Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: Manchuria 1945 - the forgotten victory

Riporto quanto ho trovato su un libro World War II ON Land edited by
DAVID G. CHANDLER, Mallard Press circa una operazione della Armata Rossa
compiuta dopo la vittoria sulla Germania.
Mi scuso con coloro che non conoscono l'inglese, ma non ho tempo di
tradurre l'articolo..
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In august 1945, one of the least-studied but most spectacular campaigns
of the war was fought in Manchuria. In just two weeks the Soviet Red
Army overwhelmed Japan’s Kwantung Army and advanced up to 900 kilometres
into enemy territory. Far from the popular myfh of a bludgeon—like Red
Army, in this campaign the Soviets demonstrated the impressive skills
they had learnt fighting the Wehrmacht. and earned themselves a share in
the spoils of the Asian victory.
The Kwantung Army had been a crack force, but by 1945 it had fallen on
hard times. Over three-quarters of its troops were raw conscripts, while
its ‘Manchuko Empire’ auxiliaries were useless.TheArmy’s small number of
tanks were merely thinly armoured vehicles with one 57mm gun, unable fo
successfully engage Soviet tanks in combat. Similarly, the Japanese 37mm
anti-tank gun would only stop a Soviet tank in exceptional
circumstances. Twa divisions lacked anti-tank guns, transport or
artillery and none had heavy artillery. Completing this picture of
weakness, their planes were trainers with virtually no combat
capability. (nota che complessivamente  l’Armata Giapponese al momento
dell’attacco era composta da 1milione e mezzo di soldati)
Despite these weaknesses, attacking Manchurìa should not be dismissed as
an easy task; after all, the Japanese did not have a reputation for tame
surrenders. Manchuria was 1,200 kilometres from east to west, and
mountains (>1600m). Desert and major rivers all hindered Soviet access
to the region.
The Japanese planned fo make Manchuria’s geography work far them by
delayìng the enemy in frontier fortifications, and then withdrawing
hundreds of kilometres to the south where the pursuing, but hopefully
exhausted Soviets could be counterattacked.
A tremendous logistical effort enabled Soviet
Far Eastern Command to deploy numerically superior forces against Japan.
Entire armies had travelled 12,000 kilomefres, aver a million
railwaywagons had made the long journey on the Trans-Siberian and
thousand of new tanks were delivered to the front. The U.S.S.R. enjoyed
a qualitative advantage as well as a numerical one; Soviet guns, planes
and tanks were better than anything the Japanese passessed. The Soviet
‘workhorse’ tank, the T34, with a 76mm or 85mm gun, was superior to
Japanese tanks, while the JS2, with its 122mm gun, had no Japanese
rivals.
Needing a rapid victory to establish the U.S.S.R.’s credibilitiy as a
Far Eastern victor, Stalin imposed commanders who had succeeded against
the Wehrmacht, thus passing over men on the spot who doubted that speedy
victory was possible.
Far Eastern Commander Vasilevsky planned to ‘fix’ the Japanese with a
northern attack, while reserving his main effort for two pincer
movements from either side. This would be supplemented by seaborne
assaults. Vasilevsky didn’t just depend on numbers; an element af
surprise, the appropriate concentrations of resources and a rapid
exploitation would give Stalin the quick victory he required.
In 1941, the Red Army had learnt the hard way that surprise could act as
a force multiplier, so far this campaign they strove to disguise the
imminence and direction of their attack. Elaborate precautions were
token to hide the build-up, but knowing the Japanese had to notice
something, deceptions were planned. In the Maritime Provinces, Soviet
troops dug fortitications where they could be seen, civilians near the
frontier were not moved, normal leave was issued and troops were sent to
help with the harvest. Even forward reconnaissance was strictly
cantrolled - it was better attacking units should be ignorant at the
enemy than maskirovka, the Soviet term far deception and surprise, be
lost.
This should not have deceived the Japanese and, indeed, revised
intelligence estimates warned of an attack in September. Soviet forces
were not expected earlier, as summer is a period of seasonal rains over
most of Manchuria, There was also an element af wishful thinking in this
Japanese calculation, since they desperateIy needed Soviet mediation to
enable them to negotiate peace with the
U.S.A.
The Red Army also achieved surprise by attacking from an unexpected
direction. The attack mode by 36th Army down the railway towards HaiIar
was a feint designed fo draw attention from Trans-BaikaI Front’s main
thrust over the Great Hingan Mountains (over 1600m), which were
considered impassable by the Japanese.
