Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: filosofie missilistiche antinave 2 (articolo in inglese)

Panoramica delle capacità dei missili antinave sovietici a lunga gittata...
Scusate se non metto semplicemente il link, ma per leggere l'articolo
bisogna essere registrati al sito (comunque gratuitamente).
Le caratteristiche sono abbastanza impressionanti, anche dal punto di vista
elettronico (guida radar contromisure capacità di manovra) non c'è paragone
con i piccoli missili antinave occidentali.
Da 
www.jedonline.com
The Cold War required the Soviet Union to compete with the US on the high
seas. Never being a naval power, the Soviets had to find a way to bypass US
dominance in blue waters. The answer was the submarine and the guided
missile. As the aircraft-carrier battlegroup is a symbol of US naval power,
the missile-armed submarine became a symbol of Soviet naval power. Russia
continues in this line, hoping to restore some of its former glory.
After WWII, it was obvious that reaching naval parity with the US Navy was
too difficult a task for the Soviet Navy. But new weapons and technology
would provide adequate capabilities. Therefore, three parallel anti-ship
missile programs started in 1947: Kometa (AS-1), air launched; Shchuka, sea
launched; and Shtorm, shore launched. In February 1953, only the first of
these missiles was accepted to service, while the other programs were
terminated due to the lack of satisfactory results. Further analyses
revealed that treating the missile as a pilotless airframe was the wrong
approach to the problem. As a result, since early 1954, all missile programs
in the Soviet Union and then Russia have been led by the guidance-system
design facility, not by the missile-design facility.
In 1955 the Shchuka program was restored under the codename "KSShch" and led
by the guidance-system designer. The missile was actually fielded in
moderate numbers on Kildin- (56EM/M) and Krupny-class destroyers. It was a
complete failure, though. Designed as a long-range attack system with a
theoretical range of 185 km, the operational range was limited to only 30-35
km by its poor guidance system. The missile was radio-command guided to the
target, which was observed by the destroyer's radar. The KSShch-B version
with active-radar guidance and target designation by Ka-15RC helicopter was
never fielded, since the radar and targeting equipment were too heavy to be
carried by a light shipboard helicopter. The whole system was withdrawn in
the mid-1960s. All the later anti-carrier missiles were developed by OKB-52
(NPO Mashinostroyenia since 1983) in Reutovo near Moscow. The organization
was lead by the famous Valdimir N. Chelomey until his death in 1984 and then
by Gerberd A. Efremov. The OKB-52/NPO Mashinostroyenia also developed some
Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Get the Carrier: P-6/P-35 Progress (SS-N-3 Shaddock, Sepal)
The first priority of the Soviet Navy was to defend coastal areas to provide
security for land operations. The second task of the Red Fleet was to
disrupt US/NATO shipping across the Atlantic and in European waters. In the
early 1950s, it became clear that the aircraft-carrier battlegroup
represented the most significant threat to the Soviet Navy. Carrier
battlegroups could hamper any Soviet naval operations, defensive or
offensive.
To fight the carrier battlegroup, it was decided in August 1956 that a
long-range anti-ship cruise missile would be developed. The basis for it was
to be the P-5 Progress (4K95; SS-N-3A Shaddock) supersonic land-attack
cruise missile with a range of 500 km. The P-5 had inertial autonomous
guidance, and the modernized P-5D version had Doppler radar mid-course
correction. The missile, developed by OKB-52 (presently NPO
Mashinostroyenia) in Moscow, had a solid-propellant booster and an
air-breathing turbojet sustainer. The missile's wings unfolded after launch,
which reduced the size of the launch container.
From the outset, two versions of the missile were developed: the
surface-ship-based P-35 (SS-N-3B Sepal) and the submarine-based P-6 (SS-N-3C
Shaddock). For both, a guidance system was developed with INS/Doppler for
the mid-course phase and an active-radar seeker for the terminal phase. The
first (land) tests began in October 1959 for the P-6 and the following
December for the P-35. During the years 1963-68, eight surface ships were
equipped with P-35 missiles: four Kynda-class cruisers with two four-tube
SM-70 launchers and four Kresta I-class large frigates with two twin-tube
KT-35 launchers. From 1963 to 1968, 16 Juliet-class diesel submarines were
also fielded, with each submarine carrying four launch tubes and the same
number of P-6 missiles. In 1966 it was also decided that the P-5 land-attack
cruise missiles that armed five Echo I-class nuclear submarines would be
withdrawn from service, with the subs being converted into torpedo-armed
attack submarines. Between 1963 and 1966, 16 Echo II-class nuclear
submarines were built for the Northern Fleet and 13 for the Pacific Fleet,
all of which were armed with P-6 anti-ship missiles. Each Echo II sub
carried six launch tubes and the same number of missiles.
