質問: クリプケの厳格な指名と科学的リアリズムとの関係は何ですか? 講演者は、科学の哲学に関する講義で、実体主義者の反現実主義とクーンの相対主義とは対照的に、アイデンティティの必要性と剛性指名者のクリプキの理論が「科学的リアリズムへの道を提供する」と述べた。典型的な「朝の星と夜の星の両方が金星です」と「水== H2O」の例がアイデンティティの必要性を説明するために与えられ、議論は真実主義とクリプケの結果はつながっている。 だから、クリプケのアイデアから科学的なリアリズムへの飛躍をどのようにしていますか?
回答: それはある意味では意味をなさない。クリフケの論文は、適切な名前はエッセンスを持っているということです。パトナムは、この論文を、文化的偏見、実用的ニーズなどに基づいてではなく、プラトンのメタファーで「継ぎ目で自然を彫刻する」という必須の性質を持つオブジェクトの「自然な種類」に拡張しました。 「人工種」である。 This provides a semantic framework for a realist ontology, as opposed to semantic theories of Quine and Wittgenstein that reduce meaning to use in a language game, which requires no realist referents, or deny such referents to "natural kinds", which only acquire meaning as placeholders in a theoretical "web of belief". E.g. gold, water, etc., only mean in the context of chemistry, which relates to experience only as a whole, and reflects pragmatic human considerations as much as nature. Of course, if "natural kinds" do "carve nature at the joints" then there is something "in nature" corresponding to them, even if we do not yet discern it fully and precisely. This provides a framework where Kripke-Putnam reference is preserved across scientific revolutions despite Kuhn's "incommensurable paradigms", this promise of continuity is what attracted Putnam in 1970s, when he was still a realist, and others. Rigid designation is tangential to this, it enters only in that if we believe in nature given "essential properties" then it makes sense to keep them fixed across possible worlds when analyzing "physical" counterfactuals. Norris's Realism, Reference, & Possible Worlds makes the case for essentialism as an aid to realism along the lines of Putnam of 1970s and the OP quoted lecture. しかし、クリプキの本質主義は「科学的リアリズムへの道」ではなく、馬の前にカートを置くことになる。 科学的本質主義のような科学的リアリズムを*前提条件*それ自身では、形而上学ではなく、話し手の「言語的直観」(同様に厳格な指定が「モーダル直感」を説明すると主張する)に基づく言語の使用を記述することを主張する意味理論である。皮肉なことに、Kripke自身はWittgensteinの一部であり、Putnamは明らかにQuinean pseudo-varietyの非常に弱い「内部のリアリズム」を破棄した。 That folk intuitions are faithful to "reality" is also highly doubtful, or as Cummins put it "*there is no more reason to think that innate philosophy is a good basis for philosophy than that innate physics is a good basis for physics*". Cummins's Reflections on Relective Equilibrium is a sharp critique of Kripke-Putnam's approach in general:"*It is commonplace for researchers in the Theory of Content to proceed as if the relevant intuitions were undisputed. Nor is the reason for this practice far to seek. The Putnamian take on these cases is widely enough shared to allow for a range of thriving intramural sports among believers. Those who do not share the intuition are simply not invited to the games*". Recently even semantic adequacy of Kripke-Putnam's theory of natural kinds has come under fire, see Ben-Yami's Natural Kind Terms.