Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: Iraq e Usa

A proposito degli armamenti iracheni... qualcuno mi sa dire più o meno
l'attuale armamento del Iraq (missili, carrarmati,aerei,soldati) e
soprattuto, se come ho letto anche gli Stati Uniti d'America rifornirono
Saddam che mezzi militari gli diedero, e ne rimangono tuttora oggi in dote
all esercito iracheno? poi,  sono di fabbricazione russa, americana o
europea ?
Saluti
Mirko

 europea ?
Che io sappia le FFAA irakene durante il periodo di Saddam al potere non
hanno mai avuto in dotazione mezzi di provenienza USA, se non catturati
all'Iran durante la prima guerra del golfo. Nello stesso periodo gli USA
fornirono all'Iraq supporto di intelligence (informazioni, foto da
satelliti), fondi e appoggio politico.
Ciao
Ale
--
*La sconfitta reclama ad alta voce perche' esige spiegazioni; mentre la
vittoria, come la carita', nasconde un gran numero di peccati*
Alfred T. Mahan

 ha
scritto:

Ancora con questa storia.
Gli USA non hanno mai rifornito di armi l'irak, è solo una propaganda
mediatica.
Cmq se vuoi sapere di cosa è dotato l'Irak, vai su Globalsecurity.com
e troverai tutto ciò che ti serve.
Bye

 satelliti), fondi e appoggio politico.
I fondi non furono neanche forniti direttamente, ma indirettamente cioè 
gli USA concessero all'Iraq un grosso credito per l'acquisto di derrate 
alimentari il che consentì a Saddam di usare i soldi che avrebbe speso 
per questi per acquistare armi, munizioni e materiali militari vari. 
Indovinate dove? dai due più grossi oppositori alla guerra di oggi, 
Francia e Russia (allora Unione Sovietica). Che strana coincidenza, non 
trovate?
Vins

