Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: lo scud è un giocattolo da bambini ormai.. (lungo ed in inglese).

gli attuali sistemi antimissile a corto raggio americani (patriot pac-3
ecc..) erano già obsoleti 10 anni fà. Nella gara tra missili balistici e
mezzi per intercettarli il vantaggio tecnologico è nelle mani dei primi ed è
probabile che lo resti fino all'introduzione di armi ad energia diretta
(forse neppure allora)
Attenzione sono incluse le didascalie delle foto presenti nell'articolo (non
fate confusione)
On the morning of April 22, 1996, the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev was
fatally wounded. He was having a long talk on his mobile telephone, the
story goes, when suddenly a missile struck almost his exact location. The
bane of Russian forces fighting the Chechen separatists subsequently died of
his wounds. According to unconfirmed sources, Dudayev's mobile-phone
conversation was monitored by a Russian signals-intelligence (SIGINT) unit,
which immediately passed the target's grid coordinates to a missile brigade
tens of kilometers away, equipped with the Tochka battlefield rocket. It
took about 10 minutes from the time Dudayev was located to the impact of the
missile.
A Russian Tochka missile launcher, which is a fairly self- contained system,
is capable of loosing its missile on five minutes' warning. This
responsiveness, combined with long range and high accuracy, is indicative of
a new dimension in the air-land battle. The Scuds that grab all of the
attention (and the cover of this magazine!) are ill suited for use as
battlefield weapons. They are almost child's toys compared with the high
technology behind Russia's precision-strike missiles.
A New Trajectory
The mobile launchers for the Tochka/Oka families were intrinsic to the
accuracy of the missile system. Since navigation systems based on
calculating wheel rotation were prone to errors introduced through spinning
tires, the launchers were fitted with a version of an aircraft Doppler
navigation system. The unit even worked when the launcher was traveling on a
rail car. Pictured here is a Czech Army 9P71 Oka launcher. Photo by Andrzej
Kinski
The late 1960s brought a lot of changes to the Soviet vision of the
battlefield. First of all, planners started analyzing the impact of the
West's "Flexible Response" doctrine that de-emphasized nuclear weapons as
part of its global strategy. Recent conflicts were also thoroughly analyzed.
The Soviets recognized opportunities under the new strategic picture, as
well as new challenges. In early 1968, major steps were taken to reshape the
armed forces and their operational doctrine. Among the changes was the
partial break with the mass "missile domination" concept espoused by
Krushchev. The armed forces would be better balanced, though missiles were
to continue playing a vital, if not dominant, role.
The foremost assumption under the new strategic picture was that the first
stage of a European war would be conducted with conventional weapons.
Previous concepts that were strongly dependent on nuclear strikes were to be
reviewed to deal with the new demands. The obvious solution was to switch
from area to precision strikes. The significant year of 1968 initiated
development of many types of tactical guided strike weapons, and the origins
of many systems can be traced back to that year.
Technological progress supported many of these efforts. Weapons whose
requirements were defined in 1968 entered critical design phases in the
1970s, and solid-state technology offered many useful solutions for missile
components. Of equal importance were the digital computing techniques that
were first employed at this time, which provided a big jump in
inertial-navigation-system (INS) accuracy. Such promised improvements in
performance and accuracy went hand-in-hand with the new role of the missile
forces in the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) that was agreed to in
1971 (see "Crimson SEAD,"JED , October 2001). This was to be accomplished by
engaging air-defense command posts, airbases, and fixed SAM sites with the
use of passive radar-homing seekers.
In early 1968, the Soviet Council of Ministers approved a new type of
missile for the missile battalions of Army divisions to replace the Luna-M
(Frog-7), which had been accepted into service just one year earlier. The
requirements were for a battlefield missile with a 70-kilometer range and
250-meter circular-error-probable (CEP) accuracy, with nuclear,
high-explosive (HE), and cluster-type warheads. The missile was to be simple
to use and highly mobile. The decision was made to use a solid-fuel rocket
motor, to reduce maintenance and shorten the launch-preparation time. The
new system was designated 9K79 (SS-21 Scarab), with the missile designated
9M79.
The new system was developed by the KBM Kolomna design bureau, which was
known for its antitank guided-missile systems and light man-portable
air-defense systems but which had little prior experience in the field of
ballistic missiles. But the existing centers of ballistic-missile
development were all committed to the strategic rocket forces and the space
program. This proved to be a very fortunate decision, since the new approach
undertaken by KBM produced an amazing system.
Launches of the 9M79 missile started in 1971 at the Kapustin Yar test range.
It was soon discovered that the missile had even better accuracy than
expected: the CEP did not exceed 100-150 m. This accuracy was achieved with
an INS only, by virtue of an analog-digital computer developed by CNIIAG
(the Central Scientific Institute for Automation and Hydraulics) that
assessed the gyro drift and calculated position by computing the
acceleration in all three dimensions. In full-scale production models, which
began rolling off the line in 1976, the computer was upgraded to fully
solid-state digital model that was hardened against electromagnetic pulses
