Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: (lungo) J. Erickson : BARBAROSSA JUNE 1941: WHO ATTACKED WHOM?

History TodayJuly, 2001 
BARBAROSSA JUNE 1941: WHO ATTACKED WHOM? 
Author/s: John Erickson 
John Erickson reviews the recent controversies surrounding Hitler's
invasion of the Soviet Union.
IN LITTLE MORE than the last ten years, perceptions of the Soviet-German
war, formerly known as the `Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union
1941-1945', have been dramatically transformed both in Russia and in the
West. Before this, decades had to pass before it was possible to
establish a wholly reliable operational narrative of the war in the
east. Much time and energy was taken up by historians in countering the
preponderance of German documentation and interpretation. Conversely,
the suffocating blanket of the `heroic myth' overlaid by Soviet
propaganda on Soviet wartime behaviour proved to be as misleading and
cloying, as it was in most instances impenetrable. That same calculated
obfuscation, equally prolonged and governed by the vagaries of internal
politics, `de-Stalinisation' and `re-Stalinisation', reduced the
catastrophe of the initial German onslaught of June 22nd, 1941, to a
bizarre conundrum of `when is a surprise not a surprise?'. Little wonder
that much Soviet historiography was either discounted or ignored, but
unfortunately along with it, the rare nugget of documentary gold was
hidden. Given the accomplishments of post-Soviet and Western
historiography over the past decade, it is no longer appropriate to
describe the `Great Patriotic War' as the `unknown war'. It has not been
so for some time; indeed, presenting its epic battles is currently high
literary fashion plus the domain of film and television, particularly
the latter, recently with BBC Timewatch's War of the Century. In this
context some might argue that we risk substituting one set of myths for
another. Whatever the drama and the variety of its presentation to a
wider public, the nature of this war still remains imperfectly
understood, especially its social psychology, its human cost and
demographic dimensions. What nevertheless ranks high in these
accomplishments in the decade preceding the sixtieth anniversary of
Operation Barbarossa has to be the reconstruction and elucidation of
German and Soviet intentions in 1941. This has furnished a convincing
explanation of Hitler's intention to invade Russia, and unravelled the
riddle of Stalin's behaviour in the summer of 1941. It was at the
beginning of the 1990s that Russian historians were finally able to
embark on a deeper analysis of the immediate pre-war period. With new
access to the archives, they were able to direct their attention to the
role of Stalin and his entourage, and investigate the basis of his
foreign policy and `military-strategic' decisions. They attempted to
uncover the causes of the catastrophic outcome of the `initial period'
of the war when the `invincible' Red Army went down to death and defeat.
The declassification of hitherto secret strategic plans for Red Army
deployment covering 1940-41 -- in particular, the May 1941 document
outlining a Red Army pre-emptive strike against German concentrations in
the east -- provided greater cogency to these investigations of Stalin's
military-political attitude and outlook. It took considerable time for
that document to appear in print. Work that signalled a radical
departure, drawing extensively on archives, was the analysis of Soviet
propaganda directives, inquiry into the emphasis on `offensivism' and
the importance of Stalin's major speech of May 5th, 1941, publicly
available for the first time as a complete, authentic text.
This `relatively peaceful discussion', as the Russian historians
described it, prompted by the limited release of archival materials
dealing with the crisis of 1941, was rudely interrupted in 1992 by the
appearance in Russia of a literary bombshell, Viktor Suvorov's
`nonfantastical tale' Ledokhod, previously published in English (though
with much less impact) as Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?
in 1990. V. Rezun, better known as Suvorov, had earlier defected to the
UK from Soviet Military Intelligence, the GRU, subsequently embarking on
a literary career. An instant best-seller in Russia, the book divided
both the academic community and the Russian public at large. Suvorov's
succes de scandale turned official, received wisdom on its head, arguing
that it was Stalin who intended to attack in 1941 (on July 6th, to be
precise), and that what Hitler launched against Russia in June 1941 was
a `preventive war' designed to forestall Stalin. At the very least,
Suvorov went a long way to relieve Nazi Germany of a significant portion
of responsibility for bringing about the Soviet-German war. A
preliminary version of Suvorov's thesis had appeared in Britain as early
as 1985 in the June issue of the Royal United Services Journal, only to
be rebutted immediately by Gabriel Gorodetsky of Tel Aviv university in
the same journal. The book that followed is a skilful and highly
plausible piece of work. It utilised a wide range of Soviet military
memoirs and open-access military publications, giving it more than a
patina of respectability, conveying the impression (but not the
substance) of drawing on actual archives. The underlying thesis is
deliberately sensational. Suvorov asserted that, like Hitler, Stalin was
bent on world domination -- his chosen method, the transformation of the
Second World War into a revolutionary war. It was Hitler who acted as
the `icebreaker for the revolution', clearing the way for Stalin's `war
of liberation' in Europe and ultimately the world. Hitler's vanquishing
of the Western democracies suited Stalin perfectly. Hitler's criminality
conferred yet another boon, permitting Stalin to assume the moral mantle
of `liberator of Europe' at the appropriate time. If the reaction to
Icebreaker in Anglo-American historical circles was tepid, the response
to the German edition, Der Eisbrecher: Hitler in Stalins Kalkul,
published in Stuttgart in 1989, caused a minor sensation, a forerunner
of what would take place in Russia. A number of German historians avidly
seized on the `red herring' -- in a literal and figurative sense -- of
`preventative war' in the east. The resurrection and revitalisation of
this version of events, first elaborated by Joseph Goebbels in June
1941, came at a singular juncture in the highly charged debate on how to
deal with German history and the period of National Socialism. If indeed
there was substance to Stalin's aggressive plan to `liberate' Western
Europe, then Hitler's decision to invade Russia should no longer be
regarded as in terms of strategic folly, ideological compulsion or naked
aggression, but rather as a justifiable preventative attack to deflect
not only a threat to Germany, but to Western civilisation at large.
The story grew with the telling, engendering a historiography all of its
own. Ernst Topitsch's Stalin's War, (1987) a `radical new theory of the
Second World War', argued that the war was essentially a Soviet attack
on the Western democracies. R.C. Raack's Stalin's Drive to the West
19381945 (1995) attributed to Stalin a plan for war in Europe which
preceded Hitler's aggressive designs. But protracted war, exhausting the
participants and fomenting proletarian revolution, did not ensue. France
collapsed precipitately, Hitler turned east and caught Stalin
unprepared, having neglected Soviet defences in favour of preparations
for attack. Conversely `The Attack on the Soviet Union', Volume IV of
Germany and the Second World War (English-language edition 1998), made
short shrift of this insistence on Soviet offensive intention. For the
concept of `preventative war' to stick, it had to be demonstrated that
Germany was being directly threatened by the Red Army. The German high
command was aware of the Red Army's capability, and even disparaged it,
but there was little evidence to support the thesis of German fear of
Soviet offensive intent. As late as June 1941, Colonel-General Halder
described Soviet deployment as `rein defensiv', dismissing the idea of
any major Red Army offensive as `nonsense'. He was even sceptical of
Hitler's concern about a Soviet thrust towards the Romanian oil fields.
What really concerned Hitler was not Soviet aggression, but Soviet
concessions to Germany, which could frustrate his own grand design,
depriving him of a pretext to attack. In Germany, Icebreaker revived and
energised a long-standing controversy about responsibility for the
Soviet-German war, providing those who sought it with the convenient
alibi that Stalin and his circle were responsible for the war. The
effect of this in Russia, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
was to pose a direct challenge to fifty years of the `official' Soviet
version of the Great Patriotic War, carefully cleansed and riddled with
'blank spots', of which the most blatant obscured the immediate pre-war
period, the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the military catastrophe of June 1941.
Suvorov added fuel to the fire with a further volume, M-Day (1994),
enlarging on his original argument, by which time a furious controversy
was raging in Russia, with the question `Did Stalin plan offensive war
against Hitler?' at its heart. Generous spirits might accord a degree of
credibility to Suvorov's interpretation of Stalin's strategic design
before June 1940, but the fall of France wrought havoc with the Soviet
leader's plans and equally demolishes Suvorov's theory of his intent.
`The Germans will now turn on us, they will eat us alive' was Stalin's
frantic comment. There was no longer any prospect of protracted war in
the west leading to the mutual exhaustion of the belligerents, no royal
road to a revolutionary Europe. Germany was no longer tied down in the
west. The situation now brought Russia face to face with Germany.
Recent releases from the archives and declassification of key documents
have made it possible to trace exactly I what `strategic design' did
materialise in Russia, as opposed to an idea based on conjecture or
invention. Between 1928 and 1941, seven major operational war plans were
drafted, complete with fifteen reviews and revisions. These were drafted
in great secrecy by the General Staff, the Chief of the General Staff,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff Operations Directorate, together with
the Defence Commissar, Stalin and Molotov. But what Marshal Tim oshenko
discovered, on succeeding Marshal Voroshilov as Defence Commissar in
1940, was not only an army unfit to fight, but also one lacking an
updated war plan, the most recent dating back to March 1938. This plan,
drawn up by Marshal Shaposhnikov, was predicated on a European war
fought on two fronts: in the east and west. It pre-supposed that any
main German attack would develop from north of the Pripet marshes and
the forces concentrated in East Prussia and north of Warsaw. The
revision ordered in July 1940 was conducted by Major-General
Vasilevskii, supervised by Shaposhnikov. It reaffirmed the location of
the main German thrust north of the river San, and the lesser likelihood
of a main attack materialising from southern Poland towards Kiev. The
undue emphasis on the area north of Warsaw and East Prussia was
immediately opposed by Timoshenko. Why not concentrate on a route south
of Warsaw into the Ukraine? On August 16th, 1940, the `revision' went
further, under a new Chief of Staff, General Meretskov. After completing
its deployment in not less than two weeks, the Red Army would unleash a
powerful counter-blow, carrying operations on to enemy (German)
territory. The plan set out two variants: deployment either north or
south of Brest. On October 5th, the revised revision (completed on
September 18th, 1940) was submitted to Stalin, who in turn urged the
General Staff to `reconsider'. He believed that Germany needed Ukrainian
grain and Donbas coal to wage protracted war, therefore it was most
likely that Hitler would launch his main attack in the south-west. This
`revision' affirmed the primacy of the south-western theatre, embodied
the principle of the `counter-blow' (otvetnyi udar) and assumed that
only part of the forces would be initially engaged, allowing time for
the Red Army to concentrate before launching a decisive
counter-offensive. This preoccupation with the south-western theatre,
concentration on the Kiev Special Military District, Timoshenko's and
latterly Zhukov's military bailiwick, proved to be the root cause of the
subsequent massive Soviet strategic maldeployment. Neither the new war
plan, nor the deliberations within the special command conference
convened in December 1940 made any mention of surprise as a factor to be
reckoned with. The records of the conference proceedings do not reveal
any assessment of the critical `initial period' of operation, nor any
analysis of German blitzkrieg experience, Timoshenko having asserted
that the Red Army had nothing to learn from it. General Klenov, who
introduced the subject of `a special type of offensive operation in the
initial phase of a war' -- a pre-emptive, preventative blow? -- was
heard in hushed silence.
A critically important link in the evolution of Soviet war planning and
operational preparation came with two-part `Red versus Blue' strategic
war-games conducted during the first week of January 1941. We now have a
detailed record of these war-games, planned as early as October 1940 and
designed to test the revised war plan. Generals Pavlov and Zhukov played
alternatively attacker and defender. The first game in the northern
theatre demonstrated that terrain and fortifications in East Prussia
would make any Soviet `counter-offensive' there a protracted
undertaking. In the south-western theatre Zhukov produced a brilliantly
successful `counter-offensive' which appeared to confirm the argument
that this theatre should receive priority reinforcement. Stalin was not
impressed. He accepted the likelihood of frontier battles, but
criticised the execution of the `retaliatory blow'. `Who won?' Stalin
got no clear reply. Meretskov was dismissed forthwith as Chief of the
General Staff to be replaced by Zhukov. However, Stalin had grasped that
the Red Army was in no condition to conduct major offensive operations.
The command conference virtually ignored defence, and the wargames
assumed a scenario unrelated to real German war plans and the location
of the main attack in the north. Soviet war planning was not tested.
Surprise played no part. It was, observed Marshal Voronov, as if the
Soviet Union was preparing for 1914, not 1941. General Zhukov's updated
war plan of March llth, 1941, confirmed the primacy of the south-western
arena at a time when Soviet intelligence reported increased German
traffic eastwards. The `updated plan' identified the main German force
concentrated to attack along the Berdichev-Kiev axis to occupy the
Ukraine. A German concentration on `the Warsaw axis' could not, however,
be excluded. As for potential Soviet operations aimed at Berlin and
Vienna, Stalin said 'We must think this over', meaning that no decision
was taken. The `update' rested on two crucial assumptions. The first was
that German forces would deploy on the frontier ten to fifteen days
after concentrating. Secondly, the Red Army would take the offensive but
only after successfully repelling an enemy attack and the main force
would be engaged only some days after the frontier battles.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Meanwhile operational plans and mobilisation
timetables had already slipped out of alignment. Instructions for a
fresh mobilisation plan had been issued on August 16th, 1940.
`Mobilisation Plan -- 41' (MP41) had been drafted by Major-General
Vasilevskii in January, and approved in February but a revision was
