Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: Aeronautica militare cinese (crescita costante, ma non impetuosa)

Rising Airpower: The People's Liberation
Army Air Force in the Early 21st Century
2nd Lt Morgan J. O'Brien, III
At the dawn of the 21st century, the military arm of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) stands at a crossroads. As the ambitions of China grow, all
branches of the PRC's military forces must prepare to fight and win
different types of battles. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)
merits special attention because, as British Field Marshal Bernard
Montgomery said, "If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose
it quickly" (Meilinger 3). To function as a globally powerful 21st century
air service, the PLAAF has begun to focus on the development of four
specific disciplines: conventional warfare, training, asymmetric or
non-traditional warfare, and using asymmetric tactics well within
information warfare.
Conventional Warfare
Thanks to a deserved reputation as the world's most powerful air force, the
USAF often does not need to engage the enemy to win a stand off. The USAF
serves as the world's model for air power in that it stands closest to the
definition of air and space superiority. According the Air Force Doctrine
Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine,
Air and space superiority rarely is an end in itself but is a means to the
end of attaining military objectives. It is an important first step in
military operations.It provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from
attack. Success in air, land, sea, and space operations depends upon air and
space superiority (AFBD 29).
The U.S. places tremendous stock in the importance of airpower in overall
military supremacy and China has begun to grasp this concept, developing a
powerful air force to succeed first regionally and eventually on the global
scale.
Open-source military forecasts out of China have yet to indicate a goal of
becoming the world's leading military power. Rather, "The eventual end state
of the current post-Cold War transitional period is always proclaimed to be
'multipolarity' among five equal powers, each of which will have its own
sphere of influence" (Pillsbury 277). An important first step towards
multipolarity comes within East Asia, China's future sphere of influence.
In 1985, China's Central Military Commission (CMC) recognized that a war
with either superpower was remote, but a local war was possible and
therefore important to prepare for. The doctrine adopted here, and hammered
home during and after the 1991 Gulf War was described as "local war under
high-tech conditions" (Van Vracken Hickey 73).
In order to establish air and space superiority within East Asia, the PLAAF
has focused on developing affordable air and space weapons with maximum
impact. China, with expansive borders and lofty global aims, must develop
weapons for impact in a variety of competitors. Over the next few years,
China will approach relations with Taiwan, Japan and the Koreas very
carefully. The US is also involved as a player in many intra-theater
scenarios; however, traditional competition with the US will follow after
China attains local hegemony.
While dealing with intra-theater problems, Taiwan (and by extension, the US)
remains a constant thorn in the PRC's side. In mid 2002, a report out of
Hong Kong announced, "Taiwan's air force has held a drill practicing
retaliatory strikes in case of an attack by China" (AFP 14 May). Reports
such as these prove bothersome to China, as the Chinese realize they must
deal with on competitor who is supplied by another competitor. Taiwan
maintains it will not strike first despite Beijing's repeated threats to
invade the island should Taipei declare formal independence. Mainland China
considers Taiwan part of its territory although the island has been
separated from the mainland in 1949 after a civil war.
Taiwan's air arm flies U.S.-made F-16s (similar to those of the USAF
inventory) and Taiwanese pilots train to fly the F-16 at Luke Air Force
Base, Arizona-the location where U.S. F-16 pilots train. According to one
account, "(Taiwanese) Air force pilots working to master the F-16 fighter
plane at Luke Air Force Base in the US have been performing well, often
winning top prizes in bombing and shooting tests taken by all foreign F-16
trainees at the base" (Hsu 8 July). In May 2002, the USAF was shown training
Taiwanese pilots in mid-air refueling. This capability, currently not
possessed by the PLAAF, will enable Taiwanese aircraft to fly with much
longer range.
All Taiwanese advanced training and weaponry may end up helping the PLAAF,
as an interesting scenario arises if China reclaims Taiwan. Taiwan's F-16s
and American weapons systems may then become property of the PRC (and the
PLAAF), and lead to the U.S. eventually having to prepare to fight against
some of its own weaponry.
North Korea, which borders China in the northeast, now admits to having a
nuclear weapons development program. By sharing borders Pakistan, India, and
Russia, China has many nuclear-capable neighbors. The U.S. military exerts
its presence in South Korea and installations on Japan's archipelago. All of
these actors cause China tremendous concern, and stress the importance of
the PLAAF providing viable power projection.
