Newsgroup: it.politica.internazionale
Titolo: Britain’s theatrical war against the Taliban

Britain’s theatrical war against the Taliban 
British troops are not fighting the ‘good fight’ in Afghanistan; they are
hiding behind US airpower and taking towns from weak forces. 
 
 
UK prime minister Gordon Brown’s recent flying visits to British troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the limits of external military
intervention as a tool for strengthening the legitimacy of government rule
in Baghdad and Kabul. In Iraq, British troops were scaling down and
leaving Basra to the local Shi’ite militia, recognising that only a
political compromise with local actors could lead to stability; while in
Afghanistan, British troops were taking part in a show of military force
in taking Musa Qala, a town the Taliban had previously taken over without
firing a shot. 
 
advertise on spikedIn Iraq, Brown gave the message that British military
control will end in two weeks with local Iraqi forces taking over in Basra
province. The 4,500-strong British force will be reduced early next year
to just 2,500, with an open question over whether they might be completely
withdrawn in March or confined to merely technical operations (1). On the
face of it, it might appear that an entirely different course of action is
being taken in Afghanistan, where over 7,500 British troops are currently
serving. The British government is leading the call for more NATO troops
to be sent to the country and it seems possible that Lord Paddy Ashdown
may become the joint NATO and UN ‘super envoy’ coordinating international
intervention (2). 
The security situation has improved in Basra since September when the
British troops withdrew from central Basra to an airbase outside the city.
That is largely because attacks on British troops have fallen dramatically
since they left the town. According to the British commander,
Major-General Graham Binns: ‘From May to July the brigade we had in Basra
was standing toe-to-toe with the militias in the city of Basra and
fighting some of the most intense tactical battles that we have had to
fight in the four years since we have been here. If 90 per cent of the
violence was directed against us, what would happen if we actually stepped
back, and would that improve the situation for the average Basrawi?’ (3) 
Basra has been a success story because the withdrawal of British troops
has not only led to fewer British casualties, but also there has been no
rise in violence between rival militias because of the dominance in Basra
of the Mahdi Army militia of Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, which agreed
a ceasefire with the Iraqi government in August (4). 
In Afghanistan, there appears to be an opposite approach. Musa Qala, at
the mountainous north of Helmland province, was ‘captured’ by the Taliban
in February of this year. They achieved this ‘capture’ with the support of
the local government and without a shot being fired. In effect, no
different to the Mahdi Army’s newly won position of authority in Basra.
The British had previously withdrawn to leave control in local hands, with
the council of elders; the Taliban then brokered an agreement with the
local tribal elders to keep the peace (5). 
The battle for Musa Qala has been presented as a major success in routing
an important Taliban stronghold. In truth, it had little to do with
military prowess: once the decision was taken to mount an assault on Musa
Qala, victory could never have been in doubt considering the imbalance in
firepower. The Taliban forces withdrew before the British, American and
Afghan forces entered the city. Yet the battle for Musa Qala was promoted
as a victory of global importance in Gordon Brown’s speech to the troops:
‘This is one of the most challenging of environments, one of the most
difficult of tasks, the most testing of times, and one of the most
important of missions, because to win here, and defeat the Taliban, and
make sure we can give strength to the new democracy in Afghanistan, is
important for defeating terrorism around the world.’ (6) 
In effect, this battle made no more sense than keeping the troops in Basra
fighting the Mahdi Army. Musa Qala may be a very visible focus for a
battle with the Taliban but taking hold of the town will make very little
difference to either the Taliban or to the Afghan government, ostensibly
being supported by these actions. As Jean MacKenzie, Afghanistan country
director for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, notes,
understanding Afghanistan in terms of decisive battles against the Taliban
makes little sense. While it is easy for NATO forces to take towns, the
problem is that they do not have the resources to occupy them militarily
in order to prevent the Taliban’s return. MacKenzie states: ‘They could
not hold it before so I do not see why they will be able to hold it this
time.’ (7) 
If improving the lives of the ‘average Basrawis’ justified the British
troops moving out of the town of Basra, and eventually moving out of the
region all together, then it is strange that the lives of the ordinary
people of Musa Qala needed to be exposed to the US aerial bombardment that
preceded the moving of ground forces into the town. It makes little sense
to stage a large-scale battle to retake a town, which was happily given up
10 months ago and will in all likelihood be peacefully retaken later. It
