Abstract:
A method substantially as shown and described the detailed description and/or drawings and/or elsewhere herein. A device substantially as shown and described the detailed description and/or drawings and/or elsewhere herein.

Description:
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES 
       [0001]      FIG. 1  shows a partially schematic diagram of an environment(s) and/or an implementation(s) of technologies described herein. 
     
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
       [0002]    In the following detailed description, reference is made to the accompanying drawings, which form a part hereof. In the drawings, similar symbols typically identify similar components, unless context dictates otherwise. The illustrative embodiments described in the detailed description, drawings, and claims are not meant to be limiting. Other embodiments may be utilized, and other changes may be made, without departing from the spirit or scope of the subject matter presented here. 
         [0003]    With reference now to the Figures and with reference now to  FIG. 1 ,  FIG. 1  shows a partially schematic diagram of an environment(s) and/or an implementation(s) of technologies described herein.  FIG. 1  depicts atypical person  100  resident within the confines of Room  101  of the Cato Institute.  FIG. 1  illustrates that Room  101  of the Cato Institute is surveilled by camera  102 , where camera  102  has an associated identifier (e.g., name) of “Skynet Security Camera Alpha.” 
         [0004]      FIG. 1  illustrates that Camera-to-Obscure Co. Circuitry  104  creates a pseudo-public-private key pair.  FIG. 1  shows that Camera-to-Obscure Co. Circuitry  104  transmits Camera-to-Obscure Co. generated Pseudo-Public Key to 
         [0005]    Skynet Name Obscuring Unit  106 .  FIG. 1  depicts that the output of Skynet Name Obscuring Unit  106  is “Encrypted-Camera-ID” which is a string that results from encrypting “Skynet Security Camera Alpha” with the pseudo-public key delivered to Skynet Name Obscuring Unit  106  by Camera-to-Obscure Co. Circuitry  104 .  FIG. 1  further depicts that Camera-to-Obscure Co. Circuitry  104  transmits Camera-to-Obscure Co. generated Pseudo-Private Key to FBI Name DE-Obscuring Circuitry  136 , which as show herein, in one implementation, will subsequently attempt to unlock various received encrypted names by trying to decrypt the received encrypted names via trying various pseudo-private keys on the FBI Name DE-Obscuring Circuitry  136 &#39;s private key chain until the encrypted name is unlocked; that is, in a fashion analogous to a human trying similar looking keys on his key chain to find the key that opens the front door to his house. In other implementations FBI Name DE-Obscuring Circuitry  136  uses a Unique Camera-to-Obscure Co. Key pair designator (not shown), analogous to the ways unique key pair designators are used as described elsewhere herein with respect to, for example, the pseudo-public-private key pairs respectively generated by Cyberdine Protective Services and Heuristic Algorithm Services such as described herein; such alternate implementations for the FBI Name DE-Obscuring Circuitry  136  that use a Unique Camera-to-Obscure Co. Key pair designator are not shown in the drawings for sake of clarity but can be understood in light of at least the reference examples herein. 
         [0006]      FIG. 1  illustrates that Skynet Name Obscuring Unit  106  transmits output—“Encrypted-Camera-ID”—which is the string that is the result of encrypting “Skynet Security Camera Alpha” with the pseudo-public key of the pseudo-public-private key pair generated by Camera-to-Obscure Co. circuitry  104 —plus a date and time window for which “Encrypted-Camera ID” is good (e.g., Jun. 16, 2014 from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) to Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 . In some implementations, the date and time is optional, and Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  just appends the appropriate date and time during which CCD output  112  is received from camera  102 . 
         [0007]      FIG. 1  shows that in one implementation CCD output  112  from camera  102  feeds—via a hardwired connection—directly into Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  as a stream—not a frame. Thus, in one implementation such as illustrated herein, at no point can camera  102 &#39;s output be intelligibly accessed until/unless several different legal entities—controlling very different encryption/decryption automation the keys to which encryption/decryption are at no time held by a single party who can decrypt and see the camera output—work in a transparent and coordinated fashion. 
