An act to develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes
PL 115-409 (S.2736), enacted 12/31/2018

132 STAT. 5387 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
Public Law 115–409 
115th Congress 
An Act 
To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and 
principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Asia Reassur-
ance Initiative Act of 2018’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act 
is as follows: 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Findings. 
TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE 
INDO-PACIFIC REGION 
Sec. 101. Policy. 
Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy. 
TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE 
INDO-PACIFIC REGION 
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. 
Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. 
Sec. 203. United States-China relationship. 
Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership. 
Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership. 
Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership. 
Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue. 
Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia. 
Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan. 
Sec. 210. North Korea strategy. 
Sec. 211. New Zealand. 
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands. 
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law. 
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation. 
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region. 
TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE 
INDO-PACIFIC REGION 
Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress. 
Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic sum-
mits. 
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership. 
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation. 
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection. 
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives. 
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative. 
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation. 
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women’s economic rights. 
22 USC 2651 
note. 
Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act 
of 2018. 
Dec. 31, 2018 
[S. 2736] 
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132 STAT. 5388 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
REGION 
Sec. 401. Findings. 
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons. 
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press. 
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel. 
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement. 
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy. 
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea. 
Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United 
States assistance. 
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations. 
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders. 
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Indo-Pacific region— 
(A) represents nearly 50 percent of the global popu-
lation; 
(B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies 
in the world; and 
(C) poses security challenges that threaten to under-
mine United States national security interests, regional 
peace, and global stability. 
(2) The core tenets of the United States-backed inter-
national system are being challenged, including by— 
(A) China’s illegal construction and militarization of 
artificial features in the South China Sea and coercive 
economic practices; 
(B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nuclear and bal-
listic missile capabilities; and 
(C) the increased presence throughout Southeast Asia 
of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as ‘‘ISIS’’) 
and 
other 
international 
terrorist 
organizations 
that 
threaten the United States. 
(3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues 
to transform, presenting opportunities and challenges to United 
States economic interests. 
(4) The United States has a fundamental interest in 
defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in 
the Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in the region 
have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo- 
Pacific governments continue to commit human rights abuses 
and place restrictions on basic human rights and political and 
civil liberties. 
(5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the 
international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, 
may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and 
global interests. It is imperative that the United States continue 
to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by— 
(A) defending peace and security; 
(B) advancing economic prosperity; and 
(C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights. 
(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, 
and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on 
United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which— 
(A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes, 
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert 
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132 STAT. 5389 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, 
Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security chal-
lenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of pro-
moting the rule of law, human rights, and democracy, 
in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
(B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor 
of Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment at Harvard University, testified, ‘‘As realistic students 
of history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role the 
United States has played since World War II as the 
architect and underwriter of regional stability and security 
has been essential to the rise of Asia, including China 
itself. But they believe that as the tide that brought the 
United States to Asia recedes, America must leave with 
it. Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, so must Amer-
ica’s role in Asia as the region’s historic superpower 
resumes its place.’’. 
(7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred 
to in this Act as the ‘‘National Security Strategy’’), which was 
released in December 2017, states— 
(A) ‘‘A geopolitical competition between free and repres-
sive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo- 
Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the west 
coast of India to the western shores of the United States, 
represents the most populous and economically dynamic 
part of the world. The United States interest in a free 
and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days 
of our republic.’’; and 
(B) ‘‘Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. 
We will redouble our commitment to established alliances 
and partnerships, while expanding and deepening relation-
ships with new partners that share respect for sovereignty, 
fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law. We will 
reinforce our commitment to freedom of the seas and the 
peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes 
in accordance with international law. We will work with 
allies and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and 
preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.’’. 
TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND 
DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO- 
PACIFIC REGION 
SEC. 101. POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States to develop and commit 
to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, 
and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region 
that— 
(1) secures the vital national security interests of the 
United States and our allies and partners; 
(2) promotes American prosperity and economic interests 
by advancing economic growth and development of a rules- 
based Indo-Pacific economic community; 
22 USC 2656 
note. 
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132 STAT. 5390 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(3) advances American influence by reflecting the values 
of the American people and universal human rights; 
(4) supports functional problem-solving regional architec-
ture; and 
(5) accords with and supports the rule of law and inter-
national norms. 
SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. 
