43. In the second place, there can be, in my opinion, no real question of onus in a case" like this where the only material before the Court is the contents of a book and the question that arises for consideration is thus in substance a Question of law. A question of law is to be decided not with reference to any doctrine of onus but on the basis of arguments, the duty to decide in accordance with reason, right and justice being always on the court.

It is true that Judges do say occasionally that the burden of establishing a proposition of law is on a particular party; but in saying so, it seems to me they are only adopting a rhetorical device to convey the meaning that they are not satisfied that the propounder is right.

44. It is conceivable however that in a particular case the Government may rely upon some facts to justify its order. It may seek to establish the objectionable intention on the part of the author by reference to other similar productions of his and certain other relevant facts (vide: Sections 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act). Questions of fact might then fall to be determined at the instance of the Government and the burden, undoubtedly, will, in such eases, be on the Government. It will of course be otherwise when the applicant himself relies upon certain facts,


N. Veerabrahmam vs State Of Andhra Pradesh ... on 12 March, 1959

45. Looking at the words themselves of Section 99-D, no other conclusion seems possible. Under it, the Special Bench shall "if it is not satisfied that the issue of the .... ......... book ............... contained .......... matter of such a nature ........... set aside the order of forfeiture."
Now, how can one be "not satisfied" that there is such and such a thing? Either when the proof that the thing exists is not satisfactory or when there is satisfactory proof 'that it does not exist. In my opinion, the party who asserts the' affirmative must carry the burden, if burden there is, of establishing it.

46. Further, the view of the learned Judges in (S) AIR 1957 All 538, seems to be opposed to the view of an earlier decision of Special Bench of their own High Court in AIR 1925 All 195. It was observed as follows:
 "Counsel for the applicant raised the further point that the onus lay upon the Local Government. This is a question of construction, not free from difficulty. We are inclined to think that having regard to the framework of the Section, the onus is cast upon the local Government."
47. Even assuming for the sake of argument that there is any question of burden and that the burden rests upon the applicant, it would be highly technical in my opinion to insist upon his carrying the burden even in a case where the Government is guilty of breach of its statutory obligation to state the grounds of its opinion. When no such grounds are stated, the applicant is entirely in the dark as to how and why it falls within the purview of Section 99-A.


It must be remembered that neither the author nor the publisher of a book is entitled to notice under Section 99-A and the Legislature provides that any person having an interest in the book must apply to the High Court to set aside such an order within two months from the date of such an order. The order is to be made under Section 99-A by a notification in the official gazette, the publicity value of which to use the words of the Supreme Court in , is "by no means great".

When the applicant receives no personal notice and therefore may in a particular case be approaching the Court within a few days of his becoming aware of the orders; when, further, he is handicapped by the fact that no grounds of opinion are stated in the order it would be unfair to insist upon his satisfying the court that the book does not contain matter of such a nature.

48. Even if the practical effect of such a view would be only that he would have to translate the whole of the book and give the Court and the other side an adequate number of copies, I should be inclined to hold that the burden to show that the order made is right apart from its obvious duty to establish the intention -- is on the Government.

49. But perhaps in using the word "burden" in this context, what is meant is the right to begin and the right to reply. If that only is meant the Government ought not to complain because they will have the advantage of opening and reply. I may state however that as a matter of fact the applicant himself began the arguments before us. I, therefore, see no substance in this contention urged on behalf of the Government.


50. I shall now deal with the objection raised by the applicant that Section 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure operates as an impermissible abridgement of some of the fundamental rights conferred On a citizen by Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The Section confers on the Government the power to forfeit copies of an objectionable book, newspaper or a document containing matter the publication of which is punishable under Section 124-A or Section 153-A or Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code.

Now, in the present case, we are concerned with a book alleged to contain matter the publication of which is punishable under Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code. In my opinion, it is unnecessary for us to consider the question whether Section 99-A in so far as it empowers the Government to deal with a newspaper etc., contained matter, the publication of which is punishable under Section 124-A or Section 153-A transgresses the constitutional limits.

The power of the Government to forfeit a publication containing matter falling within the mischief of Section 295-A seems to me clearly severable and its constitutional validity can be upheld even assuming for arguments' sake that the power of the Government to deal with a newspaper etc., containing matter, the publication of which is punishable under Section 124-A or Section 153-A should be held to be 'ultra vires'.

51. Now, we are absolved from the task of pronouncing upon the constitutional validity of Section 295-A, Indian Penal Code, because we have the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court on that matter in . In that case, it was contended that Section 295-A, Indian Penal Code is 'ultra vires' and void as it interferes with a citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression and is not protected by the reservation made under Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution.


The contention was repelled by a unanimous decision of the Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court. It follows from this decision that a person can be punished in spite of Article 19 of the Constitution with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both, if he with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India by words, either spoken or written, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class.

Now, Section 99-A empowers the Government to forfeit any newspaper etc., which contains words or visible representations insulting or attempting to insult the religion or religious beliefs of any class of citizens of India. Does this power with which the local Govt., is clothed, extend beyond the terms of the respective saving clauses in Article 19 of the Constitution? First I shall consider the right of freedom of expression. If it is proper that a person should be punished for publishing words which outrage religious susceptibilities, then it seems to me to be equally proper that the words so published should not be allowed to be circulated.

Any law aimed at destroying such dangerous words must surely in my opinion be deemed to be reasonable. I cannot conceive it as an excessive curtailment of the citizen's freedom of expression, when "in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality"
any matter which outrages the religious feelings of a class of citizens is wiped out of existence. No man's freedom of expression is prejudiced merely because he cannot deliberately and maliciously outrage the religious feelings of a class of his fellow citizens. I therefore think that Section 99-A is saved by Article 19 (2) of the Constitution.


52. Now, coining to the argument that it offends the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, the State has got under Clause (5) of Article 19 the right to make a law "imposing reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe". It seems to me that the phrase "in the interests of the General Public" contained in Clause (5) of Article 19 should be understood in a broad sense. The Supreme Court pointed out in , already referred to, that the phrase "in the interests of ........ public order", used in Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution has much wider connotation than the expression "for maintenance of public order". To quote the words in that decision "the calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult (i.e. insult to religion when it is perpetrated with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the feelings of that class is clearly to disrupt the public order".
The words in this clause "in the interests of the Public" are even wider in scope than the words "in the interests ............. of public order". I apprphend therefore that the power to seize and forfeit any property the user of which tends to disrupt the public order is without a doubt, well within the limits of reasonableness, and the grant of such power to the executive (subject to judicial supervision), can be fairly described as conceived "in the interests of general public". It is not unlike the forfeiture to the State of a lethal instrument used by an offender to commit a crime, I therefore see no force in this contention either of the applicant.


53. Coming then to the objection based upon the violation of the right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g), the saving clause is contained in Clause (6) of the Article which, in so far as it is material, is as follows:
 "(6) Nothing in Sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or -- any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause."
Preventing a book-seller from publishing a matter which has the effect of disrupting the public order is in my opinion, clearly no more than imposing a reasonable restriction on the exercise of his right to carry on business. I, therefore, hold that Section 99-A does not infringe any of the rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution.

54. It has also been argued that the mode of notification prescribed in Section 99-A and the limitation imposed in Section 99-B whereby the order can be brought before tin's Court only within a period of two months from the date of such notification render the encroachment upon the guaranteed rights unreasonable and place it outside the saving clauses of Article 19 above-referred to.


With respect to the mode of notification, although as I have already observed referring to the Supreme Court's decision in , the publicity value of such a notification is not great, still, it seems to me, that having regard to the nature of the power, it can hardly be expected to be exercised only after due notice of not only to the author or publisher but also to a book-seller or indeed any person who may be in possession of copies of the offending newspaper etc. The power vested in the Government to prevent the mischievous consequences that may flow from the circulation of the paper or the book will be rendered almost nugatory if there should be any such requirement as to notice. In the circumstances, therefore, I am not persuaded that the procedure prescribed militates against the Constitutional validity of Section 99-A.

55. With respect to the limitation as to time, it is true that in certain cases, it may cause hardship. It is possible for instance that an author, publisher or book-seller who has invested heavily in publishing or keeping for sale a number of copies may find to his dismay that the period provided by Section 99-B has already expired by the time that he becomes aware of the order and may thus be disabled from impeaching its validity.

But I venture to doubt whether the provision in Section 99-B limiting the right to question the order to two months could prevent the exercise of the power vested in the High Court under Article 226, and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. It seems to me that an unconstitutional order which affects a citizen's fundamental right can always be brought up for question before the High Court or the Supreme Court so long as it is in force and may be used in derogation of such a right.


The limitation as to time therefore in my opinion should be construed as affecting the availability of the special mode of relief provided by Section 99-B. In that view, I am not inclined to uphold the contention that that provision by itself operates to render the power vested in the Government under Section 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional if the nature of the power itself, is otherwise, as I have held it is, within constitutionally permissible limits. These contentions too, have little force.

