Patent ID: 12190185

Corresponding reference numerals indicate corresponding parts throughout the several views of the drawings.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Example embodiments will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings.

Proof of identity in the physical world typically requires the physical presence of the individual as shown as1atFIG.4in combination with the presentation of an approved/trusted form of identification, such as a picture ID. This form of physical identity proofing, having evolved over many years, generally provides an adequate level of proof for most types of transactions where proof of identity is required (e.g., financial transactions, border crossing, etc.). But as teenagers in search of alcohol have shown, nothing is simpler than creating a fake ID.

Improving on the principles shown atFIGS.1-33and described in the background section, as shown atFIGS.4-8, a new technology of smart card2as shown can be created where, as shown by arrow6, it alone sends directly all of the required identification to a computer system/host3, who passes it to a server4and/or a host such as a card reader. The information transferred by arrow6can directly be a multi-factor piece of information (e.g., either biometrics+passcode, biometrics+OTP Code, passcode+OTP Code, etc.).

As shown atFIG.4, a user1is paired5to a multi-purpose smart card2with trusted bond11. Once paired5and the bond11established, the card2send information6at once to the computer system3, or send7information relating to the bond12to the computer system3, the server4or any other location. The general principle is that the new card2has a capacity to not only interact with the user1in an ordinary means5where data can be transferred, but once the card is paired5to the user1, a temporary and severable bond11can be created and established and used alone or in conjunction with the paired5situation. The same way, data linked with this established bond12can be transferred alone or in conjunction with normal authentication. More is described below once the hardware is explained.

Hardware

Generally, a system of use 100 of the multi-purpose card2is shown atFIG.4generally. This card is also shown in close-up atFIG.5. As shown generally, the card includes a top layer31and a bottom layer32. Part of the system100includes environmental conditions such as a local wireless network9often found at any place of employment, place of interest (e.g., the Starbucks® employee free network). These days, GPS or normal 5G telecommunication networks8also have a reach in the environment where the system100operates. Also, the inventor noted how RFID or Bluetooth short distance data transfer or data connection systems10also are found in this environment of use of the system100. Also contemplated and not shown is any type of environmental wave or energy (e.g., radio waves, solar waves, heat waves, etc.) that can ultimately be caught and interact with any receiver or transceiver located in the card2in the environment. To understand generally how the system100works, a trusted bond11is created between a user1and his/her card2in addition to any ordinary means of communication and pairing5such as contact, scanning, etc. The trust can be built using multiple ways described below which in part rely on many factors including environmental8,9,10factors.

Said otherwise, the system100is a dynamic environment where external sources or transfer paths are in direct or semi-direct relationship with the card2and computer systems associated thereto. For example, and to name a few, card2could be used to allow an elevator to access a secured floor in a building. As part of this example, the elevator command bay is element3which is connected to a back-end server4remotely. As the elevator moves, this results in a change in environmental factors (i.e., the gravity) felt by the card2if it includes an accelerometer. In addition, because of the large metal box of the elevator, a value can be calculated of a Faraday resistance factor linked with the electro-magnetic insulation of the elevator when closed. The same way portable exercise equipment now has sensors designed to measure external stimuli of the user (e.g., running, heart rate, acceleration, speed, etc.) the new card2relies upon these core principles as part of the pairing process11.

The smart card2as shown atFIGS.5-6includes generally a battery or other source of onboard power23. In one embodiment, a piece including a microprocessor, a memory and a battery23shown as one single block for simplicity, but as generally described in the cited art via incorporation by reference is a battery with extended life (3-5 years) non-BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy). In other embodiments, other power sources can be used alternatively. What is contemplated is the use of any type of portable power enabled locally.

The card2, may also include a One Time Password Generator (OTP)15,25, an UHF RFID tag for long-range, in-faculty detection (up to 30 feet)22for the connection to the data connection system10shown atFIG.5, and a multi-protocol contactless access control interface21and low power Bluetooth connector.

As shown atFIG.5, the cover of the card2may be printed using any normal thermal color printer (the technology generally available in association with the production of security cards) and glued onto the electronics inside (shown atFIG.6) or using any new technology to merge the imagery with such electronics. One of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that while the current mode is planned as a printed cover with identity elements such as a face picture33, the name and titled13, and an employee code14. One of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that the use of surface identification information reinforces the system in that it creates a visual third-legal protection and allows the smart card to be used normally as a visual entry-point identification. All visual identification technologies is anticipated and claimed, for example all protection systems used on currencies like dollar bills or shipping box identification such as a code bar or other code (not shown).

Also shown atFIG.5is a thumb power symbol11designed to help a user power the card up in one embodiment. In another embodiment, the card remains permanently powered or semi-powered as used in e-Reader book technology. This element11as shown below 24 can also include a fingerprint reader of the model and type used in other known devices, such as the iPhone7to9. These readers, for example, can simply read certain fingerprint location data, can also be paired with an inductance or resistance sensor, or may also include a thermal sensor to avoid false reads. As part of the iPhone 10+ technology, such finger readers have been conveniently replaced with a camera able to map and read 3D facial features according to other known technology. The card2as shown above and this includes a reader24linked with biometric information. One of ordinary skill understands that as new biometric readers become more sophisticated, they can be added to the reader24. While it shows a biometric reader24located on the card2, what is contemplated is the use of any type of connection between the microprocessor on the card and a reader locally installed (as shown) or remove (e.g., on an external pad/reader at a terminal or door).

To name some of the most common sensors that may be added, these include: (a) temperature sensors including infrared sensors, IC sensors, Termistors, resistor temperature detectors, and thermocouples, (b) proximity sensors such as inductive sensors, capacitive sensors, photoelectric sensors, ultrasonic sensors, (c) pressure sensors, (d) infrared sensors, (e) image sensors such as charge-coupled device or complementary metal-oxide semiconductor imagers, (f) motion detection sensors, (g) accelerometer sensors, (h) gyroscopic sensors such as rotary, vibrating, or optical/MEMS sensors, (i) optical sensors such as photodetector, fiber optic detector, pyrometer, or proximity detector.

As shown, the card2includes atFIG.6an Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) for Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID). UHF band RFID uses a 860-960 MHz band and allows it to read multiple tags as a batch at a longer range under the ISO18000-63/ECP global standard, for example, the LXMS21NCH from muRata® tag for long-range in-faculty detection (up to 30 feet)22. For example, this technology allows for the management in a smart factory of PCB's. This technology can work with pocket type readers also as Blueberry UHF MS4 from Tetrium Technologies™. As explained, a location having such UHF band RFID in place will create an environment where holders of the smart card2having a tag recognized by the system will automatically be tracked for location. As explained below, loss of range can result in breach of trust of cards using this technology. In one embodiment of the present disclosure, the card2supports both UCODE-7 and UCODE-8—the technology from NXP® Semiconductors. This is designed to support the MIFARE Classic EV1, Advanced EV1, DesFire EV1 and HID ICLASS interfaces.

The OTP system shown above can operate on time-synchronization between an authentication server and the implanted local device. These are notoriously unstable over long periods of time. The second can be based on a mathematical algorithm to generate a new password based on a previous password. Others include challenge. The technology onboard above is very similar to RSA Security's SecurID™ tokens. This system also has programmable support for both the HTOP and the TOTP systems.

As explained below, the key notion is to have a card2having such biometric information able to establish trust with a user1using one of many ways defined below. Also as explained below, this trust established can be broken one of many ways often linked with the nature, quantity, and type of sensors found in the card2. Each set of use can relate to different factors linked with trust and detailed in a set of example below.

