A method to automatically configure electronic devices, in which, in the context of the configuration, at least parts of first protection-worthy configuration data on a chip card with a public and private memory area are supplied to an electronic device, in particular a terminal, characterized by the following steps of an automatic sequence control: a) the first protection-worthy configuration data are stored in the public memory area on the chip card as second configuration data, so that the stored data are the result of at least one obfuscation according to at least one first algorithm, b) at least parts of the first protection-worthy configuration data on the chip card are derivable by the electronic device, and c) the stored second configuration data are subjected to a de-obfuscation on the device side in such a manner that, with the knowledge of the first algorithm, the data are reestablished as first configuration data and used as basis for the configuration of the electronic device, d) in that the derivation according to step b) occurs on the basis of a first secret used by the first algorithm and stored in the electronic device, wherein, as first secret, a symmetric encryption key is used, e) in that the derivation according to step b) occurs on the basis of a second secret used by the first algorithm, wherein, as second secret, an initialization vector is used, and wherein a second algorithm is implemented in the electronic device, second algorithm which determines the second secret on the basis of at least one information item stored in the public memory area on the chip card, and as a result of which, if the first secret is determined or found by unauthorized third parties, an additional hurdle is installed, wherein, by the implementation of the second algorithm in the electronic device, the security is increased, since no entity needs to assign secrets in the electronic device, given that only the entity that issues the chip cards is involved, as a result of which there is one less attack site for the interception and thus the dissolution of the second secret, and wherein the automatic sequence control is carried out entirely by the user without the entry of an authentication, for example, without the entry of a personal identification number or of a biometric authentication, f) storing of dummy data sets, in particular with random numbers or any other data in addition to the obfuscated sensitive data, wherein - due to the dissolution or generation of data structures, several individual data are combined to form a data construct and alternatively or additionally - a larger data object is split into several small parts. a) the first protection-worthy configuration data are stored in the public memory area on the chip card as second configuration data, so that the stored data are the result of at least one obfuscation according to at least one first algorithm, b) at least parts of the first protection-worthy configuration data on the chip card are derivable by the electronic device, and c) the stored second configuration data are subjected to a de-obfuscation on the device side in such a manner that, with the knowledge of the first algorithm, the data are reestablished as first configuration data and used as basis for the configuration of the electronic device, d) in that the derivation according to step b) occurs on the basis of a first secret used by the first algorithm and stored in the electronic device, wherein, as first secret, a symmetric encryption key is used, e) in that the derivation according to step b) occurs on the basis of a second secret used by the first algorithm, wherein, as second secret, an initialization vector is used, and wherein a second algorithm is implemented in the electronic device, second algorithm which determines the second secret on the basis of at least one information item stored in the public memory area on the chip card, and as a result of which, if the first secret is determined or found by unauthorized third parties, an additional hurdle is installed, wherein, by the implementation of the second algorithm in the electronic device, the security is increased, since no entity needs to assign secrets in the electronic device, given that only the entity that issues the chip cards is involved, as a result of which there is one less attack site for the interception and thus the dissolution of the second secret, and wherein the automatic sequence control is carried out entirely by the user without the entry of an authentication, for example, without the entry of a personal identification number or of a biometric authentication, f) storing of dummy data sets, in particular with random numbers or any other data in addition to the obfuscated sensitive data, wherein - due to the dissolution or generation of data structures, several individual data are combined to form a data construct and alternatively or additionally - a larger data object is split into several small parts. - due to the dissolution or generation of data structures, several individual data are combined to form a data construct and alternatively or additionally - a larger data object is split into several small parts.