Date: 1981-10-21
Speaker: ROBERT C. BYRD (democrat)
Chamber: S

Mr. President. in the words of one of my favorite poets. James Russell Lowell: Once to every man and nation Comes the moment to decide In the strife of truth with falsehood For the good or evil side. Today. I .am announcing my decision on the administrations proposed sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. This has not been an easy decision for me. as I know it has not been an epsy decision for many of my colleagues. For almost every argument I have heard for the sale I can offer an equally persuasive argument against the sale. and. conversely. for every argument against the sale. I can offer an. equally convincing argumient. at least In my viewpoint. for it. In other words. the terms of the debate as currently structured leave me unable to make a decision. For example. the argument Is made that the Saudis are our friends in the region and we need to make good on a commitment to them. I think it is equally persuasive to argue that our being too close to the Saudis may not in the long run be In their best interests and. therefore. not In our own best Interests. Therefore. I feel it is impossible to try to add up pros. add up the cons. and place them on a balance to see which weighs heavier. I have met with officials of this administrationSecretary of State. Alexander Haig. National Security Advisor. Richard Allen. and Under Secretary of State. James Buckley. I have talked with President Reagan privately in the Oval Office and by telephone. and I have had a brief discussion by telephone with former President Carter. who has addressed a letter to me on the subject. which I shall later insert in the RECORD. I have discussed the proposed sale with former Secretary of Defense. Harold Brown: former National Security Advisor. Zbigniew Brzezinski. and former Secretary of Defense. James Schlesinger. I have listened to Senators on both sides of the aisle. I have been willing to lPsten to any Senator or anyo.-.e else who wishes to talk in this ear. any Senator or anyone else who wishes to talk in this other ear. but I have steadfastly refused to be "lobbied" by anybody. I have talked with numerous West Virginians. and read the letters from my constituents. Three former Presidents have expressed support for the AWACS sale. and certainly this support by three prior Presidents and their advisors must carry Important weight for us. In my view. there is only one Issue Involved in a matter of this importance. and that is whethtr or not it will serve the interests of the United States. The overarching question which should guide our discussion is this: What is the best course for America to steer toward a lasting peace in the Middle East? That must be the top priority. for. without peace. other longterm goals In that region will never be achieved. It is apparent at the outset that the proposed sale of sophisticated aircraft and the associated equipment and weaponry is but a subsidiary piece of what must be a broader policy determination by this Government. And It is precisely because a coherent policy framework for the United States in the Middle East has not yet been developed by this administration. that the decision on AWACS hap been so difficult for me and many of my colleagues. In deciding the merits of this relatively narrow questionthe sale some 4 years hence of 5 AWACS aircraft as well as enhancements for fighter planes already agreed towe have had to extend ourselves into presumptions. hypothetical scenarios. and guesswork about the sales impact on the deeper currents running In the politics of the Middle East. These calculations unfortunately lack the perspective which a larger policy framework would lend to them. The crying need today is for action on the larger issues which are burning for resolution in that tragic region. From the outset. the issue of AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia unfortunately has been politicized. affording little opportunity to weigh the merits of the case. Issues peripheral to the debate have come to dominate the headlines. obscuring deep concerns that I. and many of my colleagues. have regarding the sale. For example. some have expressed concern that the AWACS technology could be used to give the Saudis a capability of offensive action against Israel. However. the administration has addressed this Issue In some detail. and I am generally satisfied that the assurances we have received from the Saudis. as well as the continued close cooperation in the use and maintenance of tho aircraft and our complete commitment to Israels security. minimize this danger. The existence of a Saudi AWACS will not significantly alter the balance of air forces visavis the Israelis. Even if the Saudis were to attempt to use AWACS In a war against Israel. according to a staff study by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. they would probably not succeed. and the costs to the Saudis would be very high. If the Saudis were to attempt such an attack alone. according to the study: The effectiveness of such an attack would be limited ... by AWACS equipment limitstations. Israeli jammings and E20 capabilities. terrain masking. AWACS vulnerability. and possible early warning from U.S. maintenance personnel. The costs for Baudi Arabia *could be severe in termis of Israeli military retaliation and severed Military tics with