The PLAAF has begun to challenge and prepare for potential engagement with
both its neighbors and the U.S. by investing in air and space science and
technology (S&T). The key to a powerful air and space force, and by
extension a powerful military, is maximizing returns from S&T investment.
A culture heavily based on tradition, China often keeps an old-fashioned
mindset while heading into the future. The influence of Mao Zedong continues
to cast a shadow over the modern China's military. China's history is filled
with many inspired victories and comebacks, some under the leadership of
Mao. Facing odds nearly impossible to overcome, Mao led the communists over
the nationalists during the 1940's. Mao's victory came in the wake of the
Long March, another event firmly etched in China's proud history. Within the
PLAAF, there is a strong desire to learn from and implement experiences of
foreign militaries, however, "Indigenous Maoist traditions substantially
constrain adoption an integration of foreign practices" (Shambaugh 285).
Home grown military R&D, the staple of the U.S. armed forces, will provide
the most benefit to the PLAAF, and move it beyond some of the Maoist
constraints. This task is easier said than done, as scientists and engineers
are not created overnight, and require high-maintenance facilities. In China
's emerging free market, these technological minds, worth large salaries in
the private sector, must be recruited to serve in less glamorous positions
in the military.
Unfortunately, many in China's armed forces currently have a "country
bumpkin" stigma. Observers have noted that the Chinese military, "is not
attracting the best and brightest entrants, since the prestige of the
military is fairly low and many other professions offer far greater
financial rewards" (Dreyer 320). The CMC recognizes this stigma, and
recently announced that among the whole military, more than 26,000 troops
earned an advanced (doctorate or master's).1 These advanced degrees will
best help the Chinese military if they are focused in high tech areas.
A key element of new technology is a strong corps of scientists and
engineers with a constant infusion of new thoughts, usually brought about by
the natural turnover of a military force. More than the typical bureaucracy,
the PLAAF is often guilty of an unhealthy stasis of leadership. In late
1994, PLAAF commander Cao Shuangming retired on reaching 65, only two years
after assuming command. Cao's retirement came five years before the
mandatory retirement age. Cao's predecessor had been in office seven years.
Two central figures of the Chinese Military Commission, Liu Huaqing, 79, and
Zhang Zhen, 81, served at an age that Western military forces never would
have allowed. This often causes mid-level officers, stifled in their middle
management, to complain about promotions as common saying bemoans, "one's
chances of being promoted is about the same as that of climbing to the
heavens; one might as well enjoy oneself" (Dreyer2 318).
Developing and retaining scientists and engineers may be accomplished
through a thorough recruiting and retention campaign. Currently, the USAF
deals with similar attrition problems, and they attack it through
benefit-laden programs such as the technology-heavy United States Air Force
Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps, where students earn scholarships
for college while incurring a service commitment. Scientists and engineers
need not solely be military. The USAF has a strong corps of civilians and
contractors in technical positions that do not have to deal with many
responsibilities facing the military, but earn many similar benefits.
China recently began looking outside its borders to attract some great
minds, as "The Pentagon now believes that Russia has secretly helped the PRC
modernize its nuclear forces" (Van Vraken Hickey 86). Soviet aid for the
Chinese military traces its roots back to the early days of Mao's army, and
increased towards the end of the Korean War.2 During the waning days of the
Korean conflict and for several years thereafter, the Soviet Union sent
tanks, planes, artillery and ordnance to China. This equipment tended to be
poor and outdated, "Nonetheless, it significantly upgraded the PLA's
arsenal" (Dreyer 192). In addition, "With this material came several
thousand Soviet advisers. The net effect was a strong Soviet influence over
the development of the PLA" (Dreyer 192). History shows a definite schism
occurred between the two nations shortly over the next few years, however,
this relationship is mending, and doors began to reopen with the end of the
Soviet Union.