         [0008]      FIG. 1  shows atypical person  100  (e.g., one with an alternative lifestyle) who just wants to be left alone but is aware that camera  102 —“Skynet Security Camera Alpha”—is surveilling Room  101  of the Cato Institute where atypical person  100  is resident. Accordingly, atypical person  100  is depicted as saying “respect my privacy, and keep your intrusive cameras off my body!” 
         [0009]    In one implementation, the public safety is served by constant camera surveillance of Room  101  of the Cato Institute, but atypical person  100  has legitimate concerns as to how such surveillance data might be used. To allay atypical person  100 ′s concerns, illustrated is that CCD output  112  of camera  102  is clocked directly into Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  as a stream (e.g., such that it can&#39;t typically be viewed as video data), which in one implementation immediately encrypts the stream of CCD output  112  using a pseudo-public key generated by Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key-Pair Generation Automation  114 . 
         [0010]    Continuing to refer to  FIG. 1 , illustrated is that Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key-Pair Generation Automation  114  creates pseudo-public-private key pairs. Shown is that Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key-Pair Generation Automation  114  delivers the pseudo-public key along with a Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator to Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  (as show herein Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator will ultimately be utilized to coordinate the pseudo-public and pseudo-private keys by two different and unique legal entities; that is, the unique designator will allow different entities, which are “blind” to the pairing of the pseudo-public and pseudo-private keys, to subsequently use the correct pseudo-private key to decrypt that which was encoded with the corresponding pseudo-public key). Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  is depicted as under the legal control and administration of Skynet Security Company. 
         [0011]      FIG. 1  shows that Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key-Pair Generation Automation  114  delivers the pseudo-private key along with a unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator which serves to identify the pseudo-public-private key pair of which the pseudo-private key forms a part to Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130 . 
         [0012]      FIG. 1  illustrates that while Cyberdine Protective Services has legal control and administration of both keys of the pair, as well as the Cyberdine-Generated Unique Key Pair Designator which serves to identify/coordinate the key pair, Cyberdine Protective Services does not have access to CCD output  112  of camera  102 .  FIG. 1  shows that when Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  encrypts CCD output  112  of camera  102  with the Cyberdine-Security-Services generated pseudo-public key, Skynet has no legal control, administration, or possession of the corresponding Cyberdine-Security-Services generated pseudo-private key which could be used to unlock the encryption of CCD output  112  of camera  102  that was/is instantiated by Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 . Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key-Pair Generation Automation  114  is depicted as under the legal control and administration of Cyberdine Protective Services Company which is separate and apart from Skynet Security Company. 
         [0013]      FIG. 1  illustrates that the system ensures that Skynet Security Company cannot see any image because it only holds the pseudo-public key of a pseudo-public-private key pair that has been generated by another legal entity, Cyberdine Protective Services Company. 
         [0014]      FIG. 1  shows that, in one implementation, Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 , after receipt of “Encrypted-Camera-ID” which is the string that is result of encrypting “Skynet Security Camera Alpha” plus a date and time window for which “Encrypted-Camera ID” is good (e.g., Jun. 16, 2014 from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) from Skynet Name Obscuring Unit  106 , encrypts CCD output  112  of camera  102  that occurred on Jun. 16, 2014 from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. via the pseudo-public key of the pseudo-public-private key pair generated by Cyberdine Protective Services Company. Thereafter, illustrated is that Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  associates the Level One encryption of CCD output  112  of camera  102  with meta-data composed of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator.”’ In the instance shown, the “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator”’ meta-data is kept outside the Level One encryption applied by Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 , but those skilled in the art will appreciate that in other implementations all or part of such meta-data may be emplaced inside the Level One encryption. 
         [0015]      FIG. 1  shows that, subsequently, Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  sends Level One encrypted CCD output  118 , and its associated meta-data of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator”’ to Skynet Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120 .  FIG. 1  depicts that upon receipt of Level One Encrypted CCD output  118 , Skynet Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120  encrypts the received Level One Encrypted CCD output  118  as well as its associated meta-data of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator”’ using a pseudo-public key of a pseudo-public-private key pair that has been generated by another legal entity, Heuristic-Algorithm Services, thus creating a Level Two encryption of Level One Encrypted CCD output  118 . With reference now back to CCD output  112  of camera  102  at this point  FIG. 1  shows that the Level Two encryption of Level One Encrypted CCD output  118  is a doubly-encrypted version of CCD output  112  of camera  102 . 