Method of Establishing and Severing Trust

A famous unattributed quote reads, “trust takes years to build, seconds to break, and forever to repair.” At the heart of this invention is the notion that card2can be personalized and attached via an additional trust-based link to the user1of the card2. To establish trust, several steps described are needed, most often linked with sensor entry and biometric verification. To break the established trust, one of a handful or plurality of conditions must be met. The inventors now describe generally and in great detail the different steps, processes and systems linked with the establishment and severing of the trust between a user1and a card2as described above inFIGS.4-6.

Returning toFIG.4, instead of using multiple fields or multiple actions when a card2is placed in proximity of a reader (for example3onFIG.4), in one embodiment, an auto-generated token6is transmitted wirelessly or via a physical contact without any interaction from the user when the person gets in close proximity to the computer3. If trust11was established, then a trust-based token12can be sent instead or in addition to the normal string of character or the auto-generated token6. For example, a card normally requires at a reader the person to enter a retina scan in addition to sliding the card in and typing a PIN. By placing the retina information inside the memory of the card2, the user can grab the card2and enter a PIN manually and enter the retina information in a sensor on the card. The card2would connect the PIN with the biometric information in the card, validate the trust and establish the bond. When the card is placed in the proximity of the detector, if trust was established the data12would be sent directly and most likely wirelessly to open the door without a need for a PIN or the retina scan. In other cases, the card could be placed in and that data6would be sent directly which includes both the PIN and the retina information.

In such a described system, there is no need for the storage of password in the reader station3or the backend server4or the issuance/management of the OTP token7by the server which then can operate in complete disconnection from the server. While there is no need for the backend server4to operate in connection, one of ordinary skill in the art understands that additional levels of security could also be implemented to further improve the safety. For example, in the above example, if using the card2the user does not need to enter a PIN and an eye sensor map at an eye reader, the backend server4could add a third higher level of safety unique to the person, such as the request for an additional entry of a code (e.g., please provide your date of birth).

Simple typed passwords normally used are then replaced, for example, by a biometric authentication and acceptance code6. This new process and system includes the storage of biometric authentication into the card or other type of information of high relevance, and the validation by the user (i.e., the connection) of the card. In one embodiment, the same card which holds the biometric information also serves to create the OTP token and transmits it directly to replace functionality with other, lower generation cards.

Initial Pairing With New User

Having described the new smart card2above, and shown it in one embodiment having a thumbprint power-on system11, a digital code generator15, and visible identification22and associated electronics as shown atFIG.6, its use is best shown at the diagram ofFIG.7. As shown, first the smart card2as is first powered201in a first step often simply by pushing on the thumbprint and holding this position down for a longer-than-ordinary period (e.g., three seconds) such as touching element24onFIG.6or any other equivalent element as a simple switch with a timer wake mode. This will move the card from a “blank” mode to an “awake” mode. In this awake mode, at this stage, the card does not have an assigned user, it does not have, for example, biometric information stored such as (a) a picture, (b) personal identifiable information such as date of birth, or (c) thumb information or other type of information (e.g., facial mapping) that can be verified locally with a sensor of the right type.

While one type of sensor is described or shown, other types are also contemplated, for example, biometric data linked with LED or heart measurement of the object in context with the user's skin. In other cards, the device may remain on constantly in a sleep mode until it reaches the proximity of a reader and can be activated wirelessly via an antenna system into a live mode. Also contemplated are other ordinary and known methods of opening or powering up a card or any electronic element, including a switch, a tab, or even dynamic movement an piezoelectric current created by moving the body of the card2.

The card2, if awakened in one embodiment, will then run internal diagnostics and use the computerized OPT generator15to send messages as the system powers up.

Once powered up, the system checks and finds the storage room where biometric data is normally found to be empty in the memory bank. The goal of the pairing is to fill this memory according to its internal programming and the type of card2present. Guidance may be given to the user for “New ID” as part of a 8 DEL display as shown15or any other equivalent programming tool. A simple system can be used to scroll text in the 8 DEL15. For example, if a thumbprint is required, the display will alternate “NEW ID” and “TOUCH PW” as the sensor measures the print. In other embodiments, an external portable device is used to secure a clear set of the biometric information, and this data is uploaded directly via the UBS port connector to the memory. In the event the card has a camera and a 3D imprint of the face must be taken, the display will read “NEW ID” and “LOOK UP” and further information on initial phases of pairing of the card will be given in a guide or screen instruction. Once again, this system can be done as per the known technology of pairing linked with other types of phones.