The P-6 and P-35 missiles, which differ only in minor ways, were fitted with
the same guidance system and warhead. The latter could be either a 800-kg
high explosive (HE) or a 100-kT-yield (approximately) nuclear weapon. After
launch, the missile climbed to a high altitude, accelerated to Mach 1.5, and
started searching the front area with its radar seeker. The resulting
picture was transmitted to the launching ship via a TV channel. When a
target was acquired, the operator on the ship verified whether it was the
desired target (e.g., the aircraft carrier in the group). If so, the
operator designated it as such and turned the missile's seeker on
automatic-track mode. Thereafter, the missile descended to low altitude,
remaining at supersonic speed. The missile was intended to hit the water
10-20 m before the target and dive to detonate underwater to increase
damage. The range of the missile was 300-350 km.
The P-6/P-35 Progress missiles gave the Soviet Navy long-range anti-ship
capabilities for the first time. Prior to that, only Tu-16KS maritime
bombers, armed with K-10 anti-ship cruise missiles, had such reach.
Nevertheless, the whole system was cumbersome and full of shortcomings. A
single salvo took 8-12 minutes to reach the target, depending on range. Then
it took 4-6 minutes to prepare for the the next salvo, followed by another
8-12 minutes of flight. Thus, the whole missile-launch sequence for six
missiles from a nuclear submarine, or eight from a cruiser, took 20-30
minutes. Meanwhile, the attack force, consisting of surface ships or
submarines (which had to remain surfaced), was exposed to enemy
counterattacks. Moreover, only three or four ships, launching no more than
12 missiles between them, could operate at the same time against a given
carrier battlegroup due to the number of radar and datalink channels
available. It was determined that two to four hits with nuclear-armed
missiles would be enough to disable the entire carrier battlegroup. The
situation was different in the case of conventional warheads, and Soviet
commanders knew that, in this case, the task was unachievable.
However, even this thin threat led the US Navy to seek a fighter capable of
engaging multiple aircraft and cruise missiles at long range. As there was
no time to conduct traditional intercept (a F-4 Phantom armed with AIM-7
Sparrow missiles was inadequate for this task), the AN/AWG-9 fire-control
system and AIM-54 Phoenix missile systems were developed, initially for the
the F-111B and then for the F-14A Tomcat. Teams of E-2B Hawkeyes and F-14s
working together could provide early warning of cruise-missile launches. A
single F-14 could engage six targets simultaneously with AIM-54A missiles.
The E-2 and F-14 tandem became a nightmare for Soviet long-range
reconnaissance and missile-carrying aircraft for years to come, and the
danger was also appreciated by submarine commanders, who understood that
many of their cruise missiles had little chance of reaching the target.
In the early years, the biggest problem was targeting. To find and track an
carrier group on the ocean was an extremely difficult task. The answer was
found in the use of signals- intelligence (SIGINT) and radar- reconnaissance
aircraft, typified by the Tu-16RM Badger D and Tu-95RC Bear D, respectively.
The Badger D SIGINT aircraft would pick up radar and radio signals emitted
by a carrier group and direct a Bear D, equipped with a long-range
sea-search radar. Both aircraft cooperated but operated independently. There
was no need for SIGINT aircraft to approach the deadly zone around the
carrier, and when the radar track was established, the SIGINT aircraft would
search other areas.
The MRSC-1 Uspekh system was developed specifically for target acquisition
and designation for anti-ship missiles. It consisted of a Tu-95RC Bear D
with its radar and a data-exchange system with aircraft and ship interfaces.
