Patent ID: 12261884

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

It will be readily understood that the components of the invention, as generally described and illustrated in the Figures herein, could be arranged and designed in a wide variety of different configurations. Thus, the following more detailed description of the embodiments of the invention, as represented in the Figures, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, as claimed, but is merely representative of certain examples of presently contemplated embodiments in accordance with the invention. The presently described embodiments will be best understood by reference to the drawings, wherein like parts are designated by like numerals throughout.

Embodiments in accordance with the invention may be embodied as an apparatus, method, or computer program product. Accordingly, the invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment (including firmware, resident software, micro-code, etc.), or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects that may all generally be referred to herein as a “module” or “system.” Furthermore, the invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied in any tangible medium of expression having computer-usable program code embodied in the medium.

Any combination of one or more computer-usable or computer-readable media may be utilized. For example, a computer-readable medium may include one or more of a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM) device, a read-only memory (ROM) device, an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory) device, a portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM), an optical storage device, and a magnetic storage device. In selected embodiments, a computer-readable medium may comprise any non-transitory medium that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport the program for use by or in connection with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

Computer program code for carrying out operations of the invention may be written m any combination of one or more programming languages, including an object-oriented programming language such as Java, Smalltalk, C++, or the like and conventional procedural programming languages, such as the “C” programming language or similar programming languages, and may also use descriptive or markup languages such as HTML, XML, JSON, and the like. The program code may execute entirely on a computer system as a stand-alone software package, on a stand-alone hardware unit, partly on a remote computer spaced some distance from the computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer (for example, through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider).

The invention is described below with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems) and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions or code. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

These computer program instructions may also be stored in a non-transitory computer-readable medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

The computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide processes for implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

Referring toFIG.1, the methods disclosed herein may be practiced in a network environment100including a plurality of domains102a-102c. The domains102a-102cmay be any network division, such as a subnet, local area network (LAN), virtual local area network (VLAN), or the like. The domains102a-102cmay be distributed within a same building or over a large geographic area with interconnecting links including the Internet104. The illustrated domains102a-102cmay represent one or more network components, such as routers, switches, servers, and the like that implement routing of traffic within the domains102a-102cand control traffic flowing into and out of the domains102a-102c

Each domain may include one or more endpoints106a-106g. The endpoints106a-106gare production computing devices that operate as personal computers for users or servers providing production services to other endpoints or to external computers accessing the network environment by way of the internet104. The endpoints106a-106gmay be desktop or laptop computers, mobile phones, tablet computers, server computers, and any other type of computing device. Some endpoints106a-106gmay include internet-enabled devices, i.e. so-called internet of things (IoT) devices that are often a vulnerability.

The endpoints106a-106gare not dedicated honeypots, but rather perform non-decoy functions and process legitimate production data and legitimate production tasks of an enterprise, such as functioning as user computers executing applications such as word processors, browsers, graphics programs etc. The endpoints106a-106gmay also function as web servers, database servers, remote login servers, application servers, and the like.

Some or all of the endpoints106a-106gexecute a sensor module108. The sensor module108stores or accesses a list of sanctioned applications110aand may also store or access a listing or description of protected data110b. The endpoints106a-106gmay execute one or more instances of one or more of the sanctioned applications110aand store data generated or used by these applications that corresponds to the protected data. The sanctioned applications110aare production applications for performing any of the production tasks and functionality mentioned above. Accordingly, the protected data110bmay also be production data for use in performing the production tasks and functionality mentioned above, as opposed to decoy or deceptive data.

The sensor module108may store or access deception data110cstored locally on the endpoint106a-106gor accessed from another location. The deception data110cmay mimic the format of production data in the form of web pages, word processor documents, spreadsheets, databases, etc. The deception data110cmay also mimic other files used by applications such as credentials for authenticating the application with a remote server, configuration files, browser histories, a listing of recently accessed files, configuration files, and the like.