While only a minor numerical display is shown, one of ordinary skill in the art will understand that over time, such displays may be increased in resolution and capacity where a flexible screen could be used. As shown, a face image can be uploaded to the card as additional biometric instruction.

The unpaired card201is then provided to a person or a new user which will be linked with the card202for which the card is assigned. In the step of pairing the card203to the user as shown atFIG.7, one of several methods of pairing can be done depending on the type of card2and the technology linked with the card2selected. For example, if the reader24is an index fingerprint reader, the card may read: “Finger R” for reading the finger. Other types of identification203may be conducted; for example a camera can take a 3D image of the person's face. The technology to read biometric information is now prevalent in the world of cell phones (i.e., the iPhone7using fingerprints and iPhone 10 using facial 3D mapping). In the world of exercising, rings or watches are now designed with integrated sensors which monitor and measure multiple life signs. For example, such external devices can be paired with the card using Bluetooth technology. All of these modes of pairing are linked with a request and entry of biometric data204at the card2locally.

Shown also atFIG.7are different modes of pairing205and206where a simple code can be entered and used (e.g., passcode) which lowers the level of security but remains connected with the system. For example, such lower-level security can be used during a sports event for normal volunteers who are given access to limited portions of the stadium and higher biometric data entry203would be reserved to those few given access to some sensitive areas like the player's locker rooms or the ticketing center.

Terminal identification data206may be reserved for faster bulk processing of biometric entry204,205, or for entry of data like iris reading where such reading technology is not sufficiently advanced to be initially measured and mapped by a portable miniature element, but where a confirmation reader can be of simpler technology and found on the smart card. In the event the card2is connected to the identification data terminal, an additional system of identification is planned.

Creating Trust

At step207as shown atFIG.7, once a card2has been paired with a user1as shown atFIG.4, trust can be created. Once the information has been entered and the card2has been now paired with a user, the key novel concept with this device is the notion of “trust” or “active pairing.” As defined in this invention, a person/user holding a card is paired or matched with the device207by validating the required information entered as part of the pairing process202.

For example, in the morning, once a user1grabs a wallet with the card that has previously been paired203, that user1will look at the card2and, once it is powered, trust may have been broken. For example, the numerical window15may simply read “TRUSTREQ” or the image22may be replaced with a different image or a notice. Before the smart card2can be used, trust once verified can be established208with the card2.

Before any use of the card2, the computer system200will verify trust207to see if it is established208in order to use the card210in a transaction. This simple system illustrated at211allows for certain “Trust Verification Parameters” TVP225established, was lost209or confirm loss of trust209. By loss of trust, several concepts come in play to help improve the security.

Trust Verification Parameters

In most cases, users who use the card2for any purpose will have a predetermined goal in mind as to the use. Many different uses are contemplated, and each is linked with one possible example. As shown atFIG.7, at many times in the cycle of use (often before use of the card210and data is sent out), trust must be established208. In case of loss of trust209, trust can be reestablished212(in some embodiments). In case of reestablishment, the user may be asked to return to a phase of authentication207.

AtFIG.8, what is shown is a sequential logic where a set of parameters301,302,303, and304are shown. One of ordinary skill in the art will understand that while four parameters are shown, what is contemplated is the function of one or more of these parameters, sequentially, in tandem or in any set of arrangement which results in the test of external conditions such, for example randomly.

An accelerometer301can be used simply on the card2and programmed as a condition for immediate loss of trust. For example, above a level of the sensor value, the trust can be broken. In one example, this situation can be used to avoid the misuse of corporate cards. If a third party steals or rips the card from another, the trust could be broken. Accelerometers or sensors26as shown atFIG.4can be imbedded in the smart card2and in case of a higher value than a set threshold (e.g., card was dropped, robbed, or even was moved in a suspicious way) the trust can be broken301. Once again, once trust is broken, the card2will not issue the proper information to any external device.

