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Titolo: Haaretz: a revealing Interview with IDF Chief (segue traduzione)

Haaretz: Interview with IDF Chief
English:
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=202714
Hebrew:
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=202611
Haaretz Magazine, Friday August 29, 2002
-------------------------------------------------------
The enemy within
By Ari Shavit
The confrontation with the Palestinians is an
existential, cancerous threat to Israel, according to
IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon. In his first
interview since assuming his post last month, Ya'alon
attacks the Israeli pathology of self-blame, criticizes
the media and accuses various elements of undermining
him in the Shehadeh affair. No, he's not right-wing,
just the same old kibbutznik at heart
Lieutenant General Moshe ("Bogey") Ya'alon has made two
missteps since assuming the post of chief of staff on
July 9: the first arising from the liquidation of Salah
Shehadeh, and the second, from the controversial
comments he made to a group of rabbis last Sunday. In
the past, he has shown that he is capable of correcting
mistakes. However, two key errors within such a short
time are definitely cause for concern, raising serious
questions this week even among those who are closest to
the new chief of staff.
Ya'alon himself doesn't understand what all the fuss is
about with respect to his remarks. On Monday, he
sounded agitated, aggressive - pouring fire and
brimstone on his critics and, above all, absolutely
certain he had said nothing wrong. He sees the furor he
generated as additional proof that something has gone
haywire in this country.
First of all, he was astounded that comments he made in
a closed forum were taped and leaked to the press, on
top of which what he said was distorted, he maintains.
Attacking a chief of staff is grist for the media's
mill, he says, and Israel will pay a price for it. The
Palestinians will exploit it for their purposes, to
claim that the army has a policy of its own.
More substantively, Ya'alon feels that it is his duty
to express his professional opinion and to describe
precisely the way the Arabs perceive various moves made
by Israel. He does not think he trespassed on the
political arena; he has never come out against the
government of Israel and he has never publicly
criticized the political echelon.
He was especially incensed because political elements
are manipulating what he said in order to excoriate the
army and him personally. Experience has shown him that
when he says things that are consistent with the
interest of one political side, that side defends him
as a devoted professional officer. The moment he offers
a different description of the situation, the other
side labels him unprofessional and political. He finds
this pattern of behavior intolerable, and considers it
a serious obstacle to the possibility of conducting a
serious strategic debate in the public arena.
The chief of staff thus sees the whole episode as
reflecting an ethical void and a general moral crisis
in Israel. A wide gap exists between Ya'alon as he was
portrayed this week in the headlines, and the Ya'alon
who is familiar to those who work with him. While in
the media, Ya'alon was perceived this week as lacking
caution and displaying dubious judgment, the military
and personal Bogey is known as judicious, thorough and
solid.
The source of the disparity may lie in the fact that
Ya'alon is a direct person whose speech is equally
direct. The new chief of staff lacks even rudimentary
diplomatic skills or the ability to stage images. He
was the one who introduced the concept of a war to
shape consciousness, but he himself is a very
unsophisticated fighter in that battle.
When he speaks, he speaks. He says whatever is on his
mind. And what's on his mind is controversial, even if
Ya'alon will not admit it: Let the Israel Defense
Forces win. The fences and the withdrawals can wait.
They are perceived as weakness and capitulation. The
victory, from his point of view, begins with the
resilience and staying power of the civil society. The
IDF will deal with the rest.
Even though Ya'alon's skepticism about Oslo and his
recent statements have created the impression that he
is right-wing, people who know him well are convinced
that his basic worldview has not changed since his
youth. He is not a party-political person in the narrow
sense, but his basic values are those of the historic
Labor Movement.
In the following interview (which was conducted last
week), he describes himself as "a humanist, a liberal,
a democrat and a seeker of peace and security." He is a
tall, smartly turned out, very orderly officer. The
word is that he is intelligent but not brilliant. Tough
but not cruel, demanding but not macho. Fastidious,
thoroughgoing, a bit square. He is frequently accused
of being endowed with the naivete of a group leader in
a youth movement, but nearly everyone agrees that he is
extraordinarily persistent. The eyes of many of his
former subordinates shine when they talk about him.
Their impressions repeat themselves: Bogey's personal
example, Bogey's integrity, his courage.
