Date: 1982-03-16
Speaker: JAMES K. COYNE (republican)
Chamber: H

Mr. Speaker. may I first begin by encouraging the gentleman from Pennsylvania to participate in this special order as a fellow Member who had a similar experience as I did over the past several weeks. Recently public attention has been focused on the growing economic. political and social struggles in Central America. especially those in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Much of this public debate had been shaped by reports from several visiting Congressmen and an international press corps that has been accused of sloppy. if not biased. reporting. Few people can claim to be an expert on the complex sociopolitical equation that frames this continuing drama a few hundred miles south of the border. I did not believe that in the space of 5 days I would become an expert on the situation in Central America. but I did feel that I could formulate my approach to the debate on U.S. policy that clearly lay ahead. both more responsibly and more effectively. if I acquired firsthand knowledge of the relevant issues. I arrived in El Salvador on February 17 with three principal concerns: First. is the turmoil in El Salvador a political quagmire in which the United States might become militarily bogged down? Second. was the Salvadoran Government making "significant progress" in controlling the human rights violations that had appalled U.S. citizens and earned international condemnation? Third. to what degree are the Cuban and Nicaraguan regimes supporting the Salvadoran rebels? As I see it. the challenges we face is to synthesize the answers to those three questions in order to determine how the United States might foster a free and democratic system in El Salvador without involving the U.S. military. I am disturbed by the partisan and prejudiced propaganda that emerges from both the left and the right on this issue. and I seek to identify a path of accommodation. Not surprisingly. I returned after this 6day trip with more questions than answers. But I will insist on dispassionately posing those questions until credible answers emerge from the U.S. foreign policy crucible. In El Salvador. we were both well received and well treated by the Government of President Napoleon Duarte. We met with President Duarte. with Defense Minister Guillermo Garcia. with U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton. with Gen. Wallace H. Nutting and with leaders of the church and business community. We took advantage of the Presidents offer to travel wherever we pleased by visiting the village of San Antonio Abad and the Mariona Prison. where many of the political prisoners of the Government are currently held in San Salvador. I was favorably impressed by the sincerity and commitment of President Duarte. I believe that he enjoys broad support among his people and that he will continue to implement his popular program of political and economic reform. He stressed. however. that the constituent assembly elections scheduled for March 28 are a critical element to the restoration of democracy in El Salvador. a position with which I strongly concur. My favorable impression of the civilian government. however. is in contrast to my perception of El Salvadors military leadership. Few of the military leaders with whom I met seem to embrace the democratic ideals of President Duarte. I believe that this attitude was largely responsible for the apparent coverup of human rights violations which I will discuss later. Furthermore. as a result of my private meeting with President Duarte. I concluded that the military is not representing the will of the civilian government. For example. when I confronted President Durate with the informal weapons requests which had been made earlier in the day by Defense Minister Garcia. he was shocked. and he assured me that such a massive allocation of military aid was totally unnecessary. The Defense Minister had informally requested enough helicopters to move 2.000 soldiers. which I calculated would require the transfer of more than 180 helicopters. The President. on the other hand. maintained that he needed only 10 or fewer helicopters at the present time. As I met with government and military leaders. I concentrated on the three concerns which I wished to confront. and I think the Issues began to come into focus. I found that drawing analogies with the sequence of events that led us down the path toward extended involvement in Vietnam were inescapable. but for each similarity there were dozens of significant differences. In Vietnam there was a war of reunification between North and South Vietnam. In El Salvador. however. it is a war of political and class division. In Vietnam the most dominant national figure was certainly Ho Chi Minh. the primary leader of the north. In El Salvador. the most popular national figure is more than likely Napoleon Duarte himself. Americas ally. In Vietnam. U.S. troops were demanded by the governments we supported. while in El Salvador I was pleased to learn that U.S. troops are neither required nor requested. In fact. they have been adamantly refused by no less a figure then Defense Minister Garcia himself. The 11st of differences between Vietnam and El Salvador can continue at some greater length. but suffice it to say that the salient point is that we should learn lessons from our past involvement in Vietnam. but we must not allow this partial analogy to obscure our view of the reality. The human rights question is equally difficult to fathom. not only because one quickly concludes that both generals and guerrillas alike often distort the truth. but because the question is shaped by historical and socio. logical tradition as much as by current day standards of military professionalism. Nevertheless. I could not help feeling that General Garcias military forces exercised far too much autonomy and freedom from review. judicial or otherwise. In El Salvador. the local commanders. especially in rural areas outside of the main cities. have an au. thoritarian power that transcends