A method implemented at least in part by a computer, the method comprising: establishing a trust relationship of a telemetry collector with an escrow certificate issuer operable to issue certificates for use in providing telemetry data, wherein each certificate includes information including an identifier that distinguishes it from other certificates; receiving a certificate associated with telemetry data from a telemetry source (210 - 214), the telemetry data being signed by the telemetry source using a private key received from the escrow certificate issuer, the information included in the certificate being usable for the telemetry collector to verify that the certificate is valid but not usable to determine an identity of an entity that controls the telemetry source without additional data not included in the certificate; determining by the telemetry collector, whether the certificate is valid by determining whether the escrow certificate issuer issued the certificate, wherein the verification follows common public key infrastructure rules including validating the chain of trust and determining that the certificate has not been revoked or expired and wherein the telemetry data associated with the certificate is rejected or discarded if the certificate is not valid; and determining whether the telemetry source associated with the certificate is known to give low quality or false data and, when the telemetry source associated with the certificate is known to give low quality or false data, rejecting telemetry data associated with the certificate, wherein determining whether the telemetry source associated with the certificate is known to give low quality or false data is based at least in part on previous telemetry data sent with the certificate. establishing a trust relationship of a telemetry collector with an escrow certificate issuer operable to issue certificates for use in providing telemetry data, wherein each certificate includes information including an identifier that distinguishes it from other certificates; receiving a certificate associated with telemetry data from a telemetry source (210 - 214), the telemetry data being signed by the telemetry source using a private key received from the escrow certificate issuer, the information included in the certificate being usable for the telemetry collector to verify that the certificate is valid but not usable to determine an identity of an entity that controls the telemetry source without additional data not included in the certificate; determining by the telemetry collector, whether the certificate is valid by determining whether the escrow certificate issuer issued the certificate, wherein the verification follows common public key infrastructure rules including validating the chain of trust and determining that the certificate has not been revoked or expired and wherein the telemetry data associated with the certificate is rejected or discarded if the certificate is not valid; and determining whether the telemetry source associated with the certificate is known to give low quality or false data and, when the telemetry source associated with the certificate is known to give low quality or false data, rejecting telemetry data associated with the certificate, wherein determining whether the telemetry source associated with the certificate is known to give low quality or false data is based at least in part on previous telemetry data sent with the certificate.