"In my eyes he is an iconic Israeli," says the former
platoon commander and current Speaker of the Knesset,
Avraham Burg. "A person of purity without an iota of
arrogance. Like a precious metal. A nature reserve of
Israeliness."
In his first seven weeks as chief of staff, Ya'alon
read two poems to the General Staff forum. One was
Natan Alterman's posthumous poem about the rightness of
the way, "Then the Devil Said"; the other was "For
This," the famous poem about war crimes that was
written in late 1948, during the War of Independence.
Indeed, after the Black Hawk helicopter lands at the
Samaria Brigade base and Lieutenant General Ya'alon
takes his place at the head of the traditional IDF U-
shaped table around which are seated the brigade's
commanding officers, the discussion he conducts with
them ranges between the same two poles: the rightness
of the way and war crimes. How to crack the hard core
of Hamas in Nablus without visiting a humanitarian
catastrophe on the city; how to uproot the terrorist
infrastructure in the casbah without turning the severe
distress in the city into actual hunger.
At first, he says hardly anything. He listens. He asks
the name of every junior officer, patiently hears out
the situation appraisal of a battalion commander. He
takes copious notes on his yellow pad, like a well-
disciplined, diligent student. Then, quietly, he begins
to expound: Every commander must know the names of the
wanted terrorists in his sector. Every commander must
take firm action when he encounters improper behavior
by soldiers. The local population must be made to
understand why it is suffering, though ways must also
be sought to relieve the situation where possible. It
is out of the question for there not to be dairy
products in Nablus. It is out of the question for there
to be problems supplying water and medicines. He does
not electrify or excite his audience, but displays a
kind of restrained leadership, of calm control of the
situation.
Cancer calls for chemotherapy
Lieutenant General Ya'alon, of all the threats
surrounding the State of Israel, which disturbs you the
most? Are any of the threats of an existential nature?
"When I look at the overall map, what disturbs me
especially is the Palestinian threat and the
possibility that a hostile state will acquire nuclear
capability. Those are the most worrisome focal points,
because both of them have the potential of being an
existential threat to Israel. We have good answers for
all the other threats. We have a good answer for what
Hezbollah can do and for what the Syrians can do. We
also have a good answer for what the Iraqis are liable
to do."
There is something surprising in the fact that you see
the Palestinian threat as an existential threat.
"The characteristics of that threat are invisible, like
cancer. When you are attacked externally, you see the
attack, you are wounded. Cancer, on the other hand, is
something internal. Therefore, I find it more
disturbing, because here the diagnosis is critical. If
the diagnosis is wrong and people say it's not cancer
but a headache, then the response is irrelevant. But I
maintain that it is cancer. My professional diagnosis
is that there is a phenomenon here that constitutes an
existential threat."
Does that mean that what you are doing now, as chief of
staff, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is applying
chemotherapy?
"There are all kinds of solutions to cancerous
manifestations. Some will say it is necessary to
amputate organs. But at the moment, I am applying
chemotherapy, yes."
Describe for me the present campaign between the
Palestinians and us: Who is against whom, and for what,
in this campaign?
"The campaign is between two societies that are
competing for territory and, to a certain degree, for
existence. I don't think that there is an existential
threat to the Palestinian society. There is an
existential threat to us. In other words, there is
asymmetry here, but it is reversed: Everyone thinks we
are Goliath and they are David, but I maintain that it
is the opposite."
Are you saying that despite what appears to be a war of
the oppressed against the oppressors, of the occupied
against the occupiers, the Palestinians actually have a
sense of strength and power?
"Of course. They feel that they have the backing of a
quarter-of-a-billion Arabs and they believe that time
is on their side and that, with a combination of
terrorism and demography, they will tire us out and
wear us down. There is also an additional reverse
asymmetry here: We do not have intentions to annihilate
them and we have also expressed readiness to grant them
a state, whereas they are unwilling to recognize our
right to exist here as a Jewish state."
Do you not see the war of the Palestinians against us
as a campaign to end the occupation?
