Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: Due libri di Jeremy Black

Due libri che ho letto da poco, scritti da uno dei grandi storici dell'era 
moderna ( dal 1500 in avanti) e fautore dell'approccio relativista alla 
storia militare.
Entrambi sono trattati di teoria storica, ma ogni affermazione è comunque 
collegata ad un esempio storico, spesso sconosciuto perchè non legato alla 
storia occidentale.
Il primo libro è "Rethinking military history" del 2004, propone sia una 
descrizione della situazione della storia militare attuale e dei generi, sia 
una critica ad una serie di tendenze attuali nella dottrina della storia 
militare:
(a) Eurocentricity, more specifically a focus on Europe, especially Western 
Europe and North America, or rather, the USA.
(b) A technological bias in explaining military capability, and a 
fascination with technology in accounting for military developments, more 
specifically a 'machinization' of war.
(c) A focus on leading powers and dominant military systems, leading to a 
paradigm/diffusion model of military capability and change.
(d) A separation of land from sea conflict in most of the analysis.
(e) A focus on state-to-state conflict, rather than on the use of force 
within states. This is qualified in the case of civil wars only when these 
apparently correspond to state-to-state wars, as, most prominently, with the 
English and American Civil Wars.
(f) A lack of focus on political 'tasking' in the setting of force 
structures, doctrines and goals, and in the judging of military success.
Black arguisce che l'applicazione di un modello di studio atemporale e 
aculturale all'analisi della storia militare sia fondamentalmente riduttivo 
specialmente nell'analisi delle cause e delle decisioni, soprattutto perchè 
tende ad ignorare i successivi di modelli non occidentali i quali 
falserebbero molti degli assunti di cui sopra.
La seconda parte del libro offre un breve riesame dei punti cardine esposti 
sopra nel periodo 1500-oggi. Ecco alcuni brani della conclusione:
"The emphasis in this book has been on a cultural approach, but considering 
military history in this light is understood as a far from simple
or easy process. 'Culture' is used somewhat loosely as an analytical term, 
but it provides a way to bring together organization and tasking, 'war
and society', and the 'face of battle'. An emphasis on culture offers a more 
relativist mode of explanation in military history - by comparing
the strategic and organizational cultures of competing states and their 
militaries, rather than by measuring them against an absolute or
universal scale of technological capacity or proficiency. This approach
needs to be open to the variety of military cultures across the world, past
and present (and, planners note, future as well), and this openness means
not only an interest in non-Western military history, but also an 
understanding
of its variety and complexity - as well as the avoidance of
misleading approaches to the respective capability of West and 'non-
West', and to warfare between them."
"
A cultural emphasis also ranges across time, and thus poses new
questions for the explanation of change because the changes that have to
be explained increase in number and complexity. Across both time and
space, the cultural specificity of particular types of warfare emerges as
a building block for analysis, displacing attention from a crudely
functionalist account of capability, effectiveness and success, based on
the appropriate use of resources and on the maximization of the latter.
Culture, instead, focuses on perception and expectations, especially the
perception of opportunities, of problems, of options, and of success.
This poses more serious analytical problems than those of establishing
the cause of victory, and also involves addressing issues and using
sources that are more usually considered by scholars who do not
specialize in military history. That, however, is a comment on the need
to move beyond the established assumptions and methods of tactical and
operational history in order to understand the reasons for success, and
thus to evaluate capability.
The widespread failure to do so reflects a mismatch in the assessment
of means and ends. Although military history is unique in that it
deals with the organization and execution of violence in terms of the
deliberate killing and wounding of numbers of human beings, that
killing is intended as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The
assumptions that relate killing to the pursuit of ends vary, and these,
again, are best understood in a cultural perspective.
"
"
To give a personal view - and the historian is best advised not to shy
away from this, nor to hide away as an oracular figure - I played a role
in the Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare series. The first volume,
The Middle Ages 768-1487 (Cambridge, 1996), edited by Matthew
Bennett and Nicholas Hooper, was misleadingly titled as it was in
fact restricted to Europe, with an excursion into the Middle East for the
Crusades: the New World, the Orient and Africa were all neglected. As
author of the sequel, Renaissance to Revolution 1492-1792 (Cambridge,
1996), I found it difficult to persuade the packager, Calmann and King,
to include a spread on the Orient, as, for commercial reasons, the
emphasis was to be on Britain and the USA.
Intervention by the packager could be more direct. For example, I
produced a draft map of India in the eighteenth century designed to
show the peripheral nature of the European impact in the first six
decades of the century. The standard north-south map places a premium
on European penetration, making the relationship between India and
the surrounding seas apparently central: India appears primarily as a
peninsula and eye-lines focus on Delhi from European coastal positions,
such as Bombay, Calcutta, Goa, Madras and Pondicherry. The customary
maps also indicate only European victories, such as those of forces of the
British East India Company under Robert Clive at the battles of Arcot
(1750) and Plassey (1757), and also organize space and time in terms
of British annexations. In contrast, the major theme of my draft map
was the contested succession to the Mughal empire by a number of
expansionist powers: Britain, but also the Maratha Confederation, the
Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawabs of Bengal and the Carnatic, and the
Sultan of Mysore. To do so, and to show the impact of invasions by
Nadir Shah of Persia and the Afghans, I wanted a perspective in which
India opens up from the Khyber Pass, with a central alignment thence
via Delhi. As a result, the coastlines would appear more peripheral. I also
wanted to include British defeats, for example at the hands of the
Marathas in 1779 and of Mysore in 1780 and 1782, or the unsuccessful
advance on Mysore in 1791. Again, however, marketing consideration
militated against this map.
"
Il secondo libro del 2008 "Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony" è una 
revisitazione del classico di Kennedy "The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000" alla base 
di molti dei concetti espressi dal precedente libro. Il modello di grande 
potenza espresso da Kennedy è un'espressione del riduzionismo materialista, 
dove fattori economici e utilitaristici sono preminenti sulla cultura e 
sull'azione individuale. Per Kennedy il potere marittimo è l'espressione 
ultima di una grande potenza, ma questo richiede investimenti in 
infrastrutture, perciò l'enfasi viene posta sul commercio a lunga distanza e 
sullo sviluppo industriale necessari a creare queste infrastrutture. 
Nell'analisi sui fattori di caduta Kennedy pone l'accento sull' "overreach" 
e "overstretch" come fattori, cioè la tendenza a raggiungere obbiettivi che 
vanno oltre le risorse disponibili. Il libro di Kennedy fu ben accolto 
all'epoca dell'uscita (1988) perchè presentava un modello di potenza 
(anglosassone dalla metà del XIX secolo) e fattori di caduta che ben si 
confacevano alla situazione del periodo. Black arguisce che questo modello 
non è universale come Kennedy vuol far credre, in quanto non è applicabile 
in una serie di stati che nei loro rispettivi periodi sono stati considerati 
grandi potenze, e che l'enfasi o no sul potere marittimo è legata alle 
scelte e alle prioprità dello stato e non è assoluta, offrendo ancora una 
volta numerosi esempi dal 1500 ad oggi.
Qui trovate un articolo di Black del 2007 che è sostanzialmente il primo 
capitolo del libro dove fà l'esame critico del testo di Kennedy 
http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/001375.php

