Newsgroup: it.scienza.astronomia
Titolo: Nasa's Roadway....

E' passato un po' sotto silenzio, ma presso l'AIAA Space 2005
Conference & Exhibition il nuovo amministratore NASA Michael D.
Griffin ha delineato la roadmap che guiderà il ritorno della NASA sul
nostro satellite.
Ecco il testo del discorso, in inglese, ma molto, molto interessante.
*****
Eighteen months ago, President Bush committed this nation to a new
direction in space, and set forth a fresh, clear mission for NASA. The
President's directive gave all of us who are privileged to work in
this business a challenge bold enough to last a lifetime. Indeed, it
is a challenge big enough to last several lifetimes.
The Exploration Vision commits our nation to the exploration of the
Solar System, beginning with a return of humans to the Moon by the end
of the next decade, and from there to subsequent voyages to Mars. I'm
here today to discuss something of how we plan to reach these goals.
But let me start by discussing our progress in returning the Space
Shuttle to flight.
Three weeks ago, we viewed the successful conclusion of the STS-114
mission with the landing of Discovery at Edwards Air Force Base.
Commander Eileen Collins, her crewmates, and our entire Shuttle team
demonstrated tremendous skill and dedication throughout the mission,
as we tested the new Shuttle External Tank, and resupplied the
International Space Station.
Following Discovery's landing, the Los Angeles Daily News wrote an
editorial that expresses quite well, I think, the views of many of our
fellow citizens: "These men and women are our heroes, after all, for
braving the dangers and taking us into the wide, wondrous world of
space exploration and all of the discoveries it holds. We await the
next space mission with eternal hope and renewed anticipation.
Suddenly, the Moon and Mars seem that much closer, and within our
reach."
I agree with this, and for reasons beyond what that editor has noted.
The STS-114 crew are indeed heroes. In this era, with the technology
we can bring to the task, every man and woman who flies into space is
a hero for literally risking his or her life in support of the goal of
human space exploration. Their families are heroes for risking their
own emotional lives in support of their loved ones. Beyond that, every
man and woman who helps get them there is a hero, because although
they do not literally risk their lives, they are as much a part of the
effort as the few who get to fly, and they bear the terrible weight of
responsibility for having to be, literally, almost perfect in what
they do. They are all heroes for "getting back on the horse" that we
all know will throw us again, and again, and again. This is how it was
as mankind learned to conquer the air, and it will be the same as we
learn to conquer space. The Moon and Mars are not closer because the
STS-114 crew lived to tell their tale. But they are closer, maybe,
because we at NASA, on behalf of America as a whole, are willing to
confront our mistakes, remember them, learn from them, and take
another halting step forward.
As we all know, the STS-114 mission was not without flaw. Clearly,
there remains much to learn about eliminating debris from the
Shuttle's External Tank. We must learn it before we can launch the
next mission, and resume using the Shuttle to assemble the
International Space Station. But overall, in my opinion, it was a
superbly executed test flight, and it furnished us with our first real
data in connection with our efforts to improve the design of the
External Tank.
And maybe we need to understand, down deep, that every flight we fly
is a test flight, because our naivete in talking about "operational"
flights brings with it a relaxation of rigor we can't afford. Let this
be one of the "lessons learned": we humans do not yet have the
technology for "operational" spaceflight. We will. We're learning. But
we don't have it yet.
That said, however, it remains true that the STS-114 mission gave us
many reasons for optimism. But despite this, some observers see NASA's
glass as being half-empty. There have been calls for an immediate end
to the Shuttle program, and abandonment of the International Space
Station.
In my opinion, it is time for us to remember that, by definition,
major decisions have enduring consequences, not easily undone. The
decision some 35 years ago to make the Shuttle the centerpiece of
America's manned spaceflight program was of this nature. Today, we are
largely agreed that it is necessary to retire the Shuttle. So, in
accordance with the President's direction, we will fly out the Shuttle
program in an orderly, disciplined fashion, with retirement not later
than the end of 2010. Terminating the Shuttle program abruptly at this
time, while superficially attractive from some points of view, carries
with it grave consequences for American preeminence in space, and
would be utterly devastating to the workforce we will need to carry
out any future human spaceflight program.
Those who are my age, or thereabouts, lived through the consequences
of the same abrupt program termination that is now recommended by some
in our midst. From 1975-1981, between the retirement of the
Apollo-Saturn system and the first flight of the Shuttle, the United
States did not have the capability to send humans into space, our
country was not driving the space exploration agenda, and our
aerospace workforce was decimated. We lost valuable people from the
program, people who never came back. We lost valuable skills that were
relearned with difficulty, or not at all. We lost momentum.