Much like post World War II Germany, the former Soviet Union experienced an
exodus of its scientists and engineers during the 1990's. Many went to the
West, although some of these expatriates headed to China. This movement has
bolstered and will continue to enhance China's home- grown technology. This
open market could lead China into a bidding war for some of the world's best
technological minds. Much like a sports team with a good general manager, a
quick and efficient way to a championship is to buy top-notch free agents,
while simultaneously developing home- grown talent. In order for the PLAAF
to compete on a global stage, they must invest wisely, and there are many
indications the service is doing so. Some estimates show that up to "2,000
Russian technicians are employed by Chinese research institutes working on
laser technology; the miniaturization of nuclear weapons; cruise missiles;
(and) space-based weapons" (Van Vracken Hickey 88).
Perhaps a new "Cold War" battle will commence, with China fighting for
talent against the U.S. U.S. counterintelligence now claims China has and
will continue to recruit foreign scientists to spy for China. Compared to
the U.S.'s regimented military bureaucracy, China's looser bureaucracy may
allow for paying these budding minds more money out of college than the U.S.
As the PLAAF attains and develops scientists and engineers, the next step is
to gainfully utilize their talents into attaining power projection. The
PLAAF currently hopes to produce powerful planes and space platforms to work
together for successful power projection. Powerful planes are, by
definition, those equipped with the most modern technology and capabilities.
Many aircraft in the PLAAF's inventory of 5,000 warplanes are obsolete
variants of Soviet aircraft (Van Vracken Hickey 82). The PLAAF's inventory
is still primarily of 1950s-1960s Soviet Vintage. The fighter force includes
Chinese-equivalent Mig-17s, 19s and 21s (the J-5, J-6Q/Q-5 and J-7
respectively) (Shambaugh 293).
The PLAAF's firepower must not be totally underestimated. Dreyer wrote, "In
several cases, the PLA possesses pieces of systems rather than the systems
themselves. It has over-the-horizon missiles, but has yet to develop the
targeting techniques to make them effective" (Dreyer2 323). Yet, the U.S.
recently learned, "China recently test-fired a new cruise missile with twice
the range U.S. intelligence agencies initially estimated" (Gertz). In early
November 2002, China fired a YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missile from a JH-7
fighter bomber, showing the range of the missile to be about 155 miles. The
missile, previously estimated with a range of 75 miles, enables the Chinese
military to run "over-the-horizon" attack capability. The YJ-83 can travel
at supersonic speeds, making it very difficult for ships to stop (Gertz).
Going over the horizon, into the depths of space, has recently become a
major goal of the Chinese military, as "The Country's top officials make it
clear that they intend to challenge the United States in space" (Kahn). By
2010, China looks to not only reach the moon, but also explore and possibly
mine it. PLAAF leadership, such as Colonel Min Zengfu of the Air Force
Command Institute, grasp the importance of the space arena. "The air
battlefield will become decisively significant", Min said, speaking of
modern warfare, continuing, "He who controls outer space controls the
earth," and "To maintain air superiority, one must control outer space"
(Pillsbury 296).
The Chinese hope to surpass U.S. and Soviet benchmarks set on those nations'
first manned flights, by sending more men and spending more time in orbit.
Talk of Mars colonization and a Chinese space station have also entered
Chinese goal setting.
China, which has recently spent a reported $1.3 to $3 billion on their space
program, which, some scientists believe focuses China's focus on the wrong
goals. "When the United States and Russia embarked on their space
programs, . they were already leaders in making conventional aircraft.
China, despite repeated attempts, does not build airliners or high-quality
fighter jets" (Kahn). Although the PLAAF possesses more than 4,000
fighter-interceptors, "they are so antiquated as to be meaningless deterrent
against USAF F-15 and 16s" (Shambaugh 293). Its bomber force of H-5 and H-6
although equally slow and vulnerable, do have nuclear capability.3
As the PLAAF continues to modernize, they are increasingly dependent on
Russian military industry. "The PRC has indeed used the profits from its
burgeoning commercial economy to purchase a number of advanced weapons
systems. The most notable of these include the purchase from Russia of 50
Sukhoi SU-27 jet fighters and the production rights for 200 more" (Van
Vracken Hickey 76).
The 26 Sukhoi-27 (Su-27) fighter-bombers bought from Russia give the PLAAF a
capable state-of-the-art aircraft. The SU-27 is prepared for concurrent
advances such as in-flight refueling and airborne warning and control (AWAC)
remote guidance. The place can carry short and medium-range air-to-air
missiles as well as air-to ground pods for cluster bombs, it has a combat
radius of 1,500 kilometers and can fly at mach 2 speeds.