Errata corridge: è "i successi di modelli non occidentali" 

Questo è un brano interessante del primo libro:
"
The case study of India
In India, from the 1790s to 1818, the British won a number of
important battles, but these did not conform to the image of Western
warfare in terms of defensive firepower bringing down attacking
numbers, the position at Plassey. Instead, as in the American victories
over the Creeks at Fallen Timbers and Horseshoe Bend (1814), and also
with the Russian operational mode against the Ottomans developed by
Count Peter Rumyantsev and used by him with great success in 1770,
the emphasis was on the operational offensive and the tactical attack, and
the use of bayonet charges as well as firepower was of importance. It is
difficult to produce a comparative weighting of firepower and bayonet
charges, both because of a lack of information (and research), and also
due to the very confused nature of some battles, especially Arthur
Wellesley's victory over the Marathas at Assaye in 1803. The attack was
important there, as it also was in Wellesley's victory over the Marathas at
Argaon (Argaum) in 1803, Lake's victory over them at Farruckhabad in
1804, and Malcolm's victory over the Marathas at Mahidpur in 1817.
British tactics, based on firing once or twice and then charging, had had
an impact in India from mid-century. On the battlefield, speedy infantry
attack helped compensate for numerical inferiority, while at the
operational level, it was only through the use of the offensive that
the British could hope to counter the Maratha cavalry.43 The attack in
the shape of storming was also important in the British capture of
fortified positions, such as the Mysore capital Seringapatam in 1799, the
Maratha fortresses of Alegarh and Gawilgarh in 1803, and, in the East
Indies, the Sultan of Yogyakarta's kraton (royal residence) in 1812.
This might simply suggest that Western military superiority has to
be considered in a wider fashion - to encompass offensive as well as
defensive conflict. But this approach is complicated first by the quality of
the Maratha cannon (and the skilful and brave nature of its use44), and
second, by the non-military weaknesses of the Marathas, which
compromised their effectiveness. Weakened by serious divisions, the
Marathas suffered from a weak command structure and from a lack of
money that hit discipline and control, just as divisions among Britain's
opponents had helped in the conquest of Bengal.45
The latter point directs attention to the wide range of factors at issue.
The British may well, as has been argued, have benefited from the degree
to which they were less willing than earlier conquerors to absorb Indian
political and military values.46 The British administrative goals and
methods certainly seem to have been different from those of Indian
states,47 and it has been argued that, in the case of Mysore, the Marathas
and the Sikhs, there was an 'inherent weakness . . . that seriously
impeded their efforts at adopting the Western military system . . . for
all of these powers were essentially feudal in origin and had very little
time to make the transition to a stable monarchy with a centralized
bureaucracy', while the British were able 'to adapt and innovate
on the basis of a vastly superior organizational and governmental
infrastructure'.48
It is important, however, to be wary of judgements that assume a
ready superiority in Western governmental systems as a result of fiscal
demands generating institutional development, a point that emerges in
comparative discussion of Europe and China.49 Indeed, the East India
Company was nearly bankrupted by the campaigns of 1803-4, recalled
Richard Wellesley, the Governor-General, and sought peace with the
Marathas. This is a reminder of the role of competing interests and ideas
in the formulation of policy, in short of the dynamic nature of strategic
culture. British territorial gains in India coincided with the declining
influence of the East India Company vis-à-vis the British government
and parliament. In the late seventeenth century, Sir Josiah Child, a key
figure in the East India Company, argued against the building of
fortresses on the grounds that they would frighten off local traders and
thus be harmful to trade. In the early nineteenth century, in contrast,
there was an emphasis on seizing territory. In the absence of a systematic
comparative study of Britain and the other Indian powers, and indeed of
Britain's Indian wars in the period, it is rash to make statements about
military or governmental effectiveness or superiority, for example the
claim that the greater continuity and institutional stability of the
Company than those of native rulers was crucial to its military success.50
The results were notable, but the causes are less clear.
 " 

 paradigm/diffusion model of military capability and change.
Questa non l'ho capita: dov'è il problema con la Kuhniana (io direi 
quasi Darwiniana) sostituzione di paradigmi ?
Saluti,
--------------------
    Luca Morandini
www.lucamorandini.it
--------------------

Il problema non è la correttezza del concetto ma il fatto che venga
impiegato sistematicamente e aprioristicamente come fattore unico per
spiegare i cambiamenti nella cultura strategica di società non occidentali
dopo essere entrate in contatto con quelle occidentali, mentre spesso,
soprattutto prima del XIX secolo quando non c'era nessun reale margine di
superiorità occidentale, non è rilevante o è insufficiente a spiegare il
cambiamento.
-- 
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 (d) A separation of land from sea conflict in most of the analysis.
Luigi Loreto interviene sul merito in "Per la storia militare del mondo
antico", sottolineando come "esiste, in effetti, negli studi di storia
moderna una tendenziale separazione tra la considerazione della guerra
terrestre e di quella navale, che è, a sua volta, speculare alla questione
della unità o della diversità ontologica della strategia navale rispetto a
quella terrestre".
A tal proposito, in positivo, cita anche Black (Western Warfare, 1775-1882
) "che prende moderatamente posizione in contrario, ma la critica deve
essere più netta e precisa, come la nostra di seguito nel testo".
Di seguito, riferisce che tale separazione "se è comprensibilmente
determinata dal complesso di conoscenze tecniche rispettivamente
specifiche e diverse richiesto, è, tuttavia, come tale, errata
metodologicamente, in quanto, indipendentemente dalla questione della
esistenza o meno di caratteri specifici nella strategia delle due
dimensioni, una separazione ha senso solo dal livello operativo a
scendere; la comprensione della dimensione strategica e macrostrategica
invece non può prescindere dalla loro considerazione integrata. De resto
la interconnessione delle due dimensioni era già formalizzata teoricamente
all'inizio del XX sec da Callwell (Military Operations and Marittime
Preponderance. Their Relations and Interdipendence" - 1905)"
Valete


Questo è un brano più preciso sull'argomento:
"
Change
More generally, there is need for a debate on how best to explain
military change. Models that assume some mechanistic, if not automatic,
search for efficiency, and define this in terms of a maximization of force,
do violence to the complex process by which interest in new methods
interacted with powerful elements of continuity. For example, the varied
reaction to firearms is best understood not in terms of military progress,
nor of administrative sophistication, nor of cultural superiority, but
rather as a response to the different tasks and possibilities facing the
armies of the period, within a context in which it was far from clear
which weaponry, force structure, tactics, or operational method were
better, or could be adopted most successfully. Indeed, in the case of
gunpowder, like earlier the stirrup, it has been argued that 'administrative
improvements preceded military change, and that military change
preceded the introduction of any new military technology. . . . The age
of cavalry was really the age of bad infantry, and was a political, not a
technological, phenomenon'.
Linked to this emphasis on different tasks and possibilities should be
a measure of scepticism about the notion of a 'paradigm' power (or
military culture) that others sought to emulate. This situation was
indeed the case to a certain extent within particular military systems,
although less so than the more common borrowing of particular
techniques and weapons. The role of a paradigm power, and of the
diffusion of its methods at the global level, is often exaggerated however.
This is particularly the case for the situation prior to the last two
centuries: the circumstances under which the USA currently fulfils the
role provides scant guidance to the position with major powers several
centuries ago, while the force projection sought today by the USA is
exceptional, and thus lessens the applicability of the paradigm-diffusion
model." 

 cambiamento.
Non sono convinto che la superiorità occidentale si rivelò con la
Gatling: la battaglia di San Gottardo, la superiorità navale Portoghese 
  nell'Oceano indiano, etc. sono antecedenti al XIX secolo e dimostrano 
un netto vantaggio tattico e tecnologico europeo nei confronti degli 
avversari extra-europei.


 avversari extra-europei.
Infatti furono le caravelle portoghesi a stabilire la netta superiorità 
tecnologica sulle soha arabe. Rafforzata ne secoli seguenti da politiche 
di penetrazione commerciale molto aggressive ed il saggio uso della 
diplomazia.