In the case of credentials or other files that are used to access a remote server or provide a record of accessing a remote server, the deception data110cmay reference a BOTSINK120. The BOTSINK120may function as a honey pot programmed to engage an attacker while preventing access to production data or computer systems. For example, the BOTSINK120may execute one or more virtual machines implementing network services that engage and monitor malicious code while preventing access to other endpoints106a-106gof the network. The BOTSINK120may implement any of the method methods for detecting and engaging malicious code disclosed in the following applications (herein after “the incorporated applications”), which are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entirety:U.S. application Ser. No. 14/458,026, filed Aug. 12, 2014, and entitled DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM FOR BOT DETECTION;U.S. application Ser. No. 14/466,646, filed Aug. 22, 2014, and entitled EVALUATING URLS FOR MALICIOUS CONTENT;U.S. application Ser. No. 14/549,112, filed Nov. 20, 2014, and entitled METHOD FOR DIRECTING MALICIOUS ACTIVITY TO A MONITORING SYSTEM;U.S. application Ser. No. 15/157,082, filed May 17, 2016, and entitled EMULATING SUCCESSFUL SHELLCODE ATTACKS;U.S. application Ser. No. 14/805,202, filed Jul. 21, 2015, and entitled MONITORING ACCESS OF NETWORK DARK.SPACE;U.S. application Ser. No. 14/965,574, filed Dec. 10, 2015, and entitled DATABASE DECEPTION IN DIRECTORY SERVICES;U.S. application Ser. No. 15/142,860, filed Apr. 29, 2016, and entitled AUTHENTICATION INCIDENT DETECTION AND MANAGEMENT;U.S. application Ser. No. 15/153,471, filed May 12, 2016, and entitled LURING ATTACKERS TOWARDS DECEPTION SERVERS;U.S. application Ser. No. 15/204,779, filed Jul. 7, 2016, and entitled DETECTING MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS; andU.S. application Ser. No. 15/360,117, filed Nov. 23, 2016, and entitled IMPLEMENTING DECOYS IN NETWORK ENDPOINTS.

In some embodiments, the data110a-110cis provided to the endpoints106a-106gby a management server112. The management server112may implement an application policy module114. The application policy module114stores or accesses a listing116aof sanctioned applications and may provide an interface for an administrator to specific what applications are included in the listing116a. The listing116amay indicate which applications are sanctioned for particular endpoints106a-106gor for endpoints in a particular domain102a-102c. The listing116amay be automatically updated to include applications as they are installed on endpoints106a-106gby an administrator.

In a similar manner, the management server112may store or access protected data116bthat lists data files, folders, or other descriptors of data that are protected. The protected data116bmay be obtained automatically from configuration files for applications. For example, an application on installation will often create directories for files used by the application. Accordingly, these directories and files may be observed by analyzing the configuration files for instructions to create these directories and files or by observing how the file system changes following installation of the application on a sample endpoint.

The management server112may also store or access deception data118. As noted above, this deception data may mimic production data for one or more applications and may reference the BOTSINK120in order to lure attackers into engagement with the BOTSINK120.

The management server112distributes some or all of the data116a-116b,118to the endpoints106a-106g. For example, deception data118provided to an endpoint may mimic files generated or used by one or more production applications actually installed on that endpoint. Likewise, the listing of sanctioned applications116aprovide to the endpoint may include only those applications that were installed by an administrator or authorized user on that endpoint. The deception data118provided to the endpoint may then include deception data mimicking the production data of those applications. The management server112may periodically update the data116a-116b,118and distribute updated data to the endpoints106a-106g.

The methods disclosed herein are invoked in response to an attacker system122attempting to access production application data on an endpoint106a-106g. This may include the attacker system122issuing commands to the endpoint106a-106gor uploading malicious code to the endpoint106a-106g, which then attempts to access the production application data. However, unauthorized access may be prevented using the methods disclosed herein in either case.