The PLAAF is also dealing with aerospace company Antonov, which still has
close connections to the Russian military establishment. The company is
trying to sell the Chinese its "soon-to-be-certified Antonov AN-70, a short
take-off and landing transport aircraft" (Exelby 8 Nov). This capability
mirrors a major capability of the F-35, a U.S./U.K. combined/joint-service
fighter currently under development, which boasts Short Take Off Vertical
Landing capabilities. Antonov believes the AN-70's design will, "Improve
secrecy and abruptness of military transport operations 1.5 times which will
improve the survivability of the airplane and the paratroopers approximately
tenfold" (Exelby 8 Nov).
The PLAAF's dealings are not limited to Russia. The U.S., along with Israel,
France and Britain have all supplied weapons systems and components to
China, including air-to-air missiles, much needed air-refueling technology,
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, helicopter parts and assorted
avionics (Van Vracken Hickey 76). However, the U.S., no longer a weapons
supplier to the PRC, in 2000 blocked a deal that would have sent the Chinese
an Israeli-made AWAC systems. Without AWAC and mid-air refueling
capabilities the PLAAF understands, "there can be no force projection of
serious interdiction capability" (Shambaugh 294).
The PLAAF is developing the Jian-10 fighter-bomber (J-10). The plane is
reportedly a hybrid of the U.S. F-16 A/B with some Chinese and Israeli Lavi
elements. China received a single prototype F-16 from Pakistan and has been
working with Israeli Aircraft Industries to develop the plane. The PLAAF is
set to deploy the fighters in coastal areas, believing "With 'J-10' fighters
deployed, it will be able to upgrade its offensive capabilities by a large
margin" (Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao 29 May).
The PLAAF expects to have 50 J-10s by 2005. The J-10, displayed at an air
show in May, has received rave reviews from the pilots flying them. Wing
Commander Wang Yunhui, a special-grade Su-27 pilot, praised J-10 aircraft
and admitted, "During three rounds of "dog fight" in the mid-air, his Su-27
had lost to a J-10 fighter" (Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao 29 May).
The Su-27's have had their share of problems, and China's competitors have
noticed. One article out of Taiwan trumpeted, "Four Su-27 fighter planes of
the Chinese air force have crashed or have been severely damaged during
flight training over the past six months, Taiwanese defense sources said.
attributing the poor performance to human error" (Hsu Taipei Times 21 Jun).
Again, the training of PLAAF forces remains questionable. Many air forces
incorporate the use of flight simulators into pilot training and skills
maintenance; however, China only has one adequate Su-27 trainer, forcing
many pilots to wait months at a time to gain access. One article reports,
"The accidents bring to 15 the number of Chinese air force Su-27s that have
been taken out of service due to crashes" (Hsu 21 Jun). The Taiwan press
compares the specific training regimens of the two services, "By contrast, a
fighter pilot in Taiwan has much more intensive flight training. Trainees
are required to fly 15 hours a month, and sometimes fly as much as 20 hours"
(Hsu 21 Jun).
Training
To truly project lasting power, the PLAAF must emphasize proper training.
"As Iran learned many years ago, to possess state-of-the-art hardware is one
thing; to possess the 'software' and pilot capability is another. PLAAF
pilots are ill-equipped to handle these aircraft" (Shambaugh 294).
Now that the PLAAF will begin developing technology, it has to teach its
troops how to use it properly, especially since the PLAAF "Has always been
the technologically weakest leg of the PLA force structure" (Shambaugh 293).
Within China's armed forces, a current problem exists due to poorly educated
troops. One story tells of the army's anti-chemical warfare unit discovering
that the cause of the mass illness of an entire unit was "an apparently
illiterate army cook mixing rat poison into the evening meal" (Dreyer2 323).
The PLAAF has a reputation within the Chinese armed forces as having troops
with the lowest levels of education among the services, a major challenge
for a force aspiring to compete in the most technically challenging
discipline of warfare. The enlisted corps, in order to serve in their roles
most effectively, must receive adequate education as well as the officers.
