A method that verifies aircraft position information based on automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) messages (120, 130), the method comprising: receiving, by a receiver, an ADS-B message indicating an identifier of an aircraft and indicating a position of the aircraft; accessing, by a processor coupled to the receiver, a tamper-resistant distributed public ledger of authenticated flight plan data to determine whether flight plan data associated with the identifier is stored in the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger; conditioned upon a determination that the flight plan data is stored in the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger, comparing, by the processor, the position to a flight path indicated by the flight plan data; selecting, by the processor, a characteristic of an icon corresponding to the aircraft based on a determination whether the position corresponds to the flight path; and displaying, on a display device coupled to the processor and based on the characteristic, the icon at a location corresponding to the position, further comprising, conditioned upon a determination that the position fails to correspond to the flight path or that the flight plan data is not stored in the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger, transmitting, by a transmitter, a first message to a flight management system to confirm the position of the aircraft and further comprising at least one of: in response to receipt of a second message by the receiver confirming the position of the aircraft, modifying the characteristic of the icon; or in response to receipt of a second message by the receiver indicating that the aircraft does not exist or that the position is incorrect, removing the icon, and wherein the ADS-B message is not encrypted when received. receiving, by a receiver, an ADS-B message indicating an identifier of an aircraft and indicating a position of the aircraft; accessing, by a processor coupled to the receiver, a tamper-resistant distributed public ledger of authenticated flight plan data to determine whether flight plan data associated with the identifier is stored in the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger; conditioned upon a determination that the flight plan data is stored in the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger, comparing, by the processor, the position to a flight path indicated by the flight plan data; selecting, by the processor, a characteristic of an icon corresponding to the aircraft based on a determination whether the position corresponds to the flight path; and displaying, on a display device coupled to the processor and based on the characteristic, the icon at a location corresponding to the position, further comprising, conditioned upon a determination that the position fails to correspond to the flight path or that the flight plan data is not stored in the tamper-resistant distributed public ledger, transmitting, by a transmitter, a first message to a flight management system to confirm the position of the aircraft and further comprising at least one of: in response to receipt of a second message by the receiver confirming the position of the aircraft, modifying the characteristic of the icon; or in response to receipt of a second message by the receiver indicating that the aircraft does not exist or that the position is incorrect, removing the icon, and wherein the ADS-B message is not encrypted when received. in response to receipt of a second message by the receiver confirming the position of the aircraft, modifying the characteristic of the icon; or in response to receipt of a second message by the receiver indicating that the aircraft does not exist or that the position is incorrect, removing the icon, and wherein the ADS-B message is not encrypted when received.