Date: 1981-12-01
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

That Is my understanding. Madam President. I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia for his meaningful and forceful supporting statement. May I say for the benefit of the Senate that I have cleared every word that I am about to say with the appropriate people in the program as to classified material because I certainly would not want to say anything on the floor or anywhere else with respect to unclassified material If It would endanger the program In any way or endanger this Nations security. This amendment. in which I propose $250 million of additional funding to the advanced technology bomber. or Stealth bomber program. would assure the delivery of an operational aircraft at the earliest feasible date. I have been concerned. as have many of my colleagues. that the initiative on the Bi program will delay Important classified programs. Including the ATE or Stealth bomber. Many in the Senate have expressed concern. that the initial operational capability--or IOC. which is defined as a 15plane operational squadronof Stealth not be allowed to slip. I believe most of my colleagues agree It Is desirous to have the earliest possible deployment of Stealth technology. It Is my understanding that the administration has assured the Senate that itis committed to the fastest track possible and the earliest IOC feasible takIng Into consideration the various uncertainties which must be resolved. Yet. Madam President. I do not know to what IOC the administration has In (act committed itself. Obviously. we cannot pin a date certain down with absolute assurance. because we have not yet finished answering all the questions. Nor can anyone say with complete certainty the exact amount of funding which would bring us to the earliest possible TOC. But I am very concerned that. because the administration has also opted for the Bi bomber. funding for Stealth will be Inadequate. The Congressional Budget Office is now estimating the Bi could well end up costing us $400 million per copy over the next 5 years. In light of the almost certain -competition for funds between the Bi and Stealth. I am satisfied that the evie ence shows this appropriations bill does not contain enough resources to launch a vigorous program. I am cca.cemned the IOC will be delayed as a rerultperhaps substantiallyif this practice continues. The net result could well be one in which by the early 1990s we will not have a manned bomber In place which can penetrate Soviet air defenses with assurance. Why am I so concerned that the program offered by this bill does not meet the urgent national need In this area? First. I have relied upon the testimony of our strategic air commanders on the question. Second. the action of the other Chamber on this bill which Increased funding for the Stealth program. Third. my own knowledge of the program. And fourth. a pattern that seems to be emerging which Is one of delaying the necessary hard decisions io correct the strategic Imbalance with the Soviet Union. Both past and present commanders of the Strategic Air Command have testified that the enormous cost of the Bi will require a stretching out of the Stealth program. They have also stated that the uncertainties of Bi penetration capability after 1990 make an early Stealth IOC a matter of urgent national security. General Ellis. the highly respected. recently retired. SAC commander stated In Senate testimony that: The BIs would have questionable capability In terms of sucecstul penetration to the degree that would be acceptable in warplanning In the early 1090s. Although he stated that a case could be made that developments in electroniccountermeasures. or ECM. might allow our SAC forces to stretch that date beyond 1990. it is a "weak crutch and It is one that could be protected by early development of the ATB." or Stealth. The unique characteristics of the ATB. he further stated. are such that the airplane would cause the Soviets "great difficulty through the 1990s and into the next century."$ There are many unknowns In this game. so the decisions we make are calculated risks. How fast will Soviet air defenses be upgraded? How quickly can technological uncertainties in Stealth be solved? But. as General Ellis again stated. if there are many unknowns in the 1980s. there are a "lot more unknowns In the 1990s." Givim these uncertainties and what is knownm about Stealth capabilities. he c~oncludes that it would be better to "take the risk )n the 1980s than In the 1990s. The earlier we get the ATh the less risk we have in the 1900s." General Davis. the present SAC Commander. admitted In open testimony that going with the Bi would delay Stealth. He said that "lie couldnt afford to proceed at the same pace with ATh if you went with the Bi." As has been stated in this debate before. Senators should not delude themselves as to the serious question of wvhether or not the Bi can penetrate Soviet airspace after 1990. I remind my colleagues that the Secretary of Defense was quoted on November 5. 1981. less than a month ago. that sending our boys Into Soviet air space in a Bi after 1990 would be tantamount to directing "suicide missions and that Is not anything I am going to do." The Secretary reiterated this statement several times. Since that time. he has restated his position. and other officials have had to revamp their arguments. Now we are told the B1 Is Judged able to penetrate Soviet airspace "0well into the 1990s." This changed analysis disturbs me. It reduces my confidence that this bomber decision Is being made on the merits. on the basis of cold technological fact. and with the best risk calculation we can develop. Let us be clear about this scenario. If the Bi could penetrate only until 1990 or thereabouts. it might make sense to still build the airplane as a cruisemissile carrier or conventional bomber. But it only makes sense to do this after we have funded Stealth fully. In other words. If penetration is our top priority. and I think It should be. we must develop Stealth first. Then we should look at the Bi as something we might evaluate as a successor to the B52 in a conventional sense. General Davis was asked his view of these dates. He was asked whether or not he would recommend procurement of the Bi If we knew It could not penetrate Soviet airspace In the "early 1990s." He answered that he could not make such a recommendation. Yet. that is precisely what Is happening. We must ask about what could be characterized a "window of nonpenetrability" between the time when our B52s lose their penetration ability and when the Stealth comes on board. I submit that an accelerated Stealth program. which gave us an IOC in the very early 1990s. would assure us that a penetration gap would not occur. To