Burning of Houses of Sarnantha Tribals :
70. With a feeling of anguish, Sri Ramachandra Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has invited our attention to the averments in paragraphs E-62 to E-66 in the affidavit of the petitioner which relate to the inhuman act of burning by the police of 600 houses belonging to Samantha Tribals in Chintapaili Forest area on the alleged ground that the Tribals sheltered extremists. A photostat copy of an alleged tapped wireless message sent by the Station House Officer of Chintapaill was extracted in the affidavit which was to the effect that "only the houses of Samantha Tribals alone should be burnt but not the houses of other tribals.' It was alleged in paragraph E-65 of the petitioner's affidavit when the Director-General of Police, Sri Ram Mohan Rao was confronted by the press-correspondents about this matter, he was of the view, "It may have been done because they, i.e., tribals were sheltering Naxalites.'


Dhronamrajti Satyanarayana vs N.T. Rama Rao And Ors. on 2 January, 1988

71. There was no specific deni41 in the counter of the State Government about the allegations regarding the burning of the house of Samantha Tribals or the genuineness of the wireless message, asking the police to commit this atrocity. The explanation sought to be given in the Government's counter is that the houses of some of the Samantha Tribals are located away from the main village and it was suspected that those houses are providing shelter to the extremists and "unless the dwellers of these hutments are persuaded to join the main village, it would be utterly difficult to contain the extremists' menace. In that Direction, steps were taken by the police to make them join the main villages.'


72. The allegation about the burning of the houses of Samantha Tribals appears to be true. The action of the police in indulging in acts of arson in order to deprive the poor and illiterate tribals. of their shelter in the guise of containing the menace of extremists, is by any standards a brutal and barbarous act shocking the conscience of any civilized man. The depths of depravity to which the law enforcing agencies should descend this -incident illustrates. However, we are not linking the first respondent either directly or indirectly with this camage perpetrated by the police.


73. During the course of the argument Sri S. Ramachandra Rao produced before us the statement of the 1st respondent stated to have been laid before the Legislative Assembly December, 14, 1987, the day previous to the commencement of the argument in this case. The learned counsel submitted that the object of the statement was to answer the various allegations made in the writ petition. We refrain from making any comments with respect to that inasmuch as it is stated to be a .white paper placed before the Legislative Assembly and must have been with the consent of the Speaker. The learned counsel also took serious objection to practically the whole of the white paper having been published in the Government owned "Telugu Samacharam", a fortnightly, reproducing the whole of the statement contained in the said white paper which was produced in the Court on 18-12-1987. He took strong objection particularly to the editorial written under the signature of Sri V. Saidulu, Commissioner, Information and Public Relations Department and Special Officer, who is the Editor, Printer and Publisher, under the caption on the first page "(*)' (everything crystal clear), "(*)' (with the coloured Photo of the 1st respondent and putting thilakam on his f ore-head) conveying double meaning culture is being preserved or culture become sacrilege, and '(')' (end to gossip). Our attention has been drawn in particular to the following passages in the editorial :
"Dishonest persons are like Kouravasena. As in the case of "Abhimanya" who was finished in 'an unjust war they can construct or trying their army in contemptible positions to disarm the honest citizens.-


Our Chief Minister Sri Navidamuri Taraka Rama Rao Garu was determined to cleanse the rotten dishonesty in the administration and ill the political field and to control those Royal birds (Rabandulu) who are accustomed to eat money.' "it is but natural that the crows of dishonest make conspiracies to wound, the leader who was ready to eliminate dishonesty with the weapon of power given by the people, with their contemptuous weapons of allegations."
"It is very painful that by false propoganda the innocent people were submerged in confusion and in them false doubts were created against their patronaged leader."
Sri Ramachandra Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner, with certain amount of emotion submitted that this editorial was written manifestly at the behest of the 1st respondent and that it undoubtedly amounted to an attempt to interfere with the due course of justice. Inasmuch as Sri Saidulu the editor, who is stated to be the author of the editorial. is not before us and we are also told that certain contempt proceedings are already pending against him in this Court, at this stage we refrain from expressing any opinion in the matter or taking any action pursuant to the plea put forward by the Petitioner's Counsel.


74. Sri Ram Jeth malani, towards the end of his arguments raised the question about the propriety of the learned Attorney General assisting this Court as amicus curiae. According to him, the participation of the learned Attorney-General as amicus curiae vitiates the proceedings. While conceding that valuable assistance was rendered by the learned Attorney-General. it was urged by Sri Jethmalani that paradoxically its effect was vitiation of the proceedings. He ,contended that amicus curiae has extremely limited role., he is not expected to assist the Court or make comments about the factual aspects of the case. As friend of the Court, the duty of the amicus is to place, em invitation of the Court, the questions of law involved in a particular case for the Court'! consideration. The Attorney-General in India being a Constitutional functionary under Article 76, has no power to appear as a amicus in any High Court is the larger question posed by the learned counsel. The limited question on which he laid considerable stress was that the Central Government being a party to this litigation and as the petitioner has claimed relief against the Government of India. The learned Attorney-General whose duty is to aid and advise the Government of India should not have been requested to be as amicus. No partisan should be an amicus the learned Attorney-General by virtue of his office and having regard to the fact that the Central Government is a party to this litigation, cannot act in a "non-partisan" manner. Whatever be the truth of character of the incumbent of the office of Attorney-General to tell his to pursue any course of action in regard to legal matter be that by itself cannot be a consideration in judging the legal competence of the Attorney-General to appear as amicus in this Court in the present case. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel has drawn our attention to Ramnath Iyer's Law Lexicon, page 62, Jowitt's Law Dictionary and


Iyer's Law Lexicon, page 62, Jowitt's Law Dictionary and Corpus Juris Sedundum. Vol. 3. page 1046.


75. We have considered the contention very carefully and we are of the opinion that the contention is wholly untenable. It must be placed on record that when this matter was argued prior to admission, before a Full Bench of this Court 'to which one of us the Chief Justice) was a party, Shri Palkhiwala, who appeared for the first respondent, welcomed the presence of the Attorney- General as amicus curiae and referred to his arguments as 'able'. It is the privilege of this Court to request any eminent counsel to enlighten it on matters of complex and legal issues, especially those which have no parallels. In a case of this magnitude,, this Court could not have thought of a more eminent counsel than the learned Attorney- General of India. In the United Kingdom, although the Attorney-General is a Member of the council Of Ministers, his sense of detachment and objectivity in discharging his duties was never doubted. In India, the Attorney-General enjoys a unique an independent position. Distinguished men of outstanding eminence in the legal field are requested by the Union to occupy the high office of Attorney-General. Apart from discharging duties of a total character assigned to him by the Union of India under Article '116(2) of the Constitution, his services are requested by the Supreme Court of India under Article 143 of the Constitution when the President of India seeks the opinion of the Supreme Court on any question of law or fact arising in a matter of public importance. Under Article 226, there is no letter on the power of this Court to request the Attorney General for any eminent counsel to appear as amicus curiae. The entire matter was argued by the learned Attorney-General before us only from the point of view of administrative law the question of mala fides by the alleged lapses on the partof the first respondent have not been touched by the learned Attorney-General in his erstitite submissions. Even in matters where there is a conflict of interest between


Attorney-General in his erstitite submissions. Even in matters where there is a conflict of interest between the Union of India and private citizens, the7 Attorney-General appeared as amicus at the request of the Supreme Court - Gramophone Company of India Limited v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, . The fact that the Attorney- General was appointed by the Union never weighed as a constraint in requesting for his assistance as friend of the Court. The Attorney-General represents the 'interests of the public -- Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkara . Facts threw open questions of law and the latter are not decided or debated vaccue. There can never be an academic debate or argument on questions of law unrelated to any set of facts. When the leaned Attorney-General argued before us, he invited our attention to the factual situation obtaining in certain of the allegations as could be culled out from the documents filed by the State Government for the proper understanding of the legal position. We felt distressed at this unwarranted comment, that too, at the belated stage after the learned Attorney-General had concluded his submissions in the background that it was at our invitation he assisted the Court.


76. As regards the offer made by Shri Jethmalani, on behalf of the first respondent in the course of his arguments on 29-12-1987, that the first respondent Was prepared to submit himself to a Commission of Inquiry either by the Judge or a panel of sitting Judges of this Court nominated by the Chief Justice, we have already adverted to the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner in this regard. The written memo filed by Shri Jeth malani on the succeeding day, i.e., 10-12-198"7, in our view, does not accord with the offer he made on the previous day. The. acceptance of the memo inevitably implies the acceptance of the contentions advanced on behalf of the, first respondent, namely, that the writ petition was not maintainable on the ground of its not disclosing valid cause of action, not complying with strict rules of pleadings and absence of material averments, etc. When the very presence of the learned Attorney-General was objected to by Sri Ram Jethmalani, we find it difficult to comprehend how any "responsible allegations supported by prima facie evidence, selected by the Attorney- General could become the subject matter of "judicial investigation by any Judge or Judges of this. Court. That apart, ibis Court has no power to order any such judicial investigation by a sitting Judge or Judges. Even if such an investigation is instituted, it is liable to attack as being without jurisdiction ' and unconstitutional. Further, some of the allegations relate to the actions by the State,. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the State Government did not subscribe his concurrence to the appointment of such a Commission. In the 'absence of the memo being signed by the Advocate-General on behalf of the second respondent, such an investigation even if ordered, it is obvious, would be a futile exercise apart from being unconstitutional and not binding on anyone.