the United States. It should also be observed that earlier this year the Saudis used their influence. through quiet diplomacy. to help secure a reduction In tensions In Lebanon. Indeed. our envoy in the Lebanese situation. Mr. Philip Habib. has stated that the Saudi Influence in the Lebanese situation was essential. to the ceasefire agreement in the country. Another hypothetical situation put forward by some analysts Is a possible Saudi attempt to link up. -with Syrian and Jordanian command centers in a coordinated attack. The Saudis have agreed. however. according to the administration. that no Saudi AWACSgathered i nformation will be shared with third countries or parties without prior mutual consent of the United States. If this aspect of the SaudiAmerican agreement were to be violated. such information sharing would have to be practiced beforehand and be immediately obvious to us. In that case. we are told that we would have advance warning and could act to prevent this development. I think it is Important to underscore. forcefully. the following points. The vote on this Issue is not a test of the United StatesSaudi relationship. as some would have it. or a test of the United StatesIsraeli relationship. as others would have it. This Is not a test between the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the United States as to who will call the shots in our foreign policy. These are peripheral Issues which obscure and obfuscate the fundamental concerns which Congress must address In arriving at a decision on this matter. The real issue is that the Congress of the United States is being called upon to acquiesce in a major foreign policy decision impacting upon a vital. but highly volatile. region of the world. We are being called upon to make such a decision In the absence of a clearly defined or workable policy for the Middle East on the part of the administration. In attempting to arrive at a prudent decision on this matter. all we are given by the administration is some vague notion that it is Important for the U.S. to florge a "strategic consensus" In that region. It is upon this fragile reed alone that the administration predicates its foreign policy in the Middle East. Somehow. in the absence of addressing directly the potentially explosive ArabIsraeli issues. the administration hopes to bring the adversaries in the region together in some loose strategic alliance to counter the threat of the Soviet. Union and her proxies. However. the Middle East peace process must be brought back to the forefront of our policy. and significant progress demonstrated for any strategic consensus on the Soviet threatto be viable. At present. in light of the assassination of President Sadat. I do not know wvhere events will lead us in the Middle East. but I am deeply concerned. Mr. President. I have no Idea what the administration is doing relative to the Middle East. In the absence of a coherent policy. the administration has reacted with a series of ad hoc and illconceived responses to events rooted primarily in the ArabIsraeli dispute and not the Soviet threat. As a consequence. these responses have been contradictory and have served to undermine ouir fundamental goal In the regionand that fundamental goal is the promotion of peace and stability. The administrations actions toward Mr. Begin have. In my judgment. already given him too little incentive to pursue Camp David. To his credit. Mr. Begin has committed his government to complete the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai scheduled for next April. But much more Is to be expected of Mr. Begin. Mr. Begin has been given a large historic opportunityit is to replace Mr. Sadat as the key architect of peace at this Juncture. Surely no one is more aware of this than Mr. Begin himself. He is capable of exhibiting great political courage In this matter. and the circumstances demand nothing less. The central Issue for American policy in the Middle East is the ArabIsraeli dispute. and not the Soviet threat to tile region. This is not to say that there is not a Soviet threat. Soviet influenccs. direct and indirect. are a primary and destructive force throughout the region. The Soviets. through their proxies and clients in the Yemens. Ethiopia. Libya. Iraq. Syria. and elsewhere. are proinotIng Instabilities which could be a primary cause of a major war there. The American answer can only partly be the arming of our friends. for this does nothing to resolve the central Irritationwhich iz the ArabIsrael dispute. We must take Immediate action to settle the issues In that dispute. including the breathing of new life into the Camp David peace process as well as broadenIng that process to include a resolution of the Palestinian question. The fundamental questions of the status of the West Bank and Jerusalem. tile future of the Palestinians. and the right of Israel to live in recognized. secure borders are the paramount issues. and they will not go away. The administration has expended most of its time and capital to date In attempting to build an antiSoviet strategic consensus among our friendsincluding the Israelis. Egyptians. Saudis. the Gulf States. and Jordan. Yet. such a consensus would only be viable if the ArabIsraeli issues are resolved. In resolving them. a strategic consensus would become viable. If there Is no progress in resolving them. it would seem impossible to develop such a regional consensus. The Egyptians and Israelis took the initiative to reopen the autonomy talks on the West Bank and Gaza which were called for In the Camp David accords. The United States did not throw its prestige and creativity Into those talks. It should have done so. Under the Camp David framework. May 16. 