Date: 1981-02-03
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. In the past several days President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig have engaged in some tough talk with regard to the Soviet Union. They are on the right track. and I applaud their efforts. Let us make certain that this tough talk is backed up by our actions. On February 2. Secretary of Agriculture John Block repeated his opposition to the grain embargo imposed on the Soviet Union by the United States. and indicated that he will recommend to the President that the embargo be lifted. I understand that a special meeting of the Cabinet has been schedulad to consider this question. I have writt..n a letter to the President reiterating my strong support of the embargo. and conveying to him my aerious reservations about any proposed termination of it. Our Goverrnent must clearly show that the United States has the will. and the firmness of purpose. to deal eff ectively with complex international problems. In this light. it is Imperative that the grain embargo be maintained. President Carter imposed the grain embargo by Executive orders which became effect~ve on January 7. 1980. and were subsequently renewed by him 1 year later. The facts that led President Carter to Impose tl1w. embargo are well known. In late December 1079. the Soviet Union Invaded the Independent nation of Afghanistan. This was the first time since the end of the Second World War that the Soviet Union had directly Invaded a preiously Independent and unoccupied nation. Such unabashed aggression is by its nature antithetical to the principles of all free nations. The Soviet action has had a direct effect on the strategic balance of South Asia and the Near East. Pakistan. a pivotal nation. is threatened by the Soviet military action. By enterIng Afghanistan. the Soviet Union has put its aircraft within striking range of the vital oil facilities and resources of the Persian Gulf. This Is a grave development for the United Stutes. which depehds on the uninterrupted flow of oil from the gulf region for onequarter of Its supplies. our European and Japanese allies are even more dependent on the Persian Gulf region for their oil supplies. None of these facts has changed since the imposition of the embargo In 1980. The people of Afghanistan remain under the military subjugation of the Soviet Union. The grain embargo remains. An appropriate response to Soviet aggression. The purpose of the embargo should be clarified. and that is. to levy a cost on the Soviet Union for aggressive behavior. The embargo was imposed because "business as usual" with the Soviets could not be condoned in light of the invasion of Afghanistan. The embargo should not be seen as ineffective If it falls to force the Soviet Union to end its adventure In Lfghanistan. Rather. the effect of the embargo should be measured Rgainst more realistic goals: Those of forcing the Soviet Union to recognize the seriousness of Its actions in the eyes of the world. and hindering the Soviets pursuit of a variety of economic and political gains. In this context. the embargo. has been quite effective. The evidence shows unmistakably that serious costs have been incurred by the Soviet Union as a result of the embargo. The Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated that the Soviets have expended more than $1 billion over normal levels f or grain from suppliers other than the United States since the embargo began. In short. the Soviets are using their scarce foreign exchange to pay gouging prices for poorer quality grain. These high prices have been paid out of desperation for any additional source of supply. Despite vigorous Soviet efforts to make up the shortfall caused by the sales suspension of 17 million tons of Americani grain. they have been unable to do so. Soviet President Brezhnev himself admitted this fact in a speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in October. 1980. Brezhnev reviewed the shaky state of Soviet agriculture. and implied that the situation would worsen. He was correct. for the 1980 Soviet grain harvest is estimated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture at 185 million tons50 million tons under the planned level of 235 million tons. and about 10 million tons under the current projection of actual Soviet needs for this year. As a result. the reserves of grain in the Soviet Union have been reduced to levels that are vulnerable even to moderate supply disruptions. The levterage of the embargo Increases under these circumstances. Me average Soviet citizen knows full well the effect of the embargo. and did not need a warning from President Brezhnev that bad times may be ahead. Bad times are already present for Soviet consumers. The rations of meat in the Soviet Union are averaging 20- to 25percent lower than in other Warsaw Pact nations. including Poland. That fact is not lost on the Soviet leadership. nor on the people of the Soviet Union. At present. it is these incremental pressures and pains that are the true value of the embargo. In the longer run. Its value can be seen clearly as a bargaining chip. It cannot be a pleasant prospect for the Soviet leadership to contemplate a substantial reduction in their national standard of living in 1981 because of the weather. A poor harvest this year could drive their reserves down to crisis levels. A domestic problem of this magnitude may bring about restraint against foreign adventures. This is the cutting edge of the embargo. The 5year grain agreement between this country and the Soviet Union expires on September 30. 1981. The United States is fulfilling its obligations under international law by providing the base level of 8 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union. The Soviets have moved as rapIdly as they can to purchase and transport this amount to the Soviet Union. Since October. when the fifth year of the agreement began. the Soviets have importod 3.8 million tons of grain from the United States. and intend to import another 2.8 million tons by the end of February. Before 8 months of the fifth agreement year have elapsed. the Soviet Union will have lifted almiost its entire allotment from this country. Moreover. the Sovitts should understand that their aggression could adversely affect any future discussion of a longterm grain agreement. The effect of the grain embargo on our own farmers has been nifimal and transitory. Farm exports exceeded $40 billion in 1980. an alltime record. The Commodity Credit Corporation acted swiftly last year to purchase contracts for grain originally destined for the Soviet Union. As a result. grain prices arc currently at higher levels than before the embargo was Imposed. The gradual Introduction of the commodities Intended for the Soviet Union has preserved the price of grain. World grain supplies are expected to be relatively low this yeur. If the embargo is suddenly lifted. Inflationary Increases in grain prices are likely to occur. A general rise in the cost of all food to the American consumer would follow. as occurred late in 1973 and 1974. In that instance. massive sales of grain to the Soviet Union depleted American stockpiles to low levels. Removing the embargo could similarly trigger an inflationary wave. I hope that President Reagan will consider these factors in his deliberations on the status of the grain embargo. In seekIng to discourage and condemn reprehensible actions by the Soviet Union. the embargo promotes the vital Interests of the United States.