Abstract:
Data are communicated in a wireless network between a transmitter to a receiver. The transmitter estimates a first channel response between the receiver and the transmitter at the transmitter, and generating a first key based on the first channel response. The data are encoded at the transmitter using a rate-adaptive code to produce encoded data, which is scrambling using the first key before broadcasting. Subsequently, the receiver can estimate a second channel response to generate a second key to be used to descramble the broadcast data.

Description:
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
       [0001]    This invention relates generally to wireless communications, and more particularly to secure communications in wireless networks. 
       BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
       [0002]    In wired communication networks, signal energy is mostly confined in a physical medium, such as conductive wires or optical fibers. Hence, signals can only be accessed by physically attaching to the medium. 
         [0003]    In wireless networks, any receiver within range of the transmitter can intercept the signals. Therefore, conventionally secure communication typically uses cryptography and asymmetric public and private keys at the transmitter and the receiver. A public key infrastructure (PKI) generates, distributes and maintains the public keys, in which a trusted certificate authority (CA) binds all the public keys with respective user identity and issues a public key certificate to the respective user. In order to establish secure communication, the transmitter first verifies the receiver&#39;s public key certificate. After the public key is verified, messages are encrypted using the receiver&#39;s public key, and the messages can only be decrypted using the corresponding private key. Generation of public keys requires significant computational overhead. 
         [0004]    For many wireless networks, such as ad hoc network, access to a PKI is difficult, or unavailable. Wireless nodes do not have the computational power to generate public keys either. In such cases, security communication in such wireless networks becomes a challenge. Given this, realizing security in wireless communication networks is of great interest. 
         [0005]    Recently, physical layer security has been investigated for wireless networks. Based on information theory, messages transmitted at bit rates higher than a channel capacity cannot be decoded correctly. It is therefore possible to transmit a message to intended users securely, providing that the channels between the transmitter and intended receivers have higher capacity than channels between the transmitter and eavesdroppers. However, in practice, it is difficult to guarantee that such a condition is satisfied. 
         [0006]    Another approach generates secret session keys in a wireless node. The reciprocity of wireless channels enables two nodes to generate a pair of secret keys that are made identical by quantizing parameters of the channel. After a matching pair of keys are generated by each node, the keys can be used to encrypt messages between the nodes. Because eavesdroppers have wireless channels that are different than the two nodes, the eavesdroppers cannot produce the same keys, and the secure communication is guaranteed. For that approach, it is essential that the independently generated keys match completely. However, due to the noise, interference and hardware impairment, it is not always guaranteed that the keys generated by a pair of wireless nodes are exactly the same. 
         [0007]    Low-density parity check (LDPC) codes can be used for forward error correction (FEC) codes, and are widely used to reduce channel noise and key mismatches. Given the channel statistics, one can design good LDPC codes that perform very closely to the channel capacity. However, in reality, channel parameters cannot always be obtained accurately. Moreover, the channel can be time-variant. Therefore the code rate should be determined dynamically. 
       SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
       [0008]    The invention describes a method for securely and reliably communicating data between a transmitter and a receiver, generally transceivers or nodes according to embodiments of the invention. 
         [0009]    The transmitter encodes the data using a rate-adaptive code to produce a bit stream of encoded data. The rate-adaptive code can be any code that has the capability to incrementally add redundancy, such as rateless codes, rate-compatible LDPC, or convolutional codes, etc. Rateless codes do not exhibit a fixed code rate because the codes can potentially generate a sequence of infinite number of encoded bits, while rate-compatible LDPC codes adjust the code rate by “puncturing” parity check bits. Both of codes have a carefully designed structure, where encoded data is transmitted incrementally to achieve different levels of error correction capability. 
         [0010]    The transmitter encrypts the encoded data with a key K a  and transmits a small segment of the encoded data. If the transmitter receives a negative acknowledgement (NACK) from the receiver, or a time out, then additional segments of the encoded bit stream are transmitted. The transmitter keeps transmitting more segments until an acknowledgment (ACK) is received. 
         [0011]    The receiver first decrypts the received bit stream with a key K b , which is highly correlated with the key K a , but not always exactly the same. The receiver tries to decode the message using all data received. If successful, the receiver sends the ACK to the transmitter of the encoded data. It unsuccessful, the receiver signals the transmitter to send more segments by either sending the NACK, or doing nothing. 
     
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         [0012]      FIG. 1  is a schematic of a wireless network that uses embodiments of the invention; 
           [0013]      FIG. 2  is a schematic of a channel between two nodes in the wireless network of  FIG. 1 ; 
           [0014]      FIG. 3  is a block diagram of a transmitter and a receiver according to embodiments of the invention; 
           [0015]      FIG. 4  is a schematic of another embodiment of a transmitter and a receiver according to embodiments of the invention; 
           [0016]      FIG. 5  is a schematic of a transmission protocol according to embodiments of the invention; 
           [0017]      FIG. 6  is a timing diagram of rate and channel capacity using prior art fixed rate transmission; and 
           [0018]      FIG. 7  is a timing diagram of rate and channel capacity using rate-adaptive codes according to embodiment of the invention. 
       