1980. was the target date for elections of the selfgoverning authorities on the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli military governments were to have been dismantled and Israeli troops withdrawn Into special locations af ter the establishment of administrative councils. That deadline Is 18 months overdue. June 16. 1080. was the deadline for establishment of selfgoverning authorities In those areas. This was to have been the beginning of a 5year transitional period of selfrule. That deadline was missed. Prime Minister Begin visited Washington last month. His visit followed a series of Israeli actions -which have not been helpful to the peace process. The use of Americansupplied jet aircraft to destroy a nuclear reactor in Iraq was a preemptive strike which reasonable men could hardly be comfortable in defining as "defensive" in nature. Yet. further deliveries of sophisticated American jet aircraft are going forward. despite the violation of the condition. that such transfers be for defensive purposes only. Further. Mr. Begin has endorsed Israeli legislation annexing all of Jerusalem as Israels eternal capitol. and there Is a growing perception that Mr. Begin is unwilling to permit any real local control over the West Bank by Arab authorities. All these signs point In the direction of an Israeli intransigence in the peace process which discourages hope of tangible progress on the difficult questions which must be resolved. During Prime Minister Begins visit to Wazihington last month the issues of the West Bank. Jerusalem. the autonomy talks. and the future of the Palestinians were not raised by our Government In any meaningful fashion. What was announced was the creation of a new "strategic relationship" with Israel. thereby creating new suspicions on the part of moderate Arabs that the Palestinian Issue was being forced further Into the background by the administration. Subsequent to the visit of Prime minister Begin. the administration has Pressed forward with the arms sale package to Saudi Arabia. undercutting any leverage we might have with the Israelis !n obtaining substantive movement on the Palestinian Issue. In the wake of the assassination of President Sadat. the administration is now emphasizing that the United Stateoq would Protect Saudi Arabia from any external or internal threat. transferring the mantle of a client state from Egypt to the Royal Kingdom. I was talking a few days ago with a very high official of this Government and he said that to me. He said that the United States would Protect Saudi Arabia from any external or Internal matters. I said. "How can You do it?" It was obvious that he did not anticipate that question. He really had no answer. He spoke of proxies. Mr. President. It seems to me a very weak ground upon which to make such a bold. broad statement. All of these Pronouncements. or policy Initiatives. if they can be characterized as such. were made in the absence of any consultation with the Congress All are contradictory to achieving our goals in the region. And all commit this Nation to a future course which may Intensify rather than alleviate the Immediate threats to the region. On October 15. 1 addressed the Senate regarding the concerns I had as they related to our Policy In the Middle East. Nobody paid any attention to those concerns. I suppose no one will today. At that time I noted the following: in an effort to build a strategic consensus that the Soviet union constitutes the major and most immediate threat to thle vital interests in the Persian Gulf. Secretary of State Alexander Haig undertook a mission to the Middle East In April of tis year. At that time. he found A Saudi Arabia. primarily concerned with the irresolution of the Palestinian question. and he found a Jordan even more so. In Israel. the threat posed by both the Syrian Army and heavily armied PLO units In Lebanon was uppermost in the minds of Prime Minister Begin and his closest advisers. Sub~sequent to the Secretarys trip. we have witnessed the Syrian missile crisis in Lebanon. the Israeli destruction or Iraqs nuclear reactor. terrorist attacks on Israels civilian population. and the Israeli bombing raid on PLO offices In Beirut which killed an estimated 300 civilians. We have received repeated warnings from Saudi officials that Israel constitutes the only real threat to peace and stability In the Middle East. Now. we are confronted with the latest tragic chapter In the ArabIsraeli disputethe assassination of President Sadat. In sum. not one development in the Middle East this year has involved direct Soviet action and there is no 4vidence to even suggest Indirect Soviet involvement. Yet. this administration is attempting to establish a tacit regional consensus on meeting the Soviet threat among actors In the region whose primary focus is on the ArabIsraeli dispute. And It Is within this context that the sale LOf AWACS to Saudi Arabia must be placed. Mr. President. there are three fundamental principles upon which our policy toward the Middle East should be based. First. our commitment