77. After the bearing was over and the judgment reserved, the learned Advocate- General late in the evening on 31-12-1987 circulated a written memo, wishing "to place on record what has been narrated therein. It is stated in this memo that Sri Ram Jethmalani appearing for the first respondent completed his arguments at about 3-15 O.M. on 30-12- t987 and dealt mainly with the legal position and on factual aspect of only one allegation regarding allotment of cordless telephone to the Chief Minister's son-in-law and waiver of security deposit, etc., were dealt; and submitted to the Court that the "remaining allegations referred to and canvassed by the learned Attorney-General who appeared as amicus curiae will be dealt with by 'the Advocate-General as they are all executive .actions of the State Government or the instrumentalities of the State Government". The Advocate-General complains that after Shri Jethmalani's arguments were completed, he got up to address the Court to meet the contentions of the learned Attorney-General but be discovered to his acute embarrassment that his presence and attempt to draw the attention of the Court were being ignored"., and in spite of this he requested the Court to "hear him but the Honourable Court stated that it will see after the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner are over and so saying the learned counsel for the petitioner was permitted to commence his arguments." The learned counsel for the petitioner completed his arguments around 1 P.M. and thereafter "without affording opportunity to the Advocate-General, the Honourable Court reserved judgment and rose for the day., in the result, the second respondent had no opportunity to make submissions to meet the arguments of the learned Attorney-General. There was no reason why the Honourable Court could not have beard the Advocate-General after 1 P.M. on 31-12-1987 or on the next working day.'


78. We take serious exception to this memo, filed by the Advocate-General. When the petitioner's counsel Sri Ramachandra Rao, started arguing the matter after preliminary narration of the facts, Shri Ram Jethmalani sought permission to raise certain preliminary objections regarding maintain- ability of the writ petitions and locus standi of the petitioner. Since Shri Ram Jethmalani sought to raise jurisdictional questions, we permitted to argue. Thereafter, he sought permission to argue on legal questions and after completing the same, he sought leave of the Court to permit him to go away as he had to fulfill a social engagement. Accordingly, he took leave of the Court. Thereafter, the petitioner's counsel argued his case and replied to the questions of locus standi argued by Sri Ram Jethmalani. Then the learned Advocate-.General argued the case on merits, both on questions of law and fact on 21-12- 1987,22-12-1987 and23-12-1987. He readout Extensively the pleading and documents. Thus, a full and fair opportunity was given to the learned Advocate-General to meet the points raised by Shri S. Ramachandra Rao without any restriction of time. Despite the fact that he was heard at is regrettable that he chose to file this memo after the hearing was concluded. We, find it difficult to, discern the reasons. After the learned Attorney-General completed his submission Sri Jethmalani argued at length on 29-12- 1987 and 30-12-1987. The Advocate-General never sought our permission to make any submissions in reply to the arguments advanced by the learned Attorney-General The practice of this Court is that the counsel for the petitioner is permitted to state his case first and thereafter the counsel for the respondent advances arguments and subsequently the counsel for the petitioners permitted to address arguments in reply. 'It is not the practice of this Court to permit further arguments by the


address arguments in reply. 'It is not the practice of this Court to permit further arguments by the counsel for the respondent after the petitioner's counsel concluded his arguments in reply.


79. Sri Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, while summing up his arguments, fervently urged that this Court consistent with its constitutional obligation should direct the first respondent to resign from the office of the Chief Minister in view of the State Government, of which he is the head, having appointed a Commission of Enquiry to enquire into, inter alia, all allegations against public men, including himself (Vide the terms of reference in G.O. Ms. No. 578, General. Administration (SCE) Department dated November 28, 1987. According to the learned counsel, constitutional conventions in public law have taken firm roots in India and this found judied expression in State of Karnataka v. Union of India, . It is true that the Supreme Court observed:
 "it is inconceivable that a Commission d Inquiry will be appointed by a State Government without the concurrence of the Chief Minister and if the political climate is so hostile that he is obliged to submit to an inquiry into his own conduct, he will quit rather than concur. Indeed, a Council of Ministers which considers that the conduct of its Chief Minister and some of the Ministers requires examination in a public inquiry shall have forfeited the confidence of the legislature and would ordinarily have to tender its resignation."
Constitutional conventions are not, however, enforceable rights. The-observations of the highest Court of this country are self-evident self-explanatory needing no further elucidation.
80. Sri K. Jagannatha Rao, the learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government, wanted to argue with particular reference to Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952. However, we did not call upon him to argue, inasmuch as the submissions made by the other learned counsel had fully covered the ground.


81. The relief sought in W.P. No. 1280-5 of 1987 is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to take steps for penal action in proceedings in respect of the alleged violations of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, the Wealth-tax Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act on the part of the 1st respondent. So far as the allegations based on the disclosure of income and wealth in respect of the 1st respondent and his family is concerned, we find no reason for giving any direction as prayed for in view of the fact that on the petitioner's own showing no penal action is warranted against the 1st respondent in terms of the provisions of Section 11 of the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Act, 1975. The relevance, if any, of that fact has faded into insignificance after the dismissal of W.P. No. 12425 of 1987 for the issue of writ of quo warranto. inasmuch as the contention with respect to that was that the 1st respondent had forfeited his moral right to continue in office as he could not have enforced the tax laws and taken action against those who defaulted or delayed payment of tax. If there are any actions to be taken under the Wealth-tax Act or the Income-tax Act with reference to the proceedings which are new pending; it is a matter for the appropriate authorities to take action in accordance with law. We are also of the opinion that there is no justification for our issuing any direction to the Central Government for action under the F.E.R.A. From the counter-affidavit filed by the Reserve Bank of India, it is noticed that the matter is being investigated and we have no reason to believe that at the appropriate time action, if any, warranted under the provisions of the Act would not he taken by the concerned authority. In this view, we dismiss the writ petition, however, without any order as to costs.


82. What survives is W.P.No. 12426 of 1987. In the light of the foregoing discussion. we hold that the writ petitioner has locus standi to maintain the writ petition.
83. Although the prayer in the writ petition is for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to appoint a Commission under Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act. 1952, to enquire into the misdeeds, corruption and abuse of authority by the 1st respondent, we are of the opinion that we would not be justified in granting the relief in the form in which the prayer is couched. At the same time, having given our careful and anxious thoughts to every aspect of the matter in order to enable the Court to mould the relief appropriately to meet the ends of justice as requested by the learned counsel for the petitioner and in the light of the submission made by the learned Attorney General we record our prima facie findings with respect to the allegations discussed herein before and issue orders as hereunder. We have chosen to adopt this course in view of the fact that the persons who are likely to he affected by final orders. it any passed by us. are not before us and the principle of Natural Justice - audi alteram partern - obligates that they should be put on notice.
(a)In the matter of establishment of Telephone Instruments Project by Sri Naren Rajan (the 3rd son-in-law of the 1st respondent), the 1st respondent has abused his official position.
(b)The 1st respondent has abused his official position with respect to the Kamakrishna Cine Studios in -the matter of change of use of the studio's lands, reduction Of the value of the land from Rs.40/- to Rs.15/- per square yard and reduction of compounding fee from Rs.20,000/- to Rs. 1,000/-;


(c)Failure on the part of the 1st respondent to take action to withdraw the exemption and resume the Nacharam lands after the Ramkrishna Cine Studios ceased to be a cine studio amounts to abuse of his official position in order to favour the members of his family;
(d)The 1st respondent has abused his Official position in granting exemption from payment of entertainment tax in respect of the Ramakrishna 70 mm and 35 mm theatres, which are owned by the members of his family-.
(e)In regard to the setting up of M/s. L Avenir Steels Privated Limited, Medak district the 1st respondent has abused his official position,


(f)The action of the -State Government in regard to the grant of whole" . le exemption of 2,29,944 square metres (roughly equivalent to 54 acres) in ]3havanipuram, Vijayawada Urban Agglomeration under Section 20(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in favour of the Vijayawada Hardware & Iron Merchants Association is arbitrary, illegal and opposed to the Directive Principles contained in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution and the Provisions of Section 23(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act;
(g)The permission granted by the Government in Govt. Memo. No. 16854/ Mktg.11/1/83-4dated 4-1-1986 permitting the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad to Purchase from H.U.D.A. an extent of 22 acres of land at a cost of Rs.3.5 crores is arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the relevant provisions of the A.P.(Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act 16 of 1966.
84. We direct the Petitioner to implead within four weeks from today all the persons who are likely to be affected by the final orders to be passed in these proceedings. The Registrar (Judicial) will obtain the orders Of the Chief Justice, for posting of the impleading petitiom soon after they are filed.