"You gotta walk the walk if you're gonna talk the talk," said Dallas Cowboys
' Super Bowl-winning coach Jimmy Johnson. Many PLAAF airmen know the jargon
surrounding the necessary advances their service must make, but few
understand it. The CMC has sought, "To meet challenges of new military
technological revolution, the PLA has readjusted and reformed the education
system of the academies over the past five years and built five new
universities" (Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong 25 July). This provided the need for
Professional Military Education (PME) institutions like the University of
Air Force Engineering.
Other PME programs, such as China's National Defense University, also enable
PLAAF leadership to "talk the talk". The National Defense University,
founded in December 1985, is the "apex" of a three-tier system created to
train junior, midlevel, and senior officers (Dreyer 199). The school offers
a two-year course for those commanding divisions, generally colonels, and a
one year course for division and corps/army commanders who are on track for
the rank of general (Dreyer2 320).
The NDU has many flaws. Unlike Western military schools, China's military
academies have static staffs, with few instructors with field experience,
and those who do, were in the field many years ago. Questions have long been
raised as to whether or not these schools teach the future commanders to
"walk the walk".
Additionally, sources outside China have educated China's military leaders,
"Over the past five years, China's military has dispatched hundreds of
officers to study in 22 countries, of who more than 300 have returned after
completing their studies" (Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong 25 July). Typical
Chinese number crunching aside, these numbers show initiative on the part of
the Chinese, but beg the question: who is not coming back, and what are they
doing?
Asymmetrical Warfare
China respects the U.S. strengths, and looks for a way to surpass having to
face them. While the Persian Gulf conflict of the early 1990's opened China'
s eyes to the importance of technology and U.S. superiority, China's
military conducted well-planned analysis of allied weaknesses highlighted by
the conflict. Several books analyzed U.S. military weaknesses during the
Gulf War, specifically, "Space satellites are vulnerable to direct attack.
Ports and airfields are vulnerable to initial deployment. Each high-tech
weapon has its own weaknesses" (Pillsury 77). The U.S., already in the
global spotlight for Operation Iraqi Freedom, can be assured that China has
paid especially close attention to the conflict.
Several Chinese articles criticized Iraq for not exploiting U.S. weaknesses.
"The Vietcong and North Vietnamese knew how to play on American weaknesses,
but the Iraqis did not learn from those lessons.The Iraqi officer corps was
not sufficiently trained in technology to master the advanced equipment it
had purchased" (Pillsbury 179). China invokes the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese, indicating China understands the U.S. was defeated in Vietnam
and that there is a lesson to be learned from this conflict by any future
U.S. rival.
The PLAAF gleaned many important lessons from the allied air component
successes during Operation Desert Storm. They were impressed with USAF
capabilities in stealth, precision strike capability, night vision,
long-range attacks, lethality of smart munitions, and electronic warfare.
The USAF further impressed the PLAAF after capturing all the high frequency
and ultrahigh-frequency radio signals of the Iraqi army and process
information from 34 reconnaissance satellites, 260 reconnaissance planes and
40 early warning aircraft to "destroy the Iraqi communication system"
(Pillsbury 296).
Only recently has the PLAAF begun to conduct night training. Control of the
night skies has been key to recent U.S. military efforts. A decade after
Operation Desert Storm, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (JB) announced, "On the night
of 6 August, a group of fighter planes. entered the runway one after
another, rapidly took off, and soared into the vast sky, thus opening up the
prelude to night flight training for this year" (Su 14 Aug). This
announcement exemplifies at least a ten-year disparity between the PLAAF and
the USAF.
As the PRC will attempt to become a major player in a multi-polar world,
many experts put the PLAAF well behind the USAF. "It will be probably two
decades or more before the PLA has the capacity to project and sustain force
outside its borders (presuming it has the intention of doing so)" (Shambaugh
295). Other scholars are more optimistic; "Looking ahead, production of
Chinese military aircraft is likely to remain at low levels for the next ten
to 15 years" (Frankenstein and Gill 414). Another account states, "The PLA
remains at least ten to 15 years behind the state-of-the-art in almost all
weapons systems. It is still predominantly a land force with weak air and
naval forces and minimal power projection capability. overall, it remains an
antiquated force (Shambaugh 285)". Taiwan's air force commander-in-chief
General Li Tien-yuthe has an interesting opinion, "The Chinese air force
claims it will catch up with the Taiwan air force by 2005. I don't think so.
I don't think they will be able to achieve the goal by 2500 if we continue
to progress" (Hsu 15 Aug).4 Whatever the timeline, experts concur China is
chasing other nations in air force power.
An adage states, "All is fair in love and war." The PRC should embrace this
wisdom because it could open doors for their military. The easiest way to
erase a technology gap of 20 years within a matter of 20 seconds is to steal
it, making the most of asymmetric or non-traditional tactics. The PLAAF must
continue spy operations in order to first dominate their region, and then
rise to a position as a counterbalancing pole to the U.S. With the advent of
satellites, the internet and the information age, the PRC has a tremendous
advantage with the variety of outlets pipelining information to the public
on a 24-hour cycle. By simply analyzing CNN, or reading 
www.nytimes.com
,
PLAAF officials are immediately privy to a wealth of knowledge about other
nation's militaries. Nations provide blueprints for their own military
doctrine in releasable documents.
A saying goes, "The best defense is a good offense," a statement almost
always true in air war. The PLAAF does not have the firepower to use
conventional weapons in competition with other nations.
To accomplish this, China will rely on asymmetric warfare. Again, the
military can borrow from its heritage in this regard. Mao Zedong spoke of a
"People's War", which would utilize guerilla attacks to defeat an
objectively stronger enemy (Van Vracken Hickey 72). This style is credited
with bringing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) victories in World War II
and the Chinese Civil War.
The doctrine is flawed in the sense that it relies on the enemy infiltrating
China, putting the nation on the defensive. Under "people's war", the nation
stood too great a chance of having the infrastructure destroyed, as the
enemy would have access to vital industry and transportation nodes (Van
Vranken Hickey 73). Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese military leader, commented,
"Being invincible lies with defense; the vulnerability of the enemy comes
with the attack", however, many theorists would argue that a nation rarely
wins a war by remaining defensive (Meilinger 15). Borrowing from the U.S.,
the PRC could take Sun's belief because "it is inappropriate in air war
because it assumed one will wait to see what the strategy is, then move to
counteract it. Not only is this risky business. it once again surrenders the
initiative to the enemy" (Meilinger 18). Although under modern warfare these
tenets would not hold up, the PLAAF may adapt some of these teachings in
other areas of the 21st century battlefield.
China moved from "people's war" to a doctrine of "people's war under modern
conditions" in the 1970's. This came on the heels of the successful
explosion of China's first atomic bomb, launching of a nuclear missile and
detonation of a hydrogen bomb. China's military adopted a more "forward
defensive" posture during this era.
According to published reports, China has stolen information concerning the
U.S.'s most advanced thermonuclear weapons, and has "stolen or otherwise
illegally obtained missile and space technology that improves the PRC's
military and intelligence capabilities" (Van Vracken Hickey 86). The
likelihood of a nuclear war between the two nations is highly improbable;
however China, by gaining information about the U.S. most prized weaponry,
shows that it is embracing a key form of fighting, vital to a 21st century
force, information warfare.
Information Warfare
Information control provides much of the vital advantages the USAF currently
enjoys. China, with its authoritarian government, should understand this
better than many countries. With the advent of the computer age, and US
government dependence on electronic networks, a portal is opened-a portal
that is custom-made for the Chinese style of warfighing.
Chang Mengxiong, the former senior engineer of the Beijing Institute of
System Engineering of the defense science and technology establishment
(COSTIND), suggests that, in the 21st century, both weapons and military
units will be "information intensified" (Pillsbury 292). Chang uses the
metaphor of a boxer to illustrate the importance of information to
asymmetric warfare, "Information-intensified combat methods are like a
Chinese boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring an
opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement" (Pillsbury 292). Chang
describes "information superiority" as more important than air and sea power
and views "information deterrence" on par with nuclear deterrence, writing,
"Even if two adversaries are generally equal in weapons, unless the side
having a weaker information capability is able effectively to weaken the
information capability of the adversary, it has very little possibility of
winning the war" (Pillsbury 293).
