Newsgroup: it.discussioni.folli
Titolo: "Against united Europe"

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/102oyzcv.asp
Hanno paura i bastardi, finalmente.
L.C.
^^^

Hanno paura i bastardi, finalmente.
Se qui accentuiamo le contrapposizioni, se permetti, inizio ad avere 
paura anche io. :|

 Hanno paura i bastardi, finalmente.
Era ora!
Ah, non mi va il brauser, che racconta il sito?

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 19:38:56 GMT, "Uahlim e/o non Uahlim!"
<ti....@liver.oilime> wrote:
] Ah, non mi va il brauser, che racconta il sito?
] 
] 
qui ci vuole un bel copia&incolla:
AMERICA WASN'T THE ONLY COUNTRY attempting a bit of nation-building
this turbulent summer. While U.S. troops and U.N. diplomats battled
insurgents in the streets and deserts of Iraq, European politicians
and bureaucrats, in the less demanding surroundings of Brussels
bistros and Provençal villas, were putting the finishing touches on a
project that might prove every bit as consequential as the liberation
of Baghdad. 
Next month the Europeans will attempt to mop up the last remnants of
opposition to a proposed new constitution for the European Union, the
first ever codification of a supreme legal authority for the current
15 and soon-to-be 25 members. For two years, in a conscious effort to
emulate the work of America's Founding Fathers, committed Europeans,
under the leadership of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French
president, have been at work in a constitutional convention to draw up
a document that would establish a new relationship between their
nations. In June these soi-disant successors to James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton produced a draft constitution that seeks to
construct in effect the basic institutions of a single European
superstate. In October, member governments will begin a lengthy
conference before deciding whether to approve the document. 
Of course, to skeptical electorates in the member countries, the
federalists strenuously deny that they are building a European
über-nation. It is merely a tidying-up exercise, they say; European
law already supersedes the laws of individual European nations in a
number of fields. The new constitution simply recognizes this in one
document. 
This is pure casuistry. The draft E.U. constitution--1,000 pages long
(imagine that debate in Philadelphia)--enshrines in law a single flag,
anthem, motto, and currency for the union. Less symbolically but more
significantly, it also creates a single president to replace the
current arrangement whereby the presidency rotates through the member
states every six months, as well as a single foreign minister to run a
single foreign policy. It establishes vast areas of European law where
nation-states cede ultimate legal sovereignty to E.U. courts. And it
creates a "charter of fundamental rights," which includes a long list
of such basic human freedoms as the right to be represented on
workers' councils--think Bill of Rights in socialist garb. Indeed the
true intent of these founding fathers was revealed by their original
proposal right at the outset of their proposed constitution--to rename
the E.U. the United States of Europe (USE). 
Not all governments are happy with these ideas--the USE moniker did
not survive, and the drafters will probably be forced to drop some of
their more ambitious proposals. But these will be mere tactical
retreats. This week, even Tony Blair's British government made clear
it would accept the basic principles. The constitution is expected to
be approved at a summit in Rome in December and then ratified by the
member states. By the end of 2005, the E.U. constitution will join the
euro--Europe's single currency, launched four years ago--as a central
pillar of an emerging European state. 
Americans can be forgiven for yawning at these developments on the old
continent. The internal deliberations of Brussels committees can send
the most engaged Europeans to sleep, let alone Americans. But even
those Americans who are paid to keep track of what Europe is up to--at
the State Department, in Washington's think tanks, and in the White
House--do not seem unduly animated. The new European Union that is
being born is nothing for the United States to get agitated about,
they say. Indeed, from President Bush on down, U.S. officials repeat
the old line that European integration will bring untold benefits to
the United States. Future Henry Kissingers will never again have to
complain about whom to call when they want to talk to Europe. 
If this complacency becomes official U.S. policy, it will be folly of
the highest order. The events of the last year should have
demonstrated the risks for the United States inherent in a united
Europe. 
The new Europe in the making is not the New Europe Donald Rumsfeld
hailed in the run-up to the Iraq war--an alliance of Atlanticist
nations like Britain, Spain, and the ex-Communist states of Eastern
Europe. It is likely to bear a much closer resemblance to the Old
Europe of Gaullist stripe, defining itself as a self-appointed
counterweight to U.S. power; Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder are
likely to be the main drivers of its political direction. 
CALM DOWN, say Europe's supporters in America. There are many reasons
why the United States should not get agitated at events across the
Atlantic. For starters, there is the "It will never happen, so why
worry?" argument. Whatever the ambitions of the Gaullist superstaters
at the heart of Europe, haven't the events of this year revealed that
the continent is simply too divided to have a meaningful European
foreign policy identity? 
It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a
setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have spent
much of the summer adding some entertainingly trivial ones. Last month
an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and Germany over
a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European
parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were traded, and the tussle
ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday
in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who can fear a united Europe? 
But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that,
despite enduring national differences, the European project goes on.
Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be breaking
apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the
face of public opposition. European strategists are animated by the
bicycle theory--if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off--and
they have no intention of falling off. 
In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that
kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the weight
of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the
mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the British prime
minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance
of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge, and the design
for the new euro was unveiled. 
There is a powerful dynamic at the heart of the E.U. that tilts the
whole process strongly towards closer integration--and towards a
particular sort of integration. It is a bargain between Germany, the
most federalist country, and France, which supports European union on
French terms, together with smaller countries such as Belgium that see
an opportunity to punch way above their weight in international
affairs if Europe is united. 
These countries are now eagerly pressing ahead with an embryonic E.U.
security policy, formed around a Franco-Belgian-German core. In
neither France nor Germany is there any talk of reorienting policy
post-Iraq towards Atlantic cooperation. Indeed, they take seriously
Jacques Chirac's notion of a new world in which Europe balances the
United States. 
Very well, say the doubters, but surely Iraq showed a new arithmetic
at work--one basically favorable to the United States. Whatever the
Franco-German dreams, European integration will be good for Americans
because, thanks to Tony Blair's Britain, Jose Maria Aznar's Spain, and
the entry next year of Eastern European countries, the E.U. is moving
in our direction. 
This is one of the most enduring and dangerous myths about Europe, one
sadly fostered by successive British prime ministers, including Blair.
If only Britain would put itself at the "heart of Europe," it goes,
Britain would lead it. This has never happened. Which is hardly
surprising. It is no accident that the countries that have resisted
most European moves towards integration have been the least
influential. In Europe, as in life, if you pay, you play. The
Franco-German axis, together with the deracinated, committed
Europeanists who make up the bureaucracy in Brussels, will always win
this game. 
As for the role of the new Eastern European members, optimism about
their influence is misplaced. Once inside the E.U., which has powerful
economic leverage over small, relatively poor countries, the magnetic
pull of Brussels overwhelms all. When in April the United States
offered Poland a sector to control in Iraq, the reaction in official
Europe was vicious. "One cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his
security to America," warned Romano Prodi, the president of the
European Commission. 
All right, say the non-worriers, but so what? Even if a new E.U. takes
the Franco-German tilt, does it really matter? Everyone knows, thanks
to Robert Kagan's analysis, that Europeans are ideologically committed
to weak-kneed multilateralism, that they are not really interested in
exercising power. What possible effect could a United Europe have on
America's ability to execute its intentions? As one conservative puts
it, "Why get upset about 10,000 Vanessa Redgraves marching through
Paris?" 
This "Europe as soft multilateralists" argument is only half right.
The E.U.'s increasingly urgent efforts to turn itself into a single
state expose a fundamental deception in the European project. The
Europeans are not multilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want
to turn Europe from an intergovernmental institution into a single
nation--with real power. It's true that even the French have no grand
design to take on the United States in some new superpower struggle.
But this misses the point. The kind of multilateralism they do believe
in is the one that uses institutions to hold American power in check. 
Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of Sniperpower,
constantly picking off parts of U.S. foreign policy objectives around
the world. It made life difficult enough over the Iraq war; it could
make life in post-Saddam Iraq much harder for the United States. It
could cause plenty of mischief in all corners of the globe. Imagine a
united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line against the United
States in the councils of NATO. Or throwing its sizable economic
weight around in Latin America or Africa. 
