Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: [LUNGO] Pax Romana e Pax Americana

Salve a tutti, segnalo un interessante testo di Walden Bello, direttore di
"Focus on Global South", che fa' un confronto tra Pax Romana e Pax
Americana. È un confronto tra le differenti strategie militari e
diplomatiche chesono state adoperate da questi due "stati globali".
Il link è 
http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2003/0305empire.html
Il testo è qua sotto:
Pax Romana versus Pax Americana: Contrasting Strategies of Imperial
Management
By Walden Bello | May 12, 2003
Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC)
Foreign Policy In Focus 
www.fpif.org
After its successful invasion of Iraq, the U.S. appears to be at the height
of its power. One can understand why many feel the U.S. is supreme and
omnipotent. Indeed, this is precisely what Washington wants the world to
think.
No doubt, the U.S. is very powerful militarily. There is good reason to
think, however, that it is overextended. In fact, the main strategic result
of the occupation of Iraq is to worsen this condition of overextension.
Overextension
Overextension refers to a mismatch between goals and means, with means
referring not only to military resources but to political and ideological
ones as well. Under the reigning neoconservatives, Washington's goal is to
achieve overwhelming military dominance over any rival or coalition of
rivals. This quest for even greater global dominance, however, inevitably
generates opposition, and it is in this resistance that we see the roots of
overextension. Overextension is relative--an overextended power may in fact
be in a worse condition even with a significant increase in its military
power if resistance to its power increases by an even greater degree.
This point may sound surreal after the massive firepower we witnessed on
television night after night over the past month. But consider the following
and ask whether they are not signs of overreach: the failure to consolidate
a pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan outside of Kabul; the inability of a key
ally, Israel, to quell, even with Washington's unrestricted support, the
Palestinian people's uprising; the inflaming of Arab and Muslim sentiment in
the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, resulting in massive
ideological gains for Islamic fundamentalists--which was what Osama bin
Laden had been hoping for in the first place; the collapse of the cold war
"Atlantic Alliance" and the emergence of a new countervailing alliance, with
Germany and France at the center of it; the forging of a powerful global
civil society movement against U.S. unilateralism, militarism, and economic
hegemony, the most recent significant expression of which is the anti-war
movement; the loss of legitimacy of Washington's foreign policy and global
military presence, with its global leadership now widely viewed, even among
its allies, as imperial domination; the emergence of a powerful
anti-American movement in South Korea, which is the forward point of the
U.S. military presence in East Asia; the coming to power of anti-neoliberal,
anti-U.S. movements in Washington's own backyard--Brazil, Venezuela, and
Ecuador--as the Bush administration is preoccupied with the Middle East; an
increasingly negative impact of militarism on the economy, as U.S. military
spending becomes dependent on deficit spending, and deficit spending becomes
more and more dependent on financing from foreign sources, creating more
stresses and strains within an economy that is already in the grip of
deflation.
Just a few days after its military victory over a fourth-rate power, we are
already witnessing the political quicksand that the Americans have stepped
into in Iraq, as fundamentalist Islamic political currents among the
majority Shiites appear to be the political inheritors of the deposing of
Saddam Hussein. If a stable, pro-U.S. order in the Middle East is
Washington's goal, then that is nowhere in sight. What is likely instead is
greater instability that will tempt Washington to employ more military power
and deploy more military units, leading to a spiral of violence from which
there is no easy exit.
Pax Romana versus Pax Americana
Nearly three millennia ago, another empire confronted the same problem of
overextension. Its solution enabled it to last 700 years. The Roman solution
was not just or even principally military in character. The Romans realized
that an important component of successful imperial domination was consensus
among the dominated of the "rightness" of the Roman order. As sociologist
Michael Mann notes in his classic, Sources of Social Power, the extension of
Roman citizenship to ruling groups and non-slave peoples throughout the
empire was the political breakthrough that won the mass allegiance among the
nations dominated by the Romans. Political citizenship combined with the
vision of the empire providing peace and prosperity for all to create that
intangible but essential moral element called legitimacy.
Needless to say, extension of citizenship plays no role in the U.S. imperial
order. In fact, U.S. citizenship is jealously reserved for a very tiny
minority of the world's population, entry into whose territory is tightly
controlled. Subordinate populations are not to be integrated but kept in
check either by force, or the threat of the use of force, or by a system of
global or regional rules and institutions--the World Trade Organization, the
Bretton Woods system, NATO--that are increasingly blatantly manipulated to
serve the interests of the imperial center.
Though extension of universal citizenship was never a tool in the American
imperial arsenal, during its struggle with communism in the post-World War
II period Washington did come up with a political formula to legitimize its
global reach. The two elements of this formula were multilateralism as a
system of global governance and liberal democracy.
In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, there were, in fact, widespread
expectations of a modern-day version of Pax Romana. There was hope in
liberal circles that the U.S. would use its sole superpower status to
undergird a multilateral order that would institutionalize its hegemony but
assure an Augustan peace globally. That was the path of economic
globalization and multilateral governance. That was the path eliminated by
George W. Bush's unilateralism.
As Frances Fitzgerald observed in Fire in the Lake, the promise of extending
liberal democracy was a very powerful ideal that accompanied American arms
during the cold war. Today, however, Washington or Westminster-type liberal
democracy is in trouble throughout the developing world, where it has been
reduced to providing a façade for oligarchic rule, as in the Philippines,
