Date: 1981-11-30
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President as my colleagues are aware. AmenicanSoviet negotiations on nuclear weapons in the European theater begin in Geneva today. There should be no misunderstanding as to where the Senate stands on these negotiations. I believe that the Senate completely supports the position and the proposals made by the President on November 18. 198 1. I am convinced there is broad bipartisan support for sticking with the NATO Persing II and cruise missile deployment decision unless the Soviets are willing to eliminate the cause of that allied decisionmost particularly the deployment by the Soviets of mediumrange ballistic missiles characterized as ISS20s."1 The negotiations will be tough and Probably prolonged. There may be no progress for a full year. The Soviets can be expectedto make offers and propose solutions calculated to manipulate Europeaii public opinion. particularly those elements of public opinion wvhich sincerely oppose the NATO deployment decision. Oursuccess in these negotiations should be measured by certain elements. among which are these: First. whether we can effect a complete Soviet dismantling of its SS20 force. or. Second. whether alliance will hang together and move forward with the TNF modernization schedule if the Soviet dismantling cannot be achieved. This will involve American leadership wvhich Is at once flexible but strong. which is creative but unwavering. and which is sympathetic to European concerns but committed to an alliance which will not be bullied or blackmailed. It is a test of NATOs resiliency. a test of American leadership. and a test of this administrations negotiating skill. The Soviets are impressed only with determination. credible planning. and meaningful action. They may well perceive their interest to lie in stalling the talks. while offering superficially attractive counterproposals aimed at European public opinion. They can be expected to conduct discussions with our principal allies In order to probe potential cracks In NATO zolidarity. The U.S. Position in these talks is particularly complex since we art negotiating on behalf of the alliance and not simply on behalf of the United States. This raises a point which some critics of the decision to deploy nuclear missiles on Western European soil seem to overlook. The TNF decision was a decision made by the NATO Alliance as an alliance. It was not some edict foisted on unsuspecting European governments by an American Government desirous of makIng Europe a superpower battlegrouncl. A number of our key allies were players In that decision. They remain central Players. The decision must. therefore. remain an alliance decision. There was legitimate reason for the TNF modernization decision In 1977. The deployment of 8S20 missiles by the Soviets is an act of supreme belligerancy. The deployment has been ongoing at a furious pace. By July of 1981. the Soviets had placed 250 8820 launchers in the field capable of delivering 750 warheads. Most of these. some 175 systems. or 575 warheads. are aimed at Western European targets. Currently. another 65 SS20 bases are under construction. with a new start undertaken every week. They are partially com-~ pleted. An additional 100150 bases are believed planned before the Soviet program Is scheduled to reach Its conclusion in the nid1980s. Thisis a total of 1.395 warheads. with probably over 1.000 of them zeroed in on the cities and milltary bases of our European allies. To illustrate the imbalance of forces In the European theater. I shall ask unanimous consent that a chart developed by the authoritative Institute for Strategic Studies in London be Incorporated into the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The chart shows that the Warsaw Pact has a total inventory of 4.43 0 long- and mediumrange nuclear systems in the. European theater. whereas NATO has a total of 1.512. By means of a complex formula. the institute arrives at the following comparisons: The number of available warheads totals 2.004 for the Warsaw Pact. and 1.168 for NATO. The 1.168 total for NATO includes those warheads--some 400 of themaboard U.S. Poseidon nuclear ballisticmissile firing submarines because they are in fact targeted on the Soviet Union. Even more striking. if one excludes those weapons which can be delivered by aircraft. and considers only those warheads deliverable by ballistic missiles. one finds that the Warsaw Pact has an inventory of 1.335 systems. with 1.108 warheads "available" whereas the NATO alliance has 342 systems and 242 warheads available. The SS20 component of the Warsaw Pact Inventory comprises 410 of the 1.108 warheads considered available. I(t can be readily seen that. even with the Inclusion of Poseidon on the Western side. the balance is distinctly unfavorable to NATO. and becoming even more so as the Soviets continue to deploy more SS20s. The NATO cruise and Pershing II missile program is the only alliance response designed to produce some semblance of balance between these systems. Surely the defeat of this deployment decision would be a psychological blow to the alliance and a major victory for the Soviets. The "zero option" proposal endorsed by the NATO defense ministers In Scotland on October 21. 1981. wich formed the ba..Is of President Reagans proposal announced last week. is really nothing new. It is but a restatement of the rationale for the original NATO decision. For without 8820s. no NATO.. TNF deployment schedule would have been drawn up. So It stands to reason that if the original cause of the NATO deployment were to disappear. then the deployment should be canceled. A second point is made by the critics of the TNF decision. It is claimed that European targets which can be demolished by the Russian SS20 missiles can just as easily be demolished by retargetted Soviet Intercontinental ballistic missiles. Europe is just as exposed. And American stubbornness in going forward with the NATO TNF modernization is needlessly exacerbating strains within the alliance. fueling an antiAmerican movement throughout Europe and Putting unnecessary pressures on those European governments which strongly support the modernization program. The alliance. these critics claim. would be better off devoting its energies to the numerous economic problems besetting us all. rather than focusing on weaponry which will never be used or is superfluous. What is one to make of this argument? What is the purpose of the Soviet SS20 deployment In the first place? Why such a heavy investment in "purposeless missiles?" Is It so difficult to evaluate the psychology of this action? A key goal of Soviet diplomacy over the past 30 years has been the destruction of NATO. Any thinking American. be he a grocer. an auto worker. or a school teacher. can Immediately recognize this Soviet behavior for what it is: It is the action of a bully designed to Intimidate. There Is only one way to counter this kind of bullying. and that Is to make life perceptively more difficult for the Soviet regime. If the threat of the NATO TNF partisan support on this matter. that we Mr. President. I ask unanimous condeployment is not absolutely real. Is stand by our negotiators. and we will not sent to have certain material printed fIn not a certainty. then the Soviets will con- countenance the tactic of Intimidation. the RECORD at this point. tinue to act with impunity. We support the TNF deployment sched- There being no objection. the mateTherefore. the Soviets should know ule so long as the 8820. SS4. and SS5 rial was ordered to be printed ill the that the Senate is providing strong bi- threat remains a reality In Europe. RECORD. as follows: