Date: 1984-07-26
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. todays news reports carry the story of a White House decision to lift the ban on Soviet fishing in American waters. Apparently. this is part of an election year push to improve relations with the Soviets. In fact. this decision is in keeping with existing administration policy toward the Sovietsor. at least. one half of that policy. I say this because the past 3 years have convinced me that there are two administration programs with respect to the Kremlin. The first of these is a highly visible and vocal policy of dangerous rhetoric and provocation. This is the evil empire policy that encourages a war of words with the Sovietstrading bellicosity for bellicosity. But there is another track to the policy. This one is much less conspicuous. and often goes unnoticed. It might be referred to as the policy of business as usual. It manifested itself in the decision to rescind the Soviet grain embargo imposed by President Carter following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That was the policy that hurt the Soviets. and then President Brezhnev stated before the world that the agricultural policies of the Soviet Union were not working and that the Soviet Union had very real problems in agriculture. The administration. nevertheless. proceeded to lift the grain embargo and not only did not secure any quid pro quo for lifting it but also apparently did not even ask for a quid pro quo. To the contrary. the administration proceeded to conclude a major grain deal with the Soviet which ties the United States into higher sales levels. In March of this year. business as usual meant approving the sale of $40 million in oil and gas equipment to the Soviets. As Members will recall. the administration was quite visible in beating our European friends over their heads in the effort to get them to restrain themselves in connection with the sale of oil and gas equipment to the Soviets. Oil and gas exports account for more than half of all Soviet foreign exchange earnings. so this meant that we were financing the most important sector of the Soviet economy. Nonetheless. business as usual required that the sale be made. Now. we learn that the administration is prepared to allow the Soviets to resume fishing in American waters. This may seem a strange decision. given the Soviets peculiar and deadly fixation for the integrity of borders. Coming less than a year after the brutal and senseless destruction of Korean Air Line flight 007. some of my colleagues might wonder why we are opening our territory to Soviet commercial exploitation. Perhaps some have forgotten that the Soviets refused to let our ships and the ships of other nations into the waters where it was believed the Korean airliner went down. The Soviets would not let us into that area to look for bodies and the little black box from the illfated plane. But now we are going to open our waters to Soviet fishing fleets. What kind of message does this send? Does this lend certainty and predictability to our policy with the Soviets? I am sure there are those in the Kremlin who find themselves confused by these very mixed signals. But. after nearly four years. I am sure that many have reached the same conclusion I have reached about our policy. They understand that this administration draws a sharp line between what it says and what it does. And once they understand this approach. the Soviets can afford to take some satisfaction in what it means for them. The business as usual policy permits a Soviet economy dependent upon foreign sources for its food supply to rely upon regular grain shipments and a commitment to allow fishing in U.S. waters. Access to vital Western technology will allow the expansion of Soviet oil and gas production. with a resulting increase in foreign exchange earnings to finance Soviet adventurism and a military buildup. At the same time. the public diplomacy that decries the evil empire will permit the Soviets to make a credible claim that this American administration is insincere about limiting nuclear arms. This gives the Soviets the cover they need to back out of arms talks and accomplish a major goal of their foreign policy. avoiding a mutual. verifiable arms control agreement that restrains Soviet military expansion and development. Thus. the two policies seem to be giving us the worst of both worlds. They provide the Soviets with dependable and regularized economic relations with the United States. while the Soviets are able to deny us the mutual. verifiable arms limitation agreement that is in Americas interests. and in the interest of the Soviet Union as well. for that matter. I appreciate that there are some Americans who stand to benefit from business as usual. and they are understandably pleased with the grain deal. the gas equipment deal. and the fishIng agreement. which requires the Soviets to purchase from the United States an amount of fish equal to their catch. I am not eager to deny those Americans a business opportunity. But I am deeply concerned that a commitment to provide the Soviets with what they most want and need from our food and grain resources is a policy that benefits a few at the cost of interests which we all share. Finally. I wonder what the people of Afghanistan think as they see one sanction after another lifted against their Soviet oppressors. Much of the economic restraint that characterized our relations with the Soviet Union came about in response to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets have not left Afghanistan. There is no indication that they will leave soon. There are still some 105.000 Soviet troops in that wartorn country. and the people there continue their brave resistance. Does the situation in Afghanistan now warrant the economic favors we bestow on the Soviets? What does business as usual say about our commitment to the struggle of the Afghan people? * Mr. President. I yield back the remainder of my time and I suggest the absence of a quorum.