 trovate?
Qualcuno nel thread (stra)parla di propaganda mediatica. 
Guardate invece qui : 
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one of a series of crises during an
era of upheaval in the Middle East: revolution in Iran, occupation of
the U.S. embassy in Tehran by militant students, invasion of the Great
Mosque in Mecca by anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet Union's
occupation of Afghanistan, and internecine fighting among Syrians,
Israelis, and Palestinians in Lebanon. The war followed months of rising
tension between the Iranian Islamic republic and secular nationalist
Iraq. In mid-September 1980 Iraq attacked, in the mistaken belief that
Iranian political disarray would guarantee a quick victory.
The international community responded with U.N. Security Council
resolutions calling for a ceasefire and for all member states to refrain
from actions contributing in any way to the conflict's continuation. The
Soviets, opposing the war, cut off arms exports to Iran and to Iraq, its
ally under a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries resumed in 1982). The U.S. had
already ended, when the shah fell, previously massive military sales to
Iran. In 1980 the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Iran because
of the Tehran embassy hostage crisis; Iraq had broken off ties with the
U.S. during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and claimed
that it armed neither side. Iran depended on U.S.-origin weapons,
however, and sought them from Israel, Europe, Asia, and South America.
Iraq started the war with a large Soviet-supplied arsenal, but needed
additional weaponry as the conflict wore on.
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but was driven back
within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on the defensive against Iranian
human-wave attacks. The U.S., having decided that an Iranian victory
would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq: measures already
underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were accelerated, high-level
officials exchanged visits, and in February 1982 the State Department
removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism.
(It had been included several years earlier because of ties with several
Palestinian nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of
al-Qaeda. Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group,
al-Dawa, was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's
Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination
of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq received massive
external financial support from the Gulf states, and assistance through
loan programs from the U.S. The White House and State Department
pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing, to
enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain loans from other
international financial institutions. The U.S. Agriculture Department
provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for purchases of American
commodities, to the satisfaction of U.S. grain exporters.
The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984, but the
U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with intelligence
and military support (in secret and contrary to this country's official
neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from President Ronald
Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security
Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward
the Middle East.
One of these directives from Reagan, National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is available only in a
highly redacted version [Document 21]. It reviews U.S. regional
interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives,
including peace between Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other
regional conflicts, and economic and military improvements, "to
strengthen regional stability." It deals with threats to the U.S.,
strategic planning, cooperation with other countries, including the Arab
states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental review of the
implications of shifting policy in favor of Iraq was conducted following
promulgation of the directive.
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use of using
chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol requires that the
international community respond to chemical warfare, but a
diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to its
complaints [Note 1]. It intensified its accusations in October 1983,
however, and in November asked for a United Nations Security Council
investigation.
The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with
extraordinary intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran's accusations,
and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent
with its policy review and decision to support Iraq in the war [Document
24]. The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against
Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish
insurgents" as well [Document 25].
What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department
account indicates that the administration had decided to limit its
"efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our
strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the
low probability of achieving desired results." But the department noted
in late November 1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign
firms, Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has
built up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation to
end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW,
particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a
large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department argued that the
U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain the credibility of its
official opposition to chemical warfare, and recommended that the
National Security Council discuss the issue.
Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan issued
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November 26,
1983, concerned specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war.
The directive reflects the administration's priorities: it calls for
heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and
measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and
directs the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate measures to respond to
tensions in the area. It states, "Because of the real and psychological
impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the
international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal
promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic." It does not
mention chemical weapons [Document 26].
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in various positions in
the Nixon and Ford administrations, including as President Ford's
defense secretary, and at this time headed the multinational
pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched to the Middle
East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour of regional
capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish "direct contact
between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein,"
while emphasizing "his close relationship" with the president [Document
28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional issues of
mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and Syria, and the U.S.'s
efforts to find alternative routes to transport Iraq's oil; its
facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down by Iran, and Iran's
ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported Iraqi oil through
its territory. Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, according
to detailed notes on the meeting [Document 31].
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and the two
agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests." Rumsfeld
affirmed the Reagan administration's "willingness to do more" regarding
the Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear that our efforts to assist were
inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the
use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human
rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document 32]. Later,
Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests section that Iraq's
leadership had been "extremely pleased" with the visit, and that "Tariq
Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document
36 and Document 37].
Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this time, the U.S.
had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use, stating, "The United
States has concluded that the available evidence substantiates Iran's
charges that Iraq used chemical weapons" [Document 47]. Briefings for
Rumsfeld's meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated
since his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because
"bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation
of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would
emerge sooner or later" [Document 48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with
Iraqi officials the Reagan administration's hope that it could obtain
Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its
vigorous efforts to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an
affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast
travels, former NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed
to Iraq an offer from Israel to provide assistance, which was rejected
[Document 61].
Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S. military
equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a "don't ask - don't
