Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: armi a saddam,gli stati uniti sono ultimi

WAR - ARMI A SADDAM? TRA LE GRANDI POTENZE GLI STATI UNITI SONO ULTIMI E
DISTANTI DA GERMANIA, FRANCIA, RUSSIA, I PACIFISTI DI OGGI.
Dal Blog di Cristian Rocca, Camillo (
www.ilfoglio.it/camillo
 - ci arrivate
anche attraverso la homepage de Il Foglio, 
www.ilfoglio.it
) , prendiamo
questo interessante notizia sulla vendita alle armi a Saddam Hussein. La
fonte è prestigiosa e affidabile e le cifre sono sorprendenti, soprattutto
per i paesi "pacifisti", Russia, Francia e Germania. A quanto pare, gli
Stati Uniti a Saddam hanno fornito le briciole del suo arsenale:
"Uno studio del prestigioso think tank liberal, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, citato dal Times di Londra, smentisce il tam tam su
'gli americani hanno armato Saddam'. Nel periodo 1973-91, cioè fino a quando
era legale commerciare con l'Iraq, gli Stati Uniti hanno esportato in Iraq
armi per 5 milioni di dollari; la Germania per 995 milioni di dollari; la
Cina per 5.500 milioni di dollari; la Francia per 9.240 milioni; la Russia
per 31.800 milioni di dollari".
Il dubbio è che oltre all'amore per la pace, qualcuno si disperi anche per
la scomparsa di un ottimo cliente.

 la scomparsa di un ottimo cliente.
tu vedi qualche altro motivo che possa giustificare la posizione di
Francia & co.?
Quelle nazioni sono stati i principali fornitori di armi e principali
esportatori di petrolio.
Ma tanto "the devil" sono gli USA, no? chissefrega di come stanno
veramente le cose.
Raffaele
-- 
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 Francia & co.?
Gli Oleodotti nei quali la francia ha investito qualche migliardino?
--
Giochi di ruolo, Fantasy, Tolkien, Castelli. Io impazzisco!!!  ^___^;
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Ho messo da parte per un po' "Dimenticato Re Gudu'"
Dirk
Tessera BFFFC #2 (il Bardo Fosco Forforini Fans' Club) ;):p

 Gli Oleodotti nei quali la francia ha investito qualche migliardino?
beh, ovviamente quando parli di "perdere un'ottimo cliente" bisogna
intenderlo nei due sensi. iraq cliente per le armi, francia & co clienti
per il petrolio.
of course...


 per il petrolio.
Beh, cmq siamo tutti d'accordo che la presa di posizione dela francia contro
la guerra di certo non e' dettata dal filantropismo ^_-


 la guerra di certo non e' dettata dal filantropismo ^_-
diciamo quasi tutti...
il problema è che tutti o quasi parlano degli usa come principali
fornitori di armi all'iraq, senza minimamente considerare le nazioni che
oggi si proclamano "pacifiste". La stessa italia ha venduto non poche mine
all'Iraq (e non solo...) e subito prima della guerra del '91 stava per
vedere alcune navi a Saddam.
Pultroppo in giro, specialmente su internet, ormai tutti si sentono
abbastanza esperti da scrivere articoli su articoli a sproloquio, tanto
che ormai è quasi impossibile trovare informazioni "di prima mano"
Raffale


 per 31.800 milioni di dollari".
Per me, qualcuno si č giocato un po' a spostare un po' di zeri...
Adesso mi metto a cercare qualcosina in rete, ma l'ipotesi di soli 5 milioni
di dollari in quasi vent'anni č del tutto inverosimile.
--
Saluti                                   Meneldil
"Neanche una goccia di sangue europeo per le guerre petrolifere del sig.
Bush"


Solo 5 milioni di dollari di commercio di armi tra USA ed IRAQ in 20 anni?
BALLE!!!!!
Ditemi voi se tutto quanto segue puň riguardare una commessa da soli 5
milioni di dollari...