85. The task before us was both difficult and delicate in view of the sensitive issues involved. We place on record our warm appreciation for the benefit we derived from the able arguments advanced by Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ram Jeth Malani, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, and the learned Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the 2nd respondent, the State Government. Unmindful of personal inconveniences and-denying to himself a good part of his vacation, Sri K. Parasaran, Attorney-General of India, rendered as amicus curiae invaluable service to us by his masterly and erudite exposition of law on the expanding contours of public interest litigation. To him we pay our tribute and express our profound sense of gratitude. Sri Gopala Subrahmanyan, the able associate of the learned Attorney-General, deserves our special encomiums.
86. The learned Advocate-General immediately after the judgment and orders were pronounced made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. So far s W.P.No. 12805 of 1981 is concerned, we have dismissed it. So far as the orders in W.P. No. 12426 of 1987 are concerned, we have not passed any final orders. Accordingly, the question of granting leave does not arise.
87. Order accordingly.


Jupudi Sesharatnam And Ors. vs The Gift Tax Officer, Palacole, ... on 15 September, 1959

JUDGMENT Chandra Reddy, C.J.
 1. The principal question raised in all these petitions relate to the constitutionality of the Gift Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in so far as it seeks to levy tax on gifts of agricultural land.

 2. The Act was passed by the Parliament in the beginning of 1958 and received the assent of the President on 15-5-1958. The report of the Indian Taxation Enquiry Commission, 1953-54 to the Government of India considered the introduction of gift tax in India. The commission remarked that a gift tax though appeared in theory to be an attractive proposition, required considerable experience of the opinion of Estate duty before it could be introduced in this country. A year or two later Prof. Kalder, Reader in Economics. University of Cambridge was invited by the Government of India to examine this question and he made his report to the Union Government in March 1956.

His proposal was that a single integrated tax should he imposed on sifts of all kinds (including under this term accession to property through be-quest and inheritance), which should replace the present estate duty as well as to bring into charge other gratuitous transfers of property which are not now taxable. The suggestion of Prof. Kaldor to abolish estate duty with the introduction of gift tax was evidently not accepted and today THe Estate Duty Act and the Gift Tax Act exist side by side.


The gift tax is a well known system of tax obtaining in several countries of the world such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia, Netherlands and New Zealand, Generally the purpose of the Gift Tax Act is to prevent the avoidance of estate duty and income-tax by reaching transactions which would otherwise escape taxation. In order to evade estate duty or tax on higher incomes, the tendency of the people will be to make gifts inter vivos and thereby split up large fortunes which will result in the diminution of sur taxes etc. The gift tax has been resorted to as a safeguard against these things.

 3. The charging section in the Act is Section      3. That authorises a levy of a tax on all gifts made by a person during the previous year at the rate or rates specified to the schedule annexed to the Act. 'Gift' is defined in Section      2 (xii) as
  "the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or Immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration in money or moneys worth, and includes the transfer of any property deemed to be a gift under Section      4.

 "Taxable gifts" are defined as "gifts chargeable to Gift Tax under the Act." We will refer to the definition of 'previous year' in the appropriate context. The Act exempts certain gifts under Section 5. The Act also gives power to Gift Tax Officers to call upon donors to file return of gifts for the relevant year. It has set up a machinery for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act. Section 46 of the Act has conferred rule-making power upon the Central Board of Revenue for carrying out the purposes of this Act Pursuant to this, rules were framed by the said Board. Standard rates were also prescribed in the schedule appearing at the end of the Act and forming an integral part of the Act


4. The validity of the Act in so far as it affects agricultural land is attacked on the Ground that it was beyond the competence of Parliament to make laws concerning agriculturul land. The contention pressed upon us is that the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II is exclusively vested in State Legislatures and consequently it is not competent for the Parliament to legislate on any subject within the domain of State legislatures.

It is urged that entry 18 of list II mentions "land, that if to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization", that on the topic of and committed to the sphere of the State legislature, the power of the legislature is plenary and therefore the Indian Parliament is not empowered to pass an enactment imposing tax in respect of land.

The argument is elaborated thus. The expression 'land' is used in a generic sense and the words that follow "that is to say etc." introduce a general con- cept and the following clauses 'rights in or over land etc.' are added only by way of explanation or illustration and do not introduce any limitation on the subjects included in the item. It should not he understood in a narrow nr limited sense but should be interpreted as expending to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.


5. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, 1941-1 Mad LJ Sup 65 at pp. 77 and 78: (AIR 1941 FO 16 at p. 25). The passage called in aid on behalf of the petitioners occurs at page 77 (of Mad LJ): (at page 25 of AIR):
"The subjects dealt with in the three legislative lists are not always set out with scientific definition. It would be practically impossible for example to define each item in the provincial list in such a way as to make it exclusive of every other item in that list, and Parliament seems to have been content to take a number of comprehensive categories and to describe such of them by a word of broad and general import. In the case of some of these categories, such as 'Local Government', 'Education'. 'Water', Agriculture and land, the general word is amplified and explained by a number of examples or illustrations, some of which would probably on any construction have been held to fall under the more general word, while the inclusion of others might not be so obvious.


Thus "Courts of Wards" and "treasure trove" might not ordinarily have been regarded as included under "Land", if they had not been specifically mentioned in item 21. I think however that none of the items in the lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that such general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it."
 6. This dictum has been adopted by the Supreme Court in a number of rulings: See Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, . No exception could be taken to the proposition as such. It is now well-settled that topics of legislation contained in the legislative lists ought to be understood in a broad and general sense and should not be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic sense. It is also indisputable that the power to legislate on general subjects ex-tends to all ancillary matters which can be said to be fairly included in that power.

 7. Does it mean that this extends to taxing measures; in other words, does the authority to make legislation on general subject involve the authority to make taxing laws? Is a power to enact a law for the imposition of taxes incidental or ancillary to the power to legislate on general topics? In our considered opinion, the two powers are distinct and there is no indication either in the main body of the Constitution or in any of the legislative lists that taxation is comprehended in the main subject. The Constitution has enumerated the subjects committed to the sphere of the respective legislatures, List I with reference to the topics falling under the appointed field of the Union List II with reference to those of the States and List III contains matters in regard to which both the Parliament and the State legislatures have concurrent jurisdiction.


At the same time lists I and II, which alone confer jurisdiction on the legislatures to undertake taxing legislations, have divided the powers into two groups, namely, those relating to the main subjects of legislation and those bearing on taxation. A scrutiny of list I reveals that entries 1 to 81 mention the various subjects over which the Parliament has power to make laws while items 82 to 92 set out the taxes, which could be levied by the laws of Parliament; for instance item 30 of list I is carriage of passengers and goods by railway, sea or air or by national waterways in mechanically propelled vessels, while entry 89 empowers Parliament to make laws levying terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by railway, sea or air.

This entry also includes taxes on railway fares and freights while entry 22 is railways. If really entries 22 and 30 imply a power to tax in regard to those topics, item 89 is redundant and serves no useful purpose, A comparison of items 41 and 83 leads to the same result. A careful analysis of the entries or that list establishes that the Constitution has treated the two powers separately fur purposes of legislative competence.


8. Similarly, in list II items 1 to 44 constitute one group containing topics on which the state could make laws, while entries 45 to 63 deal with taxes. The intent of the Constituent Assembly in this behalf could also be gathered from Article 248 (1) and (2) and entry 97 of list I. Thus, the distinction between the two sets of entries is a well-marked one and has been brought out lucidly, if we may say so with respect, by the Supreme Court in Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, . A reference may also be made in this context to S. and V. Firm v. Fast Godavari Coconut and Tobacco Market Committee, .

 9. Alternatively, it was argued that entry 18 read with entry 49 discloses the intendment of the Constitution to authorise the State legislatures to legislate on all subjects in regard to lands including the imposition of taxes. Item 18 mentions also trans- fer of agricultural lands and entry 49 speaks of taxes on lands and buildings. A combined operation of the two entries brings taxes on transfer of agricultural lands within the jurisdiction of State Legislatures. Each of the entries in the two lists should receive the widest possible construction and should be interpreted as extending to every form of legislation on that subject and report to the residual powers contained in entry 97 of the Union list should he had only as a last refuge, continued the learned counsel.


10. We are unable to accede to this view. In this context we cannot ignore the facts that while the first part of the entry refers to land in general terms, the next two clauses specifically refer to only agricultural lands and have to be read with item 6 of list III. They both deal with the method of transfer or alienation of agricultural land but do not concern land itself. The alienation or transfer of agricultural land is subject to State legislation while lands other than agricultural lands lies within the sphere in which the provincial and the federal powers are concurrent.

Thus, transfer and alienation of lands are distri-buted in Lists II and III assigning agricultural lands to List II and non-agricultural lands to list III. It is true 'Land' is a generic term and the words that follow i.e., up to 'collection of rent' are explanatory and illustrative. But the next clause deals with a different topic. Though it is an allied subject, it to not comprised in 'land'. If the word land' was intended to include transfer or alienation of agricultural land etc. the latter becomes redundant as that expression would have served the purpose.

Further, transfer or alienation would not have been confined to agricultural lands. Again, item 6 of list III would conflict with item 18 if that interpretation were to be accented. That being so, we find it difficult to import transfer and alienation of agricultural land into 'lands' in entry 49. The latter item concerns itself with an altogether different head of legislation, that is, tax on the ownership of property.


