Date: 1981-07-10
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. there is a strong national consensus that the United States must rebuild Its defenses. President Reagan has proposed a 5year defense budget amounting to a staggering $1.3 tilllion to meet the Soviet challenge. The Senate has strongly endorsed the first stage of this plan In passing a very costly defense authorization bill for next year. Although these steps were imperative. they represent only the beginning of a defense policy. First and foremost. an effective defense policy cannot be formulated without reference to a fully developed foreign policy. The hard decisions on what kind of defense systems and equipment we need cannot be made without an understanding of where we are going In the world. The administration has stated that we must expand our forces to meet a multiplicity of challenges. both conventional and strategic. and that they may come simultaneously. But it has not identified what contingencies we are likely to face. and what new forces. alliances. and strategies must be designed to meet them. I share the administrations view that a serious imbalance has developed with the Soviet Union In the area of strategic forces. Two of the legs of our strategic Triadour land missile and bomber fleetsmay not be able to perform their mission in the near future. Although the administration has called attention to this situation In alarming terms. it has made virtually no decision to correct It. In addition. the arms control policy of this Nation is now In limbo. Indeed. the Presidents nominee to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency testified that he does not know the issues we would want to negotiate. A policy of rearm first. talk later. if it continues much longer. will seriously damage the NATO alliance. It will make it Increasingly difficult to salvage the best parts of our previous negotiations with the Soviets. Finally. p3erhaps the most difficult military problem we face today is manpower. Congress has had to mandate minimum numbers of high school graduates for the AllVolunteer Force. and there is a growing concern that the force will not be able to deliver the men needed to man our expanding forces. We will be dreadfully short of men if we must mobilize to meet an emnergencyor a series of emergencies as Secretary Weinberger suggests. The situation will worsen over the next decade as the pool of eligible men declines by some 16 percent. The answer the administration has given for this problem Is that increased pay and benefits will somehow produce additional men. The administration Is so confident of this proposition that there are Indications President Reagan may abandon the current registration system. though it has worked well and substantially enhances our ability to mobilize. There is no doubt that immediate and substantial increases In our defense effort are badly needed. The worldwvide challenge to American and Western Interests by the Soviet Union cannot be met with the inadequate defense budgets we have had over the last decade. In the 1970s. while wve retrenched from our bitter Vietnam experience. the Soviets expanded their military outlays to about 40 percent above ours. Last year according to the Central Intelligence Agency. the Soviet Unions expenditures were fully 50 percent higher than our own. These efforts have been spread acrosstheboard. from strategic to general purpose conventional forces. Beyond this expansion. the Soviets have shown a willingness and an ability to operate In areas far removed from their homeland. Frthermore. as Afghanistan illustrates. they are not reluctant to destroy the sovereignty of their neighbors when presented with an opportunity. And as Poland illustrates. the Soviets are not reticent to use the threat of massive force to Influence the politics of other nations. We would be foolhardy to assume that they value the peaceful development of world order in the same way we do. The first administration defense authorization emphasizes the modernizaA ton and readiness of the forces and equipment already in our Inventory. It buys more of the same ships. Jets. and tanks. Yet. at the same time. It Is clear that we are committing ourselves to new areas of the world. The Persian (Sulf is a case In point. I agree with the need for a frontline defense of the vital interests of the West In that region. But where are the plans for the kind of new equipment. weapons. and military doctrines necessary to credibly guarantee our commitment there? The administration has indicated that if the Soviets attempt to strangle the Industrial lifelines of the West in the Persian Gulf. we may take tnunitive action against Soviet interests elsewhere. This begs the ouestion: Are we committed to forging the new hardware. new strategy. new tactics. and new relationships with the Indian. Ocean States which will show we can effectively prevail if a crisis arises? There Is a comnelling need for a clearly articulated forelan policy toward the Persian Gulf. Military policy will then more easiy be put into place and planning can go forward. There are many Senators who believp that we need more than rhetoric and budgeb Increases to have an effective defense policy. The argument Is made that we need lighter. less costly. simpler weapons. smaller aircraft carriers and diesel submarines. for example. equipment better suited for desert warfare. vehicles less cumbersome than the heavy M1 tank. less complex aircraft. While this case is being made rather persuasively. I was dismayed that Secretary Weinberger recently dismissed such arguments out of hand. He said we would have to continue to rely on the big and complex weapons now In our inventoriesthe super aircraft carriers. the heavy tanks. and the ultrasophisticated jet fighters. It simply stands to reason that new commitments in more areas of the world require more military hardware. It stands to reason that It must be less costly or we will not have enough of It. We will never reach the 650 ship goal desired by the Navy. for instance. If we continue to build supercarriers and nuclearpowered attack submarines of the kind we ame now building. We cannot afford the numbers of these systems we would need. Even ifwe could buy them. they may be inappropriate to our new commitments outside the European theater. I have been particularly concerned over the lack of progress in the strategic weapons situation. The manned bomber Is a case In point. Congress has authorized over $2 billion for a new manned strategic boinber In fiscal year 1982. Yet. we had to authorize this money without an administration recommendation on which bomber to build. It seems quite clear that our bomber fleet must be able to perform at least two priority missions: First. it muist be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses with a high degree of assurance. second. it should be able to serve as . a cruise missile launching platform. As far as penetration is concerned. the only bomber which can perform this mission in the late 1980s and mid1990s is the socalled Stealth aircraft. The present B.