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm
Document 1: United States Embassy in Turkey Cable from Richard W. Boehm to
the Department of State. "Back Up of Transshipment Cargos for Iraq,"
November 21, 1980.
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. embassy in Ankara
reports that Turkish ports have a backlog of goods awaiting transshipment to
Iraq, and that a substantial amount of Israeli goods transit Turkey for
"Islamic belligerents," including Israeli chemical products for Iran. It
remarks on "Israeli acumen" in selling to both Iran and Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians, resulting in
hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense material damage. It was
sustained by an arms bazaar made up of a broad spectrum of foreign
governments and corporations: British, Spanish, Italian, French, German,
Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean, North Korean, Chinese, South African,
Eastern European, Israeli, American, etc., who found both combatants eager
consumers of weapons, ammunition, and military technology. Iran needed
U.S.-origin weapons compatible with the military infrastructure created by
the U.S. during the shah's reign, could not buy them directly, and had to
rely on third-party suppliers like Israel.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 2: United States Embassy in Israel Cable from Samuel W. Lewis to
the Department of State. "Conversation with [Excised]," December 12, 1980.
A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to Iran while Americans
are held hostage in Tehran, but that European arms dealers were providing it
with weapons with or without government approval.
(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in September 1979
to protest the admission of the exiled shah to the U.S. for medical
treatment, and held 52 Americans hostage. In response, the Carter
administration froze Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions. The
hostages were not released until January 20, 1981, the inauguration day of
newly elected President Ronald Reagan.)
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 3: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to All
Near Eastern and South Asian Diplomatic Posts. "Military Equipment for Iran
and Iraq," February 16, 1981.
A State Department cable delineates official U.S. arms export policy for
Iran and Iraq as it stood in early 1981: the "U.S. position has been to
avoid taking sides in an effort to prevent widening the conflict, bring an
end to the fighting and restore stability to the area."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 4: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Prospects for DAS [Deputy
Assistant Secretary] Draper's Visit To Baghdad," April 4, 1981.
The U.S. interests section (since the U.S. and Iraq did not have formal
diplomatic relations at this time - they were restored in November 1984 -
they were represented in each other's capitol by interests sections) says
that the U.S. now has "a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at
any time since the revolution of 1958" (when Iraqis overthrew the
conservative Hashemite monarchy that had been imposed under British
colonialism.) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper is to visit
Baghdad, "the first visit by a senior department official since Phil Habib
stopped by in 1977."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 5: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the
United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Secretary's Message To Iraqi
Foreign Minister," April 8, 1981.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal message to Iraqi Foreign
Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting that it is important that "our two
countries be able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis,"
paving the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper's meetings in
Baghdad.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 6: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign
Minister Hammadi," April 12, 1981.
As the Reagan administration continues efforts to improve relations with
Iraq, the U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks for more information from
Washington "so as to be able to take up with the Iraqis on suitable
occasions a wide array of issues of mutual interest."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 7: Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs Letter from Saadoun Hammadi to
Alexander M. Haig, Jr. [Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Praise for Visit
of Under Secretary Draper], April 15, 1981.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi thanks Secretary of State
Alexander Haig for Under Secretary Draper's visit, supports discussion of
strengthened trade relations, and welcomes assurances that the U.S. will not
sell arms to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 8: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Ea
gleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Letter to the Secretary from Iraqi
Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 20, 1981.
After reading a "friendly and non-contentious letter" from Iraqi Foreign
Minister Hammadi to Secretary of State Haig, the head of the U.S. interests
section agrees with foreign ministry official Mohammed al-Sahhaf that a
useful two-way correspondence had been established between the U.S. and
Iraq.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the
Iraqi Interests Section in the United States. "Meeting with Iraqint Chief
al-Omar" [For Eagleton from Draper], April 22, 1981.
Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper assures the head of the
Iraqi interests section that he was extremely pleased with his visit to
Baghdad and prospects for improved relations and increased trade. He takes
the opportunity to make a "strong pitch" for a U.S. company bidding on an
Iraqi Metro project.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 10: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to Department of State. "Meeting with Tariq Aziz," May 28,
1981.
