Date: 1985-02-25
Speaker: EUGENE ROSTOW (republican)
Chamber: S

Director. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington. DC DEAR DR. ROSTOw: The issue of verifiability is at the heart of the arms control process. There is a widespread sentiment in Congress that no significant progress in arms control can be made unless the people of the United States are assured of the verifiability of any agreement. or proposed agreement. We are therefore concerned that ACDA has not taken the initiative to assure Congress and the American people that it is addressing the issue of verifiability in a forthright manner. We note that ACDA was very slow in recreating the Verification Bureau. and that even now. a year after you took office. the Bureau has not been fully staffed. In addition. there are key issues on verifiability which. to our knowledge. ACDA has neither examined nor reported on to Congress despite the intense public interest in their resolution. These issues include: The verifiability of the unratified but not withdrawn Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The Verifiability of the various nuclear weapons freeze proposals. The verifiability of the Presidents START proposal. The presence of any significant degradations in the capacity of the United States to verify: (a) The SALT II Treaty (bi The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (c) The Limited Test Ban Treaty (d) The SALT I Interim Agreement. We note that Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. the "Derwinski Amendment." provides ACDA with the authority to initiate such reports to Congress. To date. ACDA has not taken this initiative. In addition. Section 37 also allows the Congress to request the Director of ACDA to make such reports. Accordingly. we would ask that you report as soon as possible to the Senate Intelligence. Foreign Relations. and Armed Services Committees and to the full Congress on an unclassified basis about the verifiability of the above arms control treaties and proposals and also. on any degradation of U.S. verification capacity. In addition. we request that you assess the effects of Soviet concealment measures and altered practices upon the verifiability of the above treaties and proposals. We further request that these reports should be received by the Congress before any new arms control treaties or proposals are voted on. As you know. serious charges have been leveled in the press concerning recent Soviet violations of several arms control treaties or agreements. Given the urgency of the forthcoming floor debate on SALT II and other arms control proposals. it is crucial that the validity of these charges be aired and brought to the attention of the American public. Specifically. we request that you answer the following questions. (1) Has classified U.S. intelligence data ever been revealed to the Soviets during the SALT process? If so. can it be made public? Has the SALT process jeopardized any U.S. intelligence sources and methods? (2) Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets photography of deactivated U.S. ABM sites and deactivated U.S. ICBM sites? Have the Soviets ever reciprocated with photography of any of their own installations? (3) Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets with classified U.S. data on new U.S. Early Warning radars. such as "Pave Paws"? Have the Soviets ever provided the U.S. with similar data? (4) Have the Soviets ever charged the United States with deliberate concealment. which in effect is a violation of SALT I and