Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: insomma la tua (vins) è propri o una debacle su tutti i fronti

Pyongyang can credibly threaten the prompt destruction of Seoul with
conventional arms alone. The North Korean military could also
establish a shallow foothold across the DMZ. However, the DPRK's
ability to sustain these offensive operations, or advance its forces
further to the south, is questionable. South Korean and American air
forces could quickly establish air supremacy and destroy North Korean
ground forces. The ensuing buildup of US forces in Korea could reverse
any remaining North Korean advances into the South, and unlease
offensive operations into the North. North Korea does not require
long-range missiles with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads to
devastate Seoul or to make a land grab across the DMZ. Such weapons
are needed to deter or defeat an American counteroffensive into North
Korea.
North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of
Seoul, double the levels of a the mid-1990s. Seoul is within range of
the 170mm Koksan gun and two hundred 240mm multiple-rocket launchers.
The proximity of these long-range systems to the Demilitarized Zone
threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks. Most of the rest of
North Korea's artillery pieces are old and have limited range. North
Korea fields an artillery force of over 12,000 self-propelled and
towed weapon systems. Without moving any artillery pieces, the North
could sustain up to 500,000 rounds an hour against Combined Forces
Command defenses for several hours.
North Korea's short-term blitzkrieg strategy envisions a successful
surprise attack in the early phase of the war to occupy some or all of
South Korea before the arrival of US reinforcements on the Korean
Peninsula. North Korean ground forces, totaling some 1 million
soldiers, are composed of some 170 divisions and brigades including
infantry, artillery, tank, mechanized and special operation forces. Of
the total, about 60 divisions and brigades are deployed south of the
Pyongyang-Wonsan line. North Korea has deployed more than half of its
key forces in forward bases near the border. Seventy percent of their
active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and
2,000 tanks, is garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone.
Much of this force is protected by underground facilities, including
over four thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone.
From their current locations these forces can attack with minimal
preparations. This means a surprise attack on South Korea is possible
at any time without a prior redeployment of its units.
The North Korean navy has also deployed 430 surface combatants and
about 60 percent of some 90 submarine combat vessels near the front
line in forward bases. With about 40 percent of its 790 fighter planes
deployed near the front line, the North Korean air force could launch
a surprise attack on any part of South Korea within a short period of
time.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea possesses larger forces than
Iraq, and they are already deployed along South Korea's border. A war
could explode after a warning of only a few hours or days, not weeks.
Unlike in the Persian Gulf, this attack would be prosecuted along a
narrow peninsula on mountainous terrain. It would probably be
accompanied by massed artillery fire, commando raids, and chemical
weapons. Initially, the primary battlefield would be only about 125
kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. The DPRK attack would be
conducted against well-prepared ROK forces in fortified positions and
against larger US forces than in the Persian Gulf. Most probably, the
DPRK attack would aim at seizing nearby Seoul by advancing down the
Kaesong-Munsan, Kumwa, and Chorwon corridors. If successful, North
Korean forces might also try to conquer the entire peninsula before
large US reinforcements arrive.
The South Barrier Fence is the Southern part of the DMZ. The South
Koreans have a series of Defensive lines that cross the entire
peninsula, but with the exception of the South Barrier Fence, they
aren't connected completely across the peninsula. They are designed to
withstand an attack and allow a minimum force to hold a line while
reinforcement/counter attack forces are assembled and sent to destroy
any penetrations.
The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of
allied defenses either before South Korea can fully mobilize its
national power or before significant reinforcement from the United
States can arrive and be deployed. The primary objective of North
Korea's military strategy is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under
North Korean control within 30 days of beginning hostilities. A
secondary objective is the defense of North Korea.
To accomplish these ambitious objectives, North Korea envisions
fighting a two-front war. The first front, consisting of conventional
forces, is tasked with breaking through defending forces along the
DMZ, destroying defending CFC forces, and advancing rapidly down the
entire peninsula. This operation will be coordinated closely with the
opening of a second front consisting of SOF units conducting raids and
disruptive attacks in CFC's rear.
The DPRK offensive against the ROK will consist of three phases. The
objective of the first phase will be to breach the defenses along the
DMZ and destroy the forward deployed forces. The objective of the
second phase will be to isolate Seoul and consolidate gains. The
objective of the third phase will be to pursue and destroy remaining
forces and occupy the remainder of the peninsula.
Approximately forty percent of the South Korean population resides
within 40 miles of Seoul. While the terrain north of Seoul is
dominated by rice paddies offering limited off-road mobility, the
terrain west of Seoul is a wide coastal plan with the main invasion
routes to Seoul. North Korean forces attacking Seoul through the
Chorwon or Munsan corridors would have to cross the Han or Imjin
rivers (while these rivers freeze in the winter, the ice is not strong
enough to support heavy armor). The narrow eastern coastal plain is
lightly settled and less heavily defended, though mountains make
movement of forces from the east coast difficult.
The US plans are based on the belief that the North Koreans would not
be successful in consolidating their gains around Seoul and could be
pushed back across the DMZ -- though the plans assume the North may
break through the DMZ in places. A critical issue is strategic warning
of unambiguous signs that North Korea is preparing an attack. The
warning time has reportedly been shortened from about ten days to
about three days as North Korea has covered its military activities.
The US-ROK defense plan would be shaped not only by the threat but
also by the mountainous terrain. Korea is commonly regarded as rugged
infantry terrain that invites neither mobile ground warfare nor heavy
air bombardment, but North Korea has assembled large armored forces
that are critical to exploiting breakthroughs, and these forces would
pass down narrow corridors that are potential killing zones for U.S.
airpower. A new Korean War would bear little resemblance to the
conflict of 1950­53.
During Phase 1, US-ROK forces would conduct a vigorous forward defense
aimed at protecting Seoul. Their campaign would be dominated by
combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and
armor. US air and naval forces would conduct close air support,
interdiction, and deep strike missions. After Phase 1, US-ROK
operations in Phase 2 would probably focus on seizing key terrain,
inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces, and rebuffing
further attacks. Phase 3, to start when the US ground buildup was
complete and ROK forces were replenished, would be a powerful
counteroffensive aimed at destroying the DPRK's military power. The
war plan envisions amphibious assaults into North Korea by US Army and
Marines at the narrow waist of North Korea. The entire resources of
the US Marine Corps would flow there to establish a beachead, with
substantial Army resources quickly conducting over-the-shore
operations

,
 
sm...@gmx.it
 (unit-731) wrote:
Uno è un articolo di giornale, e gli altri due?
Quando ho tempo li leggo e poi li commentiamo.
Vins
PS. di solito si fanno follow-up ao thread e non si postano thread ex 
novo, impara un po' di netiquette.

cavolo, hai aperto 4 thread diversi per la stessa cosa!!!! Ma ti pare
normale???
Frakkia
FIDDer #31

...

E' tutta roba che proviene da 
globalsecurity.org
. Per quanto riguarda
il follow up era mia intenzione rispettare la regola, ma la poca
pratica con questo forum mi ha impedito di farlo.

 pratica con questo forum mi ha impedito di farlo.
Forse perche' non e' un forum ma un newsgroup
--
Halman

 ha
scritto nel messaggio news:qhvpa.60124$iy5.1...@twister2.libero.it...

 ti pare normale un cosě selvaggio quoting?
Pomero

 normale???
e tu devi urlare per forza?
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