         [0016]      FIG. 1  illustrates that the system ensures that Skynet Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120  can only encrypt because it holds only the pseudo-public key of a pseudo-public-private key pair that has been generated by yet another legal entity, Heuristic-Algorithm Services.  FIG. 1  shows that Heuristic-Algorithm Services also generates a “Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator” that will subsequently be used to “pair” the correct pseudo-private key with the correct pseudo-public key by separate legal entities that are effectively “blind” to the pairing done by Heuristic-Algorithm Services. As shown herein, the pseudo-public-private key pairs and the Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator are generated by Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Generation Automation  127 , which is under the legal control and administration of Heuristic-Algorithm Services Company. 
         [0017]    Illustrated is that Skynet Security Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120  thereafter associates the meta-data of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator”’ with the Level Two Encrypted CCD output  121 . 
         [0018]    Thereafter, illustrated is that Skynet Security Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120  sends the Level Two encrypted CCD output  121 , having associated meta-data of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10 a.m.-11:00 a.m.” +“Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator”’ to PreCrime Repository  122 . 
         [0019]    Shown is that PreCrime Repository Double-Locked Box Storage Engine  124  receives the Level Two Encrypted CCD Output  121 , having associated meta-data of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator”’ which is then stored as a doubly-encrypted CCD output lockbox indexed by some or all of its meta-data (e.g., indexed by some or all of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator”’). In alternate implementations Level Two Encrypted CCD Output  121  is indexed by “Encrypted-Camera-ID” alone, while in other alternate implementations the Level Two encrypted data is indexed by “Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator” alone, but  FIG. 1  shows meta-data of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator”’ being used to index for sake of clarity. 
         [0020]    It is expected that, in a free society in most instances the doubly-encrypted version of CCD output  112  of camera  102  (e.g., Level Two Encryted CCD Output  121 ) will never be retrieved and decrypted. That said, it is expected that in some instances public safety might demand that the doubly-encrypted version of CCD output  112  of camera  102  be retrieved and decrypted. For sake of illustration, such an example will now be discussed. 
         [0021]    Referring now to the lower left corner of  FIG. 1 ,  FIG. 1  depicts, for sake of example, Judge Judy acting subsequent to the event of a crime (e.g., a terrorist attack) committed in the vicinity of Room  101  of the Cato Institute at some time between 10:00 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. on Jun. 16, 2014.  FIG. 1  illustrates the Department of Justice asking  160  Judge Judy to issue an order for the unlocking of the camera output from 10:00 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. on Jun. 16, 2014 that is associated with a view of Room  101  of the Cato Institute at the time in question. At this point, neither the Department of Justice nor Judge Judy has a name identifying the camera in question. In response,  FIG. 1  shows Judge Judy&#39;s machine  166  asking  162  the Department of Treasury Encrypted Camera ID+Camera Location Repository Circuitry  163  (Camera-to-Obscure Co and/or Skynet Security Company is shown as having delivered such information to Treasury at or around the time of such output&#39;s creation) for the “Encrypted-Camera-ID” that is associated with the camera that was viewing Room  101  of the Cato Institute on the date of Jun. 16, 2014, between the times of 10:00 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. 
         [0022]    In response,  FIG. 1  shows the Department of Treasury Encrypted Camera ID+Camera Location Repository Circuitry  163  transmitting  164  to Judge Judy&#39;s machine  166  the “Encrypted-Camera-ID” that is associated with the camera at Room  101  of the Cato Institute for the date of Jun. 16, 2014, between the times of 10:00 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. (e.g. the output of camera  102  from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. that the system stored).  FIG. 1  depicts that Skynet Name Obscuring Unit  106  is shown as having transmitted to Department of Treasury Encrypted Camera ID+Camera Location Repository Circuitry  163  the “Encrypted-Camera-ID” that is associated with the camera having geographic location of Room  101  of the Cato Institute for the date of Jun. 16, 2014, and between the times of 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. at or around the time “Encrypted Camera ID” was created. That is, at some point prior to Judge Judy&#39;s machine  166  making the request. 