-52 force will be unable to do so. And the B1 aircraft. from all I understand. will be unable to do so. Fortunately. the B52 fleet Is now being upgraded to carry cruise missiles and will be completely converted by 1988. The first aircraft will be fitted out this September. and a squadron of 15 aircraft will be on station in December of By1988. 172 of these planes will be carrying 20 cruise missiles eacha formidable force. And by 1988. if we accelerate the development of the Stealth aircraft. we may well solve the penetration Issue. This Is not going to happen If this administration builds a fleet of Bis. First. the cost per copy has now at least doubled since 1977. A fleet of 100 Bis Will now cost at least $20 billion and probably substantially more. What will we buy with this $20 to $30 billion bomber? A Penetrating bomber? No. And because of problems in the production base as well as cost. building the Bi will delay the development of Stealth. Indeed. the Strategic Air Command fears we may lose Stealth If the B31 goes forward. Will. we buy a cruisemissile launching platform with the Bi? Certainly. we will. But we already are well on our way toward such a platform with the retrofitting of our B52s. It makes very little sense to buy a new cruise missile platform for well over $20 billion. when we are already putting one into place for a fraction of that cost. This logic seems so clear to me that I am perplexed over the administrations proscrastInation on the bomber decision. The delay in this decision is harmIng the national Interest. There are elements in the Air Force. and powerful contractors associated with them. that have much to lose If the Bi system Is rejected. There is evidence that some of these officials and/or contractors have recently gone out of bounds In their attempts to push the B1. and that sensitive Information about our bomber technologies has been provided to the media.. I have asked the President to take action against those individuals who may have released this Information. These reckless tactics could have been shortcircuited by the administration if a bomber decision. strictly on the merits. had been made In time to meet the congressionally mandated March 15. 1980. deadline. The more the decision Is delayed. the more the national Interest may be damaged by what is fast becoming a high stakes money game among bomber factions. The door on this aspect of our deIfense posture should have been shut months ago. Further procrastination Is unwarranted. Control of strategic weapons is a matter of concern to every person on this Planet. The President has indicated that he is serious about arms control and that lie would make every effort to negotiate real reductions with the Soviets. It Is puzzling. however. to sue the nearly complete. lack of movement toward negotiations. The Secretary of Defense has recently stated that before we negotiate. we must "first make America strong again." It is unclear as to where this policy leads us. We must do everything that Is necessary to keep America strong and to make It strong where it is not strong. But the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to Impoverish their own people In order to build a formidable military machine. The simple proposition that we have to build before we talk does not make sense. We can and must do both at once. If the Soviets are not truly Interested In this process. a serious American effort will go far toward convincing our allies that our perception of the threat Is correct and that they must take further measures to contain it themselves In concert with us. The present course simply gives the Soviets the patently unearned advantage of posturing as the real exponents of arms control. It puts us In an unnecessarily difficult position when we press Europe to expand Its forces and commitments in a more even partnership with us.: History teaches that the single most Important tool of a military machine Is the human element. a tough army of men dedicated to one another and the larger national causemen who will be good soldiers because their primary motivation is loyalty. not money. This could well be the Achilles heel of our defense program. President Reagan has embraced an All Volunteer Force concept that will not be able to deliver the additional 200.000 or more men needed to flesh out the expanded military forces of the 1980s. The All Volunteer Force is fundamientally unrepresentative of the larger society. It is short a quarter of a million reservists who would be needed immediately in an emergency. and. yet. we are throwing in pay raises and expanding benefits in an effort to buy our way out of conscription. To make matters worse. the administration seems intent on eliminating the registration system now in place. a registration system which has worked well and substantially enhances our ability to mobilize. In a world where signals count. this Is a signal that we are sof t. Equally Important. the less firsthand exrosure middleclass America has to the military experience. the less the Nation will understand the need to maintain an effective human fighting force. The tendency will grow to make money and technology the solutions to our defense needs. It would be very interesting to know what the cost will be. Mr. President. to our children and grandchildren as the Personnel from the volunteer force retire more and more during the next 10. 20. or 30 years. I think that If we had some knowledge of the cost that will accrue from those retirements the amounts would be staggering. Mr. President. no more graphic illustration of the high value of small unit esprit de corps and patriotism can be found than the tough and effective resistance being made by the Afghans. With minimal weaponry against the vastly more technologically sophisticated Soviet military machine. the Soviets are denied control over most of the countryside and major portions of the urban areas. In conclusion. Mr. President. the American People deserve an effective defense Policy. Big budgets are not In themselves Policythey must serve as the tools of Policy. Clearly. we need a higher level of spending. but the emphasis must be on designing our forces *to approuriately match detailed strategies and specific contingency Planning. in turn. these strategies must be guided by a coherent and fully developed foreign Policy. To date. the underlying rationale of where we are going has not been articulated. and we cannot know whether the increased billions for defense are going to be well spent. Major decisions must be made In virtually every areain strategic arms. In the type of conventional forces we will need. In arms control. and In manpower. Tough talk and antiSoviet rhetoric may be good. They have their Place. But big defense budgets will be needed. and T support adequate defense spending. These. however. are the easy decisions. We are waiting now for the hard ones to be made. Mr. President. do I have any further time remaining?