ordered by the General Staff. The new plan was to be ready by May 1st,
1941, but this was deferred. In some sectors the readiness date was
extended to July 20th. Full implementation would be effected during the
initial stages of hostilities. But what the planners were discovering
was that five years would be needed to carry through full Red Army
modernisation. Shortage of manpower and weapons, logistical difficulties
and insufficient transport badly impeded present programmes. In June
1941 MOBPLAN was incomplete, mobilisation plans at military district
level unfinished. Above all, no plan existed to bring all units to full
readiness.
Most importantly, General Staff operational documents, those for the
`covering armies on the frontiers and those for the second echelon (of
which `Suvorov' had made great play, the `secret offensive army'), did
not include offensive operations 'against neighbouring states'. None was
contemplated. General Staff directives stipulated frontier defence to
cover Red Army mobilisation, concentration and deployment. On May 5th,
1941, Stalin made his famous speech to military academy graduates. The
text, now available for all to see, does not support previous
contentions that this was a summons to aggressive war against Germany.
Stalin intended to counter impressions of Red Army weakness, counter
German over-confidence in the Wehrmacht and bolster army morale should
war materialise. The subsequent shift in propaganda did not reflect
advocacy of `revolutionary war', rather the discharge of the Red Army's
`international tasks' in the context of defence of the Soviet Union. It
also replaced a suspect `pacifist' orientation with `offensive spirit',
revitalised patriotism and promoted `vigilance'. Propaganda zigzag both
unnerved and reassured the populace and confused the army at a time of
intense crisis, with the appearance of a manifest threat, its execution
seemingly imminent. On May 5th Soviet military intelligence reported on
the German order of battle: 103-107 German divisions (with more to come)
concentrated in the east, facing the Soviet Union. This did grave damage
to Stalin's strategy of presently deterring, and hopefully deferring,
war. For Zhukov and the General Staff, the report destroyed their entire
concept of war. The import of the latest intelligence was devastating.
There would be no `initial engagements', no two weeks in which to
mobilise, concentrate and deploy. The Wehrmacht was fully mobilised,
rear services organised, positioned to pre-empt Red Army deployment,
poised for surprise attack. The problem now was how to disrupt an
inevitable and well-nigh imminent German attack. To deny the Germans the
initiative, it was vital to `pre-empt' (upredit) German deployment and
attack to deny the enemy the possibility of forming a coherent front, of
co-ordinating separate arms. This was the basis of a highly
controversial document dated May 15th, `Considerations on plans for the
strategic deployment of Soviet armed forces in the event of war with
Germany and its allies'. It was marked `Absolutely secret', one copy
only, signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov. The aim of the plan was a
pre-emptive offensive operation by 152 Soviet divisions to destroy 100
German divisions. The first strategic objective was the destruction of
German forces south of Brest, the second objective an attack in the
centre and north-west to capture Poland and East Prussia. It was clear
to Zhukov, and pre sumably Stalin to whom the plan was submitted, that
current Soviet deployments on May 15th were insufficient for this
offensive. The western and south-western fronts could only muster 102
divisions. Movements of second echelon elements and reserves would only
be completed in June-July. To establish the requisite `correlation of
forces' would require 60 days, by which time German strength would have
increased still further. The Red Army was in no condition to launch a
strategic offensive on this scale. The moment of truth had arrived for
the General Staff and the Red Army: either launch a pre-emptive attack,
or order general mobilisation.
In the event Stalin sanctioned neither. As a result the Red Army could
neither attack nor defend. Mindful of the precedent of 1914, when
mobilisation triggered war, Stalin ruled out mobilisation and refused to
authorise increased readiness. The plan of May 15th was possibly
designed to impress him with the urgency of the situation, a plea for
increased readiness. But it was essentially what the Red Army went
haltingly to war with in June, based on a maldeployment dating back to
October 1940 and the strategic design founded in the January 1941 war
games. Three initial directives dated June 22nd-23rd prescribed
`counterblow' objectives culled from the war games. Stalin had neither
the intention nor the capability to embark on `preventive war'. His 'war
avoidance strategy' ruled out a pre-emptive strike, and even militated
against timely defensive moves lest they be construed as `provocations'.
But what of Stalin himself and his strategy? It is only in the past
decade that a serious revision of what might be called accepted
interpretations of Stalin's policies on the eve of the war has occurred.
That these `standard interpretations' have persisted is due, in
Professor Gorodetsky's view, to `the almost total absence of evidence of
Stalin's intentions'. The scant evidence which did exist was largely
exploited to place the major responsibility for the disaster of 1941 at
his door. It is no longer a case of scant evidence. Gorodetsky, author
of The Icebreaker Myth (published in Moscow in 1995) was able to conduct
a `thorough scrutiny' of Soviet archives, the Foreign Ministry, the
General Staff and intelligence materials. The fresh evidence is
impressive, the conclusions arresting. No longer was Stalin the devious
plotter or the `outwitted bungler'. This is a rational Stalin, a
geopolitical operator, interested in negotiating for European peace, but
his presumption of being a possible arbiter seduced him from awareness
of the German threat. A misreading of the political scene, coupled with
his near paranoid suspicion of the British, led him to discount his own
intelligence reports; but, worse, military errors impelled him to adopt
a policy of outright appeasement towards Germany, which led inevitably
towards disaster. Gorodetsky considers Stalin's policy to have been
`rational and levelheaded', his mentor in foreign policy Machiavelli.
But perhaps 'the single most significant factor' in bringing about the
calamity of 1941 was Stalin's failure to consider what could follow if
appeasement and warding off suspected, supposed `provocations'
completely failed. In that event Stalin had left the margins too close
to call, reality was upon him in the shape of full-blooded, war-waging,
murderously destructive Operation Barbarossa, the threat he had hoped to
parry or parley away. The Soviet Union had to bear the terrible cost of
Stalin's dogged, obstinate pursuit of what became self-disarming
mechanisms of which the final fatal instance was dismissing, discounting
the imminence of war. The `Suvorov' fantasies, fictions and inventions
do not bear comparison with a horrendous reality.
FOR FURTHER READING David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on
the Eve of World War (University Press of Kansas, 1998); Gabriel
Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia
(Yale University Press, 1999); Germany and the Second World War. Vol. IV
The Attack on the Soviet Union Edited by the Research Institute for
Military History, Potsdam, Germany. Trans. editor Ewald Osers (Clarendon
Press, 1998); Richard Overy, Russia's War (The Penguin Press, 1998);
Roger R. Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red
Army, 1925-1941 (University Press of Kansas, 1996). John Erickson is
Emeritus Professor, Defence Studies at the University of Edinburgh.
---------------------------------
Amedeo, che ne pensi?
ciao
Sergio
 
