Date: 1983-10-06
Speaker: JOHN MCCAIN (republican)
Chamber: S

and JOHN PORTER. sponsored a build down measure in the House of Representatives which. in the course of a few days. received significant support In that body. As the debate over the MX missile system heightened. the build down became part of a broader approach to weapons modernization and arms control. In the House of Representatives. Members such as Congressmen ALBERT GORE. Las AsPIN. and NORM DicKSs continued to offer fresh and innovative ideas on force planning and arms control. In the wake of pressure from both congressional bodies and from Members on both sides of the aisle. the administration undertook to modify its START position. develop a build down proposal. move forward on a small. single warhead ICBM. and create a durable. bipartisan arms control panel. During the summer. numerous meetings were held with administration officials to develop a meaningful build down proposal. This was a difficult process which. frankly. became mired at times in bureaucratic quicksand. Last month. Senator NUNN. Senator PERCY. and I decided to make a final attempt at invigorating the process. We chose the medium of the Scowcroft Commission. which has been so helpful last spring In moving the -administration toward a useful melding of arms control and weapons modernization. In a letter to General Scowcroft. we suggested a broad approach which incorporated th *e thinking and ideas of a number of Congressmen and Senators. military specialists. and the stated concerns of administration officials. We noted that: If the Reagan Administration and the Congress can agree on a sensible strategic prog~ram and on a coordinated. reasonable approach towards arms control. we will demonstrate that we have the political cohesion and the longterm bipartisan commitment needed to maintain our strength and reduce the risk of nuclear war. We outlined our approach In seven principles which offered the nearterm benefits of the build down conceptimmediate reductions as the price for modernizationand a longer term approach to resolving the major differences between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms control. We recognized that to be negotiable. any proposal to the Soviets would have to offer meaningful restraints on strategic bombers. an area in which the two countries are likely to modernize significantly in the next decade. To deal with bomber forces equitably and effectively will require Important negotiating breakthroughs. Trhe missile throw weight qtestion has been a major stumbling block In START. By proposing meaningful limits in the area where the United States enjoys a substantial and increasing advantagethe bomber forcewe believed that the United States could extract reductions In the area where the Soviets hold a substantial leadmissile throw weight. Senator NUNN. Senator PERCY. and I felt that the approach we suggested reflected. in addition to our own thinking. the Ideas and views of congressional colleagues who we believed were on parallel tracks in their dealings with the administration. To merge these tracks. we held a series of meetings with Congressmen GORE. AsPiN. and Dicits. What emerged was a unified approach which we felt could lead to a broad congressional consensus behind an arms control package the President could send to Geneva for negotiation in START. This type of support. we believed. would significantly strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. negotiators by making clear to the Soviet Union that the U.S. proposal had strong. broad support in the U.S. Congress. Our group of six developed a set of principles which were specific enough to clearly reflect the thrust of the groups thinking. but general enough to allow flexibility in implementing the approach in negotiations with the Soviet Union. We met with General Scowcroft and. subsequently. with Judge Clark to present these idas. In a series of intensive meetings over the past week. the details were worked out and presented to President -Reagan. who endorsed the principles advanced by the group of six. During this process. General Scowcroft proved again why he Is. in my view. a national asset. He listened carefully to all views and stepped in at critical moments to bridge differences and keep the process moving forward. Ultimately. it was .President Reagans personal Involvement which insured the siccess of the endeavor. He made clear. over the objections of many within the administration. that he supported the approach. and he met personally with our congressional group to Insure that agreement was reached. His actions demonstrated his sincere commitment to promoting stability through reasonable and meaningful arms control measures. He recognizes that this requires flexibility by both sides and. In his Rose Garden statement to the departing START delegation. explicitly offered to meet Soviet concerns: We seek limits on the destructive capability of missiles and recognize that the Soviet Union would seek limits on bombers in exchange. There will have to be tradeof fs and the United States is prepared to make them. so long as they result in a more stable balance of forces. This Is a significant and. In my view. courageous step. and I sincerely hope the Soviet Union will realize that. as President Reagan said. "The door to an agreement is open." Mr. President. in these troubled times I am reluctant to take an optimistic stance on the prospects for achieving an arms control breakthrough with the Sovirt Union. I must say. however. that the proposal Ambassador Rowny Is carrying with him to Geneva contains the basis for real progress. I -look now to the Soviet Union to study the proposal carefully. recognize the flexibility it displays. and negotiate toward an agreement which will significantly reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust. The U.S. Government has shown in these proposals its willingness to look beyond the immediate tensions in SovietAmerican relations and to focus on the longterm interests of both sides In a durable arms control regime. I hope that the Soviet government. likewvise. will rise above the frictions of the day and receive these fresh initiatives with a similar recognition that they open the way to an equitable agreement serving the security interests of both our peoples. Mr. President. I ask that the text of President Reagans Rose Garden statement and a factsheet released by the administration be printed In the RECORD.