The object of this item is the levy of a tax on the ownership of property as such, while gift tax is a tax on a particular use of the property or the exercise of a single power subsidiary to ownership. The owner of a property may put it to several uses. A gift Inter vivos is one of the several rights a person may have in a property. This form of tax attaches itself to a transfer of property, while the tax envisaged in entry 49 is incidental to the ownership irrespective of any use to which it may be put.


11. There is authority for this opinion of ours in Bromley v. McCaughn, (1929) 74 Law Ed 226: 280 US 124. There, the question was whether a Federal tax imposed upon transfers by gift violated constitutional provisions requiring the apportionment of direct taxes & uniformity in duties, imposts and excises throughout the United States & prohibited the taking of property without due process. This was answered in the negative by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the view that it was not a tax upon property but it was a tax imposed on the exercise of a single one of the powers incidental to ownership, the power to give the property owned to another. In repelling the contention that such a tax was upon the essential right inherent in the property and, therefore, a direct tax, Stone J., who delivered the opinion of the Court observed:
 "It is true that in each of these cases the tax was imposed upon the exercise of one of the numerous rights of property, but each is clearly distinguishable from a tax which falls upon the owner merely because he is the owner, regardless of the use or disposition made of his property."
 12. We may also cite another decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Graniteville Manufacturing Co. v. Query, (1931) 75 Law Ed 1126: 283 US 376, It was laid down that a stamp duty is a duty with respect to the creation of an instrument and as such is an excise tax and not a tax on property.


13. That being the position, the pronouncement of the Federal Court in Manikkasundara v. R. S. Nayudu, AIR 1947 FC 1, that the expression 'charity' in entry 34 of list II of Schedule VII to the Government of India Act was a term of wide significance taking in charitable institutions and charitable endowments or that of the Supreme Court in Navin-chandra Mafatlal v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay, (S) , that tax on income in entry 54 of list I embraces within its scope tax on capital gains do not carry the petitioners very far. These pronouncements only illustrate the principle that the entries in the legislative lists are heads of legislative power and should be construed liberally and should not be read in a restricted or pedantic sense and that the widest possible construction should be put upon them.


14. Nor does the decision in Labors Municipality v. Daulat Ram, AIR 1942 FC 14, assist the parties. One of the points that arose for consideration there was whether the statute of a Provincial Legislature permitting the levy of octroi duty on salt was ultra vires the provincial legislature. It was ruled by the Federal Court that the salt being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central legislature, it is only this authority that could legislate either on the general subject or on any aspect nf the taxation, that that power is not confined to imposing duties or taxes derivable under entries Nos. 44 and 45 of list I and that entry 49 in list II of schedule VII to the Government of India Act empowers provincial legislatures to make laws imposing cesses on goods other than salt. In understanding the ruling we have to bear in mind Section 140 of the Government of India Act which says:
 "Duties on salt, Federal duties of excise and export duties, shall be levied and collected by the Federation, but, if an Act of the Federal legislature so provides, there shall be paid out of the revenues of the Federation to the provinces and to the Federated States, if any, to which the Act imposing the duty extends, sums equivalent to the whole or any part of the net proceeds of that duty and those sums shall be distributed among the Provinces and those States in accordance with such principles of distribution as may be formulated by the Act"


It was because of the expressions mentioned in the Section, namely, 'duties on salt' and 'federal dutias of excise and export duties' that their Lordships thought that duties on salt were regarded as a category by themselves not comprised under the heading excise and export duties'. They also took into acr count the fact that unlike other goods, which may form the subject-matter of excise and export duties, salt was in a sense State monopoly and its manufacture, transport and sale were subject to State control.


We do not think that their Lordships intended to lay down a broad principle that 'salt' included taxes on salt. Thus, gift tax is easily distinguishable from a tax on persons because of the ownership of property and not because Of a particular use of the property. A perusal o entries 46 to 49 of list II would clearly establish that the power of taxation committed to State legislatures was confined to taxation in regard to particular aspects of agricultural lands,

 15. Coming to the argument bearing on the applicability of residuary article, which is relied upon by the Government in support of the offending statute, we agree that before it is called in aid, all the categories involved in the three lists should be absolutely exhausted. But, in order to avoid falling back upon the residual powers, the Court will not be justified in straining the language of any of the entries. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of a statute should be read in their natural and grammatical meaning.

When considering the scope or amplitude of the different entries in the respective lists, the scope and amplitude of one may have to be curtailed or enlarged to give effect to other entries arid to avoid repugnancy, conflict or overlapping. See (S) . Each entry has to be understood with reference to another so that none of the entries may be so read as to make any of them meaningless or nugatory.


16. In this regard, we have to bear in mind also some of the fundamental principles that govern the construction of statutes. There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the onus is upon the person who challenges it to establish that there has been infringement of the constitutional principles. In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may take into consideration 'matters of common knowledge', 'matters of common report', the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of the legislation. See Ramkrishna Dalmia v. S. R. Tendolkar, .

 17. We may here mention that entry 97 embodies the same concept as that underlying Article 248, which recites that Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the concurrent list or State list and that such power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those lists, It is plain that the Constitution makers were anxious to invest Parliament with exclusive power with regard to any subject which was not within the intend-ment of any of the lists.

The argument of the counsel for the petitioner that at the time when the Constitution was framed, gift tax would not have been within the contemplation of the Constitution makers is devoid of force. It is precisely to cover cases, which were not within the contemplation of the Constituent Assembly, that this provision, was conceived to enable Parliament to meet any contingency that might arise in future.


18. We cannot also give effect to the argument that gift tax would come within the purview of entry 47 of list II. It was contended that the words succession to agricultural land in that entry would take in a gift of agricultural land because succession to property may be either by inheritance or by transfer inter vivos. This argument is sought to be sustained on Santhamma v. Neelamma, (S) AIR 1956 Mad 642. In that case, the validity of certain provisions of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949, was challenged on the ground of lack of legislative competence of the Madras Legislative Assembly.

The objection was that the provision, which permitted the partition of Kutumba property, was not mentioned in entry 7 of the Concurrent list of the VIIth schedule to the Government of India Act. The learned Judges thought that the constitutionality of the enactment could be upheld both on the ground that the expression 'inheritance' or 'succession' was not confined to cases of devolution in the strict sense of a passing of interest in the property from the dead to the living but it also extended to the adjustment of the rights and obligations that subsisted between the parties governed by Hindu Law, coming within the purview of entry 7 of the Concurrent list and also for the reason that partition amounted to a transfer within the meaning of entry 8.

The conclusion as to the meaning of the words 'inheritance' and 'succession' was based upon the legislative practice bearing on the Hindu Law of partition. We are not here called upon to decide whether those words in that context could bear the meaning given to them but if it was meant to lay down as a general rule that the words 'inheritance' and 'succession' always include transfers inter vivos we express our respectful dissent.


19. Such an extended meaning is opposed to the connotation of the two expressions as also to the dictum laid down by the Federal Court in. In re Ref. Under Section 213 of Government of India Act, 1935, AIR 1944 FC 73. Chief Justice Spens observed that, even assuming that the word 'succession' is capable of wide significance, it was not capable of comprehending every kind of passing of property and that the expression succession of property was to be read in the light of other indications derivable from the lists in the VII schedule.

His Lordship pointed out that the ordinary meaning of succession is transmission by law or by the will of man to one or more persons of the property and the transmissible rights and obligations of a deceased person and that is the sense in which succession is used in the lists in schedule VII as indicated by the collocation of the words 'wills', 'intestacy' and 'succession' in entry 7 of list III.


20. We are also unable to agree that the opinion of the Federal Court on the special reference In the matter of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 AIR 1941 FC 72 is helpful to the petitioners. The passage, which is relied upon is contained at page 78 :
 "It is equally important to remember that neither in their ordinary grammatical significance nor by a lone continued use in a technical sense have the words 'devolution' and 'succession' acquired a connotation that would preclude their application to describe the operation of the rule of survivorship as above exnlained. Eminent text writers and Judges have used one or the other of these terms to include the accession of right which takes place on the death of one of the members of a Mitakshara joint family. Many enactments of Parliament and of the Indian, Legislature have used the words 'inheritance', and 'succession' in juxtaposition, justifying the inference that succession is either another category from or a wider category than 'inheritance'."


21. It appears from these remarks that it is only when accession of right takes place on the death of a person the expression 'devolution' or 'succession' would be appropriate. These words imply the passing of property to another on the death of a person and can have no application to transfers inter vivos. Thus, this dictum is in consonance with that of the Federal Court in AIR 1944 FC 73. It is also significant that the expression 'devolution' which finds a place in entry 21 of list II of the VIIth Sch. to the Government of India Act is omitted in entry 18. For these reasons, we hold that gifts do not fall within the import of entry 47. In considering whether the impugned legislation falls within one entry or other, we have to examine the pith and substance and see whether that pith and substance falls substantially within one entry or other conferring legislative power.