Some fifteen miles north of here is the site of the historic North
American Aviation plant in Downey, once home to the people who built
the Apollo Command and Service Modules, and the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
Today, you will find a shopping center and a movie production lot
where the folks in the Downey facility once focused on the real stars.
This is what happens when we lack continuity and thoughtful policy
direction in the space program. We've abandoned too many facilities
like Downey, and the aerospace workforce that filled them, in the
course of the last several decades because we've had no coherent sense
of direction in space policy. We have one now. But it will require
some time, and much discipline, to work our way out of the
difficulties which confront us today, these difficulties being a
direct result of a long history of neglect of, and poor decisions
concerning, the U.S. civil space program.
Let us learn from these experiences. Let us not repeat them. Let us at
least make a new mistake. Thus, given where we are today, carrying out
an orderly retirement of the Shuttle is the best that I believe NASA
can do for the nation. We have carefully reconsidered the Station
assembly sequence, and if we utilize the Shuttle fleet in a
disciplined, measured fashion over the next five years, we can
essentially complete that assembly. We can meet our obligations to the
international partners and effect a transition to the Shuttle's
successor. If feasible, we will conduct a mission to service the
Hubble Space Telescope. But we will no longer adhere to a plan
requiring a fixed number of Shuttle flights. Instead, we will be
prepared to complete ISS assembly using the Shuttle's successor,
should that be required.
I am gratified that during the recent Discovery mission, President
Bush again recognized the importance of moving forward by saying, "It
is important for our fellow citizens to understand that we're going to
take the NASA mission beyond the current mission...It's important for
the American people to understand, that, one, exploration is
important; two, there will be some good coming out of exploration;
and, three, that we've got a new vision embraced by NASA and its
pioneers."
So what are the next steps?
After the return of the Space Shuttle to flight, the next step in the
President's Vision for Exploration is the completion of the
International Space Station. Here again, I must note that the decision
to build this facility in accordance with its present partnership
arrangements was made over a decade ago, and that decision too carries
with it major consequences and obligations not lightly dismissed.
These arrangements have resulted in the creation, by scientists and
engineers in many nations, of many dozens of peer-reviewed research
programs which, if the ISS is abruptly terminated, will never fly. The
work we expected to do with the Space Station would go largely undone.
After getting most of the way to the finish line, we will have missed
the opportunity to use the Station to learn how to live and work in
space.
But the Station is expensive to sustain, if we continue to rely upon a
government-only approach to that effort. As I stated earlier this
year, one strategy NASA will employ to meet our future needs is to
utilize, to the fullest extent possible, commercially-developed cargo
resupply and, ultimately, crew rotation capabilities for the
International Space Station. Indeed, we will issue this fall a request
for proposal for such capabilities, with the development to be done on
a commercial basis, much like that in the commercial communications
satellite market. This is a priority for NASA. Utilizing the market
offered by the International Space station's requirements for cargo
and crew will spur true competition in the private sector, will result
in savings that can be applied elsewhere in the program, and will
promote further commercial opportunities in the aerospace sector.
After completion of the ISS, we can turn once again – for the first
time in decades – to the challenge of exploration beyond low Earth
orbit. The basic element of our architecture for exploration is, of
course, the launch system. Recognizing the need to obtain the maximum
possible efficiency from the nation's space launch systems, the
President's National Security Policy Directive requires NASA and the
Department of Defense to coordinate their plans and requirements in
this area. Thus, since commencing my tenure as Administrator, I have
worked with my DoD colleagues on this crucial topic. On August 5th,
Ron Sega and I formalized these results with a letter outlining our
agreement on our respective requirements for future launch systems.
Responding to the policy, the agreement stipulates that separating
human-rated space exploration from unmanned payload launch will best
achieve reliable and affordable assured access to space, while
maintaining our industrial base in both liquid and solid propulsion
launch systems.
The major strategic elements of the use and development of national
launch systems are:
First, both NASA and DoD will utilize the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle for national security, civil, and science missions in the 5-20
metric ton class to the maximum extent possible. Where practical, this
will include cargo missions to the Space Station. However, and as
specified by policy, new commercially-developed launch capabilities
may compete for these missions, in accordance with our intended
approach to Space Station re-supply.
Second, NASA will initiate development of a Crew Launch Vehicle,
derived from Space Shuttle solid rocket boosters with a new upper
stage, for human spaceflight missions. Consistent with my belief that
we can't afford to have a four-year gap in our nation's human
spaceflight capability, we will bring this vehicle online in the
2011-12 time frame.
Third, NASA will develop a new 125 metric ton class launch vehicle for
future missions to the Moon and Mars, derived from existing Shuttle
external tank and solid rocket booster capabilities.