to the security of Israel is. and always should be. unwavering and uncompromising. Second. in light of the Importance of Persian Gulf oil to the industrial health of the West. and In recognition of the strategic geography of the Persian Gulf. it is Important that thiti region be secured against any threat. And third. we should Immediately begin refocusing on the ArabIsraeli peace process since it is the major obstacle to the administrations ability to forge a strategic consensus In response to the Soviet threat and represents the most Imnmediate threat tc stability In the region. Within this framework. I would like to address three of the principal concerns I have regarding this sae. First. we are transferring highly soPhIsticateci technology which. if comPromised. could be of significant benefit to the Soviet AWACS program. This should be as much an Issue of sovereignty for the United States as It is for Saudi. Arabia. Second. we are launching an everescalating round of sophisticated weapons transfers to a highly volatile region of the world in which the primary fous of concern for the countries In the region remains the ArabIsraeli conflict. not the Soviet threat. I shall never forget my visit to the refugee camps in Jericho. Jordan. in 1955. when I traveled there as a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The bitterness and the indignation that electrified the atmosphere of our discussions have never been forgotten. As we visited those refugee camps. I was Impressed by the bitterness. and It lingers--lingers is the wrong word. It remains today. Why Is It that we lose sight of that fact as we seek to put second things lirst rather than the reverse? And third. we have all but abandoned the Camp David process. leaving the future of the EgyptIsraeli peace treaty uncertain at best. The technology transfer question deeply concerns me. I opposed the Carter administrations propoted sale of AWACS to Iran for the same reason. I shall put Into the RECORD later at the end. of my speech a copy of correspondence that I wrote at the time which lays out my concerns. On April 8 of this year. I sent. a letter to Secretary of State Alexander Haig expressing my concerns over the possible compromise of AWACS technology being proposed for transfer to Saudi Arabia. I later shall Include that letter In the RECORD. Despite the fact that we are providing Saudi Arabia with strippeddown versions of our own AWACS. I remain concerned that a compromise of the technology we are providing would be an aid to the Soviets. For AWACS to perform the mission of protecting the Persian Gulf oil fields. it must have a capability which the Soviets do not yet possess to deal With a potential cruise missile or deep penetration bomber threat. These concerns were reinforced wvhen Allan Schell. an Air Force electronics specialist and official of the Rome. New York Air Development Center. admitted that the Soviets could benefit from our AWACS technology. In a story which appeared In the September 24. 1981 New York Times. Mr. Schell told reporters during a briefing: In a hypothetical case In which the Soviet Union gained actual physical possession of an AWACS plane. Soviet experts could determine significant features of the system without accomplishing "reverse engineering" of the software. by a procedure that Mr. Schell called "exercising the radar." Mr. Schell stated the Soviets would fly the AWACS and deploy a wide variety of aerial radar targets in Its radius of operation. while analyzing the radar returns and the way the computerized radar processor. or radar data correlator. displayed the data on multipurpose display consoles. He further stated that this would provide valuable Information without working the codes or attempting to unravel the mysteries of the program tapes. In that same story. another civilian defense consultant was quoted as stating that the Soviet Union would most probably give the highest possible priority to reverse engineering of the programing of the radar data correlator and other computerized subsystems on the aircraft. In an unrelated story appearing In the Washington Post the same day. AWACS was discussed within the context of our Overall strategic Posture with the Soviet Union. The article noted:. The Pentagonse new strategic blueprint calls for building 12 Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) sentry aircraft to patrol the borders of North America. This is the same kind of planei that the Saudis want to buy to guard against surprise attac.... In the belief the Soviets are progressing fast on a Iookd.own AWACS of their own. Pentagon leaders shaping the Presidents military program for the next five years want existing B52 bombers armed with devices for countering Russias airborne sentries. It is clear to me that the Soviets place a high priority on obtaining U.S. AWACS technology. Even If the risk were minimal that the AWACS for Saudi Arabia could be compromised. I do not care to take that risk. particularly since we will have little control over the system.. Much has been caid about the sensitivity of the Saudis regarding the sovereignty Issue. Yet. I do not believe we should be providilng topoftheline military technology to any country in the world. without strict controls maintained by the United States. I believe the United States has a sovereign right to maintain the Integrity of all our military technology.