Newsgroup: it.cultura.storia.militare
Titolo: Stinger in Afganistan

Questa è una continuazione di una discussione intrapresa con Voorst,
putroppo mi sono perso gli ultimi post e mi scuso per il ritardo... una
volta a ciascuno :)
Per quanto riguarda l'impatto dell'introduzione dello Stinger in Afganistan
ti cito le seguenti righe dal libro "The Bear Trap" del Brigadiere Mohammad
Yousaf, Esercito Pakistano, analista e consigliere militare della guerriglia
islamica in Afganistan. Il libro contiene una buona dose di toni
propagandistici (incluso un panegirico della dittatura militare in Pakistan
e, ovviamente, un ritratto schifato della famiglia Buttho), queste sparate
comunque non diminuiscono il valore di un opera scritta da qualcuno il cui
lavoro quotidiano era organizzare l'assistenza alla guerriglia, aiuti USA
compresi.
"On 25 September, 1986, some thirty-five Mujahideen crouched excitedly in
the scrub on a small hill only a kilometre and a half NE of Jalalabad
airfield runway. It was mid-afternoon and they had been hidden in this
position for over three hours. They had done remarkably well to get so close
to the strip undetected as they were now well inside the Afghan defences.
The Commander, Engineer Ghaffar, could clearly see the soldiers in the
perimeter posts around the runway, just inside the boundary fence. At either
end of the strip were several tanks and APCs. Ghaffar had exceeded his
instructions in getting so close, but he knew the area intimately, and his
reconnaissance had confirmed a good covered approach that was useable even
by day.
I had personally selected Ghaffar for this operation, together with another
Commander called Darwesh, who had been assigned a similar task near Kabul.
For us it was a moment we had been anticipating for four years, a chance to
confront our most hated opponent of the war on equal terms. These two
Commanders had been entrusted to attack the helicopter gunship, or indeed
any aircraft, with the US Stinger anti-aircraft missile. On this first
occasion it had developed into an outright competition between these two
Commanders. Back at Rawalpindi, where they and their teams had been trained,
they had challenged each other as to who would get the first kill. To
encourage their enthusiasm I had gone along with their game, to the extent
of allowing Darwesh a two-day start on his rival as he had the longer
journey to Kabul. It was one of the crucial moments of the war. After years
of being unable to strike back effectively at the enemy in the air, the
Mujahideen had at last received a weapon worthy of their spirit.
The long wait for a suitable target was rewarded at 3.00 pm. All eyes gazed
up into the sky to pick out a magnificent sight - no less than eight
helicopters, all their hitter enemy the Mi-24 Hind gunship, were approaching
for a landing. With Ghaffar's group were three Stingers, whose firers now
lifted their already loaded launchers on to their shoulders and stood up.
Another Mujahid, armed with a video camera, was shaking with nervous
excitement as he tried to focus on the rapidly descending aircraft. The
firing parties were within shouting distance of each other, deployed in a
triangular pattern in the bushes, as it had not been certain from which
direction the target might approach. We had organized each team to have
three men the firer, and two others holding missile tubes for quick
reloading.
Although the Stinger has an effective ceiling in excess of 15,000 feet,
Ghaffar waited for the leading helicopters to begin their final approach.
The Hinds were about to be ambushed by the West's most sophisticated
shoulder-fired, man-portable air defence system. It was the Stinger's first
use against a real enemy anywhere in the world. The Stinger had become
operational in Germany in 1981, and with the 82nd Airborne Division in the
US the following year. Stingers had been taken into Grenada in October,
1983, during the US invasion of that island, but were never fired. It fired
an infra-red, heat-seeking missile, capable of engaging low altitude,
high-speed jets, even if flying directly at the firer. The missile carried a
high explosive warhead with significant countermeasure immunity. Once a
missile has locked on to a target no other heat source, such as flares, can
deflect it. The only possible way to avoid the lock-on is to keep so high as
to be out of range, or to dispense flares at such a rate that there is
virtually no interval between them. This entailed knowing when to start
firing flares and having an inexhaustible supply. On this occasion not a
single flare was fired as the eight helicopters came in. The attack would
have the added advantage of total surprise.
The three firers waited for Ghaffar's shout. They would then fire almost
simultaneously, selecting their own targets. Aiming and firing had been made
simple. The firer held the launcher, or grip-stock as the military called
it, on his shoulder. On top was the tube containing the missile, which
jutted out beyond the end of the grip-stock. The tube was left behind when
the missile was fired and would normally be discarded, but I had insisted
that these tubes must be collected and returned for security reasons. Also
it was proof that the Commander had actually fired his weapon, and so was
not hoarding or selling missiles. Without an empty tube I would not issue
more ammunition. Each Mujahideen selected a helicopter through the open
sight on the launcher, the IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system
signalled a hostile target with a pinging noise, and the Stinger was then
locked on to the heat of the aircraft. If the target was out of range no
lock-on could be achieved, or pinging heard. The trigger was pressed, the
missile fired, and the firer could immediately reload, take cover or move
away. It is a 'fire and forget' weapon, with no need to remain exposed to
guide the missile to its target. Nothing, short of a miracle, could stop the
missile. travelling at over 1200 miles per hour, from homing on its target.
When the leading Hinds were only about 600 feet from the ground Ghaffar
yelled 'Fire' and the Mujahideen's shouts of 'Allah o Akbar' rose up with
the missiles. Of the three, one malfunctioned and fell, without exploding, a
few metres from the firer. The other two slammed into their targets. Both
helicopters fell like stones to the airstrip, bursting into flames on
impact. There was a mad scramble among the firing parties to reload and
change over firers as everybody in the teams wanted their chance to shoot.
Two more missiles were fired, with another success and a near miss with a
helicopter that had landed. I believe one or two others were damaged due to
heavy landings as the frantic pilots sought to touch down in precipitate
haste. Five missiles, three kills - the Mujahideen were jubilant. "
Per quanto riguarda il problema del training ecco un'altra interessante
citazione:
"The first problem was training. Even with this weapon, we still insisted
that the Mujahideen be trained by Pakistanis, not Americans. This meant our
instructors had to be trained in the US. They flew there in June. Meanwhile
the Stinger training school was set up in my backyard, at Ojhiri Camp in
Rawalpindi, complete with simulator. In practice all training was carried
out on this simulator, with no live firing ever taking place before the
teams fired Stingers for real in Afghanistan.
Our main constraint was that we could not train more than twenty men at a
time, due to the limitations of the training equipment. The agreement with
the Americans was for an annual allocation of 250 grip-stocks, together with
1000-1200 missiles, so it would be some time before we could field
sufficient teams to absorb all the Stingers. There was no question of us
suddenly being able to swamp Afghanistan with the weapons. The build-up
would be more a gradual affair.
I personally interviewed and selected the majority of the Commanders for
training. I looked for men with a proven record on the battlefield,
particularly those who had performed well with the old SA-7. In the event,
half of the Stinger trainees were already competent SA-7 operators with one
or more kills to their credit.
US officials insisted on a four-week course for Mujahideen Our ten Pakistani
instructors, who had completed an eight-week course in America, felt three
would be sufficient. Our first courses were as long as was felt necessary to
produce competent operators. In the event three weeks was normally enough,
with some only lasting 15 days. The US sent over an officer to watch our
first course, and from him I learned that the average hit rate by American
troops trained on the Stinger was 60-65 per cent in a non-hostile situation.
They regarded this as satisfactory. From statistics we compiled later during
actual operations the Mujahideen's success rate was 70-75 per cent, while
our Pakistani instructors reached 95 per cent. "
E come giudizio complessivo sull'impatto degli Stinger nell'operazione:
"The use of Stingers tipped the tactical balance in our favour. As success
followed success, so the Mujahideen morale rose and that of the enemy fell.
We now had the Soviet and Afghan pilots running scared; they were on the
defensive. They became reluctant to fly low to push home attacks, while
every transport aircraft at Kabul airport and elsewhere had its landing and
take off protected by flare-dispersing helicopters. Even civil airliners,
which we did not attack, adopted a tight' corkscrew descent to the runway,
causing much nervousness and vomiting by the passengers. We had instructed
Commanders to hunt not only aircraft, but the crews as well. We wanted dead
pilots more than dead planes, as the former were far harder to replace than
the latter. We set out to kill or capture more pilots by training special
'hit' groups for this task, who accompanied each Stinger team whenever
possible. We even went to the extent of targeting pilots' messes at Kabul
and Bagram for stand-off rocket attacks. "
Saluti,
 Amedeo
P.S. Tra l'altro sto tentando di contattare un mio amico che ha un elenco
quasi esaustivo delle perdite della VVS e della DRAAF durante la guerra
afgana. Se potrò lo posterò in seguito.

