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[ { "from": "human", "value": "And now, boy, you may take the roll and read. EUCLID'S SERVANT READS." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth, and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if you have met with any one who is good for anything." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships without ballast, and go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, prove stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, flowing on silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "That is good news; whose son is he?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions have been anointing themselves in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a considerable fortune." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "We should ask." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "True." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Certainly we should." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And is Theodorus a painter?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I never heard that he was." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Is he a geometrician?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Of course he is, Socrates." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think so." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I should say not." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Very true, Socrates." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been praising you." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do, he will have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I suppose I must, if you wish it." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And astronomy and harmony and calculation?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I do my best." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Of course." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And by wisdom the wise are wise?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And is that different in any way from knowledge?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "What?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Certainly they are." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases...Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "We will, if we can." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus—geometry, and those which you just now mentioned—are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and all of, them, are knowledge." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "What do you mean, Socrates?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Just so." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I do." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "True." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Perfectly right." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing—for example, What is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Truly." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "He cannot." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "None." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Nor of any other science?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "No." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.'" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "True." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth—what sort of clay is not to the point." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question. You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "What was that, Theaetetus?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "he selected other examples up to seventeen—there he stopped. Now as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And did you find such a class?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Let me hear." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we compared to square figures and called square or equilateral numbers;—that was one class." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Very good." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;—all these we compared to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Capital; and what followed?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the former [i.e., with the so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the value of the superficial content of their squares; and the same about solids." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a deceiver after all." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Well, but if some one were to praise you for running, and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner—would the praise be any the less true?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Certainly not." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection!" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, I have." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And that I myself practise midwifery?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "No, never." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and drive men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that too?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Shall I tell you the reason?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "By all means." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives, and then you" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, I know." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is not a mother, and she honours those who are like herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I dare say." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Very true." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing, and if they think fit they can smother the embryo in the womb." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "They can." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers, and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "No, never." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, the same art." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I should think not." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Certainly not; but midwives are respectable women who have a character to lose, and they avoid this department of their profession, because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Clearly." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think so?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Indeed I should." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours," } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "O yes, again and again." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, he says so." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Quite true." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I suppose the last." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then it must appear so to each of them?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "True." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Clearly." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth,' (In allusion to a book of Protagoras' which bore this title.) in secret to his own disciples." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "What do you mean, Socrates?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of 'Ocean whence sprang the gods, and mother Tethys,' does he not mean that all things are the offspring, of flux and motion?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think so." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous? (Compare Cratylus.)" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Who indeed, Socrates?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and inactivity of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things, are born of movement and of friction, which is a kind of motion;—is not this the origin of fire?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It is." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And the race of animals is generated in the same way?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Certainly." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "True." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul only means want of attention and study, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "True." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Clearly." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I may add, that breathless calm, stillness and the like waste and impair, while wind and storm preserve; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go round in their orbits, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if they were chained up and their motions ceased, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then now apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, and first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them. And you must" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Then what is colour?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Let us carry the principle which has just been affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that white, black, and every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we call a colour is in each case neither the active nor the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you quite certain that the several colours appear to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Far from it." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "The latter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed; nor again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. The fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "How? and of what sort do you mean?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are six dice, which are more by a half when compared with four, and fewer by a half than twelve—they are more and also fewer. How can you or any one maintain the contrary?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Very true." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I should say 'No,' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Capital! excellent! spoken like an oracle, my boy! And if you reply 'Yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind. (In allusion to the well-known line of" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Very true." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this, and would have knocked their arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles,—whether they are consistent with each or not." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, that would be my desire." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is plenty of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are? If" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Quite true." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Thirdly, that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without becoming and having become." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, truly." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as this—if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and taller than you, may within a year, without gaining or losing in height, be not so tall—not that I should have lost, but that you would have increased. In such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I have not become; for I could not have become without becoming, neither could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you follow me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by the Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Not as yet." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden 'truth' of a famous man or school." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "To be sure, I shall be very much obliged." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have real existence." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable mortals." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their first principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Indeed I do not." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then attend, and I will try to finish the story. The purport is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion is of two kinds, a slower and a quicker; and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and with reference to things near them, and so they beget; but what is begotten is swifter, for it is carried to" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know, anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am the barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Ask me." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Then once more: Is it your opinion that nothing is but what becomes?—the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were just now mentioning?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; for there still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of hearing and sight, or of other senses. For you know that in all these cases the esse-percipi theory appears to be unmistakably refuted, since in dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far from saying that everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing is which appears." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Very true, Socrates." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse; but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly, when they imagine, some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, and are flying in their sleep." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking?" } ]