Non concordo, al Gottardo furono la posizione tattica vantaggiosa degli 
alleati e l'abilità
di Montecuccoli (anche nel convincere il suo composito stato maggiore ad un 
attacco in
massa) a portare alla vittoria. Del resto la stessa descrizione 
dell'esercito e
dell'organizzazione ottomani fatta da Montecuccoli, non lascia dubbi sul 
fatto che non
vedesse vantaggi tecnologici o nel pensiero bellico o organizzativo ma 
evidenziasse solo differenze concettuali, che davano
vantaggi e svantaggi ai turchi rispetto ai cristiani (di fatto i turchi 
continuarono ad avere per molto tempo la capacità di armare e mantenere 
eserciti più grandi dell'occidente, con la loro struttura amministrativa di 
tipo feudale). Del resto la fanteria di tipo europeo con artiglieria era già 
stata sconfitta in modo totale dai marocchini (in gran parte per merito di 
archibugieri a cavallo) a Alcazarquivir
Anche per portoghesi bisogna ridimensionare il grado di successo. 
Innanzitutto i portoghesi
 subirono anche scacchi da parte di
Ottomani e Omani. Gli ottomani scacciarono i portoghesi dal Mar rosso, 
l'Oman divenne una delle forze navali principale nell'oceano
indiano orientale dalla metà del XVII secolo, scacciando i portoghesi sia 
dalle basi arabe
che da Mombasa, saccheggiando le loro basi in India, la marina permise 
all'esercito cinese di scacciare gli olandesi da Taiwan e dalle Pescadores. 
C'è da evidenziare anche differenze di mentalità: per gli ottomani l'oceano
indiano era un'area secondaria rispetto alle risorse spese nel mediterraneo, 
contro L'iran
e nei balcani. Un'altra cosa è la diversa concezione navale: solo gli 
europei spesero
risorse in grandi navi da blue water con un elevato numero di cannoni, 
adattissime a
combattimenti di linea e appoggio contro fortificazioni costiere ma anche 
meno agili e veloci e non
capaci di sfruttare le vie di penetrazione fluviali per estendere 
all'interno l'area di
controllo,  mentre le nazioni non-occidentali che avevano comunque la 
capacità economica necessaria e la tecnologia adatta
e i modelli occidentali ad esempio, scelsero di non sviluppare o di farlo
releativamente tardi navi di questo tipo, concentrandosi di modelli agili o
adatte alle condizioni locali e al tipo di guerra preferito.
Alcuni passi interessanti
"
The arrival of first the Portuguese and then other Europeans in the
Indian Ocean and linked waters, especially the Red Sea and the Persian
Gulf, did indeed greatly expand the extent of contact between
Christendom and Islam, but the extent of the challenge should not be
exaggerated. The Islamic world was able to mount a robust response:
the Portuguese were repelled from the Red Sea and Aden in the early
sixteenth century, and driven from Muscat (1650) and Mombasa (1698)
by the Omani Arabs. In India itself, assaults by non-Europeans from
across Afghanistan - particularly the Mughal conquest of the Sultanate
of Delhi in the 1520s, the Persian invasion in 1739-40 at the expense of
the Mughal empire, and that of the Afghans in the 1750s, culminating
in the victory over the (Hindu) Marathas at the Third Battle of
Panipat (1761) - were, for long, more important to military history and
political developments than European moves."
"
This competition between Islamic states is just one example of a much
wider process. The Safavid dynasty of Persia did not fall to a Western
power. The Westerners had a presence in the region: there were Western
commercial interests and military bases in the Persian Gulf area from the
early sixteenth century on, while the Portuguese established bases at
Hormuz and Muscat. There was to be no parallel, however, to the way
the Spaniards brought down the Incas and the Aztecs in the New World
in the early sixteenth century. Instead, in military terms the European
impact on the Asiatic world was pretty minimal through the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and early eighteenth centuries (see Chapter six). The
people who brought down the Safavids were Afghan invaders. Similarly,
in the late sixteenth century, the only other major opponent of the
Safavids, other than the Turks, were Uzbeks, who were defeated by
Abbas I at Pul-i Salar in 1598.
Far from it being the central concern to fight the Christians, in 1590
the Moroccans set out to do something that in its own way was as
dramatic and bold as anything the Europeans did sailing across the
oceans. An army crossed the Sahara (only about half of the 5,000 men
sent across the desert survived), captured Timbuktu, smashed the
Songhay empire at the battle of Tondibi in 1591, and set up a state based
on Timbuktu. Furthermore, in 1684 Moroccan pressure forced the
English to abandon Tangier: English colonists and forces could defeat
Native Americas and, eventually, the French in North America, but they
could not hold Tangier against the Moroccans.
"
Naval developments
The problem of defining what was militarily significant in the
early-modern period invites debate, and certainly underlines the
questionable character of any Eurocentric emphasis for land warfare.
The situation is different on the water, at least for deep-draught naval
capability, although there is also need for study of this question, more
particularly for shallow-water capability. Furthermore, the suggestion
above of a cartographic reconceptualization can be extended to the
watery sphere as a whole, with a need to place the emphasis on rivers,
lakes, deltas, estuaries, lagoons and inshore waters, alongside the
oceans that dominate Western attention and analysis. For the
seventeenth century, it is important to consider not only the revival
in the Ottoman fleet,23 which covered the massive invasion of Crete in
1645, and the Chinese fleets that helped drive the Dutch from the
Pescadores Islands in 1604 and 1624 and from Taiwan in 1661-2,24
but also the formidable navy, with well-gunned warships, that the
Omani Arabs created after they captured the Portuguese base of
Muscat in 1650.25 In terms of amphibious operations, some of the
most impressive in the seventeenth century were by non-Europeans:
the Ottomans against Crete; Coxinga, the Ming loyalist, against
Taiwan, followed, in 1683, by its conquest by the Chinese under admiral
Shi Lang; and, albeit against weaker opposition, the Omanis against
Mombasa, which fell in 1698.26 In South Asian waters, Mataram,
Aceh, Mughal, and Magh fleets all played a local role, although Sultan
Iskander Muda of Aceh was defeated when he attacked Malacca,
then Portuguese-controlled, in 1629. Large squadrons of Mughal
riverboats, carrying cannon, played a major role in defeating the fleet
of Arakan in 1666, while the Marathas had a sizeable fleet in the late
seventeenth century.27"
"
In the eighteenth century, substantial navies were deployed by only a
handful of non-European powers, principally the Ottoman empire, the
Barbary states of North Africa, the Omani Arabs, and the Maratha
Angria family on the Konkon coast of India. The ships of these powers
had a greater range than war canoes and approximated more closely to
European warships, but they lacked the destructive power of the latter.
Tasking was important: the Barbary,28 Omani and Angria ships were
commerce raiders that emphasized speed and manoeuvrability, whereas
the heavier, slower ships-of-the-line of European navies were designed
for battle and stressed battering power, which in 1756 helped the British
capture Gheria, the stronghold on the west coast of India of Tulajee
Angria. When in 1735 the Pasha of Ottoman-ruled Basra defeated a
Persian naval attempt to seize the port, he did so by commandeering
British ships. On the other hand, the difficulties the English encountered
in the 1660s in opposing corsairs off Tangier led to interest by them in
the use of Mediterranean galleys.29
In many parts of the world, canoes were important. These boats were
shallow in draught, and therefore enjoyed an inshore range denied to
European warships. Their crews usually fought with missile weapons,
increasingly muskets, and some canoes also carried cannon.30 Areas
where canoes were particularly important included inland waterway
systems, especially in Amazonia; the eastern half of North America as
well as its Pacific coastal region; the valleys of the Brahmaputra and
Irrawaddy; coastal systems, particularly the lagoons of West Africa; and
island systems, such as the Hawaiian archipelago.31 By the end of the
eighteenth century, the fleets of outrigger canoes of the Betsimisaraka
and Sakalava of Madagascar raided as far as the mainland of northern
Mozambique. As yet, these and other forces are not only largely
unstudied but also scarcely mentioned in general accounts of naval
power and warfare. Thus, a definition of capability is asserted rather than
discussed: a common problem in military history.
"
"
In comparison, the Ottoman presence in the Indian Ocean was more modest. 
Inheriting
the Mameluke naval role in the Red Sea, the Ottomans, from the base at Suez, 
pushed it
further, establishing their power down the sea, most critically at Aden in 