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 Press, 1998); Richard Overy, Russia's War (The Penguin Press, 1998); 
certo che e' strano che nelle letture consigliate ci sia il mediocre
libro di Overy e non "When Titans Clashed" di Glantz .
ciao
S.



Personalmente lo ritengo un ottimo articolo che dettaglia brevemente ma
essenzialmente i termini della querelle scatenata da Rezun/Suvorov.
Per chi fosse 'nuovo' alla questione č importante sottolineare come la tesi
(fantascientifica) di fondo di Rezun non č tanto che l'URSS si stava
preparando ad una guerra contro la Germania fin dall'avvento al potere del
nazismo, questo č un segreto di pulcinella (e, comunque, piů che criminale
sarebbe da considerare encomiabile). I punti di fondo della tesi di Rezun
sono:
1. L'ascesa di Hitler ed il suo successo sono stati deliberatamente favoriti
ed appoggiati da Stalin.
2. L'URSS si stava preparando ad un attacco a sorpresa nell'estate del 1941.
Per quanto riguarda la scelta delle opere 'consigliate' ritengo che si sia
preferito "Russia's War" a "When titans clashed" non perché la prima sia
migliore come storia generale del conflitto, ma perché tratta piů
diffusamente i problemi delle relazioni URSS-Germania negli anni precedenti
al conflitto. A questo riguardo l'opera di Glantz piů utile č per l'appunto
"Stumbling Colussus" che consiglio caldamente a tutti coloro fossero
interessati allo stato della RKKA alla vigilia dell'attacco tedesco.
Saluti,
    Amedeo
P.S. Il Prof. Erickson č venuto, purtroppo, a mancare pochi mesi or sono.