Echo II submarines used the Argument fire-control system for presetting a
missile's INS and for data exchange with the missile in flight. The whole
system was fielded the in latter half of the 1960s. Two new systems were
developed in the early 1970s. First was the more capable Uspekh-U, which was
based on a modernized Tu-95RC aircraft. The other became the primary
targeting means of the Soviet - and presently the Russian - Navy. This was
the MKRC Legenda space-based system, operational in 1979, the main element
of which is radar-equipped 17F16 satellites that use onboard miniature
nuclear reactors for power. Again, the system consisted of both SIGINT- and
radar-equipped components, but in this case they were satellites. The
Legenda system did not replace the Uspekh-U, which also remains in service,
but provides greater coverage and flexibility. The deployment of both
systems solved the problem of targeting for cruise-missile-armed units, both
surface warships and submarines. The latter, equipped with the Kasatka (and
later-model) receiving equipment, are able to receive basic targeting
information from the Legenda reconnaissance system, even when submerged.
This feature greatly improved submarine survivability.
P-70 Ametist (SS-N-7) and P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9)
The development of an anti-ship missile system for underwater launch was
initiated in April 1959, and the OKB-52 Design Bureau, led by Vladimir
Chelomey, was appointed to the task. At the same time, development of the
first submarine to be armed with the new system, the Papa class, also
started in 1959. The submarine was nuclear powered and armed with 10
launchers for P-70 missiles.
The P-70 Ametist (SS-N-7, 4K66) had a small delta wing and was powered by a
solid-propellant sustainer. It was also provided with four small boosters
that worked underwater. It had a programmable INS guidance system and an
analog radar seeker with some anti-jamming capabilities. The missile itself
had a very small frontal radar cross-section. The missile could be launched
from depths of up to 30 m. It flew to the target at an altitude of 40-60 m
using a radar altimeter at a high subsonic speed. Maximum range of the
missile was 70-80 km when the target was designated from a third source, or
about 50 km when the target was detected by the launching sub's powerful
MGK-300 Rubin digital sonar. The missile had a 1,000-kg conventional warhead
or a 200-kT-yield nuclear one. The first underwater launch of a 4K66 Ametist
missile from a special stand occurred in June 1961. From July to December of
1964, the missile was tested on a modified Whisky-class experimental
submarine. The missile was accepted to service in June 1968.
The construction of K-162, the first Papa-class boat, began in 1962 and
continued through 1969. The long construction period was a result of the use
of many revolutionary systems at the same time: a titanium hull, a modern
nuclear reactor, and a lot of digital and analog- digital electronic
equipment. Due to the enormous costs, the navy called the ship "Golden
Fish." During trials, the submarine's performance was excellent. For
example, the underwater speed was 42 knots, and in 1971 the ship established
a still-unbeaten underwater speed record of 44.7 knots. The tactics of
attack required a quiet approach to the target as long as possible and
missile launch from maximum range. Escape maneuvers were then to be
performed at maximum speed.
K-162, however, was to be a one-of-a-kind ship, since it was too expensive
and complicated. Instead, from 1967 to 1973, eleven Charlie I-class
submarines were built with more conventional equipment. The MGK-100 Kerch
analog passive sonar had a range of 30-35 km. Each submarine was armed with
eight launchers (small silos) for the P-70 system. The Brest analog
fire-control system had interfaces to the Legenda and Uspekh systems. Most
of the Charlie Is served with the 11th Division of the 1st Flotilla of the
Northern Fleet, while some formed the 10th Division of the 2nd Flotilla of
the Pacific Fleet. All of these submarines were withdrawn from service by
1993.
From very beginning, it was obvious that the P-70 Ametist system would have
little chance of successfully engaging a target. The main limitation came
from the relatively short range of the launching sub's sonar. Even when the
target's position was known before approaching the group, sonar contact (in
passive mode) was desired to update the location of moving targets.
Therefore, in February 1963, the decision was made to develop a longer-range
missile, while work on new, long range sonars was underway. In the
mid-1970s, the Charlie I class was equipped with the digital, long-range
(150-200 km) MGK-300 Rubin sonar and, in the late 1970s, with the even more
capable MGK-400 Rubikon sonar with a range of over 200 km. The foundation
for a longer-range, underwater-launched missile has been laid.
