document: Confounding predictions of its demise four years ago during the worst diamond slump since the 1930s , De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. , the South African concern that controls 80 % of the world 's uncut-diamond market , is thriving . The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is floundering , and the international tin cartel has collapsed . But De Beers not only halted a fall in rough-diamond prices , it raised them an average 14.5 % last year . Sales still soared 40 % to a near-record $ 2.56 billion , double the $ 1.26 billion posted in the 1982 doldrums . De Beers managed the comeback by convincing diamond producers , dealers and the jewelry industry that its marketing muscle was indispensable . `` Selling diamonds is the business of dealers and jewelers ; helping them to sell more is ours , '' says Stephen Lussier , a De Beers marketing executive . De Beers helped with an advertising and promotion budget that swelled to $ 110 million this year , up from $ 43 million in 1980 . Supplemented by $ 20 million spent by the diamond trade , the De Beers campaign helped raise world sales of diamond jewelry to 47 million pieces valued at $ 21.6 billion in 1985 , up from 42 million pieces valued at $ 16 billion in 1979 . Figures for 1986 are n't yet available , but De Beers says it was another record . The promotional budget covers market research , a world-wide network of as many as 200 public-relations officials , and advertising campaigns coordinated by the agencies N.W. Ayer & Son in the U.S. and J. Walter Thompson Co. in 27 other countries . The master sales plan began in 1938 , when former De Beers Chairman Harry Oppenheimer asked Ayer to woo American couples to buy expensive diamond engagement rings . Today the U.S. is the world 's No. 1 market , with $ 8 billion in annual retail diamond jewelry sales , or about a 40 % share , even though a 1971 antitrust law prevents De Beers from operating directly there . About three-fourths of American women own diamond engagement rings that cost an average $ 1,300 . De Beers 's strategy is two-pronged , says Mr. Lussier . General `` diamond image '' advertising aims at perpetuating the mystique of quality diamonds as `` the ultimate expression of love , '' he says . De Beers applied similar promotional techniques world-wide . One out of 17 Japanese couples bought engagement rings two decades ago . Now two-thirds do , and Japan is the second-largest diamond jewelry market , followed by West Germany . De Beers 's Central Selling Organization , known as the Syndicate , is the pipeline between diamond mines and dealers based mainly in Antwerp , Belgium ; Bombay , India ; Tel Aviv , Israel , and New York . As the sole middleman , De Beers usually avoids the acrimony that has divided other cartels . The Syndicate has purchase contracts with De Beers 's own mines in South Africa and Namibia -LRB- a territory controlled by South Africa -RRB- , other African states such as Botswana , Zaire and Sierra Leone , and Australia . De Beers offers its cache to select dealers 10 times a year at sales known as `` sights . '' Each dealer gets a box containing uncut diamonds . The dealer must accept or reject the entire box , valued at between $ 1 million and $ 25 million . If the dealer refuses to buy , De Beers may never invite him back . This ritual has enabled De Beers to maintain price stability . The cartel has n't cut prices since it was founded more than half a century ago . Despite grumbling , diamond dealers generally believe that a healthy international diamond market depends on the Syndicate . OPEC members `` tend to do what they like , '' says Jo Flies , chief economist of the Antwerp Diamond Council . But De Beers is unique , he says , in influencing production and consumption of diamonds . `` People mesmerized by the producers ' cartels forget that De Beers is an aggressive , ruthless and effective sales organization , '' says a London dealer . Some analysts warn , however , that De Beers 's future may be affected by the surge in diamond output elsewhere , notably Australia . World diamond production has soared to 88 million carats from 47 million carats in 1982 . A carat equals 1/142 of an ounce . About 20 % of the prize diamonds are produced in southern Africa , but the market is being flooded by cheaper diamonds mainly from Australia and Zaire . The Soviet Union , which produces an estimated 12 million carats of top-grade diamonds annually , is another unknown . De Beers has a sales arrangement with the Soviets , but Moscow has dumped diamonds before and may prove difficult to keep in line . Angola left the cartel last year , partly because it is involved in a bitter war with South African-backed rebels . Other African nations in the cartel want more control over distribution , dealers say . `` De Beers ca n't stop evolution , '' says Jack Lunzer , chairman of IDC Holdings Ltd. , a London-based diamond firm that sells diamonds for Guinea , an African nation that is n't a cartel member . While sales independence from De Beers `` could be disastrous '' for the market , Mr. Lunzer says , that wo n't deter those producers who want `` more information and knowledge about final sales of their material . '' But the fate of De Beers , South Africa 's most famous company , will depend largely on developments in that troubled country , dealers say . International sanctions , including a possible U.S. import ban on South African diamonds , pose a growing threat . Recent history indicates , however , that it would be hasty to write off the cartel . In 1981 , Zaire , which mines 22 % of world diamond output , left the cartel . Australia was about to open a huge diamond mine and a speculative boom had led to widespread dealer bankruptcies . The monopoly was threatened with extinction . While average prices of De Beers 's rough diamonds rose 37 % , prices of polished diamonds in dealers ' stocks collapsed . The top-grade investment diamond , D-Flawless , tumbled to around $ 8,000 a carat in 1985 from an average of $ 55,000 in 1980 . In a series of shrewd moves , De Beers forced Zaire to rejoin the cartel by dumping diamonds . Meanwhile , diamond demand by consumers increased , fueled by De Beers 's promotion campaign and favorable economic trends . Dealers say trade is buoyant again because of lower interest rates and a weak dollar that makes dollar-priced diamonds cheaper in Japan and Europe . Since November 1985 , prices of D-Flawless diamonds have risen 56 % to around $ 14,000 a carat . `` De Beers is powerful ; it is everywhere , '' says Alfred Lachowsky , chairman of the Antwerp Diamond High Council . The cartel will continue to control world diamond markets , Mr. Lachosky says . `` You ca n't mix diamonds with oil . ''
extractive_keyphrases: diamond producers diamond trade world diamond markets promotion campaign world diamond production south african concern diamond jewelry de beers campaign
abstractive_keyphrases: uncut-diamond market rough-diamond prices de beers consolidated mines ltd.