 P.S. Il Prof. Erickson è venuto, purtroppo, a mancare pochi mesi or sono.
ah, non lo sapevo... :(
Ciao 



Sě, l'ho letto. Mi sembra un titolo valido.
ciao
    Amedeo

 Sě, l'ho letto. Mi sembra un titolo valido.
mi č capitata per le mani una coppia di libri della Bur sulla campagna di
Russia. Non ricordo l'autore, ma i titoli sono "operazione Barbarossa" e
"operazione terra bruciata". Li conosci? Vale la pena di leggerli? (sempre
che tu abbia capito di quali sto parlando :-)).
Frakkia
FIDDer #31


Hmmm... non vorrei sbagliarmi ma sento odore di Paul Carell.
Non l'ho mai letto, ma sicuramente gli altri membri del NG ti sapranno dare
tutte le informazioni del caso :)
ciao
    Amedeo
P.S. Se hai seguito i precedenti numerosi thread su Carell, sai già che
faresti bene a spendere meglio i tuoi soldi.

 tutte le informazioni del caso :)
Chiedere a Ball ;)
ciao


 Chiedere a Ball ;)
uh? non ho seguito i thread su Carell....perchč?
Frakkia
FIDDer #31

uh? non ho seguito i thread su Carell....perchè?
beh visto che i due libri in questione me li sono sparati anche io
:)...
Nei thread precedenti si è parecchio discusso di Carrel, il cui merito
è quello di narrare una storia piuttosto romanzata.
Carrel ti porta al livello del soldato di fanteria, in un certo senso
è una specie di Tom Clancy solo che parla di fatti storici realmente
accaduti.
Se cerchi un opera rigorosa, storicamente ineccepibile, zeppa di
documentazione....
beh Carrel non fa per te :), può essere un inizio se non hai mai letto
niente sulla guerra nazi-comunista del 41-45, ma poi per approfondire
dovresti rivolgerti ad altro, tipo i libri che ha citato il buon
Matteucci, che hanno inoltre il vantaggio di esserti stati consigliati
da un ex-colonnello del GRU ^________^ per cui puoi fidarti ;)
P.S.: in ogni caso i libri di Carrel editi dalla Bur hanno il
vantaggio di costare poco vista la loro mole.
Saluti
B29

 niente sulla guerra nazi-comunista 
nazi-comunista? questa definizione che e' il frutto della lettura di
Carell? :)
bye
S.