56. As to the submission that the order of the State Government is to be set aside merely on the ground that it does not contain the grounds of the opinion of the Government, I am inclined to think that we cannot and in any case ought not to do so. Under Section 99-D of the Code all that we are called upon to do is to decide whether the book in question contains matter of such a nature as is referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 99-A and to set aside the order only if we are not satisfied that it does.

Further, I do not read the phrase "stating the grounds of its opinion" in Section 99-A as a condition precedent to the validity of the order passed under Section 99-A, particularly when the whole matter can be thrashed out in the High Court before a special Bench of three Judges. The prejudice if any caused by the non-statement is no more than inconvenience and the applicant can be said at the worst to be somewhat handicapped in the conduct of his defence. But such a non-statement does not, in my opinion, go to the validity of the order.


57. It may however be argued that our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are wider than those which are conferred by Section 99-D and they may be resorted to. But it seems to me that even so, it would be taking too technical a view of the matter, to set aside the order of forfeiture solely on the ground that the grounds of the Government's opinion are not stated therein, if, as a matter of fact, we find that the book does contain objectionable matter.

58. This brings me to the question as to whether there is material placed before us which enables us to draw the conclusion that the applicant is guilty of deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of the Christian community. This cannot be a matter merely of presumption arising from the fact that the Government has forfeited the book.

It should be a matter of proof and the proof should, beyond all question, be offered by the Government. There is little doubt, as I have already pointed out, that if a prosecution were launched under Section 295-A, the burden would be wholly upon, the Government to establish the intention. Of course, the intention in such a case is to be gathered mainly from the words used by the author. But when I speak of the words used, I have in my mind not merely the words used in isolated passages. From the point of view of common sense, as well as sematies alike, all words should be read and interpreted with reference to their context.


The context of any passage in a book such as the one we are dealing with here is the whole of the book. Otherwise to give an example, it would not be difficult by a careful selection of passages or illustrations from a text-book of physiology or psychology of sex or a book on family planning to make out a strong case that the author concerned has a pornographic intention. The authority of the Supreme Court is available for this view if authority be needed, in the decision of . Dealing with a case under Section 4 (1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, XXIII of 1931, they held that "in order to determine whether a particular document falls within the ambit of any of the clauses of Section 4 (1) of the Press Act, the writing has to be considered as a whole and in a fair and free and liberal spirit, not dwelling too much upon isolated passages or upon a strong word here and there, and an endeavour should be made to gather the general effect which the whole composition would have on the mind of the people."
59. The relevant passages in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Government may now be extracted in order to ascertain how they want to make out firstly that the applicant has insulted or attempted to insult by words the religion or the religious beliefs of Christians & secondly that he has done so with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging their religious feelings. The relevant portions of their counter-affidavit will therefore have to be read:


"2. The very title of the book Bible Bandaram is disparaging and contemptuous in its tone and insinuation as the word 'Bandaram' in Telugu is used in popular parlance in a disparaging and satirical sense. The claim of the petitioner that the book is a dispassionate and scientific study of the Bible connected with Biblical literature is inconsistent with the abusive and insulting language in which religious personalities and tenets of the Christian (sic) have been characterized in the pages of the book as would be evident from some of the passages to which a detailed reference will be made hereinafter as typical of the insulting tone and content of the subject-matter of the book.


The petitioner may call himself a rationalist and humanist. He may claim that he is not a believer in the Hindu Religion and that the very basis of religion is shocking to his conscience. Whatever the scientific or rationalist motives that might have actuated the petitioner in embarking upon a vituperative and abusive commentary on the Bible, I respectfully submit the intention to outrage the Christian religion and its leading lights and its adherents is apparent from a reading of the book and the publication of the book would certainly come within the four corners of Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code attracting the power of the Government to issue the prohibitory order under Section 99-A of the Criminal Procedure Code.....

Whether the book 'Bible Bandaram' is the outcome of truth seeking rationalism or scientific humanism or dogmatic religionism it is certainly a publication brought out with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of the Christian community, as borne out by some of the passages in the book which are to the following effect:
(a) That the Bible contains vivid descriptions of tribal warfare, sacrifices, drink, blood-shed which shows that this book was produced by the uncivilized who were determined and engaged to destroy the more civilised races,

(b) That the old testament is neither the word of God Jahovah nor the New Testament the word of Jesus. This is amply proved by the incongruities, excesses, improbabilities and anachronisms, vulgarities that are manifest in every page of the Bible


(c) That the Old Testament came into existence 5n the 4th & 5th Century B. C. A critical reading of the Old Testament indicates that it is God Jehovah who is a cruel & selfish tyrant while Satan is a most excellent, noble and normal person. The five books of the Old Testament are mere forgeries and cannot be said to have been written by Moses at the word of Jehovah.
The prophecies contained in the Old Testament are mere poetic imaginations. The story of Jesus Christ built upon the shaky foundations of the Old Testament is a mere myth. The gospels of Saints Mathew, Mark, Luke, and John in the New Testament are subsequent fabrications. The material discrepancies contained in these gospels regarding the birth, life, teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus amply prove their spurious nature.

A person by name Jesus was reported to have been born out of an adulterous intercourse between his mother Mary and a Greek Soldier in the Roman Army. The conception of the Holy Ghost was a later creation by interested followers to purify the sinful birth of Jesus. The virginity of Mary and her subsequent apothesis were absurd and unwarranted.

The story, of resurrection is also untrue and improbable ............. Christianity is therefore a false and fabulous religion. Its early propagation is steeped in blood-shed and it is of little credit to the teachings of Christ. The Bible justifies such barbarities. The Christian Moral Code as taught in the Bible is contrary to human nature and natural evolution. The growth of fascism in European countries is entirely due to the previous propagation and belief in the stupid and extraordinary teachings of the Christian religion.


3. In view of the above grossly offensive and provocative language used in depicting the Christian Religious beliefs and in painting the birth and character of Jesus Christ in an indecent manner the claim of the petitioner that it is a dispassionate study of religion cannot carry any conviction.

On the contrary the petitioner's deliberate Intention to outrage the feelings of the Christians would be evident therefrom and various representations have been received from the Christians and Christian associations, that the book has deeply wounded their religious feelings and sentiments."
It is unnecessary to refer to the other portions of the affidavit which do not directly bear upon the important question now under consideration. Speaking for myself I am not prepared to hold that even if the word 'Bandaram' in Telugu carries a disparaging and satirical sense in popular parlance, it follows that it necessarily establishes malice on the part of the author.

Disparagement and satire do not in my opinion, necessarily import malice. On the other hand I may make it clear that the petitioner's contention that the word 'Bandaram' means only "treasure" in the innocuous sense does not commend itself to me.

60. I shall now refer to the passages to which a detailed reference is made in order to see whether they necessarily evince the particular intention.


61. The first passage referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph above-referred to is to be found at page 10 of the book. Freely translated, the passage is as follows :--
 "Just as in the Hindu Vedas, evil practices like racial hatred, wars, sacrifices, and the taking of intoxicating drink are also freely found in the Bible. It may be that this is the result? of the fact that this book was born in communities which destroy the communities in which the civilisation had progressed."
In this passage, there is criticism not only of the Bible but also of the Vedas of the Hindus. At the bottom of the previous page, the author stated thus :--
 "In truth, these books (referring to the sacred books of various religions) serve only to enable us to know the social culture of the times to which they relate and cannot be treated, as the followers of the religion foolishly think, as affording authority for an all time faith, because when any idea embodied in a book becomes effete and that idea sets a limit to man who has to progress by attaining ever-new knowledge, then it is equivalent to his death. The Zend Avesta of the Zoroastrians, the Vedas of the Hindus, the Pitakas of the Buddhists, the Bible of the Christians and the Quoran of Mohammedans etc., are books which point to man death as the alternative way."


These passages indicate that the author is attacking the sacred books of all the leading religions of the world. He may be right or wrong but in my opinion, it would be incorrect to attribute to the author a malicious intention towards the adherents of a particular religion although in the book under notice he is dealing with the Sacred Book of one religious community. It would be inappropriate in my opinion to use the word 'malice' with respect to an attitude of mind which makes no distinction between one class of people and another, It would hardly be correct in my judgment to speak of a man having malice towards the whole of humanity or towards followers of all religions. Malice should have a more specific and direct aim. Such a person may be styled a cynic, a misanthrope, but cannot be characterized as malicious.


62. It would not be out of place in judging the intention of the applicant to compare his words with those of other authors of books in wide circulation all over the civilised world.

63. In Frederic Harrison's book "The Creed of a Layman" we find the following passage. Reviewing a book entitled 'Essays and Reviews' to which several authors contributed and which he describes as a book "which at once repudiates miracles, inspiration. Mosaic history, and the authenticity of the Bible". Harrison observes as follows with reference to one of the essays therein written by Dr. Williams who, to use Harrison's words, is "a well-known tutor at Cambridge, who is now vice-principal of a training college for the priesthood and thus adds to the character of vicar, that of in educator of the clergy :--
 "............ it subjects the entire scripture to a process which combines that pursued by Niebuhr upon Livy, with that of Wolf upon Homer. In short, the truth of the narrative and the identity of the authors disappear together. It becomes a medley of legend, poetry and oral tradition, compiled, remodelled, and interpolated by a priestly order centuries after the times of its supposed authors. And this applies to the New Testament (though in a much less degree) just as to the Old."
The essay reviewed by Harrison was written and published in the year 1860 in England where there is no constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. One can hardly dream of attributing malice to Dr. Williams in subjecting the Bible to such searching criticism or to Harrison for describing the process.


64. Then with regard to the aspersions of the applicant against the Jewish race, I may quote a passage from the same book :--
 "Now, in spite of their monotheism, which they held in common with other Oriental races the Jewish national character bounds in repulsive features ................ We ask whether morbid pride, egotism, ferocity, inhuman hate and frantic fanaticism, superstition and hypocrisy, went for nothing in the national character? .............. Why, all history scarcely shows a race whose character was distorted by such hateful vices ........ It poisons their wild mythology and their sanguinary annals, it stiffens the Mossic ritual into a debasing formalism; their national songs choke with the thirst for vengence, and the warnings of their prophets are voiled in a gloomy horror."
It would be preposterous to charge the great and distinguished author of these words with a malicious intention to malign the Jewish race or outrage the feelings of Christians.

65. I am therefore inclined to think that the first passage relied on by the Government does not establish malice.

66. As regards the second passage referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2, it seems to me to be wholly innocuous. No reference is made in the affidavit to the particular page or pages in the book from which this passage is extracted. I have not been able to find in the book any single passage to this effect. The hook, however, does any these things although it may not be contained in a single passage. I consider it difficult to hold that this criticism furnishes any evidence of malice.


67. As regards what is contained in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the counter-affidavit. I may say that passages similar to what is contained up to the words 'spurious nature' are to be found in most books of Biblical criticism. For example, I may extract the following passages from Ingersoll's Lectures and Essays, Second series, entitled "Some Mistakes of Moses." :--
 "The real oppressor, enslaver, and corrupter of the people is the Bible. That book is the chain that binds, the dungeon that holds the clergy. That book spreads the pall of superstition over the colleges and schools. That book puts out the eyes of Science, and makes honest investigation a crime. That book unmans the politician, and degrades the people. That book fills the world with bigotry, hypocrisy, and fear. It plays the same part in our country that has been played by "Sacred Records'" in all the nations of the world.

The first five books in our Bible are known as the Pentateuch. For a long time, it was supposed that Moses was the author, and among the ignorant the supposition still prevails. As a matter of fact, it seems to be well settled that Moses had nothing to do with these books, and that they were not written until he had been dust and ashes for hundreds of years."
No one pretends that Shakespeare was inspired and yet all the writers of the books of the Old Testament put together could not have produced Hamlet.

 My own opinion is that General Joshua knew no more about the motions of the earth than he did about mercy and justice."
About the meaning of this book, called a revelation, there have been ages of war, and centuries of sword and flame............


It is not infinitely more reasonable to say that this book is the work of man, that it is filled with mingled truth and error, with mistakes and facts, and reflects, too faithfully perhaps, the "very form and pressure" of its time?

If there are mistakes in the Bible, certainly they were made by man. If there is anything contrary to nature, it was written by man, If there is anything immoral, cruel, heart-less, or infamous, it certainly was never written by a being worthy of the adoration of mankind.'' With reference to the applicant's statement about Satan, it may be noted that Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy quotes the following sentence from William James in the Chapter (XXIX) headed "William James" :
 "The prince of darkness may be a gentleman, as we are told he is; but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman,"
Neither William James nor Berlrand Russell could be charged with a malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of any community.


68. The only passage in sub-paragraph (c) of Paragraph 2 to which objection could really he taken is contained in the following sentence : --
 "A person by name Jesus was reported to have been born out of an adulterous intercourse between his mother Mary and a Greek Soldier in the army."
The other sentences cited are commonplaces of what is known as nationalistic criticism. As regards this particular sentence, this is really a translation of a passage from the well-known book of the celebrated German Biologist Ernst Haeckcl entitled "The Riddle of the Universe". Ernst Haeckel begins by saying in a preceding page that "the dogma of the immaculate conception ..........means that Mary was exempted at her birth or conception, from the law by which every child of Adam incurs the guilt of original sin, according to the teaching of the Catholic Church."
 Then the author proceeds to say : --
 "With regard to the doctrine of the miraculous conception of Christ by Mary (or the doctrine of "The Virgin Birth"), comparative religion has shown that this myth has even less claim to originality than most of the other stories in the Christian mythology; it has been borrowed from order religions, especially Buddhism. Similar myths were widely circulated in India, Persia, Asia Minor, and Greece several centuries before the birth of Christ. Whenever a king's unwedded daughter, or some other maid of high degree, gave birth to a child, the father was always pronounced to be a God, Or a demi-God; in the Christian case, it was the Holy Ghost."
Then follows this passage : --


Then follows this passage : --
 "To return to the particular question of the impregnation of the Virgin Mary by the Holy Ghost, we are referred to the gospels of testimony to the fact. The only two evangelists who speak of it, Matthew and Luke, relate in harmony that the Jewish maiden, Mary was betrothed to the carpenter Joseph, but became pregnant without his co-operation, and, indeed, "by the Holy Ghost" ..........When, therefore, we find in one of them, the gospel of Hicodemus (which is assigned by some scholars to the second century), a statement that Jesus was accused by the Jews of being "begotten, in sin" -- a statement that is somewhat enlarged by the second century Platonist writer Celsus (as indicated by Origen, Contra Colsum, I-32) into the charge that "the mother of Jesus was divorced by the carpenter who had married her, because she was convicted of adultery, and had borne a child to a certain soldier named Pantheras" -- we naturally connect it with the later Jewish story (in the .........)".


The passages are to be found in the book in the chapter entitled "Science and Christianity". That book was published in the 19th century and has been in circulation, I believe, all over the civilized world ever since and has been reprinted several times by the Rationalist Press Association, the latest edition to which I have access being that in the Thinker's Library and published in February, 1929. I am riot concerned to deny that a book or a newspaper or a document may well fall within the mischief of Section 99-A in spite of the fact that the words used therein are not of the author himself but of somebody else, although the fact that the idea expressed thereby is not the author's brain-child but one adopted from a book in wide circulation may well be a factor to be taken into account in reaching a conclusion as to his intention. But in the present case, I am not satisfied that a malicious intention can be gathered. It will be readily conceded, I apprehend, that such malicious intention could hardly be attributed to so earnest and sober-minded an investigator of scientific truth as Haeckel.


69. Now there are lot of people both in America and in England, not to mention other countries in the European continent, who believe that all sacred books were written by man and contain mere myths. I am prepared to admit that conditions in India are different from those in other parts of the civilized world in regard to religious beliefs, and that there are classes of people in this country prone to fanaticism, bigotry and superstition. Cut all the same, we must not forget that we are in a secular State and cannot object to free-thinking. As a people, we must get used as a result of the enjoyment of our fundamental rights to greater tolerance even of intolerance.

That will of course take time but that is no reason why we should not try to keep up in these matters with other advanced countries. One cannot of course be unmindful of the terrible ordeal through which our country has passed for one or two years both before and after the attainment of independence. In spite of it all, our law and Constitution do allow citizens even to offer insults to religion, if such insults are not made with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class, on the twin principles that curbs on freedom of expression are a greater evil than any consequences that may follow me exercise of such freedom and that one must not he afraid of error so long as truth is free to combat it.


I may mention that there are some books of Anatole France, the well-known French writer, which contain passages contemptuous of Christianity. Who has not read his famous story, entitled "Procurator of Judaea"? Swinburne's well-known Hymn to Proserpine breathes anti-Christian spirit, it is true that present day Rationalists of Europe no longer adopt the violent language of abuse to which the Bible was subjected in the 19th Century but that is only because rationalism has become established there for nearly a century. But new converts to rationalism, like new converts to any religion or cult, are apt to be fanatical and the applicant is obviously so. But fanaticism, however reprehensible, is not malice.

70. To sum up I grant that conditions in our country are different. I grant also that the passages relied on by the State may be offensive and shock the susceptibilities of overzealous Christians : But I may point out that they are no worse than excerpts I have cited from authors of three different countries where Christianity is the prevailing religion of part of one of the countries. The fact is also significant that the passages from the English author are nearly a century old while those from the American and German authors are nearly 60 years old.

They are, too from books, two of which at least must be very widely in circulation because they have been re-issued several times in "paper-books" while the other book that by Harrison, has been published by one of the most respectable publishing companies in the world, M/s. Macmillan and Co. That being so, it is difficult to hold that ideas and sentiments which have been freely in vogue for more than half a century and nearly a century in large parts even of the Christian world could be said to outrage Christian feelings.