Following consultations in Washington, the head of the U.S. interests
section in Baghdad, William Eagleton, meets with Revolutionary Command
Council representative Tariq Aziz, the "highest level in the Iraqi
government our Baghdad mission has met with since the 1967 break in
relations." Eagleton informs Aziz of "the U.S. government's satisfaction
with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi relations." After the meeting, he
tells Washington that "we are in a position to communicate directly with the
leadership should we have any sensitive or particularly important message to
convey."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 11: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the
United States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and
Transfers to Iraq and Iran," June 3, 1981.
Washington tells the U.S. interests section in Baghdad that it "has no
specific information" regarding Iran's reported acquisitions of U.S. arms
and spare parts, and asks the interests section head to assure Iraqi
officials that "the U.S. has not approved nor condoned any military sales to
Iraq or Iran."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 12: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable to the Department
of State. "Staffdel [Staff Delegation] Pillsbury's Visit to Baghdad,"
September 27, 1981.
A member of a staff delegation touring the Middle East on behalf of Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits Iraq's parliament, and has discussions during
which "the atmosphere was pleasant and friendly," reflected in expressions
of support for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 13: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the
United States Interests Section in Iraq. "De-designation of Iraq as
Supporter of International Terrorism," February 27, 1982.
The State Department provides press guidance to regional missions regarding
removal of Iraq from its list of countries that support international
terrorism. The guidance says that the decision has no implications for U.S.
policy toward the Iran-Iraq war.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 14: National Security Study Directive (NSSD 4-82) from Ronald W.
Reagan. "U.S. Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia," March 19,
1982.
President Reagan calls for a review of policy for the Middle East and South
Asia, to prepare for decisions regarding procurement, arms transfers, and
intelligence planning. Revised guidelines are needed because of regional
diplomatic and global oil market developments.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 15: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of Commerce. "Helicopters and Airplanes for
Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform," September 20, 1982.
Iraq's director of agricultural aviation invites U.S. crop-spraying aircraft
manufacturers to provide information about helicopters and pilot training,
noting problems with its existing equipment because pilots have been
inhaling insecticide fumes.
Iran was reporting chemical weapons use against its forces by this time.
According to a 1991 article in the Los Angeles Times, American-built
helicopters were used by Iraq for some of its chemical weapons attacks;
according to the Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq experimented with using
commercial crop sprayers for biological warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 16: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United
States Interests Section in Iraq. "Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister," January
15, 1983.
The State Department asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to inform
Iraqi officials that Secretary of State George Shultz would welcome a visit
by Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, but notes congressional criticism of
Iraq and the "sensitivity of the terrorism issue" (Iraq supported several
Palestinian nationalist factions.) The department suggests Iraq "contribute
to the positive atmosphere of the visit" by curtailing its support for
terrorism, mentioning specifically the Palestinian groups Black June and May
15.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 17: Department of State, Office of the Secretary Delegation Cable
from George P. Shultz to the Department of State. "Secretary's May 10
Meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz," May 11, 1983.
Secretary of State Shultz tells Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the
U.S. wants the Iran-Iraq war to end. He says that the U.S. is neutral toward
the war but observes that Aziz knows that "we had been helpful to Iraq in
various ways."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 18: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United
States Interests Section in Iraq. "Message from the Secretary for FON MIN
Tariq Aziz: Iraqi Support for Terrorism," May 23, 1983.
Secretary of State George Shultz writes to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz, commenting on the "very important common interests" between Iraq and
the U.S. Shultz obliquely encourages Iraq to disassociate itself from the
Palestinian groups it supports by evoking conservative Shiite militants
opposed to both the U.S. and to Iraq's secular government: it "appears that
at least the inspiration for certain terrorist acts against Iraq and against
the U.S. emanates at times from the same sources. By working together to
combat terrorism, our efforts should be more effective. In observing Iraqi
policy, it had begun to appear to me that Iraq was approaching the
conclusion that its national interests are never served by international
terrorists."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence
Appraisal. "The Iraqi Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks," June
1983.
