     The continuing conversations at Nicosia were reflected
by outgoing cables requesting, principally from the Tehran
Station, information which would be helpful in drafting the
operational plan.
     Discussions now narrowed down to a series of basic
assumptions which were stressed both in the draft plan and
in its final form.  It was determined that the details of
the operational plan should be included within a framework
of such basic assumptions as these:  that Zahedi alone of
potential candidates had the vigor and courage to make him
worthy of support; that the Shah must be brought into the
operation; that the Shah would act only with great reluc-
tance but that he could be forced to do so; that if the
______________________
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
                         8
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
issue was clear-cut the armed forces would follow the
Shah rather than Mossadeq; that the operation must, if
possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-legal instead
of an outright coup; that public opinion must be fanned
to fever pitch against Mossadeq in the period just preceding
the execution of the overthrow operation; that the military
aspect would be successful only if the station were able
to review the plan with the Iranians chosen by Zahedi to
execute it; that immediate precautions must be taken by
the new government to meet a strong reaction by the Tudeh
Party.  Some of these assumptions were presented in cables
sent off before the draft plan was completed.  The reactions
from the Tehran Station and Headquarters did not always
express agreement with the ideas of the planners.  The
station expressed its feeling that the Shah would not act
decisively against Mossadeq, while Headquarters wondered
whether we should not support some other individual and
whether the Persians themselves might not take the lead in
action designed to overthrow Mossadeq.  It was, however,
agreed that the station should begin at once with its new
policy of attacking the government of Mossadeq through grey
propaganda.  The station relayed this line to its own agents
and passed it on to the Rashidian brothers of SIS.  The CIA
Art Group, a section of the PP Staff Advisory Panel, was
                         9
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
asked to prepare a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq
cartoons.
     The meetings were interrupted for several days when
one of the Rashidian brothers managed to get permission to
leave Iran*--not at all an easy matter during the Mossadeq
period--and went to Geneva where he was met by SIS Officer
Norman Darbyshire.  He not only briefed Darbyshire on the
current situation but was able to give comprehensive answers
to a number of specific questions.  It should be noted that
the SIS station at Nicosia had been in tri-weekly wireless
contact with the Rashidian brothers at Tehran, employing
the best of the Britishtrained staybehind operators.  This
contact, in Persian, was naturally limited in time, and
even more limited after we passed word to Darbyshire on his
return from Geneva that the Iranian armed forces were now
in possession of directional finders supplied under MAAG.
     Mr. George A. Carroll (FI Deputy Tehran, Designate)
arrived at Nicosia on 29 May, in time to pass along reactions
____________________
*It is interesting to note that Rashidian obtained his
 exit visa to leave Iran and his reentry permit from
 no less a supporter of Mossadeq than Foreign Minister
 Hoseyn Fatemi.  This lends some evidence to long held
 CIA views that Fatemi was from time to time susceptible
 to British overtures and was trying to keep a hand in
 with the opposition and British in the event Mossadeq
 fell.  He was certainly aware of Rashidian's agent
 status with the British.
                        10
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
and suggestions from Headquarters, prior to the completion of
the draft plan.  As stated, this draft was cabled to Head-
wuarters on 1 June 1953.  (See Appendix A for a typed
transcript of the cable.)
     While Nicosia proved to be a hand point of contact with
the British and a fairly good communications intersection
point, it did have certain disadvantages.  It was remote
from the headquarters of either agency, and, even worse, the
SIS station files were extremely inadequate so that any in-
formation on personalities, especially members of the Iranian
armed forces, had to be obtained by querying the Tehran
Station and Headquarters.
     Once the draft paln had been cabled, it was agreed with
SIS that their copy would be hand-carried to London where
the viewpoint of the SIS headquarters would be incorporated
prior to 15 June.  In the meantime, as had been agreed with
Headquarteers, the Agency would conduct a searching scrutiny
of the plan at Beirut, and then bring these results to Lon-
don for amalgamation with the draft as reworked by SIS at
London.  Carroll remained a few days after the completion of
the draft to begin work on the military aspect of the plan.
He also returned to Nicosia for a few additional days after
the close of the Beirut meetings for this purpose.  It must
be noted that Miss Helen E. Morgan, CIA representative at
Nicosia, gave strong support to the CIA personnel who worked
at Nicosia.
                        11
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were no redactions in this section.
 
                    S E C R E T
III.  CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN
      On the afternoon of 9 June all those who were to take
part in the discussions arrived in Beirut:  Mr. Kermit
Roosevelt, Chief NEA and project chief throughout the
operation, came in by plane from London; Carroll came
from Cyprus by plane; Roger Goiran, Chief of Station at
Tehran, drove on from Damascus by car; and Wilber came in
from Cairo by air.
     On the morning of 10 June the talks got underway and
continued for four days.  The usual schedule was to start
quite early, carry through until about two o'clock, and
then assemble again in the late afternoon.  The first order
of business was a reexamination of all the factors and ele-
ments of the political scene in Iran in the light of the
current and comprehensive information supplied by the
Tehran chief of station.  After all the basic principles
of the draft paln had been accepted, the attention of the
conferees turned to a section by section consideration of
the plan.  The object of the meetings was to determine how
each section could be given the maximum structure and im-
pact.  One switch in general outlook was made that was most
salutary for all later thinking.  The draft plan had implied
that definite counteraction would have to be taken against
some of the strongest elements supporting Mossadeq, such as
                        12
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
the Qashqai tribal leaders; but it was now decided that
every effort should be devoted to increasing the size and
effectiveness of the anti-Mossadeq forces, the assumption
being that Mossadeq's supporting elements would not react
once their leader was out of the picture.
     The Tehran chief of station suggested that an alter-
native plan to provide for the overthrow of Mossadeq be
developed.  This was to become the Amini/Qashqai plan
which the station kept alive as a possible alternative
until the successful conclusion of TPAJAX.
     Saturday afternoon the group held its final meeting
and on the next morning, 14 June, departed by plane for
its several destinations.
     Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London on 15 June and
reported to the main offices of the SIS at 54 Broadway.
They turned over the Beirut revision of the plan.  No copy
of the original Beirut draft exists, since it was reworked
to form the final "London" draft.
     The London meetings were held in one of the conference
rooms at 54 Broadway, notable only for a large sign with
the legend in red, "Curb Your Guests."  For the SIS,
Commander Maurice M. Firth and Norman Darbyshire, who had
come on from Nicosia by way of Geneva (where he had seen
Asadollah Rashidian a second time before the latter went
                        13
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
back to Iran) were always present. Upon occasion Major
P.(Paddy) J. Keen, whose post seemed to be that of desk
officer for several Middle East countries, also participated.
Montague Woodhouse, clearly one of their most highly esteemed
officers, attended a single meeting but had little to con-
tribute.
     From the moment the discussion began, it was clear that
the SIS had no major comments of their own on the draft plan.
Nor did they have much to say on the Beirut version beyond a
certain close attention to phraseology.  As at Nicosia it was
apparent that the Americans were to be placated and allowed
to run things as they pleased.  They did, however, seem to
have abundant confidence in the plan and in the successful
outcome of the operation, and said that the Rashidians would
be ordered to follow completely the orders of CIA's Tehran
Station.
     At the final meeting those present reviewed the future
conduct of affairs.  The SIS officers stated that they
thought it would take some time to obtain a firm decision
from their government as to the approval or non-approval
of the plan.
     Roosevelt and Wilber left London on 17 June, and
Roosevelt was back in his office by noon of the 18th.
                        14
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
There the plan was immediately reconstructed and typed
up.  (It is given as Appendix B and it should be read
at this point in the chronological account of the 
operation.)
                        15
                    S E C R E T
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There were no redactions in this section.
 
                    S E C R E T
IV.  THE DECISIONS ARE MADE:  ACTIVITY BEGINS
     Since the meetings at Beirut and London had taken
such a relatively short time, there was not too much that
Headquarters could do in the interval from the time of
Roosevelt's departure until his return.  Progress had,
however, been made in setting up a specific and close
liaison with the State Department.  The fact that an oper-
ational plan was being prepared was already known to a very
restricted number of individuals in the State Department,*
and it should be noted that the security there seems to
have been excellent up to the time of the event.
     The Greece-Turkey-Iran (GTI) office of the Department
of State presented its informed opinion in two papers:  one
was a top secret paper of 6 June 1953 entitled, "Proposal
to Bring about a Change of Government in Iran" and the
other a top secret undated GTI memorandum on the subject,
"Measues which the United States Government might take
in support of a successor government to Mossadeq."
_______________________
*
 Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
 Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith
 Deputy Under Secretary of State, Harrison Freeman Matthews
 Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, Mr. Henry A. Byroade
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, mr. John Durnford
     Jernagan
 Liaison, Mr. James Lampton Berry
                        16
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
     It was not the task of officers of the State Department
to obtain high level decisions on the plan.  However, the
State Department did assert that, prior to acceptance of
the plan, assurance must be forthcoming from the British
that they would be flexible in their approach to the govern-
ment that succeeded Mossadeq as far as the oil question was
concerned.
     Mr. Leslie Herbert Mitchell, UK Embassy officer (SIS
representative) charged with liaison with the Agency, con-
cerned himself with this point and did expedite the required
assurances from the British Government.  These assurances
took the form of a foreign office memorandum presented by
British Ambassador to the United Staes, Roger Mellor Makins,
to Under Secretary of State Smith on 23 July 1953.  (Copy
attached as Appendix C.)  Also the Department of State wanted
to satisfy itself that an adequate amount of interim economic
aid would be forthcoming to the successor government before
it would finally approve decisive action.
     During this same period discussions between Agency
officers and Ambassador Henderson (in Washington, having
arrived on consultation 3 June) began 8 June.  (This is
recorded in a memorandum of conversation contained in
TPAJAX files.)  The Ambassador appeared to backtrack some-
what from his earlier opinion that the premise of the plan
                        17
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
that the Shah would cooperate was fallacious, and that
the Shah would not issue a firman naming Zahedi unless
in response to a vote of inclination by the Majlis.  The
Ambassador, who was always thoroughly cooperative, was
absorbed in a search for constructive suggestions and
willingly agreed to delay his return to Tehran by arrang-
ing a prolonged visit in Europe.  From the standpoint of
the plan it was not considered advisable to have the
Ambassador in Tehran when the final operation was under-
taken.  In addition, his continued absence was thought to
be an importan factor in the war of nerves which was to
be conducted against Mossadeq.
     The following approvals of the operational plan were
obtained on the dates indicated:
          Director CIA             - 11 July 1953
          Director SIS             -  1 July 1953
          Foreign Secretary        -  1 July 1953
          Secretary of State       - 11 July 1953
          Prime Minister           -  1 July 1953
          President                - 11 July 1953
     Pending final approval or disapproval of the opera-
tional plan, the station was carrying forward activities
already authroized toward the achievement of the goal.
In addition to the general authorization of April enabling
the Tehran Station to spend up to $1,000,000 in covert
activity in support of Zahedi, the station on 20 May was
                        18
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
specifically authorized to spend one million rials a week
(rate of 90 rials to the US dollar) in purchasing the
cooperation of members of the Iranian Majlis.
     On or about the end of June the station had established
direct contact with the Rashidian brothers and was prepared
to instruct them as their role and those of their con-
tacts in the development of the operation.
     At Headquarters two groups were organized within the
NE/4 Branch on 22 June in support of Tehran Station opera-
tional preparations.  One group, headed by Carroll who had
returned from Nicosia in mid-June, was to make an exhaustive
study of the military aspects of the overthrow operation.
(Carrol's final report on the military aspect of TPAJAX
planning is attached as Appendix D.)  The intent was to
present Zahedi and his chosen military secretariat with a
concrete plan for their modification or improvement.  It
was felt that every effort should be made to bring the
rather long-winded and often illogical Persians into a
position where each one knew exactly what specific action
was required of him.  The soundness of this feeling was
demonstrated when the failure of the Persians to maintain
security resulted in the initial breakdown.  The other
group, headed by Wilber, assumed responsibility for the
psychological warfare phases of the plan.  Overall direction
                        19
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
of these groups and of relations with the field station
were in the hands of Mr. John Henry Waller, head of NE/4
Branch.
     Carroll left for Tehran in mid-July.  He stopped over
at London to discuss his military plan with SIS Officer
Norman Darbyshire and finally reached Tehran on 21 July.
Wilber's group sent guidance cables and dispatches to the
station, all intended to flesh up the skeleton of psycho-
logical operations as presented in the plan itself.  In
the meantime a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq articles
were written or outlined by the group while the CIA Art
Group was given constant guidance in its preparation of a
large number of anti-Mossadeq cartoons and broadsheets.  In
addition, these artists did an effective drawing for a wall
poster showing Zahedi being presented to the Iranian people
by the Shah.  Written and illustrative material piled up
rapidly, and on 19 July a special courier took it all to
Tehran.  On 22 July the station began to distribute the
material to several agents.  What happened to this mate-
rial will be described in later pages.
     By the time that the go-ahead had been received from
all parties involved, the NEA Division had picked out
qualified individuals for special assignments connected
with the project:  Mr. Roosevelt, Chief, NEA, was to be
                        20
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
field commander in Tehran; John H. Leavitt, NEA/CPP, was
to go to Nicosia to be in contact and liaison with the SIS
station and to maintain the three-way wireless contact estab-
lished earlier; while Colonel Stephen Johnson Meads drew
the job of representing the Agency in meetings in Paris with
Princess Ashraf, energetic twin sister of the Shah.  Mr.
Joseph C. Goodwin, Chief of Station in Tehran, was to act
for purposes of TPAJAX as chief of staff to the field com-
mander, Mr. Roosevelt.  Mr. George Carroll, Chief FI Tehran,
was given the military planning responsibility first in
Washington, then in Tehran.  Dr. Donald Wilber was charged
throughout the operation with the propaganda aspects of the
plan and worked closely with the CIA Art Group in the prepa-
ration of propaganda material.  Mr. John Waller, just having
returned from service as Chief FI, Tehran, was charged with
the Headquarters support responsibilities during TPAJAX and
maintained the required liaison with the Departments of
State and Defense.  Although not present in Tehran for the
final implementation of TPAJAX, Mr. Roger Goiran, previous
Chief of Station Tehran, directed the early stages and
preliminaries of the operation in Tehran.  It should be here
noted that Mr. Goiran, more than any other officer, was
responsible for having developed, over a five-year period,
station assets which proved valuable and necessary to the
operation.