civilian control. especially in the smaller areas distant from the oversight of the common commanders in El Salvador. We accepted the tragedy of San Antonio Abad as exemplary of the confusion that often surrounds alleged violations of human rights perpetrated in a war torn area. And in light of this. I sought to discern the truth about what occurred there. I visited this town and heard the stories of local residents that on one night this past January. members of the Salvadoran Armed Forces dragged citizens from their homez and systematically murdered them. Those whose familie- had been "visited" in the night. retrieved the bodies of their lifeless relatives the next morning from a stack of 20. II 918 When we confronted General Garcia with this gruesome tale. he and his lieutenants denied that the murders were systematic and offered another versionof the events. He insisted that his soldiers surrounded the town in hopes of locating a guerrilla stronghold. He contended that the soldiers were fired upon in the middle of the night. and in the ensuing battle 20 civilians were caught in the crossfire. We were shocked by the difference between the two stories and Impressed by the difficulty of discerning the "truth." The most conclusive evidence. however. was contributed by a U.S. embassy official who had viewed the bodies at the morgue and determined that most were shot in the back of the head at close range. This story discredited the version of Colonel Palacios and General Garcia and damaged their credibilit. and the credibility of the military in El Salvador. at least in my eyes. I concluded that the Salvadora:i military cor.inand does not have ontrol over its frontlines forces and. therefore. cannot prevent further violations of the human rights of its citizens at this time. I believe. however. that President Duarte is dedicated to harnessing this traditionally uncontrollable military machine and will do what he can to correct the situation. if we provide him the encouragement and the incentive to do so. It is already clear that the tough international scrutiny to which General Garcia is subjected is bringing him to the realization that he must "clean up his act." However. I should point out that there are continuing violations of human rights equaUy egregious from the left in El Salvador. Those of us who hiar arguments that the revolutionary left must be supported. ask back. "What evidence do we have to suggest that their civilian leadership can control their military were they in power?" There are clear examples of dramatic violations of human rights by the guerrillas. stories which are equally hard to believe and which demand full scrutiny by U.S. press. public and politicians allfe. On February 20. I left El Salvador for Nicaragua. with the hope that I might be able to address my third concorn regarding the provision of aid for the rebels in El Salvador by the Nicaraguan Government. by Cuban sources and. of course. by the Soviets as well. I also sought to identify a course of action of U.S. foreign policy that might strengthen the democratic strains in that country and at the same time diminish the antagonisms which are clearly growing between the United States and Nicaragua. During our stay. I met with Comandante Daniel Ortega. the leader of the ruling Sandinista junta in Nicaragua. but also I met with Alfonso Robelo. the leader of the opposition party in Nicaragua and with Enrique Dreyfus. a business leader. who only 2 days before our arriv1 had been released from a cruel. extended detainment in the Managua prison. I also met with church officials and others. both within the Sandinista ruling junta and without. My visit. unfortunately. was framed by a background of strident antiAmerican rhetoric. due in part to the public commemoraton of the death of Augusto Sandino. who I learned was the founder of the Sandinista movement. While I recognize that a residue of antiAmerican sentiment might be expected in a country in which we have been so directly involved in past decades. I was dismayed. shocked and terrifiod. to discover that this hatred is being perpetuated and employed by the Government as a distraction for the masses from the obvious shortcomings of their owri political rule. In meeting with the leaders of the Sandinista regime. I encountered an unwillingness on their part wo diminish their belligerent accusations leveled against the United States and. I concluded that the Sandinista government clearly prefers to tilt. in fact overwhelmingly tilt. toward the Soviet Union and Cuba. I asked Daniel Ortega. "Comandante. suppose I go back to the United States and somehow the U.S. Congress can be persuaded to change dramatically its relationship with Nicaragua. to take steps that would lead to a restoration of economic aid and to a guarantee of no external military intervention. What then could I say to the U.S. people. to our Congress. that you would be willing to do in return? Would you. for example. be willing to say that you would not allow the Soviets to build an air force base in Nicaragua? Would you be persuaded to discourage Nicaraguan support for other revolutionary movements in Central America?" Sadly. I report that Comandante Ortega said no to all my offers for compromise. While the Sandinistas did enjoy broad support at the inception of their rule. it is clear that this support is quickly eroding. I was told that the original Sandlnista movement was supported by almost 95 percent of the people of Nicaragua 3 years ago. but just last month I was informed that today only a third of the people in Nicaragua support the course that country is following. The Sandinista government has lost the confidence of the middle class and the leadership of the Catholic church. Just a week before my arrival. all seven bishops of the Catholic church in Nicaragua condemned the Sandinistas for t lie ruthless. forced resettlement ol the Miskito Indians and the killing of innocent Miskito Indians who were unwilling to cooperate with the government in this resettlement program. Both the church and