Soviet planners determined that approaching a US carrier group closer than
100 km was suicide for a submarine, so a minimum range requirement of 120 km
was set. The new P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) missile was also developed by
the Chelomey-led CKBM Design Bureau (presently NPO Mashinostroenia). It was
based on the earlier P-70 Ametist missile, though larger to meet the range
requirement. Contrary to its predecessor, which could be launched only from
submarines, the P-120 had a universal booster that enabled launch from both
surface ships and subs. It could be launched from a depth of 50 m. The P-120
was powered by a solid-fuel sustainer that gave the missile high subsonic
speed as it flew at an altitude of 40 m. The range was dictated by the
aforementioned requirement, though some sources say it could reach 150 km. A
modernized terminal-phase guidance system had two sensors combined in one: a
traditional but improved active-radar seeker supported by a passive infrared
seeker mounted beneath. This measure improved resistance to countermeasures
launched by defending ships. The missile had either a 500-kg HE or
200-kT-yield nuclear warhead.
The P-120 Malakhit system was accepted to service in March 1972. Tests of
the underwater system took longer, and the P-120 missile was accepted into
service onboard submarines in November 1977. The new missiles armed small,
fast corvettes of the Nanuchka I class. In all, from 1969 to 1976, 18 of
these ships were built, followed by 21 Nanuchka III-class ships. Today,
though, only the latter remain in service. Between 1973 and 1980, six
Charlie II-class submarines were built. Each sub had eight missile tubes and
usually carried six conventional and two nuclear missiles. All of the
submarines had the MGK-400 Rubikon sonar system. In the early 1980s, the
Rubikon sonar was replaced by the MGK-500 Skat system, which used a much
more capable digital computer and advanced signal processing. Launch of
P-120 missiles (all eight could be launched in a quick salvo) was directed
by the Raduga fire-control system. Submarines were provided with a Molnia
digital interface to the Uspekh and Legenda targeting systems, along with a
Paravan towed array for very-low-frequency communications. All of the
Charlie II submarines were very recently withdrawn from service, but P-120
missiles continue to be used on Nanuchka III corvettes.
P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) and P-1000 Vulkan
Presently, the P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) remains only on surface ships,
but it is still one of the most capable Russian naval weapons. For a long
time it was underestimated in the West. Since the missile was similar in
appearance to the P-6/P-35 series, it was not even recognized for a long
time, especially as the main armament of Echo II submarines.
Development of the intended P-6/P-35 replacement was initiated on the very
same day as the P-120 Malakhit program (February 28, 1963). It was to be a
surface-launched missile for both submarines and surface ships. To avoid any
counterattack from a carrier group, the missile's range was to be 500 km,
outside the usual operational radius of carrier-protection forces. At the
same time, the guidance system and missile survivability were to be greatly
improved and in line with evolving tactics. For the first time, it was
assumed that any attack on a carrier group would be of a massive character.
The tactics of such an attack is described later, but it is worth describing
some P-500 Bazalt features beforehand.
The P-500 missile is similar in appearance to the P-6/35 and was powered by
a liquid-fuel sustainer and solid-rocket booster. It has a speed of Mach 2
at high altitude and Mach 1.5-1.6 at low altitude. The flight profile of the
missile varies from 30 to 7,000 m (low-low or low-high). Guidance is based
on a digital INS on a gyro- stabilized platform and an active-radar seeker,
which periodically switches to passive mode. For the first time, the missile
was equipped with a digital computer (Tsifrova Vichislenna Mashina, "digital
computing device"). The guidance system was also equipped with a datalink to
communicate between missiles in a salvo, with a salvo consisting of eight
missiles launched at short intervals. Usually, one of the missiles flies
high (5,000-7,000 m) to pick up the target, while the rest remain at medium
to low altitude with their radar seekers switched to passive mode. The
leading missile then transmits targeting data to the others and allocates
individual targets, with half of the salvo directed at the aircraft carrier
and half at other ships in the area, one apiece. The onboard radar seekers
are turned on at the last moment, just before reaching the target. If the
lead missile is shot down, another one (in a programmed sequence) takes over
and climbs to a higher altitude to continue directing the salvo. All the
missiles have active radar jamming to disrupt any defensive action from
fighters and shipboard air-defense systems. In addition, vital parts of the
P-500 missile are armored to increase survivability.