It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States— 
(1) to work with United States allies— 
(A) to confront common challenges; 
(B) to improve information sharing; 
(C) to increase defense investment and trade; 
(D) to ensure interoperability; and 
(E) to strengthen shared capabilities; 
(2) to strengthen relationships with partners who— 
(A) share mutual respect for the rule of law; 
(B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; and 
(C) understand the importance of civil society, the rule 
of law, the free and reliable flow of information, and trans-
parent governance; 
(3) to support functional problem-solving regional architec-
ture, including through the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia 
Summit; 
(4) to emphasize the commitment of the United States— 
(A) to freedom of navigation under international law; 
(B) to promote peaceful resolutions of maritime and 
territorial disputes; and 
(C) to expand security and defense cooperation with 
allies and partners, as appropriate; 
(5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea; 
(6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule of law, 
and advocate for transparent governance; 
(7) to develop and grow the economy through private sector 
partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific part-
ners; 
(8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements 
in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and build a network 
of partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets; 
(9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific countries— 
(A) to pursue high-quality and transparent infrastruc-
ture projects; 
(B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines 
or air ways, and communication; and 
(C) to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes; and 
(10) to sustain a strong military presence in the Indo- 
Pacific region and strengthen security relationships with allies 
and partners throughout the region. 
22 USC 2656 
note. 
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132 STAT. 5391 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES 
SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO- 
PACIFIC REGION 
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
(a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate 
committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives; 
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized 
to be appropriated for the Department of State, the United States 
Agency for International Development, and, as appropriate, the 
Department of Defense, $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 
2019 through 2023, which shall be used— 
(1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the value 
of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance of 
United States strategy; 
(2) to improve the defense capacity and resiliency of partner 
nations to resist coercion and deter and defend against security 
threats, including through foreign military financing and inter-
national military education and training programs; 
(3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral engage-
ments, particularly with the United States’ most highly-capable 
allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, including— 
(A) certain destabilizing activities of the People’s 
Republic of China; and 
(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea; 
(4) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs 
in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS 
and other terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat 
to the United States, its allies, and its citizens’ interests abroad; 
(5) to help partner countries strengthen their democratic 
systems, with a focus on good governance; 
(6) to ensure that the regulatory environments for trade, 
infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are trans-
parent, open, and free of corruption; 
(7) to encourage responsible natural resource management 
in partner countries, which is closely associated with economic 
growth; and 
(8) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in 
South Asia and Southeast Asia— 
(A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard 
training efforts with Southeast Asian countries; 
(B) by expanding cooperation with democratic partners 
in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; 
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132 STAT. 5392 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(C) through intelligence sharing and other information- 
sharing efforts; and 
(D) through multilateral engagements, including by 
involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts. 
(c) COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDERMINE THE INTER-
NATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection 
(b) shall be made available for United States Government efforts 
to counter the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China, 
in accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) 
of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 113– 
76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appropriate commit-
tees of Congress. 
(d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to 
subsection (b) may be made available for International Military 
Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing Programs 
for the armed forces of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
(historically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 
(e) PHILIPPINES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appropriated pursu-
ant to subsection (b) may be made available for counternarcotics 
assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the Sec-
retary of State determines and reports to the appropriate 
committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines 
has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy 
that is consistent with international human rights standards, 
including investigating and prosecuting individuals who are 
credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up 
extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human rights 
in the conduct of counternarcotics operations. 
(2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under paragraph (1) shall 
not apply to funds made available— 
(A) for drug demand reduction, maritime programs, 
or transnational interdiction programs; or 
(B) to support for the development of such counter-
narcotics strategy, after consultation with the appropriate 
committees of Congress. 
(f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to be appro-
priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for United 
States assistance programs that benefit the Government of Cam-
bodia unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the 
appropriate congressional committees that the requirements under 
section 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2018 (Public Law 115–141) have been met. 
SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 
(a) UNITED
STATES-JAPAN
ALLIANCE.—The United States 
Government— 
(1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security between the United States and Japan, done at Wash-
ington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent 
bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on 
or before the date of the enactment of this Act; 
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in 
the Indo-Pacific region; and 
Certification. 
Reports. 
Consultation. 
Determination. 
Reports. 
Drugs and drug 
abuse. 