22. Lastly, an attempt was made to bring tax on gift of agricultural lands under entry 63. It is argued that gift tax, which is a tax on transfer of lands, comes within the import of stamp duty in respect of documents. We cannot subscribe to this proposition. Entry 63 gives power to make a law in respect of rates of stamp duty on document? excluding those mentioned in entry 91 of list I. This entry does not limit the power of the State Legislature to documents relating to agricultural lands. It extends to all documents conveying immoveable property.

The occasion for levy of the duty is the execution of a document and is unconnected with the actual transfer of property, whereas the impugned statute seeks to impose a tax on the transfer of both moveable and immoveable properties whether by means of an instrument or not. While the one is confined to the creation of documents, the other is upon the exercise of one of the rights of ownership, namely, the transfer of property. This distinction is brought out by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in (1931) 75 Law Ed 1126 : 283 U. S. 376. Therefore, this contention also is unsubstantial and has to be rejected.


23. The argument of the counsel for one of the petitioners that it was incompetent for the Indian Parliament to enact the statute now questioned because the field is occupied by the Madras Village Panchayats Act does not merit much of consideration. The submission made is that Section 63 of the Village Panchayats Act has empowered village panchayats to levy tax on transfers of properties and, therefore, that has deprived the Indian Parliament of authority to legislate, providing for the imposition of taxes on transfers of agricultural land. The question of occupied field is absolutely irrelevant in the context of the present enquiry since we arc concerned here with lists I and II and not with the Concurrent List


24. Further, we have to judge the vires of the Act with reference to the applicability of the entries in the respective lists. If it does not fall within the ambit of the State list it would be saved by the residuary entry and its validity would be unaffected notwithstanding that a State legislative measure contains a similar provision. If, on the other hand, it comes within the purview of any of the entries in list II, it would not be protected by entry 97 irres-pective of the non-existence of a State enactment for a similar purpose. Quite apart from that, Section 63 does not touch upon tax on gift of property. Sub-section (2) which is relevant, merely says that a duty shall also be levied in every village on certain transfers of property in accordance with the provisions of Section 67. Section 87 runs as follows:
"1. The duty on transfers of property shall be levied--
(a) in the form of a surcharge on the duty imposed by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as in force for the time being in the State of Madras, on every instrument of the description specified below which relates to immoveable property situated in the area under the jurisdiction of a panthayat; and

(b) at such rate as may be fixed by the Government, not exceeding five per centum on the amount specified below against such instrument."

..... it is plain that the right given to village pan-chayats is to collect additional stamp duty and not any portion of the tax on gifts of other kinds of transfer of property

 25. We are not impressed with the argument that the tax is leviable only on transfers effected after the coming into force of the Act. This construction is contrary to the very terms of Section      46 which contemplates the imposition of a tax on all transactions made in the previous year.


'Previous year' is defined in Section      2 (xx) thus :

"Previous year" in relation to any assessment year --

(a) in the case of an assessee having a source of income profits or gains in respect of which there is no previous year under the Income-tax Act, means the twelve months ending on the 31st day of March Immediately preceding the assessment year:

(b) in the case of an assessee having different sources of income profits or gains, means that pre-previous years under the Income-tax Act for different vious year of 12 months determined as the previous year under Sub-clause (a) of Clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Income-tax Act or such period determined as the previous year under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (ii) of that Section whichever expired last :
(c) in the case of any other assessee means the previous year as defined in Clause (ii) Section      2 of the Income-tax Act if an assessment were to be made under that Act for that year."

Thus, the applicability of the Act is extended to all gifts made during the period prescribed in Section      2(xi) of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the Act comes into operation only with reference to gifts made after March 1958.


26. It was next urged by Sri Balaparameswara Rao for one of the petitioners that courts will not countenance retrospective operation of enactments which affect vested interests. But this is an argument of desperation because it is not for the Courts) to pronounce upon the legislative policy. Surely it is open to the legislature to say whether an enactment is prospective or retrospective. It is never stale to say that a Court is concerned with the bounds of legal power and not with the bounds of wisdom in its exercise by the legislature. Hence, this submission is wholly untenable. On this discussion, it follows that the Gift Tax Act is not open to challenge on any ground and is intra vires even in so far as it affected transfer of agricultural land.

 27. There remains the question whether it is permissible for the Gift Tax Officer to aggregate all the gifts made by an assessee during a relevant year for the purpose of assessment. The point sought to be made was that each individual gift should form the basis of assessment and that the value of all the gifts made by an assessee could not be added so as to increase the rate of levy specified in the schedule in the absence of any provision authorising the aggregation of the gifts made on different dates during the whole year.


It is submitted that whenever the Parliament intended that such an aggregation should take place, it employed language conferring specifically such a power and as supporting it our attention is drawn to Section 4(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and Section 34 of the Estate Duty Act. It is further submitted that, if aggregation should be resorted to for determining the rates, it would lead to anomalies and hardships in that even a donee of a gift of a small value has to bear the tax irrespective of whether at the time such gift was made the aggregate value of the Rifts exceed the particular limits indicated in the schedule when resort is to be had to the donee for purposes of collection.

 28. We are not inclined to accept this argument. This argument is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. The charging section itself contemplates the aggregation of the gifts made during a particular year. This notion is communicated by each one of the relevant sections. Section 5 talks of a tax to be charged in respect of gifts made. That section exempts gifts if the totality of them do not exceed the taxable limit of Rs. 10,000. Similarly, Section 13 refers to a return of all the taxable gifts. Section 15 refers to the value of the taxable gifts.

Again, Section 22, which confers a right of appeal, adverts to taxable gifts. There can be little doubt, on a study of the various sections of the Act, that in computing the rates of tax the totality of the gifts made hy an individual in the course of the relevant year should be taken into account. This idea is also emphasised in the schedule which lays stress on the value of all taxable gifts for the purpose of fixing the rates of tax. That schedule specifically indicates that each of the slabs has to be calculated on the basis of all the taxable gifts.


Therefore, the absence of the use of the word 'aggregation' or 'aggregate' does not in any way derogate from the power of the department to include all transactions occurring within one year. The expressions employed in the material provisions of the Act as also in the schedule convey the idea of aggregation. The Act throughout proceeds on the assumption that it is the totality of the gifts that determine the rate. There is no scope for the contention that each gift by itself should form the basis of assessment. It is the total value of the gifts and during a relevant year that should enter the calculation of the percentage of tax.


29. The hardship or the anomalies complained of also do not exist. Section 29 of the Act empowers the Revenue to collect the tax from the donee where it could not be collected from the donor. In such a case, the amount of tax to be recovered from the donee depends upon the value of the gift and the date of the gift. This is what the proviso to the section says :
 "Provided that the amount of the tax which may be recovered from the donee shall not exceed that portion of the gift tax which is attributable to the value of the gift made to the donee by the donor as at the date of the gift."
It appears from the section that where the tax is to be paid by the donee, it is to be paid on the taxable value of the gift as on the date on which the gift is made. To illustrate: if the total value of all the gifts does not exceed Rs. 10,000 at a given time the donee will get the advantage of Section 5. But if the gift is made after that limit is exceeded but falls within Rs. 50,000 which forms the first slab, the gifts made during that period would be subject to a tax of 4 per cent and so on and so forth. Consequently, even this grievance is unfounded. In our considered judgment, it is within the power of the department to add all the gifts made by a person in the course of a year for the purpose of assessment and more they are bound to do it, as otherwise they would be violating tile mandatory provisions of the Act. This point also fails and is negatived.


30. In W.P. No. 458 of 1959, it is argued that neither of the two gifts is subject to gift tax for the reason that one is not a transfer but only a partition of the family properties and the other does not exceed the limit imposed by Section 5 (2), being a gift in favour of the wife of the petitioner. If so, it is open to the petitioner to raise this point before the authorities concerned.

 31. In W.P. No. 459 of 1959, the complaint is that the authorities concerned have arbitrarily fixed the value of the gift. This is also a matter to be considered by the department

 32. Any question which is foreign to this enquiry can be gone into by the Revenue.

 33. In the result, all the petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 75/- in each.


Meram Pocham And Anr. vs The Agent To The State Government, ... on 25 October, 1977

JUDGMENT Samasiva Rao, J.
 1. In the three writ petitions a common question of some legal complexity arises. This complexity is deepened by seemingly different views expressed by learned Judges of this Court and some other High Courts. That was why our learned brother Jeeevan Reddy. J. referred W. P. No. 4527 of 1975 to a Division Bench and our learned brother Madhava Reddy, J. did the same with W. P. No. 3238 of 1976. In the other writ petition the same question arises.