1538 (although
Yemen was only brought under real suzerainty from 1567-71). In doing so, 
they thwarted
Portuguese attempts to make themselves a Red Sea power. From the Red Sea 
and,
subsequently, from their conquest of Iraq, the Ottomans projected their 
power into the
Indian Ocean.
Success, however, was limited. The Ottomans were unable to sustain a 
presence in
Indian waters, although they were more successful in the Horn of Africa 
(until defeat by
the Ethiopians in 1578) and further down the coast of East Africa. In the 
long term,
Ottoman limitations in the region helped ensure that the Indian Ocean became 
a zone of
European naval and imperial activity. Indeed, the leading Islamic naval 
power in the
region in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to be Oman, 
which operated
as a vigorous regional power in the Arabian Sea and along the coast of East 
Africa,
capturing the Portuguese bases of Muscat in 1650 and Fort Jesus at Mombasa 
in 1698
and retaining a presence based at Zanzibar until the late nineteenth 
century. The success
of Oman indicated that naval and amphibious capability was not restricted to 
Western
powers, and this makes the Ottoman failure to develop their presence in the 
Indian Ocean
more striking.
However, rather than concluding from this that the Ottomans had some serious 
flaws
and should be excluded from the list of great powers, it is more pertinent 
to note that all
the major imperial states of the period only devoted a portion of their 
strength to long range
activity. In discussing the Spaniards in the New World, let alone the Far 
East, it is
important not to overlook the extent to which Spain focused its resources on 
European
commitments. Within these, there was a number of challenges, including the
Mediterranean struggle with the Ottomans, which was particularly intensive 
in the early
1570s, the Morisco rebellion in Spain in 1568-70, the Dutch Revolt and war 
with France
and England. The interrelationships between these challenges put pressure on 
Philip II as
he had to choose priorities, and there are questions as to whether he had a 
coordinated
strategy linking his commitments, but his was the choice.24 Furthermore, the 
Portuguese
devoted more effort to their ultimately unsuccessful attempt to develop 
their position in
nearby Morocco, an attempt that went down to crushing defeat at 
Alcazarquivir in 1578,
than they did to the distant Indian Ocean.25
Thus, the limited Ottoman role in the Indian Ocean should not be seen as an 
aspect of
failure, not least because the Ottomans were also heavily committed in other 
spheres.
Indeed, their ability to focus on key fronts indicated that the Ottomans 
generally avoided
overstretch.26 The Ottomans also chose not to commit heavily to the Indian 
Ocean. In
part, the influential sipahis and janissaries of the army pushed for land 
campaigns."
"
The Egyptian, and later Ottoman, vessels that sailed to the west coast of
India or between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf were different in their
long-distance capability and were also less heavily gunned.Whereas there was
considerable diffusion of new weapons and techniques to non-Western powers
in land warfare in the sixteenth century, there was no comparable diffusion 
of
naval weaponry and techniques. The European combination of ships with
hull-mounted cannon, fortresses and garrisons remained particularly 
effective.8
This did not mean that European warships were invulnerable. In African,
Indian and Indonesian waters, heavily gunned Portuguese vessels, with their
deep draught and reliance on sails, were vulnerable to shallower draught 
oared
boats. This was true for example of the Straits of Malacca, where the Sultan
continued to resist after the loss of Malacca. More generally, Portuguese
warships, like those of other European powers, had only limited value in the
important inshore, estuarine, deltaic and riverine waters of the world, a 
situation
that was not to change until the introduction of shallow-draught
steamships carrying steel artillery in the nineteenth century. However, the
Dutch used shallow craft effectively in their riverine war with the Army of
Flanders, especially in its early phases, and without the specialised nature 
of
their vessels they could not have had an effective navy. The Russians had a
capability for river operations. Flotilla expeditions were sent down the Don
against Azov and the Khanate of the Crimea from 1646.
The problems faced by deep-draught European warships outside European
waters could be matched in the latter, and this serves as a reminder of the
diversity of naval warfare within Europe. Thus, the long-established Viking
tradition of longship-building continued in the islands off west Scotland 
until
the late sixteenth century. In an analogue of the cavalry forces of the
Cossacks, the Hebrideans had a military system that relied on mobility and
was able to support itself by raiding. In 1533, the English attempt to 
impose
their power by using the new technology failed when the Mary Willoughby
was captured by longships off the Shetlands.9 The use of Viking style long
ships by the Western Islemen, notably the MacDonalds, enabled them to
transport mercenary redshanks from the Isles into Ulster, using Lough Foyle 
as
their landing area, throughout the sixteenth century. Attempts to intercept 
the
fleets with English sailing ships were unsuccessful, as were attempts to 
penetrate
into the lochs of the Mull of Kintyre to attack the vessels at source.Only
the occupation of Lough Foyle by the English finally solved the problem. In
the Baltic and the Mediterranean, the continued need for galleys reflected 
the
extent of inshore waters.
South-East Asian rulers responded to the threat posed by European
warships not only by copying them but by building bigger armed galleys
whose oars gave them inshore manoeuvrability.A fleet of about fifty Cochin
Chinese galleys destroyed three Dutch warships in 1643. The Portuguese
developed coastal fleets composed of local oared vessels or small sailing 
ships
at Goa, Diu and in the Persian Gulf. These were of great value when the
Portuguese resisted Dutch and English attack in the seventeenth century, as
they could be used to harass English and Dutch big ships and could 
circumvent
blockades by them.10 Francis Drake and other English privateers took
small oared pre-fabricated raiding vessels with them to assist with 
operations
in the inshore waters of the Caribbean. Such small ships do not appear in 
lists
of naval strength as the latter focus on what became ships of the line, but 
this
is a reminder of the need to be cautious in assuming any one measure of 
naval
power. The ability successfully to transport amphibious and expeditionary
forces over long distances was another important measure of naval power, or
perhaps maritime power, for Spain, Portugal, the Ottomans and Venetians, the
English and the Dutch.
Nevertheless, European vessels in deep waters were difficult to attack
successfully, and, on the oceans of the world, there was little challenge to
European military technology. In part, this reflected the lack of interest 
shown
by China, Japan and Korea in developing a long-distance naval capability to
match their powerful short-range effectiveness. A Chinese fleet employing
cannon defeated a Portuguese squadron off Tunmen (Tou-men) in 1522, but
Tunmen is near Macao: the Portuguese were fortunate they did not reach the
Indian Ocean when the Chinese deployed fleets there, as Chinese ships were
sturdier than Indian ones, but by the sixteenth century, although the 
Chinese
had an inshore naval capability, they no longer deployed distant fleets as 
they
had done in the fifteenth century.11 The Portuguese were to have a fleet
defeated off Johor in 1603 but by the Dutch, not by an Asian power.
At one level, the very ability to project power over a long distance is of
greater consequence than its effectiveness in a given sphere. For example, a
Portuguese presence was an issue for both China and Japan, but not vice
versa. This argument has to be handled with care:Viking power extended to
Newfoundland but to scant effect. More generally, the definition of naval
power is an issue. It was a function of ships, manpower, bases and 
logistical
support, each of which was intimately related to the others, and it is 
important
not to adopt a single definition of naval power. In addition, the
temptation to think in terms of violence as a form of seizure of resources, 
of
the gains to be made through the use of power, has to be related to the
symbiotic nature of trade and the need for maritime powers which had 
developed
a monopoly of regular long-range ocean transport to accommodate
themselves to the demands and opportunities of land-based economic systems
if they were to be much more than transient plunderers. After technology had
given them an initial advantage, the Portuguese sought this accommodation.
" 