In its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program, the Central Intelligence Agency
indicates that Iraq probably plans to eventually obtain nuclear weapons. The
CIA says it has not identified such a program, but remarks that Iraq "has
made a few moves that could take it in that direction," while noting the
difficulty of clandestine research and development and procurement of the
necessary technology and fissile materials.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 20: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from Barbara K.
Bodine to the Department of State. "Militarization of Hughes Helicopters,"
June 8, 1983.
Tells the State Department that a government official from (presumably)
South Korea reported that Iraq asked his government to militarize Hughes
helicopters that were sold and delivered earlier in 1983. The request was
turned down.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 21: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99) from Ronald W.
Reagan. "United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia"
[Attached to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised], July 12, 1983.
Outlines U.S. regional objectives, strategies, and action plans for the
Middle East (most content is excised).
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 22: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S.
Eagleburger. "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position
of Strict Neutrality," October 7, 1983.
Discusses the feasibility of a U.S. "tilt" toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war
and related practical concerns. The analysis notes that the U.S. "policy of
strict neutrality has already been modified, except for arms sales, since
Iran's forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. (We assume that other
actions not discussed here, such as providing tactical intelligence, would
continue as necessary.)"
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 23: Foreign Broadcast Information Service Transcription. "IRNA
Reports Iraqi Regime Using Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV," October
22, 1983.
Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
Document 24: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz. "Iraq Use
of Chemical Weapons," November 1, 1983.
Officials from the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
tell Secretary Shultz that the department has additional information
confirming Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons. They note, "We
also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, presumably from
Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary." The issue is
to be added to the agenda for an upcoming National Security Council meeting,
at which measures to assist Iraq are to be considered. The officials note
that a response is important in order to maintain the credibility of U.S.
policy on chemical warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 25: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to
Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons" [Includes Cables
Entitled "Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons" and "Background of Iraqi
Use of Chemical Weapons"], November 21, 1983.
State Department officials recommend discussing the use of chemical weapons
with Iraqi officials soon, in order to deter further use and "to avoid
unpleasantly surprising Iraq through public positions we may have to take on
this issue." A background cable says that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons
in October 1982 and, reportedly, against Iranian forces July and August 1983
"and more recently against Kurdish insurgents."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 26: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W.
Reagan. "U.S. Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," November 26, 1983.
President Ronald Reagan directs that consultations begin with regional
states willing to cooperate with the U.S. on measures to protect Persian
Gulf oil production and its transshipment infrastructure. The U.S. will give
the highest priority to the establishment of military facilities allowing
for the positioning of rapid deployment forces in the region to guard oil
facilities.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 27: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to the United
States Interests Section in Iraq. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 7,
1983.
Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to visit Iraq during his tour of Middle
Eastern countries as an envoy for President Reagan, but notes that he does
not think his visit will be worthwhile unless he meets directly with Saddam
Hussein.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 28: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State [et al.]. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,"
December 10, 1983.
The head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad tells Iraqi Under
Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf that "perhaps the greatest benefit" of Donald
Rumsfeld's upcoming visit to Baghdad "will be the establishment of direct
contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein."
The planned topics of discussion are the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Lebanon, Syria, and any other issues that the Iraqis might want to
raise.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 29: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the United States Embassy in Jordan. "Talking Points for
Amb. [Ambassador] Rumsfeld's Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein,"
December 14, 1983.
A U.S. interests section cable notes that presidential envoy Donald
Rumsfeld's upcoming meeting will be Saddam Hussein's first with a
representative of the U.S. executive branch; therefore, a major goal will be
"to initiate a dialogue and establish personal rapport." In the meeting,
"Rumsfeld will want to emphasize his close relationship with President
Reagan . . ." Talking points for the meeting include the Iran-Iraq war (the
U.S. "would regard any major reversal of Iraq's fortunes as a strategic
defeat for the West"), expansion of Iraqi pipeline facilities, Lebanon,
Syria, strengthening of Egyptian and Iraqi ties, and the threat of
terrorism, which targets both countries.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 30: United States Embassy in Italy Cable from Maxwell M. Rabb to
the Department of State. "Rumsfeld's Larger Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM
[Prime Minister] and FM [Foreign Minister] Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19,"
December 20, 1983.