2. In all the three petitions the alienations of lands have been set aside by the Special Deputy Collector under the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation"). The lands are situated in Scheduled Areas. The Regulation as extended to the Telengana Area on and from 1-12-1963. Though the dates differ from case to case, there were contracts of sale in respect of lands in Scheduled areas by tribals in favour of the petitioners, who are not tribals, before 1-12-1963. Some amounts were paid under the contracts of sale and possession also was delivered to the petitioners when the contracts were executed. However, sanction of the appropriate authority was not obtained, under S. 47 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 ( hereinafter referred to as the 'Hyderabad Tenancy Act") which was on the statute book at that time. After the regulation of 1959 was extended to the Telangana Area on 1-12-1963 regular sale deeds were taken by the petitioners from their tribal vendors. No attempt was made to secure validation of the alienations under S. 50 -B of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. The vendors challenged the validity of these sales under the provisions of the Regulation of 1959 and the Special Deputy Collector upheld the objection and held that the alienations were invalid in view of S. 3 of the Regulation and consequently directed that the lands be placed back in the possession of the vendors. In some of the cases appeals were preferred under S. 3 (a) (iii) of the Regulation of the Agency Divisional Officer but they were filed before the State Government. The petitioners came to this Court with these writ petitions for quashing the order of the Special Deputy Collector. These facts are undisputed.


3. The Special Deputy Collector held that the transfers of the lands, which are in the Scheduled Areas, by vendors, who are members of the Scheduled Tribes, to the petitioners, who are non-tribals, were null and void in view of the provisions of S. 3 of the Regulation which were extended to the Telangana Area on 1-12-1963. Exercising his powers under Section 3 (2) (a) he directed that the lands be restored to the transferors since they were willing to take the lands. In fact the transferors initiated the proceedings and actively participated in them. The petitioners challenged the validity of this view of the Special Deputy Collector and of the Appellate Authority wherever it has been rendered, contending that the agreements in their favour were accompanied by simultaneous delivery of possession. Consequently by the time the Regulation came to be applied to the Telangana area in which the lands are situate, their right to be in possession of the lands had come to be safeguarded by the provisions of S. 53- A of the T. P. Act and so, either before 1-12-1963 or thereafter the transferor or any person claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the petitioners and persons claiming under them any right in respect of the property. They maintained that every requirement of S. 53 -A of the T. P. Act was satisfied in these cases and therefore despite the subsequent application of the Regulation to the Telangana Area on 1-12-1963 they continue to enjoy the protection of S. 53- A.


4. Therefore, the crucial question that falls for decision in the writ petitions is whether the petitioners, who had obtained contracts of sale accompanied by delivery of possession without obtaining the sanction under S. 47 of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act and without later securing a validation certificate under Section 50-B, can claim the protection of S. 53 -A of the T. P. Act after the Regulation came to be applied to the areas in which the lands, which they purported to have purchased, are situate. Chinnappa Reddy, J. and Gangadhara Rao, J. took the view that in such cases the safeguard of S. 53- A would not be available to the purchasers while Kuppuswamy , J. held that the protection would continue to be available to the purchasers despite the Regulation. There are other decisions of this Court also in addition to the decisions of the Supreme Court and those of the Mysore and Bombay High Courts which have bearing on this question. Our task now is to resolve this apparent conflict.


5. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to have a look at the material provisions of the relevant sections. The Hyderabad Tenancy Act was passed in 1950, one of its objects being to regulate the alienation of agricultural lands. Section 47 as it was originally made (it may be noted here that it was subsequently amended and was later deleted) provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any decree or order of a Court, no permanent alienation and no other transfer of agricultural land shall be valid unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. According to sub-sec (2) applications for the sanction shall be made and disposed of in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Sections 48 and 49 stipulated certain restrictions on the grant of such sanction. The expression "Permanent alienation" was defined under S. 2 (o) as including "any sale, exchange or gift and any transfer of a right of occupancy or of the patta of holding but does not include any disposition by will." However, the word "transfer" as such was not defined in the Act. It is worthy of note that even transfer of a right of occupancy is included in definition of the expression "permanent Alienation" for which also previous sanction of the Tahsildar was required under S. 47.


6. By Act 6 of 1964 a new Section viz., Section 50-B was inserted in the Act for the purpose of "validation of certain alienations and other transfers of agricultural lands". When it was inserted, Ss. 47 and 48 were retained in the statute book. Section 50-B was only an addition. As it was originally introduced by Act 6 of 1964 it had only three sub-section. By Act 12 of 1969, which was published in the Gazette on the 18th of March, 1969, sub-s. (1) of S. 50-B was substituted and a proviso was added to sub-s. (2). By the same Act 12 of 1969 and with effect from 18th March, 1969 and with effect from 18th March, 1969 Ss. 47, 48, 49, 50 and 50-A of the Act were deleted. When it was originally enacted sub-s. (1) of S. 50 laid down that notwithstanding anything in the Chapter, where any alienation or other transfer of agricultural land took place on or after 10th June, 1950 but before the 21st of Feb., 1961 and where possession of such land was given to the alienee or transferee before the 21st Feb., 1961, he may, within one year from such date as may be prescribed, apply to the Tahsildar for a certificate declaring that such alienation or transfer is valid. The reconstituted sub-s (1) as per Act 12 of 1969 reads:
 "(1) Notwithstanding anything in this chapter, where any alienation or other transfer of agricultural land took place ----


(a) on or after the 10th June, 1950 but before the date of coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 and where possession of such land was given to the alienee or transferee before such date of coming into force; and


(b) on or after the coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961, but before the date of the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Third Amendment) Act. 1969 and where possession of such land was given to the alienee or transferee before such commencement and such alienation or transfer is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961;
 the alienee or transferee may, within such period as may be prescribed, apply to the Tahsildar for a certificate declaring that such alienation or transfer is valid".
 Sub-section (2) provided for the procedure which should be adopted on receipt of an application as contemplated by sub-s. (1). It requires the Tahsildar to make such enquiry as may be prescribed and if he was satisfied that the consideration, if any, payable to the alienor or transferor has been paid or has been deposited within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, he shall require the alienee or the transferee to deposit in the office of the Tahsildar an amount equal to the registration fees and the stamp duty that would have been payable had to alienation or transfer been effected by a registered document in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. The said sub-section proceeds to lay down that on the deposit of such amount, the Tahsildar shall issue a certificate to the alienee or the transferee declaring that the alienation or transfer is valid and such certificate shall, notwithstanding anything in the Indian Registration Act, 1908, be conclusive evidence of such alienation or transfer as against the alienor or transferor or any person claiming interest under him. The proviso to this sub-section added under Act 12 of 1969 reads as follows:


"Provided that where an alienation or transfer has been effected by a registered document, the Tahsildar shall adjust the amount paid by the alienee or transferee as registration fees and the stamp duty towards the amount required to be deposited under this sub-section; and if the amount so paid by the alienee or transferee is less than the amount required to be deposited by him, the Tahsildar shall require him to deposit the balance." Sub-section (3), however, stated that the validation of any alienation or transfer of land under sub-s. (2) shall not affect the right accrued to any person under S. 37-A or S. 38 of S. 38-E.
 7. It should be noted here that Act 11 of 1965 substituted the words "within three years from such date as may be prescribed" for the original words "within one year from such date as may be prescribed". Act 12 of 12 of 1969 extended the said period for four years and Act 19 of 1969 for six years. Finally the benefit of validation conferred by S. 50-B ended with 31st of March, 1972. Thereafter there was no possibility of getting the alienations validated.


8. From the above narration of the changes in the Hyderabad Tenancy Act in respect of S. 47 and S. 50-B, it is manifest that the two provisions coexisted from 1964 to 1969. In 1969 Section 47 along with certain other provisions was deleted and only S. 50-B was on the statute book. The benefit of validation was extended up to 31st March 1972. The purpose behind these changes is not far to seek. As we have already noticed, one of the purposes of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act is to regulate the alienation of lands. In pursuance of that purpose, Chapter V was made imposing certain restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands. Section 47 was the very first provision in that Chapter. It laid down that no permanent alienation or no other transfer of agricultural land shall be valid unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. This declaration is very clear and specific. If there is any permanent alienation or transfer of agricultural land without the previous sanction of the Tahsildar , that would be invalid. However, the Legislature obviously took note of the fact that there had been very many permanent alienations or other transfers of agricultural lands which had taken place without the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. In order to obviate the confusion and injustice that might result therefrom, the Legislature introduced S. 50-B in the year 1964 for validation of certain alienations and other transfers of agricultural lands. Till 1969 until S. 47 was deleted both the sections coexisted. The position then was that the prohibition against alienations without previous sanction of the Tahsildar continued and at the same time transferees and 10th June, 1950 but before 21st Feb., 1961 who had also obtained possession, were given an opportunity to get the alienations in their favour validated within


who had also obtained possession, were given an opportunity to get the alienations in their favour validated within one year from the prescribed date. In 1969 S. 47 was altogether omitted; only S. 50 with the changes above mentioned was retained.


9. The position which emerged from the amendment of S. 50-B was that alienees of agricultural lands, who had obtained possession between 10th June, 1950 and before the Ceilings Act of 1961 and also after the Ceilings Act of 1961 but before the Hyderabad Tenancy Act (Third Amendment) 1969, were enabled to secure validation of their alienations. It is important to note that the facility of validation would be available only to those transferees who had obtained possession of the land. If all the requirements of S. 50-B are satisfied, the alienee or transferee may apply to the Tahsildar for a certificate declaring that his alienation or transfer was valid. Sub-section (2) prescribed the procedure which should be followed on making of such application. The Tahsildar shall make the necessary enquiry. In the first place, he should satisfy himself that the consideration payable to the alienor has been paid or has been deposited. He should also require the alienee to deposit the registration fee and the stamp duty. If the Tahsildar is satisfied in these respects, then only he shall issue a certificate to the alienee declaring that the alienation or transfer in his favour is valid and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the alienation or transfer against the alienor or any person claiming under him. It must necessarily follow from this that if there is no validation certificate, the alienation or transfer, though accompanied by possession, would not be treated as valid. This facility was afforded to the alienees with the obvious intention of giving them an opportunity to get their alienations or transfers validated up to 31st March, 1972 though they were invalid for want of previous sanction by the Thasildar.