The agreement also calls upon NASA and DoD to explore mutually
beneficial cooperation for new upper stage development, advanced
materials, other new propulsion technologies, and potential
ride-sharing on manned and unmanned missions. The NASA-DoD agreement
complements the work initiated last April within NASA to design an
architecture allowing U.S. astronauts to make the seventh human lunar
landing before the end of the next decade. Together with the heavy
lift launch vehicle, the crew launch system will enable a return to
the moon of a lunar landing craft and other equipment. We will employ
a combined earth orbit rendezvous and lunar orbit rendezvous approach
for these lunar missions.
The spacecraft and systems we will develop will build upon the
foundation of the proven designs and technologies used in the Apollo
and Space Shuttle programs, while having far greater capability. They
will be able to carry larger and heavier cargos into space, allowing
more people to remain on the moon for longer periods of time. Even on
the initial missions, we will take the entire crew of four astronauts
to the surface instead of two, remaining on the surface for a week
instead of a few days, while the crew exploration vehicle remains
unoccupied in lunar orbit. Going well beyond Apollo, we will have the
ability to land and conduct exploration activities anywhere on the
moon, including on the far side or in the polar regions.
In our planning, we wanted to ensure that we were designing systems
with the maximum possible applicability to future missions to Mars.
Nowhere is this more important than for the core heavy-lift
transportation system. Knowledgeable analysts are aware that a voyage
to Mars will require a spaceship on the order of 500 metric tons, more
than half of it fuel, in low Earth orbit. The Shuttle-derived heavy
lifter we are developing for missions to the Moon will support the LEO
assembly of such a vehicle in a matter of months, with no more than a
half-dozen assembly flights, utilizing Launch Complexes 39-A and -B at
the Kennedy Space Center.
Earlier, I made reference to the decisions in the American space
policy arena concerning the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs
whose consequences have spanned decades. In our future planning, we
should recognize that history is full of such crossroads, of
opportunities for bold steps either taken or not taken, with
consequences that can last not for decades, but for hundreds of years.
The decision to explore and extend the frontiers of one's own time, or
not, is just such a crossroad.
Today, we live in a world with only one superpower, the United States.
It was the same in the 15th Century, except that the superpower was
China. The Ming Dynasty had a fleet of 1,500 ships, the largest of
which rivaled the size of an aircraft carrier today. Because of the
fleet, the influence of China reached to the Philippines, Malaysia,
India, and as far as the east coast of Africa to the Cape of Good
Hope. Indeed, some believe that the Chinese reached the west coast of
the Americas.
Eventually, the leadership of the Dynasty fell to a young emperor, at
which point certain elements of the Chinese ruling class advised the
new emperor that the fleet was a wasteful indulgence. The emperor was
told there was nothing in the world to match Chinese culture, and was
advised that the highest priority was to protect what China had from
the influence of foreigners. The Emperor followed this advice,
ultimately burning the fleet. And Chinese influence in the larger
world waned for centuries.
Now consider Portugal. Looking at a map, it is hard to imagine that a
country the size of Portugal could ever have a significant influence
on world culture. But precisely because Portugal made a commitment to
sail the high seas in search of trade, treasure, discovery, and glory,
the Portuguese influence can be seen in such diverse places as Macau,
West Africa, India, and of course Brazil.
Perhaps all of us would be speaking Portuguese today, but eventually
Portugal tired, and England made an even greater commitment to the
exploration, discovery, and settlement of new territories. The
decisions that nations make to explore, or not, matter.
The human imperative to explore and settle new lands will be
satisfied, by others if not by us. Humans will explore the Moon, Mars,
and beyond. It's simply a matter of which humans, when, what values
they will hold, and what languages they will speak, what cultures they
will spread. What the United States gains from a robust program of
human space exploration is the opportunity to carry the principles and
values of western philosophy and culture along on the absolutely
inevitable outward migration of humanity into the solar system and,
eventually, beyond. These benefits are tangible and consequential. It
matters what the United States chooses to do, or not to do, in space.
It is our nation's privilege and obligation to lead yet another
opportunity to explore places beyond our own, and to help shape the
destiny of our world for centuries to come. We in our generation are
uniquely privileged to be given the challenge of initiating a
visionary program of exploration and discovery on behalf of the
American people and the world. As you leave this conference, I hope
you will take some time to ponder the enormity of the task ahead, and
to contemplate the fundamental reasons why American leadership in
space is so vital.
I thank you for your commitment to American leadership in space, and I
look forward to working with you in the months and years to come. 
-- 
Marco Zambianchi
Gruppo Astrofili DEEP SPACE member
Italian Space Society member
British Iterplanetary Society Member

 Ecco il testo del discorso, in inglese, ma molto, molto interessante.
se una marea di cazzate... Gli usa non credo torneranno mai più sulla luna,
e poi pensino a fronteggiare gli uragani.
-- 
You_fuck_with_the_bull-You_gonna_get_the_horns