(EMPs). The missile earned the name "Tochka," which could be translated as
"point," emphasizing the missile's impressive accuracy.
The Tochka's 2P129 launcher was based on a BAZ-5921 6x6 cross-country
vehicle that was fully amphibious. But above all, the launcher had a digital
INS on a stabilized and amortized platform, which maintained the current
position of the vehicle at all times. Since navigation systems based on
calculating wheel rotation were prone to errors introduced through spinning
tires (when traversing mud and rough terrain, for example), the launcher was
fitted with a version of an aircraft Doppler navigation system. The unit
even worked when the launcher was traveling on a rail car.
Thanks to this system, the 9P129 launcher did not demand any associated
targeting or command-and-control equipment. The vehicle could travel at full
speed and launch a missile five minutes after stopping. Two minutes were
needed to lower the support struts and input data into the launcher's
computer, while the system automatically performed the missile self-test
sequence. Then, upon pushing the launch button, an automatic process cycled
through the launch sequence. Unless the operator pushed the abort button,
the system automatically opened the covers and loaded the launch data into
the missile. Warming up the missile's systems and gyros took another two and
a half to three minutes. Fifteen seconds before launch, the missile was
elevated from its bay to the launch angle of about 80 degrees. A few seconds
before launch, a lamp flashed on the operator's console, and there was a
warning siren. After launch and a short ventilation of the missile bay, the
supporting struts were retracted, and the covers over the missile bay
closed, all hands-off. Then a "ready for travel" lamp flashed, and the
vehicle driver could rush away from the "hot" launch position.
The 9T218 missile re-loader carried two missiles and was equipped with its
own hydraulic crane. It was based on the same 6x6 vehicle (in a slightly
different BAZ 5922 version) that was also amphibious. A Tochka battery
consisted of two 9P129 launchers, a single 9T218 re-loader, a radio-equipped
jeep (UAZ-497) for the battery's commander, and a supply truck. It was a
mobile and flexible unit.
In 1996, Russian forces reportedly used a Tochka (SS-21) missile to kill
Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, targeting him specifically using
coordinates provided by a SIGINT unit that monitored his mobile phone. The
accuracy and responsiveness of modern Russian battlefield rockets is opening
up new dimensions for deep strike by land forces. Pictured here is a 9K79-1
Tochka-U of the Belarusian Army. Photo by Miroslav Gyurosi
The tactics for employing a Tochka battery in the field were similar to
those of other missile units. Three vehicles could leave a hidden position
(for example, an industrial area of a city, barns in a rural area, or the
cover of a forest) as it became dark, move across a river to a launch
position, launch two missiles, change position, reload, and launch another
two missiles. Then the battery had to come back to its day shelter. The
battalion was responsible for delivering spare missiles on trailers, which
was done also overnight.
The 9M79 missile is not a typical ballistic missile. The missile engine's
long burn time allowed it to fly out on a much flatter trajectory. For
example, the Scud missile, which is fully ballistic, reaches an altitude of
185 km when launched at a target 300 km away, a height that is 61% of the
range. The 9M79 missile's top altitude is only 26 km when launched at a
target 70 km away, a height that is 37% of the range. The missile does not
fly directly to the target but makes some directional changes. Although this
cannot be called "maneuvering," the flight path certainly complicates the
problem of shooting one down. Payloads for the 9M79 include the AA-60
nuclear warhead with a selectable yield of 5-50 kT (another novelty), a
conventional 482-kg fragmentation, HE warhead, and a cluster-type warhead
with antitank and fragmentation bomblets.
Starting in the late 1970s and through the mid-1980s, the Tochka replaced
Luna-M launchers in missile battalions. Usually, such a battalion had two
batteries for a total four launchers and 16 missiles. According to
unconfirmed sources, Soviet guards divisions (the elite of the Soviet ground
forces) had three launch batteries in a battalion, for a total six launchers
and 24 missiles.
New Roles, New Guidance
In addition to pioneering new missile dynamics and launch tactics, the
Tochka family also saw the development of seekers for its payloads to
increase the effectiveness and precision of strikes. The 9K71 Tochka-R was
first to be developed. It was actually not a separate system but a 9M79R
missile with a fragmentation, HE warhead and passive radar seeker,
designated SER by the Russians, with a CEP of 45 meters. Such missiles could
be fired from modified launchers. It was introduced to service in 1983.
Introduction of the 9M79R enabled the system to take part in overall SEAD
efforts. Priority targets for the Tochka-Rs were Patriot missile sites,
since these were deemed too difficult to engage by SEAD aircraft. It was
expected that a salvo of two Tochka-R missiles would be launched at a given
target, to enhance the kill probability. Later the seeker was modified to
remember the target's coordinates in the event the radar shut down.
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the US and the Soviet
Union in 1987 resulted in the destruction of all 9K714 Oka (see below) and
the obsolescent 9K76 Temp-S systems (which were considered less than
satisfactory anyway). However, the Soviets were faced with the prospect of
leaving front (a "military district" in peacetime) missile brigades without
equipment. Re-issuing obsolete 9K72 Scuds was certainly not the best
solution, but there was no other immediate choice. To make matters worse,
many of these Scuds had to be taken from army (field) brigades, which had
