Date: 1982-03-11
Speaker: CHALMERS ROBERTS (republican)
Chamber: S

Editorial Depariment. The Washington Post. Washington. D.C. DEAR CHALMERS: Your January 12 column. which I have just read with great Interest and ppproval in general. prompts this comment on one particular. The matter in mind concerns Nitzes -and Bohlens respective views about the Soviet Union. Your colunm alleges a basic difference between them and seeks to demonstrate It by selective citations. I think otherwise and rely both on citations and recollections. My acquaintance with both began soon after my becoming staff consultant to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1947. I heard them from time to time in executive sessions during the next three years. and occasionally conversed with them. I entered the State Department as a member of the Policy Planning Staffof which Nitze was then Directoron June 1. 1950. Thenceforth Nitze and I have been in many collaborations. I suppose we know each others ideas about as thoroughly as any two persons anywhere. Bohlen was called from duties as Minister at Paris for a months consultation in the Department soon after the outbreak of war in Korea. I was a participant in many interchanges involving Nitze and him during that month. Bohlen returned to State in early 1951 to become counselor and the Departments representative on the NSC senior staff. I was involved in many dozens of interchanges with him in the next two years. I saw him only oocasionallyprobably no more than ten times in allfollowing his departure for Moscow as Ambassador in the spring of 1953. I was given the then classified file on NSC/68 to study on my first day on the Policy Planning Staff and noted especially its words on "the fundamental design of the Kremlin." I quote them.as published in ". eign Relations." 1950. Vol. I. p. 238: ie fundamental design of those who controi the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power. first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders. however. achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority. The design. therefore. calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of governmentand structure of society in the countries of the nonSoviet world and their replacement by an apparatus pnd structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlli. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass.-The United States. as the principal center of power in the nonSoviet world and the bulwark of opposiLion to Soviet expansion. is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin .3 to achieve its fundamental design. I read at the same time a parcel of commentaries on NSC/88amokg them notably Bohlens memorandum of April 25. 1950. and especially his remarks on the portion above quoted. I quote those remarks as published in the same volume of "Foreign Relatives." p. 222. It is open to -uestion whether or not. as stated. the fudrJamental design of the Kremlin Is the domination of the world. If by this is meant this is the chief purpose and. as it were. the raison d etre of the Kremlin. thil carriers the implication that all other considerations are subordinate to this major purpose and that great risks would be run for the sake of its achievement. It tends. therefore. to oversimplify the problem and. in my opinion. leads inevitably to the conclusion that war is inevitable. which then renders the statement of our objectives. Le.. the frustration of the Soviet design by peaceful means and the possibility of bringing about thereby a reorlontation of Soviet policy to an extent which would permit the peaceful coexistence of the two systems [sic]. I think that the thought would be more accurate if it were to the effect that the fundamental design of those who contru. the U.S.S.R. Is (a) the maintenance of their regime in the Soviet Union. and (b) Its extension throughout the world to the degree that is possible without serious risk to the internal regime. I do not wish to belabor tsic] this point since it is obviously better to oversimplify in the direction of greater urgency and danger than it is to oversimplify [on] the side of complacency when dealing with Soviet intentions. It seemed to ine then that Bohlen had read into the document things that were not in it and that the language he thought would be "more accurate" was for all practical purposes equivalent to the language he was criticizing. I sought elucidation tin the point of difference from my new colleagues and was told that they were as mystified as I was. One of them conjectured that Behlen had commented on the basis of assumption and without actually having read the draft. I dismissed the conjecture as preposterous at the moment. Bohlens memoir-"Witness to History." published 23 years latersays. however. on page 290 in reference to NSC/ 68: ". . .. I did not study the paper until I returned in 1951." It appears that my skeptical colleague had a point. The question of there being a basic difference between Bohlens approach and the one relfected in NSC/68. in whioh Nitze had had the preeminent role. bobbed up several times in interchanges during Bohlens soJourn in Washington following the outbreak of war in Korea. The notion surfaced also during his two years as counselor beginning in early 1951. Again and again the rest of usI includedinsisted to Bohlen that the distinctions. if indeed there really were any. involved nuances so slight as to be virtually indiscernible. Bohlen doggedly insisted that the differences. even if elusive. were substantive and important. as anyone knowledgeable of Soviet arcanaas the rest of us implicitly were notwould understand. Bohlen would also remark from time to time that the pertinent concept in NSC/68 had misled Secretary Acheson into a mistaken belief that the attack on Korea represented the first item on a Soviet schedule for world conquest by force. The rest of us with matching regularity rebutted both the alleged cause and the alleged effect. Bohlens "Witness to History" preserves the idea for posterity. however. These recollections would mislead you if they suggested acrimony. Nothing of the sort was ever manifested. The point at issue was marginal to the problems at hand. The prevailing aura was agreement. Bohlen and the formulators of NSC/68 were actually as one in postulating the primacyas a Soviet goalof the regimes continuity within the areas under its dominion. Also. Bohlen and the formulators were as one as to Soviet Unions enduring purposes concerning the world in general andas to Soviet hostility toward the United States. On the latter aspects. I do not presume to repeat things that I heard Bohlen say many times in privileged Interchanges. I only Invite attention to what Bohlens 1973 memoir says In the last few pages of its chapter 15. A few sentences suffice: What caused the cold war? My view is quite simple. . . . The cold war can be traced to the seisure of power by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1917. ... Bolsheviks believed In the inherent wickedness of capitalism. which they regarded as merely an instrument for the exploitation of the workers. and in the inevitability of the triumph of Communism over capitalism. Thus any capitalist society was not only an enemy but also an enemy that had overstayed his time on the historical scene. It did not make any difference what the capitalist countries did. the mere fact that they were capitalist made them the object of continuous hostility on the part of the Soviet rulers. . .. ... The word "Bolshevism" may sound outdated to some historians. in fact it is still an accurate term to describe the particular political philosophy that has guided Soviet leaders to this day. The cold war was turned against America as part of the basic and unwavering hostility which the Bolsheviks have alwayst displayed against capitalist countries. The United States was selected as target number one simply because it was the chief source of power left in the nontommunist world after the war. ... Any action we have taken . . is judged on the basic premise that all capitalism Is evil and anything good that comes out It Is only apparently so. This is the basis for the cold war. It seems fashionable to conclude that the cold war is over. I do not see how anyone can reach this coenclusion If he takes the trouble to read the Soviet press or speeches of Soviet leaders and to examine the daily drumfire of Soviet propaganda that is directed against the United States. Too bad that your column did not specifically compare NSC/68 and Bohlens views concerning the primacy of the regimes continuity as a Soviet goal and did not give the gist of Bohlens views on Soviet hostility toward other systems in general and toward the United States in particularbut then. alas. it would havebeen necessary to Jettison a good portion of the column. I am still puzzled as to what impelled Bohlens enduring insistence on some important. even if inexpressible. distinction between his own approach and that of NSC/ 68. A possible explanation Is that given by Dean Acheson on page 347 of Present at the Creation. citing Paul Y. Hammonds thorough study of the genesis of that policy paper. That explanation postulates a purpose to defend professional turfthat Is to say. to uphold Foreign Service ascendancy in the field of policy on the basis of assumed possession of a store of incommunicable wisdom. Maybe sobjt I know no way of entering into other peoples minds. Sincerely.