                        21
                    S E C R E T
continua 
-- 
Posted via Mailgate.ORG Server - 
http://www.Mailgate.ORG

 Redactions in this section could not be restored, shown as [ ]; 
supposed redactions shown by [ ] are based on restored redactions
of other sections -- Appendix D which described the events and 
persons involved, with help from identities in Section VII.
 
                    S E C R E T
V.   MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHAH
     From the very beginning it had been recognized that
the Shah must be forced to play a specific role, however
reluctant he might prove to be.  Therefor, the plan pre-
sented a series of measures designed to rid him once and
for all of his pathological fear of the "hidden hand" of
the British, and to assure him that the United States and
the United Kingdom would firmly support him and had both
resolved that Mossadeq must go.  The measures were also
intended to produce such pressure on the Shah that it would
be easier for him to sign the papers required of him than
it would be to refuse.
     On 23 June the timetable covering all the envoys to
be sent to the Shah was drawn up at Headquarters.  In
execution all these steps went off as planned.
     The initial task was to brief Princess Ashraf, who was
thought to be in Paris at that time.  It was planned to
approach her about 10 July in Paris and have her back in
Tehran to see the Shah about 20 July.  Asodollah Rashidian,
still in Geneva, was to call upon her first and prepare her
for the joint visit of Darbyshire for SIS and Meade for CIA.
(SIS had assured Headquarters that this call could be made
in Paris at any time.)  Meade arrived in London by air on
                        22
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
10 July and went at once to Paris with Darbyshire.  Then
an unanticipated delay occurred.  Princess Ashraf was not
in Paris, and it was not until the 15th that she was lo-
cated on the Riviera and visited by Asodollah Rashidian.
He reported that she had shown no enthusiasm at all with
regard to her proposed role.  However, the next day the
"official" representatives had two meetings with here and
she agreed to do everything that was asked of her.  She
did say that her arrival would arouse a strong reaction
from the pro-Mossadeq press and hoped that we would be
able to put out effective counterblasts.  Meade reported
in London to Roosevelt and Leavitt.  He then returned to
Paris and stayed close to Ashraf until her departure for
Iran.*
     Ashraf reach Tehran as a passenger on a commercial
flight on 25 July.  As expected, her unauthorized return
did create a real storm.  Neither the Shah, himself, nor
the government of Mossadeq had been asked to permit her to
return.  Both were furious.  The Shah refused to see her
but did accept a letter passed on through the medium of
[Soleiman Behbudi], ** head of the Shah's household, who was
_________________________
* Meade's character studh of Ashraf is in the TPAJAX file.
**SIS agent within the palace. [See identity in Section 7.]
                        23
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
loyal and devoted in an effective way throughout this
period.  This letter contained news that US General
Schwarzkopf was coming to see the Shah on an errand simi-
lar to that of Ashraf, herself.  The Shah welcomed this
news and received his sister on the evening of 29 July.
The session opened stormily but ended on a note of recon-
ciliation.  On the next day she took a plane back to
Europe.  This was as had been planned, but it came as a
relief to know that she was out of the country in view of
the pro-Mossadeq press reaction.
     The second emissary arrived on the scene in the per-
son of Asadollah Rashidian, the principal SIS agent.  Accord-
ing to the plan, Asadollah Rashidian's initial task with
the Shah was to convince the ruler that Rashidian was the
official spokesman of the UK Government.  The advance plan,
that of having the Shah select a key phrase which would
then be broadcast on the British Broadcasting Company (BBC)
Persian language program on certain dates, was followed.
In London the necessary arrangements had been made by
Darbyshire to send the phrase over the BBC.  On 30 July
and again on the 31st the Shah saw Asadollah Rashidian.
He had heard the broadcast, but he requested time to assess
the situation.  Asadollah was, however, able to prepare the
Shah for the visit of the American emissary, General
                        24
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
Schwarzkopf, and to stress the point that this emissary
would repeat the message and, hence, give an additional
guarantee of the close collaboration between the United
Kingdom and the United States in this undertaking.
     Schwarzkopf had been chosen by the drafters of the
operational plan because of the fact that he had enjoyed
the friendship and respect of the Shah in the period from
1942 until 1948 when he headed the US MIlitary Mission to
the Iranian Gendarmerie.  Approached on 26 June 1953 by
John Waller, Chief, NEA/4, briefed at Headquarters on
19 July, Schwarzkopf took to his mission with relish.  He
said that he had a reputation with the Shah for telling
him unpleasant truths that others withheld from him, and
he stated that he was sure he could get the required coop-
eration from the Shah.  Schwarzkopf was given a cover mis-
sion consisting of a short tour to Lebanon, Pakistan, and
Egypt so that his visit to Tehran would appear as a brief
stop en route to a principal destination.  Schwarzkopf left
by air for Beirut on 21 July.
     Schwarzkopf's mission was to obtain from the Shah the
three papers which are described more fully in the opera-
tional plan.  They were:  (1) a firman naming Zahedi as
Chief of Staff, (2) a letter indicating his faith in
Zahedi which the latter could employ to recruit army
                        25
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
officers for the plan in the name of the Shah, and
(3) a firman calling on all ranks of the army to support
his legal Chief of Staff.  It was felt that it would be
easier to get the Shah to sign such statements than to
issure a firman dismissing Mossadeq.  It was also believed
that the action of replacing Mossadeq would be initiated
through the Majlis.
     Certain events of 21 July at Tehran both shocked and
aroused from thier attitude of complacency the more con-
servative elements which had firmly supported Mossadeq.
Demonstrations marked the anniversary of rioting against
the government of Qavam and of efforts made at that time,
two years earlier, to settle the oil issue.  However, it
was obvious to all that the number of Tudeh participants
far outnumbered those assembled by the Naitional Front, and
it was this fact more than anything else which alerted the
thinking public to the strength acquired by the Tudeh under
the Mossadeq government.  At this time station personnel
were active on several fronts.  The propaganda campaign
against Mossadeq was now gaining momentum.  [ ]
owner of [ ] was
granted a personal loan of some $45,000 on signed notes
in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to
our purposes.  Headqurters-prepared propaganda material
                        26
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
was turned over by the station to Asadollah Rashidian,
and by the end of the month an entirely separate and
especially planned campaign in favor of the Shah as opposed
to Mossadeq was under way in Azerbaijan.  The parallel and
alternative plan of keeping in close touch with the [ ]
[ ] combination for the purposes of diverting their
attention from TPAJAX and of discovering the plans and
strength of this group remained in effect.  Talks with
the [ ] continued.  At one point the station suggested
sending one of the brothers to this country, and Headquarters
made an immediate investigation of the mechanics required
for making such a trip.  The SIS was informed of these
talks, and they suggested that their facilities might be
used to stir up tribal revolts in the homeland of the
[ ].
     The station was now in direct contact with Zahedi,
who had left his sanctuary in the Majlis on 21 July.
After several meetings Station Chief Goiran and Station
Chief Designate Goodwin reported that Zahedi appeared
lacking in drive, energy, and concrete plans.  They con-
cluded that he must be closely guided and that the neces-
sary plans must be made for him.
     By 26 July a number of key individuals had moved into
position:  Roosevelt and Schwarzkopf were at Tehran,
                        27
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
Leavitt had been at Nicosia for several days, and
Ambassador henerson had come to rest at Salzburg, where
he was to remain, anxious but cooperative, for the next
two weeks.  At Nicosia, Leavitt did a most capable job of
reassuring SIS officials who frequently felt that they
were not receiving enough current information.  Concomi-
tantly, these SIS officials passed on valuable suggestions
coming from London, such as detailed plans for putting the
central telephone exchange out of operation.
     With Roosevelt's arrival in Tehran the situation was
restudied.  As a part of the war of nerves against Mossadeq,
it was considered advisable to cut down close contacts be-
tween high-ranking US officilas and officials of Mossadeq's
government.  Technical Cooperation in Iran (TCI) Director
William E. Warne was requested to reduce his normal govern-
ment contacts, and General Frank McClure, Chief of the US
Military Mission in Iran, was requested to appear less
friendly with those general officers who were firmly support-
ing Mossadeq.  At this stage it was decided to alter the
nature and number of documents which would have to be signed
by the Shah.  These documents would be limited to one firman
naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff and one letter denouncing
the government-staged referendum on the question of the
dissolution of the Majlis as an illegal proceeding.  As
                        28
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
the month of July ended, station personnel in charge of
the proganda campaign reported on the effective anti-
[ ]. It was stated that
very effective use had been made of the 28 July statemen
by Secretary of State Dulles* (made at CIA's suggestion).
A request was made that US papers reflect the Iranian
press campaign against Mossadeq and that inspired articles
be placed in the US press.
     On 1 August, two days after Princess Ashraf had left
Iran and the Shah had heard the BBC message designed to
convince him that Asadollah Rashidian was the official
spokesman of the UK Government, Schwarzkopf had an ex-
tended meeting with the Shah.  Fearful of planted micro-
phones, the Shah led the General into a grand ballroom,
pulled a small table to its exact center, and then both
sat on the table.  The Shah rejected the proposal that he
sign the required documents at once, asserting that he was
not fully confident of the loyalty of the army; that he
must give advance approval for all members of a new cabinet;
____________________
*This statement, made at a press conference, was as
 follows:  "The growing activities of the illegal Communist
 Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian
 Government has caused our government concern.  These
 developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran."
                        29
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
and that he must have time to make his own estimate as to
the probable success or failure of the undertaking.  On
the other hand, he said that should Mossadeq carry through
his referendum and dissolve the Majlis then he, himself,
would ahve full powers under the constitution to dismiss
Mossadeq and replace him by a prime minister of his own
choice.  This meeting was to be followed by a series of
additional ones, some between Roosevelt and the Shah and
some between Rashidian and the Shah, in which relentless
pressure was exerted in frustrating attempts to overcome
an entrenched attitude of vacillation and indecision.
     On 2 August Roger Goiran, for so long the exprienced
and valuable chief of station, left Tehran headed for Head-
quarters duty.  Whiel his knowledge had been of inestimable
value in the preparatory stages of TPAJAX, it was judged
that his departure as just this time would be an important
factor in the war of nerves against Mossadeq, and in the
planned efforts to confuse and disturb the potential oppo-
sition.  By this time the Counselor, Gordon Henry Mattison,
and the ranking political officer, Mr. Roy Malcolm Melbourne,
had been briefed on TPAJAX and were discreetly helpful.
Mattison, in interviews with [ ]
[ ], followed station direction in a successful
effort to divert attention of the [ ] group
                        30
                    S E C R E T
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T
from the real purpose of TPAJAX.
     During this period Mossadeq, as always, had been on
the alert to try to hold the initiative and keep his grow-
ing opposition off balance.  His attention turned toward
the Majlis, where opposition appeared to be hardening.  On
14 July he directed the deputies supporting the government
to resign.  Several of the neutral or timidly anti-Mossadeq
deputies followed suit until a total of 28 had resigned.
Headquarters urged that the anti-Mossadeq deputies be given
every encouragement to keep their posts and to take up bast
(political sanctuary) in the Majlis.  The theme to be built
up was that those who had not resigned from the Majlis
would constitute the legitimate parliamentary body.  This
stand was at least partially responsible for Mossadeq's
growing belief that the body must be dissolved.  Such
action would leave him as the undisputed dictator of the
country since his full-powers bill had several months more
to run.  However, he still had to get around the provision
of the constitution that only the Shah had the authority
to dissolve the Majlis.  He did this by staging a national
referendum in which the people were to state "yes" or "no"
to the question as to whether the Majlis should be dis-
solved.  The referendum was a clear and palpable fake.  Held
throughout the country beginning 4 August, some two million
                        31
                    S E C R E T
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                    S E C R E T
were said to have voted for dissolution and only a few
hundred against.  As a maneuver the action was not as
satisfactory as Mossadeq anticipated since it clearly re-
vealed abuse of the constitution.  This provide an issue
on which Mossadeq could be relentlessly attacked by the
CIA/SIS subsidized opposition press.  The action also did
much to alarm the more stable and established elements of
the populace, who were nationalists along with everyone
else, but who did not favor such a fraudulent breach of
the constitution.
     During the days of the referendum the station reported
in detail on the multiple efforts of station agents to ex-
ploit the illegality of this referendum, both before and 
during the event.  Also every declaration made by a religious
leader in these days stressed this point.  The station indi-
cated that some 20 local newspapers were now in violent
opposition to Mossadeq and that some 15 Headquarters-
prepared anti-Mossadeq cartoons had appeared in these
papers during the referendum week.  On 4 August word reached
the station that Mossadeq was aware of the true purpose of
the visit of Ashraf, and the personnel on the scene felt
strongly that action must be mounted very soon.  On 4 August
Ambassador Henerson per schedule set out from Salzburg for
Tehran.  He was to be met on 9 August at Beirut by Leavitt,
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who persuaded him to put off his return in view of the
delayed but imminent date for action.  In these same days,
Henerson, officials of the State Department, and officials
of the Foreign Office were drafting proposed statements
which their governments planned to issue upon the success-
ful conclusion of TPAJAX.
     At Tehran the meetings with the Shah were continuing.
On 2 August Asodollah Rashidian had presented His Majesty
with specific details concerning the manner in which the
operation would be carried out, and reported that the Shah
had agreed to dismiss Mossadeq and to appoint Zahedi as
both Prime Minister and Deputy Commander-in-Chief.  The
Shah also agreed to name General Vosua as Chief of Staff.
On 3 August, Roosevelt had a long and inconclusive session
with the Shah.  The latter stated that he was not an adven-
turer and, hence, could not take the chances of one.
Roosevelt pointed out that there was no other way by which
the government could be changed and the test was now be-
tween Mossadeq and his force and the Shah and his army,
which was still with him, but which would soon slip away.
Roosevelt finally said that he would remain at hand a few
days longer in expectation of an affirmative decision and
then would leave the country; in the latter case the Shah
should realize that failure to act could lead only to a
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                    S E C R E T
Comunist Iran or to a second Korea.  he concluded by say-
ing that his government was not prepared to accept these
possibilities and that some other plan might be carried
through.  In a later meeting with the Shah, the latter
requested Mr. Roosevelt to solicit from President Eisen-
hower assuracnes that it was advisable for the Shah to
take the initiative in removing Mossadeq.  Mr. Roosevelt
stated that he would pass this request on to the President,
but he was very confident that the latter would adopt the
attitude that the Shah had already had US desires made
adequately clear to him.  By complete coincidence and good
fortune, the President, while addressing the Governors'
Convention in Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script
to state by implicaiton that the United States would not
sit idly by and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Roosevelt used the President's statements to good effect,
by telling the Shah that Eisenhowere did indeed feel further
assurances of US attitude toward Mossadeq were unnecessary
but that his reference to Iran in the Governors' Convention
speech was made to satisfy the Shah.  In the end the Shah
said he would again discuss the question with Rashidian.