worn out their equipment during the Afghan war. Some sources indicate that
some missile brigades (12 launchers) fired about 2,000 missiles during the
war, when the paper lifespan of a given launcher was 15-25 launches. Taking
the 9K72 from armies' brigades, in turn, left these commanders without
intermediate-range missile units.
Fully amphibious, the Tochka's launch vehicle can fire a missile five
minutes after stopping. A few moments afterward, the vehicle driver can rush
away from the "hot" launch position. Launchers typically operate in
batteries of two, with a re-loader vehicle carrying two more missiles.
Photos by Michal Fiszer
Initially, the only solution was a further development of the Tochka system
with the goal of increasing its range as much as possible without increasing
the missile's weight and size. It seemed to be an unachievable task, but the
problem was soon resolved with the introduction of a new, more effective
solid-state propellant. This, combined with a new autopilot and software,
enabled the missile, designated 9K79-1 Tochka-U, to achieve a range of 120
km with the desired levels of accuracy. The new autopilot worked on a
principle derived from aircraft digital fly-by-wire technology. This enabled
the missile to be controlled by quick, subtle deflections in the control
surfaces, which reduced drag during flight and increased missile
maneuverability in the terminal phase, where 20-g hard turns at random
intervals could be introduced to increase missile survivability in a dense
air-defense environment. The INS system was further improved and a 50-100
meter CEP accuracy was achieved. Live-fire demonstrations of five Tochka-U
missiles at IDEX '93 in the United Arab Emirates resulted in accuracies
ranging from a few meters to less then 50 meters. Another interesting
feature was the incorporation of a laser rangefinder to more effectively
spread the effects of the blast-fragmentation, HE warhead.
Certain changes were also incorporated to the launcher (now called 9P129-1)
and reload vehicle (now called 9T218M-1). These were mainly software changes
to deal with the new missile (called 9M79-1). Launchers and reload vehicles
were simply modified from existing Tochka vehicles.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, all of the Russian divisional missile
battalions were removed and merged to form new missile brigades on the
numbered army level. This move retained the shrinking 9K72 assets on the
frontal level. The frontal firepower was additionally enhanced by the
introduction of the 9K58 Smerch multiple-launch rocket system; however,
numbers of this system are limited, and its use would be restricted to
reinforcing select divisions during the critical phase of an operation. The
requirement for long-range engagement at the army level is still
unfulfilled. The Tochka-U was used in the recent Chechnya war, and the
missile brigade of the 58th Army conducted several combat launches. The
targets were usually provided by satellite reconnaissance.
In the late 1980s, Tochka systems were exported to several countries. A
single Tochka battalion was delivered to Poland in 1987. A similar battalion
was established in Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria and the German Democratic
Republic (East Germany) also received 9K79 systems. The latter received
eight launchers and formed two battalions. After the division of
Czechoslovakia, the Tochka battalion became Slovakian. East Germany returned
its 9K79 systems to Russia as a condition for German reunification. Outside
the Warsaw Pact, Tochka missiles were exported to Syria and Yemen.
Presently, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan also have the system in their
inventories, the first two possessing the Tochka-U.
Strategic Partner
The Oka (SS-23 Spider) intermediate-range missile is a cousin to the
shorter-range Tochka. Both missiles were developed by the same KBM Kolomna
design bureau, which was known for its antitank guided-missile systems and
light man-portable air-defense systems. The lack of prior experience in
ballistic-missile technology, perhaps, explains why KBM "threw away the
book" when designing the Tochka/Oka family, creating tactical missiles with
new dynamics and unprecedented accuracy. The Oka missiles in Soviet
inventory were eliminated under the terms of the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. Photo by Miroslav Gyurosi
About the same time that KBM Kolomna undertook the development of the
Tochka, the design bureau was tasked with developing a longer-range missile,
designated 9K714 Oka (SS-23 Spider), that would fall into the
intermediate-range ballistic-missile (IRBM) category. This was decided so
that some commonality of research and technology could be applied to both
battlefield and IRBM systems. The team was to develop a simpler,
shorter-range missile, and after proving the concept and gaining experience,
it would build a 400-km range version. Because of this, the real development
of the 9K714 Oka started in about 1971. The first tests were conducted in
1976, and the system was officially accepted into service in 1980.
The main features of the missile and launcher were similar to the Tochka.
Like the Tochka's 9M79, the Oka's 9M714 missile was also a single-stage
vehicle, but with a revised shape of the front to accommodate a
reentry-vehicle warhead. The missile did not fly a ballistic trajectory, but
a much flatter one (peak altitude of 120 km at 400 km range) with a few
sharp direction changes. The Oka missile carried an onboard
electronic-countermeasures (ECM) system, consisting of a 30-kg jammer
developed by CNIIRTI and adjusted for Patriot, and probably included a few
decoys to simulate reentry vehicles. Three types of the warheads could be
used. The AA-75 nuclear payload had a selectable yield of between 10-50 kT.
The relatively low yield for this class of weapon was chosen because of the
system's high accuracy. When armed with the 9N74K conventional
