document: As Alberto Fujimori prepares to take over as Peru 's next president on July 28 , the question of whether the Shining Path will hound his administration as it has the previous two ranks high among his concerns . Among Shining Path watchers -LRB- `` Senderlogos '' -RRB- there is strong disagreement on fundamentals : Is the Shining Path getting stronger or weaker ? Is it making progress or losing ground among the population ? And finally , who is actually winning the war ? There are no easy answers . There is not much of a dispute on the basic data , however . The Shining Path went to war in 1980 , on the same day Peru was holding general elections after 12 years of a military dictatorship . Its first actions were cautious , modest and often ludicrous in a crazy way -LRB- like hanging dogs from lampposts , with scribbled insults over them to Chinese Communist martyrs -RRB- . But the actions intensified and soon became quite lethal . While President Fernando Belaunde 's regime did what it could to maintain democratic legality at first , it was quite unprepared to deal with any insurgency -- especially with one that had been meticulously planned and organized several years before the first shot was fired . In October 1981 , emergency laws were imposed for the first time on part of Peru ; they covered only 2 % of the population . Now about 50 % of all Peruvians live under emergency law . In 10 years , the war between the Shining Path and the government has cost about 20,000 lives . Damages are estimated at $ 16 billion , or about 85 % of Peru 's annual gross national product . If the armed forces have been rightly accused of systematic violations of human rights -LRB- Peru ranks as one of the world 's worst human-rights offenders -RRB- , the military faults the civilian authorities for failing to provide much-needed leadership . Mr. Belaunde -LRB- the first to deal with the problem -RRB- , who tried to ignore the insurgency out of existence , is regarded as a well-meaning but inept leader . There are no kind words for Mr. Garcia , on the other hand . In the first weeks of his mandate , he made several right moves -- like emphasizing his role as commander in chief of the armed forces and reorganizing the corruption-ridden police . But things began to unravel soon after . At first , he tried a liberal approach , looking for a dialogue with the fanatical Shining Path , and sending scores of young professionals to the emergency areas to attack what he said were the `` root causes '' of the insurgency . But dialogue was disdainfully rejected : Dozens of these professionals were assassinated , and the armed forces slowed down their actions , while the rebels made largely unimpeded progress . Then , Mr. Garcia tried a tougher approach , and human-rights violations surged to their current level . And for the first time , death squads -- linked by some analysts to Mr. Garcia 's APRA Party -- began to contribute to the killing . Midpoint during his term , Mr. Garcia lost all hope of defeating the Shining Path , and decided just to coexist with it , says Rafael Merino , a respected analyst on security matters . Not even in that was Mr. Garcia successful , as violence climbed steadily during the second half of his term . In 1988 , 1,986 people were killed as a result of insurgent or counterinsurgent actions ; in 1989 , 3,198 were killed ; and 1,730 during the first six months of 1990 . How well is Mr. Fujimori expected to deal with the insurgency ? His campaign pitch advocated an approach closely resembling that of Mr. Garcia 's first year . According to Francisco Loayza , Mr. Fujimori 's adviser on internal-security matters , military actions against the Shining Path should be subordinated to economic-development initiatives . '' -LCB- The military -RCB- should mainly provide security for development projects , '' Mr. Loayza says . He stressed that the main thrust of Mr. Fujimori 's `` pacification '' policies would be to address the `` structural violence -LCB- read : social injustice -RCB- that makes subversion possible . '' Mr. Loayza says that President Garcia 's approach failed because of corruption and ineptitude . He also feels that the Shining Path is weakened , and that an important Shining Path faction would be willing to engage in peace talks . This is only wishful thinking , according to Mr. Merino : `` If President Fujimori thinks he 'll finish the war through those ` pacification ' policies , it will be like riding into battle with no better dress or weapons than a tuxedo . '' Actually , Mr. Fujimori might end up implementing internal war policies that would be quite different from those advocated during his campaign . At least , that 's what seems is going to happen with the economy , where the vote-getting populist message appears in the process of being replaced by a far more orthodox approach . Free-market economist Hernando de Soto , who has been advising Mr. Fujimori during the past month , thinks that might be the case . `` He learns fast , '' Mr. de Soto told me recently , `` and he has all the right instincts . '' Even if Mr. Fujimori proves to be a quick learner , he will have his work cut out for him . Running against all major trends of contemporary history , the insurgents have followed Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman with the commitment that the faithful reserve for their prophet . This was evident when walking through their safe house in Lima . It looked , said a Peruvian journalist , like the seed for the future `` Museum of the Revolution '' -- wood carvings ; woven baskets ; tapestries ; paintings ; chiseled stone ; all meticulously , lovingly crafted with the mythified motifs of the internal war . There were also the hagiographic representations of Mr. Guzman himself , in the various postures that endeavored to combine the heroic with the intellectual . A whole closed , inbred culture , developed in the underground and unnoticed by most Peruvians -- except when it explodes in their faces . -- Mr. Gorriti is a Peruvian author and journalist .
extractive_keyphrases: shining path alberto fujimori peru next president democratic legality emergency laws armed forces president garcia