71. Further, in the present case, the first volume of the "Bible Bandaram" closely read shows that according to the author there was no person like Jesus Christ. Viewed in that light, it cannot be said that the Christ of Christianity is intended to be disparaged. You cannot he guilty of disparaging a non-existing individual. Furthermore, having read the book through in the original Telugu (a course which I was forced to adopt because of the failure on the part of the Government to recognise their duty to give an English translation of the book) I am satisfied that although the passages may outrage the feelings of some Christians, it cannot be said that the author was inspired by the malicious intention to do so. He may be accused, perhaps, of deficiency in taste or discretion. He may be characterised as a fanatical rationalist. His choice of words may not be considered happy. He is quite clearly contemptuous of what is found in any sacred book. But we live in a country which has guaranteed freedom of expression in its Constitution.

72. We must not overlook the fact that it is not enough to find an intention to outrage but we must go further and find affirmatively a deliberate as well as a malicious intention. These passages may, at the worst, he held to evince a mere intention to outrage hut there is in my judgment nothing in the book to show that the author had a deliberate intention to outrage and that he was actuated by malice : The evidence afforded by the passages considered in the light of the whole of the book cannot, I think, bring home to the applicant any guilty intention.


73. Now, it is also to he remembered that by finding the book as manifesting the necessary intention, we are holding the author guilty of a crime. In holding that Section 295-A Indian Penal Code falls under the reservation made under Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has observed in : --
 "........... Section 295-A does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the religions beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the section. It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order ....."


74. Now, I am prepared to concede that the passages in question may constitute insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religions beliefs of Christians, but it will not be enough for us to hold that they are such. We shall have to hold that they constitute that aggravated form of insult' to religion which is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of Christians. However injudicious or regrettable the passages may be and deliberate as they may be found to be, the presence of malice also must be established. That Christians, (accustomed perhaps as the more enlightened among them must be to criticisms of this Kind contained in hooks freely in circulation even in this country) have not been, as a matter of fact, outraged is to my mind shown by the fact that although this book was published in November, 1956, the present action by the Government has been taken only on the 10th of April, 1958, when the present notification was issued. The Government have adduced no evidence, whatsoever even to the effect that Christians as a class have shown that their feelings have been outraged.


But it is an aspect of the case that need not be pursued because it does not bear directly on the question of the applicant's intention. I shall content myself with stating that it is the duty of the State to prove the objectionable intention beyond all reasonable doubt as in a criminal case and that it has failed to prove it.

75. I shall now turn to the next question as to whether it is open to the Government to issue an order covering all the volumes of a book issued in several volumes when only one of the volumes contains obnoxious matter. It has been contended before us that the word "book" means every volume of a book and Section 99-A enables the Government to do so. Speaking for myself, I can only express my great surprise that such an argument could be advanced.

The whole object of Section 99-A is to prevent the outrage of religious feelings by deliberate and malicious action. Objectionable words which have so outraged, if they are contained in a particular volume, that particular volume which causes the offence should be destroyed. But I can think of no conceivable reason why when a book consists of 16 volumes and the offending matter is contained in the 14th volume all the 16 volumes should be forfeited.

It seems to me that there is no justification for the State Government exercising any such power either on the ground of commonsense or on the plain meaning of the words of the section. "Book" is defined in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, as including every volume, part or division of a volume, and pamphlet, in any language, and every sheet of music, map, chart or plan separately printed or lithographed. (This definition will perhaps have to be token along with the clause above it that this is the meaning of 'book' unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context).


This is only an inclusive definition and therefore we must read into it in addition the ordinary meaning of a "Book". A hook in its plain and ordinary meaning is in my opinion a separately hound volume. Of course the word also has a larger sense. All Shakespeare's dramas can be referred to as one book when they are contained in a single volume. The whole Bible is a hook and so is the New Testament by itself. Every volume of Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" is a hook and so likewise is the whole of the Encyclopeadia Britannica. Even a single volume is found sometimes divided into 'books'.

The word 'book' has thus a wide as well as a narrow sense and when the word has to be understood in a particular statute, it should be understood with reference to the context as well as the purpose and object of the Statute. The purpose of the Statute is to destroy the offending matter by forfeiture. It is well settled that when forfeiture is involved, the narrowest possible construction consistent with the object of the statute should be adopted.

The definition includes even a part or a division of a volume but part or a division of a volume cannot be separately forfeited. So, the power should be read as extending to the forfeiture of the volume containing the offensive matter. That is the sense in which the word 'book' is to be understood in the present context having regard to the object and effect of the Statute. I think the matter is so plain that it requires no authority to support it. However, I may refer to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1925 All 195.


There the learned Judges of the Special Bench were dealing with six separate text books of Hindi Readers, Nos. 1 to 6, each being a volume by itself. By a notification under Section 99-A, all copies of parts 3, 4, 5 and 6 were declared to be forfeited by the Government. The order of forfeiture was impugned before the learned Judges. In their order, they state that they did not propose to go into the contents of each of the books in any great detail and observe as follows : --
 ".......... but it is necessary that we should consider each of the Readers separately; and that if we find in any one of the series extracts which though extravagant, do not fairly come within Section 124-A, it is our duty to 'exempt that particular Reader."


The argument of the learned 3rd Government Pleader to the contrary is to my mind also otherwise unsustainable on the facts of this particular case, because as I have already noticed at the outset of this opinion, the Government does not seem to have been aware of the fact that there is a second volume of "Bible Bandaram". The notification does not refer to two volumes or parts. No copy of the second part or volume has been produced before us by the Government; nor any passages from that volume referred to in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Government. It is not our duty, as I conceive it, to make an order of forfeiture but only to examine the correctness of any such order made by the Government It was suggested at one stage of the argument that the learned 3rd Government Pleader would translate portions of the second volume to show that they also contained passages to which objection could be taken. A translation of some of the passages has been handed over to us after the arguments were closed. But I have excused myself from the trouble of going through them because in my view, apart from the merits of the contention and the infirmities in the procedure adopted by the Government at the hearing of these petitions, it is not the task of this court in the discharge of the statutory duties imposed upon it by Section 99-D to go through a volume in which the Government have failed to discover for themselves any obnoxious matters.


Having read through the book, I am not inclined to consider that the assertion of the applicant in paragraphs 1 and 2 of his affidavit that he only attempted to probe in a rationalistic spirit into the historicity of the Christ and the origins of the Christian gospels and faith is unacceptable. It seemed to me moreover that it would be an improper procedure to take into consideration against the applicant passages which were neither referred to in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government nor relied on at the hearing and which he had no opportunity of explaining.

76. Before I conclude I ought to mention the argument on behalf of the Government that the applicant has not clearly made the point in his affidavit that there is an innocuous second volume of his book which, if deemed to be covered by the order, should be declared exempt therefrom. I am disposed to consider this objection as one conspiously devoid of substance. In the first place, this is not a matter to be decided on technical points. In the second place, when there are two or more volumes of a book in a notification under Section 99-A, the Government should state in a manner free from, all ambiguity whether their order is intended to cover one or more of the volumes.

In the present case, as I have already stated, neither the Government nor their counsel seems to have been even aware that there were two volumes and that is clear from the fact that at the hearing of these petitions they have only produced one. The counter-affidavit does not refer to any passages from the second volume -- so much the learned counsel for the State was compelled to concede. And what is not less striking is that in the counter-affidavit filed, the deponent skips over the passage in paragraph 8 of the applicant's affidavit which after referring to the two parts of the book advances the claim that the 2nd part "should be excluded from the operation of the order."


Hence, I overrule this technical objection urged on behalf of the Government. Whether I am right or wrong in my view as the Volume I, I have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that Volume 2, was not intended to be covered by the notification and cannot be covered by it. In the absence of a separate order of forfeiture in relation to it, we have no jurisdiction to go through the contents of the Second Volume in order to record the satisfaction or want of satisfaction mentioned in Section 99-D.

77. I may add that if the submission for the Government is right -- and of course, I do not accept it -- I should hold that Section 99-A would have the effect of imposing an unreasonable restriction on the right of freedom of expression, not to mention the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, because it would then empower the Government to deal not only with the offending matter or volume containing it but also altogether innocuous material.

78. The result is that in my opinion, this application should be allowed. If my order should prevail, I should be inclined to award the petitioner Rs. 300/- by way of costs of the application.

79. In my opinion, the writ petition need not be separately considered having regard to the result of the main application. In so far as its object is to attack the constitutionality of Sections 99-A and 99-B of the Criminal Procedure Code, it must fail. I propose to dismiss it. But having regard to what I propose to do in the result of the Criminal Miscellaneous petition, I would make no order as to costs.


Srinivasachari, J.
80. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice and Bhimasankaram, J., and on a consideration of all the material placed before the court and the circumstances of this case I am inclined to agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that this writ petition should be dismissed and I would like to add a few words of my own.