A capacitance sensor27as shown atFIG.6can be added and operate in the card in connection with the other elements for the detection of a value generally related to a person's body capacity value. If the person drops the card or the capacitance value is lowered too much, the card will be considered to have been moved a fixed distance from the person's body302. This is a similar process to when an iWatch is removed from the wrist of a user and some sensors are then considered to have lost the user physical connection. In this first embodiment, a low capacitance value can be set as a trigger point as well as a higher capacitance value. For example, lockers at a pool may be paired with cards2for storing personal effects. The card may be given to the person in the form of a wrist piece. By setting a TVP value of zero or outside of an initially measured value when the trust was created207if the card2is disconnected from the user1and then used by a second individual, when trust is tested207, if the value is outside of a range or if the value has moved in the past (i.e., last hour) outside of the range, there could be a simple loss of trust209.

In another example, an external sensor (a watch, a phone, or other device) can be used as shown by8,9, and10atFIG.4as proximity detector. After a Bluetooth or other short distance connection is lost, the trust is broken303. For example, employees can be given cards2that are paired at work where a network is present. Once the employee leaves the workplace, the signal is lost and trust can be broken immediately or when tested by looking in the data if it has been lost. As a further example, a coffee chain may have some type of signal value up at all of its locations for use by its employees. The same way the loss of a signal is described as a condition, one of ordinary skill in the art will understand that the finding of a signal may also be a condition for loss of trust.

In yet another possible variation, the smart card monitors the workplace wireless signal, and once the signal is lost, trust is broken304. As shown atFIG.4, the network9is as shown. The same way, it could be other types of networks8,10.

Example 1: Monthly Ski Pass

Most ski resorts sell ski passes to be worn by riders. These passes are expensive and because of bulky snow equipment and difficult environmental conditions, the management of these passes can be a nightmare for station owners. People may easily exchange and give others their passes which are too often hard to verify. By using the above-described technology, the season pass can be personalized to the user in one of many ways at the time of issuance by entry of biometric information. Such cards can be custom designed with TVP225that are best adapted to creating a loss of trust best adapted with skiing. For example, since this sport involves important changes in accelerations, the accelerometer threshold301may not be well adapted. Pairing the card with a user's own personal cell phone may also not be best adapted since people may desire to ski without a phone. But since most users have single pairs of boots, a simple RFID can be glued to the person's ski boots. When trust is verified207, as long as the ski pass card2is within a short range of the RFID on the boots trust is established208and use of the card is enabled210.

Example 2: Employee Value

Today many online systems require two-level security and need the card at210to send automatically and without prompting the user the information as shown atFIG.4. In the case of an employee at work trying to enter into a computer system, the card if paired will automatically verify trust207, once established208will send automatically210the data to the computer to gain access without any other confirmation. As described, the conditions of trust could be the ambient operation of the local network as a signal, the presence of the user's own private cell phone with Bluetooth in proximity, a calibrated value of capacitance of the user sitting at the chair, etc. Loss of signal also can be added as an alert condition. For example, in the workplace, all employee cards may be deactivated simply by sending a certain fixed signal over the wireless or shutting down the wireless. Also, for the trust to be established, a person may have had to pass door security or badge in within a certain period of time (e.g., 30 minutes).

As part of this card2, what is also important is that while conditions to establish trust217may be visible, known, and fixed for any type of use, these the TVP225may not be known or can be changed or modified to further increase the level of security.

The current version includes an advanced ultra-thin flexible circuit with a 32-bit ARM microprocessor of technology similar to those of cell phones. These Advance RISK Machines (ARM) exist in 32-bit and 64-bit. It also includes a 256-bit AES hardware encryption, the most common federal government standard. This standard is included in the ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard. In addition, the current model uses Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low-Energy, Near-field Communication (10 cm or less), and USB interface. The flash memory is around 8 GB in size and the battery is of a rechargeable type.