"If the term 'occupation' had any relevance at all, it
lost it, as far as I am concerned, in the year 2000,
when the State of Israel put a certain proposal on the
table that was supposed to resolve the problem. That
proposal was supposed to get the Palestinians off our
back, but instead they started to stab us. They stayed
on our back, attached to us and stabbing us. That is
the reality. Therefore, without getting into a
political discussion of what the solution should be, I
maintain that the story is not occupation. The story is
non-recognition of the right of the State of Israel to
exist as a Jewish state."
Are you saying unequivocally that the Palestinian
struggle is not aimed at liberating the territories
that were conquered in 1967?
"Of course not. Of course not. The Palestinians have
three stories. Their narrative in Arabic is one of
mobilization for a war of jihad and non-recognition of
Israel's right to exist. That narrative rejects any
attachment between the Jewish people and the Land of
Israel, and it mobilizes the Palestinian people for a
war with the goal of bringing about Israel's collapse.
In English, the story is different: occupation,
colonialism, apartheid. Those are completely irrelevant
terms, which are intended to furnish the Western world
with familiar terminology that clarifies who the good
guys are here and who the bad guys are.
"In Hebrew, they have a third story: the peace of the
brave. But I know the details and I say that
[Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser] Arafat is
taking the name of Yitzhak Rabin, of blessed memory, in
vain. He saw Oslo as a Trojan horse that would enable
the Palestinians to enter Israel, and September 2000 as
the moment of emerging from the belly of the horse.
Today, too, the ideology of Fatah is to bring about
Israel's disintegration from within. What they are
after is not to arrive at the end of the conflict, but
to turn Israel into a Palestinian state."
In other words, the goal of Arafat and of Fatah is to
liquidate Israel by stages?
"Of course. Not to reach an agreement and not to arrive
at the end of their claims, in order to preserve the
conflict and to let time run its course according to
the phased theory."
If so, you would say that the Oslo agreement was a
mistake?
"We can't talk in terms of a mistake or not a mistake.
If you ask me personally, in terms of the rightness of
our way, I find the situation far more convenient
today. When I move, in the end, to fight against what
the Palestinians are creating, I think that after what
we went through in the past nine years, I have fewer
question marks and more exclamation marks. For me,
moral clarity has emerged here."
The spider-web theory
Do you see Arafat himself as a strategic threat to the
State of Israel?
"Today he is greatly weakened. He has lost much of his
strength and his legitimacy. But the answer is yes:
Arafat does not recognize Israel's right of existence
as a Jewish state and his game plan is to bring about
Israel's disintegration by means of a combination of
strategy and demography. Even today, in his weakened
state, he believes in the spider-web theory. That is
why he persists in using terrorism.
What is the theory of the spider web?
"It is a theory that is attributed to [Hezbollah
secretary-general] Hassan Nasrallah, which holds that
Israel is a military power, but that its civil society
is a pampered consumer society that is no longer
willing to fight and struggle. The Israeli army is
strong, Israel has technological superiority and is
said to have strategic capabilities, but its citizens
are unwilling any longer to sacrifice lives in order to
defend their national interests and national goals.
Therefore, Israel is a spider-web society: It looks
strong from the outside, but touch it and it will fall
apart.
"Yasser Arafat maintains that he and not [Hezbollah
secretary-general Sheik Hassan] Nasrallah is the father
of this perception of Israel. He is right. That's why
he does not want to put a stop to the terrorist
pressure. Even at low points, he is constantly looking
for the cracks in the Israeli wall. Time after time, he
promises his people that Israeli society is about to
break."
Does he really see himself as Saladin?
"Yes. But his strategy is complex, a strategy of
entanglement. He believes that the more he entangles
the situation, the more he will be needed. He is trying
to be both the problem and the person to solve the
problem: both the pyromaniac and the firefighter, both
the person who lights the fire and the fireman. Even
now Arafat is trying to achieve escalation. Even though
he could stop the confrontation, he is not doing so."
Do you consider him an illegitimate leader?
"[U.S. President George] Bush's speech [on the Middle
East on June 24] was strategically decisive and
normatively decisive. He defined things very clearly:
Anyone who is tainted by terrorism is not legitimate.
Therefore, Arafat can no longer be the decision-maker
on the Palestinian side. There is nowhere to go with
him. The Americans made it clear that they are not
going to liquidate him, but that if the Palestinians
want to see light at the end of the tunnel, they
themselves should neutralize him. That is an
unequivocal statement: Arafat will not be the decision-
maker. He will not be."