Referring toFIG.2, the sensor module108may be incorporated into the operating system200, such as by modifying the functions of one or more libraries for performing access to a file system. The sensor module108intercepts file system command from instances of applications202installed on the endpoint as well as file system commands from an attacker, such as an attacker tool204executing on the endpoint. The file system commands that are intercepted may include write commands, read commands, delete comments, or instructions to list the contents of a directory or other commands to navigate through a directory.

The sensor module108evaluates a source of each command, e.g. the binary instance executing on the endpoint that issued the command to the operating system. If the source of the command is an application listed in the sanctioned applications110a, the command is passed to the file system I/O (input output) functions206of the operating system200, which then executes the command with respect to the production application data208.

If the source of the command is not found to be in the sanctioned applications110a, the command may be modified such that it refers to deception data110c. The modified command may then be input to the file system I/O functions206. In the case of a write or delete command, the sensor module108may suppress execution of the command and return an acknowledgment to the source of the command indicating that the command was executed successfully.

In the embodiment ofFIG.2, the modified commands are executed by the same file system I/O functions206as other commands. Accordingly, the deception data110cmay be stored in the file system and accessible to such functions206. However, the deception data110cmay be hidden such that it is not viewable by users or applications executing on the endpoint.

In other embodiments, the sensor module108itself may access and return the deception data110c, in which case the deception data110cmay be stored anywhere, including remotely from the endpoint and referenced by the sensor module108. The deception data110ccould, for example, be encrypted such that only the sensor module108can decrypt the deception data110cin order to return it in response to a read command from the attacker tool204or other unauthorized source.

In still other embodiments, the sensor module108may automatically generate deception data110cin response to file system commands, such as based on templates that are populated with random data in order to mimic a type of file requested by the file system command from the attacker tool204.

Referring toFIG.3A, the sensor module108may include any executable code programmed to execute the illustrated method300a. The method300amay include receiving302a file system command, such as by intercepting a command made to the operating system200of the endpoint in which the sensor module108is embedded.

The method300amay include evaluating304whether the data (file, directory, type of file, etc.) is protected data, such as might be indicated by the listing110bof protected data on the endpoint. If not, the method300amay include executing306the file system command without modification, i.e. passing it to the operating system200for execution. In some embodiments, only the sanctioned applications110aare permitted to issue file system commands, which may include operating system utilities. Accordingly, in some embodiments, step304may be omitted.

The method300amay further include evaluating a source of the file system command according to some or all of steps308-312. For example, if the source of the file system command is found308to have a certificate matching that of a sanctioned application110a, then file system command may be executed306with respect to the data referenced in the command.

If a hash, e.g. the SHA-1 (secure hash algorithm) hash of the binary code that issued the file system command is found310to match a hash of the binary executable for one of the sanctioned applications110a, then the file system command may be executed306with respect to the data referenced in the command.

If a path to the binary code that issued the file system command is found312to match the path to the binary executable of one of the sanctioned applications110a, then the file system command may be executed306with respect to the data referenced in the command.

Steps308-312are just examples of checks that may be used to verify whether binary code issuing a command is in fact an instance of a sanctioned application. In some embodiments, all of steps308-312must be satisfied before step306will be executed with respect to the data referenced in the command. In other embodiments, other checks may be used as alternatives or as additional requirements before step306will be executed with respect to the data referenced in the command.

In some embodiments, certain protected data may be bound to a particular sanctioned application110a. Accordingly steps308-312may be evaluated only for those applications that are bound to the protected data110breferenced in the file system command, i.e. the command will be executed with respect to the data referenced in the command only if one of308-312(or each and every one of308-312in some embodiments) is satisfied for at least one sanctioned application110athat is also bound to the protected data110breferenced in the file system command.

If the tests of steps308-312are not sufficient to invoke execution of step306for the data referenced in the file system command according to any of the embodiments mentioned above, then the source of the file system command may be determined not to be one of the sanctioned applications110aand processing continues at steps314,318.