81. The title of the book now under consideration is "Bible Bandaram". It is urged that Bandaram in ordinary parlance means 'treasure'. The heading would connote that the book deals with the treasure of the Bible. But it cannot be gainsaid that if the words in a book, leave alone the title, though prima facie innocent are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, then it is a question to be determined as to what meaning the readers would attach to the words. It will be of no avail if the publisher urges that he meant the words in the innocent sense. No doubt courts would not strain to find an innocent meaning for words prima facie defamatory, neither will they put a forced construction which may fairly be deemed harmless. The court will find out the meaning of the words even though disguised in a riddle or in hieroglyphics. The sting of a libel may he contained in a word or sentence. If the book is a fair and honest criticism of the tenets contained in the Bible, then there could be no harm. But if it transgresses the bounds of fair and honest criticism and enters the realm of obscene abuse, the courts would step in to put an end to this criticism. Certain sentences occurring in the book now under consideration have been extracted in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice such as that "Jesus was the result of adulterous intercourse". It may be that the author of the book might justify it by reference to books which speak about this. But it is not the justification that matters as what consequences it would have been upon the religious susceptibilities of the Christian Community, who hold the Bible to be sacred.


82. The Supreme Court in the case of Veerabhadra Chettiar v. Ramaswami Naicker, observes that "Section 295 of the Penal Code has been intended to respect the religious susceptibilities of persons of different religions, persuasions or creeds. Courts have got to be very circumspect in such matters and to pay due regard to the feelings and religious emotions of different persons with different beliefs irrespective of the consideration..... Whether they are rational or otherwise in the opinion of the Court."
It follows from these observations that we cannot in a light-hearted way brush aside the religious susceptibilities of a class of persons. Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code was introduced after an abortive prosecution of a person who had published a pamphlet called "Rangeela Rasool" meaning 'amorous Prophet' in which he described the incontinence of the Prophet Mohommed. When he was charged under Section 153-A Indian Penal Code the Lahore High Court held that the man could not be convicted as the attack was only on the founder of the religion and did not amount to creating class hostilities or hatred between classes within the meaning of Section 153-A. If the inevitable consequence of such writing is the excitement of feelings of hatred between the followers of two religions, then it must be put an end to. The matter must be judged primarily by the language of the book itself though it is permissible to receive and consider external evidence either to prove or to rebut the meaning ascribed to it in the order of forfeiture: Kali Charan Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 1927 All 649.

83. No doubt where there is religious freedom, a certain latitude must of necessity be conceded in respect of a free expression of opinion together with a certain measure of liberty to criticise the beliefs of others but it is contrary to all reason, to imagine that liberty to criticise includes the licence to resort to vile and abusive language.


84. The right to freedom of religion Is guaranteed under Article 25 and Article 26 of the Constitution, In a case before the Supreme Court where a person was charged under Sections 153-A and 295-A and convicted for having published an article in a paper or a cartoon about a donkey on which the agitation was started by the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh, it was contended before the Supreme Court that Section 295-A was ultra vires in that it interfered with the petitioner's right to freedom of expression guaranteed to him under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and it was urged that the restriction imposed thereon was not a reasonable restriction. While dealing with this question, their Lordships stated that where the restriction was in the interests of the security of the State and where the restriction is made in the interests of public order, such a restriction was a reasonable restriction and, therefore, it is no longer open to contend that Section 295-A of the Penal Code is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution--Vide .
85. For all the above reasons I am in agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice that this writ petition should be dismissed with costs.


D.K.V. Prasada Rao And Ors. vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh on 8 April, 1983

JUDGMENT Ramaswamy, J.
 1. These four writ petitions consisting of individual and juristic persons (Partnership Firms) and a lone lessee-licensees of cinema buildings (hereinafter called 'theatres') situation in West Godavari, Khammam, Nizambad and Mahboobnagar Districts are the petitioners. They invoked the constitutional remedy under Article 226 impugning "the vires of R. 12 (3)" of the Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Rules, (1970), hereinafter called "the impugned Rule", mounting three pronged attack viz., infringement of their fundamental right to carry on trade or business in exhibiting cinematographs, on the anvil of (1) smack of statutory base, (2) excessive delegation and (3) unreasonable constraint in the exercise and enjoyment of their aforesaid right. Whether the base thus created on their four pillars (writ petitions) stand erected on solid foundation or shifting sand, is the subject of broach hereinafter. The reliefs claimed thereon are : (a) for declaration that the conferment of the rule-making power under Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Act (4 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as "the Act" as ultra vires the Constitution; (b) to declare R. 12 (3) and the conditions if any imposed in Form 'B' Licence pursuant to the said rule fixing the prices of cinema tickets as illegal, void and ultra vires the Constitution and the rule-making power; (c) and to issue a direction to the respondents to permit the petitioner to revise the rates of admission to their theatres.


2. The allegations made in support thereof are that the petitioners are either proprietors or lessee-licensees of the theatres at their respective places of business. They constructed the theatres at a huge cost. They provided all amenities as per law. Pursuant to the licences granted under the provisions of the Act and the Rules in the prescribed 'B' Form to exhibit cinematographs, they are doing their business. As owners thereof and as incident to their business avocation, they have got a right to fix the rates of admission to permit the persons to enter into different classes to witness the cinematographs. But the respondents have impeded their free right to fix the rates of admission at their choice. The Act was legislated with the sole object to regulate only to ensure safety to the cine-going public in their theatres as enjoined under Section 6 and health and sanitation, as incidental to regulation. Sections 3 and 5 of the Act are intended to operate only in that field. Section 11 delegates power to the State Government to make rules regulating to work out successfully in implementation of the aforesaid purpose. Rules were initially made to meet those purposes. But the price control of cinema tickets is not within the purview of the Act and the Rules. Therefore, the fixation of maximum rates of admission to different classes cannot be said to carry out any of the purposes of hteAct. There is no specific provisions under the Act empowering the State Government or the Licensing Authority to fix the rates of admission. So, the rule-making power under Section 11 cannot travel beyond the above 'purposes'. They are incurring huge expenditure to provide the facilities and amenities prescribed, apart from the payment of minimum wages to workmen while meeting the mounting cost of exhibiting films. But in view of the unlawful interference by the licensing authority, viz., the second respondent in these writ petitions in fixing the rates of admission, the petitioners are put to great financial loss. The


writ petitions in fixing the rates of admission, the petitioners are put to great financial loss. The petitioners made repeated representations bringing to the notice of the licensing authorities of the loss thus being incurred and requrested to revise the rates of admission. Without any justification, they have been delaying revision of the rates of admission, thereby they are made to incur huge financial loss. Gradually the business be closed and be driven out from trade or business.


3. The power to fix rates of admission is a legislative act. Incases where the Parliament intended to operate detrimental to the fundamental right of a citizen in respect of fixing the rates of prices, vis--vis the right to trade or to carry on business, specific enactments like the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 and the Defence of India Act and various Control Orders issued in pursuance of the delegation thereunder, have been brought on statute book inhibiting the free right of a citizen to fix the prices of essential commodities. If the Legislature intended to invade into this right of fixation of rates of admission, being a legislative act, the Legislature would have specifically provided for such a power under the Act itself. But the Act does not envisage any such power. A reading of the preamble, all the provisions of the Act and Rules, does not indicate any such power being given to the Legislature. The Legislature intended its delegate to make rules only to operate in the field adumbrated and adverted to earlier. Therefore, exercise of power by the delegated authority, viz., the State Government in making Rule 12 (3) lacks legislative competency and therefore unconsitutional. Even admitting that there inheres such power. It is not incidental to the main purpose and is of excessive delegation. There are no guidelines provided under the Act or the Rules made thereunder. Therefore it is arbitrary leading to capricious exercise of power. Even otherwise, it is an unreasonable restriciton on the exercise of their fundamental right enshrined under Article 19 (1) (g). It is also arbitrary, offending Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners in all the four writ petitions have reiterated these contentions. Untrammelled by question of fact, questions of law arise for decision in all these writ petitions, we have therefore extracted the averments made in W. P. No. 480 of


petitions, we have therefore extracted the averments made in W. P. No. 480 of 1980 being first to approach.


4. The Government have filed their counter-affidavits in all these writ petitions. We are constrained at the outset, to express out dissatisfaction of lack of interest and apathy on the part of the Government to meet any of the legal contentions in any of the counter-affidavits filed, except stating few skeletal factual position. It is deplorable, that when, the vires of R. 12 (3) which has got a great public importance is specifically assailed the Government adopted usual apathy and did not bestow any thought, care or attention to deal with these points, providing necessary material to the Court. But these questions being questions of law bearing constitutional importance, we are not inclined to short circuit the issues on mere technicality but propose to deal them in extenso.


