Date: 1994-02-09
Speaker: PETE GEREN (democrat)
Chamber: H
State: Texas

Mr. Speaker. the carnage of last weekend in the former Yugoslavia that was brought into all of our living rooms over the television set I fear has brought us to the brink of intervention in a bloody 1.000yearold civil war in what was the former Yugoslavia. Mr. Speaker. as we consider this as a Congress and as a nation. I think it is important that we consider it very soberly and consider the implications. blueprint to lead us into this postcoldwar era. a blueprint that has been used repeatedly over and over by our great military leaders since that time. Let me quote from that speech: I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons. and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me now share them with you: First. the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand.. as we did with Korea in 1950. that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter. Second. if we decide it Is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation. we should do so wholeheartediy. and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives. we should not commit them at all. Of course if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives. then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland. small combat forces then could perhaps have prevented the Holocaust of World War II. Third. if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas. we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have andsend the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote. "No one starts a war--or rather. no one in his senses ought to do sowithout first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war. and how he intends to conduct it.. War may be different today than in Clausewltzs time. but the need for welldefined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests. then we must send forces capable to do the joband not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping. Fourth. the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committedtheir size. composition and dispositionmust be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change. then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national interest?" "Does our national interest require us to fight. to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes". then we must win. If the answers are "no". then we should not be in combat. Fifth. before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad. there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face. the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or. as in the case of Vietnam. in effect asking our troops not to win. but just to be there. Finally. the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. As we as a nation consider this weighty decision. I think that we must reflect back on these questions asked by Secretary Weinberger and also ask ourselves is this a fight we are willing to go to the finish. I do not think so. Mr. Speaker. I hope that the carnage of the last weekend. the .tremendous emotional appeal and the desire of every honorable person in the world to do something about this does not cause us to act imprudently. I fear that the Bosnian crisis is a riddle without an American solution.