If the file system command is found314to be a read comment, then file system command may be changed318to refer to the deception data110cof the endpoint. Step306may be executed with respect to the modified file system command, which will include returning the deception data referenced by the modified file to the source of the file system command, such as to the attacker tool204.

If the file system command is found316not to be a read command, such as in the case of a write or a delete command, then the file system command is ignored and a simulated acknowledgment of the command is returned316to the source of the file system command.

Referring toFIG.3B, in some embodiments, the sensor module108, or a different sensor module108may execute the illustrated method300bwith respect to commands other than file system commands. In some embodiments, a plurality of sensor modules108execute on the endpoint and each sensor module108may intercept a different types of command. Each sensor module will then execute the method300aor300bupon intercepting that type of command. For example, requests to modify, delete, or read information regarding processes executing on the endpoint, the registry of the endpoint, or an application programming interface (API) available to applications executing on the endpoint. The method300bmay include receiving320a command and evaluating322whether the command references protected data or is a protected command. If not, then the command may be executed324. For example, the protected data110bmay indicate which commands are restricted to sanctioned applications110ain addition to data or types of data that are protected. In some embodiments, only sanctioned applications are permitted to access any data or invoke execution of any command. Accordingly, step322may be omitted as a path to execution324of a command.

The method300bmay further include evaluating the source of the command of step320according to steps308-312in the same manner as for the method300a. If the conditions of steps308-312are met, then the command may be executed in the same form it was received. As for the method300a, all of steps308-312must have a positive result before the command is executed324and one or more additional tests may be required to be satisfied before the command is executed324without modification.

If the steps308-312indicate that the source is a sanctioned application, then the method300bmay include evaluating326whether the command is a request for information, such as a request for information regarding executing processes, the registry, available APIs, or other system information. If so, then deception data is returned328to the source of the command. As for other embodiments disclosed herein, the deception data that is returned may mimic the legitimate data that is requested but not correspond to actual system data.

If the command is not a request for information, the method300bmay include returning330a result that simulates successful execution of the command. As for the method300a, a delete command may indicate that data was successfully deleted, a modify command may indicate that the system data or process or operating parameter referenced in the command was modified as requested.

An example of the use of the method300amay include the browser history for a browser. For example, the FIREFOX browser history may be stored at C:\Users\<user name>\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<some profile number>.default\formhistory.sqlite. Ordinarily, only the FIREFOX browser should access this file inasmuch as it will include functions for displaying the browser history on request.

Accordingly, any other application attempting to access this file or its directory may be blocked by the sensor module108and instead receive a simulated browser history file including decoy data.

In another example, in WINDOWS, the “shawdowcopy delete” command deletes the volume shadow copies. Malware often deletes this to accessing of backup volumes.

Accordingly, this file may be listed as protected data110band sensor module108will detect attempts to delete the volume shadow copies by non-sanctioned applications and prevent their execution. As noted above, acknowledgments of such commands may be returned indicating that the volume shadow copies were in fact deleted.

In an example of the use of the method30b, an attacker, e.g. attacker tool122, tries to access the registry, which may be in a listing of protected data110b. For example, the attacker may attempt to read the registry to determine a registry key for one or more antivirus application (e.g., MCAFEE, SYMANTEC, or the like) is present in the registry. No legitimate application would generally need to access the registry to determine whether an antivirus application is installed. In some embodiments, the sensor module108may intercept such attempts and return a result including a registry key for the antivirus tool, regardless of whether the antivirus application is installed. In many cases, this will cause the attacker tool to refrain from installing itself or otherwise attempting to perform malicious activities.

In another example, the attacker, e.g. attacker tool122, seeks to determine whether the endpoint is a virtual machine (VM), such as by evaluating the registry to determine whether a hypervisor is installed and/or executing on the endpoint. The sensor module108intercepts these requests and returns an output indicating that the endpoint is executing a VM,

e.g. indicate that the current operating environment in which the command was received is a VM or that a hypervisor is installed and/or executing on the endpoint. In another example, the attacker, e.g. attacker tool122, seeks to view a list of processes executing on the endpoint. In response, the sensor module108will return a “correct list of processes list” to the attacker.

