Date: 1981-11-17
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. the control of nuclear weaponry has become a matter of increasing urgency and difficulty at several different levels. At the level of strategic Intercontinental delivery systems. the administration has taken the position that the SALT II agreement was "fatally flawed." and America must rebuild her strategic systems in order to negotiate a new treaty from a Position of greater strength. The goal of the new negotiations is said to be arms "reduction." rather than "$limitation." There are serious problems with this approach. First. the strategic weapons recommendations made by the administration have been termed "Interim" in nature. The decision to build a Bi will cost so much over the next 5 years that the present Strategic Air Commander has stated the vital Stealth program will be stretched out. We simply cannot afford two new bombers at once. Furthermore. the decision .to harden existing Titan and Minuteman silos. to place the MX missiles in them. does nothing to reduce the vulnerability of our ICBM force to Soviet attack. Indeed. the administrations program calls for early retirement of portions of our B52 and ICBM force. and may well make us more vulnerable in the mid1980s than we would have been under the program of the Previous administration. The net result of these decisions. decisions dictated by severe budget constraints rather than defense needs. is that the position of greater strength looks more and more illusory. Does this mean that we will delay the initiation of strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union Indefinitely? Apparently not. since administration officials are saying that such talks will begin sometime next spring. The second difficulty relates to the upcoming negotiations with the Soviets on the question of nuclear weapons in the European theater. It is essential that the American position In those negotiations appears serious and credible since the pressure is mounting on European governments to back off from their cornmltment to deploy such weapons in 1983. Our NATO partners expect us to negotiate the TNF question within the overall strategic arms framework. Indeed. Secretary Haig signed a communique with the other NATO defense midnisters on May 5. 1981. which stated that the 110 * allies welcome the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on theater nuclear forces arms control within the SALT framework by the end of the year." The Problem here is that the administration. while rejecting SALT II. has not developed any of Its own concrete arms reduction proposals around which the Alliance could rally. The danger exists. therefore. that the Soviets are being handed an opportunity to submit attractive proposals this year which could divide the Alliance and accelerate European tendencies to repudiate. American leadership on the TN? deployment . The situation has been needlessly exacerbated by recent assertions that a nuclear conflict may be plausibly limited to European soil. Needless to say. such statements make implementation of the TN? deployment schedule more difficult. They put us in a more difficult position in the upcoming negotiations. They provide the Soviets with propaganda opportunitiesopportunities which they skillfully exploit across Europeto posture as genuine proponents of arm control. All that Is occurring as they continue to deploy their SS20 medium range ballistic missiles at the rate of one a weekmaking the Imbalance of nuclear forces continually worse. . A third difficulty Is that technological developments will make the successful conclusion of verifiable arms control agreements more difficult as time goes on. For example. U.S. cruise missile deployments introduce new elements of uncertainty into the equation. and the eventual Production and deployment of similar Soviet weaponry will compound the uncertainties. The distinguished Senator from Georgia. Senator NUNN. a highly respected Member of this body on defense issues. has made a valuable contribution to the discussion of these matters In a guest editorial Published In the November 12. 1981. edition of the Washington Post. He suggests that institutional changes withIn the U.S. Government are needed In order to bring more coherence and consistency to American arms control efforts over time. He points out that more coordination Is needed between Defense Department decisionmakers and administration arms controllers. Indeed. without more attention to this problem. our efforts to build a strong consensus within NATO on these matters may be doorfied to failure. In addition to these matters. however. Senator NUNN identifies with great clarity a problem now developing as a result of the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology: The possibility of nuclear weapons use by irresponsible parties to blackmail the West. to conduct nuclear terrorism. or even to precipitate a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Senator NUNN surmises that the number of nucleararmed nation states could grow from 8 to 20 by the end of this century. He speculates on a number of frightening. but certainly. "plausible. scenarios in which these weapons could plunge the world Into a nuclear crisis. whether through. 4tonations- of unknown origin or through outright blackmail. Thus. he points out that arms reduction or limitation principles must now be supplemented by a new conceptto control the potential use of such weapons in a crisissocalled crisis -stability. Since there is no international mechanism to decisively contain these new possibilities of nuclear war. it seems clear that the United States and the Soviet Union bear a responsibility to work together on this crisismanagement problem. Obviously. the problem is but a subset of the whole question of nuclear arms control arrangements which must be developed by the superpowers. It is one more important reason why the United States must make renewed efforts to develop. in detail. its arms control policies as soon as possible and to initiate serious negotiations with the Soviets. I commend Senator NUNN for his continuing contributions to the debate on our Nations defense posture and congratulate him for this thoughtprovoking article. I commend my colleagues attention to It and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.