5. In the counter-affidavit filed in W. P. 480/80 it is stated that the licensing authority viz., 2nd respondent fixed the maximum rates of admission to different class4es in the theatres in the District in the year 1979. Within a short period thereafter the petitioners attempted to get them revised on the pretext of increast of expenditure. The Licensing Authority has to take into account the additional amenities provided in the interregnum and the purchasing capacity of the cine-going public. These factors required through examination. The Licensing Authority is anxious to consider the request. But without awaiting the decision, they rushed to this Court on vague feat. The Government made the impugned Rule. The Government also provided guidelines in G. O. Ms. No. 2041 Home Department dated 25-6-1953 and G. O. Ms. No. 744 Home Department dated 3-4-1965, hereinafter called "the Guidelines" for fixing the rates of admission. On receipt of interim directions from this Court, the authorities considered the request in the light of the guidelines, examined various aspects and enhanced the rates of admission taking into account the authorities provided in the theatres.
 6. In the counter-affidavit filed in W. P. no. 1279/80 it was averred that the petitioner No. 2 did not apply for enhancement of rates of admission. Petitioners 1, 3 and 4 made their applications. It was referred to the concerned officer for inspection and reports. They submitted the reports pointing out lack of some of the basic amenities and of their giving direction for rectification thereof. Without rectifying those defects and to evade providing the wanting amenities and sanitary conditions in the theatres, they approached this Court suppressing those facts and obtained directions.


7. In pursuance of the interim directions issued by this Court, the Licensing Authority made personal inspection of all the theatres. He found deplorable insanitary conditions and lack of basic amenities prevalent in the theatres. Yet he objectively considered and received the rates of admission depending upon the existing amenities etc. in the respective theatres. With regard to petitioner No. 1, he gave in paragraph No. 4 the particulars thereof and the reasons for increase or otherwise and for others in the subsequent paragraphs. He stated the existing, proposed and revised rates. They read thus :-
 Peititoner No. 1 :
 ___________________________________________________________________________________


Sl. No.  Class.         Existing rates Rates proposed by Rates enhanced now

     the management.

___________________________________________________________________________________

1.  Balcony   Rs. 2-60   Rs.  2-80   Rs.  2-80

2. I Class        2-00         2-65         2-20

3. II Class        1-20         1-50         1-40

4.     III Class        0-60         0-75         0-70

___________________________________________________________________________________

 Petitioner No. 3 :

   ___________________________________________________________________________________

1. Balcony    Rs. 2-25    Rs. 3-25    Rs. 2-70

2.  II Class        1-50        2-50        2-20

3. III Class        1-00        1-75        1-50

4.       IV Class        0-60        1-00        0-70

___________________________________________________________________________________

 Petitioner No. 4 :

   ___________________________________________________________________________________

1. Balcony    Rs. 1-95   Rs.  2-50   Rs.  2-30

2.   I Class        1-45        2-00        1-75

3.  II Class        0-95        1-40        1-20

4.       IV Class        0-45        0-70        0-60

___________________________________________________________________________________

 Petitioner No. 2 :

 ___________________________________________________________________________________

1. Balcony    Rs. 1-75   Rs.  2-30   Rs.  2-30


2.   I Class        1-15        2-00        2-00

3.  II Class        0-75        1-25        1-25

4.       III Class        0-60        0-80        0-70

___________________________________________________________________________________


___________________________________________________________________________________

 8. In the counter-affidavit in W. P. No. 1279/80 it is pleaded that the rates were revised at request on 4-7-1978. No request thereafter was made except on 14-3-1980. Thereon it was referred to the Revenue Divisional Officer for report which is awaited. In the meantime he obtained interim directions on 27-3-80 from this Court. On receipt thereof on17-4-1980, he was called upon to produce evidence. It was received on 14-4-1980. By petition dated 16-4-80 he requested time for eight days which was acceded to. Yet he did not produce any evidence. The R. D. O. submitted his report stating that the petitioner did not provide any additional amenities. The record was considered and the request was rejected by memo dated 23-4-80. In W. P. No. 6335/80 it is stated in the counter-affidavit that a petition dated 4-2-1980 was filed requesting revision. On 26-4-1980 it was referred to the R. D. O. for inspection and report. It was submitted on 19-1-81. In the meanwhile the petitioner reduced the seating capacity. As per the rules, the concerned Commercial Tax Officer has to be consulted. On having consultation, the rates were revised by memo dated 22-3-1981 to the following effect :
 (For revised rates see the table below) ___________________________________________________________________________________ Existing classwise Classwise seating capacity and Now Seating capacity Seating capacity and rates of admission proposed and rates of admission Rates of admission. .by the proprietor. .allowed.
___________________________________________________________________________________

1. Ist Class 129 seats 1. Spl. Class 18 seats 1. Spl. Class 18 seats


(Chairs) Rs. 1-00 (Box. Newly Rs. 3/-     Rs. 2.20

  opened Class)      (Box)

2. 2nd Class  160 seats 2. Ist Class  140 seats 2. 1st Class  140 seats

  Rs. 0-70    (chairs) Rs. 2-25    (chairs) Rs. 1-70

3. 3rd Class  500 seats 3. 2nd Class  180 seats 3. 2nd Class  180 seats

    (benches) Rs. 0-50    (Chairs) Rs. 1-50    (Chairs) Rs. 1-20

    4. 3rd Class  430 seats 4. 3rd Class  430 seats

        (Benches) Rs. 0-80    (Benches)

             Ladies 200

              Gents. 230  0-70

___________________________________________________________________________________


9. Sri M. R. K. Choudary, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all these writ petitions, while reiterating the contentions in the pleadings, referred to us the preamble and purposes envisaged in Ss. 3, 5 and 6. From that he reiterated that the fixation of maximum rates of admission is not one of the purposes connected with the Act and pressed the contentions in the pleadings as part of his argument. He contends that the word "Regulation" though is of wide meaning only intended to operate in the matter of construction or reconstruction. The faixation of maximum rates of admission is not one of the purposes nor an incidental power. Had the Legislature intended, to give such power to its delegates, the Act would have made specific provision in that regard. The absence is eloquent. A reading of the provisions and the rules made thereunder does not lend any such indication. Therefore the delegatee cannot make the rule beyond what is provided for except to the extent of cognate or analogous matters incidental to the main purpose. He draws an analogy from the rules made for admission of students into medical courses and the University Acts and the Statutes made thereunder for the actual running of the University subsequent to the admission. He states that rules of admission are only made to select candidates. Once candidates are selected and were admitted into courses, the rules ceased to have any application and thereafter the students are bound by the University Act and the Statutes made thereunder. On that premise he urges that once the rules were made for construction of the theatres, and the theatres are constructed as per the rules, the power gets exhausted. There is no further power to inhibit the fixation of right of admission by the licensees of the theatres unless there is a separate provision in the Act to that effect. In support of his contention that fixation of rates of admission is not one of the purposes of the legislative act, he places


contention that fixation of rates of admission is not one of the purposes of the legislative act, he places strong reliance on the decisions reported in a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Durga Chand v. Union of India, , a single Judge's decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Deepak Theatres, Dhuri v. State, and also a judgment of the Madras High Court in Royal Arts v. State, . He further contended that in construcing the provisions of the Act for the purpose of ascertaining its intention the law laid down in Pathumma v. State of Kerala, , has to be kept in view. In this context he pressed for considerations the motive behind the the impugned Rule. According to him, this was made as a step-in-aid to the Andhra Pradesh Entertainments Act to levy higher rate of tax. He also contends that unless there is specific power given under the Act, no rules can be made in exercise of its delegated legislation. It is not a plenary power. If made, it would be without authority of law. For this contention, he relies upon the decision reported in Hukum Chand v. Union of India, .


10. He further contends that even assuming that there is any such power to make rules, it is an excessive delegation of rule-making power. He contends that rules cannot override Statutes and Government cannot make rules fixing rates of admission under the guise of the rule-making power to trenching upon the legislative field. He relies upon Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, ; Sant Saran Lal v. Parsuram, ; A. M. Sinha v. A. K. Biswas, ; and Gwalior Rayon Mills v. Asstt. Commr. of Sales Tax, .


11. He further contends that even if there is any such power, the Legislature did not give any guidelines. It left to the arbitrary exercise of power by the executive. Therefore it is uncanalised and unguided power leading to exercise of unbriddled and arbitrary power. The guidelines provided in the G. Os. referred to earlier are not statutory; they are only administrative in character; they cannot supplement the statutory rules and they cannot be relied upon. Therefore, unless statutory rules are made as part of the impugned rule, the conferment of the power in the impugned rule is unwarranted or excessive. It is the usual legislative practice that after the rules are made, they should be laid before the Legislature immediately after its sitting and the Legislature has got the power to annul. Under this enactment, there is no such provision provided. Therefore that should be taken as one of the indicia to find that the Legislature did not intend to give such wide power of fixation of rates of admission, a legislative act, to the rule-makign authority. Lastly it is contended that even assuming that the Act provides for making such a rule and the rules are not made in excess of hthedelegated legislation and are valid; even then, the rule infringes their fundamental right to carry on the trade and their incidental right to fix rates of admission is ultra vires and unreasonably invaded their right; therefore it is violative of their fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. He relied on the decision reported in R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore, .


