Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Al-Zarqawi. Un utile mito.

The risks of the al-Zarqawi myth
       By Scott Ritter
Tuesday 14 December 2004
An interesting phenomenon is taking place today in the Iraqi city of
Falluja.
For months now, the Bush administration had been building up the image of a
massive network of foreign terrorists using Falluja as a base for their
terror attacks against targets associated with the interim government of
Iyad Allawi and the US military which backs him.
One name appeared in western media accounts, over and over again: Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, a wanted Jordanian turned alleged "terror" mastermind. Almost
overnight, Zarqawi's terrorist group, al-Qaida Holy War for Iraq, expanded
its operations across the width and breadth of Iraq.
Al-Zarqawi was everywhere, his bombers striking in Mosul, Baghdad, Samarra,
Najaf, Baquba, Ramadi and Falluja. Islamist websites published accounts of
al-Zarqawi's actions, and the western media, together with western
intelligence services, ran with these stories, giving them credibility. The
al-Zarqawi legend, if one can call it that, was born.
The problem is, there is simply no substance to this legend, as US marines
are now finding out. Rather than extremist foreign fighters battling to the
death, the marines are mostly finding local men from Falluja who are
fighting to defend their city from what they view as an illegitimate
occupier. The motivations of these fighters may well be anti-American, but
they are Iraqi, not foreign, in origin.
There is, indeed, evidence of a foreign presence. But they were not the ones
running the show in Falluja, or elsewhere for that matter. As a result, the
US-led assault on Falluja may go down in history as the tipping point for
the defeat of the US occupation of Iraq. The January 2005 elections are now
very much in doubt, and anti-coalition violence has erupted throughout Iraq
(including from sources claiming to be aligned with - no surprise  - Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi).
Reflecting back, one cannot help but wonder if al-Zarqawi was used as a lure
to trap the Americans into taking this action. On the surface, the
al-Zarqawi organisation seems too good to be true. A single Jordanian male
is suddenly running an organisation that operates in sophisticated cells
throughout Iraq. No one man could logically accomplish this. But there is an
organisation that can - the Mukhabarat (intelligence) of Saddam Hussein.
According to former Iraqi intelligence personnel I have communicated with
recently, the Mukhabarat, under instructions from Saddam Hussein, had been
preparing for some time before the invasion of Iraq on how to survive,
resist and defeat any US-led occupation of Iraq. A critical element of this
resistance was to generate chaos and anarchy that would destabilise any
US-appointed Iraqi government.
Another factor was to shift the attention of the US military away from the
true heart of the resistance - Saddam's Baathist loyalists - and on to a
fictional target that could be manipulated in an effort to control the pace,
timing and nature of the US military response.
According to these sources, the selection of al-Zarqawi as a front for these
actions was almost too easy. The Bush administration's singling out of
al-Zarqawi prior to the war, highlighted by Colin Powell's presentation to
the Security Council in February 2003, made the Jordanian an ideal candidate
to head the Mukhabarat's disinformation effort.
The Mukhabarat was desperate for a way to divert attention from the fact
that it was behind the attacks against Iraqi civilians. Iraqis killing
Iraqis would turn the public against the resistance. It needed a foreign
face, and al-Zarqawi provided it. A few planted CD disks later, and the
al-Zarqawi myth was born.
In its attempts to use the al-Zarqawi myth to distract and defeat the US
military and the interim government of Iyad Allawi, the Mukhabarat is
engaged in a dangerous game. In embracing the al-Zarqawi myth, the
Mukhabarat has engaged the forces of Islamist activism to a degree never
before seen in modern-day Iraq.
According to my contacts, the goal in creating a foreign Islamist face for
the violence taking place in Iraq is to get the Iraqi populace to turn away
from Iyad Allawi and the US military as a source of stability, and endorse
the return of the Baathists (under a new guise, to be sure), who would then
deal with the Islamists by shutting down an operation the Mukhabarat thinks
they control.
But engaging these activists may not be without cost. Having created a
fiction, there is a potential danger of it becoming a reality. Al-Zarqawi
may not be the real force behind the anti-US resistance in Iraq, but many
now, in Iraq and throughout the Muslim world, believe him to be.
Having created this giant the Mukhabarat may not be able to control it. The
real danger in Iraq is not the inevitable defeat of the United States and
the interim government of Iyad Allawi, but the fact that the longer it takes
for the United States to realise that victory cannot be achieved, the more
emboldened the Islamists become.
Right now, the Mukhabarat controllers of the al-Zarqawi network think
themselves clever as they watch the US military play into their hands
through the destruction of Falluja, and the futile search for a phantom
menace.
But the tragedy that is the war in Iraq is far from over, and it may very
well be that it is al-Zarqawi and his followers, and not the Baathist
Mukhabarat, who will have the last laugh. And, as always, it will be the
people of Iraq who will pay the price.
Scott Ritter was a senior UN arms inspector in Iraq between 1991 and 1998.
He is now an independent consultant.

        By Scott Ritter
Una teoria interessante. Anche perché getterebbe una luce alquanto fosca
sulla cosiddetta resistenza irachena: a tessere le fila degli innumerevoli
attentati che uccidono giornalmente soprattutto iracheni sarebbe il servizio
segreto baathista.
Mettiamo che un giorno questa diventi l'evidenza, sarei curioso di vedere
come si schiererebbero gli Stati, le forze politiche, i movimenti di
opinione contrari all'occupazione.
Come si potrebbe mitizzare una resistenza la cui spina dorsale sarebbe
costituita da uomini che si sono macchiati di crimini tremendi, contro il
proprio popolo?
La democrazia imposta dagli usa verrebbe ancora vista come l'instaurazione
di uno stato fantoccio, oppure si lavorerebbe tutti in tal senso?

 di uno stato fantoccio, oppure si lavorerebbe tutti in tal senso?
Uno Stato-fantoccio resta uno Stato-fantoccio, chiunque ne sia il nemico.
Anyway, io sono *contrario* alla resistenza irachena (senza virgolette), ma
è evidente che questa resistenza (di qualunque tipo siano le forze che la
organizzano) è sostenuta dal popolo iracheno (o almeno da una gran parte di
esso), altrimenti sarebbero già cominciate le delazioni e lo smantellamento
militare della stessa. Se la situazione fosse ritenuta universalmente
"migliore", rispetto a Saddam, credi che i guerriglieri potrebbero muoversi
come pesci nell'acqua? In ogni caso, la "democrazia imposta" semplicemente
NON è una forma di governo libera, anche se è sovente apprezzata, da chi non
si trovi a subirla; io (che non conto nulla, lo so) NON la sosterrò mai. Che
l'Italia non sia tuttora una vera democrazia (viste le persistenti
tentazioni autoritarie, nonché l'onnipresente spettro
populista/personalista) non dipenderà forse da come è nata? Tanto è vero che
l'*unico* elemento autonomo (ovvero la Resistenza) del processo di
liberazione nazionale è posto senza tregua sotto processo, e, al meglio,
trattato come una curiosità folklorica... Eppure la democrazia italiana ha
una sua storia culturale (quamquam difficillima, come dimostra il 1799);
figuriàmoci l'innesto astratto di un sistema politico occidentale su
un'identità bi-religiosa islamica soffocata da una "modernizzazione"
autoritaria! Gli uomini non sono tessere di puzzle, da spostarsi a
piacimento sulla scacchiera della Storia... Ma che lo dico affà? Gli umani
non imparano mai niente dai loro errori... Bye.
Namib