cluster-munitions warhead, the missile was called 9M714K. One interesting
feature was that the warhead was not installed at the factory but could be
connected to the missile in the field, even 15 minutes before launch. The
nuclear 9N63 weighed 455 kg, and the missile had a 400-km range. The 9N74K
cluster warhead weighed 715 kg, and the missile's range was reduced to 300
km.
It was clear that an INS-only guidance system, even one as advanced as the
Tochka's, would not be enough to ensure the required accuracy. Therefore,
missile guidance was to be supported by a low-power ground-mapping radar
that would be switched on during the terminal phase of the attack. The radar
picture was matched with a digital picture of the target stored in the
missile's computer. When the proper course to the target was calculated, the
radar was switched off in order to increase the missile's survivability. The
concept had been proven during trials, and a CEP of about 50 meters had been
achieved. Another mode for the guidance radar was being developed that would
enable the missile to track and engage a moving target. However, the radar
guidance system for the Oka was not introduced into service, and the missile
relied solely on its INS. Radar guidance was to be introduced for the
improved Oka-U version, which was under development at the time of the
signing of the INF Treaty.
Another interesting feature was that updated target information could be
sent by radio to the missile while it was in flight. During the Oka's
development, it was expected that a radar-reconnaissance aircraft similar to
the US J-STARS would be available in the near future that would search for
targets for the missile, artillery, and air forces. The aircraft was to
carry members of the frontal missile and artillery staff, which was
responsible for targeting and fire-support planning in the front's area. The
airborne control aircraft would have a direct radio link with missile units
and, in the case of the Oka, could even update target information after
missile launch. These ambitious plans came to naught upon the collapse of
the Soviet Union, but the Oka was equipped from the outset with this radio
receiver.
An optical targeting system developed for the 9K72 (Scud) missile was also
tested on both the Tochka and the Oka. It passed all trials successfully and
even saw test service with an operational unit, but it was not introduced to
service because the existing guidance systems fully met all requirements.
An Oka brigade consisted of 12 launchers and 36 missiles. It was organized
into three battalions of two batteries, each with two launchers and a reload
vehicle. The 9P71 Oka launcher was based on a BAZ-6950 Osnova 4x4
cross-country, amphibious vehicle. As with the Tochka system, the 9P71 was
equipped with inertial and Doppler navigation systems, ensuring a
rapid-launch capability upon arrival at the desired launch location.
Before signing the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union produced 130 Oka launchers
and about 500 missiles, of which 24 launchers and about 100 missiles were
for export. All of the launchers and missiles in Soviet service were
decommissioned and mostly destroyed, except for a few retained for museums.
Of the exported systems, all but eight launchers and 36 missiles were
delivered to Warsaw Pact nations and these have been decommissioned as
well - most recently by Bulgaria in 2002. It is uncertain which country
received the balance of the Osa systems, but in all likelihood it was Syria.
The INF Treaty also interrupted work on the improved Oka-U system, at the
stage when a prototype was ready for tests. It was to have had a combined
radar/electro-optical seeker for terminal homing and much improved onboard
ECM.
Death and Rebirth
The reentry vehicle for the Oka's 9M714K missile, which dispensed
conventional cluster munitions over a target, is shown here. The cluster
9N74K warhead weighed 715 kg and the missile's range with that payload was
300 km. The Oka missile carried an onboard jammer adjusted for Patriot and
probably included a few decoys to simulate reentry vehicles. Photo by
Miroslav Gyurosi
Prior to the INF Treaty, the 1980s had brought nuclear weapons back into the
forefront of Soviet military thinking. It was simply decided that the Soviet
Union would not follow the rules of the Flexible Response game, and in the
case of general war, nuclear weapons would be used independently, whether
enemy had used them first or not. The new concept said: "We have to be ready
for every kind of war on equal basis." At the same time, the development of
the extremely successful Tochka/Oka missile family enabled the Soviets to
broaden the tasks assigned to the missile forces. SEAD became one of the
most important among them, while attacks on enemy airbases were to enhance
the overall efforts in the fight for air superiority.
At this time, the Soviets became fascinated with so-called
"reconnaissance-strike" systems. They were afraid of the impact of US
"Assault Breaker" systems, which would pepper the battlefield with
rocket-deployed "smart" antitank submunitions, and the Soviets sought to
develop similar systems for themselves. "Assault Breaker mania" spread among
the Warsaw Pact air forces, and there was not a single exercise in which
these systems weren't priority targets for simulated attacks.
On the attack, new precision-engagement systems like the Tochka and Oka,
supplemented with new automated command-and-control systems, solved the
Soviets' delivery problem. But the blind spot was the lack of a proper
reconnaissance aircraft similar to J-STARS. A first attempt to create such
an aircraft used the M-55 high-altitude research aircraft equipped with a
side-looking airborne radar (SLAR). In the meantime, Su-24MRs were to be
used for gathering targeting data, and efforts were made to connect them
with missile-battalion command posts directly to enable fast data transfer.