 agili o adatte alle condizioni locali e al tipo di guerra preferito.
Anche Venezia aveva i sui buoni motivi per continuare a costruire galee, 
ma non si può negare che esse furono inferiori ai velieri... e che 
Venezia divenne irrilevante come potenza navale.
Da notare che, per il Cipolla di "Vele e cannoni", anche quando gli
Orientali copiarono i velieri, magari montando cannoni occidentali, essi
non riuscirono ad assimilare le tattiche artiglieresche, continuando a 
porre troppa enfasi sull'abbordaggio.
Saluti,
P.S.
A quando il IV numero di Vexillum ?


 A quando il IV numero di Vexillum ?
Siamo quasi pronti, stiamo aspettando gli ultimi due articoli; dato che sono 
molto interessanti abbiamo deciso che è meglio ritardare di qualche 
settimana,
piuttosto che pubblicarli tra 6-8 mesi con il numero 5. Sarà un numero 
abbastanza corposo, come  numero di pagine molto vicino al secondo numero.
ciao

 vicino al secondo numero.
Non è un problema... la mia stampante è fronte/retro ;)
Saluti,



Certamente l'affondamento a colpi di cannone è improbabile, ma la cattura 
della nave implica che la devi catturare in condizioni accettabili per 
poterla portare in un porto a riparare, se la tempesti di colpi fino a far 
tacere la sua artiglieria, e cedere l'equipaggio, ciò che rimane, magari 
senza più alberi, difficilmente sarà una piattaforma sicura per navigare in 
condizioni oceaniche. La scelta tra abbordaggio e cannoneggiamento era 
dettata anche dalle condizioni in cui si ingaggiava il combattimento: se hai 
meno cannoni ma più soldati a bordo (come i mercantili armati di cui la 
maggior parte delle flotte era piena nel XVI secolo) tenti il primo , non il 
secondo. Stai parlando delle triremi antiche o delle galee?
Alcuni passi da Warfare at Sea 1500-1650 di Glete
"
Heavy guns were, however, deployed at sea only gradually and in small 
numbers. For a
long time older wrought-iron guns were probably dominant and ships might 
have had to
surrender their guns if they were needed for siege operations. The artillery 
of most states
remained a specialised technical branch of the armed forces, rather than 
being integrated
parts of their armies and navies. There is, however, little evidence for the 
belief that chivalric
contempt for gunpowder weapons or the inertia of established organisations 
had much
importance in delaying the deployment of guns at sea. Outside the 
Mediterranean there was
little established naval organisation or chivalric tradition in warfare at 
sea, and in the
Mediterranean the galley fleets were early users of heavy guns. Portuguese 
knights commanding
fleets in the Indian Ocean from 1498 on, avoided boarding and used their 
superior gunpower
to defeat enemies at sea and to bombard cities. Dutch sea officers were very 
seldom of noble
origin, but they frequently used boarding tactics even in the 
mid-seventeenth century. In
actual combats there were instances when men exposed to superior gunfire 
scornfully invited
the enemy to board and fight as men but it is very doubtful if this should 
be taken as a
confrontation between different attitudes to war. Both on land and at sea, 
aristocratic
commanders used guns if that was to their advantage."
"
Those (very few) who have seriously studied the naval wars
in the Baltic of 1509-12, 1534-36 and 1563-70 have found that major battles 
were repeatedly
fought with guns and that certain Nordic kings and admirals had a fairly 
clear grasp of the
potential of the new technology. On the other hand, the experienced Dutch 
sea commanders
whose gunnery defeated another Spanish Armada in the Channel in 1639 tried 
to use boarding
during the war with England in 1652-54. The decades around 1650 were also 
the heydays of
fireship tactics in battles at sea. The extensive use of fireships from the 
1630s to the 1690s
is a sign that contemporary tacticians were aware of limitations in gunnery 
tactics and were
searching for alternatives.
In several respects, guns were revolutionary weapons, but there were 
considerable
difficulties in making full use of their potential power at sea. At present 
there is uncertainty
about how guns were mounted and loaded in sixteenth- and early 
seventeenth-century
sailing warships. There are a number of problems which remain to be 
investigated before we
have a clear picture of how guns were handled in different navies and how 
this affected
tactics. Up to the early seventeenth century there is scattered evidence 
that guns had to be
loaded with one man working outside the ship, that is, in a very exposed 
position. Guns may
have been lashed to the side rather than allowed to recoil for reloading. 
There might be more
than one reason for this. Some guns (especially the long culverins) might 
have been so long
that they could not recoil fully in a small ship. Second, armed merchantmen 
might have had
so much cargo on their decks that there were no space for the guns to 
recoil. Third, some
ships (especially armed merchantmen) had such small crews that they could 
not haul out the
heavy guns if they were allowed to recoil. Fourth, the current tactical 
doctrine might, under
these circumstances or other limitations, have presumed that guns should not 
be reloaded
under enemy fire.
One interpretation of the Spanish manner of fighting in 1588 is that many of 
their guns
were mounted in gun-carriages which were unsuitable for rapid reloading and 
that the Spanish
crews were not trained to reload under fire and were consequently unable to 
achieve even a
moderate rate of continuous fire.23 On the other hand, early 
sixteenth-century naval gunnery
was dominated by breech-loaders which could be reloaded fairly quickly from 
inside the
ship. Is it conceivable that all navies would have adopted muzzle-loaders if 
this meant a
dramatic decline of the rate of fire when all guns had to be loaded from 
outside the ship?
Studies of ammunition expenditure in naval battles, to improve our knowledge 
of the realities
of warfare in this period, would be welcome."
"
Broadside guns - which were probably few in number originally - may 
primarily have
been regarded as an anti-boarding device. For a fleet which acted 
defensively broadside
gunfire provided a new first zone of defence which had been largely absent 
in the age of
infantry warships. To use the same guns for tactically offensive purposes - 
continuous fire
in order to defeat an enemy - was more difficult. Our knowledge about how 
contemporary
naval commanders thought about this question, before the general 
introduction of the battleline
after 1650 is deficient. The general impression is that for a long time they 
were thinking
more in terms of the moral and material effect of hits from a limited number 
of well-aimed
guns than of the effect of rapid broadside fire from well-drilled gun crews. 
This philosophy
was realistic in duels between lightly built galleys and against merchantmen 
with hulls easily
shattered by heavy guns. However, against purpose-built warships only a 
massive amount
of gunfire would have decisive effect.
"
"
The purpose-built royal warships represented a much larger part of the 
English fighting
power than on the Spanish side and some of the private English ships were 
real warships,
built for privateering. The gun armament of the two contending fleets gave 
the English a
marked quantitative advantage and this seems to have been increased by a 
qualitative advantage
in gun-handling and in the ability of the ships to manoeuvre into a 
favourable position for a
gun-fight.30 The Spanish fleet could only win a battle if it came to close 
combat and boarding
and, with inferior armament and a fleet of slow and unweatherly merchantmen, 
it could not
force the English to such a battle. Medina Sidonia did not act as if he 
intended to defeat the
English fleet in a major battle to gain command of the sea. His strategy was 
based on the idea
that the Armada should sail through the Channel to its narrowest part. There 
it would
protect the transport of an invasion army of elite solders from the Army of 
Flanders. The
plan made sense if it was based on the assumption that English gunnery was 
not numerous
and efficient enough to sink or disable a substantial number of his huge 
fleet where the sheer
size of the ships enabled them to survive a number of hits. Losses might be 
expected, but, if
they could be kept within acceptable bounds the Armada might be successful.
Such an assumption was not unrealistic. The effect of English gunnery in 
1588 was
indeed not devastating although we will never know if the Armada really 
would have been
able to protect an invasion flotilla in the open sea where the more 
manoeuvrable English
ships probably would have concentrated their attacks on the transport 
vessels. But the
problem was how these vessels should come out to the open sea. The Duke of 
Parma had
created a large invasion flotilla in the Flanders ports, but the coast 
outside these ports was
shallow and inaccessible for the large ships of the Armada.31 Light Spanish 
naval forces
available in July 1588 were inferior to the light forces of the Dutch and 
English fleets which
would have sunk or captured much of the invasion flotilla before it could 
reach the deep
water where the Armada would have a chance to protect it. The enigma with 
the Spanish
planning is why they brought with them only four galleys when they actually 
had at least 80
galleys available in the Mediterranean. The French had shown that it was 
possible to
transfer a Mediterranean galley fleet to the Channel in 1512 and 1545, and 
galleys with
heavy guns were the obvious answer to English and Dutch shallow-water 
forces.32
The summer of 1588 seems to have been unusually stormy and the Armada was
seriously delayed by heavy weather. The four galleys actually never reached 
the Channel.
The fleet finally entered the Channel on 20/30 July (Julian/Gregorian 
calendars). The
English fleet was divided. Most of it was in Plymouth, guarding the entrance 
of the
Channel, while a smaller force was in the Narrows, guarding Parma's invasion 
flotilla in
company with the Dutch. The English, under the command of the Lord Admiral, 
Lord
Howard of Effingham, with the privateering veterans Francis Drake, John 
Hawkins and
Martin Frobisher as sub-commanders, easily gained the wind from the Spanish 
and followed
the Armada when it proceeded east along the English coast. From a distance 
they attacked
the Spanish fleet with gunfire but, with the exception of two ships which 
suffered accidents,
Spanish losses were small. The main effect of the English shadowing of the 
Spanish fleet
was that it made it impossible for it to make a landing on the English coast 
or anchor in the
protected water inside the Isle of Wight.
On 27 July/6 August, the Spanish fleet anchored on the open roadstead off 
Calais and the
English western fleet joined the squadron in the Narrows. Nothing had 
happened to solve
the problem of how Parma's invasion army would pass the sand-banks guarded 
by light
Dutch ships. The alternative, that the Armada might land its own army, could 
not be
executed in the presence of an undefeated English fleet which effectively 
might interfere with
such a landing or defeat the Spanish ships if the soldiers were landed. Both 
lack of light
forces and inferiority in gunpower had doomed the enterprise to failure. No 
explanation for
this failure other than Philip II's wishful thinking has ever been found - 
no Spanish admiral
or general had assured him that the plan was feasible.
Failure did not in itself mean catastrophe. That phase began on the night of 
29 July/8
August when the English made a fireship attack on the Armada. The Spanish 
ships cut their
cables and escaped (except one galleass which ran aground), but in that 
process many ships
sailed far to leeward and the fleet lost its earlier cohesion. Medina 
Sidonia was able to form
a defensive line with several of the best ships but, with many of the 
troop-carrying Spanish
ships in a leeward position, the English felt free to close for a fight with 
guns at decisive
ranges. English gunnery proved superior. During the battle off Gravelines 
one Spanish
merchantman sank, two galleons ran ashore and were lost and other Spanish 
ships suffered
considerable damage.
The Spanish fleet was now in a critical situation. Ammunition and supplies 
were
running out, ships were damaged and there was no friendly deep-water harbour 
in the
North Sea or the Channel. To sail back through the Channel meant fighting 
both the
English and the prevailing westerly winds, and the Spanish fleet had to make 
the long
return journey to Spain northward around Scotland and Ireland. Many ships 
were damaged
and 28 ships sank at sea or were wrecked on the coasts, often when trying to 
take on fresh
water. The large Mediterranean merchantmen were particularly unsuited to 
Atlantic weather
and suffered badly, eight of ten being lost.33 The losses of men were very 
high, although,
in that respect, the English also suffered large losses in the months after 
the battle.
Epidemic disease and bad logistics caused the death of thousands of seamen 
in a fleet
where the losses in action were minimal."