During a meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and other Iraqi officials,
Donald Rumsfeld notes that the U.S. and Iraq have both differences and "a
number of areas of common interest." Aziz says that he was heartened by a
line in President Reagan's letter to Saddam Hussein stating, "The Iran-Iraq
war could post serious problems for the economic and security interests of
the U.S., its friends in the region and in the free world."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 31: United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable from Charles H.
Price II to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting
with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein," December 21, 1983.
At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein evinces "obvious
pleasure" at a letter Rumsfeld brought from President Ronald Reagan. The two
discuss common U.S.-Iraqi interests, including Lebanon, Palestine,
opposition to an outcome of the Iran-Iraq war that "weakened Iraq's role or
enhanced interests and ambitions of Iran," and U.S. efforts to cut off arms
sales to Iran. Rumsfeld says that the U.S. feels extremely strongly about
terrorism and says that it has a home - in Iran, Syria, and Libya, and that
it is supported by the Soviet Union. He encourages arrangements that might
provide alternative transshipment routes for Iraq's oil, including pipelines
through Saudi Arabia or to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan. The State Department
calls the meeting a "positive milestone."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 32: United States Embassy in the United Kingdom Cable from Charles
H. Price II to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister," December 21, 1983.
Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld and Tariq Aziz meet for two and one-half
hours and agree that "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests,"
including peace in the Persian Gulf, the desire to diminish the influence of
Iran and Syria, and support for reintegrating Egypt, isolated since its
unilateral peace with Israel, into the Arab world. Rumsfeld comments on
Iraq's oil exports, suggests alternative pipeline facilities, and discusses
opposition to international terrorism and support for a fair Arab-Israeli
peace. He and Aziz discuss the Iran-Iraq war "in detail." Rumsfeld says that
the administration wants an end to the war, and offers "our willingness to
do more." He mentions chemical weapons, possible escalation of fighting in
the Gulf, and human rights as impediments to the U.S. government's desire to
do more to help Iraq, then shifts the conversation to U.S. opposition to
Syria's role in Lebanon.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 33: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to
Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "EXIM [Export-Import] Bank Financing for Iraq"
[Includes Letter From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William Draper, Dated
December 24, 1983], December 22, 1983.
Pursuant to the Reagan administration's policy of increasing support for
Iraq, the State Department advises Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to urge the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide
Iraq with financial credits. Eagleburger signs a letter to Eximbank saying
that since Saddam Hussein had complied with U.S. requests, and announced the
end of all aid to the principal terrorist group of concern to the U.S., and
expelled its leader (Abu Nidal), "The terrorism issue, therefore, should no
longer be an impediment to EXIM financing for U.S. sales to Iraq." The
financing is to signal U.S. belief in Iraq's future economic viability,
secure a foothold in the potentially large Iraqi market, and "go far to show
our support for Iraq in a practical, neutral context."
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 34: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to United States
Embassy in Jordan. "Rumsfeld Mission: Meeting with King Hussein in London,"
December 23, 1983.
Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary Donald Rumsfeld discusses
prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations with King Hussein of Jordan.
Rumsfeld reports on his talks with Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz and says
they had "more areas of agreement than disagreement." He also reviews the
status of a proposed pipeline to Aqaba for Iraq's oil.
The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously for several years
during the early to mid 1980s. It would have carried oil from northern Iraq
to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq's
oil output that resulted from Iran's attacks on oil transshipment facilities
in the Persian Gulf and from Syria's closing of a pipeline that had
transported Iraqi oil. The proposed project reflected the U.S.'s extreme
nervousness about threats to the world oil supply resulting from the
Iran-Iraq war.