Referring toFIG.4, the network environment100may further include an active directory server402in one or more of the domains102a-102c. The active directory server402may implement a directory service. A directory service functions as databases that map and store the names of network resources to their respective network addresses. Users referencing network objects need not remember the physical address of the object. The directory may store network resources and those resources may or may not have a name. The directory can also store user identifiers (very common), departments of user identifiers, access level of user identifiers, hosts accessible by user identifiers, the access level associated with each user identifier. The directory may further store organizational details, a network topology, an IT policy, and the like. Although Active Directory, the most popular directory server, depends on DNS very heavily, it is distinct therefrom and provides much more than a simple mapping between domain names and IP addresses. In particular, directory services may perform authentication for access to resources as well. LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is one of the popular methods available to access the data in directory services. LDAP also provides authentication and authorization to let user access resources in directory services.

The directory service implemented by the active directory server402may provide authorization and access to key assets in corporate networks. Attackers may use various methods of exploitation to get unauthorized access to directory services. Once an attacker obtains access to a directory service, the attacker can easily log into key servers, databases etc. by impersonating credentials stored in directory services. The attacker may then exfiltrate data. For example, confidential data may be disclosed. In some instances, unauthorized modifications could be made (such as new account creation, access control modifications, document forgery, backup corruption, unauthorized financial transactions etc.) or data may be made unavailable (such as crypto malware, bank account takeover, bringing down or defacement of corporate web servers).

The systems and methods disclosed herein incorporate database deception into directory services so that attackers cannot differentiate between real production assets with respect to fake assets. Once an attacker access fake credentials pointing to a BOTSINK120, the system prevents outbound access and simulates access to actual enterprise assets. This enables the identification and analysis of attackers for use in preventing data breaches.

“Active Directory” (AD) is one of the directory services supported by WINDOWS operating systems. The AD domain controller is a server that provides authentication services within a domain whereby it provides access to computer resources. AD provides a database storing information about objects. Each object can be a user, computer, or a group of users. Although the systems and methods disclosed herein are described for use with an Active Directory system, they may be applied with equal effectiveness to any directory service.

The systems and methods described herein returns simulated responses to requests to an active directory server402. These responses reference the BOTSINK120and may include credentials for authenticating with respect to the BOTSINK120, such as a user account defined on the BOTSINK120or a service executing on the BOTSINK120. These responses lure an attacker to use the service or to attempt to use the user account. However, use of such services or accounts results in engagement of the attacker with the BOTSINK120and other resources described herein. This enables early detection of malicious intent and account misuse and diverts attention from real targets and resources.

Referring toFIG.5, in some embodiments, the sensor module108on an endpoint106a-106gmay detect responses from an active directory server402. These responses may be the result of requests issued to the active directory server402by an application202or attacker tool204executing on that endpoint106a-106g. For example, the sensor module108may operate in conjunction with substituted or modified functions in an active directory API (application programming interface) in the operating system200of an endpoint106a-106g. The substituted or modified functions may route responses from the active directory server402to the sensor module108prior to return of the response to the application that requested it. The sensor module108may then determine whether to return the response to an application202to which the response is addressed without modification or with modification. In particular, if the response is addressed to an attacker tool204that is not a sanctioned application, the response may be modified such that any system, user account, or credential included in the response is replaced with corresponding references to the BOTSINK120, decoy computer on the BOTSINK120, a credential or user account for authenticating with the BOTSINK120(e.g., logging in, accessing a particular service, etc.).

The manner in which the application to which the response is addressed is determined to be sanctioned or not may be according to the approach described in either ofFIGS.3A and3B. In particular, the response from the active directory server402may be received on a port with respect to which an application is registered by the operating system200.