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132 STAT. 5393 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, 
economic, and security ties between the United States and 
Japan. 
(b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLIANCE.—The United 
States Government— 
(1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between 
the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Wash-
ington October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral 
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before 
the date of the enactment of this Act; 
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security 
in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, 
economic, and security ties between the United States and 
the Republic of Korea. 
(c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The United States 
Government— 
(1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia 
and the United States of America, done at San Francisco Sep-
tember 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral secu-
rity agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
date of the enactment of this Act; 
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
United States and Australia in promoting peace and security 
in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, 
economic, and security ties between the United States and 
Australia. 
(d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The United States 
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between 
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, 
done at Washington August 30, 1951, and all related and subse-
quent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded 
on or before the date of the enactment of this Act, including the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 
28, 2014. 
(e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is committed 
to— 
(1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950; 
(2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done 
at Manila September 8, 1954; and 
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements 
and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, including the Joint Vision Statement for 
the Thai-United States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok 
November 15, 2012. 
SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 
(1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that 
seek— 
(A) to further constrain space for civil society and 
religion within China; and 
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132 STAT. 5394 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific 
region; 
(2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world 
affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law 
and international norms; 
(3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relationship with China— 
(A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and 
(B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including over 
human rights, economic policies, and maritime security; 
and 
(4) is committed to working with China on shared regional 
and global challenges, especially— 
(A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based inter-
national system; and 
(B) the denuclearization of North Korea. 
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should— 
(1) welcome a decision by China to change course and 
pursue a responsible results-oriented relationship with the 
United States and engagement on global issues; 
(2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the 
Indo-Pacific region and globally; and 
(3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine 
the rules-based international system. 
SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 
(1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership 
between the United States and India in promoting peace and 
security in the Indo-Pacific region; 
(2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, 
economic, and security ties between the United States and 
India; and 
(3) is committed to— 
(A) the New Framework for the United States-India 
Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia on June 
28, 2005; 
(B) the United States-India Defense Technology and 
Trade Initiative, launched in 2012; 
(C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific and 
Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015; 
(D) the United States-India Joint Statement on Pros-
perity Through Partnership, issued on June 26, 2017; and 
(E) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
agreements and arrangements concluded as of the date 
of the enactment of this Act. 
(b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress makes the 
following findings: 
(1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 
2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of India 
as a major defense partner. 
(2) The designation of India as a major defense partner, 
which is unique to India— 
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132 STAT. 5395 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(A) institutionalizes the progress made to facilitate 
defense trade and technology sharing between the United 
States and India; 
(B) elevates defense trade and technology cooperation 
between the United States and India to a level commensu-
rate with the closest allies and partners of the United 
States; 
(C) facilitates technology sharing between the United 
States and India, including license-free access to a wide 
range of dual-use technologies, after taking into account 
national security concerns; and 
(D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on defense 
strategy and policy, military exchanges, and port calls in 
support of defense cooperation between the United States 
and India. 
SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should— 
(1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the United States- 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this 
section as ‘‘ASEAN’’) relationship to a strategic partnership; 
(2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong, 
stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and socially 
responsible community of nations that has common rules, 
norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent with 
international law and the principles of a rules-based Indo- 
Pacific community; 
(3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
integration among its members; 
(4) recognize the value of— 
(A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and 
security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including Aus-
tralia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and 
(B) strategic economic initiatives, such as activities 
under the United States–ASEAN Trade and Investment 
Framework Arrangement and the United States-ASEAN 
Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and 
the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon economic 
relationships in the Indo-Pacific region; 
(5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN— 
(A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in 
a constructive manner; and 
(B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and 
legitimate regional and international arbitration mecha-
nisms, consistent with international law, including through 
the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China 
Sea to further promote peace and stability in the Indo- 
Pacific region; 
(6) support efforts by United States partners and allies 
in ASEAN— 
(A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime 
domain awareness; 
(B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of, inter-
national waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that are crit-
ical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce; 
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132 STAT. 5396 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(C) to counter piracy; 
(D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking activities such 
as the trafficking of persons, goods, and drugs; and 
(E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of countries 
or regional organizations to respond to emerging threats 
to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region; and 
(7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common 
approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration’s ruling with respect to the case between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China. 