 accaduti.
Piů che Tom Clancy penso sia piů corretto paragonarlo a Stephen Ambrose.
Alterna la descrizione delle operazioni con episodi e ricordi di veterani
sulla linea del fuoco.
Non ho seguito il thread su Carell, in tutti i modi mi pare sia stato il
primo storico tedesco a ricostruire l'intera campagna di Russia e se non mi
ricordo male i due tomi hanno qualche decennio sulle spalle (primi anni '60)
Ti confermo le due cose che mi ricordo dell'introduzione : gli Italiani e
gli alleati in genere praticamente non esistono, fatti salvi gli spagnoli
della Divisione Azzurra (trattati un paio di volte). Non si occupa manco di
striscio degli effetti dell'occupazione (leggi stermini, stragi, misfatti
vari, etc.) a parte l'ordine della fucilazione dei commissari politici, ma
poi solo per ribadire che č tutta colpa di Adolf allo scopo (palese) di
salvare l'onore della Wehrmacht  (e della allora nascente Bundeswehr,
aggiungerei io).
E' piů che evidente che Carell scrive sforzandosi di fare una cronaca
meramente militare, senza sfiorare i perchč ed i percome di tipo
politico-ideologico, una sorta di politically correct ante-litteram. Con in
piů un che di stile anglosassone tipo "i nostri ragazzi al fronte", "right
or wrong...", "quel dannato battaglione in piů...".
Alla Ambrose, appunto.
Ciao

Dimenticavo, mi associo a chi li classifica come "introduttivi". Non mi sono
parsi nulla di più, senza infamia e senza lode.
Ciao

 ha scritto nel messaggio
| > Hmmm... non vorrei sbagliarmi ma sento odore di Paul Carell.
|
| AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAARGH! :)
Classica reazione di sergio all'udire quel nome..
| > Non l'ho mai letto, ma sicuramente gli altri membri del NG ti sapranno dare
| > tutte le informazioni del caso :)
|
| Chiedere a Ball ;)
Nel senso che dopo quasi un anno sergio non è riuscito ancora a capire come la penso su
Carell...
Ma noi punici abbia tanta pazienza... :))
salus
Ball

 Carell...
Ti ho tirato in "BALL"o solo perche' ne abbiamo discusso proprio noi
tempo fa. :)
Ciao


 ha scritto nel messaggio
|
| > | > Non l'ho mai letto, ma sicuramente gli altri membri del NG ti sapranno dare
| > | > tutte le informazioni del caso :)
| > |
| > | Chiedere a Ball ;)
| >
| > Nel senso che dopo quasi un anno sergio non è riuscito ancora a capire come la penso
su
| > Carell...
|
| Ti ho tirato in "BALL"o solo perche' ne abbiamo discusso proprio noi
| tempo fa. :)
caro sergio,
mi sollevi non poco, temevo che tu ti fossi asserragliato in convinzioni difficili da
estirpare o che io non fossi più in grado di esprimermi compiutamente.
Tutto a posto, allora!!
salus
Ball

Carell? :)
mi sembra di arguire che qualcuno non è d'accordo con questa
definizione :))))
E come mai ?
Cmq no, non mi viene da Carrel, imho ritengo che il conflitto sul
fronte orientale possa essere definito così, più che sul fronte
occidentale o africano si combattè una guerra ideologica, fra i due
eserciti opposti,  fra nazismo e comunismo appunto.
Che poi si debba dire che non tutti i tedeschi erano nazi, che non
tutti i russi erano comunisti, che in realtà la lotta può essere
inquadrata in un contesto più ampio di appartenza a una "gens" (mi
perdonino i latinisti puri ^__^) qui allora si entrerebbe in un thread
lunghissimo penso.
Saluti
B29

 eserciti opposti,  fra nazismo e comunismo appunto.
Oddio, mica sono tanto d'accordo. Se l'attacco tedesco fu coerente comn
l'ideologia nazista sia negli scopi (acquisizione del lebensraum) che
nei modi (ordine dei commissari, sterminio di intere popolazioni civili
e dei prigionieri tutti considerati untermensh perche' slavi o ebrei,
etc.), i sovietici si sono semplicemente difesi. Ci fosse stato anche un
altro regime, che dovevano fare? La condotta sovietica non mi pare molto
condizionata dall'ideologia dominante nella sua ratio, e nemmeno tanto
nel suo modo di agire.
Ciao
Ale
--
*La sconfitta reclama ad alta voce perche' esige spiegazioni; mentre la
vittoria, come la carita', nasconde un gran numero di peccati*
Alfred T. Mahan