The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational corporations in planning
the project. International financier Bruce Rappaport, a friend of CIA
director William Casey, was also a central figure in the proposed deal. (The
final report of the independent counsel for the Iran-Contra "arms for
hostages" scandal cites reports indicating that Rappaport's bank in Geneva
was the recipient of a mysterious $10 million payment from the Sultan of
Brunei to fund the Nicaraguan contras that subsequently disappeared.
Rappaport denied this; the final report says that the issue remained
unresolved. He was invited to testify in 1999 at a House Banking committee
hearing on corruption in Russian financial transactions, but declined.) The
project was complicated by demands that the U.S. arrange for ironclad
security guarantees from the Israelis, since the pipeline would have been
vulnerable to their attack. The Israelis, for their part, demanded
guarantees that pipeline facilities would not cause environmental damage.
All involved had their reasons for at least hypothetical interest in the
project. For Iraq, it would have been a manifestation of improved U.S.-Iraq
relations - they wanted as much U.S. financial and other involvement in the
proposed deal as possible. For the U.S., it would have provided an
alternative, theoretically secure outlet for oil and created a nexus for
entangling Iraqi interests with those of Jordan and Israel, consistent with
U.S. plans to create a wider consortium of Arab countries that would
cooperate with the U.S. and would be willing to resolve the Palestine-Israel
dispute on U.S. terms. Israel would have benefited from new oil facilities
in its vicinity, and won points with the Reagan administration. Also,
according to internal documents from a friend of Reagan administration
Attorney General Edmund Meese, brought in as an intermediary because of his
Israeli ties, payoffs would have been skimmed from complex financial
guarantee arrangements for the Israeli government and Labor Party.
Attempts to agree on arrangements that would satisfy all parties dragged on,
until the several private companies that had been brought in to plan the
project backed out, questioning the motives of all involved. Iraq, however,
revived the concept in 2000, presumably for its own strategic interests.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 35: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to
Baghdad," December 26, 1983.
William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf to
follow up on Donald Rumsfeld's visit. Eagleton discusses U.S. efforts to
coordinate policy toward the Iran-Iraq war among Persian Gulf states, its
campaign to stop arms sales to Iran, and its wish to see Iraq's oil exports
increase. He informs the Iraqi official of the degree of U.S. interest in
Iraq's economic situation, mentioning the "high level policy review which
had established the environment and policy positions that had been conveyed
to the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador Rumsfeld."
Eagleton comments, "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi
relations to a new level. This is both symbolically important and
practically helpful."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 36: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meeting With Tariq Aziz:
Expanding Iraq's Oil Export Facilities," January 3, 1984.
During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld's talks, Tariq Aziz tells William
Eagleton that President Saddam Hussein was pleased with the visit and with
the positive atmosphere it created.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 37: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "[Excised] Iraqi Pipeline through
Jordan," January 10, 1984.
The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington, "the Iraqi
leadership was extremely pleased with Amb. Rumsfeld's visit. Tariq Aziz had
gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person . . ."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 38: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United
States Consulate General, Jerusalem. "Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran"
[Includes Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.
The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts to curtail arms sales to Iran
and imposes anti-terrorism export controls on that country. However, it does
not plan to prohibit U.S. imports of Iranian oil.
The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize its export policy for Iraq. The
revised rules would permit the export of U.S.-origin armored ambulances,
communications gear, and electronic equipment for the protection of Saddam
Hussein's personal aircraft. The Reagan administration was continuing
efforts to persuade the Export-Import Bank to provide financing for Iraq --
a positive Eximbank determination would improve Iraq's credit rating and
make it easier for it to obtain loans from international financial
institutions.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 39: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from David T. Schneider to
George P. Shultz. "Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq," January 30,
1984.
The State Department presents the case for relaxing controls on exports to
Iraq of militarily useful items. The department is concerned specifically
with an application to export dual-use heavy trucks, the sale of which to
either Iran or Iraq has been banned under the Export Administration Act.
Secretary of State Shultz approves the proposed sale.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 40: Export-Import Bank of the United States, Country Risk Analysis
Division Memorandum to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, Africa
and Middle East Division, Board of Directors. "Country Review and
Recommendations for Eximbank's Programs" [Extract; Includes Document
Entitled "Appendix I: Iraq"], February 21, 1984.