(b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH 
ASEAN.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
other Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees on a strategic framework to admin-
ister programs, projects, and activities of the United States 
to support diplomatic and economic engagement between the 
United States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year 
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) 
shall address the following elements of United States strategy: 
(A) Promoting commercial engagement between the 
United States and member countries of ASEAN. 
(B) Helping member countries of ASEAN use sustain-
able, efficient, and innovative technologies in their respec-
tive energy sectors. 
(C) Supporting economic conditions in member coun-
tries of ASEAN that promote innovation, the creation of 
new businesses, sustainable growth, and the education of 
the region’s future innovators, entrepreneurs, and business 
leaders. 
(D) Working with member countries of ASEAN to 
improve the policy and regulatory environment for growth, 
trade, innovation, and investment. 
(E) Supporting the regional integration objectives of 
member countries of ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic 
Community. 
(F) Partnership opportunities with the governments 
of other countries friendly to the United States that have 
committed to a high set of standards for investment and 
development with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary 
of State. 
SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL 
SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. 
It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop 
a strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between 
the United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile 
defense, intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives. 
SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the security dialogue between the United States, Aus-
tralia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing security 
challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to promote— 
(A) a rules-based order; 
Time periods. 
Consultation. 
Effective date. 
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132 STAT. 5397 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(B) respect for international law; and 
(C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and 
(2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than 
to replace, current mechanisms. 
SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 
(a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is committed 
to— 
(1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partner-
ship, done in Washington November 9, 2010; 
(2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense 
Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and 
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agree-
ments and arrangements between the United States and Indo-
nesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 
(b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is committed 
to— 
(1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive Partner-
ship, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014; 
(2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive 
Partnership between the United States of America and 
Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017; and 
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agree-
ments and arrangements between the United States and 
Malaysia concluded on or before the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
(c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is committed 
to— 
(1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for 
a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, 
done at Washington July 12, 2005; 
(2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done 
at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and 
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agree-
ments and arrangements between the United States and Singa-
pore concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this 
Act. 
(d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is committed 
to— 
(1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, 
done at Washington December 16, 2013; 
(2) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement on 
Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015; 
(3) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement, done 
at Washington May 31, 2017; and 
(4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agree-
ments and arrangements between the United States and 
Vietnam concluded on or before the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
(e) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and 
counterterrorism, 
with 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Singapore, 
and 
Vietnam. 
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PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN. 
(a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It is the policy 
of the United States— 
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security 
relationship between Taiwan and the United States; 
(2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States Govern-
ment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, 
and the Six Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan 
in July 1982; and 
(3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to 
support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. 
(b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President should conduct 
regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored 
to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s 
Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to 
develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, 
including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into 
its military forces. 
(c) TRAVEL.—The President should encourage the travel of high-
level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the 
Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135). 
SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea has flagrantly defied the international community 
by illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, 
in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 
2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017). 
(2) The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its 
own people and citizens of other countries, including the United 
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. 
(3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful 
denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in 
close concert with its partners. 
(b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO SANCTIONS 
AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.— 
(1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United 
States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to activities 
of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
persons acting for or on behalf of such government, or other 
persons in accordance with Executive Order No. 13551 (50 
U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain per-
sons with respect to North Korea), Executive Order No. 13687 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional sanctions), 
Executive Order No. 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant 
malicious cyberenabled activities), Executive Order No. 13722 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of the 
Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, 
and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to North 
Korea), and Executive Order No. 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; 
22 USC 9203 
note. 
22 USC 3301 
note. 
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PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North 
Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect on the day 
before the date of the enactment of this Act, until the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the 
illicit activities described in such Executive orders, including 
actions in violation of the United Nations Security Council 
resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1). 
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after terminating any 
sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a person acting 
for or on behalf of such government, or any other person pro-
vided for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees justifying the termination of the sanction and 
explaining the relationship between such termination and the 
cessation of any illicit activity that violates any of the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection 
(a)(1) by such Government or person. The reporting requirement 
under this paragraph shall terminate on the date that is 5 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection 
shall be construed to limit the authority of the President pursu-
ant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 
(c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIA-
TION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR 
AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United 
States that the objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear 
and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement 
of such programs. 
