Newsgroup: it.arti.cinema
Titolo: Move Yasser Arafat up -- not out

 Tutto il mondo e' con Arafat, tranne un paio di fanatici che non conosco i
fatti ne' si degnano di seguirli, ma hanno poche certezze inscalfibili.
Arafat e' ora un uomo di pace, Sharon un boia che sta portando il suo paese
al massacro e il mondo sull'orlo della guerra.
Leo, prendi le distanze da questo ignominio prima che il ridicolo si
trasformi in colpa.
By Herbert C. Kelman, 9/20/2003
<
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2003/09/20
/move_yasser_arafat_up____not_out/>
THE ISRAELI Security Cabinet's decision to "remove"
Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat is
ominous. Though the stated justification for the
decision is the assertion that Arafat is an obstacle to
peace, it actually seems to be designed to ensure the
failure of the peace process envisaged by the road map.
This is not a time for passivity, subtlety, or ambiguity
in Washington's response. Vehement US opposition to such
a project is essential to averting reckless actions that
are likely, at the very least, to set back the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process for a long time to come.
There is no Palestinian leader who would be able to
negotiate a peace agreement in the wake of Arafat's
expulsion. Worse yet, if the expulsion causes the death
of Arafat and/or the deaths of Palestinians who gather
to protect their leader, the likely result is a further
escalation of violence, with disastrous consequences for
both communities.
Washington, unfortunately, prepared the ground for this
dangerous turn of events by framing the appointment of
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as another case
of "regime change" in the Middle East -- as the
replacement of Arafat with Abu Mazen -- and by shunning
and seeking to isolate Arafat and pressuring European
officials to break all contacts with him.
This approach has compromised Abu Mazen's legitimacy in
the eyes of the Palestinian population and seriously
undermined his position. He came to be seen by many as a
tool and accomplice in US efforts to reorder the Middle
East and Israeli efforts to perpetuate the occupation.
It also encouraged a power struggle between Abu Mazen
and Arafat, who had an incentive to block some of Abu
Mazen's initiatives in order to maintain his personal
control.
Defining Abu Mazen and now his designated successor,
Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), as replacements and rivals of
Arafat, flies in the face of an important reality: Both
men are long-term, close associates of Arafat and derive
whatever domestic legitimacy they have and can
potentially enhance from this association.
Furthermore, the political strategy pursued by these two
men -- and, indeed, by all of the Palestinian leaders
who have been committed to negotiating a historic
compromise with Israel, in the form of a two-state
solution -- is ultimately the strategy of Arafat.
Where Arafat's leadership has gone awry is in his
tactics: his continuing embrace of the bankrupt idea
that violence can be used as a bargaining tool; his
unwillingness to share control and credit.
The appeal of Abu Mazen and Abu Ala is that they are
ready to advocate an end to violence and to engage in
realistic negotiations in pursuit of the goal that
Arafat has enunciated and persuaded the majority of the
Palestinian population to accept: an independent
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with its
capital in Jerusalem, in peaceful co-existence with the
State of Israel.
The irony of the situation is that, by the time of Abu
Mazen's appointment as prime minister, there was growing
dissatisfaction with Arafat's leadership -- including,
significantly, his inability to end the violence and
advance the negotiations -- within the Palestinian
political elite and general population. The idea of
appointing a prime minister was generated within the
Palestinian community itself and represented a
significant accomplishment under trying circumstances.
US pressure no doubt contributed to Arafat's decision to
accept his Legislative Council's recommendation. But by
defining the action as a US-sponsored regime change, we
were in effect saying to the Palestinian leadership: "We
will force you to appoint a new prime minister, even if
you have independently decided to do so."
As a result, not only was the legitimacy of the new
prime minister undermined, but Palestinians felt further
humiliated because their elected president, the father
of their nation, and the symbol of their collective
identity was being denied the respect and dignity due to
his status.
Not surprisingly, Arafat's popularity has increased --
and will increase even further if he is forcibly
removed.
With the designation of Abu Ala as the new prime
minister, we have another chance to frame this political
development constructively, in a way consistent with the
intentions of the Palestinian reformers and the dignity
of the Palestinian public. Far from removing Arafat or
replacing him with the new prime minister, we should
endorse a redefinition of the role of the Palestinian
president. Arafat, as president, would become the head-
of-state, occupying a position that is essentially
ceremonial and symbolic (similar to the position of the
president of Israel), while the prime minister would be
the head-of-government, responsible for conducting the
internal and external affairs of the Palestinian
Authority, including internal security and peace
negotiations.
As head-of-state, Arafat would be treated with the full
respect that is due to his office and would be
recognized in his historical role as the symbol and
father of the Palestinian people and its incipient
state.
There is no guarantee that, under such an arrangement,
Arafat would readily abandon his life-long habit of
maintaining personal control. But his incentive to
cooperate with his prime minister would be greatly
enhanced. Above all, the prime minister would start out
with the domestic legitimacy that he needs to function
effectively and would have the opportunity to enhance
his legitimacy by pursuing a meaningful peace process
and achieving positive changes in the daily lives of his
constituency.
Herbert C. Kelman is Richard Clarke Cabot Research
Professor of Social Ethics and co-chair of the Middle
East Seminar at Harvard University. (c) Copyright 2003
Globe Newspaper Company.

 fatti ne' si degnano di seguirli, ma hanno poche certezze inscalfibili.
Sei OT.
Ciao,
mAx
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