Although the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 had a big impact on Russian
military forces, these had started to recover by the end of the decade.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's iron hand assured that the recovery
process was organized and well coordinated. "Fewer but better" is the basis
of the new concept. Long-term modernization plans for Russia's armed forces
are well tailored to available finances, and budgets are getting higher and
higher as the Russian economy rapidly improves. Finally, the notion of
information warfare has been recognized, and the need to achieve information
superiority has been set high on the list of priorities.
The need for a long-range, precision-strike system led to the development
and fielding of the Tender, better known under its export name: Iskander-E
(SS-26). The system's performance has been tailored to the INF Treaty rules,
which restrict own systems to 400 km and export systems to 300 km. The
Tender has a range of over 300 km, while the Iskander-E has a 280-km range.
The requirements for the Tender/Iskander-E were set in the early 1990s as
follows:
Use of non-nuclear warheads only
High accuracy
Control throughout the entire flight path
Broad range of effective warheads
Availability of battle-management automation and information-support systems
Possible integration of global-satellite-navigation system data, such as the
Russian GLONASS or US NAVSTAR GPS
Ability to engage hardened targets
Increase in the number of targets engaged at one time
Ability to penetrate air and missile defenses
Capability to engage moving targets
The development of the missile had been undertaken by KBM Kolomna. Some
sources indicated that the work was actually a secret continuation of the
Oka-U project, but tailored to the INF Treaty requirements. In any event,
the Tender can be seen as a continuation of the Tochka/Oka legacy. To
increase kill probability, at least two different warheads were developed.
One is a cluster dispenser with 54 smart bomblets, which had homing
seekers - imaging infrared and radar - to engage individual targets. The
other type of warhead is a penetrator for engaging hardened targets. Other
warhead types are under development.
The Iskander-E (SS-26) is the export version of the Tender medium-range
missile. The Tender/Iskander series is a continuation of the Oka concept
that conforms to the provisions of the INF Treaty in both its Russian and
export versions and carries a variety of non-nuclear warheads. The weapon
employs a number of sophisticated guidance and ECM features to ensure high
accuracy and survivability in a dense air-defense environment. In many ways,
the Tender/Iskander is the epitome of the modern tactical artillery rocket.
Rosoboronexport photo
One interesting feature of the Tender missile is a further development of
the non-ballistic trajectory. The missile climbs to an altitude of about 50
kilometers and then levels out. Keeping this altitude in the lower
ionosphere more or less constantly, it travels to the target area following
waypoints. In the terminal phase, the missile does not dive directly to the
target but makes sharp maneuvers of 20-30 g. During this phase, the
GPS-aided navigation system provides the final corrections, and the
imaging-infrared seeker developed by CNIIAG is used for target engagement,
working in a mode similar to the US' digital scene matching. The seeker is
able to engage either a fixed or a moving target. It probably transmits an
image of the target prior to impact via a satellite link. However, the
imaging-infrared seeker is not the only means used to enhance the Tender's
accuracy. Fazotron NIIR developed a light (10-kg) radar scene-matching
system, and a special computer will combine both infrared and radar images.
The dual seeker (together with embedded INS-GLONASS) provides very high
accuracy.
Very important are the countermeasures undertaken against anti-missile
defenses. First of all, the missile's reentry vehicle has some stealth
features, including its shape and use of radar-absorbent materials. The
latter seems to be novelty in such missiles and was certainly a difficult
task, since the material has to sustain high temperatures and air drag. The
Tender is also provided with an improved version of the ECM jammer developed
for the Oka.
The Iskander-E lacks the radar seeker, and the ECM suite is probably scaled
back a great deal. Certainly the radar-absorbent materials are not for
export. The optical seeker is not standard but an option. Some sources
indicate that the Russian version of the scaled-down Tender is called the
Iskander-M. Presently, Russian armed forces have one brigade of the system,
deployed in the Asian part of Russia. At the same time, it was officially
announced that the Iskander-E had passed the all trials successfully and is
ready for production, while the trials and updates of the full Tender system
are still ongoing. Most probably, the aforementioned Russian brigade has
been equipped with a hybrid of the Iskander-E's simpler missile avionics
with the Russian missile. The latter has a larger fuel chamber and a heavier
warhead (allowed under INF). In the Iskander-E, the missile size and weight
is the same, but some ballast is incorporated to stay within the 300-km
range and 500-kg warhead limits. The 700-kg Russian submunitions warhead
would carry 72 instead of 54 homing bomblets, and a penetrator is available.
The system has been declared as non-nuclear, but it is quite possible that
this declaration refers only to the export version, and that a nuclear
warhead for the Russian Tender will be developed in the future. Tender units
will have a specially designed automated command-and-control system.
Battalion headquarters will have a command vehicle called KShM
(Komandno-Shtabnaya Mashina, which translates as "command and staff
vehicle"), while the brigade will have a special PPI (Punkt Podgotovki
Informatsy - "point of information preparations") vehicle.