         [0023]      FIG. 1  depicts that, subsequent to receiving “Encrypted-Camera-ID” that is associated with the camera that was surveilling Room  101  of the Cato Institute on the date of Jun. 16, 2014, and between the times of 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. (the encrypted envelope that holds the time of interest of 10:00 a.m. to 10:45 a.m.), Judge Judy&#39;s machine  166  transmits to Department of Justice Machine  168  an order directing that the output of “Encrypted-Camera-ID” associated with the camera at Room  101  of the Cato Institute for the date of Jun. 16, 2014, between the times of 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. be unlocked.  FIG. 1  illustrates that Department of Justice Machine  168  transmits messages to Homeland Security Doubly-Encrypted Lockbox Retrieval Circuitry  180 , Homeland Security Level Two DEcryption Circuitry  128 , and FBI Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130  directing the retrieval and/or unlocking of the doubly-encrypted lockbox associated with “Encrypted-Camera-ID” for the date of Jun. 16, 2014, between the times of 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. 
         [0024]    Referring now to the approximate middle-right portion of  FIG. 1 ,  FIG. 1  illustrates that, in response to Judge Judy&#39;s order the content of which was relayed through the message of Department of Justice Machine  168 , Homeland Security Doubly-Encrypted Lockbox Retrieval Circuitry  180  asks PreCrime Repository Circuitry  122  for the files indexed by “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”; “Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”’ More specifically,  FIG. 1  shows that Homeland Security Doubly-Encrypted Lockbox Retrieval Circuitry  180  transmits a request for the double-encrypted lockbox files having index of “Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”&#39; to PreCrime Repository Doubly-Encrypted CCD Output Retriever Engine  126 . 
         [0025]      FIG. 1  depicts PreCrime Repository Doubly-Encrypted CCD Output Retriever Engine  126  pulling the doubly-encrypted files indexed by ‘“Encrypted-Camera-ID”+Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.+“Unique Heuristic-Algorithm Services Key Pair Designator”’ from within PreCrime Repository  122 .  FIG. 1  illustrates that thereafter PreCrime Repository Doubly-Encrypted CCD Output Retriever Engine  126  sends Level Two Encrypted CCD output  121  along with the associated meta-data of “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Heuristic-Algorithm Services Key Pair Designator”’ to Homeland Security Level Two DEcryption Circuitry  128 , which, in view of Judge Judy&#39;s order, upon receipt decrypts the received Level Two Encrypted CCD output  121  with the correct pseudo-private key generated by Heuristic Algorithm Services. In one implementation, Homeland Security Level Two DEcryption Circuitry  128  is able to retrieve the correct pseudo-private key to do the decryption via use of Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator which was previously delivered—by Heuristic-Algorithm Services Key-Pair Generation Automation  127 —to Homeland Security Level Two DEcryption 
         [0026]    Circuitry  128  in association with the pseudo-private key that unlocks the corresponding pseudo-public key that was previously used by Skynet Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120  to encrypt as described herein. Thus, in one implementation Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator is used to retrieve the correct decryption key, even though the decryptor never had possession/control of the Heuristic-Algorithm pseudo-public key that was used to encrypt. 