(d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE THREATS POSED 
BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter 
for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, or a designee 
of the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees that describes actions taken by the United States 
to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under paragraph (1) 
shall include— 
(A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United States 
to identify strategies and policies, including an assessment 
of the strengths and weaknesses of such strategies and 
policies— 
(i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and 
(ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the ballistic 
missile program of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea; 
(B) an assessment of— 
(i) 
potential 
road 
maps 
toward 
peaceful 
denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic 
Summaries. 
Assessments. 
Consultation. 
Termination 
date. 
Consultation. 
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132 STAT. 5400 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
of Korea and the elimination of the nuclear and bal-
listic missile threats posed by the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea; and 
(ii) specific actions that the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea would need to take for each such 
roadmap to become viable; 
(C) a summary of the United States strategy to increase 
international coordination and cooperation, whether unilat-
erally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, including sanctions 
enforcement and interdiction, to address the threat posed 
by the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea, which shall include— 
(i) a description of the actions taken by the Sec-
retary of State, or designees of the Secretary, to consult 
with governments around the world, with the purpose 
of inducing such governments to fully implement the 
United Nations Security Council resolutions referred 
to in subsection (a)(1); 
(ii) a description of the actions taken by such 
governments to fully implement United Nations Secu-
rity Council resolutions related to the Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea; 
(iii) a list of countries with governments that the 
Secretary has determined are noncooperative with 
respect to implementing the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and 
(iv) a plan of action to engage, and increase 
cooperation with respect to the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, with the governments of the coun-
tries on the list described in clause (iii); 
(D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national 
export control regimes of countries that are members of 
the United Nations, and multilateral export control 
regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions imposed 
with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and 
(E) an action plan to encourage and assist countries 
in adopting and using authorities necessary to enforce 
export controls required by United Nations Security 
Council resolutions. 
(3) FORM
OF
REPORT.—Each report required under this 
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) representatives of the United States shall use the voice 
and vote of the United States in all international organizations, 
as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea from such organizations, until such 
time as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its 
commitments under the United Nations Security Council reso-
lutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and 
(2) the Secretary of State should work to induce countries 
to meet their commitments under the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1), including 
Plan. 
Plan. 
Lists. 
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132 STAT. 5401 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
by considering appropriate adjustments to the diplomatic pos-
ture and foreign assistance of the United States with govern-
ments that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative 
with respect to implementing the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1). 
SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND. 
The United States Government is committed to— 
(1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on November 5, 
2010, which reaffirmed close ties and outlined future practical 
cooperation between the United States and New Zealand; 
(2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 19, 2012, 
which strengthened the defense relationship by providing a 
framework and strategic guidance for security cooperation and 
defense dialogues; and 
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agree-
ments and arrangements between the United States and New 
Zealand concluded on or before the date of enactment of this 
Act. 
SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should— 
(1) support strong United States engagement with the 
nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Mar-
shall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; 
(2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the South 
Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including— 
(A) fisheries and marine resource conservation; 
(B) environmental challenges and resilience; 
(C) global health; 
(D) development and trade; and 
(E) people-to-people ties; and 
(3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, 
as appropriate, to support the rule of law, good governance, 
and economic development. 
(b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION.—It is the 
sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free Association entered 
between the United States and the Freely Associated States 
(Republic of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
and the Republic of Palau)— 
(1) enhance the strategic posture of the United States 
in the Western Pacific; 
(2) reinforce United States regional commitment; 
(3) preempt potential adversaries from establishing posi-
tional advantage; and 
(4) further self-governance, economic development, and self- 
sufficiency of the Freely Associated States. 
SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
(a) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.—It is the policy of the United 
States— 
22 USC note 
prec. 1971. 
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132 STAT. 5402 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation 
Program, regular freedom of navigation, and overflight oper-
ations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with applicable 
international law; and 
(2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to peace-
fully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in 
accordance with applicable international law. 
(b) JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.—It is the sense 
of Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy 
that includes working with United States allies and partners to 
conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation oper-
ations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea 
and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international 
system benefitting all countries. 
SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives. 