In the cable describing this meeting, Roosevelt stated his
belief that it was hopeless to attempt to proceed without
the Shah, and that it must be decided whether to exert
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                    S E C R E T
ultimate pressure for the next two or three days or to
accept a delay of up to ten days in which the Shah might
finally be won over.  On 7 August Rashidian met again
with the Shah who agreeed that action should be taken on
the night of either the 10th or 11th.  On 8 August Roose-
velt agains saw the Shah and struggled against a mood of
stubborn irresolution which broke down to the extent that
the Shah agreed to give oral encouragement to selected
army officers who would participate in the action.  Then,
he said, he would go to Ramsar* and let the army act with-
out his official knowledge, adding that if the action was
successful he would name Zahedi as Prime Minister.  On
9 August Rashidian took over the struggle in his turn and
reported that the Shah would leave for Ramsar on the 12th,
and that prior to his departure he would see Zahedi and
key officers and express orally his choice of Zahedi as
the new head of the government.
     On 10 August Colonel [Hassan Akhavi] saw the Shah and
informed him of the names of the army officers who were
ready to take action upon receipt of an order from the
Shah.  The Shah again asserted that while he approved
of the plan for action he would sign no papers.  [Akhavi]
____________________
*Royal resort on the Caspian Sea, north of Tehran.
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                    S E C R E T
registered a protest at this decision, and the Shah again
sent for Rashidian to discuss this all important point.
Rashidian carried a message from Roosevelt to the effect
that the latter would leave in complete disgust unless
the Shah took action within a few days.  At the conclusion
of the audience the Shah stated that he would sign the
papers, would see Zahedi, and then would leave for Ramsar
on the Caspian.  The next day he did see Zahedi and did
leave for Ramsar, but the papers, contrary to the promise
of the Rashidians, were not ready for the signature of the
Shah.  The Shah thus promised to sign the papaers as soon
as they were sent to him at Ramsar.
     After discussion between Roosevelt and Rashidian, they
reverted to a decision closer to the original London draft
of TPAJAX, deciding that there should be two firmans royal
decrees), one dismissing Mossadeq and one naming Zahedi as
Prime Minister.  Rashidian and [Behbudi], the Shah's [palace]
[head] and an established UK agent, prepared the documents,
and on the evening of 12 August [Colonel Nematollah Nasiri], 
[Commander of the Imperial Guard] took them by plane to
Ramsar.
     At this time the psychological campaign against
Mossadeq was reaching its climax.  The controllable press
was going all out against Mossadeq, while [ ]
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                    S E C R E T
[ ] under station direction was printing
material which the station considered to be helpful.  CIA
agents gave serious attention to alarming the religious
leaders at Tehran by issuing black propaganda in the name
of the Tudeh Party, threatening these leaders with savage
punishment if they opposed Mossadeq.  Threatening phone
calls were made to some of them, in the name of the Tudeh,
and one of several planned sham bombings of the houses
of these leaders was carried out.
     The word that the Shah would support direct action in
his behalf spread rapidly through the "Colonels' conspiracy"
fostered by the station.  Zahedi saw station principal
agent, Colonel [Aban Farzanegan], and named him as liaison
officer with the Americans and as his choice to supervise
the staff planning for the action.  Then [Farzanegan] took
General [Batmangelich] and Colonel [Zand-Karmini] to see Zahedi.
CIA officer Carroll maintained close contact with [Farzanegan]
and members of the "Colonels' conspiracy," and on 13 August
was present at the final meeting of those individuals to
whom would fall the responsibility of carrying out the
operational staff plan.  However, this meeting was the
last one in which the station was represented, and the
fact that contact was broken proved to have serious results.
     Late on the evening of 13 August, Colonel [Nasiri]
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                    S E C R E T
returned to Tehran with the firmans signed by the Shah
and delivered them to Zahedi; according to his story
(which has never been confirmed), it was Queen Soraya
who finally convinced the Shah that he must sign.  If
this is true, here was an ally form a totally unexpected
quarter.
     On 14 August the station cabled that upon the con-
clusion of TPAJAX the Zahedi government, in view of the
empty treasury of the country, would be in urgent need
of funds.  The sum of $5,000,000 was suggested, and CIA
was asked to produce this amount almost within hours after
the conclusion of the operation.  No more news came in
from Tehran on the 14th, and there was nothing that either
the station or Headquarters could do except wait for action
to begin.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Redactions in this section could not be restored, shown as [ ]; 
supposed redactions shown by [ ] are based on restored redactions
of other sections -- Appendix D which described the events and 
persons involved, with help from identities in Section VII.
                    S E C R E T
VI.  THE FIRST TRY
     The precise order of events of the night of 15 August
1953 has not yet been established in all detail.  The early
accounts of various participants differed widely enough to
make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth
through the dark night.  However, the main outline of
this first try is clear, as are two basic facts connected
with it.  These facts are:  that the plan was betrayed by
the indiscretion of one of the Iranian Army officer partici-
pants--primarily because of the protracted delay--and that
it still might have succeeded in spite of this advance
warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept
or lacking in decision at the critical juncture.
     Not until the evening of 14 August were Tehran Station
personnel informed that action had been postponed from that
night until the next one.  Station principal agent Colonel
[Farzanegan] was not longer in touch with events and the
station was unable to guide General [Batmangelich], Zahedi's
Chief of Staff deisgnate--if, indeed, it was he who had
assumed the main responsibility.
     According to a statement by Mossadeq's Chief of Staff,
General Tahi Riahi, he was informed of all the details of
the "plot" at five in the afternoon of 15 August.  But
curiously enough--and according to his own account--he did
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                    S E C R E T
nto elave his house in shimran, where National Frontists
Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas were staying, until 2000 hours and
then drove to staff headquarters in Tehran.  Riahi did,
however, order the commander of the 1st Armored Brigade to
have the brigade ready at 2300 hours.  At 2300 hours Riahi
sent his deputy, General Kiani, to the Bagh-i-Shah, the army
barracks on the western side of Tehran which included the
barracks of the Imperial Guard.  Kiani was arrested there by
Colonel [Namiri] who had arrived at the Bagh-i-Shah sometime
earlier with several officers who supported him.
     In the meantime a number of truckloads of pro-Shah
soldiers were making arrests.  About 2330 hours they came
to Riahi's house in Shimran and, finding him out, arrested
Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas.  Also about 2330 hours several
officers and a considerable body of soldiers rushed into
the home of Hoseyn Fatemi, Mossadeq's Foreign Minister,
and took him away before he had a chance to put on his 
shoes.  This meager haul of prisoners was driven to the
guard house of the Imperial Palace (Saadabad) at Shimran.
     Officers who were aware that Riahi had been alerted
took no action, but others who were not, carried out their
tasks.
     Sometime before 2330 hours a limited attack had been
made against the telepone system.  Wires leading to the
house of Fatemi and to the houses of others who were to
be arrested were cut; the wires vetween GHQ (staff
                        40
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(continua)


 S E C R E T
headquarters) and the Bagh-i-Shah were cut; and Colonel
[ ] with a small armed force, occupied the telephone
exchange in the Tehran bazaar.
     When Riahi did not hear from General Kiani, who had
gone to the Bagh-i-Shah, he (according to his own account)
phoned Colonel Momtaz of the 2nd Mountain Brigade and 
Colonel Shahrokh of the 1st Armored Brigade and told them
to take their forces to the Bagh-i-Shah.  At or before
this time he also alerted other officers, including Colonel
Parsa of the 1st Mountain Brigade; Colonel Ashrafi, the
Military Governor and Commanding Officer of the 3rd Mountain
Brigade; and Colonel Novzari of the 2nd Armored Brigade.
However, according to the accounts of Zahedi men engaged
in their operation, Momtaz and Shahrokh were arrested at
the Bagh-i-Shah and held there with Kiani for some time.
     Government sources differ in their accounts as to what
happened when Colonel [Namiri] tried to deliver to Mossadeq
the Shah's firman dismissing him.  According to General
Riahi, Colonel Momtaz was on his way to the Bagh-i-Shah
when he ran into Colonel [Namiri] in the street and there-
upon arrested him.  According to the official communique
of the Mossadeq government, [Namiri] showed up before Mossadeq's
house at 0100 hours on 16 August with four trucks full of
soldiers, two jeeps, and an armored car.  He claimed that
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he had a letter to deliver to Mossadeq, but was at once
arrested by the guards at the house of the Prime Minister.
Farzanegan [in clear] had still another version, claiming that [Namiri]
was arrested at 2350 hours at Mossadeq's house.  After his
arrest, [Namiri] is alleged to have said that a delay of two
minutes in the arrival at Mossadeq's house of Lt. Colonel
[Zand-Karimi] with two truckloads of soldiers caused the
plan to fail.
     It does seem fairly certain that Riahi had been able
before midnight to get detachments of soldiers to the
strategic points most likely to be attacked.  Just what
incident or what reaction on the part of Riahi and others
loyal to Mossadeq caused the pro-Zahedi officers to falter
in their duties is not clearly known.  It is known, however,
that Zahedi's Chief of Staff, General [Batmangelich], lsot
heart and went into hiding.  This undoubtedly did much to
lower morale at the crucial time, as did the rapidly circu-
lated word of [Namiri's] arrest.  Colonel [Farzanegan] went to
the Chief of Staff's office at 0100 hours on the 16th to
meet [Batmangelich] and it is known that General [Batmangelich]
did approach the GHQ with the intention of taking it over
but was frightened off when he saw tanks and troops in
readiness.  He then rushed to Zahedi and told him to flee,
but Zahedi only laughed at him.  Even the trucks with the
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                    S E C R E T
prisoners had come down from Saadabad to the GHQ but, find-
ing it in hostile hands, retreated to Sasdabad.  Those in
charge of the trucks released the prisoners at dawn.
Zahedi waited in vain for an escort to come and conduct him
to the Officers' Club.  By about 0230 hours those Persians
who were still willing to carry out the operation were con-
vinced that the cause was lost, as they saw strengthened
detachments, more troops moving into the city, and vehicles
being stopped for questioning.  [Farzanegan] and General
[Batmangelich] themselves, toured the town about 0230 hours;
then presumably separated, since [Batmangelich] was soon
picked up, while [Farzanegan] found sanctuary in station
hands.  At the Embassy the station personnel had spent a
nerve-racking period of hours.  The army radio-equipped
jeep called for in the plan failed to arrive at the compound,
and there was no way of knowing what was happening in the
city.
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VII.  APPARENT FAILURE
      At 0545 hours on the morning of 16 August 1953, Radio
Tehran came on the air with a special government communique
covering the so-called abortive coup of the night just end-
ing, and by 0600 hours Mossadeq was meeting with his cabinet
to receive reports on the situation and to take steps to
strengthen the security forces at government buildings and
other vital points.  Again at 0730 hours the communique was
broadcast.
     Station personnel had passed an anxious, sleepless
night in their office.  From the fact that certain actions
provided for in the military plan failed to materialize--
no jeep with radio arrived at the compound, and the tele-
phone system continued to function--it was obvious that
something--or everything--had gone wrong.  At 0500 hours,
as soon as the curfew was lifted, Carroll toured the town
and reported there was a concentration of tanks and troops
around Mossadeq's house, and other security forces on the
move.  Then Colonel [Farzanegan] called the office to say
that things had gone badly, and he, himself, was on
the run toward the Embassy in search of refuge.  At 0600
hours he appeared, gave a summary of the situation, which
was like that of the government communique, and was rushed
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                    S E C R E T
into hiding.  The station was now suddenly faced with the
task of rescuing the operation from total failure, and
decisions of far-reaching effect were quickly taken.  The
first need was to establish contact with Ardeshir Zahedi,
son of General Zahedi.  At 0800 hours he sent word to the
station of his whereabouts, and Roosevelt drove up to
Shimran--the summer resort section north of Tehran--to hear
that Areshir and his father felt that there was still hope
in the situation.  It was immediately decided that a strong
effort must be made to convince the Iranian public that
Zahedi was the legal head of the government and that Mossadeq
was the usurper who had staged a coup.  (It should be noted
that all action taken from this time on corresponded to the
basic estimate of the operational plan that the army would
respond to the Shah if they were forced to a choice between
the ruler and Mossadeq.)  This action was initiated by em-
ploying station communications facilities to relay a message
to the New York Associated Press (AP) office stating that:
"Unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders
of the plot are armed with two decrees of the Shah, one
dismissing Mossadeq and the other appointing General Zahedi
to replace him."  In order to get an authoritative state-
ment that could be distributed for local consumption, the
station planned to send General McClure, head of the American
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                    S E C R E T
Military Mission, to see the Shah and ask him whether the
alleged firmans were valid.  Later in the day it was learned
that the Shah had fled.
     By 0930 hours the city was calm, with shops opening
and people going about their normal business.  However,
tanks, extra soldiers, and police were stationed at key
points, including the royal palaces which were sealed off
from outside contact.  Rumors began to circulate.  The one
that gained early attention was to the effect that the
alleged coupt had been inspired by the government in order
to give Mossadeq an excuse to move against the Shah.  At
about this time Roosevelt sent General McClure to see General
Riahi, Chief of Staff, to ask whether the US Military Mission
was still accredited to Mossadeq or someone else, as the
Embassy had heard that an imperial firman had been issued
naming Zahedi as Prime Minister.  Riahi denied that the
firman had been "authentically signed" and stated that:
"Iran and its people are more important than the Shah or
any particular government," and that the army was "of the
people and would support the people."  It was not until a
number of hours later that McClure reported to Roosevelt
on this meeting, and from the time of the meeting on, McClure
seemed disposed to go along with Riahi in the hope that Riahi
himself might eventually try to overthrow Mossadeq.