Early trials of the first version of the P-500 system were conducted from
1969 to 1970, and from 1971-75, tests of the final version, with a 550-km
range, were completed. The missile has a 1,000-kg HE warhead or a
350-kT-yield nuclear warhead. In 1975 the P-500 system was introduced to
service on 10 out of the 29 Echo II-class submarines then in service. Nine
of them received the Kasatka-B system for receiving data from the Uspekh and
Legenda targeting systems (radar picture only), while one received the
Uspekh interface only, without access to the Legenda space targeting system.
Communications with targeting systems could be conducted from periscope
depth with the antenna above the surface. Usually, Soviet submarines carried
six conventional and two nuclear P-500 missiles on combat patrols. All of
the submarines armed with P-500 missiles were withdrawn from service in the
mid-1990s.
The P-500 Bazalt system, however, was not only used on submarines. In 1977
the system was accepted into service onboard Kiev-class aircraft carriers,
four of which were built. The first three had a battery of eight launchers
in the forward deck. The last ship of the class, commissioned the Baku in
1987, was built to a modified design and had no less than 12 launchers. All
of these ships were withdrawn from service in the 1990s, but the last ship,
renamed Admiral Gorshkov , is to be sold to India - after stripping off the
P-500 missiles.
The only ships still armed with the P-500 Bazalt system are Slava-class
cruisers. The first ship of the class, commissioned in 1983, underwent a
major overhaul in the 1990s and was renamed the Moskva . It serves with the
Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet. The Northern Fleet operates the Marshal
Ustinov , commissioned in 1986, while the Pacific Fleet operates the Varyag
, commissioned in 1989. According to unconfirmed sources, however, the last
was re-armed with the P-1000 system (see below). The first two ships (and
possibly all three) have a tremendous battery of 16 P-500 Bazalt missiles,
which can be directed at targets with the assistance of embarked Ka-27 Helix
helicopters. A fourth cruiser, the Ukrainian Ukraina , was armed with the
P-500 system. The ship was completed in late 2001, but after lengthy
deliberations, it never entered service with the Ukrainian Navy. Declared
spare, it now is to be sold abroad.
The P-1000 Vulkan was one of the most mysterious missiles in Soviet service.
It was also the last Russian missile that required a submarine to surface
for launch. Its existence was never discovered by NATO, despite the fact it
was operational on five submarines. It was generally similar to P-500 but
had titanium armor, and many of its steel parts were replaced by titanium
ones. This enabled a significant decrease in launch weight. At the same
time, a more powerful booster and a more powerful and more fuel-efficient
sustainer turbojet engine was employed. This increased the range to about
700 km. Its development was initiated in May 1979, and it underwent tests in
the mid-1980s. The P-1000 was introduced into service in about 1987. In the
late 1980s, five Echo II-class submarines were modernized to accommodate the
new P-1000 Vulkan system, but all five were withdrawn from service in the
mid-1990s. Thus, it was in front-line service for only about seven or eight
years (unless it has, in fact, been installed on the Varyag ).
P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)
The development of the P-700 missile system started in 1969, but it was
prolonged due to its complexity. It was assumed that the main source of
information would be the satellite-based reconnaissance network, and from
the very beginning, it was believed that the missile would be able to
communicate with it directly after launch. The initial targeting information
was to be received by a submarine cruising at a depth of about 30 m via a
long-wave communications system from ground bases. The attack was to be
coordinated with a group of long-range Tu-22M anti-ship aircraft. The
underwater attack group consists of three to five Oscar and Oscar II subs,
each armed with 24 P-700 missiles. The subs were to launch 70-120 such
missiles against a single carrier group in a single mass attack. Roughly
30-50% of them are aimed at the carrier, while the others go after
accompanying ships. Another salvo of 12-24 missiles was to be launched by
aircraft, mainly to saturate the carrier group's defenses. The 30-knot speed
of the Oscar I/II submarines enables a rapid approach to the launch area,
about 450-500 km from the carrier group, and equally quick evasion after the
attack.
The missile employs all of the techniques from the Bazalt/Vulkan. One lead
missile per every 24 in the salvo flies at high altitude to reconnoiter the
target, using its radar in active and passive modes. The active mode is used
in quick "looks," then turned off to increase the penetration probability.