(2) ISIS.—The term ‘‘ISIS’’ means the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, 
and other appropriate Federal officials, shall submit a report to 
the appropriate committees of Congress that contains an assessment 
of the current and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, 
al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in Southeast 
Asia that pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, 
and its citizens interests abroad. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection (b) shall 
include— 
(1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, 
and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South-
east Asia; 
(2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda- 
linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters 
expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the Middle 
East; 
(3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of ISIS-linked, 
al Qaeda-linked, and other various extremist group affiliated- 
fighters in Southeast Asia; 
(4) the current resources available to combat the threat 
of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist 
group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional 
resources required to combat such threat; 
(5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-linked, 
al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated 
fighters to operate effectively in the Indo-Pacific region, 
including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia; 
Assessment. 
Analysis. 
Estimate. 
Consultation. 
Assessment. 
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132 STAT. 5403 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(6) a description of the capabilities and resources of govern-
ments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist groups; 
and 
(7) a list of additional United States resources and capabili-
ties that the Department of Defense and the Department of 
State recommend providing to governments in Southeast Asia 
to combat violent extremist groups. 
SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION. 
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United 
States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region— 
(1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, including 
state-sponsored threats; 
(2) to share best practices to combat such threats; 
(3) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks, misin-
formation, and propaganda; and 
(4) to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized 
to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 
through 2023 to enhance cooperation between the United States 
and Indo-Pacific nations for the purposes of combatting cybersecu-
rity threats. 
SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO- 
PACIFIC REGION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 
(1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and other weapons 
of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes 
a threat to international peace and security; 
(2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed 
to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the pro-
liferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and 
missile technologies, and other weapons of mass destruction; 
(3) notes efforts by China and Russia— 
(A) to expand and modernize their respective nuclear 
arsenals, including through significant research and 
development resources in hypersonic glide vehicles and 
other advanced technologies; and 
(B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear technologies; 
and 
(4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries 
in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of 
peaceful applications. 
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States Government should undertake all reasonable 
and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and non-
proliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. 
Lists. 
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132 STAT. 5404 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO- 
PACIFIC REGION 
SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
by 2030— 
(A) 66 percent of the global middle class population 
will be living in Asia; and 
(B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will take 
place in Asia. 
(2) According to the Asian Development Bank— 
(A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or 
regional trade agreements; and 
(B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries 
are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry 
into force. 
(3) Free trade agreements between the United States and 
3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, Singapore, and 
the Republic of Korea) have entered into force. 
(4) The member states of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (referred to in this section as ‘‘ASEAN’’), as 
a group— 
(A) represent the fifth largest economy in the world; 
and 
(B) have a combined gross domestic product of 
$2,400,000,000,000. 
(5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew 
by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value 
of bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN 
member states has increased by 78 percent since 2004. 
(6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies 
in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States 
was $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade sur-
plus of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member 
states was $8,000,000,000. 
(7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, goods and 
services exported from the United States to ASEAN member 
states support 550,000 jobs in the United States. 
(8) According to the Business Roundtable— 
(A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singa-
pore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined 40 
percent of global gross domestic product in 2017; and 
(B) United States bilateral trade with the other nations 
referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 15,600,000 jobs 
in the United States. 
(9) According to the United States National Security 
Strategy— 
(A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
‘‘remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architec-
ture and platforms for promoting an order based on 
freedom’’; and 
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132 STAT. 5405 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(B) the United States will ‘‘work with partners to build 
a network of states dedicated to free markets and protected 
from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.’’. 
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo- 
Pacific region is vitally important to the United States economy, 
United States exports, and jobs in the United States. 
SEC. 
302. 
INDO-PACIFIC 
TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS, 
MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS. 
Congress supports— 
(1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements 
with partners that— 
(A) comply with trade obligations and respect, promote, 
and strictly adhere to the rule of law; and 
(B) increase United States employment and expand 
the economy; 
(2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete, 
verifiable, and measured outcomes; 
(3) negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization, including negotiations to enter into appropriate 
plurilateral and sectoral agreements; 
(4) full implementation of the World Trade Organization’s 
Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo-Pacific countries; and 
(5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use 
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia 
Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP. 
The President should seek to develop to negotiate a comprehen-
sive economic engagement framework with the Association of South-
east Asian Nations. 
SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to produce a 
robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilita-
tion strategy, including leveling the playing field for American 
companies competing in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized 
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry 
out subsection (a). 
SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION. 
(a) IN
GENERAL.—The President should takes steps to 
strengthen the enforcement of United States intellectual property 
laws as a top priority, including taking all appropriate action to 
deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled theft of intellectual 
property. 