12. We may mention at the outset that though in the course of argument the learned counsel stated certain figures of percentage said to be increased in the cost of exhibiting cinematographs, we are refraining to refer them in detail for what of any material placed before us to consider their correctness. Though the contention of arbitrariness in procedure violating Article 14 of the Constitution was raised in the pleadings, it is not pursued at the Bar. Therefore we are relieved to consider the same.
 13. Sri A. Venkatarama Reddy, learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, strenuously repelled all the above contentions. He argues in the first instance, that the Act itself is a regulatory measure. The provisions of Ss. 3 and 5 of the Act read in the light of its preamble clearly contemplates that the Legislature intended to regulate all the steps in the business inclusive of the right to fix the rates of admission. It is an integral part of the provisions of the Act. The Legislature enacted the law to delegate the power to make rules. The regulation of exhibition, therefore, includes the power to fix the maximum rates of admission to different classes for entry into the theatres by the cine-going public. This power is incidental to the power of regulation of exhibiting cinematographs to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power by the owners of the theatres or lessees thereof, so as to avoid unhealthy competition in exhibiting cinematographs. Thus, it is incidental to the main purposes of the Act. In support of his contention, he relies upon S. Subba Rao v. P. Veeraraghaviah, AIR 1977 Andh Pra 63 and Jayanthilal v. Union of India, . Therefore, the exercise of the power by the delegated legislation in making the impugned rule is thus backed by the legislative sanction and is within the competency of the State Government.


14. He further contends that the Government have wide power to issue instructions regulating the manner of exercise of power by Licensing Authority. He relies upon the decisions reported in State of Punjab v. Harikishan, and Vishnu Talkies v. State of Bihar, . In exercise of that power, the Government have issued G. Os. referred to earlier in the counter-affidavit. The delegation of the power is not excessive. The Legislature has given discretion to the Licensing Authority to fix the rates of admission. He relies upon R. K Porwal v. State of Maharashtra, . He further contends that the Licensing Authority in each case has properly taken all the material available before them and revised the rates of admission in pursuance of the interim directions given by this Court and negatived in one case. There is no illegality committed by the Licensing Authority in revising the rates of admission. No material has been placed before the Court to substantiate as a fact the alleged arbitrary exercise of power in any of these writ petitions. Therefore the writ petitions are entailed to be dismissed.
 15. In view of the above respective contentions, the questions that emerged for decision are:
 (1) Whether the Act gives power to make the impugned Rule?
 (2) Whether the fixation of the rates of admission are illegal?
 (3) Whether the fixation of the rates of admission are illegal?
 16. Before adverting to the above questions, it would be profitable to refer to the legislative history of the Act and the Rules.
 Legislative history:


Legislative history:
 17. For the first time in 1918, the Central Legislature stepped in to regulate proper control of cinematograph exhibitions with particular reference to the safety of the persons to witness them and to prevent exhibition to the public of improper or objectionable films. In implementation therefo, the Cinematographs Act (2 of 1918) was brought on Statute Book to obtain licence subject to the conditions prescribed thereunder and certification of films suitable for public exhibition. The Act reigned the field nearly for 34 years with amendments made from time to time. With the ushering of the Constitution and with the avowed pledge in the fundamental principles of State Policy to promote welfare of the people, economic, social and cultural, to secure social order vis--vis the fundamental rights designed to entrust the task to its sovereign Legislature to make laws in that regard. As a step-in-aid, it enumerated the legislative power in Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution and earmarked to the Parliament and State Legislatures of the respective entries thereto enumerated in VIIth Schedule to the Constitution, namely, the Union List, State List and the Concurrent List. Thereunder Entry 60 of the Union List empowers the Parliament "for sanctioning of cinematographs for exhibition" and Entry 33 of the State List empowers the Legislature of the State to enact laws relating to "cinemas" subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of the Union List. As a consequence thereof, Act 2 of 1918 became a fixed blend necessitating to bring about an amendment. It was resolved to re-enact the provisions of Act II of 1918, separating the provisions relating to the sanctioning of films for exhibition relegating the licensing regulation of Cinemas (State subject) to the State Legislature. Thus, the Cinematographs Act (37 of 1952) was retained by the Parliament with suitable amendments.


18. Similarly, the State Legislatures set in motion to enact laws under Entry 33 of the State List. Several States made Laws similar to the Act. On the conferment of the power on the President of India bys. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1954 (Central Act 45 of 1954), the Parliament enactaed the Andhra Cinemas (Regulation) Act (4 of 1955). It was brought into force with effect from 19th March, 1955. It was re-enacted by the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area). Re-enacting Act, 1956 (Act VI of 1956). By Section 3 of the Schedule of Andhra Pradesh Extension of Laws (Andhra Pradesh Act 23 of 1958), the Andhra Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1954 was extended to the Telangana area. The Short Title was substituted in the Act by amendment of Andhra Pradesh Laws (Amendment of Short Titles) Act, 1961 (Act IX of 1961). Thus, the Andhra Pradesh Cinemas (Regulation) Act (4 of 1955) has come into force in Andhra Area with effect from 27th March, 1955 and in Telangana Area from April 1, 1960. As on the date of filing of writ petitions, the Act is in force in the entire State of Andhra Pradesh regulating the exhibition of cinematographs.
 Meaning of the word "Regulation" & Title a Key :


Meaning of the word "Regulation" & Title a Key :
 19. In view of the specific contentions raised by the parties, it is profitable to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act in detail. The prominent feature that strikes glaringly to the naked eye is the title of the Act, "The Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Act, followed by its preamble. It is true", quoted Chief Justice Lefroy, by Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 192 that "although the title of an Act cannot be made use of to control or express provisions of the Act, ye tif there be in these provisions anything admitting of a doubt, the title of the Act is a matter proper to be considered, inorder to assist in the interpretation of Act, and thereby to give to the doubtful language in the body of the Act a meaning consistent rather than at variance with the clear title of the Act (Shaw v. Ruddin, (1858) 9 Lr CLR 214, 219). The heart of the title is the word "Regulation". The prominence thus ascribed is to the word was "Regulation". But it lacks legislative definition of its own. Therefore, it is profitable to find what meaning has been ascribed to it either under the dictionaries or analogous statutes or Judge made law to understand its scope and reach and whether it would comprehend within its ambit the power to make rules to regulate maximum rates of admission. The term "Regulate" is defined in Oxford Dictionary, as follows:
 "to control, to govern, to protect by rules or regulations, to subject to guidance or restrictions, to adopt to circumstances or surroundings."
 IN Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 76, p. 610, the meaning of the word "regulate" is stated thus:


"The word 'regulate' is derived from the lating word 'rego and regula'. It is a word of broad import having a broad meaning and is very comprehensive in scope."
 20. IN Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, (1896) AC 88 at 93 (House of Lords (Privy Council - Ed.), Lord Davey, while considering the word "Regulation" has held that:
 "There is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of trade and the regulation or governance of it and indeed ............ a power to regulate and to govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regualted or governed."
 21. Sri C. Herman Prechette in "The American Constitution" III Edition, at page 186, gives the meaning of the word "Regulation" as the breadth of regulatory power which the Congress may exercise within its recognised scope of authority has seldom successfully questioned. Efforts to read restrictive interpretations into the word "regulate" have almost uniformly failed. Regulations, the Court has said, means not only "protection and promotion" but also "restriction and even prohibition".
 2. In Cook v. Marshall Country, (1904) 196 US 261 at 272 Mr. Justice Brown of the Supreme Court of Congress to regulate inter-State Commerce, observed that :
 ".......... But so long as they are adopted in good faith, with an eye single to the public welfare, they are as much entitled to the recognition of the general Government as if they were uniformly adopted by all the States."
 23. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhushan v. Rama Sundari, , where the scope of the word 'regulation' was considered, it was held :


'The Dictionary meaning of the word 'regulation' in Shorter Oxford Dictionary is "the act of regulating" and the word "regulate" is given the meaning "to control, govern, or direct by rule or regulation". This entry thus, gives the power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling all house accommodation in cantonment areas. Clearly, this power to direct or control will include within it all aspects as to who is to make the constructions under that conditions the constructions can be altered, who is to occupy the accommodation and for how long, on what terms is to be occupied, when and under what circumstances the occupant is to cease to occupy it, and the manner in which the accommodation is to be utilised. All these are ingredients of regulation of house accommodation and we see no reason to hold that this word "regulation" has not been used in this wide sense in this entirety."
 24. It would, therefore, be reasonable to deduce that the word "regulation" is a word of broad import having wide meaning comprehending all facets not only specifically enumerated in the Act but also embrace within its fold the powers incidental to the regulation envisaged in good faith with an eye single to the public welfare. Court has to recognise this power of the Government in public interest.
 Relevant provisions in the Act and Rules and their salient features:
 25. When such is the sweep of the word "Regulation" engrafted in the title of the Act, what is the ambit it embraced in the Act is to be considered.