pre-Musharraf Pakistan, and throughout Latin America. In fact, liberal
democracy in America has become both less democratic and less liberal.
Certainly, few in the developing world see a system fueled and corrupted by
corporate money as a model.
Recovery of the moral vision needed to create consensus for U.S. hegemony
will be extremely difficult. Indeed, the thinking in Washington these days
is that the most effective consensus builder is the threat of the use of
force. Moreover, despite their talk about imposing democracy in the Arab
world, the main aim of influential neoconservative writers like Robert
Kaplan, Robert Kagan, and Charles Krauthammer is transparent: the
manipulation of liberal democratic mechanisms to create pluralistic
competition that would destroy Arab unity. Bringing democracy to the Arabs
is not even an afterthought as a slogan that is uttered tongue in cheek.
The Bush people are not interested in creating a new Pax Romana. What they
want is a Pax Americana, where most of the subordinate populations--like the
Arabs--are kept in check by a healthy respect for lethal American power,
while the loyalty of other groups--such as the Philippine government--is
purchased with the promise of cash. With no moral vision to bind the global
majority to the imperial center, this mode of imperial management can only
inspire one thing: resistance.
Challenges to the Empire
The present in Afghanistan is likely to be the future in Iraq--that is, an
inability to consolidate a stable political order, much less a truly
representative and democratic one.
The combination of their policies of internal repression and their failure
to come to the aid of the Palestinians and the Iraqis is likely to put the
Arab regimes allied to the U.S.--the most noteworthy of which are the
governments in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt--in an even more precarious
position with respect to the Arab masses. A strengthening of political Islam
is a likely result, and Islamic groups are likely to either come to power or
be serious contenders for power in many of these countries. Ironically, a
democratic opening up of the political systems in these countries--which
Washington is said to be desirous of--is likely to lead to this outcome,
even in Iraq, where the radical stream of Shiite Islamic politics is
dominant. The same boost to Islamic groups is likely to be the result in the
rest of the Muslim world, especially in two places considered extremely
strategic by the U.S.: Pakistan and Indonesia.
Like Washington's security, Israel's security, the enhancement of which has
been a primordial objective of neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and
William Kristol, will be compromised even further. This, as well as the
bigger frustration of failing to create a stable political base for American
hegemony via formal democratic mechanisms, will lead the U.S. to contemplate
an unpalatable choice: withdraw or impose direct colonial rule. It will,
however, try not to face this choice as long as possible and continue to
pour more money and resources to unworkable political arrangements.
At the same time, local variants of the new global civil society movement
for peace and against corporate-driven globalization will achieve power or
threaten to come to power in other parts of the world, particularly in Latin
America. The examples of Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela will become more
attractive as neoliberal economics becomes even more discredited in the
context of prolonged economic stagnation at the national, regional, and
global levels.
With the U.S. increasingly seen as a universal threat and with their
economic interests increasingly at odds with Washington, France, Germany,
Russia, and China will consolidate the balancing coalition that emerged
during the Iraq crisis. Some of the more weighty developing countries, like
Brazil, India, and South Korea, might eventually join this formation. This
balancing coalition is likely to be a permanent fixture, though its members
may change.
One consequence of this diplomatic alliance will be closer coordination in
military matters. Indeed, the formation of a European Defense Force distinct
from NATO is likely. Another will be increased military spending, arms
buildups, and arms research by members of the balancing coalition, whether
separately or in cooperation with one another. Still another will be greater
economic and technological cooperation to create the economic infrastructure
for protracted military competition. Ironically, Washington's crusade to
monopolize weapons of mass destruction will lead to greater investment in
the development of such weapons among its big country rivals, while not
stopping their development by smaller countries or by non-state actors.
Global economic stagnation and U.S. unilateralism will lead to a further
weakening of the IMF and WTO and a strengthening of trends toward
protectionism and regionalism. Regional economic arrangements, combining
trade preferences, capital controls, and technological cooperation will
become even more attractive in opposition to both multilateral free trade
arrangements and bilateral trade deals with the U.S. and the EU. Trade wars
will become more frequent and more destabilizing.
One actor will be central in all this: China. As the American economy is
mired in stagnation and Washington is overextended militarily and
politically, China will grow in relative strength. The unilateralists will
grow more and more preoccupied with China's growing strength and will
sharpen their political and ideological competition with Beijing. At the
same time, their options will continue to be limited given Wall Street's
increasing financial stakes in China, American corporations' increasing
dependence on investment in that country, and the U.S. consumers' escalating
reliance on imports from China, from low-tech commodities to high-tech
goods. Washington will not find an easy exit from its Chinese conundrum.
Finally--and ironically, given recent events--the UN will enjoy a new lease
on life, as countries realize that its ability to grant or withhold
legitimacy remains an important tool in international realpolitik. The role
of the UN as a mechanism for isolating the U.S. will be enhanced, and
Washington is likely to respond with even more vituperation and threats to
cut off funding, though it will not be able to boycott the organization.
Like Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy prior to the Second World War, the U.S.
is likely to be more and more isolated in the community of nations while
retaining the immense power to plunge that community into disorder.
One thing is certain: if the Romans were around today, they would come up
with one conclusion: this is no way to manage an empire.