also does not make much sense to fight a war against the Taliban, who
enjoy an element of popular support in the area around Musa Qala, at the
same time as retreating from the rocket attacks of the Shi’ite militias in
Iraq. 
There is no doubt that the British government is equally aware that the
war against the Taliban can no more be won by outside military action than
a war against the numerous local Iraqi militias. In fact, there is an
increasingly common mantra within Whitehall that ‘military effort alone
does not provide solutions’ (8). The taking of Musa Qala, in fact,
provides a good example of the extension of the policy of withdrawal to
Afghanistan, rather than an example of extending military commitment. 
The media have stated that 2,000 British troops were engaged in the
battle, but in real terms it was US airpower that convinced the Taliban to
leave the town. Brown praised the British troops, but most importantly he
argued that the battle of Musa Qala demonstrated the capacity of the
Afghan troops and the central government. He stressed that the Musa Qala
battle was ‘led on the ground by the Afghan forces themselves’, arguing:
‘There is no doubt that succeeding in Musa Qala will make a huge
difference both to how people see the weakness of the Taliban in the
future and the ability of the government to build, not just militarily and
politically, but with social and economic progress for the people of the
area.’ (9) 
The sideshow of Musa Qala was presented as an argument for drawing down UK
troops, rather than a demonstration of the need for them, and is part of
the drawdown strategy of stressing ‘Afghan solutions to Afghan problems’
(10). In fact, Brown has made it clear that he wishes to switch the
emphasis to the limits of military solutions, recognising the fact that
the central government’s remit has never spread much beyond the capital
Kabul. The shift in emphasis will focus on international aid for economic
development rather than on putting British troops in harm’s way (11). This
approach, of shifting from attempting to impose central governing
authority to local compromises, reflects the realisation that other NATO
allies have no wish to put their troops at risk in attempting to impose a
centralised state in Afghanistan. As UK defence secretary Des Browne made
clear, Britain is feeling increasingly isolated: 
‘There still is a need to meet the demands set by both the NATO and
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders as to what the
minimum amount of troops and support are. What is known as the
“requirement” has not yet been met and that is something we continue to
discuss with our allies and friends in the international community.’ (12) 
The British government is appealing to other NATO countries to take more
of the burden, but with few illusions that many new contributions will be
forthcoming. At the same time, the minister for the armed forces, Bob
Ainsworth, has stated that there will be no new British troop commitments
(13). Even the proposed ‘super envoy’ Lord Ashdown would be merely there
to manage a face-saving transition; Ashdown has already publicly stated
that, in his opinion, NATO has ‘lost’ in Afghanistan (14). 
The farcical policy shifts in British and international policy in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the theatrical use of military force, reveal that
external armies cannot build someone else’s state. In the past, military
force has been essential in overthrowing regimes and also been of proven
use in peacekeeping between two opposing armies. It is only in the last
few years that the use of military coercion has been increasingly seen to
be central in the construction of post-conflict states (15). 
Military occupation has, especially since the implosion of Iraq, been seen
as a central component of successful state-building, with leading
policymakers and academics calling for more troops to be made available
for ‘winning the peace’ than were necessary for ‘winning the war’ (16).
However, it seems clear from the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan that
only the withdrawal of foreign military forces allows a process of
political bargaining, which can begin to rebuild the structures necessary
for securing a stable peace. 
David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Centre for
the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster and editor of the
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding.  
-- 
visitate 
http://www.comunisti-italiani.it/frames/index.htm
 
http://www.larinascita.org
http://www.italia-cuba.it/associazione/associazione.htm
questo articolo e` stato inviato via web dal servizio gratuito 
http://www.newsland.it/news
 segnala gli abusi ad 
ab...@newsland.it

 contrario di tutto.
 tu non c'hai ricapito un cazzo come sempre. lol
su rimettiti a porgere e farti fare il pieno dai nazilikudniki
 
-- 


 avviene copiaincollando, come ho appena dimostrato.
hai appena dimostrato che sei un cretino che non ha capito un cazzo.
Il tuo commento lo testimonia.

 sua appartenenza politica (vedi URL postate) c'e' da starne sicuri...
IMHO non è credibile.
Tb
-- 
Libertà per i comunisti siriani in carcere: Fateh Jamus, 'Isam Dimashqi,
Basel Hurani, 'Abd al-Halim Rumieh, Ratib Sha'bu, and Doha 'Ashur
al-'Askari 
http://snipurl.com/1oqtm

 Dici?
visto la totale inconsistenza e cretinaggine del commento che hai
fatto dico proprio di si.