 stati organizzati in Asia e Africa?
Forse la visione da adottare è un'altra: per motivi che non è
necessario riprendere a partire dal basso medioevo l'Europa conobbe
una crescita che non si sarebbe mai più arrestata e questa crescita fu
accompagnata da un notevole dinamismo. Il resto del mondo invece fu
molto meno dinamico e la sua crescita conobbe battute d'arresto.
Ragion per cui probabilmente non è vero che l'Europa dominò il mondo
dal 1400 alla I guerra mondiale, in quanto un vero dominio si ebbe
solo a partire dal XIX secolo. Tuttavia nel periodo precedente gli
europei furono più dinamici dei loro avversari extraeuropei,
conquistarono facilmente le americhe in quanto abitate da popolazioni
sostanzialmente primitive e furono in grado di eliminare la
concorrenza dei potentati asiatici e musulmani nei mari d'oriente (o
quantomeno riuscirono a guadagnare una loro fetta a scapito degli
altri senza che questi altri potessero impedirlo). Non erano in grado
di conquistare la Cina o l'Indonesia e nemmeno il Marocco però misero
piede in quei territori senza che gli autoctoni riuscissero a
ricacciarli mentre nessun asiatico fu mai visto dalle parti di Lisbona
o Amsterdam. Gli unici extraeuropei che riuscirono ad avere
l'iniziativa contro gli europei tanto da attaccarli in casa loro
furono gli ottomani per circa un paio di secoli. Possiamo stare a
discutere dei motivi per cui i cinesi non si comportarono, pur
inizialmente potendo, come portoghesi o olandesi, tuttavia non lo
fecero e la tecnologia europea progrediva decennio dopo decennio
mentre quella extraeuropea no

 mentre quella extraeuropea no
Anche questo è un assunto: lo sviluppo tecnologico delle armi da fuoco dal 
1500 al 1800 fu inferiore a quello a cui assistiamo nei primi '50 del XIX 
secolo, e prontamente copiato in paesi extra-europei spesso migliorando il 
modello. Malacca quando venne presa dai portoghesi era pesantemente protetta 
da cannoni prodotti da fonditori locali che Albuquerque considerava ottimi 
come quelli tedeschi, così la città non venne presa dopo un attacco delle 
navi ma con un attacco con spade, picca e archibugi della fanteria 
portoghese sbarcata dalle navi. Basta comunque citare le considerazioni 
tecniche britanniche sulla fortezza di Gheira dopo che fu presa, per vedere 
che altri fattori importanti entravano in gioco rispetto al solo disavanzo 
tecnologico:
"The walls are very thick, and built with excellent cement, and the
best stone I ever saw for such a purpose. We found upwards of two
hundred guns here of different sizes, twenty three of which are brass,
and six of them new field pieces with elevating screws, so that Angria
was not without European friends, notwithstanding he was so
common an enemy. There were also six brass mortars . . . and a sufficient
quantity of ammunition of all kinds . . . had the garrison been
provided with men of spirit and knowledge it must have been a
much dearer purchase to us." 

 seventeenth-century sailing warships. 
Questo è indubbiamente vero, e ne abbiamo discusso in precedenza.


