Abstract:
A method and system of protecting content by ensuring a secure boot of a processor environment. A processor is coupled to a certification unit which may include a decryption engine and a one-way hash unit. The certification unit is employed to ensure that only certified software is permitted access to memory containing content and that only certified software may access a content bit stream such as may flow across a 1394 serial bus from a digital video disk player. By preventing access by uncertified software, the risk of a personal computer being used as an instrumentality of piracy is reduced.

Description:
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     (1) Field of the Invention 
     The invention relates to digital content protection. More specifically, the invention relates to a secure booting mechanism for content protection. 
     (2) Background 
     Increasingly, content such as the video and audio of Hollywood movies is becoming available in digital form. Particularly with the proliferation of digital video disks (DVDs) every bit of data that makes up the/content is available for manipulation. Currently, industry groups and Hollywood are working together on a strong encryption that will protect the content from piracy. Even as the strong encryption is developed, efforts are being made to break the strong encryption. 
     Typically, the content, be it audio, video, or stills, might flow across a serial bus and into main memory. The serial bus may be an IEEE 1394 bus which is defined in the IEEE specification IEEE Standard for a High Performance Serial Bus, IEEE Std. 1394-1995 published Aug. 30, 1996 (1394-1995 Standard) or a subsequent revision thereof. Once the bits, even if encrypted, are stored in main memory, software executing on the processor can access those bits. The internet exacerbates the protection problem because it provides a vast network of processors which can all work to break the encryption. Even an unsophisticated user could download a favorite cracking program from the internet, then upload the results of their cracking effort and, over a relatively short period of time, the global network is likely to decrypt the content. 
     Instrumentalities of piracy can subject their manufacturers to huge potential liability. Here, since a personal computer (PC) can be used without modification to pirate digital content through a lawful activity (downloading from the internet), it is quite possible that PCs may be found by a court to be an instrumentality of piracy. Processor manufacturers will likely find it desirable to take steps to avoid this possible liability. To that end, products shipped should not enable piracy with a simple download. 
     BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     An apparatus and method of providing content protection by secure booting is disclosed. A processor core is coupled to a certification unit. The certification unit certifying a BIOS stored in memory responsive to a start-up request. 
    
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
     FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system of one embodiment of the invention. 
     FIGS. 2 a  and  2   b  show a flow chart of startup certification in one embodiment of the invention. 
     FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a system of an alternate embodiment of the invention. 
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
     FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the system of one embodiment of the invention. A processor core  10  is coupled to a memory  22  by a bus  32 . Memory  22  is partitioned into operating system (O/S) protected memory  24  which is deemed uncopyable by applications. In the remainder of the memory, which may be freely copied and/or accessed by applications executing on the processor core, a software certification unit  28  is provided to ensure that software executing on the processor core  10  is certified. Certification unit  28  includes an decryption engine  12 , a hash unit  14 , and a comparator  16 . A flash key storage unit  18  is coupled to the decryption engine  12  to provide it with keys necessary for it to perform its decryption function. In one embodiment, decryption engine  12  will perform public key decryption and verification of digital signatures. A flash unit  20  provides authorized hash values to one input of comparator  16  as part of the certification process. Flash unit  18  and flash unit  20  may be a single flash memory unit. A digital video disk player (DVD)  26  is coupled to memory by a serial bus  34  which in one embodiment of the invention implements a 1394 protocol. In operation, a content bit stream either encrypted or unencrypted will flow across the serial bus  34  to memory  22 . In one embodiment, the bit stream will be stored in protected memory  24 . In that manner, if the O/S is not compromised, the content cannot be copied and pirated. Certification of the BIOS and O/S described below reduces the risk of unauthorized access to content. 
     Typically, software entering the system is routed through decryption engine  12 . If the software is encrypted, decryption engine  12  decrypts the software and forwards it to either or both of the processor core and hash unit  14 . Hash unit  14  forms a one-way hash of the incoming software. The resulting hash value is compared with an authorized hash value which is retrieved from the flash unit  20 , responsive to a signal from the decryption engine. If the comparator does not find identity between the authorized hash value and the incoming hash value, a hardware lock signal  30  is asserted and the software is not permitted entry to the processor core  10 . As used herein, software may refer generically to BIOS, operating systems, or applications. Alternatively, when the hardware lock signal is asserted, the operating system may restrict access privileges of the uncertified applications. 