 with one conclusion: this is no way to manage an empire.
Giusto, torno a ripetere che Traiano è meglio di Bush
Al di là delle osservazioni fin qui formulate, che paiono supportare questo
raffronto tra l'Impero Romano e gli USA (ma l'attuale politica USA mi ricorda
più quella Ateniese, come detto prima), devo però dire che vi sono delle
differenze fondamentali tra mondo antico e mondo moderno, che rendono questo
parallelismo affascinante, ed in alcuni punti giusto, un pò troppo audace.
Inoltre vi sono situazioni peculiarità tipiche del mondo moderno quali il ruolo
dell'Islam, attore allora non presente, o del mondo antico, quali il  ruolo
della cultura ellenistica in molti dei paesi assimilati, e così via, che rendono
la Pax Romana difficilmente riproponibile nell'attuale situazione.
Ciao
Gianfranco

 Giusto, torno a ripetere che Traiano è meglio di Bush
Perché?
ciao
k.

 dell'Islam, attore allora non presente,
In realtà qualcosa di simile all' Islam esisteva ed era l' Ebraismo (vedi I 
e II Maccabei, e Flavio Giuseppe)
Il precedente storico non depone a favore dell' Islam, comunque....
Saluti.
 
-- 
Dottor Piergiorgio d' Errico-Storico militare e Navale
Niitakayama Nobore ichi ni rei ya

 > Giusto, torno a ripetere che Traiano è meglio di Bush
Perchè nonostante sia stato dipinto come un rozzo soldataccio con una certa
propensione per i bei fanciulli Traiano era più che disposto a mediare
diplomaticamente, e lo dimostrò in varie occasioni nel suo regno; non mi pare
che Bush sia invece molto propenso ad abbandonare il suo "unilateralismo" come
lo chiama Bello.
D'altronde nel suo entourage vi era anche Adriano, a controbilanciare un falco
come Quieto.
Ciao
Gianfranco