10. Another aspect which has to be examined at this juncture is as to the nature of the alienation made under a contract of sale accompanied by delivery of possession. It is worthy of note that S. 50-B provided for validation of those alienations and transfers which had taken place between years 1950 and 1969 only which were accompanied by possession. If the alienee had not been given possession, then he could not apply for validation under S. 50-B. The petitioners before us very much emphasise so that fact that the alienations in their favour were not simply based on contracts of sale but were also accompanied by possession and therefore S. 53-A of the T. P. Act would give them protection and any subsequent law made thereafter would not defeat their right to be in possession. That is why we are emphasising this feature of S. 50-B of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act which also made obtaining of possession by the alienee one of the requirements for validation.
 11. The three transactions which are involved in the writ petitions before us are contracts of sale. Section 54 on the T. P. Act specifically declares that contract of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. A contract, in pursuance of which possession of the property has been given to the alienee, is not a contract of sale simpliciter and has a higher status, for it creates an interest in the property that is agreed to be sold under the contract. That higher interest is stated in S. 53-A according to which the transferor or any person claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract.


12. We will now go back to the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. We have already noted that S. 47, which was in force right from 1950 till 1969 and which was in force when the contracts of sale in these three cases were entered into, declared that no permanent alienation and no other transfer of agricultural land shall be unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar. "Permanent alienation," as we have already noted, is defined in S. 2 (o) of the Act within the scope of which expression "transfer of a right of occupancy" is included. When a contract of sale is entered into accompanied by possession, it is clearly transfer of a right of occupancy. This conclusion is further reinforced by the provisions of S. 53-A of the T. P. Act. Therefore, the contracts of sale accompanied by possession, which are the subject-matters of the three writ petitions, were "permanent alienations" and still admittedly no previous sanction of the Tahsildar had been obtained. From this, it must necessarily follow that the possession given along with the contracts of sale was invalid and unlawful. It is true that the present petitioners obtained possession and continued in it and yet, their possession was only an invalid and unlawful one. Certainly, S. 53-A of the T. P. Act postulates taking possession of the property or continuing in possession of the property in part performance of the contract only in a lawful manner. It cannot be predicated that S. 53-A purports to give protection to those transferees who have taken possession of the property in a manner contrary to the law which was in force and applicable to them. In our view, S. 53-A protects only such possessions which were valid and lawful and does not safeguard possessions which are invalid and unlawful.


13. At this juncture we should refer to S. 98 of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act which provides:
 "Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land -
 (a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act.
 (b)     xx  xx  xx  xx  xx


(c)     xx  xx  xx  xx  xx

 may, if the said provision do not provide for the eviction of such person, be summarily evicted by the Collector."

 Since the possession of the petitioners was wrongful and since the transfer of S. 47, they became liable to be summarily evicted by the Collector.


14. We draw support to these conclusions of ours from certain Bench pronouncements of this Court. In Syed Jalal v. Targopal, , Jaganmohan Reddy, C. J. and Parthasarathi, J., held that under S. 47 there can be no bar to the maintainability of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to direct the defendant (seller) to apply for permission under S. 47 and after he obtains it to execute s sale deed. This result would follow whether or not there was a specific term in the agreement that permission would be obtained under S. 47 and that thereafter a sale deed will be executed. Having said this, and with which we are in respectful agreement, the learned Judges proceeded to lay down that what is prohibited and what is invalid according to S. 47 is transfer or alienation of legal right of interest which confers a right to possession of agricultural land if its is without the permission of the Tahsildar Agreement to enter into transactions to confer such a right, title and interest, if the provision of law are complied with, namely, after obtaining the permission of the Tahsildar are not prohibited. Nor do they by themselves confer a right to possession so that if any possession is delivered in pursuance thereto, it cannot be said that that possession has been delivered in conformity with the statute or in a manner that would be according recognition thereunder. A contract of sale followed by possession, by the general law, would subject to the fulfilment of the requirements of S. 53-A of the T. P. Act, have enabled a person in possession to use it as a shield to defend his possession. But having regard to the provisions of S. 47 read with S. 98, no right to possession capable of being upheld under the special enactment can be conferred by means of a permanent alienation or other transfer unless the prior permission of the


enactment can be conferred by means of a permanent alienation or other transfer unless the prior permission of the Tahsildar is obtained. The leaned Judges proceeded to lay down that if possession is wrongful or unauthorised, no suit for a permanent injunction or for delivery of possession can be brought. The leaned Judges continued to observe that when S. 47 refers to other transfers of agricultural land, it is presumed that a permanent alienation is a transfer and permanent alienation includes the several kinds of transfers referred to therein viz., sale, exchange, or gift which under the general law, namely, the T. P. Act, would come within the definition of transfer of property. Transfer of a right of occupancy or a patta of a holding in so far as the Land Revenue Act of 1317 Fasli is concerned, would equally be a transfer of all that is necessary to effectually transfer agricultural land and vest a title in the person to whom it is transferred.


15. We will then refer to the decision of Gopal Rao Ekbote, J. (as he then was) and Sriramulu, J. in L. P. A. No. 139 of 1970, D/- 18-2-1972 : (ILR (1974) Andh Pra 119). That decision was in a Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the decision of Madhava Reddy, J. given in S. A. No. 520 of 1968 on 20th of July, 1970 : (ILR (1972) Andh Pra 1313). One of the questions decided by Madhava Reddy, J., and considered by the Division Bench in the appeal was whether the deletion of S. 47 and introduction of S. 50-B makes the previous contracts of sale legal and effective which contracts were considered illegal in view of S. 47. The Division Bench held that mere deletion of S. 47 or introduction of S. 50-B does not by itself validate all the transfers which were invalid and that such invalid and that such invalid transfers do not become legally enforceable unless a seal of approbation is put by the Tahsildar by granting a certificate validating the same. We shall refer to this aspect of the matter a little later. For the present, we are referring to this Bench decision for the purpose of showing that this Division Bench agreed with the view expressed in Syed Jalal's case (supra). In fact the learned Judges noted that the correctness of Syed Jalal's case was not challenged before them. After nothing the main points decided in Syed Jalal's case (supra) the Division Bench observed:


"What follows from the said decision is that while the agreement to sell is valid the possession delivered in pursuance of the agreement is unauthorised. The vendee therefore can institute a suit for specific performance but cannot avail of the doctrine of part-performance."
 16. On this point there is a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C. R. P. No. 1233 of 1976, D/- 9-8-1977 rendered by out learned brothers Ramachandra Raju and Jeevan Reddy, JJ. It is short-noted at p. 28 of 1977 (2) APLJ (Chenna Reddy v. Hanumanth). In this case the Division Bench was considering the relevant scopes of Ss. 47 and 50-B of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. The learned Judges held that on the date the transaction was entered into and the entire consideration money was paid by the respondent, possession of the lands purchased was given to the respondent by the petitioners and thus there is a transfers of the right to be in possession. Transfer of a right of occupancy can also mean transfer of a right to be in possession and enjoyment. In this view of the matter, the transaction entered into between the parties is a permanent alienation as per the definition under Section 2 (o). It is a permanent alienation, S. 47 is attracted and if S. 47 is attracted S. 50-B is attracted and the respondent would be entitled to the validation certificate.
 17. These three pronouncements of the Division Benches of this Court support the view we have expressed above that the possession given to the three petitioners in pursuance of the contracts of sale, without obtaining previous sanction of the Tahsildar under S. 47, was unlawful and S. 53-A of the T. P. Act would not safeguard that possession.


18. This was the position which was obtaining when the Regulation of 1959 was applied to the Scheduled areas in the Telangana Region. That is a regulation to regulate the transfers of lands in Scheduled areas and is clearly a social piece of legislation. It is essential to notice effect by including a non obstante clause therein. Despite any other law, transfers contrary to that provision are declared to be null and void. Going through the provisions of the Regulation, they would demonstrate beyond any doubt that its object is to prevent transfers of lands in the Scheduled areas in favour of persons who are not members of Scheduled Tribes or a society not composed solely of the members of the Scheduled Tribes. It is further aim is to set aside transfers of immovable property made in contravention of the law, to eject any person in possession of the property, and to restore it to the transferor or his heirs. If the transferor or his heirs are not willing, the appropriate authority may order assignment or sale of the property to any other member of the Scheduled Tribe. It is for this purpose very wide connotation is given to the word "transfer" in S. 2 (g), where by mortgage with or without possession, lease, sale, gift, exchange or any other dealing with immovable property, not being a testamentary disposition and a charge on such property or a contract relating to such property in respect of such mortgage, lease, sale gift, exchange or other dealing, are treated as transfers. It is true this Regulation has no retrospective effect and does not affect any valid transfers which had taken place before 1-12-1963 in the Scheduled Areas of the Telengana Region. If the transfer did not become final or if the transferee had not obtained indefeasible rights in the property by 1-12-1963, then the Regulation would certainly apply to such cases.