Accordingly, the sensor module108may evaluate that application to determine whether it is sanctioned according to the approach of either ofFIGS.3A and3B. If not, the response is modified at step606to replace references to addresses, actual user accounts, services, computer systems, or other production resources with corresponding references to the BOTSINK120, i.e. an address of the BOTSINK120, a decoy user account, decoy service, decoy virtual machine, or other decoy resource executing on the BOTSINK120.

Referring toFIG.6, the sensor module108may execute the illustrated method600with respect to responses from the active directory server402. The method600includes receiving602a response from the active directory server402by the sensor module108. The sensor module108evaluates604whether the application to which the response is addressed is sanctioned. For example, this may include evaluating an application listening to a port to which the response was addressed. Alternatively, the response may include some other identifier that is sufficient to identify the application (i.e. instance of an application executing on operating system200to which the response is addressed. As noted above, receiving the response may be performed by interfacing with an API programmed to interface with the active directory server402such that response are intercepted before they are returned to the requesting application. For example, the sensor module108may interface with substituted or modified versions of the Power Shell such that commands input to the Power Shell are intercepted and possibly modified by the sensor module108. Commands that may be intercepted may include commands such as ‘net group/domain “domain users”’ will return list of domain users present in Active Directory. Other example commands include ‘Get-ADComputer-Filter*’ will return all computer accounts in Active Directory, “nltest/dclist:domain name” will return domains in the network.

The modified response is then returned608to the application to which it is addressed, i.e. the application that requested the information included in the response from the active directory server402. Where the application is found604to be sanctioned, the original response, or data from the response, is returned608to the source of the request without substituting references to the BOTSINK120.

Note thatFIG.6illustrates the case where a response from the active directory service is received and modified. In other embodiments, a request from an application that is not sanctioned that is addressed to the active directory service is intercepted and simulated response is generated that references the BOTSINK120, i.e. a response that has an expected format corresponding to the request but with names of systems, addresses, credentials, services, etc. referencing such entities as implemented by the BOTSINK120.

In some embodiments, the active directory server402may host decoy information describing a configuration of the BOTSINK120, such as decoy information describing decoy users accounts, addresses of decoy systems (virtual machines), decoy services, and decoy credentials for accessing any of these accounts, systems, and services. Accordingly, modifying a request by the sensor module may include modifying the request such that it is a request for decoy information on the active directory server (e.g., references the BOTSINK120) such that the response from the active directory server402includes only the decoy information rather than the information actually requested.

In some embodiments, authenticated users of an endpoint106a-106gare added to a whitelist accessed by the sensor module108such that requests to the active directory server402and responses received are not substituted according to the method600.

Referring toFIG.7, in some embodiments, the sensor module108intercepts responses to requests to a domain controller700. In some embodiments, the function of the domain controller700is performed by a domain joined computer. For example, the sensor module108may monitor one or both of requests to a network API702of the operating system200to the domain controller700and responses to such requests.

For example, referring to the method800ofFIG.8, the responses may be responses to requests for session data issued received802from a network API702. A response determined804to be to a non-sanctioned application may be modified at step806to refer to the BOTSINK120and returned808to the non-sanctioned application. In one scenario, an attacker tool204executing on an infected endpoint (e.g., endpoint106a) requests session data from the domain controller700or domain joined computer700using information learned via earlier active directory queries.

Responses determined804to be in response to requests from sanctioned applications202may be returned808to them without replacing a reference to a computer system in the response with a reference to the BOTSINK120. The manner in which an application is determined804to be sanctioned may be performed in the same manner described above with respect to either ofFIGS.3A and3B.

FIGS.9A and9Billustrate how the methods600and800may be used to redirect and occupy an attacker. In an unprotected case shown inFIG.9A, an attacker tool204on an infected endpoint106auses the active directory API on the infected system to access an active directory database900through the active directory server402. Using this information, the attacker tool204uses the network API to request session data in order to identity of an endpoint106blogged in to the domain account for a domain to which infected endpoint106abelong. The attacker tool may infect the administrator endpoint106band access the active directory database900and discover that the admin user account is referenced in domain data904defining another group, e.g. an administrator group. The endpoint106bmay further store credentials enabling the endpoint106bto access a service hosted by server106f.