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                    S E C R E T
     It was now well into the morning, after the papers had
been out for some time.  Shojat, the substitute for the
principal Tudeh paper, Besuye Ayandeh, had been predicting
a coup since 13 August.  It now stated that the plans for
the alleged coup had been made after a meeting between the
Shah and General Shwarkkopf on 9 August, but that Mossadeq
had been tipped off on the 14th.  It should be noted that
the Tudeh appeared to be at least as well posted on the coup
plans as the government--how is not known.  The station prin-
cipal agent team of [Djalili and Keyvani] working on their
own and with singular shrewdness, had put out a special
broadsheet with documented the current rumor but twisted it
to read that the alleged coup was arranged to force out the
Shah.  The morning issue of Mellat-i-Ma told this same story,
while a first mention of the firman naming Zahedi was given
on an inner page of the large circulation daily Keyhan.
     At 1000 hours another communique added a few details
to the earlier one.  By this time the Tudeh party members,
organized in small groups, were making speeches in many
parts of the city, while smaller groups of pro-Mossadeq
nationalists were also out in the streets.  Then a fresh
rumor made the rounds:  that a plot had existed but that,
when it had failed to materialize, Mossadeq had staged a
fake coup.  At 1100 hours two correspondents of the New
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                    S E C R E T
York Times were taken to Shimran, by station arrangement,
to see Zahedi.  Instead, they say his sone, Ardeshir, who
showed them the original of the imperial firman naming
Zahedi as Prime Minister and gave them photostatic copies.
These photostats had been made by Iranian participants in
the plan.  Following this meeting the station took charge
of the firman, had its own photostats made, and kep the
original locked up in the station safe until final victory.
At noon RAdio Tehran put out a very brief statement signed
by Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq (without his title of Prime Minister
being used) stating that:  "According to the will of the
people, expressed by referendum, the 17th Majlis is dissolved.
Elections for the 18th session will be held soon."  It was
this statement, together with the following violently anti-
Shah remarks of Fatemi and the undisguised and freely-preached
republican propaganda of the Tudeh Party, that was instru-
mental in persuading the general public that Mossadeq was
on the verge of eliminating the monarchy.
     At 1400 hours Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi held
a press conference.  He stated that for some time past the
government had received reports from several sources to the
effect that the Imperial Guards were planning a coup and,
hence, measures were taken to counteract any such coup.  He
then went on to review the incidents of the coup, as already
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                    S E C R E T
stated by the government communiques.  In reply to a ques-
tion, he said that Abul Ghassem Amini, Acting Minister of
Court, had been arrested since it could not be considered
that the court was not a part of the conspriacy.  He added
that his own views would be found in his editorial in
Bakhtar Emruz:  this editorial, as printed and as read in
full, over Radio Tehran at 1730 hours, was a save, lengthy,
malicious attack upon the Shah and upon Reza Shah--a man
for who the general public still feels a large measure of
respect and awe.  It may be said that this editorial did
a great deal to arouse public resentment against the govern-
ment of Mossadeq.
     During the afternoon the station was at work preparing
a public statement from General Zahedi which was prepared
with the direct advice of Ardeshir Zahedi, the Rashidian
brothers, and Colonel [Farzanegan.] When it was ready the
agents were unable to find a press in town which was not
watched by the government.  Therefore, one of the Rashidians
did ten copies on a Persian typewriter.  These were rushed
to General Zahedi for his signature adn then given out to
the foreign correspondents, to local pressmen and to two
key army officers.  By the time they were distributed, it
was too late to catch the press for the morning of the 17th.
However, station agents, [(Djalili and Keyvani),] although not
                        49
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                    S E C R E T
in touch with the station, the Rashidians, or [Farzanegan,]
went ahead on their own.  They composed a fabricated inter-
view with Zahedi and had it printed on the 17th, along with
a copy of the firman.  In this instance, as in a number of
others, the high-level agents of the station demonstrated
a most satisfying ability to go ahead on their own and do
just the right thing.  During the day the station was
securing the persons of key individuals and sending them
to safety.  Some were concealed in the house of a station
clerk in the Embassy compound and some in the houses of US
personnel of the station outside the compound.  Thus,
Ardeshir Sahedi was in station hands from the morning of
the 16th on, General Zahedi from the morning of the 17th
on, the Rashidian brothers from the 16th on with the excep-
tion of a venture out on the 18th, Colonel [Farzanegan] from
the morning of the 16th on, and General [Guilanshah] from the
morning of the 16th.  These people had to be concealed by
the station, both in order to secure them from arrest and
also to have them in places to which Americans could logi-
cally and easily go.
     That evening about 1930 hours crwods massed in the
Majlis Square to hear speeches, and the proceedings were
rebroadcast over Radio Tehran.  The speakers included pro-
Mossadeq ex-Majlis deputies Mosavi, Dr. Szyyid Ali Shayegan,
Engineer Zirakzadeh, Engineer Razavi, and Foreign Minister
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                    S E C R E T
Fatemi.  All the speakers attacked the Shah and demanded
that he abdicate.  During the course of these speeches,
the public was informed for the first time that the Shah
had fled to Baghdad.  The station had learned several
hours earlier that the Shah had left.  By 1600 hours the
two principal US Embassy political officers had given up
hope, while Roosevelt was insisting there was still a
"slight remaining chance of success" if the Shah would use
the Baghadad radio and if Zahedi took and aggressive stand.
Additional station messages to Headquarters contained the
texts of the type of statements the Shah could make over
Baghdad radio.
     Allowing for the seven hour difference in time, Head-
quarters received the first message from the station on the
non-success of the coup at 0130 hours on the 16th, and a
few hours thereafter was working on the station's request
to get the Shah to broadcast from Baghdad.  As the working
day ended, they had to report to the station that the State
Department was firmly opposed to any American effort to
contact the Shah and suggested the British do it.  At
Nicosia they responded enthusiastically to the station's
suggestion, and the SIS attempted to get permission from
London to have Leavitt and Darbyshire flown to Baghdad by
RAF jet fighter early in the morning of the 17th, for the
                        51
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                    S E C R E T
purpose of exerting pressure on the Shah.  Londong refused
permission.
     As the station personnel entered on another day after
a second sleepless night, some real encouragement came from
word that, in breaking up Tudeh groups late the night before,
the soldiers had beaten them with rifle butts and made them
shout, "Long live the Shan."  The station continued to feel
that the "project was not quite dead" since General Zahedi
General [Guilanshah], the Rashidian brothers, and Colonel
[Farzanegan] were still determined to press action.
     Now, on the morning of 17 August, the press was again
on the streets.  Niruye Sevum stated that Schwarzkopf
engineered the plot with the Shah and that "simple-minded
Americans thought the Shah was a trump card." Dad and Shahed
both blamed the so-called coup on the government, and Keyhan
carried the text of an alleged Radio London statement quoting
Zahedi to the effect that he had a firman from the Shah and
that the Shah had left because his life was threatened.
Throughout the morning Iranians with good radios were able
to get word from foreign stations of statements that the
Shah had made in Baghdad.  He said:  "What has taken place
in Iran cannote be considered a coup d'etat in the real sense."
The Shad said he had issued his orders for the dismissal of
Dr. Mossadeq under the prerogatives given to him by the
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constitution, and had appointed General Zahedi in his
place.  He went on to say that he had not abdicated and
that he was confident of the loyalty of the Iranian people
to him.  This line was what the station had in mind, if
less strong than desired; and the Baghdad papers hinted
that painful, bloody events were still to come in Iran.
The station suggested that Imam Khalasi, religious divine
at Baghdad, and the Agha Khan be enlisted to give the Shah
moral backing, while Headquarters, on State Department
instructions, continued to refuse permission for direct
US contact with the Shah.  In the meantime the US Ambassa-
dor to Iraq, Burton Berry, reported on his conversation
with the Shah on the evening of the 16th.  His statements,
made on his own initiative, were quite in line with sugges-
tions reaching him after the event.
     About 1000 hours a considerable body of the troops
that had been dispersed throughout the city were called
back to their barracks, as the government was certain the
situation was well in hand.  At 1030 hours Radio Tehran
called up General Zahedi to surrender to the authorities,
and then began broadcasting lists of those arrested as
having taken part in the abortive coup or having had some
connection with those events.  The separate lists, includ-
ing those of the next day, contained the following names
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(those underlined indicate the individuals who were known to
the station to be engaged in the coup attempt):
    [Acting Minister of Court Abul Ghassem Amini
     Colonel Novzari, Commander of 2nd Armored Brigade
     Colonel Zand-Karimi, Chief of Staff of 2nd Mountain
          Brigade
     Commander Poulad Daj of the Police
     Colonel Nematollah Nasiri, Commander of Imperial
          Guards
     Lt. Colonel Azamudeh, Reg. CO 1st Mountain Brigade
     Colonel Parvaresh, head of the Officers' Club
     1st Lieutenant Niahi
     Mr. Perron, Swiss subject
     General Nadr Batmangelich, retired
     Colonel Hadi Karayi, Commander of Imperial Guards
          at Namsar
     General Shaybani, retired
     Rahim Hirad, Chief of Shah's private secretariat
     Soleiman Behbudi, Chief of Shah's household
     Lt. Colonel Hamidi, Asst. Director of Police visa section
     Colonel Mansurpur, Squadron Leader (cavalry)
     Colonel Rowhani, Chief of Staff of 3rd Mountain Brigade
     Captain Baladi
     1st Lieutenant Naraghi
     Captain Shaghaghi
     Captain Salimi
     1st Lieutenant Eskandari
     1st Lieutenant Jafarbey
     Mr. Ashtari
     Mr. Mohammed Jehandari
     1st Lieutenant Rauhani
     Dr. Mozaffar Baqai]
     Rumors circulated to the effect that the arrested
officers were to be hanged on 20 August, and throughout
the unit commands of the Tehran garrison, the police, and
the gendarmerie, officers met to discuss the situation.
Several of them resolved to risk all to attempt to rescue
their friends.
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     The station devoted a great deal of effort during
the day to circulating photostatic copies of the firman--
particularly among the army--and in trying to arrange
for more and more press coverage.  It was now obvious
that public knowledge of the existence of the firmans
was having an effect.  Everyone was asking questions:
"Was it true that the Shah had issued the firmans?  If so,
why was Mossodeq lying about it?  Wasn't that a most
reprehensible thing to do?"
     At 1325 hours Fatemi held a press conference at
which he dealt with the flight of the Shah to Iraq, read
the abjectly pleading letter from arrested Acting Minister
of Court Armini, and stated that 14 officers had been arrested.
His more detailed views on the current situation were ex-
pressed in an editorial in Bakhtar Emruz and were in the
main a repetition of his previous scurrilou attacks against
the Shah.  He wrote such words as, "O traitor Shah, you
shameless person, you have completed the criminal history
of the Pahlevi reign.  The people...want to drag you from
behind your desk to the gallows."
     Early in the afternoon, Ambassador Henderson arrived
in Tehran from Beirut.  On the way out to the airport to
meet him, members of the Embassy passed the site of the
bronze statue of Reza Shah at the end of the avenue of
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that name.   Only the boots of the figure remained on the
pedestal.  A passing truck was dragging behind it the horse
from the equestrian statue of the same ruler that had stood
in Sepah Square.  In the crowds engaged in this activity,
the Tudeh were obviously in the majority.
     On behalf of the government, Henderson was welcomed
by Dr. Gholam Hosein Mossadeq, son of the Prime Minister,
and by Dr. Alemi, Minister of Labor.  At 1630 hours the
station sent off a cable giving a general survey of the
local situation which, although it foresaw Mossadeq's
position strengthened for the next few weeks, did insist
that a policy of opposition to him be continued.  Near the
end of the afternoon, the government used the voice of a
religious leader, Sadr Balaghi, to attack the Shah over
Radio Tehran.
     The evening was a most active and trying time for the
station.  Principal agents [Keyvani and Djalili] were reached
and given instructions.  Within the Embassy compound,
Roosevelt and Carroll held a prolonged council of war with
the heads of their team:  General Zahedi and Ardeshir
Zahedi, General [Guilanshah,] the three Rashidian brothers,
and Colonel [Farzanegan].  These teammates were, when re-
quired, smuggled in and out of the compound in the bottom
of cars and in closed jeeps.  A few hundred yards away
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Ambassador Henderson and General McClure were out in the
garden in front of the residency, and Roosevelt wore a
path back and forth to reassure them that no Persians were
hidden out in the compound, so that they could in all hon-
esty so inform Mossadeq if the question were asked.  The
council of war went on for about four hours, and in the
end it was decided that some action would be taken on
Wednesday the 19th.  As preparation for this effort, several
specific activities were to be undertaken.  In the field of
political action, it was planned to send the Tehran cleric
[Ayatollah Behbehani] to Qum to try to persuade the supreme
cleric, Ayatollah Borujerdi, to issue a fatwa (religious
decree) calling for a holy war against Communism, and also
to build up a great demonstration on Wednesday on the theme
that it was time for loyal army officers and soldiers and
the people to rally to the support of religion and the
throne.  In the field of military action, support from
outside of Tehran seemed essential.  Colonel [Farzanegan]
was sent off in a car driven by a station agent (US national
Gerald Towne) to [Kermanshah, a distance of 400 miles,] to
persuade Colonel [Timur Bakhtiar,] commanding officer of the
[Kermanshah] garrison, to declare for the Shah.  Zahedi, with
Carroll, was sent to Brigadier General [Zargham] at [Isfahan]
with a similar request.  Through station facilities these
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messengers were provided with identification papers and
travel papers which stood up under inspection.  All those
leaving the compound were also given station-prepared
curfew passes.
     Throughout the long hours of 17 August, there seemed
little that Headquarters could do to ease the pangs of
despair.  A wire sent to the station in the afternoon
expressed the strong feeling that Roosevelt, in the interest
of safety, should leave at the earliest moment, and it went
on to express distress over the bad luck.  At about the
same time, an operational immediate cable went out to
Ambassador Beery in Baghdad with guidance concerning his
future meetings with the Shah.  Propaganda guidance was
sent to the stations in Karachi, New Delhi, Cairo, Damascus,
Istanbul, and Beirut to the effect that the Zahedi govern-
ment was the only legal one.  Just after midnight Headquarters
urged a Paris Station officer in southern France to get in
touch with the Agha Khan at once, in order to urge the latter
to send a wire to the Shah expressing his strongest moral
support.  Much later, Headquarters learned that contact
had been established, but there was not the hoped-for outcome.
