A method for securing keys when key-management processes are subverted by an adversary, the method comprising the steps of: (a) upon receiving a creation request in a computing-environment having at least one appliance (Appliance A) and a server system (PVKM B), creating a specific key (Ks) in said at least one appliance and/or said server system in said computing-environment, wherein: (i) a master key (Km) is encrypted using a one-way project-level key (Ep) generated in said at least one appliance, and using an encryption key (Ek) generated in said server system; (ii) said encrypted master key undergoes blinding by repetitively computing generated values as generated from operating on said master key with respective blinding values (r, r', r"): in said at least one appliance and/or said server system; and in a set of N computing resources (Appliance A, PVKM B), in said computing-environment, wherein N is a non-negative integer; and (iii) said specific key undergoes key encryption (86, 118) using said master key; and (b) applying said respective blinding values to change a specific-key value in accordance with encryption protocols (88-104, 112-116, 124-130) within a malicious model, wherein: (i) said respective blinding values cannot be omitted or modified by said at least one appliance; (ii) said respective blinding values are proven to have been applied properly by said at least one appliance, wherein said at least one appliance can include a subverted appliance penetrated by an adversary attempting to arbitrarily deviate from said step of applying; and (iii) said specific key is never revealed to said computing resources; thereby enabling said computing resources in said computing-environment to ensure that said specific key is truly random; wherein said at least one appliance and said server system each include a region of memory located in a computing resource operationally connected to said computing-environment. (a) upon receiving a creation request in a computing-environment having at least one appliance (Appliance A) and a server system (PVKM B), creating a specific key (Ks) in said at least one appliance and/or said server system in said computing-environment, wherein: (i) a master key (Km) is encrypted using a one-way project-level key (Ep) generated in said at least one appliance, and using an encryption key (Ek) generated in said server system; (ii) said encrypted master key undergoes blinding by repetitively computing generated values as generated from operating on said master key with respective blinding values (r, r', r"): in said at least one appliance and/or said server system; and in a set of N computing resources (Appliance A, PVKM B), in said computing-environment, wherein N is a non-negative integer; and (iii) said specific key undergoes key encryption (86, 118) using said master key; and (i) a master key (Km) is encrypted using a one-way project-level key (Ep) generated in said at least one appliance, and using an encryption key (Ek) generated in said server system; (ii) said encrypted master key undergoes blinding by repetitively computing generated values as generated from operating on said master key with respective blinding values (r, r', r"): in said at least one appliance and/or said server system; and in a set of N computing resources (Appliance A, PVKM B), in said computing-environment, wherein N is a non-negative integer; and in said at least one appliance and/or said server system; and in a set of N computing resources (Appliance A, PVKM B), in said computing-environment, wherein N is a non-negative integer; and (iii) said specific key undergoes key encryption (86, 118) using said master key; and (b) applying said respective blinding values to change a specific-key value in accordance with encryption protocols (88-104, 112-116, 124-130) within a malicious model, wherein: (i) said respective blinding values cannot be omitted or modified by said at least one appliance; (ii) said respective blinding values are proven to have been applied properly by said at least one appliance, wherein said at least one appliance can include a subverted appliance penetrated by an adversary attempting to arbitrarily deviate from said step of applying; and (iii) said specific key is never revealed to said computing resources; thereby enabling said computing resources in said computing-environment to ensure that said specific key is truly random; (i) said respective blinding values cannot be omitted or modified by said at least one appliance; (ii) said respective blinding values are proven to have been applied properly by said at least one appliance, wherein said at least one appliance can include a subverted appliance penetrated by an adversary attempting to arbitrarily deviate from said step of applying; and (iii) said specific key is never revealed to said computing resources; thereby enabling said computing resources in said computing-environment to ensure that said specific key is truly random;