         [0027]      FIG. 1  shows that Homeland Security Level Two DEcryption Circuitry  128  uses the pseudo-private encryption key of Heuristic-Algorithm Services that is identified by Unique Heuristic-Algorithm-Services Key Pair Designator—which accompanies the doubly encrypted lockbox as meta-data—to undo the Level Two encryption that was previously instantiated by Skynet Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120 . Depicted is that in one implementation the decryption yields the Level-Two Decrypted-Level One Encrypted CCD output data  129  (e.g., the Level Two Decryption applied by Skynet Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120  has been unlocked but the data is still encrypted via the Level One encryption previously applied by Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 ) and further depicted is that the decryption done by Homeland Security Level Two Decryption Circuitry  128 —accomplished via retrieval of the correct key identified by the Unique Heuristic-Algorithm Services Key Pair Identifier—also provides as output the successful decryption of the Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator (which as shown herein had previously been encrypted by Skynet Level Two Encryption Circuitry  120 ).  FIG. 1  depicts that thereafter Homeland Security Level Two DEcryption Circuitry  128  associates as meta-data ‘“Encrypted-Camera-ID?+Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator”’ with the Level-Two Decrypted-Level One Encrypted CCD output data  129  (which is still encrypted via the level one encryption previously applied by Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 ).  FIG. 1  illustrates that Homeland Security Level Two DEcryption Circuitry  128  thereafter sends the meta-data “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time: 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator”’ in association with the with the Level Two Decrypted-Level One Encrypted CCD output data  129  (which is still encrypted via the level one encryption previously applied by Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 ) to FBI Level One Decryption Circuitry  130 . 
         [0028]      FIG. 1  shows that, FBI Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130  receives the meta-data “‘Encrypted-Camera-ID”+“Date: Jun. 16, 2014; Time 10:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m.”+“Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator”’ in association with the Level-Two Decrypted-Level One Encrypted CCD output data  129  (which is still encrypted via the level one encryption previously applied by Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110 ).  FIG. 1  depicts that FBI Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130  determines that Judge Judy&#39;s order, as related through the message of Department of Justice Machine  168 , indicates that the data associated with “Encrypted-Camera-ID” is to be unlocked. Accordingly,  FIG. 1  illustrates that FBI Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130  uses the received Unique Cyberdine-Protective-Services Key Pair Designator to retrieve the correct Cyberdine-Protective-Services pseudo-private key that corresponds to the Cyberdine-Protective-Services pseudo-public key that Skynet Level One Encryption Circuitry  110  used to encrypt CCD Output  112 .  FIG. 1  shows that FBI Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130  uses the retrieved Cyberdine-Protective-Services pseudo-private key to unlock the Level One encryption. Thus,  FIG. 1  shows FBI Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130  outputting doubly-decrypted CCD output  132  (e.g., the in-the-clear stream of CCD output  112  of camera  102 ). 
         [0029]      FIG. 1  depicts that Stream-to Viewable-CCD Output Conversion Circuitry  134  converts the stream to viewable CCD output (e.g., still or motion image frames) which is securely displayed in Judge Judy&#39;s chambers. Depicted is that for an additional level of citizen&#39;s right&#39;s protection, “Encrypted-Camera-ID” is sent by FBI Level One DEcryption Circuitry  130  to FBI Name DE-Obscuring Circuitry  136  which then, using a pseudo-private key of a pseudo-public-private key pair generated by software created by Camera-to-Obscure Co., decrypts “Encrypted-Camera-ID” to “Skynet Security Camera Alpha” which is then used by Stream-to Viewable-CCD Output Conversion Circuitry  134  to associate the name of the camera with the viewable CCD output. 
         [0030]      FIG. 1  illustrates Judge Judy in her Chambers viewing the output of “Skynet Security Camera Alpha” Video of 10:00 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. that was captured on Jun. 16, 2014. Depicted is that Judge Judy determines that atypical person  100  has done nothing wrong, and concludes that the Department of Justice need not see the output. Thus,  FIG. 1  shows Judge Judy denying the Department of Justice&#39;s request to see the output of the camera viewing Room  101  of the Cato Institute for the date of Jun. 16, 2014 and time from 10:00 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. 
         [0031]    Thus as shown herein, atypical citizen  100 &#39;s rights to privacy, as well as the public&#39;s right to safety, are thus protected and/or balanced by the disclosed technologies. 
         [0032]    While various aspects and embodiments have been disclosed herein, other aspects and embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art. The various aspects and embodiments disclosed herein are for purposes of illustration and are not intended to be limiting, with the true scope and spirit being indicated by the following claims.