     At startup, the first software entering the certification unit will be the system BIOS. System BIOS is typically stored in non-volatile flash memory. The BIOS may be encrypted or unencypted. In either case, a hash of the BIOS is compared with an expected hash of the BIOS. If the comparison does not result in an identity, the processor will not boot. Assuming the BIOS is successfully certified, it will begin to boot the operating system (O/S). The O/S must also be certified. It may follow the same certification process routing through the decryption engine and hash unit or alternatively, the BIOS may perform the certification. If the O/S is successfully certified, the O/S or the BIOS may certify applications, or the applications may again be run through the certification unit  28 . 
     FIGS. 2 a  and  2   b  show a flow chart of a secure boot in one embodiment of the invention. In response to a start request, e.g., power-up, restart, etc., the BIOS is loaded from a flash memory at functional block  110 . The certification unit decrypts (if necessary) and hashes the BIOS at functional block  112 . The hash of the BIOS is then compared with an expected hash for a certified BIOS. A determination is made at decision block  114  if the BIOS should be certified based on that comparison. If the BIOS is certified, the BIOS is allowed to execute at functional block  116 . 
     Once the BIOS completes its initialization routines, the BIOS initiates a load of the operating system at functional block  118 . The BIOS will then certify the O/S. Initially, at functional block  120 , the BIOS will request an authentication certificate from the O/S. The O/S will return the authentication certificate via handshaking signals between it and the BIOS. The BIOS will determine if the authentication certificate is okay at decision block  122 . If it is, the BIOS will perform a checksum on the operating system at functional block  124 . By performing the checksum, the BIOS ensures that the operating system has not been hacked. This prevents the O/S certifying itself based on a certificate which is otherwise isolatable from the entire content of the O/S. In one embodiment, the O/S provides to the BIOS, in addition to its authentication certificate, an encrypted checksum. The encrypted checksum is compared with the checksum generated by the BIOS. 
     A determination is made based on the success or failure of the checksum comparison whether the checksum was okay at decision block  126 . If the checksum was okay, the O/S is permitted to execute on the processor at functional block  128 . The O/S may then load applications at functional block  130 . 
     After the application is loaded, the O/S will request an authentication certificate from the application at function block  132 . The operating system will determine if the authentication certificate is okay at decision block  134 . If the authentication certificate is okay, the operating system will further perform a checksum on the application at functional block  136 . A determination is made at functional block  138  whether the checksum was okay. If the checksum is okay, the application will be allowed to access memory and content at functional block  140 . If the authentication certificate provided by the application is not okay or the checksum fails, an implicit determination is made at decision block  142  whether the system permits non-certified applications. If it does permit non-certified applications, the operating system must police the applications to ensure that they are provided only limited memory access and no access to content at functional block  144 . If the BIOS certification fails at decision block  114  or the operating system certification fails at decision blocks  122  or  126 , or if non-certified applications are not allowed at implicit decision  142 , a hardware interlock will occur at functional block  146  and access by the respective software will be denied. 
     In the foregoing discussion, the hardware certifies the BIOS and then the BIOS certifies the operating system and the operating system subsequently certifies incoming applications. It is also within the scope and contemplation of the invention for the hardware to perform all certification. It is further within the scope and contemplation of the invention to have the BIOS perform all certification beyond the certification of itself. However, by only requiring the hardware to certify the BIOS and then permitting the BIOS to certify the operating system and so forth, the flexibility of the system is increased. Specifically, it is possible that new versions of BIOS or other software will necessitate changes which are more easily made in the BIOS or operating system for certification purposes than to the hardware itself. The likelihood of such changes increases with each relative layer. This may be particularly important, where for example, one form of encryption is cracked or keys become known. It may be necessary to update the key store and/or the hash store. This may be done using a certified BIOS or a certified application, as appropriate. 
     FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an alternative embodiment of the invention. A processor  50  is coupled to a bus  52 . A system memory  54  is also coupled to the bus. The boot memory  60  containing BIOS  62  is similarly coupled to the bus. A chipset  56  is coupled between the bus  52  and I/O bus  64 . Chipset  56  includes a certification unit  58  which is used to certify the BIOS  62  before it is permitted control of the processor  50 . Either the certification unit  58  or the BIOS  62  or both in conjunction may then certify subsequent software elements as described above. 
     In the foregoing specification, the invention has been described with reference to specific embodiments thereof. It will, however, be evident that various modifications and changes can be made thereto without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the invention as set forth in the appended claims. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense. Therefore, the scope of the invention should be limited only by the appended claims.