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT 
     Key Generation 
       [0019]      FIG. 1  shows a wireless communication network  100  according to embodiments of that includes a transmitting node A  101 , and receiving nodes B-C  102  and D  103  within a receiving range r  110  of the transmitting node. Any node within the receiving range can intercept the broadcast signals via channels  120 . For example, node D  103  could be an eavesdropper. 
         [0020]    Due to an open medium, a wireless transmission is very vulnerable to eavesdropping because potentially any receiver can intercept wireless broadcasts. Therefore, security is an extremely important issue in wireless communications. 
         [0021]      FIG. 2  shows a channel  200  between the transmitter  101  and one legitimate receiver (node B)  102 , and one eavesdropper node (node D)  103 . The received signals of both legitimate node and eavesdropper can be modeled as the transmitted signals multiplied by the respective channel responses H  211  and added to some noise W  212 . 
         [0022]    Two wireless nodes (A and B) can generate a pair of keys independently by estimating the channel between the node and the other node. Without noise and other hardware impairment, the channel estimate of node A and that of node B, denoted as H ab  and H ba , respectively, are theoretically identical, i.e., H ab =H ba =H. However, because of environmental noise and hardware impairment, the actual channels estimated by each node are often not exactly identical, but highly correlated. The estimated channel can be expressed as: 
         [0000]        Ĥ   ab   =H   ab   +z   a , and 
         [0000]        Ĥ   ba   =H   ba   +z   b , 
         [0000]    where Z a  and Z b  are noise observed by node A and node B, respectively. 
         [0023]    Node A can generate a key K a , based on a channel estimate Ĥ ab , and node B generates a key K b , based on a channel estimate Ĥ ba . Given that Ĥ ab ≈Ĥ ba , K a  and K b  are not always identical, but typically highly correlated. 
         [0024]    The eavesdropper node D  103  can also estimate the channel, Ĥ da  or Ĥ db , and generate a key K d  based on either channel estimate, or a combination of both. However, the correlation between eavesdropper&#39;s channels and H is low, and therefore a mismatch rate using key K d  is much higher than the rate obtained using keys K a  and K b . Here, a mismatch rate predetermined threshold is defined as the ratio of the number of mismatching bits to the total number of bits in the second (or first) key. 
         [0025]    Conventional secure communications using encryption require that keys K a  and K b  are perfectly matched. That is, the receiver cannot decode the data correctly if there are mismatched bits between key pair K a  and K b . 
         [0026]    In contrast, the embodiments of the invention describe a method to transmit data securely using a pair of key that are not perfectly matched, but correlated. 
         [0027]      FIG. 3  shows one embodiment of the invention. The transmitter  101  encodes a kbit data vector X=[x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ]  301  using a rate-adaptive encoder  381 , which can be a Luby transform (LT) code, a raptor code, a rate-compatible LDPC code, etc., to produce a coded bitstream of symbols Y  371 . The length of Y can be potentially very long. The longer the length of the stream Y  371 , the lower the transmission rate and the higher error correction capability the code. 
         [0028]    The transmitter gradually adjusts the error correction capability of the transmitted code according to feedback  330  from the receiver  102 . If the feedback indicates a failure (NACK) in decoding, the transmitter increase the error correction capability by sending additional symbols of Y  371  to assist the receiver to decode the bit stream. 
         [0029]    The transmitter  101  also scrambles (SCBL)  382  the coded data Y  371  with the key K a  to scrambled data Z  372 . The transmitter  101  broadcasts the first n bits of Z, denoted as Z( 1 :n). The bits Z( 1 :n) are received at the intended receiver node B  102  as V b  ( 1 :n). 
         [0030]    The receiver descrambles  392  the bits V b  ( 1 :n) using the first n bits of the key K b ( 1 :n). If the length of the key is less than n, then a repeated key is used. 
         [0031]    The descrambled data are S b ( 1 :n). A decoder  391  in the receiver attempts to decode data (message) X using S b ( 1 :n). The receiver sends a feedback  330  to the transmitter according to the decoding result. If the data are decoded successfully, the receiver then sends the ACK to the transmitter. If decoding fails, the receiver can either explicitly send the NACK, or do so implicitly by not transmitting anything. 
         [0032]    If after broadcasting the t th  segment of Z, i.e., Z((t−1)n+1: tn), the transmitter  101  receives the ACK message, it stops transmitting additional symbols in Z and is ready for the next input data (message). 
         [0033]    If after broadcasting the t th  segment of Z, i.e., Z((t−1)n+1: tn), the transmitter  101  receives the NACK, or times out in the case of the implicit NACK), and continues by transmitting additional n-bit of Z, Z(tn+1: tn+n). 
         [0034]    The scrambling  382  performs symbol-wise operation. Each output symbol z(m) is generated with input symbol y(m) and a key symbol k a (m). As an example, if y(m) and k a (m) are binary, the scrambling can be done by applying an exclusive OR (XOR) operation on the encoded data and the first key, i.e., z(m) y(m) XOR k a (m). Other methods, such as rotating the phase of the symbols, can also be used. If a length q of the key is less than m, a repeated key is used, i.e., z(m)=y(m) XOR k a (m mod q). 
         [0035]    The receiver  102  can include an individual descrambling block  392  and a decoder block  391 . The descrambling block  392  takes the received symbol v b (m) and the key k b (m), and generates a descrambled symbol s b (m). If both v b (m) and k b (m) are binary, then the XOR operation can be used in the descrambler. 
         [0036]    If reliability information for v b (m) or k b (m) or both are known, then an advanced soft descrambling scheme can be used. We denote the reliability of bit s, given an observed value r, by L=log(Pr(s=0|r)/Pr(s=1|r)). Then, the reliability of the received data is L c (m)=log(Pr(z(m)=0|v b (m))/Pr(z(m)=1|v b (m))). The reliability of individual bits in a key L k (m) can be obtained from the key generation process. If the key is not known, K b  can be treated as error free, i.e., considering the value of L k (m) as infinity. When the key L k (m) is known, the soft output information L d (m) of the m th  symbol after descrambling can be determined according to 
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         [0037]    Otherwise, if the key L k (m) is unknown, then 
         [0000]        L   d ( m )=(1−2 ·K   b ( m ))· L   c ( m ).
 