19. Then we go to the problem as to whether the subsequent deletion of S. 47 of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act would have the effect of automatically validating the alienations and transfers, though they were invalid on account of lack of sanction of the Tahsildar under that Section. If there was deletion of S. 47 simpliciter without anything more, possibly two views might have been possible. On the one hand, probably it could have been one hand, probably it could have been said that what had been the cause of invalidity of an alienation or transfer has been removed by the deletion of S. 47 and therefore it must be deemed that the original defect in the alienation or transfer must be deemed to have been cured or removed. On the other hand, it could be argued that what was invalid to start with could not be validated unless there is a special proclamation by the Legislature or a provision under which such invalid alienations or transfers could be validated. However, in our view, this possibility of the existence of two views does not exist in so far as the Hyderabad Tenancy Act is concerned, particularly so in these writ petitions. Why we say that such situation does not exist in these cases particularly is that S. 47 was deleted in 1969 and the Regulation relating to the prohibition of alienations of lands in the Scheduled Areas by Tribals came to be applied to the Telengana Area on 1-12-1963 which was long before S. 47 was removed from the stature book. Even if it were to be argued that the removal of S. 47 would automatically validate the invalid alienations and transfers, the insurmountable hurdle in the way of the petitioners would arise in the form of the Regulation which came to be applied to their lands even on 1-12-1963 . By virtue of the Regulation the invalidity, which was inhibiting the alienations or transfers in their favour by


of the Regulation the invalidity, which was inhibiting the alienations or transfers in their favour by 1-12-1963 on account of lack of sanction under S. 47 of the Hyderbad Tenancy Act, could not be cured in respect of their rights and interests that might have existed earlier. It is true that upto 1-12-1963, that is to say, till the Regulations came to be applied to the Telengana Area, either the petitioners or their alienors could have applied to the Tahsildar for permission for the alienations or transfers thereby securing legal sanction to them. It is a moot point whether after the Regulation came into force of 1-12-1963 and before S. 47 was deleted in 1969 permission could be obtained for transfer in respect of these lands in the Scheduled Areas in view of S. 3 of the Regulation. However, we do not express any view on this point since it is not necessary to do so in these cases. The admitted fact remains that no attempt has been made either by the petitioners or their alienors for securing the required permission under S. 47 even after 1-12-1963 and before S. 47 was deleted.


20. There is yet another formidable objection to the validity of the transfers on favour of the petitioners. In 1964 S. 50-B was introduced for validation of the earlier invalid transfers. For five years thereafter till 1969 S. 50-B was part of the statute along with S. 47. The result was that even after 1964 no permanent alienation or transfer could be effected without the necessary permission from the Tahsildar. At the same time, the earlier invalid alienations for want of that sanction could be validated by taking recourse to S.50-B proceedings. In 1969 S.47 and the allied provisions were deleted and yet, S.50-B was retained. This is a very material and significant circumstance. Though S. 47 was deleted, thereby implying that from that date no permission was necessary for alienations or transfers, the earlier invalid transfers, which had taken place from 1950 to 1969, could be validated with the aid of the proceedings under S. 50-B. It would also be very pertinent to note that by Act 12 of 1969, which deleted s. 47 and the allied provisions from the statute book, substituted sub-sec. (1) of S. 50-B where under the invalid alienations, which had taken place from 10th June , 1950 right up to the date of the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1969 could be validated. We have already noted that originally as S. 50-B (1) stood when it was first inserted by Act 6 of 1964, only alienations from 10th June, 1950 till 21st of Feb. 1961 could be validated under that section. While deleting S. 47 and the allied provisions in 1969, Sub-sec. (1) of


47 and the allied provisions in 1969, Sub-sec. (1) of S. 50-B was altered by extending the period from 21st February 1961 till the third Amendment to the Hyderabad Tenancy Act 1969 was made. That is to say, under the newly altered S. 50-B as per Act 12 of 1969, even the alienations and transfers which were invalid right up to 1969, could be validated. In other words, even those alienations and transfers, which had been made without obtaining sanction under S.47 up to 1969 in which year that section was deleted, could be cured and made lawful by invoking the provisions of S.50-B. It is thus manifest that S. 50-B was made by the Legislature with a definite purpose and that purpose was clearly declared in the marginal note as "validation of certain alienations and other transfers of agricultural lands". As we have pointed out, very many alientations had been made contrary to Ss. 47, 48 etc., and the Legislature thought it just and proper to validate some of them. The alienations which could be validated, the manner which could be validated, the manner in which such validation could be made and the time within which that validation could be made and the time within which that validation could be sought were all prescribed in the Section. As it stood amended by 1969 Act, transfers, which had taken place between 10th June, 1950 and 1969 when the Third Amendment to the Hyderabad Tenancy Act was made where possession had been given and which were not inconsistent with the provisions of the A. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961, were eligible for validation under the provision.


21. It is also very important to note that the last paragraph of sub-sec. (10 of the section enables the alienee or transferee to apply within such period as may be prescribed by the Tashildar for a certificate declaring that such alienation or transfer is valid. This sub-paragraph or sub-sec (1) makes it abundantly certain that though it is an enabling provision, in the sense that it permits the alienee or transferee under an invalid alienation or transfer, to apply for validation, the invalidity of the alienation would continue if there is no declaration under S. 50-B. This intention of the Legislature in making S. 50-B is further brought out by the last sentence of sub-sec (2) that on deposit of the amounts required, so it is provided in sub-sec (2), the Tahsildar shall issue a certificate to the alienee or transferee declaring that the alienation or transfer is valid and that such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of such alienation or transfer against the alienor or transferor or any person claiming interest under him. This part of the provision of sub-sec. (2) is practically, in the nature of enforcing the rights of an alinee or transferee under S. 53-A of the T. P. Act. The certificate under sub-sec. (2) could be granted only where possession had been delivered and where the alinee has paid the balance of consideration or deposited the same in the manner prescribed, if any unpaid purchase money was payable, and also on the deposit of the registration and stamp charges. Once that registration is given on the Tashildar reaching his satisfaction, it is declared to be conclusive evidence of the alienation or transfer as against the alienor or transferor any person claiming interest under him.


22. The similarity between the provisions of S. 50-B of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act and those of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is self-evident. It is thus manifest that while enacting S. 50-B of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act, the Legislature kept in view the provisions of S. 53-A of the T. P. Act. Therefore, even if delivery of possession in pursuance of the contract of sale was invalid and unlawful on account of the failure to secure the permission under S. 47, such possession and transfer could be validated under S. 50-B. To our minds, it necessarily follows that if the transferee or alienee did not avail himself of this opportunity of getting his alienation and possession validated under S. 50-B, he should suffer the consequences, since the transfer and delivery of possession in his favour remained invalid and unlawful. It is unnecessary for us, as we have already pointed out, to decide whether the three petitioners before us could apply for validation under S. 50-B in view of the Regulation which came to be applied to their areas on and from 1-12-1963. It is common ground that no applications have been made by the petitioners for validation under S. 50-B.


23. On account of the foregoing reasons we are of the view that S. 50-B was not merely an enabling provision but was also intended by the Legislature as a remedy for validating transfers and possessions which were invalid. Without such validation, the invalid transfer and delivery of possession remained invalid. This facility to get the invalid alientations declared as valid existed only up to 31st March, 1972, since the Legislature stopped further extension for such validation after that date. Those who did not apply under S. 50-B up to 31st March ,1972 would reap the result of having a invalid transfer and delivery of possession on their hands. The Legislature's refusal to extend the time beyond 31st March, 1972 does not validate the invalid transfers and delivery of possessions. If this was not the intention of the Legislature by enacting S. 50-B and amending it, then that section would be postulated that any provision of an enactment has been made without any purpose.


24. In this view we have taken, the opinion expressed by Parthasarthi , J. in Hafeezunnisa V. Syed Arab, (1969) 2 Andh WR 317, that S. 50-B was merely an enabling provision and the omission of a party to take advantage of it does not put the validation itself in jeopardy is not correct. We also express our firm dissent from the further opinion of the learned Judge that the Legislature has, by necessary implication, made the provisions of Ss. 47 to 49, inapplicable to the cases of transfers specified in sub-sec. (1) of S. 50-B and that those transfers are exempted from the operations of Ss. 47 to 49. We are of the opinion that the learned Judge did not lay down the law correctly when he held that the absence of certificate under S. 50-B would not nullify the validation of the alienations or the exemption granted to them from the operation of the provisions of Ss. 47 to 49. We hold that this is not the correct meaning of Ss. 47 to 49 and S. 50-B and therefore it is not good law.
 25. Now we will consider the different view-points expressed by our learned brothers of this Court and other Courts particularly in the light of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Nathulal V. Poolchand, .