(b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the fol-
lowing 5 years, the President shall submit a report to Congress 
that— 
(1) describes the efforts of the United States Government 
to combat intellectual property violations and commercial cyber- 
enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; and 
China. 
President. 
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PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority 
areas for United States engagement and capacity building 
assistance. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized 
to be appropriated to the United States Trade Representative such 
amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral 
activities designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas 
described in the annual report required under subsection (b). 
SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES. 
(a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.— 
(1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
following 5 years, the President shall establish a comprehen-
sive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts 
of Indo-Pacific countries to implement national power strategies 
and cooperation with United States energy companies and the 
Department of Energy national laboratories to develop an 
appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to suffi-
cient, reliable, and affordable power in order to reduce poverty, 
drive economic growth and job creation, and to increase energy 
security in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are author-
ized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 
2019 through 2023 to carry out paragraph (1). 
(b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States should explore opportunities to partner 
with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to promote universal 
access to reliable electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including 
Myanmar (historically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 
SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in cooperation with 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, should increase regional engagement in the areas 
of environment, health, education, and infrastructure development 
with the Lower Mekong countries, including— 
(1) assisting in the development of programs that focus 
on forecasting environmental challenges and resilience; 
(2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable 
uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving 
the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe drinking 
water; 
(3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband 
internet 
connectivity, 
particularly 
English 
training 
and 
connectivity in rural communities; and 
(4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries, 
including— 
(A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and 
(B) helping regional partners to track and treat malaria 
and tuberculosis. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2023, the 
Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, shall submit 
a report to Congress that includes— 
Cooperation. 
Deadlines. 
President. 
Assessment. 
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132 STAT. 5407 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
(1) a list and evaluation of Lower Mekong Initiative activi-
ties since its inception in 2009; 
(2) a strategy for any increased regional engagement and 
measures of success for the activities described in paragraph 
(1); and 
(3) an accounting of funds used to execute Lower Mekong 
Initiative activities. 
SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATURAL 
RESOURCE CONSERVATION. 
It is the sense of Congress that the President should encourage 
the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and United 
States private sector interests with operations and investments 
in the region to deploy agriculture practices that— 
(1) conserve natural resources; and 
(2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable lands and 
water bodies. 
SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN’S ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should— 
(1) support activities that secure private property rights 
and land tenure for women in developing countries in Asia, 
including— 
(A) establishing legal frameworks to give women equal 
rights to own, register, use, profit from, and inherit land 
and property; 
(B) improving legal literacy to enable women to exer-
cise the rights described in subparagraph (A); and 
(C) increasing the capacity of law enforcement and 
community leaders to enforce such rights; 
(2) work with Asian civil society, governments, and multi-
lateral organizations to increase the capability of disadvantaged 
women and girls in Asia— 
(A) to realize their rights; 
(B) to determine their life outcomes; 
(C) to assume leadership roles; and 
(D) to influence decision-making in their households, 
communities, and societies; and 
(3) seek to expand access to appropriate financial products 
and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises in Asia. 
TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES 
VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 
SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The promotion of human rights and respect for demo-
cratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United States’ 
national security interest. 
(2) Continued support for human rights, democratic values, 
and good governance is critical to a successful United States 
diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific. 
(3) Strong support for human rights and democracy in 
the Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to reduce poverty, 
Strategy. 
Lists. 
Evaluation. 
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132 STAT. 5408 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
build rule of law, combat corruption, reduce the allure of extre-
mism, and promote economic growth. 
(4) There are serious concerns with the rule of law and 
civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, Thailand, 
and Vietnam, which have all been identified by Freedom House 
as ‘‘Not Free’’. 
(5) There have been unacceptable human rights develop-
ments in— 
(A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by 
Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’, and the Department of 
State has declared that the violence against the Rohingya 
constitutes ethnic cleansing; 
(B) the Philippines, which has been identified by 
Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’, and where there are 
continued disturbing reports of extra-judicial killings; and 
(C) China, where forced disappearances, extralegal 
detentions, invasive and omnipresent surveillance, and lack 
of due process in judicial proceedings remain troublesome. 