 Further south, the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry Mechanized Group achieved
surprise by advancing across the Gobi Desert. In the east 1st Far
Eastern Front faced fortifications, wooded hills and numerous rivers,
considered by the Japanese an unlikely direction for a major attack.
Even at the tactical level the Red Army strove for achieve surprise. On
9th August many initial advances took place without prior artillery fire
and where artillery was used it was in a brief, ‘hurricane’ bambardment.
Infantry advances were small group infiltrations, not the human waves
typical of the Red Army earlier in the war.
Vasilevsky expected different types af advance from each of his three
fronts. Trans-Baikal Front was the key mobile thrust and consequently it
received a disproportionate allocation af tanks. Facing formidable river
barriers, 2nd Far Eastern Front obtained the services at the powerful
Amur River Flotilla.
In the east 1st Far Eastern Front had its artillery component
strengthened to enable it to deal with Japanese fortifications.
The spearhead af Malinovsky’s Trans-Baikal Front was elite 6th Guards
Tank Army, whose experience of mountain warfare in the Carpathians was
put to good use as it led the advance over the Great Hingan Mountains.
Attacking on a narrow front, it enjoyed a 15:1 advantage in tanks, total
control of the air and glonous sunny weather. Kravchenka’s tanks
advanced rapidly against feeble opposition, taking the Kharakhan Pass on
the evening of lOth August and gaining access to the central Manchurian
plain. Here the tanks ran out af fuel but, using the 400 planes of 453rd
Aviation Battalion, Malinovsky resupplied the force and the advance
resumed.
 Deploying a powerful forward detachment Kravchenko was able to keep the
bulk of the tank army in march formation, maximising its speed – in just
eleven days it covered 900 kiiometres.
To the south of Kravchenko’s army 17th Combined Arms Army (CAA) reached
the coast with little opposition. The 53rd CAA provided the second
echelon, advancing with relative ease behind 6th Guard Tank Army. Only
the 39th CAA, of all the armies of the main thrust, encountered strong
opposition: Japanese resistance in the Arshaan-Wuchakau area was fierce.
The thankless task af advancing down the route that the Japanese
expected Soviet forces to take was given to 36th CAA. As it crossed the
northern section of the Great Hingan. Japanese apposition was heavy.
Although advancing less spectacularly than the rest of the Front, 36fh
CAA’s achievement was in enabling other armies to advance relatively
unopposed.
Pliev’s Cavalry-Mechanized Group made the most exotic advance in
crossing the Gobi Desert. Careful logisfical support enabled it to
advance up to ninety kilometres a day and the only real resistance was
met northwest of Kaigan. Crossing the Great WaIl, PIiev met the Chinese
Communist 8th Route Army and was preparing for enter Beijing when the
campaign ended.
Meretskov’s 1st Far Eastern Front faced Japanese fortifications in
awkward terrain. Despite this his front penetrated up to 600 kilometres
into Manchuria, and the southern 25th CAA reached northern Korea.
A few months earlier 5th CAA had distinguished itself during fierce
fighting in the awkward terrain of East Prussia, and now they were to
assault in similar countryside north of Suifeno. Meretskov strengthened
the artillery and tank components of the army, making them the key
elements in the thrust towards Japanese 1st Area Army HQ at Mutankiang.
Krylov decided to forego the advantages af bombardment, partly as he
lacked information on enemy positions, and instead attacked in hilly
country north of the easiest route af advance. The ìnitial assault was
lead by small groups of about a hundred men taken from first echelon
rifle battalions. These units were balanced cambat teams whose task was
to infiltrate deep into Japanese defences. For the main thrust Kryilov
had 5.4 battalions, 218 guns or mortars and forty tanks or
self-propelled guns (SP) per kilometre.
Attacking in heavy rain at 1.00am an 9th August, 5th CAA caught the
Japanese by surprise. The assault groups recklessly penetrated deep into
the Japanese defences, leaving points of resistance to be taken by the
2nd echelon. For example, the ‘Camel’ strongpoint was taken by infantry,
supported by tanks and 152mm SP guns, later in the morning. By nightfall
leading elements of the 5th CAA were fifteen to twenty-two kilometres
into the Japanese rear. Having broken the initial Japanese defences, 5th
CAA deployed a powerful forward detachment af a tank brigade, two
battalions of infantry and a regiment of SP artiilery; this force,
reinforced when it faced serious oppasition, enabled the bulk of the
army to move forward rapidly in march formation. Defeating two Japanese
infantry divisions, 5th CAA, supported by the 1st  Red BannerArmy,
entered Mutankiang on 6th August.
