Date: 1981-09-14
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. the announcement of cuts In our Nations defense program by the administration over the weekend raises some serious concerns. It presents fundamental questions about the adequacy of our longterm defense effort. and about the credibility of American staying power. The Initial spending levels announced this past March. by the administration were certainly not carved In stonethey were. after all. this administrations best estimate of how the Nation should meet -the formidable challenges posed to us by the Soviet Union. Changes could be expectk*J as we went along. but the general level of effort seemed appropriate. Now. suddenly. we are reducing by over onethird the Increased outlays previously announced over the Carter budget for reasons totally unrelated to our real defense needs. it seems to me. The administrations initial reaction to the growing military Imbalance with the Soviet Union received widespread bipartisan support. The first Installment of this defense program was overwhelmingly approved by the Senate In the fiscal year 1982 defense authorization bill. The polls showed a national consensus in favor of the need for higher levels of spending in order to Invest In and sustain the forces America needed to meet the Soviet challenge. to lead the Western alliance. and to support new commitments in the Persian Gulf. The consensus which was forged. and which I believe still exists. Is grounded on a real belef that there is no higher priority than the defense of the United States. The level of our defense. the adequacy of our forces. and the credibility of our word. cannot be whipsawed by a changing balance sheet manipulated by the Office of Management and Budget. It Is no secret that the men who are charged with seeing to It that Americas defenses are where they should bethe Secretary of Defense and Senators in this bodywere alarmed by the prospects of the cuts which have just been announced. In his presentations supporting the budget submissions to Congress. the Secretary of Defense made a convincing case that renewed defense efforts were overdue. His presentations were substantiated by an analysis of the comparative Soviet and American defense effort released by the Central Intelligence Agency last February. The CIA documented a very serious divergence In the Soviet and American defense efforts over the last decade. in the aggregate. for the 197180 period. the CIA estimated that the dollar costs of Soviet defense activities were 40 percent higher than comparable U.S. outlava. Last year their expenditures were fully 50 percent higher than our own. The disparity in strategic forces. as documented In the analysis. is alarming. Including intercontinental missiles and ballistic missile firing submarines the Soviet effort was triple our own. In general purpose forces. including land forces. tactical air. naval and mobility capabilityairlift and sealiftthe Soviet effort was 60 percent higher than our own. Even in naval forces. an area In which It. Is absolutely crucial for an island maritime nation like our own to be preeminent. the Soviets have challenged our supremacy. The general drift against the United States In the comparative balance of military forces with the Soviet Union was emphasized and reemphasized by the President during his election campaign. It was highlighted and rehighlighted by his chief advisers as they strove to persuade the Congress to accept their new budget formulations. Secretary Weinberger. in his presentation before the Senate reiterated the driving point: President Reagan had an "election mandate to rebuild our defense capability." The defense budgets of the previous administration had been "underfunded." he stated. Again. he said: The operating levels assumed In those budgets reflect a much mare tranquil view of the International political scene than actually exists. Those budgets simply will not support the desired military capability." The shortfalls In our military capabilities were virtually across the board. There is a "growing Imbalance In our strategic forces. while our conventional force structure Is too small and lacks sufficient mobility. readiness. and sustainability". said Secretary Weinberger. While we ietrenched in the decade of the 1970s. the Soviets. he maintained. "embarked upon a military buildup unprecedented in world history." They have "relentlessly improved their military capabilities all across the spectrum." Thus the budgets of thO recent past have been inadequate to support our widespread commitments. They have lead to a diminution of confidence In the United States abroad. They have tempted Soviet adventurism. We must strengthen our presence In Southwest Asia since Southwest Asia will be the "fulcrum of contention for the foreseeable future." The sum and substance of everything we have heard so far is that major new investments must be made now in strategic forces and in conventional forces. We must be prepared to meet several contingenciesin different parts of the globeat the same time. On arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union the policy is to go slowly until we improve our capabilities. Our allies have been exhorted to Increase their defense effort. Deputy Defense Secretary Carlucci received prominent attention across Europe In March when he told our allies that the Soviet military buildup exceeds any rational requirement for defense. that on "all levels of military capability. the trends are ominous." He bluntly pressed European governments to both Increase their overall defense effort and to Increase their force projections outside the European theater. Particularly Into south-. west