What will happen if he is reelected in democratic
elections?
"The alternative Palestinian leadership has to be
elected democratically on the model of Germany after
World War II. Anyone who was a member of the Nazi Party
was not allowed to be a candidate in the elections
there, and anyone who is tainted by terrorism cannot be
a candidate here."
Staying power
Is it your assessment that Israel is approaching
victory in the struggle against the Palestinians?
"Since Operation Defensive Shield [the Israeli army's
operation in the West Bank last April following the
suicide bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya on
Passover eve], and in the past two months especially,
signs of cracking have appeared on the Palestinian
side. The situation is completely different from what
it was in March. But caution is needed. It's like in
judo: Sometimes you think you're throwing your
opponent, but in the end, you're the one who's thrown.
And with the person in the Muqata [Arafat's
headquarters in Ramallah], extra caution is needed. He
has been eulogized and eulogized all his life, and he
returns like the phoenix.
"The key point here is the staying power of the Israeli
society. That is the most important factor that is
being put to the test at this time and will continue to
be put to the test in the near future. That is what the
campaign is about. When the Palestinians initiated the
confrontation, their evaluation was that Israel would
not be able to withstand even a few dozen casualties.
They were surprised. Operation Defensive Shield showed
them that they were dealing not with a spider web, but
with a tiger. But if they see cracks and a chance of
[Israel's] disintegration, a prospect of Israeli
capitulation, that achievement will be erased."
Do you have a definition of victory? Is it clear to you
what Israel's goal in this war is?
"I defined it from the beginning of the confrontation:
the very deep internalization by the Palestinians that
terrorism and violence will not defeat us, will not
make us fold. If that deep internalization does not
exist at the end of the confrontation, we will have a
strategic problem with an existential threat to Israel.
If that [lesson] is not burned into the Palestinian and
Arab consciousness, there will be no end to their
demands of us. Despite our military might, the region
will perceive us as being even weaker. That will have
an impact not only on those who are engaged in the
violent struggle, but also on those who have signed
agreements with us and on extremists among the Arabs in
Israel. That's why this confrontation is so important.
There has not been a more important confrontation since
the War of Independence."
It's that critical?
"Yes. I have no doubt that when this period is viewed
historically, the conclusion will be that the War of
Independence was the most important event in our
history and this war was the second most important
event."
Even more important than the Six-Day War or the Yom
Kippur War?
"Of course, of course. Because we are dealing with an
existential threat. There was an Israeli attempt to end
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by means of a
territorial compromise, and the Palestinian reply was
war. So this brings us back to the confrontation of the
pre-state period, the partition proposal and the War of
Independence. The facts that are being determined in
this confrontation - in terms of what will be burned
into the Palestinian consciousness - are fateful. If we
end the confrontation in a way that makes it clear to
every Palestinian that terrorism does not lead to
agreements, that will improve our strategic position.
On the other hand, if their feeling at the end of the
confrontation is that they can defeat us by means of
terrorism, our situation will become more and more
difficult. Therefore, I say that we must not blur the
weighty meaning of this confrontation. When you grasp
the essence, it's clear to you what you have to do. You
have to fight for your life."
Does that mean that any move involving unilateral
withdrawal before the confrontation is resolved and
before the violence ends is dangerous?
"Of course. That would give a push to the struggle
against us. Even if tactically it appears right to
withdraw from here or from there, from the strategic
perspective, it is different. That was my argument when
the question arose of withdrawing from Joseph's Tomb
[in Nablus]. It was clear to me that leaving the tomb
would be an incentive for the Palestinians, whereas
others thought that leaving the site would neutralize a
point of friction. But those who thought in those terms
were thinking like Israelis, not like Palestinians."
So that means that in the present situation, leaving
settlements would be a mistake with potentially
catastrophic implications?
"Of course. I'm not talking about the political
solution. I am not saying what will be right and what
will not be right after the violence ends. That's not
my affair. When asked, I will give my security
recommendation. But today, any such departure under
terrorism and violence will strengthen the path of
terrorism and violence. It will endanger us."