tell" basis. In April 1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be
kept apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell
helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for
military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had
informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from
Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes helicopters. An allied
government, South Korea, informed the State Department that it had
received a similar request in June 1983 (when a congressional aide asked
in March 1983 whether heavy trucks recently sold to Iraq were intended
for military purposes, a State Department official replied "we presumed
that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy for the sale of
dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program, and its "preliminary
results favor[ed] expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear
entities" [Document 57]. Several months later, a Defense Intelligence
Agency analysis said that even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to
"continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical
capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq is
situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled a large
nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure. Nuclear
nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan administration -
throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's nuclear program, though
its intelligence indicated that a weapons capability was being pursued,
in order to avert congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions would
have impeded the administration's massive military assistance to
Pakistan provided in return for its support of the mujahideen fighting
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.)
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major Iranian attack,
issued a warning that "the invaders should know that for every harmful
insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever the
number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide" [Document 41].
On March 3, the State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company
from shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons
precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S. interests section to
protest to the Iraqi government, and to inform the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation of Iraqi use of
chemical weapons in the near future," and that "we are adamantly opposed
to Iraq's attempting to acquire the raw materials, equipment, or
expertise to manufacture chemical weapons from the United States. When
we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their
export to Iraq" [Document 42].
The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said, "While
condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The United States finds the
present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed
objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq
to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and
the moral and religious basis which it claims" [Document 43].
Later in the month, the State Department briefed the press on its
decision to strengthen controls on the export of chemical weapons
precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response to intelligence and media
reports that precursors supplied to Iraq originated in Western
countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s conclusion that Iraq had used
chemical weapons would have "any effect on U.S. recent initiatives to
expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also
a willingness to open diplomatic relations," the department's
spokesperson said "No. I'm not aware of any change in our position.
We're interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq"
[Document 52].
Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to condemn Iraq's
chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate to the U.N. was instructed to
lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a general motion of "no
decision" on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S.
delegate was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the
U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked for
"restraint" in responding to the issue - as did the representatives of
both France and Britain.
A senior U.N. official who had participated in a fact-finding mission to
investigate Iran's complaint commented "Iranians may well decide to
manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if [the] international
community does not condemn Iraq. He said Iranian assembly speaker
Rafsanjani [had] made public statements to this effect" [Document 50].
Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State James Placke on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq
strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a
resolution, and wanted the response to refer to former resolutions on
the war, progress toward ending the conflict, but to not identify any
specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke said
the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals if the Security Council went
along. He asked for the Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . .
embarrassing situation[s]" but also noted that the U.S. did "not want
this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship" [Document 54].
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential statement
condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the
offending party. A State Department memo circulating the draft text
observed that, "The statement, by the way contains all three elements
Hamdoon wanted" [Document 51].
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another presidential directive
(NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S. objective of ensuring access to
military facilities in the Gulf region, and instructing the director of
central intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S.
intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified U.S. determination to
develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive said that
U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical warfare
(without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that the U.S. should
"place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing
the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent
offensives." The directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical
warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S. support
for Iraq [Document 53].
A State Department background paper dated November 16, 1984 said that
Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after a November 1983 demarche
from the U.S., but had resumed their use in February 1984. On November
26, 1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption of ties,
met with Secretary of State George Shultz. When their discussion turned
to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that his country was satisfied that "the
U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional stability is 'in agreement
in principle' with Iraq's," and expressed thanks for U.S. efforts to cut
off international arms sales to Iran. He said that "Iraq's superiority
in weaponry" assured Iraq's defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic
intent, "remarked that superior intelligence must also be an important
factor in Iraq's defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document 60].
Conclusion
The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly moralistic
terms to further its goal of persuading a skeptical world that a
preemptive and premeditated attack on Iraq could and should be supported
as a "just war." The documents included in this briefing book reflect
the realpolitik that determined this country's policies during the years
when Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. Actual rather than
rhetorical opposition to such use was evidently not perceived to serve
U.S. interests; instead, the Reagan administration did not deviate from
its determination that Iraq was to serve as the instrument to prevent an
Iranian victory. Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially
embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to
provide assistance. The Iraqi government's repressive internal policies,
though well known to the U.S. government at the time, did not figure at
all in the presidential directives that established U.S. policy toward
the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its ability to project
military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing.
Most of the information in this briefing book, in its broad outlines,
has been available for years. Some of it was recorded in contemporaneous
news reports; a few investigative reporters uncovered much more -
especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A particular debt is owed to
the late representative Henry Gonzales (1916-2000), Democrat of Texas,
whose staff extensively investigated U.S. policy toward Iraq during the
1980s and who would not be deterred from making information available to
the public [Note 2]. Almost all of the primary documents included in
this briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive
through the Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995 [Note
3].
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Troverete i documenti di cui si parla in formato pdf su
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm
Di questi documenti, se non volete scaricaverli troverete un estratto
delle parti piu' interessanti qui
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm#docs
Saluti
Sergio
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