(6) according to the National Security Strategy, the United 
States— 
(A) will ‘‘support, with our words and actions, those 
who live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, 
individual dignity, and the rule of law’’; 
(B) ‘‘may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools 
to isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests 
and whose actions run contrary to our values’’; and 
(C) ‘‘will support efforts to advance women’s equality, 
protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women 
and youth empowerment programs’’. 
SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS. 
The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to 
combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo- 
Pacific region. 
SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) United States Government officials should lead by 
example— 
(A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of the press 
in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
(B) by engaging with the press corps at every appro-
priate opportunity; and 
(2) the United States should advocate and support a Min-
isterial to Advance Press Freedom in the Indo-Pacific to convene 
government and civil society, including journalists, to discuss 
and address the challenges facing press freedom in the Indo- 
Pacific region. 
SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PERSONNEL. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) United States embassies and consulates in the Indo- 
Pacific region should have personnel, as appropriate, who are 
dedicated to reporting on and advancing United States democ-
racy, human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and good governance 
policy interests; and 
(2) appropriate resources should be made available to carry 
out such activities. 
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132 STAT. 5409 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE 
ENGAGEMENT. 
The Secretary of State should, as appropriate— 
(1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues 
with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights 
and religious freedom violations; 
(2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange 
programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs 
engaging young leaders; and 
(3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building 
programs emphasizing civil society development. 
SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS STRATEGY. 
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should continue to work with ASEAN to improve 
the capacity of ASEAN to address human rights, democracy, and 
good governance issues in Southeast Asia. 
(b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, after consultation 
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate 
congressional committees to increase cooperation with ASEAN to 
promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in South-
east Asia. 
(c) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under subsection (b) 
should include— 
(1) an assessment of the types of United States Government 
resources available to support increased cooperation; and 
(2) an assessment to identify entities within ASEAN that 
the United States could potentially support or partner with 
to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance 
in Southeast Asia. 
SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA. 
The President is encouraged to continue efforts to enhance 
freedom of information access with regard to North Korea. 
SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND 
SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. 
(a) SANCTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President 
should impose targeted financial penalties and visa ban sanctions, 
in accordance with applicable law and other relevant authorities, 
on any individual or entity that— 
(1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or 
(2) engages in censorship activities. 
(b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—It is the sense of 
Congress that the President should, in accordance with applicable 
law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States economic 
assistance to any country that has engaged in serious violations 
of human rights or religious freedoms. 
SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
(a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated 
$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, 
to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, 
rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific 
Assessments. 
Deadline. 
Consultation. 
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132 STAT. 5410 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
region, including for universities, civil society, and multilateral 
institutions that are focusing on education awareness, training, 
and capacity building. 
(2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States 
Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democ-
racy, the rule of law, and human rights in the People’s Republic 
of China. 
(3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph 
(1) shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations 
to support activities preserving cultural traditions and pro-
moting sustainable development, education, and environmental 
conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, 
and Nepal. 
SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS. 
(a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘human rights 
defenders’’ means individuals, working alone or in groups, who 
nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of univer-
sally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms if the 
advocacy of such issues may result in the risk of safety or life. 
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been facing 
increased difficulties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns 
and conflicts. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized 
to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 
through 2023 to provide critical assistance to human rights 
defenders through the Department of State’s Human Rights 
Defenders Fund. 
(d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2023, the 
Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, shall submit 
a report to Congress that includes— 
(1) a list and evaluation of the Human Rights Defenders 
Fund activities since its inception; 
(2) a strategy for any increased regional engagement and 
measures of success for the activities described in paragraph 
(1); and 
(3) an accounting of funds used to execute the Human 
Rights Defender Fund activities. 
SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES. 
There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for each 
of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support Indo-Pacific young 
leaders initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other people- 
to-people exchange programs that focus on building the capacity 
of democracy, human rights, and good governance activists in the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
Appropriations 
authorization. 
Strategy. 
Lists. 
Evaluation. 
Cooperation. 
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132 STAT. 5411 
PUBLIC LAW 115–409—DEC. 31, 2018 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 2736: 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018): 
Dec. 4, considered and passed Senate. 
Dec. 12, considered and passed House, amended. 
Dec. 19, Senate concurred in House amendment. 
DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS (2018): 
Dec. 31, Presidential statement. 
SEC. 412. SAVINGS PROVISION. 
Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use 
of military force. 
Approved December 31, 2018. 
22 USC 656 note. 
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