Date: 1981-07-17
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. during the political campaign last fall. President Reagan rejected the SALT II treaty as being too disadvantageous to the United States. However.~ the President promised the American people that if he were elected he would begin immediate preparations for a new round of strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets. During confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month. Eugene Rostow. the new Director of th Arms control and Disarmament Agency. testified that negotiations with the Soviets were a good 9 months away. Thus. we cannot expect any movement on this issue at least until March 1982. Mr. .Rostow even went so far as to say that the administration really did not know what it wanted to negotiate with the Soviets. This is the same administration which promised the American people it would hit the ground running when it came to formulating and implementing foreign policy. This Is the President who promised during the campaign to begin immediate preparations for a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. As the BaltimQre Sun pointed out in a recent editorial: It (the Administration) doesnt know. by Mr. Rostows admission. If It wants a SALT 11 or a SALT III. If it seeks an indefinite treaty or one with a time limit. If It hopes to control the numbers of launchers or the missiles they carry. If It would like to limit or actually -reduce nuclear arsenals. These are technical questions Mr. Rostow supposedly examined with great care when his Committee on the Present Danger was finding the Carter administrations SALT IT Treaty "seriously flawed." On July 14. Secretary of State Alexander Haig. In a speech In New York. outlined the administrations arms control policy. The speech raised more questions than it answered. Outside of a reaffirmation of an earlier commitment to our allies that negotiations would begin with the Soviets on theater nuclear forces in Europe. the policy is marked by some Inconsistencies. First. the Secretary noted that: The supreme interest of the United States has been to avoid the extremes -of either nuclear catastrophe or nuclear blackmail. Nobody can argue with what has been a basic tenet of U.S. foreign policy In the postWorld War II era. The Secretary then noted that: Arms control can be only one element In a comprehensive structure of defense and foreign policy designed to reduce the risk of war. It cannot be the political centerpiece or the crucial barometer of U.S.-Soviet relations. burdening arms control with a crushIng political weight. It can hardly address such Issues as the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. the IranIraq war. the Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia. the Libyan Invasion of Chad. or Cuban interevntion In Africa and Latin America. Instead. arms control should be one element In a full range of political. economic and military efforts to promote peace and security. No one would argue that arms control cannot be the political centerpiece or the crucial barometer of United StatesSoviet relations. Yet. further on in his speech. the Secretary contradicts this observation when he addresses the Issue of linkage. He stated: Soviet international conduct directly affects the prospects for success in arms control. Recognition of this reality is essential for a healthy arms control process In the long run. Such "linkage" Is not a creation of U.S. policy: It is a fact of life. A policy of pretending that there is no linkage promotes reverse linkage. It ends up by saying that In order to preserve arms control. we have to tolerate aggression. This Administration will never accept such an appalling conclusion. First of all. with this observation the Secretary sets up a straw man. one of many which can be found throughout his speech. I cannot think of any responsible person in this country who believes. or who has stated. that We should tolerate Soviet aggression. Further. I find this statement rather apPalling since it comes from an administration which lifted the grain embargo against the Soviet Uniona grain embargo which was Imposed by President Carter following the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Secretary Haig points to Sovietsponsorecl terrorism. and to Soviet InvolveMenit In Central America. Africa. and Cambodia as reasons for linking strategic arms negotiations to Soviet behavior. Yet. the administration Is willIng to reward Soviet aggression by help*Ing to feed the Russian People. and most. probably Russian troops occupying Afghanistan. Thus. I am somewhat perplexed by the inconsistencies in this administrations policies toward the Soviet Union. Does it believe In linkage or