piuttosto che affondare ?
Qui si spiega meglio:
"
Guns could only be used effectively if the gun-carrying ship was able to 
bring them to
bear on the enemy. Against enemy ships built to resist gunfire only repeated 
hits would have
any serious effect. This posed a problem in combining effective and decisive 
firepower with
offensive tactical movement, a problem never fully solved with sailing 
warships. During the
sixteenth century sailing tactics emphasised the importance of forward fire, 
so as many guns
as possible were mounted in a forward firing position. The foremost 
broadside guns might
also be canted in order to fire as close as possible to the axial direction 
of the ship. This
combined fire power with offensive movement. Similarly, guns in the stern 
were important
during retreats, but in both cases the amount of fire power was limited.
Broadside guns - which were probably few in number originally - may 
primarily have
been regarded as an anti-boarding device. For a fleet which acted 
defensively broadside
gunfire provided a new first zone of defence which had been largely absent 
in the age of
infantry warships. To use the same guns for tactically offensive purposes - 
continuous fire
in order to defeat an enemy - was more difficult. Our knowledge about how 
contemporary
naval commanders thought about this question, before the general 
introduction of the battleline
after 1650 is deficient. The general impression is that for a long time they 
were thinking
more in terms of the moral and material effect of hits from a limited number 
of well-aimed
guns than of the effect of rapid broadside fire from well-drilled gun crews. 
This philosophy
was realistic in duels between lightly built galleys and against merchantmen 
with hulls easily
shattered by heavy guns. However, against purpose-built warships only a 
massive amount
of gunfire would have decisive effect.
The heterogeneous and improvised character of major fleets was a problem 
typical of
this period. It was largely eliminated in the decades after 1650 when major 
investments in
battle fleets, the formation of permanent officer corps and the introduction 
of detailed
fighting instructions provided naval tactics with a new framework. In the 
earlier period naval
commanders had to do what was possible with combinations of specialised 
warships of
greatly differing sizes, and temporarily employed armed merchantmen with 
different fighting
qualities. The ships were commanded by an equally heterogeneous collection 
of more or less
professional officers (often with an army rather than navy background), 
aristocrats with or
without military or naval training, and civilian shipmasters with or without 
fighting experience.
During the sixteenth century armed merchantmen were often armed only with 
light guns and
were added to fleets primarily as carriers of infantry for boarding. As such 
they might assist
purpose-built warships with additional soldiers when the fleet became 
engaged with the
enemy.
During the seventeenth century merchantmen serving in navies were built to 
carry a
substantial gun armament, but they were inferior in fighting qualities to 
purpose-built warships
of the same size. With ships and commanders of very different backgrounds 
and with little
experience of co-operation, advanced tactical performance was not to be 
expected. Established
doctrines of tactical behaviour were at best rudimentary.
With heterogeneous fleets and without a fighting doctrine which emphasised 
the decisive
effect of continuous broadside fire, fighting instructions of this period 
seldom attempt to
impose formations which the fleet could maintain once battle was joined. The 
signals systems
in use were too primitive to enable commanders of large fleets to exercise 
any effective
command when the fleets were actively engaged. Offensively minded commanders 
who
attempted to fight decisive battles with sailing warships saw no alternative 
to close combat
and melée tactics, where individual ships or small groups of ships would 
attack individual
enemy ships and do their best to defeat them with guns, musketry, boarding 
or fireships.
Fighting instructions are often emphatic in their demand for support of 
ships heavily
engaged with the enemy and they are often careful to divide the fleet into 
squadrons and
groups of ships and to appoint senior officers in command of each 
sub-division of the fleet.
Unlike later periods when this practice was intended as a command structure 
for the battleline,
the subdivision of fleets in this period seems to have been made mainly for 
reasons of
morale. The senior officer of a group normally had a large ship, while other 
captains in the
group had ships of inferior strength. The large ships were supposed to 
provide a kind of
vanguard and break into the enemy formation, and the smaller ships in their 
group would
support them to the best of their ability. Cohesion within groups of ships 
and loyalty to a
group commander might compensate for the lack of professional training and 
the difficulties
of controlling a major fleet from a flagship.
The choice between gunnery tactics or boarding might be made at a fleet 
level, as well as
by individual commanders of ships. It was natural that a fleet which had a 
comparative
advantage in infantry should try to board or fight at musket range while a 
fleet with a similar
advantage in guns tried to fight a stand-off battle. Fleets with 
approximately the same
fighting capability might leave it to the individual ship and squadron 
commanders, and the
tactical circumstances, to determine how best to defeat the opposing enemy 
ships. The
heterogeneous composition of the fleets made it impossible to give permanent 
and centralised
instructions about which tactic every ship should use. However, there was 
not a free choice
between the two systems of fighting. Gradually it became clear that a 
gun-armed warship
was difficult to close and board by a ship of equal size and sailing 
qualities, especially from
a leeward position. Attempts to board might normally be fought off with 
guns, as long as the
ship remained manoeuvrable. Boarding might be attempted against damaged 
ships or against
a numerically inferior enemy, although it was normally not to be expected 
that a much
inferior enemy would join battle if it could be avoided. Especially from the 
1630s, specially
prepared fireships manned by well-trained crews provided another method of 
attacking
gunarmed ships with small vessels.26
Naval commanders, however, were frequently careful in preparing formations 
which
their fleet should keep when battle was joined. Like other questions 
connected with the
naval tactics of this period these formations are imperfectly known. Still, 
a few main types
of fleet formation may be discerned:
1 Line abreast formation inspired by army tactics and galley warfare. These 
formations
were intended for boarding tactics after initial gunfire. The only 
formations of this type
which are known with certainty are those of the English fleet in 1545 and 
the Spanish
Armada of 1588.27
2 Groups of three ships (one large and two smaller) which might be formed 
into a
wedge-formed column or a line of three-ship groups when the fleet attacked 
from windward
or into one or two lines ahead when the fleet sailed close-hauled and 
awaited an enemy
attack. The Danish and the Swedish navies developed such formations during 
the Nordic
War of 1563-70.28
3 A group tactic where ships sailed in a line ahead formation and fired in 
succession at
the enemy with bow guns and the broadside. After having fired, each ship 
tacked and
reloaded her guns at a distance from the enemy, while the other ships in the 
group fired their
guns, one ship at a time. This was the usual English formation against 
Spanish fleets and it
assumed a passive and defensive enemy from which it was easy to gain the 
wind. Against
ships of equal sailing quality it would hardly work.29
4 Line ahead formation. Essentially a defensive formation in this period, 
used for
example by the Dutch against the Spanish fleet in the battle in the Channel 
in 1639.30 Its use
by the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in the early sixteenth century is 
disputed.31
The fact that none of these formations had achieved a predominant position 
by 1650
suggests that they were far from ideal, especially for offensive action 
against serious resistance.
Indeed, the first half of the seventeenth century seems to be especially 
barren in tactical
innovations. Warship technology had by now developed to about the constant 
level it would
retain until the end of the seventeenth century: warships were fairly 
manoeuvrable; they had
an increasing number of broadside guns; and enough staying power to fight 
prolonged
gunnery actions against ships of equal size. Up to 1650, naval commanders 
seem to have
been little interested in the problems and opportunities which this 
increasingly sophisticated
weapon system posed during major fleet engagements. Instead, they may have 
been
increasingly interested in finding determined and loyal captains who could 
train efficient
crews of good sailors and gunners. This was the most important requirement 
for normal
naval duties in this period of long wars over the sea lines of 
communication: patrolling,
escorting, blockading and attacks against enemy shipping. Major fleet 
contests were rare and
if individual ships were manned by good teams of officers and men they would 
probably
have the advantage in a melée type of battle. Naval commanders were 
responsible for
decisions about when and where battles should be fought, and their tactical 
skill might be
tested in preliminary manoeuvres to gain the wind from the enemy, but when 
the battle was
joined the individual skills of the captains and their crews would be 
decisive.
It would require a period of intense and repeated fleet engagements, and a 
dose of tactical
inspiration from the new type of warfare on land, to achieve a new tactical 
paradigm in the
European navies. This occurred during the period 1650-80, with the three 
Anglo-Dutch
wars as especially important trend-setters for naval reorganisation. 
Somewhat belatedly,
guns were acknowledged as the main and decisive weapon at sea, and tactics 
were determined
by the overriding importance of achieving massive and decisive effect on the 
enemy through
continuous broadsides fired by well-drilled gun crews from battleships 
formed in line ahead.32
"