The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq a bad credit risk because of its very
high level of indebtedness and the uncertainty created by the Iran-Iraq war.
An appendix lists U.S. companies that would be potential exporters to Iraq
if credits were available, including Westinghouse, General Electric,
Bechtel, and Halliburton.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 41: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraqi Warning re Iranian
Offensive," February 22, 1984.
Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's two visits to Iraq to seek ways
to improve U.S.-Iraq relations and to identify measures to assist Iraq's war
efforts, the Iraqi military issues a statement declaring that "the invaders
should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of
annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation
insecticide."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 42: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United
States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Chemical Shipment to Iraq," March 4,
 1984.
Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride to Iraq
was held back at JFK airport because of "concern over Iraq's possible
intention to use the chemical in the manufacture of chemical weapons."
Washington asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to remind Iraq's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.'s grave concern about chemical
weapons, and to inform it that the U.S. will publicly condemn their use in
the near future. The interests section is to reiterate the request that Iraq
not use chemical warfare, and to say that the U.S. opposes Iraq's attempts
to acquire chemical weapons related material from the U.S.: "When we become
aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 43: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Memorandum from James A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et al.]. [U.S.
Condemnation of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use], March 4, 1984.
The State Department circulates for review a draft press statement and
guidance for a U.S. condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The
statement says that "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . .
The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to
deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government
of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior
among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 44: Department of State Memorandum. "Notifying Congress of
[Excised] Truck Sale," March 5, 1984.
The State Department informs a House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff
member that the department has not objected to the sale of 2,000 heavy
trucks to Iraq, noting that they were built in part in Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan. The official policy of the U.S.
is that it does not export military related items to Iraq or Iran. When
asked if the trucks were intended for military purposes, the official
responds, "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 45: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraq Reacts Angrily to U.S.
Condemnation of CW [Chemical Weapons] Use," March 7, 1984.
Reports that Iraq's defense minister denounced the State Department's
condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. interests section
comments that "The Iraqis apparently have been stunned by our public
condemnation."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 46: United States Embassy in Austria Cable from Helene A. von Damm
to the Department of State. "Iranian War Wounded in Vienna," March 13, 1984.
The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the State Department that a Belgian
laboratory found residual amounts of mustard gas and mycotoxin in the blood
of Iranian war casualties brought to Vienna for medical treatment.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 47: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the Mission
to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International
Organizations. "U.N. Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on
Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq," March 14, 1984.
The State Department instructs the U.S. delegate to the United Nations to
get the support of other Western missions for a motion of "no decision"
regarding Iran's draft resolution condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons.
Failing that, the U.S. is to abstain on the resolution.
The U.S. is to emphasize points made in a recent State Department press
conference, including the assertion that "The USG evenhandedly condemns the
prohibited use of chemical weapons whenever it occurs."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 48: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United
States Embassy in Sudan. "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad [Page
Missing]," March 24, 1984.
A State Department background cable for Donald Rumsfeld's March 1984 visit
to Baghdad notes the distress caused to Iraqi officials by the U.S.'s public
condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons "despite our repeated
warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later." Most of the cable is
concerned with the Reagan administration's interest in reassuring Iraqi
officials that U.S. financing might be available for the proposed pipeline
to deliver Iraqi oil to Aqaba, and other U.S. regional interests. The cable
notes that Iraqi officials are "confused" by the administration's "means of
pursuing our stated objectives in the region."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 49: United States Embassy in Bahrain Cable from Donald Charles
Seidel to the Department of State. "Middle East Mission: U.S. Efforts to
Stop Arms Transfers to Iran," March 24, 1984.
In preparation for his second round of meetings with officials in Baghdad,
Donald Rumsfeld asks for a list of the countries that the U.S. has
approached in order to persuade them to cut off arms sales to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 50: Mission to the United Nations Cable from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
to the Department of State. "U.N. Report on Chemical Weapons Use in
Iran/Iraq War: Consideration in Security Council," March 28, 1984.
Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft a quick United Nations resolution
condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, describes
evidence regarding Iraqi chemical weapons use, and passes on the observation
by a U.N. official that "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use
chemical weapons themselves if international community does not condemn
Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 51: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Cover Memorandum from Allen Overmyer to James A. Placke. [United
Nations Security Council Response to Iranian Chemical Weapons Complaint;
Includes Revised Working Paper], March 30, 1984.
Reports that the U.N. Security Council decided to adopt the text of a draft
Dutch resolution on chemical weapons and issue it as a presidential
statement. "The statement, by the way, contains all three elements Hamdoon
wanted."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 52: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United
States Embassy in Lebanon [et al.]. "Department Press Briefing, March 30,
1984," March 31, 1984.
The State Department announces it has imposed foreign policy controls on
Iran and Iraq for exports of chemical weapons precursors. It responds to
questions from the press about U.S. policy regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and
a department spokesperson says Iraq's chemical weapons use will not change
U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-Iraq relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 53: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W.
Reagan. "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to
Developments in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5, 1984.
Ronald Reagan says that action must be taken to increase U.S. military
capabilities and "intelligence collection posture" in the Persian Gulf.
Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Director of
Central Intelligence William J. Casey are to prepare a plan to prevent
Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan directs Shultz to ensure that the
U.S. government's condemnation of the use of chemical weapons is
unambiguous, while placing "equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran
from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized
recent offensives."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 54: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to United
States Embassy in Jordan. "Chemical Weapons: Meeting With Iraqi Charge,"
April 6, 1984.
Reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke discussed a
draft United Nations' resolution on chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq
war with Iraqi interests section representative Nizar Hamdoon on March 29.
Hamdoon said that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential
statement to a resolution. Placke indicated that the U.S. could accept Iraqi
proposals regarding points that should be included in the resolution if the
Security Council approves them. He said that the U.S. would like the Iraqi
government's cooperation "in avoiding situations that would lead to
difficult and possibly embarrassing situation[s]" regarding chemical weapons
use, but noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our
bilateral relationship nor to detract from our common interest to see war
brought to [an] early end."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 55: United States Interests Section. Iraq Cable from William L.
Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Bell Discusses Possible
Helicopter Sale to Iraq," April 12, 1984.
The U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks to be kept apprised of
developments in ongoing talks between Iraq and Bell Helicopter Textron about
its sale of helicopters to Iraq's Ministry of Defense that "can not be in
any way configured for military use."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 56: Letter from Richard M. Nixon to Nicolae Ceausescu. [Regarding
U.S.-Romanian Venture to Sell Uniforms to Iraq], May 3, 1984.
Former president Richard Nixon sends a letter to Romanian President Nicolae
Ceausescu in support of a deal made by Colonel John Brennan, his former aide
and chief of staff, and former attorney general John Mitchell, to buy
Romanian-manufactured military uniforms for export to Iraq.
Media and criminal investigations of U.S. companies that had exported
weapons-related or dual-use items to Iraq were conducted after Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. Many of these companies seemed to have connections with
former U.S. government officials.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 57: Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary on
Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick
Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy. "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific
Actions" [Includes Document Entitled "Dual Use Exports to Iraq" Dated April
27, 1984], May 9, 1984.
An internal State Department paper indicates that the government is
reviewing policy for "the sale of certain categories of dual-use items to
Iraqi nuclear entities," and the review's "preliminary results favor
expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities."
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 58: Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. "Defense
Estimative Brief: Prospects for Iraq," September 25, 1984.
The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses political, economic, and military
conditions in Iraq, predicts that it will continue to develop its
conventional and "formidable" chemical capabilities, and will "probably
pursue nuclear weapons." It says that Iraq is unlikely to use chemical
weapons against Israel because of certain Israeli retaliation, and that
U.S.-Iraqi relations will hinge on U.S. policy toward the Middle East,
including its aid for Iraq.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 59: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Briefing Paper. "Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons," November 16, 1984.
Indicates that the U.S. co