The Agha Khan had at once stated that a ruler who left his
throne and country would never return, and after his state-
ment no effort was made to sell him on the idea of backing
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the Shah.  Of course, he was later delighted to hear that
the Shah did get his throne back after all.
     At Nicosia the SIS refused to give up hope, and bucked
against their own office in London and against the Foreign
Office.  Darbyshire continued to try to get permission to
got to Baghdad.  While the persistence and apparent faith
shown by the SIS station at Nicosia was altogether admira-
ble, it should be remembered that they had nothing to lose
if the cause had been pressed to ultimate failure and dis-
closure.
     The 18th was to be the most trying day for every person
in every country who was aware of the project.  At 0730 hours
that morning the Shah left Baghdad for Rome on a regular BOAC
commercial flight.  It would be some hours before this news
reched Tehran.  In Tehran the day opened with small bands
roaming the streets.  The Tudeh managed to ransack the Pan-
Iranist Party headquarters ([Keyvani/Djalili] claim credit
for this incident) located near the Majlis Square, and then
there were minor clashes between gangs of the Tudeh and the
Third Force (a Marxist, non-Tudeh opposition group).
     Morning papers appeared about as usual, although very
few opposition sheets were available since secret police
were posted in all printing shops.  Those papers supporting
Mossadeq announced that the Pahlevi dynasty had come an
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end, while [Ettelaat (despite assurances from its publisher
to support the station's line)] wrote that the nation ex-
pressed its violent disapproval of the coup which was in
foreign interests.  [Dad continued its really remarkable
efforts by reprinting the firman and an interview with
Zahedi.] Shahed ran a copy of the firman, and Keyhan ran
two brief notes on Zahedi's claims.  Shojat, replacement
for Besuye Ayandeh and, hence, the leading organ of the
Tudeh Party, printed a statement by the Central Committee
of the Tudeh Party--the first such statement to appear for
some weeks.  In this statement the party blamed the recent
events on Anglo-American intrigue, and added that the watch-
word for the day must be:  "...Down with the Monarchy!  Long
live the democratic republic!"  During the morning the AP
correspondent wired out a story, destined to get consider-
able play abroad, which included Zahedi's statement to the
officers of the Iranian Army:  "Be ready for sacrifice and
loss of your lives for the maintenance of independence and
of the monarchy of Iran and of the holy religion of Islam
which is now being threatened by infidel Communists."
     Military communiques read over Radio Tehran indicated
that continuing efforts were being made by the government to
firm up its control.  One announcement offered a reward of
100,000 rials for information as the whereabouts of
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General Zahedi, [a second demanded that retired officer
Colonel Abat Farzanegan appear before the military govern-
ment] and a third was a reminder that all demonstrations
were forbidden by the government.  At 1030 hours General
Riahi, Chief of Staff, met with the high ranking officers
of the army in the lecture hall of the Military School and
read them the riot act, stressing that they must be faith-
ful to the government.
     Personnel at the Tehran Station, while continuing to
make every effort to carry out its decision of the 16th,
were also planning for eventualities.  One message to
Headquarters asked that the means for a clandestine evacu-
ation of up to 15 people from Iran be prepared.  Another
cited local military opinion that officers would carry out
instructions broadcast by the Shah, and then went on to
put it up to Headquarters as to whether the station should
continue with TPAJAX or withdraw.  Nicosia commiserated
over the initial failure and stated that they, personally,
were continuing to do all they could to induce London to
continue to support station efforts.  This message was
followed by a report on the Shah's statements at Baghdad,
and by still another to the effect that SIS Nicosia was
asking London's assent to urge the Shah's return on pil-
grimage to the holy shrines in Iraq where he would be in
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direct contact with Iranian divines resident there.
     During the afternoon most of the news was not of
action but of statements from various sources.  At his
press conference Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi
asserted that there had been serious anti-Shah riots in
Baghdad--a complete lie.  At 1500 hours the Shah arrived
in Rome, where he was to make statements to the press which
followed a middle ground.  These statements did not dash
the hopes of his supporters, but neither were they a call
to action.  Also, in the afternoon, Radio Moscow carried
the text of the appeal of the Central Committee of the
Tudeh Party as it had been printed that morning in Shojat.
     In the evening, violence flared in the streets of
Tehran. Just what was the major motivating force is impos-
sible to say, but it is possible to isolate the factors
behind the distrubances.  First, the flight of the Shah
brought home to the populace in a dramatic way how far
Mossadeq had gone, and galvanized the people into an irate
pro-Shah force.  Second, it seems clear that the Tudey
Party overestimated its strength in the situation.  This
fault may have been that of the Soviet liaison people, of
of the leaders of the Tudeh party, or of the rank and file.
During the day the Party not only had defiled statues of
the monarchy, but also had erected their own flags at
certain points.  Party members had also torn down street
signs in which the Pahlevi dynasty was mentioned or which
commemorated events in the reign of Reza Shah, and had
replaced them with "popular" names.  The party seemed
ready for an all-out effort to bring in a peoples' democ-
racy, believing either that Mossadeq would not challenge
them or that they could outfight him in the streets.
Third, the Mossadeq government was at last beginning to
feel very uneasy about is alliance with the Tudeh Party.
The Pan-Iranists were infuriated and the Third Force was
most unhappy about the situation.  Fourth, the climax was
now approaching of the [Keyvani/Djalili] campaign of alleged
Tudeh terrorism.  (Details of this campaign have been given
on earlier pages.)  On this evening [Keyvani/Djalili] had
gangs of alleged Tudehites on the streets with orders to
loot and smash shops on Lalezar and Amirieh streets when-
ever possible, and to make it clear that this was the Tudeh
in action.
     During the evening all these factors came together in
ferment.  Security forces were given orders to clear the
streets and serious fighting resulted.  Friends of Colonel
[Hamidi] in the Police Department exceeded instructions in
preventing Tudeh vandalism by beating up Tudehites and
shouting for the Shah.
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     The Tudeh did seem to take rapid cognizance of the
facts that a covert action was being staged, and that
their members were not strong enough to fight the police.
They brought people out who tried to argue demonstrators
into going home.
     Headquarters spend a day featured by depression and
despair.  The immediate direction of the project moved
from the Branch and Division to the highest level.  At the
end of the morning a handful of people worked on the
draft of a message which was to call off the operation.
As the message was finally sent, in the evening, it was
based on the Department of State's tentative stand:
"that the operation has been tried and failed," the posi-
tion of the United Kingdom that:  "we must regret that
we cannot consider going on fighting" and Headquarters'
positon that, in the absence of strong recommendations to
the contrary from Roosevelt and Henderson, operations
against Mossadeq should be discontinued.
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                    S E C R E T
VIII.  "THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS"
     While on the 18th only [Dr. Baghai's paper Shahed] had
published the imperial firman naming Zahedi as Prime Minis-
ter, on 19 August, as soon as the city was awake, early
risers could see photostats or type-set copies of the
firman in the papers Setareh Islam, Asia Javanan, Aram,
Mard-i-Asia, Mellat-i-Ma, and the Journal de Tehran.  The
first four of these papers, and Shahed and Dad in addition,
ran an alleged interview with Zahedi which stressed that his
government was the only legal one in existence--an interview
that had been fabricated by [Djalili].  Somewhat later in the
morning the first of many thousand of broadsheets which carried
a photostatic copy of the firman and the text of the Zahedi
statement appeared in the streets.  Although each of these
newspapers had a normal circulation of restricted size, the
news they carried was undoubtedly flashed through the city by
word of mouth, for before 0900 hours pro-Shah groups were
assembling in the bazaar area.  Members of these groups had
not only made their personal choice between Mossadeq and the
Shah, but they were stirred up by the Tudeh activity of the
preceding day and were ready to move.  They needed only
leadership.
     Even before the day had dawned [Keyvani and Djalili]
having been informed that a pro-Shah statement by the
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ranking religous leader, Ayatollah Borujerdi, might be
forthcoming during the day, had made definite preparations
to utilize any such statement.  [Djalili] and two of their
most enegetic sub-agents, [Mansur Afshar and Majidi] were
down at the bazaar section with a jeep and trucks ready
to set out for Qazvin.  Their plan was to print broadsheets
at this town some 85 miles west of Tehran should it appear
that the Mossadeq government had increased its attempted
strangelhold on the urban press.  As soon as they notice
that the pro-Shah groups were gathering, [Djalili, Majidi,]
[and Rezali, another sub-agent] rushed to supply the needed
leadership.  [Djalili] accompanied one group in its progress
toward the Majlis, and on the way incited them to set fire
to the offices of Bakhtar-i-Emruz, the semi-official paper
owned by Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi, which on the
17th and 18th had printed most bitter and scurrilous attacks
on the person of the Shah.  About the same time [Afshar] led
other elements toward the offices of the Tudeh papers
Shahbaz, Besuye Ayandeh, and Javanan-i-Democrat, all of
which were thoroughly sacked.
     The news that something quite startling was happening
spread at great speed throughout the city.  Just when it
reached Mossadeq, who was meeting with members of his
cabinet, is not known.  By 0900 hours the station did have
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this news, and by 1000 hours word had come in that both
the Bakhtar-i-Emruz office and the headquarters of the
Iran Party had been ransacked.  Also about 1000 hours
contact was established with the Rashidian brothers who
seemed full of glee.  Their instructions, as well as orders
directed to [Keyvani and Djalili] were now to attempt to
swing security forces to the side of the demonstrators
and to encourage action for the capture of Radio Tehran.  To
what extent the resulting activity stemmed from specific
efforts of all our agents will never be known, although
many more details of the excitement of the day may slowly
come to light.
     Fairly early in the morning Colonel [Demavand] one of
those involved in the staff planning, appeared in the square
before the Majlis with a tank which he had secured from the
Second Battalion of the Second Armored Brigade, [a battalion]
[originally committed to the operation] Lt. Col.[Khosro-]
[Panah] and Captain [Ali Zand] were on hand and were joined
by two trucks from the same battalion, while members of
the disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove
through the streets.  By 1015 hours there were pro-Shah
truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares.
     While small groups had penetrated to the north of
the city by 0930 hours, the really large groups, armed
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with sticks and stones, came from south Tehran and merged
as they reached Sepah Square in their progress north toward
the center of the city.  There the troops held in readiness
fired hundred of shots over the heads of the crowd, but
apparently were not willing to fire at these partisans of
the Shah.  As a result the crowds were able to fan out
toward key points.  Just up Lalezar, a main shopping street,
the Saadi theater, long sponsored by the Tudeh Party, ws
burned.  The surging crowds of men, women, and children
were shouting, "Shah piruz ast," (The Shah is victorious).
Determined as thye seemed, a gay holiday atmosphere pre-
vailed, and it was if exterior pressures had been 
released so that the true sentiments of the people showed
through.  The crowds were not, as in earlier weeks, made
up of hoodlums, but included people of all classes--many
well dressed--led or encouraged by other civilians.  Trucks
and busloads of cheering civilians streamed by and when,
about noon, five tanks and 20 truckloads of soldiers joined
it, the movement took on a somewhat different aspect.  As
usual, word spread like lightning and in other parts of the
city pictures of the Shah were eagerly display.  Cars went
by with headlights burning as a tangible indication of
loyalty to the ruler.
     At about 1030 hours, General Riahi informed Mossadeq
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that he no longer controlled the army and asked for relief,
but Mossadeq visited his office and told him to hold firm.
Colonel Momtaz was able to assemble only one battalion
and disposed that force around Mossadeq's house.
     About noon separate elements composing the crowds
began to receive direct leadership from the military and
police.  Those army officers previously alerted to take
part in the military operations provided by TPAJAX were
now taking separate but proper individual action.  By 1300
hours the central headquarters of the telegraph office on
Sepah Square had fallen into royalist hands.  The AP man
filed a cable there shortly after 1300 hours giving a brief
report on the fighting.  Then fighting moved a few hundred
yars away to the police headquarters and to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs building just across the wide avenue
from it.  Defenders of the police station held out until
nearly 1600 hours.
     Also about noon, Roosevelt went to the houses where
Generals Zahedi and [Guilanshah] were in hiding.  They were
both fully informed of the events of the morning and told
to wait for instructions.  An hour later Carroll and
Persian-speaking Major William R. Keyser (Assistant US
Military Attache) reported on the military situation.  By
early afternoon more of the important objectives in the
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center of the city, such as the press and propaganda
offices, had been taken over by the royalists.  With
important facilities under control, it was possible
to begin dispatch of streams of telegrams to the provinces
urging them to rise in support of the Shah.  Even during
the greatest heat of the day there was no slacekening of
activity.  Station agent [Djalili] was still on the streets
and, finding a crowd on Firdausi Avenue, urge them to go
to military police headquarters and demand the release of
Colonel [Nasiri] and General [Batmanlegich].  This they did.
The soldiers on guard put no resistance.  Meanwhile
agent General [Nakhi (Qods Nakhai)] was touring the city in
his car attempting to round up members of the Imperial
Guard, soldiers who later took part in the attack on
Mossadeq's house.  Early in the afternoon the crowds did
collect around approaches to Mossadeq's residence.
By this time he had probably already left.
     Radio Tehran was a most important target, for its
capture not only sealed the success at the capital, but
was effective in bringing the provincial cities quickly
into line with the new government.  During the heat of
activiy, it broadcast dull discussions of cotton prices,
and finally music only.  Already at 1030 hours there had
been an inerruption of its schedule, but it was not until
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early afternoon that people began streaming up the borad
avenue toward their goal, some three miles to the north.
Buses and trucks bore full loads of civilians, army offi-
cers and policemen.  Sheer weight of numbers seemed to
have overwhelmed the defenders of the radio station, and
after a brief struggle in which three deaths were reported,
at 1412 hours the station was in royalist hands.  At 1420
hours it broadcast the first word of the success of the
royalist effort, including a reading of the firman.  A
stream of eager speakers came to the microphone.  Some
represented elements upon whom reliance had been placed
in TPAJAX planning, while others were quite unknown to the
station.  Among the former elements were opposition papers
[Bakhtiar and Zelzeleh,] one of [Ayatollah Kashani's sons,] and
[likeh Etozadi.]  Among spontaneous supporters of the
Shah to come to the microphone were Colonel Ali Pahlevan
and Major Husand Mirzadian; their presence was the proof--
no longer required--of the truth of the TPAJAX assumption
that the army would rally to the Shah under just such
circumstnces.  For some period of time, Radio Tehran was
alternately on and off the air.  It may have been finally
put into good operating condition by those engineers who,
as one speaker said, had come along for just such a purpose.