At the southern end of the Front,  Chistyakovs 25th CAA demonstrated the
value of amphibious operations., while the rapid land advance was also
supplemented by several airborne assauIts. The biggest landing was at
Seishin, the second largest city in northern Korea. Three separate
landings- on l3th, l4th and I5th August- secured the city for the
advancing 393rd infantry Division. An infantry division, a marine
brigade and two maritime battalions held out until I6th August when
393rd Division arrived. Had the campaign lasfed longer, it would have
been evident that 1st Far Eastern Front had ruined Japanese hopes of a
defence based on northern Korea and precluded any chance of the Kwantung
Army receiving reinforcements.
The least spectacular role in the campaign was given to 2nd Far Eastern
Front commanded by Purkayev’s. He concentrated his forces for an advance
on three axis, ignoring most of the 2130-kilometre frontage. The Front’s
job was to ‘fix’ Japanese forces in the north while the two Soviet
pincers joined in central Manchuria.
A distinctive feature of Purkayev’s campaign is the use made of the
powerful Amur River flotilla. The l5th CAA crossed the Amur helped by
the flotilla, which then supported a 700-kilometre advance down the
Sungari River into Harbin. The 2nd Red Banner Army was the oniy Saviet
army unable to achieve surprise on 9th August. HeId up in the
Aihun-Sunwu fortified region until 2Oth August, they still managed to
push eiements of the army over the Lesser Hingan Mountains to Tsitsihar
by the end of the campaign.
Purkayev was also responsible for operations against southern Sakhalin.
Here, once again, the Soviets combined an overland advance with a
thirty-three-ship amphibious expedition. At the eastern extreme of the
Front’s extensive area, a division landed on Shumsu isiand and, by 3rd
September, Soviet forces had landed on all the Kuriles islands.
Japan’s formal surrender on l4th August did not immediately stop the
fighting in Manchuria. For a while it seemed that the Kwantung Army
would continue fighting, but wiser councils prevailed and on l9th August
Hata signed the surrender document at Vasilevsky’s HQ. The Soviet
advance continued; as the campaign ended ad-hoc airborne units occupied
Manchuria’s major cities.
The Kwantung Army had compounded an impossible task by responding
ineptly to the Soviet threat. Despite basic weaknesses, such as lacking
any aircover, (after two days combat Japanese planes were ordered out of
Manchuria), the Red Army shouId not have won so quickly. The problems
faced by 2nd Red Banner Army demonstrate that the Kwantung Army as a
whole could have mode things harder for the Soviets. Otuzu’s plan for a
fighting withdrawal was ruined by the disobedience of Ushikaru Jun,
commander of 3rd Area Army, who failed to pull back from the frontier
zone as ordered.
Nevertheless, the Soviet achievement should not be belittled because of
the errors of their opponents; after all, the Red Army had worked hard
to bring about these errors. The campaign was a virtuoso performance. It
achieved surprise at all levels, created purpose-built forward
detachments to maintain the momentum of the advance and displayed the
capacity to take the initiative at lower levels of command. Only the
precipitous end of the Asian War deprived the Red Army of recognition
for an impressive victory. Nevertheless, Stalin’s army had delivered the
rapid triumph his political objectives required, thereby enabling him to
underline the U.S.S.R’s claim to great-power status in the Far East.

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:3A13A8D0...@hotmail.com...
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ciao
l'ho postato in seguito ad una discussione che puoi leggere nel thread
"perche' gli USA sganciarono la bomba" ...  e in cui uno user sminuiva un bel
po' il significato dell'operazione arrivando a dire che il territorio su cui
si e' verificata la campagna era piatto e senza ostacoli naturali (!!!!!).
Mah.
Il libro l'ho trovato in una bancarella ma credo che si trovi ancora nelle
librerie specializzate.
Sergio

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:3A1D0EF9...@hotmail.com...
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Ma questo ha mai guardato un atlante ? :-))
Luca

Luca Bregoli wrote:
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certo. Ma si e' dimenticato di aprirlo :)