Also what is contemplated is the use of publicly described “fuzzy extractor” algorithms. It is possible to generate a set of deterministic keys directly from the user's biometric template as part of the SentryID platform. This eliminates the vulnerabilities associated with the need to store cryptographic keys as the keys are only generated at the point of authentication and are transient with no need to be persisted. The SentryID platform may apply this method to provide a trusted platform that greatly exceeds existing authentication mechanisms.

What is described herein is a general concept of creating a trusted bond between a card2and a user1. By making this connection early, before entry of information is truly needed, time and effort is saved. The card2also appears to work automatically without the need to bother the user at the needed point. A person holding the paired and trusted card2can enter into the range of a wireless server network and via the notion the card was never “untrusted” using the process atFIG.7, automatic entry is given to the network. Also, whileFIG.7shows multiple ways to lose the trusted bond, for each situation, it may be possible to program different types of loss of bond for each type of environment. For example, where greater security is needed, only one of the trust loss conductions301,302,303, and304would sever the loss as shown atFIG.8. But in other configurations, what would be required is the loss of two parameters. For example, as long as the card remains in capacitance contact302, the trust could not be lost even if the network304is lost. Such configurations are endless. As illustrated atFIG.6for simplicity purposes the line310and the logic requires for the non-loss of the four parameters301,302,303, and304.

Also of great interest is how this card2can be remotely activated or deactivated using external signals like wireless radios such as Bluetooth, UHF RFID, WiFi, etc. For example, for additional security, all cards can be “untrusted” via an external command. For example, in case of a security breach, all cards can be deactivated. In an even more severe breach, the deactivation may prevent any reestablishment of trust.

In another embodiment, the image22as shown atFIG.5is an e-ink or active display capable of displaying QR codes or other types of information. This allows multiple more possibilities. For example, a QR scanner may be placed next to a door. What is also contemplated is the ability to visually indicate when a cardholder has entered into an unauthorized area by flashing a warning indicator on the integrated card display or some portion of a code. Also, the inventor teaches how this card can serve to visually indicate when cardholder has entered into an unauthorized area by brightly illuminating the card edge or surface using optical fibers and similar materials placed on the card. Further, the card2can be activated only after the user authenticates himself through a second device, such as a smart phone, biometric capture device, or embedded input device, etc. The technology for example can be paired with the iWatch and require an iWatch to function.

What is shown and described above and in the drawings asFIGS.4-8is a multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment comprising an operative field from one of a data connection system, a GPS or normal telecommunication network, a local wireless network, and the smart card comprising a top layer with a cover printed and glued to a bottom layer, the cover including identity elements, an activation symbol, a code display window for allowing illustration of a One Time Password Generator (OTP), the bottom base later on which is a microprocessor for running in a memory and connected to a power source a software for operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment, and a mass storage memory for storing biometric information of a user and private data, the microprocessor connected to a one-time password generator (OTP), a biometric reader, an UHF RFID tag for long-range, in-faculty detection, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with low power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor, and wherein the smart card is configured to enable an upload into the memory of a user biometric data, and enabled to allow the user having the user biometric data into the memory to perform an operation of pairing in which the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader.

The smart card is further configured to enable at least a portion of the dynamic environment from (a) the data connection system, (b) the GPS or normal telecommunication network, or (c) the local wireless network, to interact with one of (i) the UHF RFID tag for long-range, in-faculty detection, (ii) the multi-protocol contactless access control interface with low power Bluetooth connector, or (iii) at least one sensor for the management (establishing or losing) of trust between the smart card and the user, where the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow for the programming of at least one trust verification parameter (TVP) to be tested and confirmed before the card releases data to help as part of a secured digital transaction, and where the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow for the programming of more than one trust verification parameter (TVP) to each be tested serially, randomly or sequentially before the card releases data to help as part of a secured digital transaction.

