Date: 1981-11-12
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. my amendment requires that a comprehensive trade ban be imposed on the Soviet Union if that country. or its allies. takes direct military action against Poland. We live in a period of history in which terrorist attacks are nearly commonPlace. undeclared wars flare up and fester all over the globe. and some nations engage in brutal aggression at Will. with little fear of retribution. Afghanistan Was one cledr example of blatant and brutal aggression. Poland must not be another. My amendment is clearly In line with administration policy as articulated by Secretary of State Alexander Haig In the aftermath of the administrations decision to lift the grain embargo imposed by President Carter following the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. In a story appearing in the Washington Post on April 25. the Secretary stated that the administration would impose not only a new grain embargo. but an acrosstheboard ban on trade with the Soviets. should they invade Poland. So my amendment makes automatic such an embargo if the Soviets or their allies should invade Poland. I also recognize that the President requires flexibility in making foreign policy determinations of this importance. Therefore. I have so structured 4my amendment to insure that Presidential flexibility is maintained. A trade ban will not be implemented if. within 30 days after an Invasioni of Poland. the President certifies to Congress that such a suspension of trade would not be In the national security or foreign policy Interests of the United States. Why do I offer this amendment? I think it is imperative that we send a strong signal to friend and foe alike that Congress stands behind the admninistrations publicly stated policy regarding Poland. I think it strengthens the Presidents hand If Congress sends this signal abroad. During his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Haig stated that the basic ingredients of a successful foreign policy include consistency. reliability. and balance. With respect to consistency. the Secretary stated: Ani effective policy cannot be created. anew daily. Informed solely by Immediate need. To do so risks misperception by our adversaries. loss of confidence by our aline.. and 6onf usion among our own people. I could not agree more with the Secretarys criteria for the conduct of our foreign policy. That is why I expressed coniTE .November 172. 1981 cern onl Tuesday of this week when I introduced my amendment that our policy wvith respect to the Soviet Union has been marked by inconsistency. I cited the following: The lifting of the grain embargo imposed by President Carter following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Sovlets are still in Afghanistan. The announcement that While we would provide grain to the Soviet Union we would not provide butter. We turned around and made a major butter sale to New Zealand which. in turn. can sell the butter to a third country which would not be precluded from selling it to the Soviet Union. The new grain agreemuent with the Soviet Union. which will allowv them to purchase 23 million tons of grain during the sixth year of the longterm grain agreement which we have with them. I also cited the warnings we have Issued our European allies that purchases of Soviet natural gas could allow the Soviet Union to exercise an unhealthy influence over Western economies. I think this latter Issue deserves greater attention. and I urge my colleagues to read an Item from the November 9 New York Times entitled: "EuropeUnited States Energy Rift." Written by Clyde Farnsworth. the article noted: The United States is getting a polite rebuff from western Europe onl the energy alternative. it is offering In last ditch efforts to dissuacie the Europeans from Increasing their rieliance onl Soviet natural gas. However. Mr. Frnsworth pointed out the inconsistency of our warnings to the Europeans when hie notedi Even while the United States has lobbied hard against the project. the Commerce Department has quietly issued export licenses to the Caternillunr Tractor Company for pipelaying equipment the Russians need to build the line. The Japanese would have gotten the business. had Caterpillars bid been turned down. I might point out that the Caterpillar deal was finalized after we had pressured the Japanese to refrain from selling the pipelayers to the Soviets for the same gas project. Our concern for European reliance on Soviet natural gas has a hollow ring to it. One of the justifications for raising the grain embargo on the Soviet Union was that it was hurting our farmers more than It was hurting the Soviets. It Is estimated that the Soviet Union ill be facing a 40millionton. shortfall In grain production this year. And the future looks equally bleak for the rest of Soviet agriculture. On the one hand. we worry about the Europeans becoming overly reliant upon the Soviet Union for natural gas supplies. Yet. on the other band. are American farmers becoming overly reliant upon the Soviet market for grain exports? The Europeans certainly see this dichotomy in very clear terms. Mr. President. In sum. I believe my amendment to be consistent with a firm and commonsense policy. It maintains Presidential flexibility. It sends the appropriate signal that Congress will support the administrations pledge for a total trade ban if Poland Is invaded. And this congressional signal will demonstrate that. on this issue. friend and foe alike can expect consistency and reliability in this aspect of our foreign policy. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following material: A letter dated November 12. 1981. addressed by me to the President. an article from the Washington Post of April 27. 1981. entitled "No Quid Pro Quo Given M.S. for End of Grain Embargo". an article entitled "For a Bushel of Grain." published in the Economist of May 2. 1981. and an articl3 entitled "Reagan in Wonderland." published in the National Journal of May 9.