Here, as in so many other phases, chance served the cause
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very well, for, hd the original defenders of the radio
station managed to damage its facilities, the firm con-
trol of the capital might have been delayed.
     At the Embassy, station personnel were following the
broadcasts of Radio Tehran, and were elated when it sudden-
ly fell into royalist hands.  Once again Roosevelt set off
toward the hiding place of his valuable charges, meeting
them a little before 1600 hours.  Told it was time for them
to play an active role, both promptly dressed for the
occasion.  It was agreed that General Zahedi should meet
General [Guilanshah] at 1630 hours on a certain street corner
with a tank, and should proceed wih this vehicle to Radio
Tehran where Zahedi would speak to the nation.  General
[Guilanshah] was taken from the house by Major [Keyser] in a 
jeep; and then along the way, he spied two Air Force
officers, he asked to be let out, saying he would take
care of everything.  Right on the street these officers
greeted him warmly and when he said he would like a tank,
they soon rounded one up.  Asked if he knew where Zahedi
was, he said he did and that he had an appointment to
meet him at 1630 hours.  His comrades pressured him to
make an immediate rendezvous with Zahedi, so he directed the
tank toward the compound in which the house sheltering
Zahedi was situated.  Zahedi emerged and the tank set off
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again.  At 1725 hours Zahedi spoke over Radio Tehran, and
this speech was repeated a little after 2100 hours that
evening.
     Howevere, Zahedi had been preceded on the air by [sta-]
[tion agent Farzanegan.]  In the dash back from [Karmenshah]
[Farzanegan's] car had broken down completely at about the 
halfway mark, but he was able to get an uncomfortable ride
the rest of the way in an oil tank truck.  He arrived in
Tehran by morning and contacted the station.  At the latter's
urgent instructions, [Farzanegan] sent a telegram to Colonel
[Bakhtiar] which message contained a code phrase* signalling
[Bakhtiar] to lead his division on forced march to Tehran.
An interesting sidelight concerning [Bakhtiar's] march to
Tehran** occurred en route to Hamadan.  The division entered
Hamadan just as the local Tudeh Party was holding a large
pro-Mossadeq demonstration.  [Bakhtiar] quelled the demon-
stration in short order.  The astonishment of the Tudeh
on seeing the [Kermanshah] division enter Hamadan was ex-
ceeded only by that of the town mayor.
     Within Tehran proper the last nests of resistance were
being subdued.  The Chief of Staff headquarters gave in at
_____________________
*    "Am coming today to see my sick sister."
**   The division actually arrived after Tehran was
     already in Royalist hands.
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the end of the afternoon, and befofe 1900 hours Mossadeq's
house was taken and soon turned into a shambles.  Its
belongings were dragged out into the street and sold to
passersby.  Reactions were also being reported from the
provinces.  At 1450 hours the regional station at Sanandaj
in Kurdestan suddenly went off the air.  At 1555 hours
Radio Tabriz reported the capture of the station itself
by forces loyal to the Shah, and stated that ll of Azer-
baijan was in the hands of the army.  As it continued
broadcasting, it became apparent that one of the speakers,
[Mohammad Deyhim, head of the Fedakaran-i-Azerbaijan] and
an effective sub-agent of station assets had played an
important role in events at Tabriz.  By 1800 hours the
station at Isfahan was on the air with strong statements
in favor of the Shah and Zahedi by such elements as local
editors, a member of Baghai's Toiler's Party, religious
leaders, and staff officers--all groups which we had hoped
would react in this fashion.  Not until 2000 hours did the
radio station at Kerman proclaim loyalty to the new govern-
ment.  Meshed Radio was not heard from at all, but the
religious-minded town turned Loyalist almost immediately
after the news of the change had been sent out over Radio
Tehran.  Known Tudehites were pursued and shops of Tudeh
sympathizers looted.
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     Colonel [Farzanegan] following Zahedi's instruction,
and Carroll now closed up the operation.  While [Batmangelich]
had [been named Chief of Staff, Farzanegan]--at that office--
kept in touch by phone and placed known supporters of
TPAJAX in command of all units of the Tehran garrison,
seized key military targets, and executed the arrest lists.
     As the afternoon drew to its close, Radio Tehran seemed
to get down to a less haphazard schedule.  From 1800 hours
on, it made short announcements of government appointees.
At 1845 hours the Associated Press representative and the
New York Times man made fairly brief statements on the
events of the day, intended for their home offices.  Brief
government communiques dealt with curfew hours, contained
warnings against demonstrations, etc.  A general news sum-
mary at 2100 hours was followed by a statement from Zahedi,
installed in the office of the Chief of Police, and before
2200 hours the station had signed off for the night.  The
hectic day was over and curfew now in effect.  Lives had
been lost, but not nearly as many as stated in the white
heat of the actual events.  The security forces were
firmly in control and well prepared to destroy any counter-
effort.
     How had other interested parties weathered the exciting
day?  One such must have felt real anguish.  This was the
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USSR and its people in Iran.  Radio Moscow lagged far
behind the rest of the world and did not put out a sum-
mary of the day's events at Tehran until 2300 hours GMT.
Its Persian program that reach Iran early in the after-
noon was built around the text of the earlier Pravda
article entitled "The Failure of the American Adventure
in Iran," and this program was repeated early in the
evening.  The same Pravda article was broadcast through-
out the late afternoon and early evening from Moscow in
English, Arabic, Bulgarian, Polish, Czech and Slovak, German,
Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, and Turkish, although by that
time nearly everyone of its listeners must have known that
this materila was no longer applicable.
     The other parties to the original plan felt elated,
and possibly self-satisfied.  While the reactions of
the Shah at Rome are rather beyond the scope of this account,
one or two of his remarks are worth citin as they bear
upon some of the original assumptions of the TPAJAX plan.
He said, "It was my people who have shown me that they were
faithful to the monarchy and that two and a half years of
false propaganda were not enough," and again, "My country
didn't want the Communists and therefore have been faithful
to me."
     At Nicosia the earliest FBIS intercepts had not been
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translated and distributed until nearly mid-afternoon local
time.  As word passed from Leavitt to Darbyshire, he latter
became so excited that he drove his friend right to his
]
office outside of the town, something he and his associates
had always avoided doing in earlier weeks.
     Headquarters had its first word of what the day was
to bring just before 0900 hours when someone burst in from
the hall pouring out what at first seemed to be a bad joke--
in view of the depression that still hung on from the day
before--the news that Mossadeq was on the way out.  Through-
out the morning, the afternoon, and until late that night
people hurried down the corridors with fresh slips of ticker
tape.  During the entire day only two TPAJAX cables were
received from the station.  However, it was a day that should
never have ended for it carried with it such a sense of ex-
citement, of satisfaction, and of jubilation that it is
doubtful whether any other can come up to it.  Our trump card
had prevailed and the Shah was victorious.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section IX had no redactions.
Section X had one redaction: the names of Djalili and Keyvani
Appendices A, B, C and E had no redactions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T 
                    APPENDIX D
                     Report on
             Military Planning Aspect
                     of TPAJAX
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    S E C R E T 
Military Aspects  Operation TPAJAX
     In early summer 1953 Carroll was assigned the task of
planning military aspects of TPAJAX.  Several assumptions
first had to be taken into account:
   A.  Operation would be joint operation with SIS.
   B.  Operation would rely heavily upon military
       willingness to fight for Shah.
   C.  Armed forces in Iran under Mossadeq very strongly
       led by pro-Mossadeq officers.
   D.  Operational assets within armed forces controlled
       by SIS o CIA were not at the outset capable of
       executing the military objectives of TPAJAX.
Planning tasks which had to be accomplished:
   E.  Detailed study of the leading military personali-
ties in Iran.
   F.  Detailed study of order of battle of the Iranian
       Army with emphasis on the Tehran garrison.
   G.  Detailed military study of communications, supply
       dumps, ammunition depots, command structure Iranian
       armed forces, time and distance factors within
       Tehran and throughout Iran, including road and
       rail nets.
   H.  Detailed study military assets possessed by SIS.
   I.  Operational assets to be developed by CIA; almost
       no military assets were then under CIA control.
                    S E C R E T 
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                    S E C R E T 
     George Carroll in Washington began a staff study pre-
liminary to drafting a military plan.  Persons who were
particularly helpful in the preparation of this study were
Jerome F. Begert, Willima Fowlkes, Jr., Eugene E. Cilsdorf,
Elizabeth E. McNeill, Betty J. Caldwell, and Arthur W.
Dubois.  This group constituted a branch task force.
     Throughout the summer cables were exchanged with the
Tehran Station in an effort to procure the latest informa-
tion on the order of battle of Iranian armed forces.  The
Iranian desk, G-2, Pentagon, was queried in an effort to 
obtain whatever information they could get which might help
accomplish the above tasks.  Information available in G-2
was almost non-existent.  Biographical information on
leading Army figures was extremely scanty.  G-2 did not
possess a tactical map showing the military situation in
the city of Tehran.  It must also be admitted that CIA
too was unprepared for this type of operational plan and
a heavy burden had to be laid upon the field at a time
when the Tehran Station was already occupied with the
opening phases of TPAJAX.
     The primary difficulty in staff planning at this time
was the fact that neither the field nor headquarters pos-
sessed detailed information on military figures in Iran.
CIA had heretofore never placed particular emphasis on
                        2
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                    S E C R E T 
that type of operational reporting, and we learned as
the days went by how extremely important, indeed vital,
that type of reporting is.
     Throughout the month of June, the branch task force
gradually was supplied information from the field which
made it possible to begin thinking about the use of the
forces within the Tehran garrison.  The field reported
that Tehran was garrisoned by five brigades, three infan-
try mountain brigades, and two armored brigades.  In
addition, four other military forces existed:  the Gen-
darmerie, the police, the armed customs guard, and the
forces under the military governor.  It was also learned
that the young Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Taghi
Riahi, and his staff had been drawn primarily from members
of the pro-Mossadeq Iran Party.  It had to be assumed that
the chief of staff and officers within all sections of his
staff were under control of Mossadeq.  I has also to be
assumed that at least three out of five of the brigade
commanders in Tehran were completely under General Riahi's
control.  Those assumptions proved to be correct. SIS
reported that Colonel [Ashrafi, military governor of Tehran
and commanding officer of the Third Mountain Brigade,] could
be relied upon; this later turned out to be incorrect but
for staff planning purposes in June it had to be assumed
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                    S E C R E T 
correct.  It was disappointing to learn that Major General
Zahedi, Prime Minister designate under TPAJAX, possessed
almost no military assets.  General Zahedi, therefore,
could not be relied upon to execute his own staff plan.
     In the early part of July, the branch task force was
able to draw up a plan designed to neutralize the Tehran
garrison and to isolate all other brigades in Iran.  It
appeared at that time that only a very small force could
be relied upon by CIA, primarily the Thrid Mountain Brigade
in Tehran.  Therefore, our first staff plan was based upon
the use of the Third Mountain Brigade for the capture and
arrest of the officers assigned to the Chief of Staff, as
well as the arrest and neutralization of all other forces
in the city of Tehran.
     Because of the fact that CIA did not possess any mili-
tary assets capable at that time of helping TPAJAX, it was
suggested that Station agent Colonel [Aban Farzanegan] be
given special training.  [Farzanegan] was trained in a safe-
house in Washington with the assistance of instructors from
the training division.  [Farzanegan] had no idea what lay
before him.  He had never previously participated in any
military action, although he had been superbly trained [in]
[logistics in the Command and General Staff School at Ft.]
[Leavenworth. Further, he had been assistant military]
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                    S E C R E T 
[attache for Iran in Washington for several years, and]
before that had been the [Iranian liaison officer to the
[United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran.]
[He, therefore, had a good grasp of American army methods.]
[He was a Signal Corps officer by profession.]  Because of
the extreme sensitivity of TPAJAX, [Farzanegan] was given
the lie detector test.  In early July, [Farzanegan] was
directed to go to Tehran and to renew all of his old
contacts within the Iranian Army.
     In June, Carroll was assigned TDY to Cyprus to work
with Donald Wilber, NEA Planning Officer, and SIS.  Carroll
concentrated on military planning aspects with SIS, and
ascertained the extent to which SIS could control Iran
military assets.  Headquarters was extremely concerned
because the plan assumed that the Shah would sign a firman
dismissing Mossadeq without being certain that his Army
officers and men were well organized enough to force
Mossadeq from office in the event Mossadeq did not obey
the firman, since CIA and SIS did not possess military
assets capable of being organized into an effective fight-
ing force and it was feared that the development of new
military assets adn their organization into a fighting
force could not be accomplishe in time.
     SIS in Cyprus stated that it did have several important
                         5
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                    S E C R E T 
friends among the military, but the only officer among their
friends then in a position to be of assistance to us was
Colonel [Ashrafi.]  SIS agreed that our preliminary military
plan must be based on the assumption that Colonel [Ashrafi]
would cooperate.  Military Planner Carroll doubted whether
one brigade out of five would be sufficient to overthrow
Mossadeq and stated frankly that our military plan must be
viewed as extremely tentative; he also stated that he hoped
upon arrival in Tehran to find other assets in addition to
Colonel [Ashrafi.]  From the military point of view the dis-
cussions in Cyprus were extremely disappointing because they
made it clear that we wanted to accomplish much but had very
little with which to accomplish it.  It also made it clear
that Carroll and Colonel [Farzanegan] should arrive in Tehran
as soon as possible where the military plan would be neces-
sity have to be completed.
     On 15 July Carroll left for London where SIS studied
the military plan for two days and approved it with little
comment.  They agreed that, if TPAJAX were to succeed, CIA
must start from scratch adn work quickly to find powerful
friends among Iranian Army troop commanders.  In London,
Carroll with Major Keen and two other British Army officers
on duty with SIS, went over two military plans which had
been drawn by the branch task force.
     Both of our military plans used the same arrest lists
                         6
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 S E C R E T 
for military and civilian persons in Tehran.  These lists
were compiled as a result of a long study of pro-Mossadeq
Iranians, and later proved to be at least 90 percent cor-
rect.  The British approved the arrest lists after their CE
expert and their biographical section studied them.  A
third arrest list, the Tudeh Arrest List, was studied very
carefully by SIS Tudeh Party experts and was approved with-
out addition.  It would seem that our appraisal of Iranians
must have been based upon approximately the same information.