the middle class are condemning this government for its repression. and sadly they have become the new victims of the Sandinistas rhetorical abuse as a result. I found my interview with Enrique Dreyfus and Alfonso Robelo particularly enlightening. Both of these leaders confirmed allegations that the repressive policies of the Sandinista regime have caused a marked decrease in the popularity of the government. I found the violations of human rights in Nicaragua to be no less reprehensible than those In El Salvador. though obviously I recognize that the actual loss of life due to those violations and due to the continuing war In El Salvador is considerably L- **ater. I am particularly outraged. however. by the suffering that these Miskito Indians are enduring at the hands of the government. The Sandinistas have systematically relocated. jailed and caused great suffering to thousands of Indians in the northeast. section of Nicaragua. We heard numerous reports about Indians who lost their lives at the hands of government soldiers. When the congressional delegation requested an opportunity to travel to the riverfronts along the Coco River. where these villages have been burned and where massacres allegedly have taken place. we were flatly denied the chance to make a visit. This is in clear contrast to our experience in El Salvador. where the Duarte government allowed us a free rein and a free passport throughout the country. My visit to Managua clearly demonstrated the broad extent of Cubas involvement in that country. a role that neither the Sandinist.as nor the Cubans seem to deny. Although Mr. Ortega did not discuss the Nicaraguan role in supplying the rebels in El Salvador. both Mr. Dreyfus and Mr. Rubelo confirmed that the transfer of military assistance is extensive. This trip left. me with a great many impressions that I needed to assess. I had no doubt. however. about the need of our Government to act fairly and decisively in an effort to bring peace and democracy to Central America. both to left and right wing governments. Following are several of my recommendations. I believe that President Duarte and the political and economic reforms he has implemented deserve our continuing support. Because the constitutent assembly elections scheduled for March 28 are a critical element of President Duartes plan to restore democracy to his country. we must affirm our belief in the importance of these elections and strive to insure that they are fair and representative. Attainment of this goal will be more feasible if we enlist the support of our NATO and other Latin American allies in overseeing the voting process. This support of free elections should be accompanied by negotiations aimed at involving as many political groups as realistically possible in the government. as has been suggested by Bishop Rivera y Damas and President Lopez Portillo of Mexico. Furthermore. I applaud President Reagans Caribbean basin initiative as a recognition that economic growth can promote political stability in this region. It seemed to me that the guerrillas effort to undermine the economic infrastructure of the country is at least as dangerous as an effort to overthrow the government. President Duarte. for example. has emphasized the need for buses. pointing out that just in the past few weeks almost 200 buses have been destroyed in El Salvador. I am opposed to further military aid to El Salvador at this time. however. not only because I believe that the military command has not adequately protected the citizens of El Salvador from violations of human rights. but also because I think that granting military aid at this time will strengthen the military faction of the government. especially in these weeks leading up to the elections. which cannot be supportive of a solution based on reconciliation achieved through peaceful means. Furthermore. in recognition of the demonstrated gap in communication between the civilian and military leaders we must clarify that our support is for the civilian governments efforts to achieve a political and economic solution and not for the militarys attempts to achieve victory on the battlefield. Despite the unfriendly rhetoric which is emerging from Nicaragua. I believe that we must not pass up this chance to negotiate with the Sandinistas. but obviously we need a third party intermediary. It is clear that we must use our leverage to do anything possible to discourage the Nicaraguans from continuing to support the flow of arms to the rebels in El Salvador. For this reason. I have supported the initiative proposed by President Portillo of Mexico to establish substantive negotiations with the Sandinistas. In this process. however. we must not ignore the violations of human rights that have been committed by the Nicaraguan Government. just as we do not ignore the violations in El Salvador. Finally. I am convinced that U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua is not the avenue to the institution of peace and democracy in that country. I believe that our evolving policy toward the turmoil in Central America must stress the importance of fair and free elections and negotiations. where appropriate. in an effort to foster democracy and stability and to avert further military conflict. I believe that the Presidents Caribbean basin initiative is this type of response and I am strongly supportive of our efforts to promote economic and hence political stability. I cannot. on the other hand. support the notion that further military aid to El Salvador at this time will be a constructive influence in this process. especially when we are trying to do all that we can to encourage a moderate conclusion in the election process just 2 weeks away. Finally. I maintain that if we are to continue to employ the human rights records of other countries as a criterion in the provision of U.S. aid. then we must apply that requirement fairly and consistently. Mr. Speaker. I would like to take this opportunity now ) see if there may be other members. other colleagues. who would like to participate.