Asia. The Secretary of the Navy and our top admirals have stated with unprecedented bluntness that for the first time the United States has lost Its historic edge In naval forces. The Chief of Naval Operations stated In February the "trends of the last decade have led us to this point where even a slim margin of superiority has to be set aside." He continued. "For the first time In anyones recollections. the U.S. Navy Is unable fully to meet Its peacetime commitments" and would have to vacate essential areas of the world to respond to an emergency. The upshot of the rhetoric of the first 9 months of this administration has been that a massive military rebuilding program should be launched . The projected spending program. In gross terms. did not appear to be unreasonablefrom the viewpoints either of the Imbalances with the Soviet Union or of historic levels of defense spending in America. The Reagan program. as originally announced. would have provided a defense budget which comprise&. about 32 percent of the national budget. Although these percentages are higher than those during most of the 1970s. they are considerably lower than comparable figures from the end of World War 31 up through the early 1970s. In 1060. for Instance. nearly onehalf of the entire national budget went to defense. Over the period covered by fiscal years 108284. the Reagan administration originally projected increases In outlays of $38.1 billion above the previous administrations budget. This increase represents the additional oash outlays. the additional spending beyond what would have occurred under the Carter program. The cuts announced this week. amountIng to $13 billion In outlayrs for those 3 fiscal years. reduces the Reagan administrations addons by 34 percent. There is no rationale. from a military standpoint. for these outs. They are purely and simply dictated by budgetary expediency. The difficulty has riot been In understanding the need for significant increases in the defense budget. It has been in the lack of detailed rationale within the budget. The strong national consensus to meet the Soviet challenge must be sustained by specific Justifications. Although the administration has exhorted us to expand our forces to meet a multiplicity of challenges. both conventional and strategic. It has not identified what contingencies we are likely to face. and what new forces. alliances and strategies must be designed to meet them. Since details of the Nations longterm defense program have not been made available. Indeed perhaps have not yet even been developed. it has been Impossible to determine whether the specific spending levels were adequate to do the job. For Instance. the administration has stated that Soviet investments in Intercontinental missiles may soon permit them to demolish our landbased missile force In a first strike. It has stated that -our aging B.-52 bomber force will be inadequate to perform Its mission by the end of the decade. Yet it has not been able to make any recommfendations on what kind of missile force and bomber force we should produce to correct this problem. Delay and more delay characterize our our straSS 5 S3 tegic decisions. Naturally. withoui these decisions. It cannot be known what the price tag in the strategic area will be. In the key sector of naval forces. the administration has stated that its goal should be a Navy of about 600 ships. up from the present active force of about 450. By law. the submission of a 5year Navy shipbuilding program is required to accompany the executive branch budget submission each year. This plan has not yet been made available. What knd of Navy ire we going to build? How many ships? What kind of ships? The answers are not available. and so we cannot know the price tag. We are clearly commiting ourselves to a firstline defense of the Persian Gulf. How will we do It? What kind of forces will It take? Where are the plans for the new equipment. weapons and military doctrines necessary to credibly guarantee our commitment there? Since the details of our longterm role In the Persian Gulf are not available. we cannot know with any precision what the longterm costs will be. And so. the cuts announced by the administration are as painless as the increases originally announced. There Is an increasing air of unreality over the defense budget process. Neither the Increases nor the decreases can be identified with the specifics of a defense program. There are those who have been arguing that even the March budget projections were inadequate to buy the forces needed In all these areas. Yet without a specific program we cannot possibly know what level of spending is appropriate. But whatever level of spending should be appropriate. it must directly related to our defense needs. to the strength of the West. to the Soviet challenge. These realities cannot be wishedaway on the altar of a balanced budget. The administration cannot simply rediscover high interest rates and cut back its increases over -the previous defense budget by fully onethird. It Is Irresponsible -to delay all the tough decisions in defense in order to wait on the success of the administrations economic program. The fragile consensus supporting significant spendIng Increases will not last forever. The Natioft needs a visible. tangible military program. The time for rhetoric has long passed. I do not believe the Senate .should endorse somersaults on military spending without the assurance that a carefully developed and effective defense policy will be put into place. It is not too much to expect that such a policy. and the costs necessary to implement It. be articulated without further delay. Mr. President. do I have any time remaining?