Accordingly, the attacker tool204on the infected system106amay attempt to move laterally by requesting information from the active directory server402in order to discover the endpoint106bof the admin user account, infect it, and use it to access the service on server106fas an administrator.

FIG.9Billustrates an alternative view seen by an attacker tool204on the infected endpoint106awhen the methods according toFIGS.4through6are implemented. The attacker tool204requests information from the active directory server402. The responses to these requests are modified to reference decoy information, such as decoy active directory data906having a same format as the active directory database900but with references to computer systems and services being replaced with references to the BOTSINK120(e.g. virtual machines executing on the BOTSINK120) and services executing on the BOTSINK120.

A response to a request to obtain the identity of an administrator of a domain to which the endpoint106abelongs using the network API is intercepted and modified to reference to a decoy domain908. A request for the identity of the administrator of the decoy domain908may include a reference to a user account912or virtual machine logged in to a user account912on the BOTSINK120. That user account912may be defined as part of an admin domain910and that user account912may include credentials (e.g., VM for which the user account912is logged in may store or reference credentials) that are sufficient to authenticate a user with respect to a service914executing on the BOTSINK120.

Accordingly, the attacker tool204may attempt to move laterally as in the case ofFIG.9Abut only engage the BOTSINK120. The activities of the attacker tool204may be monitored and logged by the BOTSINK120in order to characterize the attacker tool204and alerts may be generated to alert and administrator to remove the attacker tool204from the infected endpoint106a. Engaging, monitoring, logging, characterizing, and generation of alerts may be performed according to any of the approaches described in the incorporated applications.

FIG.10illustrates a method1000that may be implemented using the system shown inFIG.9B. An attacker tool204executing on an infected endpoint (e.g., endpoint106a) requests1002session data using a network API for the domain of the infected endpoint, the session data indicating computers (e.g., computers in the same domain) that are connected to the active directory server402. For example, a network API command for requesting such session data may be used. The sensor module108intercepts1004a response to this request and determines that the attacker tool204is a non-sanctioned application attempting to access restricted data (seeFIG.6). In response, the sensor module108returns1006the session data with references to one or more computers in the session data replaced with one or more addresses assigned to the BOTSINK120. In the alternative, the sensor module108intercepts the request for session data and creates a decoy response referencing the BOTSINK120rather than modifying a response from the active directory server402.

In particular, the IP address of the computer logged in to the administrator account of the domain may be replaced with an IP address assigned to the BOTSINK120. For example, the BOTSINK120may acquire IP addresses in various domains as described in the incorporated applications. Each address added to the session data may be assigned to a virtual machine (VM) executing on the BOTSINK120.

The attacker tool204may then attempt to access1008the computer logged in to the administrator account, which is in fact the BOTSINK120. The BOTSINK120(e.g., the VM assigned the IP address represented as that of the administrator's computer at step1006(“the admin VM”)) may then engage1010the attacker tool. The activities of the attacker tool204with respect to the BOTSINK120may be monitored and stored in order to characterize the attacker tool204as described in the incorporated applications.

In particular, the attacker tool204may attempt to obtain credentials or identifiers of services cached or stored by the admin VM. In response, these credentials may be returned1012to the attacker tool. However, these credentials or identifiers of services may reference services implemented by the BOTSINK120, such as by other VMs being executed by the BOTSINK120. The attacker tool204receives the credentials or identifiers and attempts to access1014the services represented by them.