nel suo modo di agire.
già ma i Russi si sono fatti incanalare e indottrinare dal regime
comunista per resistere ai nazi.
Dopo i primi mesi in cui molte popolazioni dell'impero sovietico
speravano che i nazi fossero dei liberatori per poi ricredersi
frettolosamente Stalin sposo abilissimamente la propaganda e la
retorica patriottica russa con quella comunista per proteggere la sua
nazione.
Non ricordo dove l'ho letto ( e forse è una notizia falsa, per cui
spero che qualcuno possa smentire o confermare) ma durante la guerra
mi pare che  si registrò il massimo numero di adesioni al PCUS fra le
popolazioni dell'ex URSS.
L'ideologia diede un notevole contributo a parere mio (sempre imho
ovviamente) alla resistenza russa.
In quegli anni Rodina e fede comunista andarono a braccetto più di
quanto accadde in seguito.
Tutto sempre imho naturalmente :)
Saluti
B29

 comunista per resistere ai nazi.
Mah, la cosa e' andata nei due sensi: se da una parte il regime ha
adottato alcune concessioni alla tradizione russa e militare in genere
(nuove uniformi, cerimonie religose, minor potere ai commissari,
designazione di ''guardia'' per alcune unita', retorica
nazional-patriottica, etc.) per galvanizzare i soldati ed il popolo
daall'altra il popolo si e' stretto attorno al regime. Ripeto pero' che
mi pare un fenomeno naturale in un paese aggredito e, per giutna,
aggredito con la violenza e la crudelta' che adottarono i tedeschi in
URSS.


URSS.
già ma non è che poi i Russi sono stati tanto carini con i tedeschi
quando il testimone è passato dalla loro parte.
Non c'era mica un detto durante gli ultimi giorni di guerra che diceva
"Meglio un americano sulla testa che un russo sulla pancia?"
Saluti
B29


Diciamo che i russi non avevano la convenzione di Ginevra (non l'avevano
firmata negli anni 30') mentre gli americani si' e cmq erano il minore dei
mali.
Pensa solo se tutte le ricerche in campo nucleare, jet, sommergibili, radar,
razzi e tecniche d'addestramento dei deutsche fossero cadute in mano ai
sovietici!! Magari a quest'ora  l'Unione Sovietica dominerebbe con la sua
ideologia e le sue armi l'Eurasia e l'Africa, mentre le Americhe sarebbero
man mano scomparse come potenza e il capitalismo sarebbe scomparso. Una
volta che il sistema sarebbe risultato insostenibile per i costi, gli
effetti di ricaduta in tutte questwe terre sarebbe stato disastroso ad un
livello ancora piu' grave di quelli dell'ultimo decennio nella ex-Urss.
                                        Andrea 'Cid Highwind'


A parte che molte dei risultati delle ricerche pionieristiche degli
scienziati tedeschi sono comunque finiti in mani sovietiche, vuoi forse dire
che il problema dell'URSS sia stata la mancanza di know-how sulle tecnologie
militari? Ed i segreti atomici regalati dagli scenziati comunisti? E i
motori Rolls-Royce Nene regalati dal governo Laburista?
Se c'era qualcosa che non difettava all'URSS post 2GM era la tecnologia
miliatre. I problemi erano ben altri.
Il fatto è che, nonostante quello che era il paradigma interpretativo
standard rimasto incrollabile fino all'inizio degli anni '80, la paranoia
indotta dall' "accerchiamento capitalista" non era solo propaganda. Certo
questo non rende l'URSS il paradiso terrestre, né giustifica i crimini di
cui alcuni dei suoi rappresentanti si sono macchiati, ma quantomeno mostra
che l'Unione Sovietica non era la germania nazista e neppure l'archetipo del
'rouge state' dei romanzi à la Clancy.
Saluti,
    Amedeo


                                Andrea 'Cid Highwind'

 Pero' L'Urss c'ha guadagnato parecchio e quasi senza colpo ferire,
si e' ripresa parte dei territori che aveva la Russia zarista,
fermandosi alla nota "linea Curzon", territori che, indebolita con la
guerra civile, gli furono sottratti dopo la I guerra mondiale.
Ripeto a chi e' interessato, ci sono diversi thread molto interessanti
su ICS.
Sergio