     While these arrest lists were farmed out to SIS ex-
perts Carroll sat down to study the two military plans
with Major Keen and with the British major.  The first plan
was based upon the assumption that [Colonel Ashrafi] was a con-
trolled British agent [and that his Third Mountain Brigade would]
[follow his commands.]  After a detailed examination of the
Target List for Neutralization In the City of Tehran (machine
gun factory, Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Office of the
Chief of Staff, etc.), SIS stated that the targets we had
listed for neutralization were the correct ones and that we
had assigned duties for components of the Third Mountain
Brigade about as well as any other way they might suggest.
     We next turned to an examination of our second military
plan based upon the assumption that Carroll might be able
to develop assets in Tehran capable of controlling three
bridgades.  We all agreed that it would be extremely
                         7
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                    S E C R E T 
hazardous to base all of our hopes upon one brigade out
of the five in Tehran and that, if possible, we should
attempt to develop additional forces.  SIS approved this
plan and they then passed both plans up to a brigadier
who returned them next day without comment.
     During these discussions a cable arrived in London
via Cryprus from Tehran in which Tehran Station reported
General Zahedi's "military assets."  This message con-
firmed all of our fears.  For some time the Station had
been attempting to persuade General Zahedi to list his
military assets and to indicate how he hope to use them.
At last General Zahedi reported.  He claimed none of the
five brigades in Tehran.  His military plan assumed that he
might be able to use the Imperial Guard, some troops from
the Department of Army Transport, components from the De-
partment of Police, and components of the Armed Customs
Guard.  He also hoped that Colonel [Timur Bakhtiar] might
be able to bring troops to Tehran from [Kermanshah.]  SIS
asked Carroll to write for them an appreciation of Zahedi's
plan.  In that appraisal it was stated that he did not
believe the Shah would sign a firman dismissing Mossadeq
until Zahedi could indicate to him how Chief of Staff
Riahi's control over the Tehran garrison could be broken;
further, he felt that if TPAJAX were to succeed military
                         8
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                    S E C R E T 
assests must be developed within the five brigades in
Tehran.
     SIS agreed in London that military tasks should take
the following priority:
    1.  Seizure and occupation of designated points.
    2.  Execution of arrest and detention lists.
    3.  Neutralization of pro-Mossadeq military
        forces in Tehran.
    4.  Neutralization of the city of Tehran.
    5.  Reinforcement of pro-Zahedi forces in
        Tehran by forces outside of the city.
     These priorities were laid down because it was desired
that communications be knocked out as soon as possible in
order to prevent pro-Mossadeq forces and personnel from
communicating with each other.
     Carroll left London on the first available aricraft
following these conferences, arrived in Tehran on 21 July,
and got in touch with [Farzanegan.]
     Sifting through [Farzanegan's] operational contact
reports covering all of his important conversations in
Tehran [after his arrival from the United States], two offi-
cers were noted as being of especial promise.  These were
contact reports of conversations with Major General [Nadr
[Batmangelich] and with Colonel [Hassan Akhavi], both of whom
                         9
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                    S E C R E T 
were old and good friends of [Farzanegan].  These two officers
reflected the fear of the Tudeh party that was becoming gen-
eral after the Tudeh showing of 21 July.  Goiran, Goodwin, and
Carroll agreed that it was imperative that Carroll meet as
soon as possible with an officer appointed by Zahedi to work
on our military scheme.  Zahedi never did designate a military
secretariat, and it was necessary for us to develop our own.
     Because of General Zahedi's manifestly weak position
among the military then on active duty, and because it be-
came apparent that it would be necessary for CIA to seize
the initiative and to furnish him with a military plan and
military forces, the development of Colonel [Akhavi] was
stepped up.  [Farzanegan] was directed to determine what
assets Colonel [Akhavi] might be able to lead us to. Colonel
[Akhavi] first offered a "Plan A" which called for a military
coup d'etat without explaining how it was to be accomplished.
Then [Farzanegan] was pressed to persuade Colonel [Akhavi] to be
more realistic, and on 30 July he received from Colonel
[Akhavi] a plan which was more specific but still pitifully
inadequate.  Colonel [Akhavi] said he would execute arrests
and target lists, neutralize military installations and
non-cooperating forces within two hours; this was nonsense.
The most important thing Colonel [Akhavi] reported was that
he was in touch with three young colonels who might possess
                        10
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                    S E C R E T 
important strength within the Tehran garrison.  Colonel
[Akhavi] also told [Farzanegan] that General [Batmangelich]
lacked courage but would stiffen his back should the
Shah appoint him Chief of Staff.  Colonel [Akhavi] did not
mention General Zahedi and did not seem to be in touch
with him.  [Farzanegan] told Colonel Akhavi that he could
put Colonel [Akhavi] in touch with one or two Americans whom
he had met in the United States.
     At this time the Shah also indicated that he did not
have control of important military assets.
     Carroll met [Akhavi] and [Farzanegan] on 2 and 3 August and
begam [sic] staff planning.  Colonel [Akhavi] was full of desire to
do something, but had no idea of how to go about it.  He
said that he had friends who could control the Second and
Third Mountain Brigades but did not trust either Colonel
[Ashrafi], Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade
[and an alleged SIS asset], or Colonel Momtaz, Commanding
Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade.  Colonel [Akhavi]
reported that General [Batmangelich] had told him the day
before that if the Shah acted he was ready to perform any
service whatsoever and to die for the Shah if necessary.
After these early meetings with Colonel [Akhavi], it became
apparent that he, himself, was not in a position to command
anything and was only hoping that he might persuade his
                        11
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                    S E C R E T 
friends to do so.
     Carroll then met directly with Colonel [Akhavi] and
his friend.  The latter turned out to be Colonel [Zand-Karimi],
[Colonel Komtaz's deputy].  Colonel [Zand-Karimi] reported a
long list of assets within the Tehran garrison, principally
among deputy commanders of brigades and regimental com-
manders.  On 6, 7, and 8 August, Colonels [Akhavi, Zand-
Karimi, Farzanegan], and Mr. Carroll carried on staff plan-
ning based upon the units commanded by friends whom [Zand-
Karimi] claimed.  Colonel [Zand-Karimi] stated that his primary
friends were [Colonel Hamidi], of the Tehran police; [Colonel]
[Ordubadi], of the Tehran Gendarmerie District; and [Colonel]
[Mansurpur, Commanding Officer Iranian Cavalry].  He felt
certain that ultimate victory would be ours through these
friends, and through his friends who were regimental and
battalion commanders, among these were important unit
commanders in the Tehran garrison: [Colonel Rohani, Deputy]
[Commander of the Third Mountain Brigade; Lt. Colonel Khosro-]
[Panah, Commanding Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade]
[Infantry Regiment; Lt. Colonel Yusefi, who was soon to be
named Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade's
Infantry Regiment.]  Through these officers Colonel [Zand-
[Karimi] was in touch with every infantry battalion commander
in Tehran and with most of the company commanders; however,
                        12
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                    S E C R E T 
those officers had not been formed into an organization
and were not ready to overthrow Chief of Staff General
Riahi's firm control of the Terhran garrison which he ex-
ercized through the Brigade Commanders in Tehran.  For
instance, if we were to succeed we must arrest Colonel
Sharokh, Commanding Officer First Armored Brigade; Colonel
Parsa, Commanding Officer First Mountain Brigade; and
probably Colonel Ashrafi, Military Governor and Commanding
Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade.  Colonel Novzari,
Commanding Officer of the Second Armore Brigade would
probably remain neutral but we felt it imperative that his
deputy, Lt. Colonel Bahrami, be arrested.
     It therefore became clear from the military point of
view that success might depend upon whether or not General
Riahi succeeded in arresting our friends before we arrested
his, and that the test of strength would very largely rest
upon the amount of security we were able to maintain while
attempting to knit all of our friends into a functioning
team.
     It also was clear that we had to devise a scheme capable
of carrying our operations in the event our first platoon
of young officers was arrested.  Carroll therefore worked
for two nights with Colonels [Farzanegan and Zand-Karimi]
                        13
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                    S E C R E T 
devising a system which would work in the event our first
team was arrested.  The danger signal we adopted to alert
battalion and company commanders to take independent action
was the arrest of Colonel [Zand-Karimi] and of his closest
friends.  The weakness in our plan lay in the fact that the
station would not be in a position to contact battalion and
company commanders but would have to depend upon Colonel
[Zand-Karimi] to do the job.  While discussing this subject,
Colonel [Zand-Karimi] stated that he would be able to contact
lower unit commanders within 48 hours after receipt of the
Shah's firman.
     The hesitation of the Shah in signing the firman worked
to our advantage for it gave us several more important days
in which to discuss with Colonel [Zand-Karimi] the development
of our final staff plans which was based upon the use of the
units which his friends commanded.  This problem was compli-
cated by the fact that Colonel [Akhavi] became violently ill
and was later forced to retire to his bed.  As the climax
approached, tension increased and it is not inconceivable
that tension caused by fear had something to do with Colonel
[Akhavi's] illness.  Colonel [Akhavi] did remain on his feet
long enough to speak to the Shah on 9 August in an interview
which later proved vital to the success of the military phase 
of TPAJAX.  Until Colonel [Akhavi] saw the Shah, he was not
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                    S E C R E T 
certain that our friends in the Tehran garrison would act
without the Shah's approval.  However, after talking with
the Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] was able to tell Colonel [Zand-
Karimi] that the Shah did desire military support in the
event he should decide to sign the firman.
     Colonel [Akhavi] was asked by the Shah whether or not
the Army would back a firman dismissing Mossadeq.  Colonel
[Akhavi] told the Shah that he had been meeting with Carroll
and that a reasonable staff plan was being prepared, one
that assured victory if it were carried out properly.  The
Shah then asked [Akhavi] for the names of the officers who
would cooperate, and Colonel [Akhavi] reported the same names
which we had earlier submitted to the Shah through Asadollah
Rashidian.  He asked [Akhavi] to meet General Zahedi.
     In reporting the substance of his audience with the
Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] asked the station if the United States
would support General Zahedi.  He was told that it would.
Colonel [Zand-Karimi] also accepted General Zahedi.  Both
officers stated that they had not been in touch with General
Zahedi for several months but believed him to be a very good
leader.
     During the nights of 11, 12 and 13 August, staff plan-
ning continued based upon the use of forty line commanders
within the Tehran garrison.  Colonel [Akhavi] met General
                        15
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                    S E C R E T 
Zahedi who agreed that General [Batmangelich] might be chief
of staff.  General [Batmangelich] expressed the desire to
meet Carroll and to discuss plans with him, Farzanegan [in clear],
Colonel [Akhavi], and Colonel [Zand-Karimi].  This meeting
was postponed until we felt our staff plan was complete
enough for General [Batmangelich] to act upon it.
     On 11 August Zahedi asked [Akhavi] to have [Farzanegan]
come to see him.  General Zahedi and [Farzanegan] talked
for three hours.  [Farzanegan] reported that General Zahedi
was extremely appreciative of American assistance and
asked [Farzanegan] to act as liaison officer between him-
self and the Americans for military purposes; he also asked
him to become his officer in charge of the Military Bureau
which had been meeting with Carroll during the last week.
     On 12 August Farzanegan [in clear] took General [Batmangelich] to
see Zahedi, and General [Bamangelich] pledged General Zahedi
all assistance.  [Farzanegan] also took Colonel [Zand-Karmini]
to see Zahedi and the latter reported to General Zahedi
progress of military staff planning.  In retrospect it
would appear that under more favorable conditions we should
have spen more time going over the staff plan with Zahedi
and General [Batmangelich], for it was at this moment that
the military phase of TPAJAX passed into Zahedi's hands,
although Zahedi did not know any of the young officers
                        16
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                    S E C R E T 
involved and General [Batmangelich] knew only a few of them.
     During the afternoon of 15 August, Carroll met with
General [Batmangelich] and the Military Secretariat composed
of [Farzanegan,] Colonel [Akhavi,] and Colonel [Zand-Karimi].
The firmans were expected momentarily and much of the
conversation revolved around the question of how long it
would take Colonel [Zand-Karimi] to contact our friendly
forty line commanders.  After a long discussion everyone
agreed action should commence within 48 hours of the re-
ceipt of the firmans.  It was also agreed that Colonel
[Namiri, Commanding Officer of the Imperial Guard], would
deliver the firmans to Mossadeq after he had sent the
station a radio set attuned to Colonel [Zand-Karimi's]
command net.
     Colonel [Namiri] flew to Ramsar with the unsigned
firmans on 13 August.
                        17
                    S E C R E T 


 parzialmente, ostaggio di Khamamei e delle guardie della rivoluzione.
Non sono molto d'accordo. Se l'Iraq e gli iracheni sono laicizzati
come si ripete da mesi sui media questi elettori integralisti da dove
salterebbero fuori? Certo non si potra' prescidere dall'opinione
politica dei credenti, ma in quale democrazia cio' non avviene?
Quanto al paragone con l'Iran, non mi pare che in Iraq ci sia un clero
islamico numeroso, articolato e potente come c'era in Iran gia' prima
della rivoluzione.
Ciao
Ale

 della rivoluzione.
Probabilmente su questo punto hai ragione, vedremo che tipo di evoluzione
avra' la democrazia (o supposta tale) irakena.


 Russia,ecco perche' la Francia e la Russia sono contrari alla guerra
Con questa logica, anche Cheney dovrebbe essere contrario alla guerra.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A35751-2001Jun22&notFound=true
UNITED NATIONS -- During last year's presidential campaign, Richard B.
Cheney acknowledged that the oil-field supply corporation he headed,
Halliburton Co., did business with Libya and Iran through foreign
subsidiaries. But he insisted that he had imposed a "firm policy"
against trading with Iraq.
"Iraq's different," he said.
According to oil industry executives and confidential United Nations
records, however, Halliburton held stakes in two firms that signed
contracts to sell more than $73 million in oil production equipment
and spare parts to Iraq while Cheney was chairman and chief executive
officer of the Dallas-based company.
Two former senior executives of the Halliburton subsidiaries say that,
as far as they knew, there was no policy against doing business with
Iraq. One of the executives also says that although he never spoke
directly to Cheney about the Iraqi contracts, he is certain Cheney
knew about them.
