Newsgroup: it.scienza.ambiente
Titolo: Re: Arizona gets Haren in trade with Oakland

No. Do they then indicate what
is typical? No, but what is either real or typical. But the first passages,
excluding as they do reality, indicate that all this is only typical.
All these passages together cannot be applied to reality; all can be said to
be typical; therefore they are not spoken of reality, but of the type.
Agnus occisus est ab origine mundi.135 A sacrificing judge.
686. Contradictions.--The sceptre till the Messiah--without king or prince.
The eternal law--changed.
The eternal covenant--a new covenant.
Good laws--bad precepts. Ezekiel.
687. Types.--When the word of God, which is really true, is false literally,
it is true spiritually. Sede a dextris meis:136 this is false literally,
therefore it is true spiritually.
In these expressions, God is spoken of after the manner of men; and this
means nothing else but that the intention which men have in giving a seat at
their right hand, God will have also. It is then an indication of the
intention of God, not of His manner of carrying it out.
Thus when it is said, "God has received the odour of your incense, and will
in recompense give you a rich land," that is equivalent to saying that the
same intention which a man would have, who, pleased with your perfumes,
should in recompense give you a rich land, God will have towards you,
because you have had the same intention as a man has towards him to whom he
presents perfumes. So iratus est, a "jealous God," etc. For, the things of
God being inexpressible, they cannot be spoken of otherwise, and the Church
makes use of them even to-day: Quia confortavit seras,137 etc.
It is not allowable to attribute to Scripture the meaning which is not
revealed to us that it has. Thus, to say that the closed mem of Isaiah
signifies six hundred, has not been revealed. It might be said that the
final tsade and he deficientes may signify mysteries. But it is not
allowable to say so, and still less to say this is the way of the

a man when we say of him, on his entry,
that he is a very clever poet; and it is a bad sign when a man is not asked
to give his judgement on some verses.
35. We should not be able to say of a man, "He is a mathematician," or "a
preacher," or "eloquent"; but that he is "a gentleman." That universal
quality alone pleases me. It is a bad sign when, on seeing a person, you
remember his book. I would prefer you to see no quality till you meet it and
have occasion to use it (Ne quid minis),[3] for fear some one quality
prevail and designate the man. Let none think him a fine speaker, unless
oratory be in question, and then let them think it.
36. Man is full of wants: he loves only those who can satisfy them all.
"This one is a good mathematician," one will say. But I have nothing to do
with mathematics; he would take me for a proposition. "That one is a good
soldier." He would take me for a besieged town. I need, then, an upright man
who can accommodate himself generally to all my wants.
37. Since we cannot be universal and know all that is to be known of
everything, we ought to know a little about everything. For it is far better
to know something about everything than to know all about one thing. This
universality is the best. If we can have both, still better; but if we must
choose, we ought to choose the former. And the world feels this and does so;
for the world is often a good judge.
38. A poet and not an honest man.
39. If lightning fell on low places, etc., poets, and those who can only
reason about things 

than that of desire. They are
principles natural to man.
It would, therefore, be right to obey laws and customs, because they are
laws; but we should know that there is neither truth nor justice to
introduce into them, that we know nothing of these, and so must follow what
is accepted. By this means we would never depart from them. But people
cannot accept this doctrine; and, as they believe that truth can be found,
and that it exists in law and custom, they believe them and take their
antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not simply of their authority apart
from truth. Thus they obey laws, but they are liable to revolt when these
are proved to be valueless; and this can be shown of all, looked at from a
certain aspect.
326. Injustice.--It is dangerous to tell the people that the laws are
unjust; for they obey them only because they think them just. Therefore it
is necessary to tell them at the same time that they must obey them because
they are laws, just as they must obey superiors, not because they are just,
but because they are superiors. In this way all sedition is prevented, if
this can be made intelligible and it be understood what is the proper
definition of justice.
327. The world is a good judge of things, for it is in natural ignorance,
which is man's true state. The sciences have two extremes which meet. The
first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at
birth. The other extreme is tha