In response, the BOTSINK120authenticates the attacker tool204and engages1016with the attacker tool204using the service, i.e. executes commands from the attacker tool in accordance with the service. Actions of the attacker tool204may be monitored and used to characterize the attacker tool204as described in the incorporated applications. In addition or as an alternative, interaction with the BOTSINK120at steps1010,1012, and1016by the attacker tool may trigger an alert or remedial action such as removing the attacker tool204from the infected endpoint106aor isolating (disconnecting) the infected endpoint106afrom a network.

Note that in some embodiments, one of the services implemented on the BotSink120may be a decoy active directory service that implements an interface for responding to commands in the active directory API and is programmed to response to these commands with decoy data referencing decoy computers, user accounts, and services implemented on the BOTSINK120.

FIG.11is a block diagram illustrating an example computing device1100which can be used to implement the system and methods disclosed herein. The endpoints106a-106g, management server112, BOTSINK120, attacker system122, and active directory server402may also have some or all of the attributes of the computing device1100. In some embodiments, a cluster of computing devices interconnected by a network may be used to implement any one or more components of the invention.

Computing device1100may be used to perform various procedures, such as those discussed herein. Computing device1100can function as a server, a client, or any other computing entity. Computing device can perform various monitoring functions as discussed herein, and can execute one or more application programs, such as the application programs described herein. Computing device1100can be any of a wide variety of computing devices, such as a desktop computer, a notebook computer, a server computer, a handheld computer, tablet computer and the like.

Computing device1100includes one or more processor(s)1102, one or more memory device(s)1104, one or more interface(s)1106, one or more mass storage device(s)1108, one or more Input/Output (I/O) device(s)1110, and a display device1130all of which are coupled to a bus1112. Processor(s)1102include one or more processors or controllers that execute instructions stored in memory device(s)1104and/or mass storage device(s)1108. Processor(s)1102may also include various types of computer-readable media, such as cache memory.

Memory device(s)1104include various computer-readable media, such as volatile memory (e.g., random access memory (RAM)1114) and/or nonvolatile memory (e.g., read-only memory (ROM)1116). Memory device(s)1104may also include rewritable ROM, such as Flash memory.

Mass storage device(s)1108include various computer readable media, such as magnetic tapes, magnetic disks, optical disks, solid-state memory (e.g., Flash memory), and so forth. As shown inFIG.11, a particular mass storage device is a hard disk drive1124. Various drives may also be included in mass storage device(s)1108to enable reading from and/or writing to the various computer readable media. Mass storage device(s)1108include removable media1126and/or non-removable media.

I/O device(s)1110include various devices that allow data and/or other information to be input to or retrieved from computing device1100. Example I/O device(s)1110include cursor control devices, keyboards, keypads, microphones, monitors or other display devices, speakers, printers, network interface cards, modems, lenses, CCDs or other image capture devices, and the like.

Display device1130includes any type of device capable of displaying information to one or more users of computing device1100. Examples of display device1130include a monitor, display terminal, video projection device, and the like.

Interface(s)1106include various interfaces that allow computing device1100to interact with other systems, devices, or computing environments. Example interface(s)1106include any number of different network interfaces1120, such as interfaces to local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), wireless networks, and the Internet. Other interface(s) include user interface1118and peripheral device interface1122. The interface(s)1106may also include one or more user interface elements1118. The interface(s)1106may also include one or more peripheral interfaces such as interfaces for printers, pointing devices (mice, track pad, etc.), keyboards, and the like.

Bus1112allows processor(s)1102, memory device(s)1104, interface(s)1106, mass storage device(s)1108, and I/O device(s)1110to communicate with one another, as well as other devices or components coupled to bus1112. Bus1112represents one or more of several types of bus structures, such as a system bus, PCI bus, IEEE 1394 bus, USB bus, and so forth.

For purposes of illustration, programs and other executable program components are shown herein as discrete blocks, although it is understood that such programs and components may reside at various times in different storage components of computing device1100, and are executed by processor(s)1102. Alternatively, the systems and procedures described herein can be implemented in hardware, or a combination of hardware, software, and/or firmware. For example, one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) can be programmed to carry out one or more of the systems and procedures described herein.