 fate confusione)
Per segnare il tuo punto, sarebbe stato sufficiente postare il link, non 
tutto l' articolo, che è estremamente lungo. Comunque se vuoi sapere 
come la penso io, qualunque difesa è meglio di nessuna difesa, e se il 
Patriot PAC-3 mi ferma solo i TBM, pazienza, meglio che niente. In ogni 
caso il sistema è combat-tested, nella recente GG3 ha distrutto diversi 
bersagli (compresi ahimè anche un paio di aerei della coalizione, ma 
questo è un altro discorso) missilistici, perciò io aspetterei a 
definirlo obsoleto.
Per quanto riguarda le armi ad energia diretta, il problema è uno di 
portabilità e di avere energia sufficiente, perciò secondo me lo vedremo 
prima su una CV (che ha i reattori nucleari) che in applicazioni 
terrestri. Comunque se non ricordo male ci sono già stati esperimenti di 
intercettazioni avvenute con successo di razzi campali e mi pare anche 
proiettili di artiglieria, quindi è solo questione di attendere che la 
tecnologia sia matura a sufficienza. Certo, non saranno una copertura 
assoluta, visto che quando piove la loro efficacia è molto ridotta, però 
sempre meglio averceli che no, ti pare?
Ciao,
Ander
First they ignore you, then they laugh at you,
then they fight you, then you win.
Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948)