26. The Preamble of the Act is a key to open the mind of its makers adumbrating that it is intended to regulate the exhibitions by means of cinematographs in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 2 (1) defines "cinematograph" includes any apparatus for presentation of moving pictures or series of pictures. sub-section (2) of S. 2 defines "Government" means the State Government. Sub-section (3) defines "Notification" means notification published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. Sub-section (4) defines "Place" includes a house, building, tent and any description of transport whether by water, land or air. Under sub-section (5), 'Prescribed' means prescribed by rules and under the Act.
 27. Section 3 is important for consideration which reads thus:
 "cinematograph exhibitions to be licensed; save as otherwise provided in this Act, on person shall give an exhibition by means of a cinematograph elsewhere than in a place licensed under this Act, or "otherwise than in compliance with any conditions and restrictions imposed by such license."
 28. Section 3 posits that a person acquires no right to exhibit cinematograph except as otherwise provided in this Act. It was couched in the negative language. In the positive form a person shall exhibit cinematographs only in the licensed 'place' on his complying with any conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence. It thus highlights the regulatory control by licensing system and its control thereof bythe Licensing Authority.
 29. Section 4 defines "Licensing Authority" as to mean the District Controller having power to grant licences under this Act. The proviso thereto enables the Government by notification to constitute for the whole or anypart of the State "such other authority" as it may specify in the notification to be the Licensing Authority for the purposes of the Act.


30. Section 5 imposes restrictions on powers of Licensing Authority to grant licence. It reads thus:
 "(1) The Licensing Authority "shall not grant a licence" under this Act, "unless it is satisfied that"-
 (a) "the rules made under this Act" have been substantially complied with, and


(b) adequate precautions have been taken in the place, in respect of which the licence is to be given, to provide for the safety of the persons attending exhibition herein.
 (2) "Subject to" the foregoing provisions of this Section and "to the control of" the Government, the Licensing Authority may grant licences under this Act, to such persons as that authority "thinks fit and on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as it may determine;
 (3) The Government may, from time to time, issue directions to licensees generally or to any licensee in particular for the purpose of regulating the exhibition of any film or class of films, so that scientific films, films intended for educational purposes, films dealing with news and current events, documentary films or indigenous films secure an adequate opportunity of being exhibited, and where any such directions have been issued, those directions shall be deemed to be additional conditions and restrictions subject to which the licence has been granted."
 31. In respect of the matters specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S. 6 (1) of the Act set out in sub-section (1) of S. 6 are excluded in their application with reference to construction or reconstruction or use of or the installation of any machinery in anyplace or building to be used "exclusively" for the holding of cinematograph exhibitions. The applications for permission thereof shall be made to the Licensing authority under the Act in accordance with the rules made in that behalf. Sub-sec. (2) gives power to the Licensing Authority, subject to the control of the Government and any rules made in that behalf, after making consultations with the authorities mentioned therein and for the reasons to be recorded, either to grant or refuse to grant licence or the permissions applied for.


32. Section 7, provides right of appeal to the aggrieved persons against the decisionof the Licensing Authority under S. 6.
 33. Section 7 empowers the Government of the District Collector to suspend exhibition of films in certain cases while Section 9 prescribes penalties. Section 10 gives power to revoke or suspend the licence against which the right of appeal to the State Government and the power of the State Government to suspend the impugned order have been provided for. Though these provisions are are ......, a close reading of them would indicate that the regulation of licensing and control of the business of trade in exhibitions of cinematographs "was couched in broad language".
 34. Section 11 gives power to the State Government to make rules by notification "for carrying out the purposes of the Act".
 Sub-section (2) says that-
 "In particular" and without prejudice to the generallity of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for-
 (a) "the terms", "conditions and restrictions", "if any", subject to which licences and permissions may be granted under the Act, ............... (The other clauses are not necessary for the purpose of this Act. Hence they are omitted.)


35. In exercise of the aforesaid powers, originally rules have been framed viz., Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Rules, 1961 and were published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 26-7-1962 and they came into force with effect from July 26, 1962. Thereafter, the rules have been completely recast and new rules have been brought on the Statute viz., the Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Rules, (1970), with appendices and forms prescribed therein hereinafter called "Rules". They were published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette and they came into force with effect from August 14, 1970. Now for the first time impugned rule was made. Therefore, these rules and appendices are statutory in character and form part of the integral scheme of the Act.
 36. Rule 2 (c) defines 'building' means - in relation to a permanent cinema and temporary cinema, a building which is constructed for permanent use with stone, etc.; Rule 2 (n) defines 'place' means town or village (including the hamlet or hamlets attached to the village); Rule 2 (o) defines "prescribed' means prescribed by order of the Licensing Authority. Rule 2 (q) defines 'existing cinemas' mean the cinema buildings existing or those under construction prior to the commencement of these rules. Rule 4 empowers any person of the age of 20 years or any company or firm or association of individuals whether incorporated or not, to obtain or hold any permission or licence under the Act.
 37. Rules 6 to 9 relate to compliance with the requirements of the specifications for construction of the cinema building and other general matters, as elaborated in the Appendices attached to the Rules etc.


38. Rule 11 in Chapter III provides the procedure for applying to the Licensing Authority for grant or renewal of licence under the Act and the formalities to be complied with.
 39. Rule 12 gives power to the Licensing Authority to grant licence or permission on satisfaction of the conditions prescribed therein.
 40. Rule 12 (3) is the relevant which is now the subject-matter of attack. Therefore it is necessary to extract the said rule in extenso. It reads thus:
 "12 (3) (a). The Licensing Authority, while granting or renewing a licence in form-B shall also fix the maximum rates of payment for admission to the different classes in the licensed premises;
 (b) These rates shall not be increased during the currency of the licence without an order in writing by the Licensing Authority permitting such increase.
 (c) The order of the Licensing Authority is liable to be cancelled or modified by the Government, if they consider such a course just or necessary.
 (d) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Licensing Authority may appeal to the Government who may make such order as is deemed fit."
 41. Rule 13 prescribes the duration of the period of licence granted under the Act shall be either for five years or one year respectively for permanent or temporary licences. Chapter IV deals with fees payable for inspection certificates, licences and appeals under the Act.
 42. Chapter V deals with powers and functions of the Licensing Authority and the inspecting officers. It enjoins on the Licensing Authority or the officers specified therein to make necessary inspections and send the reports with the desirability of ..... of licence or renewal of licences applied for.
 43. Rule 17 prescribed the power and functions of the Licensing Authority, etc. Chapter VI provides the right of appeal.


44. Rule 18 postulates that any appeal to the Government under S. 7 or sub-section (4) of s. 10 or clause (d) of sub-rule (3) of R. 12 shall be preferred within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order appealed against, accompanied by the stated particulars. The proviso gives power to admit appeals after the expiry of the prescribed period, provided the appellant satisfies sufficient cause for the delay caused in not preferring the appeal.
 45. Appendix I, under para 6 specifies the requirements as to specifications for construction of the cinema building and other general methods.
 46. Para 19 of Appendix I deal with :
 "Seating arrangements : (1) The number of seats to be provided in the auditorium;
 (2) The number of persons to be admitted ......... calculating at the rate of 25 persons per 9 square meters of floor area, .... .... And at the rate of 30 persons per 9 square meters of floor area, etc. ......."
 47. Para 22-A prohibits the use of licensed premises for any other purposes except for the purpose for which the licence has been granted.
 (The other appendices are not necessary to be dealt with in detail for the purpose of this case.)


48. Form 'B' is the licence for exhibiting cinematographs as required under sub-rule (2) of R. 12.
 49. It is necessary to extract Condition (11) as prescribed in sub-rules (2) and (3) of R. 12 referred to and extracted earlier, which reads thus:
 1. Maximum number of persons permitted and maximum rates of admission allowed in each part of the auditorium under sub-paragraph (2) of para 19 of Appendix I and sub-rule (3) of R. 12.
 ___________________________________________________________________________________ Class of accomodation Maximum number of persons Maximum rates of admission permitted. allowed.

 (1)   (2)    (3)

 xx   xx    xx

__________________________________________________________________________________

 Note: These rates of admission shall not be increased during the currency of this licence without an order in writing by the Licensing Authority permitting such increase.

 (The other conditions are not necessary to be dealt with.)


50. A resume of the relevant provisions thus surveyed would indicate "the broad spectrum spread out the whole gamut of controlling the regulation of exhibiting cinematographs starting from construction and ending with appeals including imposition of terms, conditions and restrictions" subject to which licensees are to carry their trade or business thereunder.
 Whether fixation of maximum rates of admission to different classes is one of the purposes:
 51. As stated, earlier, Sri M. R. K. Choudary, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the object of the Act is only to regulate the construction or reconstruction of the cinema theatres and providing health and sanitation as incidental thereat. The power thereafter gets exhausted. Section 11 empowers to make rules to achieve the said object. The fixation of rates of admission is a legislative act. There is no specific power in the Act to fix the rates of admission. Therefore fixation of maximum rates of admission is not one of the purposes of the Act. There is no policy or guidelines given under the Act except to regulate the above contended purpose. Undoubtedly there is no specific provision empowering the rule-making authority to frame the impugned rule. Therefore the first question that arises for consideration is, whether fixation of the maximum rates of admission to different classes is one fohte purposes and hwether the Legislature intended to give such power to the State Government to frame the impugned rule. Whether such a power inheres in the Act has to be gathered from a consideration of all the provisions of the Act, Rules and Appendices together. We have already considered earlier the meaning of the word 'Regulation' in the context of the title of the Act.