Date: 1981-10-01
Speaker: SAM B. HALL (democrat)
Chamber: H

Mr. Speaker. I commend the gentleman from Missouri for securing a special order to give House Members an additional opportunity to discuss the posture of or Nations civil defense. His concern over the possilhility that Congress may compromise our civil defense capability by reducing Its budget commitment for this program Is to be appreciated.. Indeed I share fully his commitment to maintaining a level of appropriations adequate to preserving civil defense as an essentail and integral part of our overall national defense policy. The civil defense effort should not be surrendered or reduced. In the process of reviewing and establishing defense priorities civil defense always seems to be the odd man out. Offensive hardware attracts attention away from the very real need to maintain passive defense programs. Including civil defense. Neither effort should take from the other. They must be mutually supportive In their roles of deterring soViet aggression and the aggressive acts of other potential adversaries. The result of this conscious disenchantment with passive defense has been the erosion of our civil defense posture over a period of years to the point where it no longer Is a credible element within our strategic force structure. Civil defense. in my judgment. must once again be considered In conjunction with our offensive and defensive forces If our national security is to be preserved. To erase it from our strategic formula is to threaten the very mission and purpose of our strategic nuclear force. namely the deterrence of nuclear wvar. We no longer have the luxury of assured force superiority over the Soviets. Those days are long behind us and it is questionable today whether or not a balance of strategic military poweroften referred to as a "rough equivalence"-exists. At best. we can say that. for the present time. the real strength and preparedness of the U.S. strategic Triad remains credible to the Soviet Union. However. the future of relative United StatesSoviet strategic balance Is cloudy. United States development and deployment of modern strategic weapons just are not keeping pace with the Soviet Union and our defense capability. in the eyes of the Soviets. may be waning. The facts speak for themselves. To understand the extent of our vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack requires only a brief review of the relative United StatesU.S.S.R. strategic balance. The current U.S. B52 bomber force will require modernization beyond the mounting of cruise missiles. We cannot afford continued reductions In fleet size for the purpose of cannibalization of aircraft to keep remaining B52s on line. Current landbased ICBM forces will become more vulnerable with time as Soviet missile accuracy and MIRV capability improve. The submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLEM) force represents the only U.S. strategic delivery system being modernized. Meanwhile. the Soviet Union is modernizing a large portion of Its forces. hardening its facilities and continuing its Intensive research and development. Since 1970. according to information provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. the United States has put Into production one variant of an existing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). one new type of submarine and submarinelaunched ballistic missile system. and no new strategic bomber systems. In the same period. Soviet efforts to improve and enlarge its strategic forces have brought them from a position of clear Inferiority to one of superiority In many measures of capability. The Soviets have modernized the ICBM force through new deployment and modifications to deployed systems which have incorporated greater throw wveight. more reentry vehicles per missile. and increased accuracy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now report that the Soviets possess a "clear and growing advantage in ability to kill hard targets." Too. the Soviets continue to diversify and Improve other elements of their strategic element structure. They continue to build modern. nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines more quickly than the United States. new generations of longer range submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBM) thereby expanding the patrol area of the Soviet submarines making them and their missiles less accessible to U.S. Interception. Further. while retaining their existing Intercontinental bomber forces. the Soviets have deployed over 100 Backfire bombers and are adding about 30 each year. This bomber has sufficient range to be used as an Intercontinental bomber against the United States. While the United States can claim advantage In stateoftheart technology. technology not employed or deployed does nothing to improve our defense posture. These trends. which must be viewed with serious concern. have created what the President often refers to as the "window of vulnerability." The very size of that socalled window makes survivability a top priority concern. It Is more than clear that the strategic military balance between the United States and U.S.S.R. continues to shift toward our potential adversary in a very big way. Indeed. the Imbalances are of such magnitude measured quantitatively and qualitatively as to confront the United States with the prospect of facing such Imbalances well into the future. This is particularly true in light of the Soviets willingness to continue to invest heavily to keep the momentum going in their favor. The realities of the United StatesSoviet strategic balance render it essential that civil defense be maintained as a criticil element In our national defense structure. The Soviets are approaching a first s trike capability and the ability of the United States to survive such a strike becomes of evergrowing importance as a deterrent factor. To note now seriously the Soviets view civil defense. one has only to look at their efforts In this regard. �Lo complement their offensive capabilities. the Soviet Union maintains a large strategic defense force supplemented by what the Joint Chiefs of Staff refer to as "an extensive civil defense program." both of which are far superior to their U.S. counterparts. We must approach the Soviet level of effort for passive defense. Including cfvil defense. If our strategic nuclear force Is to continue to provide a credible deterrence to potential Soviet nuclear aggression. Our "window of vulnerability" remains too wide open without such an Improved civil defense posture. We must take into account the civil defense commitment of the Soviets and strengthen our own civil defenpe program accordingly with the purpose of developing plans to be Implemented during timies of crisis. The magnitude of Soviet civil defense efforts and capability. when coupled with high accuracy and more reliable missiles. could adversely affect our ability to implement the U.S. deterrence strategy. We have to own up to the fact that the worse case scenario might occur. Should It occur In the near future. the Soviet Union has a first strike capability of Inflicting on currently unprotected Americans something in the order of 1.60 million fatalities. Enhanced civil defense efforts providing for a greater degree of survivability and continuity of government will serve to improve our deterrence posture. . In the Interest of world peace. the Soviets cannot be permitted to believe that their civil defense system will Improve their ability to wage war and enhance Soviet survival of a nuclear exchange. We need. Instead. to impress upon the Soviets the ability of the United States to recover quickly from the effects of a nuclear attack. and In a condition permitting a U.S. retaliatory attack of a nature to Inflict catastrophic damage to the Soviet Union. Currently. our civil defense program lacks credibility. and I join my colleague and friend in taking this opportunity to express my full endorsement for maintaining a firm budget commitment for a strong and viable civil defense.*