Newsgroup: it.comp.sicurezza.crittografia
Titolo: Codici segreti iraniani

Visto che ho un attimo di cazzeggio, faccio un paio di pensieri in libertà sui
codici segreti iraniani. Assolutamente niente di tecnico, se qualcuno vuole
dire la sua..
E' uscita la notizia qualche settimana fa, che Chalabi, candidato iracheno
alla presidenza e sostenuto dagli americani fino a poco tempo prima, è stato
scaricato dalla CIA perchè ha rivelato agli iraniani che li americani
riuscivano a decifrare il loro codice segreto. Ora, ammesso che sia vero
(Chalabi passò agli americani informazioni sugli armamenti iracheni poi
rivelatesi false, per cui magari questa dei codici è solo una scusa), la mia
idea è questa.
Gli iraniani *potrebbero* essere indietro anni luce coi codici.
Visto che applicano ancora la legge del taglione, la cosa non mi stupirebbe,
ma considerando che ormai alcuni degli algoritmi più noti li conosce pure il
mio fiorista, credo che il codice degli iraniani sia *almeno* a livello PGP (o
GPG).
Ora, ammesso e non concesso ciò, significa che esiste un laboratorio da
qualche parte che decifra tranquillamente le cose "da PGP in poi"
(so che questa espressione è assolutamente imprecisa, perciò l'ho
virgolettata).
Forse è un laboratorio con tecniche sofisticate e complicate da realizzare,
per cui solamente alcuni "messaggi scelti" possono essere decifrati, ma può
anche darsi che PGP sia stato "rotto" per cui viene attuata una decifratura
"di massa" su qualunque cosa passi in rete. Oppure (ma forse esagero) sono
riusciti a realizzare un computer quantistico sufficientemente potente da
poter essere usato.
Non so, li mie sono solo idee al vento, se qualcuno ha qualche pensiero a
riguardo...
Ciao,
Gio


Ehm...
Francamente non sò cosa ci sia dopo PGP/GPG perchè gia questi due programmi
utilizzano il top, apparte l'OTP, in fatto d algoritmi crittografici...
(AES è pure uno standard...)
Ma se fossero stati in grado d decifrare o se avessero rotto l'algoritmo,
perchè nn hanno sventato l'attacco dell'11 settembre, come diceva TjL73 (se
era lui :-p).
Io ho letto che più che altro potrebbero usare la steganografia, quindi
magari gli Americani sn riusciti a risalire al modo con cui nascondevano le
info e dove, e quindi nn serve nessun super computer, ma tanto intuito...
O magari se si trattava di supporti informatici, con analisi del traffico
etc etc si riesce cmq.
Manuel

 riuscivano a decifrare il loro codice segreto. 
mah, la questione non e' chiara, uno dice una cosa l'altro un'altra,
io dubito abbiano crackato AES o cose simili, piu' probabile che
gli iraniani usavano strumenti con backdoor o cmq canali non sicura, 
o che sia tutta una messinscena per motivi politici.
alcune info ulteriori:
http://www.rtfm.com/movabletype/archives/2004_06.html#000934
e questo articolo:
The New York Times
June 2, 2004
Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code
By JAMES RISEN and DAVID JOHNSTON
ASHINGTON, June 1 - Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi leader and former ally of
the
Bush administration, disclosed to an Iranian official that the United
States had broken the secret communications code of Iran's intelligence
service, betraying one of Washington's most valuable sources of
information
about Iran, according to United States intelligence officials.
The general charge that Mr. Chalabi provided Iran with critical American  
intelligence secrets was widely reported last month after the Bush
administration cut off financial aid to Mr. Chalabi's organization, the
Iraqi National Congress, and American and Iraqi security forces raided
his
Baghdad headquarters.
 The Bush administration, citing national security concerns, asked The
New
York Times and other news organizations not to publish details of the
case.
The Times agreed to hold off publication of some specific information
that
top intelligence officials said would compromise a vital, continuing
intelligence operation. The administration withdrew its request on
Tuesday,
saying information about the code-breaking was starting to appear in
news
accounts.
Mr. Chalabi and his aides have said he knew of no secret information
related to Iran and therefore could not have communicated any
intelligence 
to Tehran.
American officials said that about six weeks ago, Mr. Chalabi told the
Baghdad station chief of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security
that
the United States was reading the communications traffic of the Iranian
spy
service, one of the most sophisticated in the Middle East.
 According to American officials, the Iranian official in Baghdad,
possibly
not believing Mr. Chalabi's account, sent a cable to Tehran detailing
his
conversation with Mr. Chalabi, using the broken code. That encrypted
cable,
intercepted and read by the United States, tipped off American officials
to
the fact that Mr. Chalabi had betrayed the code-breaking operation, the
American officials said.
 American officials reported that in the cable to Tehran, the Iranian
official recounted how Mr. Chalabi had said that one of "them" - a
reference to an American - had revealed the code-breaking operation, the
officials said. The Iranian reported that Mr. Chalabi said the American
was
drunk.
 The Iranians sent what American intelligence regarded as a test
message,
which mentioned a cache of weapons inside Iraq, believing that if the
code
had been broken, United States military forces would be quickly
dispatched
to the specified site. But there was no such action.
The account of Mr. Chalabi's actions has been confirmed by several
senior
American officials, who said the leak contributed to the White House
decision to break with him.
 It could not be learned exactly how the United States broke the code.
But
intelligence sources said that in the past, the United States has broken
into the embassies of foreign governments, including those of Iran, to
steal information, including codes.
 The F.B.I. has opened an espionage investigation seeking to determine
exactly what information Mr. Chalabi turned over to the Iranians as well
as
who told Mr. Chalabi that the Iranian code had been broken, government
officials said. The inquiry, still in an early phase, is focused on a
very
small number of people who were close to Mr. Chalabi and also had access
to
the highly restricted information about the Iran code.
 Some of the people the F.B.I. expects to interview are civilians at the
Pentagon who were among Mr. Chalabi's strongest supporters and served as
his main point of contact with the government, the officials said. So
far,
no one has been accused of any wrongdoing.
In a television interview on May 23, Mr. Chalabi said on CNN's "Late
Edition" that he met in Tehran in December with the Iranian supreme
leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami. He
also said he had met with Iran's minister of information.
 Mr. Chalabi attacked the C.I.A. and the director of central
intelligence,
George J. Tenet, saying the agency was behind what Mr. Chalabi asserted
was
an effort to smear him.
 "I have never passed any classified information to Iran or have done
anything - participated in any scheme of intelligence against the United
States," Mr. Chalabi said on "Fox News Sunday." "This charge is false. I
have never seen a U.S. classified document, and I have never seen - had
a
U.S. classified briefing."
 Mr. Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, said, "We meet
people from the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad regularly," but said that was
to
be expected of Iraqi officials like himself.
Some defenders of Mr. Chalabi in the United States say American
officials
had encouraged him in his dealings with Iran, urging him to open an
office
in Tehran in hopes of improving relations between Iran and Washington.
Those defenders also say they do not believe that his relationship with
Iran involved any exchange of intelligence.
 Mr. Chalabi's allies in Washington also saw the Bush administration's
decision to sever its ties with Mr. Chalabi and his group as a cynical
effort instigated by the C.I.A. and longtime Chalabi critics at the
State
Department. They believe those agencies want to blame him for mistaken
estimates and incorrect information about Iraq before the war, like
whether
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.
One of those who has defended Mr. Chalabi is Richard N. Perle, the
former
chairman of the Defense Policy Board. "The C.I.A. has disliked him
passionately for a long time and has mounted a campaign against him with
some considerable success," Mr. Perle said Tuesday. "I've seen no
evidence
of improper behavior on his part. No evidence whatsoever."
 Mr. Perle said he thought the C.I.A. had turned against Mr. Chalabi
because he refused to be the agency's "puppet." Mr. Chalabi "has a mind
of
his own," Mr. Perle said.
American intelligence officials said the F.B.I. investigation into the
intelligence leak to Iran did not extend to any charges that Mr. Chalabi
provided the United States with incorrect information, or any
allegations
of corruption.
 American officials said the leak about the Iranian codes was a serious
loss because the Iranian intelligence service's highly encrypted cable
traffic was a crucial source of information, supplying Washington with
information about Iranian operations inside Iraq, where Tehran's agents
have become increasingly active. It also helped the United States keep
track of Iranian intelligence operations around the world.
 Until last month, the Iraqi National Congress had a lucrative contract
with the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide information about Iraq.
Before the United States invasion last year, the group arranged for
Iraqi
defectors to provide the Pentagon with information about Saddam
Hussein's
government, particularly evidence purporting to show that Baghdad had
active programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Today, the
American
intelligence community believes that much of the information passed by
the
defectors was either wrong or fabricated.
-- 
ciao
GPG/PGP key available on keyservers