support this contention. I point to General Davis statement that the B52H. the latest model of which we have about 90 in our inventory. could penetrate to "11989 or so." Indeed. according to public reports the Central Intelligence Agency. in testimony before the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. testified that the B52 force could indeed penetrate Soviet air defense with acceptable degree of risk throughout the reinainder of this decade. Madam President. It may be argued that the Bi would be a more effective penetrator than the B52. but the point is that both aircraft could do the Job. Soviet air defense could be likened to a hitter in baseball. and our bombers as a pitcher on the mound. If the batter can only hit baseballs traveling at 80 miles per hour. It really does not matter If a pitcher can throw a ball at 85 miles an hour or a second pitcher can throw It at 90 miles per hour. Both pitchers will be able to strike out the batter. In other words. both the B52H and Bi can do the job. But if the next batter can it any ball under 100 miles per hour. then we had better be getting a new pitcher ready In the bullpen. Because the betting is that only our Stealth pitcher will be able to win Inning after inning. and game after game. as the decade of the nineties opens up. I want to be sure that It Is the technology. and not the funding level. which limits the pace of the Stealth program. The second point I want to make is that the House of Representatives has funded the Stealth program at the level I am proposing in my amendment. It should be noted also that the House version of this bill is some $11 to $12 billion below the level of the Senate bill. I pose the question. then: Are we to assume that the House is being overly extravagant with this vital program at the same time it Is so far below the Senate appropriations bill In our overall defense spending effort? I do not believe this to be the case. The House also sees the desirability uf avoiding a "window of nonpenetrability" in our strategic bomber systems. Third. I have consulted other Senators who have studied the details of the Stealth program. It should be pointed out that these Senators are well briefed and up to date on the status of the program. I am confident that the present funding level in the bill. as opposed to the full funding I propose. will lead to an IOC that will be measurably delayedat least a year. but more probably longer if the Bi funding eats up more and more of the budget in the outyears. The important thing Is not the $250 million additional for 5ktalth developmenit in fiscal year 1982. The important thing Is the Initiation of a practice of seriously underfunding the development of a technology which. In Its many uses. may very well have a major impact on the SovietAmecrican strategic balance through the end of this century. It could very wvell negate a Soviet air defense infrastructure into which the Russians have invested well over $100 billion thus far. The administration has argued that it will be more successful In conducting negotiations with the Soviets on strategic weaponry only if it goes into those negotiations from a renewed position of strength. Yet. there is a growing feeling that the recent mix of strategic decisions announced by the administration. in reality. only reduces our strategic capabilities. In sum. we intend to retire B52 bombers earlier than previously achedtiled and retire Titan missiles earlier than previously scheduled. There Is nothing to take their place until after 1985. The hardening of our current silos. be they Titan or Minuteman. from what I understand. will not add to our missile survivability. Therefore. It Is probably a waste of money for the lack of a workable program. In the meantime. wve ax*.. delaying a decision on the possibility of a mobil MX basing miode until 1984a 3year delay. Oin top of that. Stealth would be delayed If Congress agrees to the administrations funding request contained in this bill. Furthermore. wve shiall be reducing our procurement of cruise missiles very significantly. from about 5.000 If we kept the B52 in service. down to only 3.000 if we opt for the Bi. In sum. Madam President. this defense appropriations bill does not look like a commitment to strengthen our strategic posture. Indeed. General Davis admitted In open testimony that we "lose capability" with the program funded by this appropriations bill. This is extraordinary. The head of our Strategic Air Command has testified that the strategic program announced by the administration. and funded by this bill. will be providing us with a gradual reduction in our capability over the next 5 years. In my estimation. there are serious flaws in this program which weaken our entire strategic posture. The Senate has a respoinsIbIlity to correct these flaws to the extent it Is possible. The Stealth issue Is merely a part of the problem. but a very important part. It Is possible that the Senate will endorse the administrations decision on the B1. But this administrations policy is purportedly one of pursuing an aggressive Stealth program which will not be sacrificed at the alter of the Bi. I do not have confidence that there are sufficient funds in this bill to carry out the administrations policy on both the Bi and Stealth. and that Is the purpose of my amendment. The Senate should agree here and now that we fund the Stealth technology at the maximum level until the aircraft are all delivered. To those who argue that the tczchnology is not developed enough and that we would only be throwing money at it. I would agree there are risks. But If one goes to the major corporations Involved in the development of Stealth. they will tell one that the risks are no greater than they take with any major new commercial development. Further. it is hard to address risks by conducting only paper research. We have to start spending money to build the equipment in order to find out the potential problems of any premise. To say that since all our Programs slip. so must this one. Is simply throwing In the towel. It is the same criticism that this administration leveled at the previous administrations defense program. Madam President. Our leverage with the Soviets rests upon exploiting our technology to the fullest and Stealth represents the most advanced technology we have the capability of developing in a critical strategic program. If we fail to provide adequate resources for the Stealth program. it would be a tragic mistake. Madam President. my amendment would fulfill a commitment made by the administration that the Stealth program would be funded at the fastest prudent pace. I share that commitment. My amendment Is putting the resources behind the administrations commitment. I urge the adoption of the amendment. Madam President.