And one other longstanding goal of U.S. policy could also make
European awkwardness more of a constraint for America. It has long
been an axiom of U.S. policy that Europe should develop military
capabilities of its own--genuine ones that would enable Europe to
fight hot wars in difficult places and take some of the burden off the
Americans. This too has always been dubious policy. If a united Europe
really does develop enhanced capabilities, it is inconceivable that it
will not demand a bigger say in the decision-making in new
international crises. 
Finally, there are those who accept all these premises, but still say,
What can the United States do about it? U.S. intervention in a private
debate won't help--and will probably make matters worse. The one thing
that would make Europeans more determined to press ahead with their
project is the idea that the United States was trying to stop it. 
BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN Washington is powerless. It can do a number of
useful things. Above all, it can stop spouting the outdated Cold War
idea that an integrated Europe is in the best interests of the United
States. Can anyone now seriously believe that a single E.U. foreign
policy will be more helpful to the United States than a British, a
Polish, and a Spanish one? 
Second, it should strengthen its political and military ties with
Eastern Europeans. Moving troops out of Germany to Bulgaria, Romania,
and perhaps other countries is a smart move, as was offering the Poles
a leading role in postwar Iraq. 
Third, it should temper its enthusiasm for the development of stronger
European military capabilities. Franco-German-Belgian-Luxembourg plans
for a core E.U. military alliance can easily be laughed off. But in
these testing times, the United States should be extra careful about a
separate European identity within NATO. 
Fourth, it should oppose any plans to change the membership of
multilateral institutions to reflect a single "European" identity.
There should be no talk of a U.N. Security Council seat for Europe, or
the creation of a United States-Japan-Europe Group of Three in
international economics to replace the G7. 
Fifth, it should refrain from doing anything that might help push
Britain into the euro. Nothing would represent a more fateful step for
European integration than Britain's joining this ill-starred project.
U.S. officials sometimes argue that the U.K.'s membership in the
single currency would help American businesses. There is scant
evidence for this, and the impetus such a British decision would give
to European superstatehood cannot be overstated. 
In the end, U.S. policymakers should know that the biggest threat
posed for the United States by European ambitions comes from inside
Europe. Most ordinary Europeans are aghast at the sovereignty that has
already been handed over to Brussels. The dynamic of European
integration is not a popular one, but one driven by political elites,
and there is already evidence of mounting unease among the general
public. The euro, the biggest leap yet towards European statehood--and
the monetary and fiscal policies required to make it work--are causing
real stresses for Europeans. 
There are signs of broader political unrest--of a growing mood of
popular disenfranchisement, with increasing support for extreme-right
parties in France, Italy, Germany, and even Britain, as voters react
with irritation to the growing gap between the governing institutions
and the governed. In the last three years, voters in Ireland and
Denmark have rejected grandiose E.U. integration plans in referendums.
Polls going into Sweden's September 14 referendum on joining the euro
suggest the Swedes could deliver another rebuke to the
Euro-federalists. 
But still the European creators press on, continuing to shift power
away from communities, regions, and nations in favor of the emerging
supernation in Brussels. 
This is the ultimate irony. The Europeanists see themselves as
latter-day Thomas Jeffersons and George Washingtons, creating a new
state and a new continental global power. But they are closer in
spirit to George III and General Cornwallis--imposing a remote,
burdensome, and ultimately undemocratic authority on a reluctant
people. The risks for stability in Europe are obvious. It is not too
late for the United States to help stop the European superstate from
becoming a reality. 
Gerard Baker is associate editor of the Financial Times. 

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Tranquillo, c'è una fila lunghissima prima che arrivino a Bruxelles.


Che dire? Adesso si capisce perche' ci sono tante tensioni intorno alla
Costituzione Europea. Si facessero i cazzi loro una volta ogni tanto non
sarebbe cosi male. Comunque non siamo il sudamerica, qui i loro giochetti
NON funzionano cosi bene.
Dovremmo pero' aspettarci un po di attacchi terrostici "proattivi" a
sommarsi a quelli "naturali" arabi. Per capire cosa intendo per terrorismo
proattivo leggere: 
http://www.tmtmetropolis.ru/stories/2002/11/01/120.html
mah che noia sti americani, non cambiano mai....

 Se qui accentuiamo le contrapposizioni, se permetti, inizio ad > avere
paura anche io. :|
Ma si, dai, cazzo, facciamo la guerra nucleare U.S.A.-U.S.E. cosě vediamo
chi č il piů forte.
--------------------------------
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chi è il più forte.
Facciamo anche a chi ce l'ha più lungo?
E un bel concorso di bellezza "Miss Stati Uniti di..."?