 Mary Matalin, Cheney's counselor, said that if he "was ever in a
conversation or meeting where there was a question of pursuing a
project with someone in Iraq, he said, 'No.' "
"In a joint venture, he would not have reviewed all their existing
contracts," Matalin said. "The nature of those joint ventures was that
they had a separate governing structure, so he had no control over
them."
The trade was perfectly legal. Indeed, it is a case study of how U.S.
firms routinely use foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures to avoid
the opprobrium of doing business with Baghdad, which does not violate
U.S. law as long as it occurs within the "oil-for-food" program run by
the United Nations.
Halliburton's trade with Iraq was first reported by The Washington
Post in February 2000. But U.N. records recently obtained by The Post
show that the dealings were more extensive than originally reported
and than Vice President Cheney has acknowledged.
As secretary of defense in the first Bush administration, Cheney
helped to lead a multinational coalition against Iraq in the Persian
Gulf War and to devise a comprehensive economic embargo to isolate
Saddam Hussein's government. After Cheney was named in 1995 to head
Halliburton, he promised to maintain a hard line against Baghdad.
But in 1998, Cheney oversaw Halliburton's acquisition of Dresser
Industries Inc., which exported equipment to Iraq through two
subsidiaries of a joint venture with another large U.S. equipment
maker, Ingersoll-Rand Co.
The subsidiaries, Dresser-Rand and Ingersoll Dresser Pump Co., sold
water and sewage treatment pumps, spare parts for oil facilities and
pipeline equipment to Baghdad through French affiliates from the first
half of 1997 to the summer of 2000, U.N. records show. Ingersoll
Dresser Pump also signed contracts -- later blocked by the United
States -- to help repair an Iraqi oil terminal that U.S.-led military
forces destroyed in the Gulf War.
Former executives at the subsidiaries said they had never heard
objections -- from Cheney or any other Halliburton official -- to
trading with Baghdad.
"Halliburton and Ingersoll-Rand, as far as I know, had no official
policy about that, other than we would be in compliance with
applicable U.S. and international laws," said Cleive Dumas, who
oversaw Ingersoll Dresser Pump's business in the Middle East,
including Iraq.
Halliburton's primary concern, added Ingersoll-Rand's former chairman,
James E. Perrella, "was that if we did business with [the Iraqi
regime], that it be allowed by the United States government. If it
wasn't allowed, we wouldn't do it."
Dumas and Perrella said their companies' commercial links to the Iraqi
oil industry began before the U.N. Security Council imposed an oil
embargo on Baghdad in the wake of its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
They returned to dealing with Iraq after the council established the
"oil-for-food" program in December 1996, permitting Iraq to export oil
under U.N. supervision and use the proceeds to buy food, medicine and
humanitarian goods. The program was expanded in 1998 to allow Iraq to
import spare parts for its oil facilities.
The Halliburton subsidiaries joined dozens of American and foreign oil
supply companies that helped Iraq increase its crude exports from $4
billion in 1997 to nearly $18 billion in 2000. Since the program
began, Iraq has exported oil worth more than $40 billion.
The proceeds funded a sharp increase in the country's nutritional
standards, nearly doubling the food rations distributed to Iraq's
poor.
But U.S. and European officials acknowledged that the expanded
production also increased Saddam Hussein's capacity to siphon off
money for weapons, luxury goods and palaces. Security Council
diplomats estimate that Iraq may be skimming off as much as 10 percent
of the proceeds from the oil-for-food program.
Cheney has offered contradictory accounts of how much he knew about
Halliburton's dealings with Iraq. In a July 30, 2000, interview on
ABC-TV's "This Week," he denied that Halliburton or its subsidiaries
traded with Baghdad.
"I had a firm policy that we wouldn't do anything in Iraq, even
arrangements that were supposedly legal," he said. "We've not done any
business in Iraq since U.N. sanctions were imposed on Iraq in 1990,
and I had a standing policy that I wouldn't do that."
Cheney modified his response in an interview on the same program three
weeks later, after he was informed that a Halliburton spokesman had
acknowledged that Dresser Rand and Ingersoll Dresser Pump traded with
Iraq.
He said he was unaware that the subsidiaries were doing business with
the Iraqi regime when Halliburton purchased Dresser Industries in
September 1998.
"We inherited two joint ventures with Ingersoll-Rand that were selling
some parts into Iraq," Cheney explained, "but we divested ourselves of
those interests."
The divestiture, however, was not immediate. The firms traded with
Baghdad for more than a year under Cheney, signing nearly $30 million
in contracts before he sold Halliburton's 49 percent stake in
Ingersoll Dresser Pump Co. in December 1999 and its 51 percent
interest in Dresser Rand to Ingersoll-Rand in February 2000, according
to U.N. records.
Perrella said he believes Halliburton officials must have known about
the Iraqi links before they purchased Dresser. "They obviously did due
diligence," he said.
And even if Cheney was not told about the business with Baghdad before
the purchase, Perrella said, the CEO almost certainly would have
learned about it after the acquisition. "Oh, definitely, he was aware
of the business," Perrella said, although Perrella conceded that this
was an assumption based on knowledge of how the company worked, not a
fact to which he could personally attest because he never discussed
the Iraqi contracts with Cheney.
A long-time critic of unilateral U.S. sanctions, which he has argued
penalize American companies while failing to punish the targeted
regimes, Cheney has pushed for a review of U.S. policy toward
countries such as Iraq, Iran and Libya.
In the first expression of that new thinking, the Bush administration
is campaigning in the U.N. Security Council to end an 11-year embargo
on sales of civilian goods, including oil-related equipment, to Iraq.
U.S. officials say the new policy is aimed at easing restrictions on
companies that conduct legitimate trade with Iraq, while clamping down
on weapons smuggling and other black-market activity.
If the plan is approved, there would be "nothing to stop Iraq from
importing [as many] oil spare parts as it needs" from Halliburton and
other suppliers, according to a British official who briefed reporters
on the proposal when it was introduced last month.
Cheney resigned as chairman of Halliburton last August. Although he
has retained stock options worth about $8 million, he has arranged to
donate to charity any profits from the eventual exercise of those
options, Glover Weiss said.
Confidential U.N. documents show that Halliburton's affiliates have
had broad, and sometimes controversial, dealings with the Iraqi
regime.
For instance, the documents detail more than $2.5 million in contracts
between Ingersoll Dresser Pump Co. and Iraq that were blocked by the
Clinton administration. They included agreements by the firm to sell
$760,000 in spare parts, compressors and firefighting equipment to
refurbish an offshore oil terminal, Khor al Amaya.
The Persian Gulf terminal was badly damaged during the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq War and later was destroyed by allied warplanes during
Operation Desert Storm. At the time, Cheney was secretary of defense.
Washington halted the sale because the facility was "not authorized
under the oil-for-food deal," according to U.N. documents. Under the
terms of the oil-for-food program, Baghdad is permitted to export
crude oil, subject to U.N. supervision, through only two terminals,
Ceyhan in Turkey and Mina al Bakr on the Persian Gulf.
The equipment was never delivered to Iraq, but Baghdad subsequently
repaired the Khor al Amaya facility on its own.
A senior Iraqi oil ministry official, Faiz Shaheen, told an official
Iraqi newspaper that Iraq would soon be able to export about 600,000
barrels a day of crude oil from the terminal.
Dumas said he was not aware of the dispute over the Khor al Amaya
terminal. It was unlikely, he added, that Cheney or other top
Halliburton executives would have known about the specific deals. "We
had great independence in running our business," he said.
U.S. officials say the Bush administration is prepared to allow Iraq
to resume exports from Khor al Amaya, as long as the earnings are
placed in a U.N. escrow account that is used to pay for humanitarian
supplies and further improvements to the oil industry.
"The U.S. attitude towards Iraqi exports has evolved considerably,"
said James A. Placke, a Washington-based analyst for Cambridge Energy
Research Associates, a consulting firm. "They used to tightly restrict
Iraqi oil exports, and now there is no limitation on Iraqi exports."
Iraq's power to entice foreign investment, meanwhile, has increased
with the soaring demand for oil. U.S. companies, which have been able
to trade with Iraq only through foreign subsidiaries and middlemen,
are wary of dealing with Baghdad but eager to get a piece of the
action, according to industry sources.
"The American oil industry is very interested in trying to enter
Iraq," said J. Robinson West, chairman of Petroleum Finance Co., a
consulting firm. "But I think that they are quite respectful of U.S.
policy towards Saddam Hussein. There is a very strong feeling that in
fact he is the greatest threat to oil production in the Middle East."

 continua
=Se l'operazione Ajax, coordinata dal MI6 britannico e dalla CIA americana,
che rovesciò la giovane democrazia iraniana di Mohammed Mossadeq, fosse
rimasta per sempre solo un progetto sulla carta.
Immaginate se fosse stato permesso a Mossadeq, formato in occidente e leader
carismatico appoggiato massicciamente dalla nascente borghesia iraniana, di
condurre pacificamente il suo paese verso la prima vera democrazia
mussulmana in Medio Oriente.
Ed immaginate se al suo governo fosse stato concesso di assumere gli
obblighi e le responsabilità stabilite dalla costituzione del 1906, e se
allo scià fosse stato consentito di regnare ma non di governare, come di
nuovo stabilito dalla costituzione iraniana, ed immaginate se Gran Bretagna
e Stati Uniti non fossero state istigate da società petrolifere furibonde
per la nazionalizzazione voluta da Mossadeq degli interessi petroliferi in
Iran, ma invece fossero rimaste fuori dagli affari dell'Iran e non fossero
intervenute. Immaginate quello che probabilmente sarebbe accaduto. Senza
quel colpo di stato, l'Iran avrebbe probabilmente continuato a costruire una
democrazia solida ed allargata, che avrebbe portato ad una stabilità di gran
lunga più duratura di quella che lo scià - da sempre visto, agli occhi della
sua gente, come un burattino dell'Occidente debole e facilmente
manipolabile - non riuscì mai a creare.
Senza quel colpo di stato, l'Iran democratico avrebbe da tempo spazzato via
il mito secondo cui Islam e democrazia non sono compatibili. Fatto più
importante, l'Iran, nazionalista ed anti-colonialista com'era, sarebbe
splendidamente servito da modello per le dozzine di stati arabi e mussulmani
che avevano da poco guadagnato, o erano sul punto di guadagnare,
l'indipendenza dall'occupazione coloniale, evitando in questo modo il loro
allineamento al blocco sovietico così come l'ascesa di criminali interni e
dittatori.
Senza quel colpo di stato, gli ayatollah, che avevano sostenuto il colpo di
stato contro Mossadeq, non avrebbero mai raggiunto il loro prestigio
politico. Di fatto lo scià vide negli ayatollah conservatori i perfetti
partner contro il radicalismo della sinistra ed il liberalismo della
borghesia.
Se quel colpo di stato non avesse avuto luogo e se agli ayatollah non fosse
stato dato il prestigio politico di cui hanno goduto sotto lo scià, la
rivolta del giugno 1963, alimentata dal malcontento dei religiosi per i
tentativi di modernizzazione dello scià, altresì non sarebbe mai avvenuta. E
quindi, alla rivolta non sarebbe seguita nessuna dura repressione, né un
religioso poco noto, un certo Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, avrebbe
guadagnato l'attenzione internazionale come leader spirituale di quel
confronto contro lo scià.
Senza quel colpo di stato, Khomeini sarebbe rimasto un religioso poco noto.
E invece, venne esiliato per 14 anni, un periodo durante il quale coltivò la
sua immagine da quella di leader carismatico a quella di sacro messia
tornato in terra. E durante quei 14 anni, mentre veniva sempre più oscurata
la prospettiva di un Iran veramente democratico, il radicalismo islamico,
associando tutto ciò che è Occidentale all'odiato scià ed ai suoi
sostenitori - principalmente gli Stati Uniti - guadagnava una presa più
profonda sulle passioni di una giovane generazione sempre più frustrata.
Senza quel colpo di stato, non ci sarebbe stata una "crisi degli ostaggi", e
gli Stati Uniti non avrebbero troncato le relazioni con l'Iran ed imposto le
sanzioni economiche. Entrambe le azioni sono oggi, a più di vent'anni di
distanza, ancora in vigore. Senza quel colpo di stato, Saddam Hussein non
avrebbe mai osato invadere l'Iran nel settembre del 1980. Gli Stati Uniti
non avrebbero mai parteggiato per il dittatore iracheno e non si sarebbero
impegnati in una politica volta ad assicurare la vittoria dell'Iraq. Non
avrebbero fornito a Hussein un aiuto decisivo e non avrebbero chiuso un
occhio davanti ai suoi enormi crimini contro la sua gente.
Senza quel colpo di stato, Hussein non si sarebbe ritrovato ad essere, alla
fine della guerra con l'Iran, il comandante di uno dei più grandi eserciti
nel Medio Oriente. Cosa più importante, non avrebbe mai avuto la convinzione
che, finché avesse circoscritto le sue aggressioni ai fratelli mussulmani e
finché avesse lasciato fuori Israele, il mondo l'avrebbe solo denigrato e
condannato, ma non avrebbe reagito. Senza quel colpo di stato, è probabile
che l'Iraq non avrebbe mai invaso il Kuwait, e gli Stati Uniti non avrebbero
dovuto orchestrare una massiccia campagna militare contro il suo esercito,
senza considerare le basi costruite sul suolo Saudita. Non si sarebbero
sentiti discorsi su diritti umani e legge internazionale che suonano
totalmente privi di senso ed ipocriti ad orecchi arabi e mussulmani.
Immaginate una nuova era della politica estera - un'era in cui la legge
internazionale è presa sul serio, rispettata, in cui le democrazie sovrane
sono incoraggiate, nutrite, applaudite, piuttosto che combattute, soffocate
ed uccise. Immaginate se noi abbandonassimo, una volta e per sempre, le
velenose dottrine del "Cancelliere di Ferro" Bismarck e di Henry Kissinger,
e se invece sottoscrivessimo quelle di Amnesty International e del Human
Rights Watch. Immaginate se noi prendessimo sul serio le Nazioni Unite e
l'Aja, invece di trattarli come tribunali illegali in cui solo le cause
sponsorizzate dai forti e dai potenti sono perseguite con vigore, mentre le
altre ingiustizie sono trascurate e disprezzate.
Quanti milioni di vite avremmo salvato, e quanto oggi sarebbe più prospero e
più sicuro il mondo?
Bis vincit se vincit in victoria
Dente Blu
P.S. : Dente Blu preferisce sempre l'italiano per "comunicare"