Date: 1981-05-14
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. I am pleased to support 8. 815 because it takes a first step toward rebuilding Americas defenses. Its major accomplishment Is to bring our defense spending levels more appropriately into line with that of the Soviet Union. It en. hances the longneglected readiness and modernization of our forces. It Is clear that the massive resources that the Soviets have dedicated to their military machine should be of major and continuing concern to us. They have thrown down the Gauntlet in both atategic and conventional military areas. It Is also clear that we are expanding our commitments into new areas of the world. particularly the Persian Gulf. in order to protect our vital interests. These new commitments must be supported by credible military forces. This bill is the first step in what has rightly become a major reassessment of our defense posture. Nearly a decade ago American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam. and the Nation has experienced a prolonged period of selfdoubt over the utility of military solutions to political problems beyond our shores. This agonizing was. of course. a natural result of our bitter and frustrating experience in Vietnam. It translated. itself. however. into a dangerous reduction in our commitment to national defense. Whether our defense posture is adequate or not depends to a large degree on how we compareand particularly how other nations compare uswith the Russians. And. unfortunately. at the very time that we have retrenched. the Soviets have embarked on a defense spending binge which is unprecedented in the postWorld War I era. We have fallen behind. The Central Intelligence Agency this past February documented the comparison between Soviet and American defense spending. Although It is difficult to compare market and nonmarket economies. the trend is alarming. The buildup of the Soviets military system affords them a steadily increasing capacity to operate in more areas of the world for longer periods of time. We see the graphic results of this Soviet. foreign policy In Afghanistan and Poland. At the same time that the Soviets are perpetuating their brutal and relentless occupation of Afghanistan with some 85.000 troops. they have well over 200.000 more troops ready to intervene in Poland at a moments notice. It would be foolhardy to assume that the Soviets do not intend to continue to use their massive military machine. Nor can we assume that the Soviets value the development of a. peaceful world order in the same way that we do. The Soviet Union is deploying nuclear missiles in the European theater at a breakneck pace. These missiles are targeted at the industrial heart of our NATO alliesand our allies do not have comparable weapons systems to counterbalafice this Soviet deployment. The Soviets have built a firstclass Navy which is rapidly overtaking our own. They have built intercontinental missiles which appear capable of obliterating American Minuteman missiles in their silos in the American heartland. In aggregate defense costs. for the 197180 period. the CIA estimates that the dollar costs of Soviet defense activities were 40 percent higher than comparable U.S. outlays. Lust year their expenditures were fully 50 percent higher than our own. The disparity in the area of strategic forces is truly alarming. Including intercontinental missiles and ballistic missile firing submarines. the Soviet effort was triple our own. In general purpose forces. including land forces. tactical air. naval and mobilityairlift and sealiftthe Soviet effort was 60 percent higher than our own. according to the CIA. Even in naval forces. an area which is absolutely crucial for an island maritime nation like our own to be preeminent. the Soviets have challenged our supremacy. Indeed. our naval leaders have recently said that American naval supremacy is now a myth. They now proclaim lack of confidence in the Navys ability to fight a major conflict at sea. While these comparisons provide a sense of perspective on the effort of the two nations. they do not mean we should copy the Soviet force structure of weapon systems. A dollarfordollar match in spending would not buy us a better. stronger. tougher or more credible military capability. Strategic weapons systems that are ill conceived. or that do not fulfill their basic mission do not impress me. I am sure they do not impress the Soviets. And they most certainly do not give comfort to our allies. Further. it would be unwise to build a standing army the size of the Soviet Unions. They have maintained uniformed personnel at about 4.3 million men. slightly double the size of our manpower. There would be no purpose In our maintaining such large troop levels. The committee report ottlines the key defense problem facing us. While demonstrating the need for a sustained and increased defense effort. it is a commitment to defense programs. rather than a de* fense spending level. that Is essential. In the past we have failed to relate In a consistent aid focused way our defense strategy with our foreign policy. The time Is late and we have still not followed the advice of our former colleague from Oklahoma. Senator lellmon. who admonIshed the Senate to develop a mechanism for "undierstanding and developing a cohesive. mutually supportive U.S. defense and foreign policy." It is a simply stated propositionwe have to be clearer about where we are going in the world and how we are going to get there. We must designnowthe defense program for the several decades ahead. What do we consider to be our vital interests? To what other nations and interests should we commit ourselves? What in the nature of these varied commitments? From this assessment. we must decide what forces are necessary to serve as a credible guarantee of American steadiness in honoring those commitments. Given the kinds of challenges the Soviets and their various proxies are mountingto our vital interests and those of other nations and regionswe must also develop forces and doctrines to respond to these challenges. In short. we must rationally relate our forces to an American foreign policy which is global in scope. This is the onlyworkable definition of "credibility." For this to succeed. we have to work out new mutually agreeable arrangements with other nations. This may appear to some to be a simple proposition. But how strong NATO should be. for instance. is a matter of serious dispute in the alliance. We are committing ourselves to levels of defense spending which far exceed that .of the Europeans. How the NATO military burden Is to be shared depends on the perception of the Soviet threat. That perception is not the same on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus. new dialogs. new consultative mechanisms. new assessments of the defense needs of the West are in order. This is not an easy process. but as the most powerful free Nation on Earth it is our obligation to take the lead in this area. At the same time. leadership must be exercised In a careful and sophisticated waywe cannot dictate to our NATO partners. The problem is compounded when we are dealing with other nations with whom we have had a minimal or even negligible historic relationshipsuch as in the Persian Gulf. Our defense decisions must be taken with an eye toward what is realistically achievable in the bargains we strike with such nations. Our force structure must be tailored to some extent by the nature of those bargains. in addition to what seems necessary to defend our vital interests. such as assured oil supplies. In passing this. big. the Senate will endorse a budgetary increase of over 14 percent above last year for defense. We are supporting. the reactivation of battleships. funding a new Nimiftclass aircraft carrier and insuring that progress will be made on a new strategic missile and a new strategic bbmber. The consensus on this bill indicates an acceptance of the need for new symbols of American power. new strategic systems and a bigger Navy. But we have Just begun and the hard decisions have not yet been made. We have a very high level of spending. but only the very beginning of a credible and. over the long run. affordable defense program.