Some keen insight into high-tech informational warfare comes from a Chinese
ruler who lived more than 2,400 years ago, Sun Tzu remains a fixture in
worldwide military education centuries after his death. His book, The Art of
War, is still considered essential reading for military leaders and
businessmen alike, especially within the United States. One Chinese military
outlet notes, "Renowned US military academies including the West Point have
always specified the Chinese book "Sun Tzu's Art of War" as mandatory
reading for their trainees. US generals often take pride in quoting concepts
and phrases from the book in their writings" (Yi 6 Feb).
Sun's teachings preach the art of a bloodless victory. This mindset will
become important for the PLAAF as it remains decades behind the advances put
forth by the USAF. Sun teaches that a good commander must, "Know the enemy
and know yourself; in a hundred battles (they) will never be defeated" (Sun
86). Those words, written long ago still ring true today.
Borrowing from Sun's teachings, the USAF teaches Information Superiority as
a core competency, and details why an air force is the best service to
spearhead a nation's information warfare efforts:
Information superiority is the ability to collect, control, exploit, and
defend information while denying the adversary the ability to do the same
and, like air and space superiority, includes gaining control over the
information realm and fully exploiting military information functions.Today,
the Air Force is the major operator of sophisticated air- and space- based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, and is the service
most able to quickly respond to the information they provide (AFBD 31).
With a platform based in the high ground provided by the sky, and the
ultimate high ground in space, the PLAAF seeks to position itself to
maintain and utilize the flow of information.
Oxford professor Norman Stone explains, "Sun Tzu's real trick is that he
understands how to exploit the enemy's divisions and weaknesses and hence to
use, to his own advantage, the enemy's strengths" (Sun 9). In a conventional
war with the U.S., China is the clear underdog. However, China, ever the
optimistic nation, seeks for "The mouse (China) to defeat the elephant
(U.S.)" (China Debates 278). By moving competition with the U.S. from the
traditional battlefield into an intelligence-driven chess match, China does
stand a chance.
The best opportunity for China to focus an intelligence attack against USAF
information systems comes thousands of miles from hostile lines. In fact,
the PLAAF does not even need to centralize their troops while conducting
these attacks. With solid training and wise investments the PLAAF could
develop computer hackers who can monitor and possibly wreak havoc U.S.
military infrastructure. Spread across China, these hackers can work
unsupervised and become hidden from the reach of the USAF's might. As
reported almost boastfully in a recent edition of JB,
"The cyberspy can sit in a neat and tidy laboratory in his own country while
obtaining the other side's classified information, without having to worry
about his own safety. This is what makes the cyberspy such a menace. He can
even be thousands of kilometers away, sipping coffee while obtaining the
other side's nuclear secrets, quietly opening a new Battlefield" (Mao 29
May).
Never before has air warfare seen an enemy strike from behind friendly lines
without the use of a missile or airframe, and force a rival air service to
go offensive to defend.
JB reported, "For a long time, the world's "espionage wars" have been very
complex. Now, the battlefields have quietly extended to the intangible space
of computer networks" (Mao 29 May). The paper explains the importance of
using cyber spying against the U.S. with a convincing set of statistics:
The US military has the world's largest computer network system, called the
"Defense Information Infrastructure." This gigantic system is composed of
210 million computer terminals, 10,000 local area networks, 100 wide area
networks, 200 control centers, and 16 large scale computer centers. Of all
the world's armed forces, the US military is the most reliant on computer
networks, from military command and weapons preparation right on through to
moving, paying, and provisioning the troops, everything relies to a high
degree on computer networks (Mao 29 May).
People's War is a key to this strategy because the Chinese see a weakness in
a U.S. strength, "As application of computer networks expands, and vast
amounts of classified information is stored and transmitted via these nets,
many spies are aiming at this new area, and cyber-espionage is rising to
meet the demand" (Mao 29 May).
The PRC, which has used spies as a powerful instrument of war against the
U.S., clearly sees a bright future for cyber spies,
Computer spies are highly efficient and a great threat. Once cyberspies have
broken into an important computer system, especially if they have gained
access privileges, they can make use of this foundation to obtain a constant
stream of huge amounts of highly classified information, and the injured
party may never be aware that damage is being done. Cyberspies have very few
limitations of time and space, they are totally flexible in their work (Mao
29 May).
In one case, hackers traced back to Russia were found to have been quietly
downloading millions of pages of sensitive data. Again, cases such as this
open many doors for Sino-Russian relations. Here, trades concerning details
gathered and techniques used to get past U.S. military defenses could become
viable bargaining chips in this relationship.