 afgana. Se potrò lo posterò in seguito.
Bello!!!Rimango in attesa, cmq grazie per la fonte sugli stinger. Molto
esauriente.
Ciao
Voorst


Mi sembrano esagerate. Stime d'efficacia degli Stinger in Afghanistan lette
su diverse riviste vanno dal 40% all'80%. Comunque sia, mi sembra che,
propaganda a parte, l'impatto di questi missili sia stato tutt'altro che
trascurabile (tra l'altro i Blowpipe di fabbricazione britannica usati dai
Pakistani non hanno beccato un cavolo... non è che la tua fonte sulle
Falkland si riferiva all'unico kill in combattimento di un Blwopipe?)
Ciao
    Amedeo

... continuo a drogarmi con fantasmagorici errori di ortografia...


Il Blowpipe è un missile troppo complesso per un utilizzo da parte del medio
lanciatore afgano. C'è bisogno di un addestramento molto preciso e continuo
e da quello che ho letto i Pachistani lo hanno ridotto al minimo
indispensabile. E' vero però che l'utilizzo degli Stinger è talmente
intuitivo che anche le scimmie sono in grado di impiegarlo.
Ciao
Giuseppe Fassari


Il Blowpipe è un missile troppo complesso per un utilizzo da parte del medio


 Falkland si riferiva all'unico kill in combattimento di un Blwopipe?)
Possibile, debbo ancora controllare, ti farò sapere...
In effetti erano più presenti Blowpipe alle Falkand che gli Stinger...
forse ricordo male..anche se i sistemi non sono poi troppo differenti(tali
da definire uno 0% a un 60%medio in Afghanistan, non trovi?)
Ciao
Voorst

 intuitivo che anche le scimmie sono in grado di impiegarlo.
Cacchio, sono peggio di una Scimmia????
Io non l'ho trovato proprio così immediato, un minimo di addestramento è
necessario,
specie per avere decenti possibilità di non buttare al vento quei non meno
di 15 milioni
di lire al colpo...^__^
Ciao
Voorst

 da definire uno 0% a un 60%medio in Afghanistan, non trovi?)
Il Blowpipe è stato poco usato in generale. In Afganistan era solo in
dotazione a dei gruppi dell'esercito pakistano che ne hanno tirati una
dozzina senza effetto.
Ciao
    Amedeo

 intuitivo che anche le scimmie sono in grado di impiegarlo.
Hai notizie sull'utilizzo di Blowpipe da parte della guerriglia? Io ricordo
di aver letto di Strela (catturati), Stinger e, forse, Redeye.
ciao
    Amedeo

 di lire al colpo...^__^
Insomma, visto che siamo tutti (secondo la teoria evoluzionistica)
provenienti dai Primati, forse siamo un po' scimmie tutti quanti. Comunque
io stavo scherzando ed ovviamente mi riferivo ad un funzionamento generale
più semplice rispetto al Blowpipe.
Bye
Giuseppe Fassari

 di aver letto di Strela (catturati), Stinger e, forse, Redeye.
Anche quě dobbiamo andare con le pinze, nel senso che prima che iniziassero
le consegne in maniera continuativa degli Stinger, la guerriglia utilizzo un
po' di tutto, tra i quali ho letto anche dei Blowpipe passati dai pachistani
(od al limite impiegati da loro stessi) o perlomeno si sono avute delle
indicazioni in tal senso, ma nessuna visivamente certificata. Questi missili
perň si dimostrarono poco efficaci in relazione al teatro operativo,
soprattutto perchč richiedevano un addestramento superiore che gli afgani
non possedevano. Da questo stato di cose necessariamente precario, nacque la
richiesta per un missile efficace e di semplice utilizzo (soprattutto
robusto). Poi vennero gli americani... ed il resto č storia nota.
Ciao
Giuseppe

 Cacchio, sono peggio di una Scimmia????
:)

 Giuseppe Fassari
Certamente...era un commento "relativo":-)
Ciao
Voorst