 Il precedente storico non depone a favore dell' Islam, comunque....
Quando ho citato l'Islam, l'ho fatto proprio pensando all'Ebraismo di allora.
Visti i problemi che la religion ebraica (di diffusione alquanto limitata)
provocò all'Impero, ho pensato che l'Islam avrebbe provocato molto più seri
grattacapi ( e li provocò effettivamente nel VII sec.).
Insomma, ho il dubbio che la politica di assimilazione romana non avrebbe
funzionato altrettanto egregiamente con le grandi religioni monoteistiche (dopo
tutto fu il Cristianesimo ad assimilare l'Impero, non viceversa).
Perciò ho molti dubbi sulla capacità USA di assimilare al sistema occidentale
Irak e Afghanistan.
Ciao
Gianfranco

 occidentale Irak e Afghanistan.
E difatti penso proprio che gli amerikani abbiano in mente una soluzione 
titina (Divus Titus, non Josip Brosz) per l' islam....
Quanto si distinguerà da quella già effettuata da un altro popolo 
occidentale verso un popolo semitico, e' quello che mi fa pensare....


 titina (Divus Titus, non Josip Brosz) per l' islam....
Qui si fermano le somiglianze tra mondo classico e mondo moderno.
I Romani, quando trovavano una certa opposizione andavano giù con la mano
pesante, ne sanno qualcosa i Cartaginesi, ma anche i Galli, gli Iraeliti
ecc.; in effetti penso che quanto a violenza organizzata su grande scala,
prima dell'età moderna i Romani siano stati secondi ai soli Mongoli.
Certe procedure quali la deportazione o la riduzione in schiavitù di intere
popolazioni, l'uccisione indiscriminata dei civili delle città conquistate
ed altre simpatiche abitudini non sono certo applicabili nel mondo moderno
(almeno non nella scala applicata dai Romani).
Insomma, per applicare la soluzione del Divus Titus all'Islam gli USA
dovrebbero usare mezzi tali da essere definitivamente cacciati dal novero
delle nazioni civili, e comunque la stessa opinione pubblica americana si
ribellerebbe a tali metodi.
Sto insomma dicendo che certi metodi di sterminio, riduzione in schiavitù o
deportazione erano politicamente accettabili al tempo dell'Impero, mentre
ora metodi simili (possibili anche su scala più ampia a causa del progresso
tecnico) non sarebbero politicamente accettabili..
Tra l'altro gli stessi metodi "Titini" non furono efficacissimi contro gli
Israeliti, che ancora sotto Adriano si ribellarono, e dettero problemi e
grattacapi fin nel VI e VII sec.  oppure contro i resilienti Germani.
Insomma, se al posto degli Americani, mutatis mutandis ci fossero i Romani a
Baghdad non credo che se la passerebbero molto meglio.
Bisogna però dire che le legioni e le coorti ausiliarie, e gli stessi
comndanti romani (che erano spesso anche degli abili politici e diplomatici)
erano più abituati dei soldati degli eserciti moderni a svolgere compiti di
polizia e sorveglianza della popolazione ed a interagire positivamente con
essa (anche attraverso l'uso massiccio del matrimonio con ragazze del luogo,
a quanto sembra :-)).
Inoltre la prima preoccupazione di un comndante romano che avesse preso una
città senza spargimento di sangue (altrimenti il problema non si poneva ...)
era quello di ristabilire l'ordine pubblico, istituire un minimo di
autogoverno e far ritornare la vita alla normalità, anche riparando le
infrastrutture civili mediante l'uso della fanteria legionaria, che aveva
l'addestramento basico da geniere, ed ufficiali preparati tecnicamente a
tali lavori.
In Irak non sta avvenendo nulla del genere,  e scommetto inoltre che il
razzismo ha già cominciato a seminare discordia.
Comunque nutro una grande fiducia nella capacità della democrazia americana
di autoregolarsi; Bill Clinton non avrebbe mai permesso cose del genere e
sono convinto che il nostro beneamato cespuglio verrà mandato a casa alle
prossime elezioni; dopo di che il suo successore (e sono convinto che sarà
un liberal) dovrà liberarsi di due patate bollenti: Irak e Afghanistan, ma
questa è un'altra storia.
Ciao
Gianfranco