         [0038]    A decoder capable of accepting soft input can be used and L d  can be used to initialize the decoding process. 
         [0039]    If the eavesdropper node  103  has the same structure as a legitimate receiver, as shown in  FIG. 3 , the eavesdropper descrambles the input data V d  with key sequence K d . Given that the correlation between K d  and K a  is low, the eavesdropper cannot correctly decode the data, i.e., X d   H ≠X. Therefore, the invented method allows data to be transmitted securely only to intended receivers. 
         [0040]      FIG. 4  shows another embodiment of the invention where concatenated rate-adaptive codes, e.g., raptor codes, are used. The transmitter  101  of a concatenated rate-adaptive code includes an inner code encoder  401  and an outer code encoder  402 , and scrambling  403  between the two encoders instead of being at the output of the outer encoder as in  FIG. 3 . Alternatively, the scrambling  403  is instead performed on an output of the outer decoder. 
         [0041]    The transmitter  101  first encodes  401  the input data X  301  with an inner code. The output of the inner encoder, Y in    411 , is then scrambled  403  with K a  to produce a scrambled sequence Z in    412 . The outer encoder  402  takes Z in  as inputs and outputs Z out , which is broadcast. 
         [0042]    The receiver  102  decodes the received coded signal V b  with the side information K b . If the receiver does not decode successfully, the receiver sends an implicit or explicit NACK to the transmitter  101 . Otherwise, the receiver sends an ACK to the transmitter  101 . During the broadcasting, the outer code encoder  402  in the transmitter  101  continuously produces additional bits until the ACK is received from the receiver  102 . 
         [0043]      FIG. 5  summarizes the protocol. Upon receiving a new input data, node A  101  encodes and scrambles the data and transmits  501  a portion of the scrambled, encoded data  504 . A NACK  505  is sent  502  by node B  102  if the scrambled data cannot be decoded, and another portion of the scrambled data is sent. That is, the transmitter continuous to broadcast the scrambled data, produced by the rate-adaptive encoder, until the data are decoded successfully. 
         [0044]    If the message is decoded correctly, then the node B  102  sends  502  the ACK  506 , and broadcasting terminate  507 . 
       EFFECT OF THE INVENTION 
       [0045]    Compared to fixed rate transmissions, the invention can improve the security level of wireless communication networks. The invention is especially effective in a time variant channel. 
         [0046]      FIG. 6  shows prior art transmissions where fixed rate (dotted line) is used. Data  699  are transmitted at a pre-determined rate R ab    601  regardless of the channel capacity at the time of the transmission. Such a method has two drawbacks:
       1) when the channel capacity (solid line) of the intended user C ab    602  is lower than the pre-determined rate R ab    601 , the transmission is unsuccessful; and   2) when the channel capacity (dash line) of the eavesdropper C ad    603  is higher than R ab    601 , the eavesdropper node  103  can decode the data, which leads to an unsecure transmission.       
 
         [0049]      FIG. 7  shows transmission using the embodiments of the invention. By scrambling the transmitted data with keys, the separation  700  between the effective legitimate channel capacity C ab    602  and the eavesdropper channel capacity C ad    603  is increased. For each segment of data  699 , the transmitter starts transmission at rate R init    701 , which is the highest possible transmission rate, e.g., R init  can be set high, such as 1. With each additional transmission, the effective rate  710  is lower. 
         [0050]    When the rate is lower than the channel capacity C ab    602  (solid line), and the receiver can decode the data correctly, the transmission stops. This allows the rate to be adaptive to instantaneous channel capacity, and guarantees that only the intended receiver can receive the message successfully and minimizes the probability of the data being decoded by the eavesdropper. 
         [0051]    Although the invention has been described by way of examples of preferred embodiments, it is to be understood that various other adaptations and modifications may be made within the spirit and scope of the invention. Therefore, it is the object of the appended claims to cover all such variations and modifications as come within the true spirit and scope of the invention.