 ti pare?
Anche avere una Ferrari per andare a fare la spesa è meglio che andarci a
piedi, ma il punto è ne vale la pena?

 piedi, ma il punto è ne vale la pena?
Se mentre vai a fare la spesa a piedi ti sparano addosso direi di sì :-)
Only two things are infinite,
the universe and human stupidity,
and I'm not sure about the former.
Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

 :-)
Si, ma le portelle di una ferrari non sono antiproiettile (anche se questa
battuta sembra non c'entrare col discorso intavolato ti assicuro che è
abbastanza legata :-))

 abbastanza legata :-))
Già, ma il punto è che la Ferrari va *più veloce* di un proiettile :-)
Ciao,
Ander
Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains,
no matter how improbable, must be the truth.
Sherlock Holmes (by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 1859-1930)

 prova dei fatti, che per la dottrina missilistica manca ancora.
Speriamo che arrivi presto.
Basta che consideri che tomahawk block 4 è in gradi di orbitare per un paio
d'ore sul campo di battaglia in attesa che un operatore avanzato gli procuri
un bersaglio via satellite... Missili balistici ad alta precisione armati
con penetratori sono equivalenti più o meno alle grosse bunker buster
lanciate dai b-2 (comunque più facili da abbattere di un missile balistico)
missili cruise intelligenti possono occuparsi anche di bersagli areali e di
una marea di altri tipi di bersagli adatti ad essere battuti da aerei da
interdizione. L'unico cosa che manca è il CAS ma naturalmente submunizioni
intelligenti come le skeet o le bat saranno in grado di mettere fuori un
battaglione corazzato nel giro di pochi minuti, mentre per truppe appiedate
basterebbero assai più economiche submunizioni antimateriali (i 900 kg di
queste bombette contenute in un atacms bastano a saturare un'area
equivalente ad un campo da calcio o due)

> Speriamo che arrivi presto.
Scherzi vero?
Ti rendi conto che hai appena detto che speri che scoppi un' altra guerra?
Ciao,
Ander
There are 10 types of people in the world:
those who understand binary and those who don't.

 guerra?
Più si combatte più la tecnologia bellica si affina più la ricerca va
avanti. Si può dire che gli USA siano il paese più avanzato del mondo (con
il Giappone) proprio perchè negli ultimi 50 anni hanno compiuto più azioni
militari. E poi diciamoci la verità la guerra è diventata una condizione
permanente di ogni luogo del mondo grazie al conflitto assimetrico, prova a
pensare al acquabomber e dimmi se tra emulazione e mediaticità dell'atto non
si può considerare un'aggressione di tipo militare (sabotaggioo mediatico) a
chi imbottiglia acqua minerale? Ti ricordo che sette, organizzazioni
terroristiche, fino ai singoli individui rappresentano un pericolo costante
dal quale gli attacchi partono senza alcun preavviso.


Non badarmi più di tanto è che ultimamente sono abbastanza proiettato verso
il futuro... Sto addirittura pensando a come implementare militarmente le
nanotecnologie....

 nanotecnologie....
Continuo a sostenere che dovresti scrivere un romanzo :-)
Ciao,
Ander
Do, or do not. There is no 'try'.
Yoda (The Empire Strikes Back)

 negli ultimi 50 anni hanno compiuto più azioni militari.
Ti contraddici in tre righe.
Quali azioni militari ha compiuto il Giappone da 50 anni in 
qua?
-- 
non ho fatto il militare, GAD

 militarmente le nanotecnologie....
no comment
-- 
Dottor Piergiorgio d' Errico-Storico militare e Navale
ICQ: 208180385
Niitakayama Nobore ichi ni rei ya

 no comment
e allora sta zitto no... :-D