With creative hacking, the Chinese could fully carry out a modern "people's
war" by turning a competitor's strength against itself. A British hacker
with the handle "Datastream Cowboy" was caught planting eavesdropping
software on the USAF's Rome Laboratory in 1994 (Birdis). According to a
Congressional review of security in cyberspace, "Datastream Cowboy" was a 16
year old "who liked to attack '.MIL' sites because they were so insecure.
New Scotland Yard eventually caught Datastream Cowboy, and discovered he had
launched his attacks on "a very modest system that is very slow with very
limited storage capacity (Security in Cybersace). While the USAF an US
military have beefed up cyberspace security, "computers sold off the shelf
today. are significantly more powerful (Security in Cyberspace). This simple
attack, carried out by a 16-year-old without any formal training, cost the
USAF an estimated $211,722, and that number does not include the costs
incurred while investigating the hacker, nor does it cover the
difficult-to-quantify costs from the national security perspective.
The U.S. has had to move out of a comfort zone and resort to low-tech
trickery to find the enemy in previous hacker cases concerning the military
and international hackers. "Once, the FBI tricked two Russian computer
experts, Vasily Gorshkov and Alexey Ivanov into traveling to the United
States so they could be arrested rather than extradited" (Birdis).
Suspicions of information piracy have already begun to surround the early
stages of China's space plans. In March, two U.S. space companies, including
Boeing Co., agreed "to pay $32 million to the U.S. government in a civil
suit centering on 123 charges of violations of the Arms Export Control Act
and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations" (Space Wire). Chinese
officials have denied the charges, claiming that the accusations are not
based on facts. "The charges date from before Boeing's acquisition of the
satellite arm of Hughes Electronics.Hughes was reportedly charged with
providing technology on guidance systems, telemetry, aerodynamics, and
rocket failures that helped China's Long March program after launching
disasters in 1995 and 1996" (Space Wire). If these accusations are true,
they show Chinese initiative and willingness to exploit a valuable resource
in catching up in areas where the U.S. is far superior.
Conclusion
China's history is riddled with five-year plans and programs that did not
work. For the PLAAF to lead China's surge to global power, they must develop
incremental short-term plans to accomplish a variety of goals over a long
period of time.
First, the PLAAF must continue to develop the most important resource, its
people. Scientists and Engineers should be developed in a similar fashion to
a championship sports team, with an influx of "free agents" combined with
homegrown talent. These Scientists and Engineers then must enhance the PLAAF
with a fighter force capable of providing viable power projection in East
Asia.
Once China becomes exerts control over their region, the nation can then set
its sites on the "big picture", competing with the U.S. on a global scale.
To accomplish this, the PLAAF will continue to depend on traditional and
cyber-espionage to close the rift between the two nations. China's defense
investments will continue to be information systems heavy, as satellites and
high-tech monitoring equipment will dominate modern warfare. Wise
investments and solid focus over the long term are the key ingredients to
the building of a competitive PLAAF.
Notes
1. Here is an opportunity to employ the "Dreyer Rule."  China scholar June
Teufel Dreyer wrote, "Military statistic are, like most other statistics in
China, subject to considerable manipulation and distortion" (Dreyer2 316).
Whenever the state-controlled press announces statistics, the "Dreyer Rule"
should be invoked.
2. The Chinese refer to the Korean War as "War to Resist America and Aid
Korea" (He 13 May 2002).
3. China has possessed nuclear capabilities since 1964.  This article
assumes that the status quo is maintained because, "The pace and scope of
Chinese nuclear weapons modernization is in large measure dependent on what
happens outside China's borders (Johnston 549)."
4. For the record, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) also declined
to comment on Li's remarks, saying Li has the freedom to express his
personal opinions (Hsu 15 Aug).
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 wins a war by remaining defensive (Meilinger 15). 
Sun Tzu never suggests that one wins with defence.