In other words, as chief of staff, you are saying that
even if you need a battalion to hold an isolated
settlement, if we leave it we will need a great deal
more?
"Correct."
Back to 1948
What are the implications of the separation fence that
is being built? Will it, too, not be interpreted in the
same way?
"It is liable to be interpreted like that. But the
route that was chosen may offset the strategic threat
it entails. There is also a tactical improvement in
that you succeed in preventing infiltrations. But I
don't think the fence will solve all the problems."
So you are not an admirer of the separation fence?
"It's complex and it's in the political arena, so I am
very careful here. If I were given that money, I would
invest it elsewhere."
Can we sum up by saying, without getting into the
political question, that your professional opinion is
that concessions that are made under fire are
dangerous? Is it your view that any possible Israeli
concession can be made only after the confrontation is
decided and the violence ends?
"Yes."
If so, and if the position of the Palestinians is as
you say, where is all this leading? What will the end
be? How long are we to live by the sword?
"I would refer people who ask what the end will be to a
well-known quotation of Moshe Dayan. When he was asked,
in 1969, what the end will be, his reply was, `Do not
fear, servants of Abraham.' Dayan said that the
emphasis should be on the path and not on the final
goal, on the process of the struggle and not on the
final destination. As human beings, we want a solution
now. Now. But in the situation of Israel, nowism is
false messianism. Nowism is the mother of all sins. And
it makes no difference whether to the word `now' is
added `messiah' [thus, `messiah now'] or something else
now.
"We live in a very complex neighborhood, in which our
right to exist has not yet been recognized. We have
been living for a hundred years in crisis management.
Therefore, we have to maneuver it into directions that
strengthen us. And we have to win in this
confrontation. Otherwise, the next war will not be far
off."
Are you saying that we are entering a basic,
existential situation again, that we have to understand
that the confrontation is an inseparable part of our
lives, but that if we are strong, we will reduce and
control it?
"Do we have a choice? We must understand: The
Palestinians have returned us to the War of
Independence. Today it is clear that the State of
Israel as a Jewish state is still an alien element in
the region. It will take generations until various
elements in the region accept its existence. Therefore,
we have to go back to the ethos of standing fast, not
because I am enamored of that ethos, but because there
is no choice. It is an ethos of no choice.
"At the same time, there is no reason for gloom. We are
a power. Even though we are only 6 million, we are a
power: a military, economic, cultural and scientific
power. Nor do I think that there is any sort of decree
from heaven here. In Islam, there are waves that rise
and fall, sometimes in the direction of extremism and
sometimes in the direction of moderation. The Muslim
world is not monolithic. It is possible that over time,
the region will see processes of Westernization,
democratization, a joining of the global village. But
as long as we are under attack, Israeli society must
show staying power. True, it is difficult, but when I
was a boy, it was more difficult. And true, people are
sad. But we should look at things in perspective: After
54 years, we are truly a power. Therefore, at bottom, I
am truly optimistic."
No sleepless nights over Iraq
You said that the second existential threat to Israel
was the nuclearization of the Middle East.
"If a hostile state acquires nuclear weapons, that will
have three implications. First, it will be able to use
them against Israel. Second, it will be able to make
use of biological and chemical weapons without fear, in
spheres where we have so far achieved deterrence.
Third, under a nuclear umbrella, a hostile state will
certainly also dare to act in additional - conventional
- areas. The appearance of hostile nuclear weapons will
also violate the balance that exists today in the
region between moderates and radicals."
Is your conclusion that Israel should adopt the Begin
doctrine of using operational force in order to prevent
hostile states from going nuclear?
"I will not go into that."
Let me put it another way: Is it in Israel's supreme
interest to prevent hostile nuclearization in any way?
"Yes. Unequivocally. All efforts have to be made so
that no hostile state will achieve nuclear capability."
Are you not concerned about the possibility that in the
event of an American attack on Iraq, Saddam Hussein
will attack Israel with nonconventional weapons?
"If Iraq feels its survival is under threat, it may
definitely want to demonstrate force against Israel
along the lines of `Let me die with the Philistines.'
However, Iraq's capabilities are shallow compared to
what they were in the Gulf War. They are not
capabilities that give me sleepless nights."