Il lato apparentemente paradossale è che le 'espansioni' delle zone di
influenza dell'URSS staliniana avvengono tutte, per così dire, di
contropiede. Non solo per l'Europa orientale, ma anche per la Cina, dopo la
guerra. Stalin non credeva che Mao sarebbe riuscita a spuntarla e non ha
mosso quasi un dito, salvo poi vedersi servita la Cina su di un piatto
d'argento dallo stesso ossequioso Mao dopo la sua vittoria.
Per quanto concerne il caso dell'U-234... innanzitutto mi pare che il carico
comprendesse 500kg di ossido di uranio (e non di plutonio). Diciamo che non
sarebbe stata quella mezza tonnellata di materiale a mettere in grado l'URSS
di produrre la bomba atomica prima di quanto abbiano fatto realmente. Per
quanto riguarda il Me-262 smontato... agli americani ha giovato?
Comunque sia, ti faccio notare che nel 1949 i sovietici avevano l'atomica e
caccia paragonabili al meglio disponibile in occidente. Nello stesso periodo
avevano superato la fase prototipica armi eccezionali (per l'epoca) come il
T-54 e l'AK. Quindi non mi pare proprio che a fermare le presunte mire
espansionistiche dell'URSS dopo la 2GM sia stata la mancanza di know-how
tecnologico. Non è che, molto più banalmente, questi qui la 3GM proprio non
la volessero far iniziare?
Saluti,
    Amedeo

 -Faro' un saltino su di esso.
                                Andrea 'Cid Highwind'

sovietici!!
cosa che però è avvenuta, non per tutti i campi ovviamente, ma anche i
Russi avviarono alla fine della guerra una caccia allo scienziato ne
più ne meno come gli americani (la cui tecnologia missilistica è
frutto in massima parte del genio di VOn Braun senza il quale
IMHOISSSIMO ^__^ ritengo che sarebbero arrivati con molto più ritardo
di quanto in realtà avvenne nel sperimentare il loro primo missile
balistico).
Saluti
B29

 <snip>
Credo che Sergio volesse dire che se l'unico obiettivo fosse la mera
espansione territoriale mediante annessioni forzate perché l'URSS non s'è
annessa l'intera Europa orientale dopo il 1945?
E sul fatto che gli stati satelliti fossero totalmente succubi ed
impossibilitati a staccarsi dall'orbita sovietica si potrebbe discutere. Non
voglio dire che non ci fosse controllo ferreo sulla maggior parte di essi,
ma in alcuni casi i rapporti erano meno improntati alla rigidezza ed alla
sudditanza di quanto si potesse pensare in passato.
Saluti,
    Amedeo

deutsche invasori.
appunto
inizialmente.  (e ci sarebbe anche da ridire qualcosa sulla frase...)
ciao
Sergio
--------------------------------
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 di solito citi ? :)
forse perche' si citano anche... dei documenti?
 
saluti
S.

forse perche' si citano anche... dei documenti?
e per te questo basta per provare la bonta delle tue fonti ?
Mah.
Chi ti dice che i documenti non siano stati anch'essi manipolati ?
Un vecchio adagio dice "La storia la scrivono i vincitori", non puoi
essere al sicuro al 100% che quello che leggi sia vero in assoluto.
Saluti
B29


Non sempre... nel caso del fronte orientale, per noi 'occidentali', la
storia l'hano spesso scritta i perdenti :)
ciao
    Amedeo

storia l'hano spesso scritta i perdenti :)
 
:)


 ha
scritto:
    >

    Amedeo,
    hai seguito i diversi interessanti thread che ci sono su ICS
sull'URSS/Germania di quel periodo?
    Se hai qualcosa da aggiungere sei benvenuto :)
    ciao
    S.


Caro Sergio,
come sai non bazzico sul ICS, in primo luogo per mancanza di tempo, in
secondo luogo per evitarmi travasi di bile. Qualche tempo addietro ho
provato a leggere un paio di thread e ho visto nero (in tutti i sensi) già
al terzo post. Dico mancanza di tempo in quanto rispondere fondatamente a
certi post richiede sicuramente più tempo e dispendio di energie che dare un
paio di dati su qualche oscuro aereo, e non vorrei che la mancanza di
assiduità venisse scambiata per mancanza di argomenti, soprattutto da chi,
magari supplisce con tonnellate di non sequitur alla tenuità delle sue
argomentazioni.
Di certo non voglio sminuire l'importanza di ICS o snobbare i suoi
partecipanti... ci mancherebbe! Qualcuno potrebbe pensare che per me il
quesito più importante sull'era Chruscev sia perché abbia deciso di tagliare
le gambe allo sviluppo di nuovi carri pesanti, ma ovviamente non è così. Ho
avuto modo di affrontare discorsi storici di ordine più marcatamente
filosofico e politico su alcuni forum stranieri, ed ho anche avuto le mie
soddifazioni, ma ho anche sperimentato che l'assiduità e l'impegno richiesti
sono di un ordine di grandezza maggiori rispetto ai miei attuali su ICSM.
Saluti
 Amedeo

 le gambe allo sviluppo di nuovi carri pesanti, ma ovviamente non è così.
no, certo . Pero' conto su un tuo ripensamento perche' sono certo che avrai
"qualcosa" da dire :)
Cordialmente
Sergio
--------------------------------
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