Also the data released to help as part of the secured digital transaction includes a security token (HOTP or TOTP systems) and at least one sensor is selected from the group of: (a) temperature sensors including infrared sensors, IC sensors, Thermistors, resistor temperature detectors, and thermocouples, (b) proximity sensors such as inductive sensors, capacitive sensors, photoelectric sensors, ultrasonic sensors, (c) pressure sensors, (d) infrared sensors, (e) image sensors such as charge-coupled device or complementary metal-oxide semiconductor imagers, (f) motion detection sensors, (g) accelerometer sensors, (h) gyroscopic sensors such as rotary, vibrating, or optical/MEMS sensors, (i) optical sensors such as photodetector, fiber optic detector, pyrometer, or proximity detectors.

The same way, a process of use of a multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment comprising one of an operative field from one of a data connection system, a GPS or normal telecommunication network, a local wireless network, and the smart card comprising a top layer with a cover printed and glued to a bottom layer, the cover including identity elements, an activation symbol, a code display window for allowing illustration of a One Time Password Generator (OTP), the bottom base later on which is a microprocessor for running in a memory and connected to a power source a software for operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment, and a mass storage memory for storing biometric information of a user and private data, the microprocessor connected to a one time password generator (OTP), a biometric reader, an UHF RFID tag for long-range, in-faculty detection, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with low power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor, and wherein the smart card is configured to enable an upload into the memory of a user biometric data, and enabled to allow the user having the user biometric data into the memory to perform an operation of pairing in which the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader, the method comprising the steps of powering an unpaired card, providing to a new user the unpaired card, pairing the card with the user by either one of (a) entry of the user's biometric data, (b) the request of a code, or (c) the entry from a terminal of identification data; and creating a trust by allowing the card further configured to enable at least a portion of the dynamic environment from (a) the data connection system, (b) the GPS or normal telecommunication network, or (c) the local wireless network, to interact with one of (i) the UHF RFID tag for long-range, in-faculty detection, (ii) the multi-protocol contactless access control interface with low power Bluetooth connector, or (iii) at least one sensor.

Also, what is contemplated is the step of allowing for the management (establishing or losing) of trust between the smart card and the user, the step of allowing for the programming of at least one trust verification parameter (TVP) to be tested and confirmed before the card releases data to help as part of a secured digital transaction, the step of allowing for the programming of more than one trust verification parameter (TVP) to each be tested serially, randomly or sequentially before the card releases data to help as part of a secured digital transaction.

Finally, also the above describes a method of use of a smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment comprising one of an operative field from one of a data connection system, a GPS or normal telecommunication network, a local wireless network, and the smart card comprising a top layer with a cover printed and glued to a bottom layer, the cover including identity elements, an activation symbol, a code display window for allowing illustration of a One Time Password Generator (OTP), the bottom base later on which is a microprocessor for running in a memory and connected to a power source a software for operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment, and a mass storage memory for storing biometric information of a user and private data, the microprocessor connected to a one-time password generator (OTP), a biometric reader, an UHF RFID tag for long-range, in-faculty detection, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with low power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor, and wherein the smart card is configured to enable an upload into the memory of a user biometric data, and enabled to allow the user having the user biometric data into the memory to perform an operation of pairing in which the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader; the method comprising the steps of pairing an unpaired card to a user by inserting biometric data in the memory of the card, creating trust by allowing a user at the biometric reader to validate the paired biometric data in the memory of the card, and establishing a set of trust verification parameters for testing of trust (established or loss) before any use of the card in a digital transaction.

The foregoing description of the embodiments has been provided for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the disclosure. Individual elements or features of a particular embodiment are generally not limited to that particular embodiment, but, where applicable, are interchangeable and can be used in a selected embodiment, even if not specifically shown or described. The same may also be varied in many ways. Such variations are not to be regarded as a departure from the disclosure, and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scope of the disclosure.