Iraq today does not constitute an existential threat to
Israel?
"No. Obviously, we have to prepare for the possibility
that they will launch a missile or a plane. But we have
good answers to that threat, and the threat itself is
limited. It might be unpleasant, but not terrible."
And the situation on the northern border, where
Hezbollah has deployed thousands of rockets, doesn't
disturb you either?
"The situation in the north cannot not be disturbing.
But Israel will never say die. The problem there is
less severe than in the Palestinian arena."
Is the threat from the north more serious or less
serious than it was before the withdrawal from southern
Lebanon?
"The potential that exists today in Lebanon is far
graver than it was in the period when we were in the
security zone [an Israeli-controlled strip on the
Lebanese side of the border]. Hezbollah, together with
the Syrians and the Iranians, has created a strategic
threat to the north of the country, which consists of a
combination of rockets of various types and various
ranges that are threatening Israeli population centers
in the north."
How tangible is that threat?
"If the Hezbollah potential is unleashed against us and
we meet it with an appropriate response, it is possible
that the response will, in fact, have the effect of
strengthening Israel's deterrent capability. If it is
unleashed and our response is inadequate, it will hurt
us. So, if the threat materialized, we will have to
exact a heavy price from those who are responsible for
its development."
Who are they?
"First of all Syria, then Lebanon, Hezbollah and the
Iranians in Lebanon."
What you are saying, then, is that if there is a
significant rocket and Katyusha rocket attack from
Lebanon, we will have to react against all those
parties?
"We have to confront them with a price that will make
the realization of the potential not worthwhile: not
for them and not for anyone who is thinking about using
similar weapons against Israel in the future."
But isn't it the case that a reaction of that kind
could bring about a general deterioration in the north?
"What is a general deterioration? There will be a
certain period - not very long - in which we will have
to learn to be on the receiving end, but then
immediately to set a price that will make them
understand that it is not worthwhile. All told, we have
a crushing answer to Hezbollah. And if the Syrians try
to take us on in the field of army versus army, we have
a crushing answer to that, too - they know it and
that's what deters them. Therefore, I do not think that
a confrontation in the north is inevitable. But if they
decide to escalate, we will be obliged to exact a very
heavy price from all the bodies I mentioned."
Is Bashar Assad really more adventurous than his father
was?
"As the Arabs wrestled with the problem between
agreements and the armed struggle, Hafez Assad sat on
the fence with both his legs and both his hands in the
direction of a settlement. Bashar Assad is sitting on
the same fence with both his legs and both his hands on
the side of the armed struggle. There is a dramatic
difference between the father and his son."
Does that mean that Syria is turning toward
confrontation with Israel?
"Syria is turning toward support for terrorism. It is
not interested in an army versus army clash - under no
circumstances. Part of the difference between Bashar
Assad and his father is due to the fact that Bashar's
formative experience is not the military defeats of
1967 and 1973, which his father experienced personally.
Bashar's formative experience is the Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon, which occurred shortly after he assumed
power. His conclusion from that was that terrorism is
victorious.


È Bashar Assad realmente più avventuroso del suo padre
era?
"come gli Arabi wrestled con il problema in mezzo
gli accordi e la lotta munita, Hafez Assad si sono seduti sopra
la recinzione con sia i suoi piedini che entrambe sue mani in
senso di uno stabilimento.
Bashar Assad sta sedendosi sopra
la stessa recinzione con sia i suoi piedini che entrambe sue mani sopra
il lato della lotta munita.
Ci è un drammatico
differenza fra il padre ed il suo figlio."
Fa quella media che la Siria sta girando verso
confronto con l'Israele?
"la Siria sta girando verso sostegno terrorismo.
È
non interessato ad un esercito contro il disaccordo dell'esercito - sotto no
circostanze.
Parte della differenza fra Bashar
Assad ed il suo padre è dovuto il fatto che Bashar
l'esperienza formativa non è le sconfitte militari di
1967 e 1973, che suo padre ha sperimentato personalmente.
L'esperienza formativa del Bashar è il ritiro israeliano
dal Libano, che si è presentato subito dopo He ha presupposto
alimentazione.
La sua conclusione da quella era che il terrorismo è
victorious.