The lead missile assigns targets to all subordinate missiles and
communicates with the other lead missiles in the massive salvo to coordinate
the attack. To achieve this, the missile is equipped with a powerful digital
computer with three processors. The missile has an onboard integrated
electronic-countermeasures suit for avoiding enemy anti-missile attacks
using a combination of maneuver and deception jamming. The computer could
order the missile to one of various stored courses with multiple altitudes.
At high altitude, the missile speed is Mach 2.5, while at low (sea-skimming)
altitude, it is Mach 1.5. Vital parts of the missile are armored to increase
penetration against fire from Phalanx-type close-in weapon systems and
against fragments of closely exploding air-defense missiles. The missile has
a conventional 750-kg HE warhead or a nuclear warhead with an unknown yield
(reportedly 500 kT, but that seems too high).
The guidance system was developed by TsNII "Granit." The missile itself was
developed in OKB-52 (later NPO Mashinostoyeniya) under the direction of
Chelomey and, after his death in 1984, under Gerberd Efremov. First tests of
the missile started in November 1975. Numerous difficulties prolonged the
factory tests until 1979, and in autumn of that year, the missile began
state trials. Technical difficulties further prolonged the trials through
October 1983, and the missile was officially accepted into service in March
1983. At this time, the space-based Legenda reconnaissance system had been
fully deployed. In addition to the satellite system, the submarine could
also use its own MGK-540 Skat-3 sonar system for targeting.
Only two Oscar I ships have been built: the K-525 (Arkhangelsk ) and K-206
(Murmansk ), commissioned in 1981 and 1983, respectively. Both remain in
service with the Northern Fleet, and each are armed with 24 missiles and
have Kasatka-U receivers for communication with the Legenda system. The subs
were followed by the "ultimate" Oscar II class, of which 11 have been
commissioned since 1986. The Northern Fleet operates the K-119 (Voronezh ),
K-148 (Krasnodar ), K-410 (Smolensk ), K-266 (Orel ), K-186 (Omsk ), and
K-150 (Tomsk ). The K-141 (Kursk ) exploded and sank on August 13, 2000. The
Pacific Fleet operates the K-132 (Irkutsk ), K-173 (Krasnoyarsk ), K-442
(Chelabinsk ), and K-456 (Vyluchinsk ). The Russian Navy plans to commission
a replacement for the Kursk, the K-329 (Belgorod ).
The P-700 missile was also introduced to service as a weapon for surface
ships. Four Kirov-class nuclear cruisers were commissioned between 1980 and
1998: the Kirov (renamed Admiral Ushakov ), Frunze (renamed Admiral
Lazarev ), Kalinin (renamed Admiral Nakhimov ) and Yuriy Andropov (renamed
Pyotr Velikiy ). They were armed with 20 semi-vertical (with some oblique,
like in submarines) P-700 Granit launchers. The system was directly adapted
from submarines - to the point where the launchers have to be filled with
water before launch. Fire control is provided by the MR-212 Vaygach-U
onboard radar and other ships' electronic systems (the Gurzuf or Kantata-M
passive reconnaissance systems, for example). The first two cruisers were
withdrawn from service in the late 1990s, but the Admiral Nakhimov and the
Pyotr Velikiy continue to serve. The only other ship equipped with P-700
Granit system is the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznietsov , commissioned in
1990 and operational with Russian Northern Fleet since 1995. The ship is
armed with 12 P-700 launchers.

 con i piccoli missili antinave occidentali.
Già, ma non c'è paragone neanche:
-di costo (quanto costano)
-di numero (quanti Harpoon ci sono in servizio e quanti Granit?)
Ciao,
Ander

 -di numero (quanti Harpoon ci sono in servizio e quanti Granit?)
L'ss-n-25 è equivalente all'Harpoon ed i russi pensano di utilizzarlo per lo
più contro piccole navi mercantili e naviglio minore (Corvette Fregate). L'
SS-N-22 e l' SS-N-26 sono dedicati ai cacciatorpediniere ed incrociatori.
Mentre il Granit ed il Sandbox sono dedicati alle portaerei. L'immagine che
se ne ricava delle armi antinave russe è di un apparato missilistico ASUW
molto più potente e flessibile di quello occidentale (che dopotutto è basato
sugli aerei imbarcati e non sui missili). Sono due dottrine differenti penso
che quella occidentale sia più efficace, ma quella russa almeno per me è
molto più affascinante ed interessante.